
Effects of the “European Security and Defence Policy” in Greece

Maria Markantonatou¹

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of the transformations and the changing notions of the national and international security, especially by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in Greek policies. In this frame, it discusses the debate over “new wars”, as one that incorporates the rhetoric of globalization, the increasing role of information technologies, as well as the “preemptive wars” as response to “new threats”. Furthermore, this paper discusses the development of the ESDP and categorizes different sets of arguments that focus on the relationship between ESPD and the nation state. These sets of arguments refer to the EU as an emerging global superpower, as an agent of governmentality in agendas of “good governance” and “humanitarian intervention”, as a response to the decline of nation states in the frame of globalization and also, as a coalition where the nation state remains predominant and operates as a reference level for the EU. As far as Greece is concerned, this paper summarizes its basic foreign policy features, the problem of its high defence expenditure, its participation to several ESDP-institutions, police missions and peace-keeping operations, as well as problems that concern both the EU and Greece as a border and transition country, such as the migration from belligerent countries.

Keywords: Security, defence, ESDP, Greece

1. The changing agenda of security and defence

The post Cold war era, especially the period after September 11th, and the beginning of the US “war on terrorism” are considered as an era of “new wars” and “new threats” for international security (Kaldor 2003, Wulf 2005). These “new wars” are no more understood as conflicts between nation-states (inter-state conflicts), especially between Western nation-states, but as “non-state wars”. They are characterized by the intensification of “low-intensity” and “intra-state” conflicts by ethno-cultural conflicts as in Yugoslavia, urban, asymmetric warfare as in the case of the Israel-Palestine conflict, guerilla-fighting as in the zone of Afghanistan-Pakistan (“Afpak” war) or “small wars” but most of all by threats defined as “terrorist”, as in the case of Al Qaida and Taliban. This debate over the “new wars” is based on three fundamental arguments.

a) *Globalization*. In this argument, globalization is thought to have caused loss of control over national governments and their military forces, because of the rapid flow of migration, weapons, information and illegal transactions (Wulf 2005).

¹ Lecturer, University of the Aegean, Department of Sociology, mmarkant@soc.aegean.gr

War exceeds nation states and is being informalized through the intensive participation and empowerment of warlords, members of the organized crime, gangs and private militias. These non-state bodies, war professionals and clan militias in “shadow states” and in “war economies” fight for resources, power and leadership, creating in this way new cores of “insecurity” for the international stability (Wulf 2005: 197). Therefore, the disorder and the uncertainty that is caused by globalization demand a more effective control over these groups. However, such efforts require more than merely a confrontation by national armies and their regular forces. They require international cooperation and coordination for special complicated operations and doctrines grounded on joint force flexibility. The maximal effect of cooperation is required not only between the different military units and NATO, but also between NATO, the EU, public and private actors, states and INGOs, or even between states and private military and security companies.

b) *The increasing role of information.* This argument stretches the role of information technology on “new wars”. The debate around the so called “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA), as it developed after the end of Cold war and intensively after September 11th, has dramatically influenced modern defence agendas². RMA incorporates a broad discussion on the modernization and professionalization of the army and its adjustment through high technology to new forms of “flexible”, “targeted” and “information-centric” operations in the frame of “asymmetric” warfare. Through the use of high-tech and networking practices, RMA’s two main targets are the minimalization of casualties (“risk free warfare”) and the precision in military operations (“precision warfare”). This kind of “information” and “digital” warfare includes unmanned aircrafts, non-detectable drones and radar-satellites that can chart and spy from a great distance for purposes of aerial photography, data mining and espionage. RMA-techniques include “precision guided munitions, “smart bombs” or laser-guided bombs. At the same time, the so called “digital soldiers” at the “digital battlefield” have the possibility to penetrate the battlefield virtually, use precision techniques and munitions while they remain hidden with the option of changing each time their plans, paralyze and exterminate small or larger targets from a great distance. (For an overview about RMA see Sørensen 2004: 130, Gray 2005, Arquilla 2007).

