

Hegelian Phenomenology as Second-Order Cybernetics and System Theory

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Section A-1: An Introduction to the ‘Introduction’

The TRANSCENDENTAL TURN, as commenced by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1st ed. 1781), logically undercut the philosophical debates of his contemporaries on how sensuous experience and intellectual knowledge relate to one another. The conditions for the possibility of experience and knowledge *as such* (i.e. the transcendental) were themselves then to be called into critique. In our intuitions, the chaotic manifoldness of experience was revealed to be situated, grounded, and ordered in space and time (the transcendental form of our intuitions). And this order is what leads to logically-necessary structures and inner necessity.

The development from the form-giving principle of this manifoldness, the constitution of our representations as well as the law-like order of our thought is the SYNTHESIS: the systematic horizon in which all objects are always already (i.e. A PRIORI) given to us. The bearer of this system, that act which performs this transcendental function is the transcendental I, the affected subject, or, simply, CONSCIOUSNESS. Our thematic access to this horizon is rendered conceptually explicit via JUDGMENTS (the smallest possible unit of thought), more specifically via SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS A PRIORI. The main question of Kant’s Pure Reason is then: *How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?* This is the El Dorado of ide-

alism: here, reason is *pure*; here, thought is thinking itself, advocate, simultaneously judge and judged.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* (German: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*), the *of/der* covers both GENITIVUS SUBJECTIVUS and GENITIVUS OBJECTIVUS. With regards to experience, part of the punchline of Kant's entire First Critique is that he then goes on to prove that the conditions for the possibility of experience are not merely constitutive of our *access* to objects; they also happen to coincide with the conditions for the possibility of objects *as such*.

Albeit purely formalistic, these figures of thought — synthesis, categories, synthetic judgments a priori — have the potential to ground nothing less than the entirety of philosophy and science. Kant goes on to do just this with arithmetic, geometry and (meta-) physics (First Critique), with right, morality, and ethics (Second Critique), and with aesthetics of both nature and art (Third Critique), by grounding their presuppositions in the conditions of their possibility; the presuppositions of morality are identical to the presuppositions that you necessarily have to embrace in order to count as a rational being (responsibility, authority, commitment, &c.).

But Kant was not radical enough, not *Kantian* enough — one final step remained. What are the conditions for the possibility of Kant's transcendental method *itself*? In this sense, Kant's philosophy was like a Wittgensteinian eye, which saw everything except for itself. The realisation of this problem marked the birth of German Idealism and the era of system philosophy. The Idealist solution: We must have *immediate* access to this synthesis, *immediate* without any further principle or (meta-)theory/ as a mediating third term. For Hegelian philosophy, this immediate access to the synthesis of subject and object was to be found in CONSCIOUSNESS — an immanent reconceptualisation of Kant's transcendental I.

To show how the phenomenology of Hegel and Gabler attempts to solve this Kantian problem of providing a ground for philosophy and science is the primary aim of this essay. By doing so, we simultaneously provide an introduction to Hegelian philosophy, while also reconstructing the origin and foundational principles of this discipline from Hegel, to Husserl, to Heidegger.

PHENOMENOLOGY? *Phenomeno-logic* is — according to the subtitle of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) — the Science of the Experience of Consciousness. How does knowledge, and error, appear within experience? How does the unity, or *gap*, between the knower and the known, between the known and the being to which it correlates in actuality, arise *for* consciousness? In Hegel's and Ga-




Figure 1: Hegel and Gabler's system of phenomenology

bler's phenomenology, the process of this arising must necessarily be an *immanent* learning process, of which the following illustration provides a systematic overview, outlining consciousness's developmental path.

As Ovid's *Metamorphoses* is the theme of the artwork featured in this year's volume of *Threads*, one could also refer to this development as a sequential chain of *transformations*. The striking difference, how-

This kind of tri-
adic and fractal
visualisation of
the Hegelian sys-
tem (Sierpinski
triangle) was first
employed by the
Hamburg He-
gelians Martin
Grimsmann and
Lutz Hansen, as
well as Kai Froeb
(www.hegel.net).

Hegel himself in-
vites us to think
of his entire sys-
tem as 'a circle of
circles' (*ein Kreis
von Kreisen*) in
both his *Ency-
clopaedia of the
Philosophical Sci-
ences* in 1830 ('In-
troduction,' §15)
and his *Science of
Logic* in 1833/34
(*'Absolute Idea,'*
§1814). The most
adequate vis-
ualisation, com-
bining the two,
would probably
be Lacan's to-
pology: the *Bor-
romean knot*, a
self-contained
chain of 3 inter-
locking Möbius
strips.

ever, is that consciousness' transformative plasticity is wholly *immanent* — it does not require *divine intervention* of the sort found in the Ovidian narrative. By the same token, this immanence is inherently *dialectical*: self-affection, self-alienation, radical otherness, projections into a transcendent beyond, &c. are all essential moments of consciousness' *metamorphosis*.

This essay focuses on the relation of the *first* and *final* transformative shapes of Hegel's and Gabler's phenomenological system: OBJECT-CONSCIOUSNESS (1.1 in Figure 1: Hegel and Gabler's system of phenomenology on page 61), i.e. sensuous consciousness (the unreflective I) vis-à-vis its (seemingly) independent object (the Non-I); and SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT (3.3), a historically-mediated community consisting of self-conscious agents mutually recognising and identifying with each other (the WE). Whilst Section B covers the translation of selected parts of Gabler's opus, Section A of this paper gives a preliminary explication of all these concepts in relation to phenomenology, as the developmental unity of a totality.

The phenomenologist *observes* consciousness, she *observes* the conscious being as an organic, self-adaptive system in its own right, which proactively conceptualises itself out of the immanence of its immediate intuitions. She observes by withdrawing herself, and by granting each individual shape and stage of consciousness the conceptual *space* that it deserves, meeting it at its own ground without violently imposing an *external* criterion of truth upon it. Not coincidentally, this also happens to be the phenomenological equivalent of the definition of LOVE and of FORGIVING, I of Spirit's final forms following Hegelian Phenomenology (2.3).

In other words, the focal point of phenomenology is the intimacy of consciousness's very own, immediate, experience, as it appears *in*, *through*, and *out of* an individual consciousness's interaction with the world.¹ The phenomenologist then has to do no more than render the underlying logic of consciousness's experience — always already *im-*

1 We are making use of scholastic terminology here: *in ipso, et per ipsum, et ex ipso*.

plicity at play! — conceptually *explicit*.² Just as the maturing consciousness learns from experiencing and suffering through its own committed errors, the phenomenologist uncovers the performative self-contradictions at work, simply by applying the logic of a respective consciousness's self- and world-conception to itself, *self-referentially*. This immanent critique and presuppositionless method — presuppositionless because it is intimately grounded in its conceptual content — is what Hegel refers to as DIALECTICS. Consciousness contradicts itself in the space between what it thinks it does and what it does *in actu*. And therein lies both the developmental character of consciousness's truth, and the dynamic principle of the movement of its self-adaptive *evolution*. *Metamorphosis*! Like a self-reflexive information system, reincorporating its own feedback loops in second-order cybernetics...