² The RMA-debate had already started since the Cold War, it was systematized after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, it was spread after the end of the Cold War and was intensified by the “war on terror”. At its initial state, because of its geopolitical position, the idea that the US could not stand with ground in Europe as the Soviets would if such a war possibility arose, drove to the development of a strategy less based on soldiery and more on air force and on strategies of awareness through information. When the war in Vietnam ended, RMA focused on the ways they would reduce casualties and victims and it was confirmed in the political agenda through “Powell’s doctrine” about the “war without casualties”. This was introduced because of the Vietnam experience and because the US refused to take part in a war abroad without rational aspirations of victory and would not risk any human lives without important strategic reasons.

c) *The rhetoric of human rights and the preemptive wars.* This argument refers to the rhetoric of “human rights”, as one that establishes a set of priorities, social values and aims that attempt to exceed the nation state. In a context of changing perceptions of “threat”, sovereign states hold the power to instrumentalize human rights, defining them according to their criteria and engaging them to “preemptive” wars and “humanitarian operations”. The triple action of preemptive violence, state building and humanitarian assistance has become a fundamental factor for the superpowers of the post-Cold War era, as in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. This blend between violence and humanitarian operations invested in the rhetoric of human rights, undermines the sovereignty of “weak” or “failed” states. It has also legitimized military operations for the protection from leaderships and groups considered as “dangerous” for the international stability as well as from “rogue states” that are considered to sponsor and support “terrorists”. At the same time, preemptive wars, “chirurgical operations” and the “total war” (where old distinctions between military and civilians are blurring) have become dominant practices of modern military superpowers and international actors (see Sakellaropoulos/Sotiris 2008: 15). This emphasis on human rights and preemption requires new forms of cooperation between international actors and necessitates an empowerment of their tasks.

The above sets of arguments illustrate a shift in the understanding of both national and international security. New definitions of “threat”, the current trend of intrastate and low-intensity conflicts and the threat of the defined as such “terrorism” as well as the new forms of high-tech warfare, initiate a process of “securitization”. As the American National Security Strategy in 2010 and the Provisions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 show, the above developments effect increasingly the ways with which powers such as the US and the European Union implement new forms of social control and adopt new practices, policies and strategies at the level of security and defence. The project of the European security and defence policy is neither new, nor is it simply a product of the threat of terrorism after September 11th. However, its social dynamics appear more intensive after the end of the Cold War and over the last decade.

2. The European Security and Defence Policy

The idea of a common European security and defence policy has been in the process of development since the European Convention in 1991 that announced a perspective of cooperation in the future. During the Cold War, efforts such as the Fouchet Plan, the European Defence Community and the European Political Cooperation have not resulted into a substantial cooperation (Jones 2007: 14). The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 emphasized the need for cooperation and inserted the pillars of Justice and Home Affairs and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which intended to intensify the convergence of the EU’s state-members to

the direction of common evaluations of security threats. Thereafter, the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, apart from elaborations in the judicial and policing levels, led also to the creation of a High Representative in charge of foreign policy. In 1998, a French-British Summit agreed at St. Malo on an important Declaration³. Although it introduced the ambiguous concept of the “autonomous action” of the EU, the need to buttress institutional defence foundations was for the first time prioritized, so that the Declaration became, as Merand (2008:118) notes, a “conceptual breakthrough”, which consisted of “a step forward in papering over social representations and authorizing officials to engage more deeply in reconfiguring the European security architecture”. Following this development, the Cologne European Council launched the European Security and Defence Policy (hereafter ESDP) in 1999, as a special sector of the Common Foreign and Security Policy⁴. ESDP’s declared aims were the creation of a unified defence and security agency, the harmonization of national equipments, the promotion of research and technology related to defence and the creation of a competitive European defence industry. Subsequent to the Nice Treaty in 2001, the Joint Action of the Council of Ministers established in 2004 the European Defence Agency (EDA) in order to promote actions for the empowerment of defence capabilities, crisis management, strategic intelligence and European security. EDA’s priorities were the setting of a common defence agenda in the context of the ESDP. Finally, the Lisbon Treaty⁵ in 2007 established the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) stretching the need for strengthening and deepening the cooperation on issues of defence, equipment harmonization and a common asylum and border legislation. Under the clause of “mutual solidarity” of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU should provide military assistance, if one of its members suffers from a terrorist attack (for the EU treaties with regard to security and defence see Merlingen/Ostraukaite 2006, Jones, 2007, Merand 2008, Grevi/Helly/Kehoane 2009).