Section A-2: A Sketch of Phenomenology's 3 Paradigm Shifts

Over the course of its historical development, this relatively young field went through 3 major paradigm shifts, as conceptualised by the 3 *German supernovae of phenomenology*: Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger.

1. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL (1770 – 1831) and his phenomenology of knowledge. Following the previous explications, phenomenology functions as a propaedeutic to science (i.e. the formal introduction to science from the standpoint of science), providing a *developmental* answer of how *conceptually* articulated truth arises immanently in, through and out of the *sensuous* experience of an individual (self-)consciousness, experience: ranging all the way up to ethical actions of historic agents, the creation of works of art as well as the ecstasy

2 'Implicitness' and 'explicitness': A dialectical dichotomy borrowed from Pittsburgh Hegelian Robert Brandom, conceptualised in his 'semantic reading' of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Open access to the recorded lecture course which goes by the same name and related papers are provided on his website (Date of access: 03/24/2017): http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/hegel_2013/index.html.

of religious epiphanies. Individual sciences give individual accounts of the world; phenomenology gives an account of account-giving as such. This foundation laid out by Hegel's holistic approach in 1807, as elaborated by GEORG ANDREAS GABLER in 1827, is the focus of this essay (Section 2, p. 69). PHENOMENOLOGY. PRIMA PHILOSOPHIA. SCIENTIA GENERALIS.

2. EDMUND HUSSERL (1859 – 1938) and his phenomenology of perception. Husserl's research initiated an approach comparable to the Hegelian enterprise, especially in *Ideas I* (part 1913; the remainder published *postumum*) and *Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy* (1936), establishing phenomenology as a self-sufficient discipline in the process. One key aspect of his phenomenology of science was his refutation of psychologism, according to which the laws of logic were purely derived from psychological facts, and the popular forms of behaviorism of his time. Contemporary examples of this are the reduction of objects or of emotional states to brain states, &c. The core concept of his critique — of which the following translation of Gabler's text provides an anticipatory pre-configuration — is consciousness's *intentionality* towards the world or the *aboutness* of its experience: Correspondence links a *belief picture* to something that one *believes about*, the concept of intentional correlation, on the other hand, distinguishes between *the believing performed by the subject* (act) and *that which is believed by the subject* (content). Notice how the correspondence theory of psychologism does not provide us a conceptual space for grasping phenomena, as separate senses can interact differently with the same content (i.e. synesthesia).
3. MARTIN HEIDEGGER (1889 – 1976) and his phenomenology of language. Language as a *medium*, whether for

science, technology, or the role played in simple everyday phenomena, is not merely an *instrument* or *tool* (ἔργον/*ergon*), but rather the *constitutive* force of consciousness's relation to *world*, to *actuality* as such (ἐνέργεια/*energeia*). Science and its vocabulary 'enframes' us in our own world-constitution, our 'being-in-the-world.' Heidegger himself practiced phenomenology in the form of *philosophical* translations of Ancient Greek texts, like Aristotle's ethics, and *hermeneutical* interpretations of works of art, such as Hölderlin's poetry; a project akin to textual aspects of Sigmund Freud's *psychoanalysis* or Jacques Derrida's *deconstruction* (Heidegger himself referred to it as 'DESTRUCTION,' the uncovering of unreflected history, traditions, and vocabularies that we have repressed or routinely ritualised and taken for granted). Language is inherently dialectical, as it is both blessing and curse: 'gifting' us the possibility of spaces both for learning about ourselves as well as for our own self-disclosure. Language is the 'house of being.' In the translation of Gabler's style and language, we will uncover subtle hints of this implicitly in play — vis-à-vis the instrumentalization of language, degrading it to a mere 'tool' (Section B-2-1, p. 73, commentary of §11; Section B-2-2, p. 76, translation of §14). By incorporating this translational component into this essay, we follow the *traces* from Heidegger to Derrida.

One element that remains consistent throughout this — admittedly playful — sketch of the 3 paradigm shifts between the 3 philosophical systems is phenomenology's direct (and indirect) relation to science. A self-conscious being that engages in science is a self-conscious being that engages in a scientific *community*, together with other self-conscious beings. This marks the normativity of our knowledge (and experience as such); we stand 'on the shoulders of giants,' whether it be science or any other institution, such as the state, art, or religion; each and every individual consciousness always-already par-

ticipates in the becoming of a community of persons (scientists, chess players, musicians, &c.) who mutually *recognise* each other, who are *conscious* of this very act of recognition, and who *identify* themselves in and through this reciprocal relationship.³ The (comm-)unity of a self-differentiating totality; ALL-ONE-NESS. The name Hegel and Gabler give to this fractal development of self-consciousness is SPIRIT (GEIST). Science is but a post-enlightenment moment, and the movement of modernity's *Zeitgeist* — an aspect that reflects within it the *spirit* of the whole. This essay focuses on the very foundation of this phenomenology of science, which, for Hegel and Gabler, simultaneously functions as the philosophical introduction to their entire 'System of Science'.⁴

Section A-3: A Phenomenology of 'Forgivingness'

To conclude this sketch of an introduction *to* phenomenology *as* an introduction to science (meeting the natural consciousness on its own ground, while simultaneously maintaining one's own philosophico-scientific standpoint — the dialectic of didactics), let us reiterate the briefly mentioned aspect of Spirit qua 'forgiving' self-conscious beings (p. 62) by taking a look at a few short examples, before elaborating in SECTION B-2-3. Forgiven consciousness is a developmental stage of Moral Spirit (2.3, Figure 1) and an integral part of consciousness' overall *metamorphosis*:

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- 3 This also extends to the recognition of the dead members within a respective community (the scientific version of this is the Newtonian dictum 'on the shoulders of giants'). Hegel himself exemplifies this in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* via the allegory of Antigone, based on Sophocles' Ancient Greek tragedy (her mourning over the dead; defying King Creon's order, according to which her brother Polynices is not to be buried; paying her last respects to him). The Phenomenology of Spirit gives a developmental answer for the emergence of asymmetrical or defective forms of recognising the Other in experience as well as throughout history.
- 4 "System der Wissenschaft", Hegel's magnum opus as outlined in his *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (3rd Ed., 1830): 1. LOGIC, the Formal Sciences (1.1. Ontology, 1.2. Metaphysics, 1.3. Epistemology); 2. NATURE, the Natural Sciences (2.1. Mechanics, 2.2. Physics, 2.3. Organics); Phenomenology is part of 3. SPIRIT, the Human Sciences (3.1. Subjective Spirit: 3.1.1. Anthropology, 3.1.2. Phenomenology, 3.1.3. Psychology).

1. 'FORGIVING': A philosopher engaging in her precursors' philosophical systems, movements and periods performs an act of *forgiving*. Forgiving? Over the course of hundreds and hundreds of years we may (or may not?) have learned more, but, regardless of any *apparent* inconsistencies or errors, we do grant each and every thinker's system the conceptual space it rightfully deserves, engaging with it in terms of its own immanent logic, its own immanent ground, its own immanent principles, without violently imposing an *external* criterion of truth upon it. As an opposing view, we entertain it without dismissing it a priori, yet without taking it for granted uncritically. The same applies to contemporary thinkers and their systems. "As for the individual, every one is a *child of its time*; just as philosophy is *its time captured in thought*,"⁵ (Hegel 1833a).