ESDP is organized inter-governmentally and it is therefore important to underline that it neither interferes as an outside international power to the defence policy of the EU’s member states, nor does it conflict with NATO principles. It does not create a unified European Army and does not collide with the sovereignty of the nation state or with the countries’ parallel participation to NATO. In this sense, both the *national* structure of defence and security policy and NATO’s *international*

³ Among other positions, the St Malo Declaration stated that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces and the means to decide to use them and a willingness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”. Furthermore, “Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology” (see <http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html>).

⁴ See <http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/eu-security-defence-policy-archived/article-117486>

⁵ See http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm

character are not substituted by the ESDP. Europe is neither a homogenous mega-state, nor a constitutionally legitimized and institutionally harmonized entity. Until now, the states-members’ geopolitical and strategic interests and targets are not necessarily identical or equally urgent. States maintain different defence priorities, risk perceptions and military traditions.

However, the dynamics of the cooperation between European countries at the level of security and defence is being intensified over the last two decades. The end of the Cold War innovated an unipolar accumulation of power in the hands of the USA instead of the former bipolarity between the US and the Soviet Union. This unipolar accumulation has impelled Europe to search for perspectives, in order to ensure long-term peace in the continent, increase its ability to project power abroad and decrease reliance on the United States (Jones 2007: 15). Gradually, after the end of the Cold War, despite the lack of coherence between European societies and the lack of willingness of national populations, as the French and Dutch veto of the European Constitution in 2005 showed, the dynamics of cooperation for security and defence at the governmental level has been intensified. As a result, several institutions, common actions and undertaken operations constitute gradual steps towards a common basis of security and defence. Indicatively, such actions include:

- *Eurocorps*, located in Strasburg, was formed in 1992 with the participation of France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Luxemburg in order to gradually establish a European military unit that in cooperation with NATO or distinctively, would undertake military, humanitarian and peace keeping operations, as in the case of the NATO-EU operations in Kosovo⁶.
- *Eurofor* (European Operational Rapid Force), located in Florence, was formed in 1995 with the participation of France, Spain, Italy and Portugal and was later assimilated in the ESDP. It is consisted of a permanent multinational staff for the promotion of the Petersburg Declaration, which in 1992 decided that countries from the Western European Union (WEU) could undertake humanitarian and peace keeping missions⁷.
- The *European Union Battle-Groups (EUBG)* are complementary with the NATO Response Force (NRF). They are part of the Headline Goal 2010, initially launched by the Headline Goal 1999 in Helsinki, with the ambition of a Rapid Reaction Force of 60.000 troops. At the moment, 15 EU-Battlegroups are established, each consisting of 1500 soldiers, operationally deployable within 15 days, for a period from 30 to 120 days. Equipments and troops are provided by the member states under a lead nation. In the frame of the 2007 “Full Operational Capability” of the European Security Strategy, they can undertake humanitarian and rescue operations, crisis management tasks, joint disarmament operations, and

⁶ See <http://www.eurocorps.org/>

⁷ See <http://www.eurofor.it/>

provide support for third countries such as institution building within the NATO and UN agenda⁸.

- The *European Union Police (EUROPOL)*, located in The Hague, was set up in 1992 in order to deal with issues of terrorism, human trafficking, organized crime, migration, drug and vehicle trafficking. Exchange of information between the EU member states, information gathering, investigations and operations take place within the EU, under the Justice and Home Affairs Council⁹.
- *Frontex*, located in Warsaw, was set up in 2004 in order to promote borders policing in Europe for the control of migration. Its tasks include: risk analysis and evaluation of consequences, cooperation at the field of management of external borders, promotion of common training standards of the national border guards through the system of the “new European Curriculum” which functions as a code for the establishment of common skills and competencies for the basic training of border guards. Also, Frontex examines the research relevant to the control of external borders and digital surveillance technologies, assists operationally member states and cooperates with national military and police agents as well as with other police institutions such as EUROPOL¹⁰.
- The *European Gendarmerie Force (EGF)*, located in Vicenza, was formed in 2004 with the participation of France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, while Romania also entered in 2008. EGF aims at the field of the civil security, crime prevention, crisis management by police forces and cooperation between police and military at the disposal of the EU, NATO and UN¹¹.