2. 'CONFESSING': This same logic also applies self-reflexively, self-referentially to ourselves — we must confess that *what we have forgiven* also applies to ourselves. In this sense, this epistemic humility and principle of charity is bidirectional; the phenomenologist is not an omniscient observer or narrator, but she is part of the system herself. We do not adopt a *noumenal* view or a *god's-eye* view (Kantian imagery) or a view from *nowhere* (Nagelian imagery) on an individual system, its environment and the world as such; no, we do so by reading and experiencing it *phenomenally* in and through our *own* systems. This involves development, learning and error. This then marks the *conditio sine qua non* for our *genuine* and *authentic* access to history; it is what enables us to think history as such, be it the history of philosophy, science, art, &c. And

5 Our translation, from the *Preface* to Hegel's *Philosophy of Right in Outline* (1833) p. 19: "Was das Individuum betrifft, so ist ohnehin jedes ein *Sohn seiner Zeit*; so ist auch die Philosophie, ihre *Zeit in Gedanken erfaßt*" (emphasis original).

we, too, are but daughters and sons of our times. “The *I* becoming *We*, and the *We* becoming *I*”⁶ (Hegel 1907). From Consciousness to Spirit.

3. ‘TRUSTING’: Trust in future thinkers, future members of the same communities; trust that they will do the same as we have done (the dialectical interplay of forgiving and confessing *preserved* moments within the act of trusting). Commitments. Just like philosophers such as Hegel and Gabler themselves may have trusted in *translators* of future generations to treat their lifetime works with the respect and dignity they truly deserve; just like the *translator* of their philosophy (a purely hypothetical entity!) must make a confession with regards to her limited capacities and finite resources and must go on to trust her readership to make up for her (necessary) failure.⁷ To bring up the theme of this volume again, one might be reminded of the famous last words in Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* (*Sphragis*), in which he artfully describes how he himself *transforms* into and lives on in his magnum opus, a work created with his own blood, sweat and tears, embodied for recipients of future generations. ‘Some are born posthumously,’ to paraphrase Nietzsche’s famous saying in his autobiography *Ecce Homo: How to become what you are*.

But everything sketched out so far is a mere ‘external *reflection*’ (Hegel 1814), the name of a category in Hegel’s ‘Logic of Essence’ that refers to an incomplete mode of thought *in medias res*. The philosophical standpoint, however, is to be developed *system-immanently*, handing itself over to the dynamics of ‘the concept’ and the interplay of its

6 Our translation, from Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (ed. 1907), ‘Self-Consciousness’ p. 122: “*Was für das Bewußtsein weiter wird, ist die Erfahrung, was der Geist ist [...] Ich, das Wir, und Wir, das Ich ist,*” (emphasis original).

7 Thanks is owed to Steven Bednarek for editing the following translation of Gabler’s work, and to Colin Bodayle for his extensive review of that translation.

'self-movement.' This is also why phenomenology qua science — as a propaedeutic, as a didactic, as a pedagogic — must *necessarily* begin with *sensuous* consciousness (Figure 1, 1.1): rebuilt from scratch, rebuilt from the bottom up; in exactly this sense, phenomenology is *even more* radical than ancient and modern scepticism alike.

Section B-1: 'Doctrine of Philosophical Propaedeutic' (§1)

The following section provides a translation with commentary of selections from the book *Doctrine of Philosophical Propaedeutic* (1827), written by Georg Andreas Gabler (a first-generation Hegelian: *Althegelianer*, 1786 – 1853), Hegel's hand-picked successor, who also became the editor and publisher of his oeuvre and opus postumum during the period 1831 – 1845, and who took over his master's administrative position as a lecturer and functionary of the University of Berlin in 1835 (a position which had passed to Hegel after the death in 1814 of contemporary idealist philosopher Fichte, who had conceptualised a similar philosophical enterprise under the name *Wissenschaftslehre/Doctrine of Scientific Knowledge*; Schelling would inherit the position from Gabler in 1841).⁸

Doctrine of Philosophical Propaedeutic (Lehrbuch der philosophischen Propädeutik): A non-punctual reiteration of Hegel's phenomenology as an immanent *deconstruction* of consciousness's experience of knowledge, now shifting focus to phenomenology as an introduction to thinking as well as thinking about thinking as such, in an attempt to break out of the philosophical ivory tower and to reach out towards a

⁸ GEORG ANDREAS GABLER: Co-founder of the 'Hegelian School' ('*Hegel'sche Schule*'), the 'Philosophical Society of Berlin' ('*Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin*'), as well as the Hegelian Circle 'Friends of the Eternal One' ('*Freunde des Verewigten*') which edited and published Hegel's works and lectures. Gabler's academic career, carrying the weight of the German Idealist heritage from Kant to Hegel on his shoulders, received heavy scratches by Anti-Hegelian thinkers: Eichhorn, who was also part of the administration of the University of Berlin (firing and refusing to hire any new professors associated with Hegelianism); and Trendelenburg, who was part of the Prussian ministry for education and levelled a critique against Hegel (a critique which Gabler also answered in 1843 with his second major work: *Hegelian Philosophy [Die Hegelsche Philosophie]*).

Table 1: §1 Introduction	
<p>Was überhaupt Philosophie sey, kann nicht vor, noch ausser ihr erklärt oder gelernt werden; denn sie ist nur in ihrer Entwicklung und in dem Wissen von ihr.</p>	<p>What philosophy as such may or may not be can neither be explained nor learned prior or external to it; philosophy is only in and through its development and the knowledge thereof.</p>
<p>Nur die vollständige, aus ihr selbst hervorgehende und von der ihrem Begriffe inwohnenden und gemässen Methode geleitete Darlegung und Entfaltung ihres Inhalts kann ihren Gegenstand sowohl, welcher nicht in der Vorstellung oder Erfahrung angetroffen wird, erst für die Erkenntniß und mit ihr hervorbringen, als auch für die Nichtigkeit einer Definition, welche etwa, wie bei andern Wissenschaften, gleich im Eingange und an der Spitze des Ganzen gegeben würde, die wahre Beweisführung enthalten.</p>	<p>Only the complete elucidation and unfolding of philosophy's content — developed out of its own immanence and guided by the adequate method inherent in its concept — can function as both: [A.] the development of its subject matter, which is not to be found in representation or experience, for and together with knowledge; as well as [B.] true reasoning, contrary to the nullity of a definition when given — as it is the case in other sciences — immediately at the beginning and the very top of the whole.</p>

broader audience. The development of the scientific method (*μέθοδος/methodos*) cannot be presupposed as given *a priori*, cannot be deduced *ex nihilo*; the path to science is itself already science. Phenomenology, in this sense, is a *philosophy prior to philosophy*; a *science prior to science*.⁹ In the very first paragraph of the text, Gabler summarises his philos-