3. ESDP and the nation states

EU’s economical, social and political formation has been over the last decades in the center of political analysis. The numerous approaches with the main focus on the relationship between the EU and the nation state illustrate at the same time different views about the role and the future of ESDP. These approaches can be summarized as following:

1) *EU as a superpower at the global level*. Contrary to mainstream visions of a Euro-Atlantic alliance as an expression of the common “Western” perspective, this approach theorizes the EU as a forthcoming superpower, autonomously from the US. Through the structuring of its own economy, military, policing, judicial and political system and a corresponding institutional progress, several developments may result into competitions between the EU and the US. In the frame of this

⁸ Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union Directorate B, Policy Department, European Parliament, Note: The EU-Battlegroups, 2006

⁹ See <http://www.europol.europa.eu/>

¹⁰ See <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/>

¹¹ See <http://www.eurogendfor.org/>

argument, the US – especially after September 11th – is, in the face of its war fronts in the Middle East, in a process of gradual faltering. The increase of global rivalries and struggles for power at international level will force the EU to the empowerment of ESDP, because of the inability of the US to confront new threats alone. A dynamic ESDP will gradually turn the EU into a powerful “super state”, as Haseler (2004) names it. According to Haseler’s (2004: 3) view, “more than by policies and constitutions coming out of Brussels or Strasbourg, a new European superpower will be built in the crucible of global rivalry and conflict, in global economic crises, in future conflicts along Europe’s long borders and, above all, in Europe’s response to American economic and military power”.

2) *EU as a response to the decline of the nation state.* This approach conceptualizes nation states as weakening political entities. Globalization, transnational neoliberal capitalism and the consequent deregulation of national welfare states and institutional regimes, the empowered role of political federations like the EU, international organizations like the IMF and the World Bank, NGOs and INGOs, as well as the decreasing importance of territorial sovereignty and the flow of information are considered as factors that have challenged the sovereignty of the nation state, its cohesion and its monopoly of violence (for an overview of these approaches see Markantonatou 2005). Therefore, the empowerment of ESDP is a defensive reaction to globalization and an effort to respond adequately to new security problems connected to globalization, such as threats defined as “terrorist”, migration, organized crime, transnational weapons and guns circulation etc. Such problems exceed nation states and cannot be confronted without deepening the interaction and cooperation between the EU member states.

3) *The nation state as a reference level for the EU.* This approach considers the nation state as a reference level for the EU and emphasizes the “predominance of the nation state” (Voigt 1996: 229). This predominance is based on the constant role of the state in maintaining the conditions of the economic reproduction and in balancing interests, demands and conflicting social values in order to promote social order. At the same time, political parties remain national. Their discourse is that of the “national interest” and of a nationally defined “common good”. As Voigt (ibid.) assumes, “the nation state is not disappearing from politics. More than that, within the general trend towards internationalization on the one hand and regionalization on the other, the nation state is a central reference level for political parties, interest groups etc., and especially for the voters”. In this approach, the EU cannot succeed in establishing a powerful ESDP, because states keep their own strategic and military agendas, while their first priority remains their own national military forces. Therefore, because ESDP is secondary, it cannot replace national security and defence agencies and can only operate complementarily to the nation states, their aims, plans and priorities.

4) *EU as a body of governance.* In a Foucauldian line of analysis, this approach considers the EU as a body of governmentality. For instance, Merlingen

and Ostrauskaite analyze in their study about the European peace-building and policing operations the basic repertoire of technologies, the mechanisms and the *modi operandi* of these operations. Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2006: 29) challenge what they describe as the “commonsensical view that ESDP police missions are ‘weak’ because they are small-scale operations lacking the means to use big sticks and juicy carrots to reform the security sector in divided countries”. To this end, they draw on governmentality theory as opposed to traditional theories of power as sovereignty and to paradigms of political realism. The focus of the governmentality approach is on capillary, non-sovereign forms of power that illustrate how “ESDP police missions refashion, reposition and reorganize law enforcement officials in host societies” (ibid.). As the authors note (ibid.: 124), “task of non-executive ESDP police missions is not to conserve a precarious peace, defeat spoilers of a peace settlement or maintain public order. Rather, they foster and mould capacities for action (...) with a view to making the conduct of locals consistent with EU objectives”. Instead of a linear exercise of power, the EU bodies in such operations mobilize through a series of administrative forms discourses of “truth”, professionalization and “scientific” knowledge. In this sense, EU’s operations do not aim at a total intervention in places considered as transitional or violent, but at an effective management of these places and at the socialization of ideologies and practices of “good governance”. As Merlingen and Ostrauskaite assume (ibid: 110), “the governmentalization (...) has become a powerful post-Cold War instrument of the West to shape the institutional trajectory of state apparatuses transiting from instability or violence with a view to making them secure for Western-style liberal peace”. The legitimacy of these operations is based on the general premises of the disciplinary, security-orientated neoliberal societies of the broader West and are, as the authors describe (ibid.), “rationalized and legitimized in the ahistorical, acultural and acontextual idiom of rational-legal authority and economic rationality”.

These approaches highlight deferent aspects of the relationship between the EU and the nation state. Conflicts or controversies between the EU and the US are likely to appear in the future, although the complex of their common interests can hardly drive to a serious rupture. ESDP does not replace national armies and what Voigt (1996: 229) describes as the “predominance of the nation state” is not, for the present, challenged by the development of ESDP. On the other hand, ESDP indicates a direction towards institutional chaining, cooperation and identification of political values at the fields of security. This form of social control as conducted by ESDP establishes a set of governmentality mechanisms, intensifies a process of securitization both of national and international politics and creates new distinctions between “inside” and “outside” as well as new forms of social exclusion of places, populations, groups and individuals considered as threatening or incompatible to the EU’s general political agenda and its ideological orientations.

4. Greece and the ESDP

Except for the period 1974-1980, Greece has been a member of NATO since 1952, member of the European Community since 1981 and a member of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since 2002. Through the consolidation of the political system after the collapse of the dictatorship in 1974 and despite the deep ideological and political controversies within the Greek society, Greek governments gradually considered the European perspective as a factor of economic empowerment and stability in its foreign affairs. ESDP's dynamics increased through the creation of various institutions, agreements and conventions from 1990s onwards. From the mid 1990s and through the politics of “modernization”¹², Greece's priority has been to integrate several aspects of the tension with Turkey to the European foreign policy agenda. The idea was that through the assimilation of the rivalries between Greece and Turkey in the European agenda, the relation between the two neighbor countries would be normalized and Greece would be relieved from a vicious circle of high equipment expenditures, operational costs, safety anxieties and nationalistic deadlocks.

However, the Greek proposal for a clause of “solidarity and guarantee of the external borders” was rejected at the Amsterdam session in 1996, as long as EU's policy would be not to involve in a possible conflict between an EU/NATO country (Greece) and a NATO country (Turkey) (Ntokos/Tsakonas 2004: 36). With regard to ESDP, the resolution of conflicts and the normalization of the tensions between Greece and Turkey did not fall directly into the interests' agenda of the strongest EU-states. Furthermore, Lisbon's “mutual solidarity” clause has been subjected to a series of legal restrictions and elaborations from national judicial systems, for instance by the German Constitutional Court, so that its potential in deepening ESDP that would benefit the Greek defence agenda, is blocked by strictly national interests and priorities (Kotzias 2010: 129).

As a result of the rivalries between Greece and Turkey and despite Greece's membership in the EU, Greek governments have not been able to reduce budgets for defence expenditure. High defence expenditures are one of the most striking features of the Greek defence policy, closely related to evaluations of threat and danger by

¹² Priorities and narratives of the so called “modernization” denoted a political trend towards “Europeanization”. The concept of Europeanization accumulated narratives of institutional restructuring in the public administration, socio-political representations of state effectiveness and order, as well as priorities of convergence with EU's economic and political criteria. However, in 2010, the appeal to the International Monetary Fund and the budgetary European Consolidation Pact under the conjuncture of the Greek debt crisis, have challenged the rhetoric of “modernization” as “Europeanization” and arose questions about the efficiency of Europe in confronting economic crises and securing peripheral, smaller economies in neoliberal circumstances.

defence policy agents. These expenditures have caused one of Greece's most important economic problems and one that Europeanization did not manage to ease. In the 1990s, expenditures for equipment have reached remarkably high amounts, both for Greece and Turkey (Ntokos/Tsakonas 2004: 37). Recent data show that six countries, the UK, France, Germany and Italy, Holland and Spain cover around 80 per cent of the total EU defence spending, but if Greece, Poland, Sweden and Belgium are added, it emerges that only 10 countries out of the 27 account for 90 per cent of the total EU defence spending (Grevi 2009: 79).