⁹ *Science prior to science*. Conceptualising philosophy as the science of science is a central aspect for the philosophies of all the German Idealists, whether Kant, Fichte, Schelling or Hegel; c.f. Anton Invanenko's essay *Wissenschaft vor Wissenschaft* (2014), on Hegel's conception of science vis-à-vis that of Fichte.

ophy as the *process philosophy* of a conceptually articulated ‘System of Science’ (Table 1).¹⁰

Section B-2: ‘Consciousness as such’ (§§10–20)

Gabler’s book strictly follows the self-development of consciousness throughout its *historic odyssey*, as it is dialectically developed by his master in the aforementioned *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807). After some preliminary remarks on the contrasts between the philosophical and scientific method in general (§§1–9: the individual sciences give accounts, philosophy gives an account of account-giving as such), Gabler sketches out the minimal logical structure of consciousness’ immanent experience in the first third of the following section, entitled ‘On consciousness as such, as well as its relation to the object and the true’ (§§10–35; the selected part of this essay covers §§10–20). ‘[C]onsciousness as such’ can be equated to ‘1. Consciousness’ in Figure 1. Our focus lies on the following 3 aspects, into which we have split up the text (this is **not** a text division made by Gabler himself):

1. Dialectics of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ (§§10–11), entailing a conceptual pre-configuration of Husserlian *intentionality*.
2. Dialectics of ‘certainty’ and ‘truth’ (§§12–15) — the consciousness-immanent critique of sceptical doubt and other possible presuppositions.
3. Dialectics of the ‘THING-IN-ITSELF’ (noumenon) and its ‘BEING-FOR-CONSCIOUSNESS’ (phenomenon)¹¹ — the self-development of consciousness

¹⁰ My transcription (German) and translation (American English) follows the original source text (with original emphasis). Gabler, Georg Andreas. 1827. *Lehrbuch der philosophischen Propädeutik als Einleitung zur Wissenschaft*. Einleitung. §1, p. 3.

¹¹ My transcription & translation follows the original source text, but omits Gabler’s supplementary remarks. Gabler, Georg Andreas. 1827. *Lehrbuch der philosophischen Propädeutik als Einleitung zur Wissenschaft*. “Erster Abschnitt. Von dem Bewußtseyn überhaupt, und seinem Verhältniß zum Gegenstand und zum Wahren.”

Table 2: §10
On consciousness as such, as well as its relation to the object and the true

<p>Bewußtseyn überhaupt ist Wissen oder bestimmtes wis-sendes Ich.</p>	<p>Consciousness as such is knowing or a determinate knowing I.</p>
<p>Wissen überhaupt (eben so Erkennen), als nothwendig ein Wissen von Etwas, einem Anderen als Ich, (Gewußtes, Gegenstand), enthält unmittelbar in sich die Unterscheidung zweier unterschiedener, aber in ihrer auf einander bezogener Bestimmungen, deren eine das Wissende, Ich, die andere das Gewußte, der Gegenstand, — ihre Beziehung aber, wie ihre Unterscheidung das Bewußtseyn oder Ich selbst ist.</p>	<p>Knowing as such (just as cognising) is necessarily a knowing of something, something that is other than the I (a known something, an object etc.). This knowing contains immediately within itself the differentiation of two differentiated determinations, which are nonetheless related to one another in and through their differentiation: On the one side the knower, the I; on the other side the known, the object. Their relation and their differentiation, however, is nothing but consciousness or the I itself.</p>
<p>Ich unterscheidet sich von seinem Gegenstande, dadurch wird es ein Wissen desselben; oder vielmehr wird eben sowohl Ich als sein Gegenstand erst in der dieser Unterscheidung; vor ihr ist weder Ich noch Gegenstand.</p>	<p>The I differentiates itself from its object, and thereby becomes a knowing of this object; in fact, both the I and its object only become what they are by virtue of this differentiation; prior to this differentiation, there is neither I, nor object.</p>
<p>Wissen mithin oder Bewußtseyn, als Einheit zugleich und Unterscheidung von beiden, ist eben so sehr Unterscheidung des Wissenden und des Gewußten, als Beziehung des Einen auf das Andere, das Ich auf den Gegenstand und des Gegenstandes auf Ich.</p>	<p>Knowing or consciousness, simultaneously unification and differentiation of the two, is therefore both differentiation of knower and known as well as relation of one to another: The I to the object and the object to the I.</p>

and its conceptualisation of the world and its self
(§§16–20).

This movement begins with *consciousness in its immediacy*, i.e. the *intimate* unity of consciousness with its experienced world, without any further determination or mediating third terms. Immediacy: The ‘umbilical cord’ connecting consciousness (here still in its initial shape or stage) *immediately* to the world...

Section B-2-1: Dialectics of ‘Subject’ and ‘Object’ (§§10–11)

§§10–11. For most words in the German language, there is no morphological differentiation between the noun form and the nominalised verb form, as both are capitalised:

1. noun form: ‘**the knowledge**’ = ‘*das Wissen*’;
the nominalised verb form: ‘**knowing**’ = ‘*Wissen*’
2. noun form: ‘**the cognition**’ = ‘*das Erkennen*’;
the nominalised verb form: ‘**cognising**’ = ‘*Erkennen*’

To emphasise that consciousness ‘is’ essentially *in* and *through* this act of knowing and cognising, the nominalised verb form has been prioritised (highlighting the progressive aspect). Consciousness cognising its other, self-consciousness ‘*re-cognising*’ its other (‘*An-erkennen*’); both acts of intentionality. A self-movement in and through its own “differentiation,” in and through its “other,” as “[t]he I differentiates itself from its object, and thereby **becomes** a knowing of this object,” (§10, p. 72).

In its *initial* stage, consciousness is nothing but this very *gap*, a gap caused not by an external act of violence, but by an immanent *erupting*. In this sense, the self-development of consciousness in its var-

§§10–20, p. 33–66. In his lectures on the propædeutic, Gabler would first read out a paragraph, and then give additional oral remarks similar to the aforementioned supplementary remarks.

ious stages represents consciousness's various attempts to fill this *void* (we visualise this attempted bridging-of-the-gap with hyphen constructions, e.g. the "thing-in-itself" becomes a "being-for-consciousness"). In its initial stage, consciousness can only grasp itself in and through this emptiness as the non-object; or, vice versa, it can only grasp the object as the "NON-I" (Section 2-3: 'Sensuous Consciousness' (§§38—39) on page 91).

Table 3: §11

<p>Indem Ich im Bewußtseyn seinen Gegenstand sich unmittelbar gegenüber hat, ist dieser ein Seyn für Ich, oder das Wissen vielmehr ist selbst dieses Seyn eines Gegenstandes für Ich.</p>	<p>Since the I stands in immediate opposition to its object within its consciousness, its object is a being-for-I; in fact, the knowing itself is the being of an object for-I.</p>
<p>(Oder speculativer ausgedrückt: Ich ist sich selbst das Seyn eines Gegenstandes für es.)</p>	<p>(In more speculative terms: The I is for itself the being of an object.)</p>
<p>Durch dieses Wissen findet Ich sich unmittelbar bestimmt, oder es hat Gewißheit, d. h. das Wissen vom Gegenstande, in das Ich aufgenommen, gehört ihm eben so sehr als Ich sich selbst an, und ist unmittelbar seine eigne Bestimmtheit, welche es als die seinige erkennt, und welche so sehr ist als Ich selbst.</p>	<p>In and through this knowing, the I finds itself to be immediately determined. In other words, the I has certainty: the knowing of the object is internalized by the I, belonging to the I just as much as the I belongs to itself; in its immediacy, this knowing is the I's very own determination, which the I cognises as belonging to it and which 'is' just as much as the I itself is.</p>

“[D]ifferentiation”. In consciousness’s *initial* stage, the “THING” (Kantian “DING”) or “OBJECT” of consciousness is its *abject*; the German word “Gegenstand” is inherently dialectical, and literally translates to “oppositional-stasis” (Gegen-stand), the very opposite of what consciousness wants its object to be: a kind of “reciprocal-dynamic.” From a first-person viewpoint, the “object” — the opposing “other” — must necessarily appear *first* to consciousness as a contamination of the purity of its own *immediacy*. But it is this loss of innocence, this very alienation, which provides the conditions for the possibility of the becoming conscious of consciousness. Otherwise, it would remain ‘stuck’ in immediacy.

Another inherently dialectical terminus is “determination” (“*Bestimmtheit*”), in both senses of the German word: determination in the sense of a *predicate or a property of the I*; and determination in the sense of *vocation*, as if the I’s certain “knowledge” of the object (§11) were its *destiny*. This “I” (“*Ich*”) of which we are speaking is usually rendered as ‘Ego’ in translations of German Idealist texts (e.g. Kant’s ‘transcendental ego,’ Fichte’s ‘absolute ego’); *I* do not follow this tradition, as *I* want to preserve the triad of Subjective Spirit: I (*Ich*), ego (Ego), self (*Selbst*).

Even something as simple as a minor nuance in etymology, or the ambiguity of a play on words like the above (c.f. “object”, “determination”) — usually overseen or lost in translation — can carry within itself the implications of a complex philosophical idea, when used as a method of conceptual engineering. Additionally, Gabler also breathes life into his majestic, maybe even monstrous (because untamable in English grammar), syntax, by using punctuation to *evoke* pauses in reading, and by highlighting key words to *simulate* the aspect of *orality* when read out loud or in one’s head (as preserved in the translation).¹² These hints are not meant to be a *help* for the recipient; they are *orders, imperatives* on how one must read the text. This interlaced text’s

12. Theodor Adorno was the first philosopher to explicitly point out the significance of a *philosophical* punctuation in his 1956 essay *Satzzeichen*, which was translated into English as *Punctuation Marks*.

rhythm or *tempo* — to employ musical terminology — of Gabler’s philosophising and thought is a slow but careful *Adagio*.

Therein lies the AUTO-REFLEXIVITY and SELF-REFERENTIALITY of Gabler’s language; it fulfils a function similar to his explicated idea, the idea of the development of consciousness as a consciousness that *reflects* on itself (i.e. *self-consciousness*). Conveying this kind of performativity via a text is what it means to write philosophically; language is not just a ‘one-dimensional’ *instrument*.¹³ Heidegger, following in the footsteps of Nietzsche, would later perfect this self-reflexive approach to language in his phenomenology of language, in both his writings and translations; the ‘forgetting of language’ (which he calls *Sprachvergessenheit*) is a key theme in his works.

In its *initial* stage, however, consciousness appears to have no access to this kind of self-reflexivity, and to possess nothing more than immediate “CERTAINTY” of its object, or maybe even *less* than that.

Section B-2-2: Dialectics of ‘Certainty’ and ‘Truth’ (§§12–15)

Out of the immanent logic of consciousness’s experience arises the possibility for “UNCERTAINTY or DOUBT,” the erupting gap or “SPLIT”: between “CERTAINTY” and “TRUTH” (§12). Truth? Truth, for Gabler, is not to be grasped via a *static* correspondence or identity theory: “The true”, following Hegel’s programmatic dictum, “is the whole. The whole, however, is nothing but the self-unfolding essence, in and through its own immanent development.”¹⁴ Already, at the first stage of this very development of consciousness, we can catch a first glimpse of its nature as a process in its continuous “going-be-

13 Hegel takes this self-reflexivity of language one step further, insofar the style of his *Phenomenology* is inspired by the lyrical prose of his dear friend and contemporary German Idealist philosopher Hölderlin. As consciousness is still in the process of development, viewing the world first in intuitional form, second in representational form, and third in conceptual form, Hegel uses **allegories** like *Force, Master and Slave*, and *Antigone* to get his ideas across. Gabler puts next to no emphasis on this allegorical dimension.

14 Our own translation, from the *Preface* to Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (ed. 1907), p. 14: “Das Wahre ist das Ganze. Das Ganze aber ist nur das durch seine Entwicklung sich vollendende Wesen.”

yond," the *self-transcending* of consciousness (solely grounded in its own experience). It is its own self-alienation that is pushing it from its initial immediacy to doubt as a form of negation, which in turn pushes it on to even more complex, richer and developed stages, just to "return" back to itself in and through its reconciliation with its "other," which is now a present and preserved *moment* within consciousness. But both Hegel and Gabler warn us not to 'fixate' on the mere result of this; instead, we must be open to this self-differentiating "movement" of consciousness as a whole. To draw a — vague — connection to the philosophy of Zen Buddhism, consciousness would best be visualised as a *circle* (the INFINITE and SELF-CONTAINED line); the dialectical interplay of subject and object in experience is the *wavy motion* of this Ouroboros.

What is the *content* of this *act* of "uncertainty", this "doubt"? The dialectical shift to the unjustified "presumptions" and "presuppositions" arising out of "doubt" (§§14–15) brings us right back to the pro-

Table 4: §12

Table 4: §12	
So lange aber das Wissen mit dem Gegenstande noch nicht selbst übereinstimmt oder ihm gleich ist, ist die Gewißheit noch nicht Wahrheit .	But as long as the knowing itself does not coincide with or is not yet identical to the object, certainty still is not truth .
Zwischen der ersten unmittelbaren Gewißheit, und der Wahrheit, welche die auf einer höheren Stufe befestigte Gewißheit ist, (wie sie wenigstens hier vorläufig bestimmt werden kann,) steht die Ungewißheit oder der Zweifel .	Between the first immediate certainty and truth, which is certainty elevated to a higher stage (this is the only preliminary determination that can be given for truth at this initial point), stands uncertainty or doubt .