Greece is one of the countries with the highest defence expenditure both per capita and as a percentage of GDP. In 2008, Greek defence expenditure covered 2,55% of the Greek GDP, while for instance France spent 2,32% and Germany spent 1,27% of their GDP¹³. As Ntokos (2007: 21) describes, "Greek defence expenditure exceed to a great degree the average both of the EU and NATO. Indicatively, in 2004 they amounted 4,2% of the GDP, which is double of the EU and NATO average for the same year". Greek defence expenditures appear amongst the highest in Europe not only with regard to equipment procurement, but also at different levels. Apart from equipments, high expenditure in Greece are also directed to programs of "Research and Development" (R&D) and "Research and Technology" (R&T), namely expenditure for basic research and technology. While its military infrastructure and construction expenditure remain relatively low, Greece is the country with the greatest number of military personnel after France, Germany, the UK and Italy and with an amount of almost 12.000 civilian personnel in 2008¹⁴.

The levels and the ways ESDP influenced the Greek security and defence agenda as parts of its foreign policy can be summarized as following:

1) *The Greek participation in ESDP institutions and operations.* At the level of participation in ESDP, Greece's role is centered to operations of policing and humanitarian assistance. Because of its special geographical position, Greece is influential in the Balkans zone, the Mediterranean and the Greater Middle East, which is observed by NATO, the EU and Turkey, for its stability – in the sense of a specific allocation of power in the area – interests all parts. This position increased Greece's involvement to operations of policing and humanitarian relief at the post-conflict level. Indeed, in the frame of the Berlin Plus Agreement in 2002, which forwarded the cooperation between the EU and NATO and set a series of NATO facilities at EU's disposal, the EU has undertaken numerous "peace operations" together with NATO, such as the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Greece has taken action together with other countries in EU-operations such as the "Operation Concordia" in FYROM¹⁵, the "Operation Artemis" in Congo, the

¹³ See European Defence Agency: Defence Data of EDA participating Member States in 2008.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Concordia took place from 3.03 to 10.12 2003 and was one of the first operations that the EU took over by attempting to be present as "a body of international security". Tasks of the

“Operation Althea” in Bosnia, but also in operations such as the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (for an overview of the EU peace operations see Grevi/Helly/Kehoane 2009), while there are some on-going operations such as the NATO-ISAF operation in Afghanistan¹⁶. In these operations, all bodies have engaged a coordination with NATO and INGOs for both civil and military crisis management, security establishment, local conflict resolution and humanitarian aid.

Furthermore, in 2002, Greece and Turkey, as NATO members, integrated personnel into Eurocorps, while in the frame of the Helsinki Headline Goals, Greece joins a EU-battlegroup together with Spain, Italy and Portugal and also the HELBROC-group together with Bulgaria, Rumania and Cyprus, where Greece has the role of a Framework Nation for the organization of common actions and for the reinforcement of interoperability and joint cooperation¹⁷. In the meantime, Greece has set at the disposal of the EU and NATO several naval and aerial forces, as well as facilities such as the multinational Athens Sealift Coordination Centre, which operates as a data basis on sealift capabilities and undertakes monitoring tasks about international transports¹⁸. The country also participates amongst ten other countries in programs such as the “Joint Investment Program on Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies”, which aims at promoting research cooperation, for example on nanotechnologies for soldier protection.

EU were limited to presence patrols and information-gathering patrols; reconnaissance tasks and meetings with civilian and military authorities as well as international organizations. As Gross (2009: 175) notes, Concordia tested operational procedures and illustrated inadequate coordination with other EU bodies at FYROM (such as the European Agency for Reconstruction or the EU Monitoring Mission). However, as Gross (ibid.) underlines, “the attainment of a working EU-NATO relationship and the implementation of a comprehensive approach to crisis management represented two challenges that the mission could not fully meet”.