<p>Im Zweifel geht das Bewußtseyn, sich selbst nicht trauend, über seine erste unmittelbare Gewißheit und den Gegenstand derselben hinaus, entzweit sich mit sich selbst, und hat in seinem Wissen ein Nichtseyn oder Andersseyn des Gegenstandes, und erst von diesem kehrt es in die Einheit mit dem Gegenstande und mit sich zurück.</p>	<p>In doubt, consciousness, which does not trust itself, goes beyond its first immediate certainty and the object of this immediacy, splits itself into two, and knows only of the non-being or being-other of the object; and only in and through this other does consciousness return to the unity with the object and with itself.</p>
<p>Diese Bewegung des Bewußtseyns (hier nur im Allgemeinen oder ihrer Form nach betrachtet, und so, daß der Zweifel noch nicht zu einer Aenderung des Wissens im Gegenstande selbst führt) verläuft sich mithin in diesen drei Momenten:</p>	<p>This movement of consciousness (here only grasped in its universality or its form, and in such a way that doubt has not yet lead to the transformation of the knowing of the object itself, consists of 3 moments:</p>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Unmittelbare Gewißheit = dem unmittelbaren Seyn des Gegenstandes; 2) Negation der Gewißheit = dem Nichtseyn oder Andersseyn des Gegenstandes; 3) Rückkehr zur ersten Einheit der Gewißheit, aber nunmehr als einer durch die Negation vermittelten Gewißheit, d. i. der Wahrheit (Subjective Wahrheit, Fürwahrhalten). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Immediate certainty: the immediate being of the object; 2) Negation of certainty: the non-being or being-other of the object; 3) Return to the first unity of certainty, but now as a certainty mediated by negation, i.e. truth (subjective truth, reckoned-to-be-true).
<p>(1) Etwas ist so; 2) nein, es ist nicht so; 3) ja, es ist doch so.)</p>	<p>(1.) Something is thus and so; 2. no, it is not thus and so; 3. yes, it is actually thus and so.)</p>

Table 5: §13

<p>Da das Wahre dem Bewußtsey als dasjenige gilt, was der Gegen- stand ansich sey, dieses aber noch unterschieden wird von demje- nigen, was er für das Bewußtsey ist; oder von dem Wissen und Er- kennen des Gegenstandes:</p>	<p>Consciousness takes the true to be what the object is in-itself, which is, however, as of yet differentiated from what it is for consciousness, or differentiated from the knowing and cognising of the object:</p>
<p>soliegt bei dieser Unterscheidung die Vorstellung nahe, daß das Wahre oder das Ansich des Gegenstandes und das Erkennen, jedes fürsich und vom andern getrennt, beide gleichsam durch eine zwischen sie fallende Grenze absolut geschieden seyen.</p>	<p>and this differentiation seems to suggest that the true, or the in-itself, of the object and the cognising, each only for-itself and isolated from the other, are absolutely separated by a border between the two.</p>
<p>Und da es ungewiß scheint, ob das Erkennen, wenn es geradezu an die Sache selbst geht, d. h. wenn es erkennen will, sich auch wirklich dessen, was an sich ist, bemächtigen könne, und nicht vielleicht statt der Wahrheit den Irrthum erfasse:</p>	<p>It remains uncertain whether the cognising does in fact manage to grasp the in-itself when it directly approaches the thing, i.e. when it wants to grasp it; uncertain whether it actu- ally commits an error instead of grasping truth:</p>
<p>so entsteht die Frage, ob nicht das Erkennen selbst zuvor nach seinem Vermögen und Umfang oder nach seiner Wirkungsweise zu prüfen und zu untersuchen sey, um hienach durch Hinzuthun oder Abziehen, durch Verbesse- rung und Berichtigung dessen, was das Erkennen bei der Sache thut, das Wahre selbst desto reiner herausbringen zu können.</p>	<p>out of this, the question arises whether cognising itself is first to be analysed with regards to its capacity and extent or its principles of operation to then go on and distil the true in a more pristine form via ad- ditions and subtractions, im- provement and correction.</p>

Table 6: §14

<p>Allein so sehr nach dem ersten Ansichsein eine vorgängige Prüfung des Erkenntnißvermögens in Beziehung auf Zweifel solcher Art sich als nothwendig und beifallswürdig empfiehlt:</p>	<p>Just as much as an a priori analysis of the capacity of cognition (having transcended the initial in-itself) may appear to be necessary in relation to doubt of this kind:</p>
<p>so wenig zeigen sich diese Bedenklichkeiten und Zweifel bei ihrer eigenen näheren Betrachtung und Prüfung, der sie zuvor selbst zu unterwerfen sind, als etwas auf der Wahrheit der Sache Beruhendes und das Erkennen selbst Förderndes.</p>	<p>little are these concerns and doubts, after their examination and analysis (as they themselves must first be called into doubt), grounded in the truth of the thing, and neither do they facilitate cognising itself.</p>
<p>Es sey daß das Erkennen dabei als ein thätiges Werkzeug oder als ein bloß positives Medium genommen werde:</p>	<p>Following this train of thought, cognising is taken to be an operative tool or a mere positive medium:</p>
<p>so ist dieses schon eine willkürliche Voraussetzung und Annahme, welche etwas Fremdartiges von aussen, das weder für sich gerechtfertigt auftritt, noch in der näheren Betrachtung seiner Anwendbarkeit sich bewährt, zur Sache mitbringt und hereinträgt, und diese vielmehr ändert, als sie läßt, wie sie unmittelbar ist.</p>	<p>since this is by itself already an arbitrary presupposition and presumption, smuggling in foreign determinations from the outside that are neither justified nor stand the test in practical application; in fact, the thing is hereby transformed into something different than what it is in its immediacy.</p>

<p>Eben so willkürlich und blindlings aufgegriffen ist die Annahme und Vorstellung, welche in der obigen Frage uns selbst von unserem Erkennen trennt und unterscheidet;</p>	<p>Equally as arbitrary and blindly accepted as the problem stated above is the presumption according to which we ourselves are separated and differentiated from our cognising:</p>
<p>und als vollends ungerechtfertigt und Alles vielmehr schon voraussetzend oder hineintragend, was erst auszumitteln wäre, erscheint die Voraussetzung, welche in völliger Trennung erst unter Erkennen auf die eine, das Wahre oder Absolute auf die andere Seite stellt, und dann fragt, wie sie beide zusammenkommen, —</p>	<p>and in the light of the fact that this is completely unjustified, and that it already presupposes everything that would first have had to be called into question, this presupposition first puts cognising on the one side and the true or absolute on the other side, only to go on and ask how both are to be reconciled;</p>
<p>eine Voraussetzung, die um so unwahrer wird, wenn sie zugleich unter Erkennen, welches doch, nach dieser Annahme, für sich noch kein Erkennen des Wahren seyn, oder vorerst ausser dem Wahren und Absoluten sich heruntreiben soll, gleichwohl als etwas Wahres und Reelles und für sich Gültiges gelten läßt.</p>	<p>a presupposition that becomes even less true if cognising is considered to be both: [A.] on the one hand, cognising is in its current form (according to this very presumption) in fact unable to grasp the true, or it must be initially external to the true and absolute; [B.] but at the same time this knowledge is then taken to be something true, real and valid for-itself.</p>