¹⁶ At the London Conference about Afghanistan on 28.01.2010 most countries contributed to the US “war on terrorism” and to the campaign for the Afghanistan’s state restructuring. Greece contributed with an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team, two medical teams, 53 people for Kabul’s International Airport, the amount of 3 millions for the Afghan National Army and 600.000 for the «Helicopter Initiative» (see <http://afghanistan.hmg.gov.uk/en/conference/>).

¹⁷ According to data taken from the Ministry of Defence, Greece’s national contribution in the accomplishment of the Military Headline Goal consists of one Headquarter at Brigade level and a Brigade of 3.550 men, as well as naval and aerial forces, such as 2 frigates, 4 missile boats, one fleet oiler, one oceanographic survey vessel, and two amphibious warfare ships, one mine sweeper, one fleet support ship, one submarine and one naval cooperation aircraft, F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters, six reconnaissance and surveillance RF-4 aircraft and four C-130 transport aircraft. (<http://www.mod.mil.gr/Pages/MainAnalysisPage3.asp?HyperLinkID=3&MainLinkID=50&SubLinkID=146>).

¹⁸ See <http://www.geetha.mil.gr/media/pdf-arxeia/poskestham/POSKESTHAM-AMSCC.pdf>

At the same time, several public or privatized Greek defence industries, which produce both for the defence and the commercial field, are involved into European programs of defence partnerships. Because of the increasing competition between defence industries, this participation offers advantages in the level of technology, research, management and countervailing benefits (Ntokos et al. 2007: 28). In the frame of the common European defence programs, Greece joins several EU-projects, such as the Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS). MUSIS has been launched by six European Union Member States: Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy and Spain. The program illustrates the trend towards the diffusion of military and policing tasks¹⁹, aims through observation satellites at the development of a space-based imaging system, in order to monitor specific situations and ensure strategic watch, to support prevention, to anticipate crises and provide planning and operational assistance²⁰.

2) *The ESDP-Greek treatment of migration.* An important problem that Greece is facing because of its geographical position is the migration wave from the Greek borders to other European countries and the EU through Frontex is also involved. The adoption in 2003 of the Dublin Convention has special consequences for border countries like Greece. Dublin Regulation requires that the first country, in which a person enters, is responsible for dealing with the application and also that if a person is arrested as “illegal” inside a country, that person is transferred back to the first reception country²¹. Therefore, the role of border countries that have also signed the Schengen Agreement such as Greece, Italy, Spain and Malta for the regulation of migration in Europe is essential as they are often transitional places before the final destination in other EU countries. European Commission requires from borders and transition countries, to adapt to strategies of the Dublin Regulation. Although Greece is sponsored for such purposes by the European Refugee Fund²², NGOs have criticized the Greek authorities for the system of migration’s treatment and asylum seeking, for its lack of infrastructure at reception centers, the bad hygienic and living conditions, for delays to asylum dispensations and inadequate mechanisms during examination of applications.

Greek national borders from Turkey constitute also Europe’s sea-borders. The Aegean-islands of the borderline are often first intermediate destinations for immigrants travelling through Turkey to Greece and to other European countries. This is one of the most common but also complicated routes of immigrants to European territory. Dramatic data show that between 1988 and August 2009, 1.315

¹⁹ As Alexander Weis, EDA’s Chief Executive stated, “aim of the project is the connection between military and civil space agendas”, (see <http://www.eda.europa.eu/newsitem.aspx?id=456>).

²⁰ Information about MUSIS at Ministère de la Défense, www.defense.gouv.fr

²¹ For the Dublin Regulation, see The UN Refugee Agency <http://www.unhcr.org/4a9d13d59.html>

²² See European Refugee Fund, Multiannual Program 2008-201, Greece

people died in the Aegean-zone between Greece and Turkey, 823 registered as missing, while the “dark number” of the dead is estimated much higher (Trubeta 2010: 2). In cooperation with Frontex stationed in Greece, Greek police and a series of Greek marine and air-force agencies, undertake joint surveillance, control and arrest operations. For instance, “Operation Poseidon” in the Aegean Sea in 2007 was organized by the Greek government and supported by Frontex, an operation in more than six islands, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Patmos, Leros and Kos. The refugees arrested in those islands were either transferred to Athens deportation centers or kept at reception centers, for instance at Lesbos “Pagani Center”, where they were kept and subjected to numerous administrative mechanisms and controls²³.