Table 7: §15	
<p>Indem daher hier jede bloße Voraussetzung, welche es mit einem für sich und ausser dem Erkennen bestehenden Wahren zu thun hat, als eine solche zunächst beseitigt wird:</p>	<p>After first eradicating each and every mere presupposition in play here, which is related to a truth that is for-itself and external to cognising:</p>
<p>haben wir uns vielmehr, als mit dem unmittelbaren Gegenstande, den wir suchen, mit der Wahrheit unseres Wissens und Erkennens selbst zu beschäftigen und dieser uns durch die nähere Betrachtung und Untersuchung zu versichern.</p>	<p>we now have to engage with the truth of our own knowing and cognising itself to gain certainty of it via closer examination, instead of engaging with the immediate object which we seek.</p>
<p>Wenn aber unser Wissen und Erkennen ein wahres ist, so folgt von selbst, daß es auch ein Wissen und Erkennen des Wahren sey, weil es im entgegengesetzten Falle vielmehr ein unwahres seyn würde.</p>	<p>If, however, our knowing and cognising is true, then it naturally follows that they are a knowing and cognising of truth, as they would simply be untrue in the opposite case [§18, p. 87].</p>

paedecutal aspect of phenomenology as first philosophy and (meta-) science. Simply by applying the logic of doubt (solely grounded in consciousness's own experience) *self-reflexively* to itself, without imposing an *external* criterion of truth and without any *external* reflection does the doubting refute itself. Presuppositionlessness, foundationlessness; nothing more than the individual consciousness and its very own immanent logic *learning* something about itself, from its own errors and its own performative self-contradictions. The sceptical approach to the world must necessarily collapse due to its logical structure, as it

must doubt its own measuring stick, its own criterion for doubting, which functions as its presupposed criterion for truth.

Phenomenology in this sense is *disillusioning*; the self-revelation of the self-imposed phantasmagoria. From illusions to “APPEARANCES” (*φαινόμενον/phainómenon*)...

Section B-2-3: Dialectics of ‘Phenomenon’ and ‘Noumenon’ (§§16–20)

Gabler asks the GENETIC QUESTION about the becoming of consciousness: How does the “differentiation,” (§10) the “split” (§12) in consciousness, *arise* between how things are in-themselves and how they are for-consciousness? How does the ABOUTNESS of consciousness’s representations arise in experience? As explicated throughout the selected parts of the text, the phenomenologist, and, in fact, consciousness itself, can answer this question based purely on its very own phenomena, its “experience,” its “appearances” (§§19–20). Just like Hume’s classic example of the bent stick (in-itself) that merely *appears* to be bent because it is half-submerged into water (for-consciousness), by committing myself, reflecting on my actions, and taking responsibility for my own errors, the world “transforms” from something that I assumed to be merely “in-itself” (mind-independent, external, isolated etc.) into an appearance-for-I, a BEING-FOR-CONSCIOUSNESS. The world *is* only in and through the process-nature of consciousness’s own activity. There is no transcendent beyond, no god’s-eye view, no view from nowhere.

This dialectical interplay is the immanent logic of “error” (§13, p. 79). And, following this logic, *interpreting* the world *always already* entails *changing* the world; the phenomenological inversion of Marx’s 11th thesis on Feuerbach, turning Marx on his head: “Philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is to *change* it,”¹⁵ (Marx 1845). Interpretation always already entails change (and vice versa); consciousness is a self-adaptive system which *self-reflexively*

15 Karl Marx’s 11th thesis on Feuerbach (1845): “Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert, es kommt drauf an, sie zu verändern.” (emphasis original).

Table 8: §16

<p>So gewiß aber im Bewußtseyn das wissende Ich seiner selbst ist, und Gewißheit von einem Andern dadurch hat, daß es das Wissen von ihm als seine eigene Bestimmtheit weiß (§. 11.):</p>	<p>However, just as the knowing I is certain about itself in its consciousness, and as far as it has certainty of its other in virtue of knowing this other as its very own determination (§11, p. 74):</p>
<p>so gewiß ist es auch für das Bewußtsein, daß Alles, was wir einen Gegenstand nennen, von dem wir wissen, zunächst nur unser Wissen von ihm ist.</p>	<p>So, too, is consciousness certain that everything which we call an object, that everything which we know about this object is first and foremost only our knowing of it.</p>
<p>Wenn aber unser Wissen und Erkennen ein wahres ist, so folgt von selbst, daß es auch ein Wissen und Erkennen des Wahren sey, weil es im entgegengesetzten Falle vielmehr ein unwahres sey würde.</p>	<p>If, however, our knowing and cognising is true, then it naturally follows that they are a knowing and cognising of truth, as they would simply be untrue in the opposite case [§18, p. 87].</p>
<p>Es sey, daß der vom Bewußtseyn unterschiedene Gegenstand auch ausser dem Wissen vorhanden ist:</p>	<p>It may be the case that the object that is differentiated from consciousness does have a being of its own outside of this knowing.</p>
<p>die Frage, ob er es ist oder nicht, geht uns hier zunächst nichts an; zunächst ist nur so viel gewiß, daß er im Wissen vorhanden ist, und das Bewußtseyn muß dieses Seyn des Gegenstandes für es, wodurch es eben sein Wissen ist, als seine eigene Bestimmtheit anerkennen.</p>	<p>Here, however, this question is not yet relevant. At first, we are only certain of this much: The object is present in knowing and consciousness has to recognise the being of this object for-itself as its very own determination.</p>

reincorporates its own feedback loops in and through what is other-to-itself. Consciousness must *necessarily* commit errors — which only *appear* as errors *for* consciousness in retrospect (each and every experience is always-already retroactively mediated in this sense), a posteriori — to learn, to grow, to mature and to develop. This is also why Hegel refers to phenomenology as the “*path of suffering*,”¹⁶ (Hegel 1907). *Via dolorosa*.

The realisation and incorporation of this factum gives phenomenology a therapeutic connotation; every mistake is a lesson. To put it in Kantian terms, reason is judge, judged and advocate, all at the same time. Reason (Figure 1: Hegel and Gabler’s system of phenomenology on page 61, 1.3) or Consciousness (1) in general, must take responsibility, and think for itself; the photophobic soul must jump over its own shadow and set foot outside of its Platonic cave, into the bountiful light of philosophy. To the contrary, Descartes had tried to eliminate all possibility of error right from the get-go, *a priori*;¹⁷ the self-doubting consciousness is too afraid to *commit* itself. This also marks the problem of Kant’s transcendental method, which gave birth to German Idealism in the first place (Section 1). *Pons asinorum!*

The same then applies self-referentially to the phenomenologist herself, on a meta-level: She does not *passively* withdraw herself in her observation and interpretation of the individual conscious being; this absolute self-retraction is itself a self-reflexive *act* of granting space, letting consciousness’s very own immanent logic unfold itself, meeting it on its own ground. Here lies, *in nuce*, the prototypical pre-configuration of second-order cybernetics and system theory — and, for Hegel, the key to philosophy and science themselves; the phenomenologist is like an ornithologist, dressing up as a feathered creature to observe *birds of paradise*.