Although Frontex is still subjected to the principal of national sovereignty of the EU-states and does not intervene with decision making about migration management, border-zones such as the Aegean-sea and the intensification of surveillance through a variety of means tend to a blurring of the limits between the military and the police, or between “search and rescue” operations, like those undertaken by Greek “Super Puma” and Frontex Helicopters and operations of deportation. These developments result into a complex network between EU-policing institutions and the Greek state with its various military and police agents. This cooperation, however, is limited to the treatment of migration and does not extend to more subtle issues relating to the disputes and rivalries for the precise determination of sea-borders between Greece and Turkey.

²³ As Trubeta (2010: 4) notes, the Pagani Center corresponded to three levels of action, the local level, the one of the Greek nation-state that cooperates with the EU or Frontex and, finally, a level of global governmentality. The problematic situation at the border-islands of the Aegean sea rises a series of important questions about international human rights, the management of the spreading phenomenon of “forced migration” and demonstrates a European migration policy based mostly on two processes: First, the criminalization of people coming from belligerent countries, such as Afghanistan or Iraq where “humanitarian” actions take place and their treatment simply as “bodies to be managed”, for instance within the so called “screening centers”. In the “screening centers” their genetic characteristics are registered and they receive a “personal identity”, through which they can be controlled, regardless if they hold legal documents or not (ibid.). Second, on the increasing militarization of borders through the complex and simultaneous action of different border-institutions and agents, whose actions often overlap and necessitate each other (ibid.).

5. Final Remarks

ESDP is everything but an integrated or completed project. The international conditions of the post-Cold War era and the struggles for power in the instability of globalization, the role of emerging ruling powers such as China, Russia and India, the dynamics of Turkey and Iran, as well as unsolved problems like the Israel-Palestine conflict and the Afghanistan-Pakistan war, compose the international conditions, in which the EU seeks to adjust. Europeanist optimistic views see the EU as capable of “maintaining stable European relations with Russia, with Islam and the Middle East and, above all, China”, and as “willing” to undertake the “heavy responsibility” of “becoming a superpower” (Haseler 2004: 192). However, a supposed EU project directed to increase its influence worldwide and demand more than simply an economic union under neoliberal premises, does not seem realistic without a concrete and applicable in facts foreign policy. The heterogeneity, the political deficits, the distance of interests and common understandings, the lack of social coherence and power of persuasion, the hierarchies between EU-countries and the shallow, top-down institutional structures, seem to remain insuperable obstacles.

By fulfilling its obligations towards NATO and the EU, Greece keeps a Euro-Atlantic orientation until now, for its governments have traditionally considered these alliances as necessary for the country’s security and economic reproduction. The Cyprus-problem, the high defence expenditure and the frictions with Turkey in the Aegean-sea, which are the three interrelated problems that Greece is facing, have not been decisively affected by Europeanization and they remain to a great degree national. In an era of international openings, of reconfiguration of power coalitions and of quest for new alliances, it seems that Greece’s Europeanization is no longer enough for the resolution of these problems and for its active involvement to the new international circumstances. For reasons of political stability and economic extension and in order to strengthen its role as a regulating actor in the area, Greece has supported the European perspective for the Balkans and has invested on promoting the rhetoric of the historical bonds and the common Greek-Balkan traditions. However, in the frame of Turkey’s declared aims towards the strengthening of its influence at the Balkans-zone, Greece may face the challenge of searching for new strategies and ways of increasing its influence at the area and re-evaluate its foreign policy (Kotzias 2010: 127). Greece’s role at ESDP-operations at the Balkans and at the Middle East is likely to increase. But as long as ESDP remains limited to its scope, the role of peripheral countries like Greece will remain at the level of simply implementing bureaucracy and participating unawares and mechanically, as bodies of a greater governmentality network and of neoliberal ideologies of “good governance” and state restructuring.

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