16 Our own translation, from the *Introduction* to Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (ed. 1907), p. 54: “Er kann deshalb als der *Weg des Zweifels* angesehen werden [...]” (emphasis original).

17 I am here, of course, referring to Descartes’s ‘sum cogitans’ from his *meditationes de prima philosophia* (later changed it into ‘cogito ergo sum’ by his editors; the ‘ergo,’ however, results in misleading connotations). Descartes’s dualistic subject stands in opposition to Kant’s transcendental reason and Hegel’s immanent spirit.

Table 9: §17

<p>Diese Bestimmtheit macht für das Bewußtseyn zugleich die Wahrheit und das Wesen des Gegenstandes aus; er ist nur dasjenige, als was er gewußt wird.</p>	<p>By the same token, this determination constitutes the truth and the essence of the object; the object merely is what the object is known to be.</p>
<p>Welche besondere Bestimmungen (Momente, Merkmale, Beschaffenheiten,) der Gegenstand auch haben möge, die das Bewußtseyn an ihm findet und unterscheidet, das Seyn desselben ist hier dem Wissen von ihm gleich.</p>	<p>Here, the being and knowing of this being are the same — regardless of any particular determination (moment, characteristic, constitution etc.) in the object, determinations which consciousness finds and differentiates therein.</p>
<p>Findet das Bewußtseyn in seinem Wissen vom Gegenstande oder in demjenigen, was er für es ist, sich nicht befriedigt, oder, was dasselbe heißt, erscheint ihm seine Bestimmtheit, in welcher es ihn weiß, ungenügend, das Seyn und Wesen des Gegenstandes nicht erreichend (oder auch so: schreibt es dem Gegenstande noch ein ihm unbekanntes Seyn zu, welches noch kein Seyn für es geworden ist);</p>	<p>If consciousness does not find self-satisfaction in its knowing of the object or in what it is for-itself — or if, which is equivalent to this, its determinacy (in which consciousness knows the object) does appear to be insufficient to arrive at the being and essence of the object (— or if consciousness still ascribes to its object an unknown being which has not yet become a being-for-itself);</p>
<p>geht es folglich über diese seine Bestimmtheit, als welche zuerst und bisher der Gegenstand ihm galt, und in welcher sein Wissen dem Seyn des Gegenstandes gleich war, hinaus:</p>	<p>if consciousness does hereby go beyond its own determination, which first determined what the object was up to this point, and in which its knowing was identical to the being of the object:</p>

<p>so wird es auch sein Wissen darnach ändern, oder hat es vielmehr schon geändert, eben in und mit diesem Hinausgehen.</p>	<p>then consciousness will also transform its knowing accordingly; in fact, consciousness has already transformed it in and through this very process of self-transcending.</p>
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Table 10: §18	
<p>Hiemit aber hat der Gegenstand gegen das, was als was er zuvor dem Bewußtseyn galt, nothwendig und unmittelbar sich ebenfalls geändert; er ist das, als was das Bewußtseyn ihn jetzt weiß.</p>	<p>Hereby, however, the object has also necessarily transformed in opposition to what it was for consciousness beforehand; the object is now what consciousness knows it to be.</p>
<p>Würde er hierin, in seiner jetzigen Bestimmtheit, welche sein Wissen, und eben so auch sein Seyn für das Bewußtseyn ausmacht, ihm wieder nicht genügen, oder, was dasselbe ist, auch so ihm unwahr erscheinen:</p>	<p>If the object in its current determination, which is constitutive of its knowing and its being-for-consciousness, would turn out to be unable to satisfy consciousness, — or if it would appear to be untrue to consciousness (which is equivalent to the first case):</p>
<p>so würde es von neuem sein Wissen ändern, aber damit auch der Gegenstand nicht der vorige bleiben, sondern ein anderer oder geänderter werden, u. s. f.</p>	<p>then consciousness would transform its knowing again, just as the object would not remain to be the same as it was before, but instead become other or transform etc.</p>

<p>Allemal ändert sich der Gegenstand selbst, in der Bestimmtheit seines Seyns für das Bewußtseyn, zugleich mit dem Wissen.</p>	<p>In the determination of its being-for-consciousness, the object transforms itself, and always in accordance with consciousness's knowing.</p>
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Table 11: §19	
<p>Oder, nennen wir das für wahr gehaltene Seyn oder Wesen des Gegenstandes, wie ihn die Gewißheit des Bewußtseyns zuerst unmittelbar erfaßt hat, das, was er ansich ist, und geht über dieses Ansichseyn desselben das Bewußtseyn, sein Wissen von ihm ändernd, hinaus, (mit welcher Bewegung nach §. 18. der Gegenstand selbst nicht mehr der vorige bleibt, sondern ein anderer, wie es ihn nämlich jetzt weiß, wird):</p>	<p>Or if we refer to the in-itself as that which consciousness (in its immediate certainty) assumed to be the object's true being or essence — and if consciousness self-transcends this in-itself by changing its knowledge of it (which, according to §18, marks the movement in virtue of which the object does not remain to be what it is and instead becomes other, becomes what consciousness in fact now knows it to be):</p>
<p>so hört es damit, weil es das ihm zur Unwahrheit Gewordene nicht länger als das Ansich festhalten kann, auch auf, sein erstes Wissen für ein wahres zu halten;</p>	<p>then consciousness also stops to take its initial knowing to be a true one, as it can no longer hold that which has now become the untrue for the in-itself;</p>
<p>es erkennt, daß jenes Ansich nicht in Wahrheit ansich ist, sondern nur für dieses Bewußtseyn als solches galt.</p>	<p>it realizes that this in-itself is in fact not truly in-itself, as its validity only rests in its being-for-this-consciousness.</p>

Mit dieser Erkenntniß und Unterscheidung hat das Bewußt-seyn an ihm selbst eine **Erfahrung** gemacht, in welcher das, was ihm zuerst das Ansich des Gegenstandes war, sich als eine bloße **Erscheinung** und zwar als eine Erscheinung (το φαινόμενον, unterschieden von dem Gegenstand **an sich** und dem νοούμενον) sowohl des **Wissens (erscheinendes Wissen)** als des **nur so gewußten Gegegenstandes** darstellt.

With this knowledge and differentiation, consciousness has made an **experience** in and through its itself, according to which that which it first took to be the object-in-itself has turned out to be a mere **appearance**; an appearance (το φαινόμενον [phenomenon] in differentiation from the object **in-itself**, the νοούμενον [noumenon]) of both the **knowing (appearing knowledge)** as well as the known **object**, which is **only** known insofar it **appears**.

To reincorporate our *external* reflections, as developed in Section 1-3, this 'FORGIVING'-SPIRIT-qua-consciousness is but 1 stage of self-consciousness's reflections on self-consciousness as such (the Hegelian *Verzeihung*), 'recollecting' the entirety of its individual experiences throughout its own immanent self-development, and synthesising it to an organic whole, a system, or *Erinnerung*. *Er-inner-ung* here also functions as a play on words for Hegel, which can be literally rendered as 're-internal-isation,' a community of 're-member-ing' self-conscious beings).

Only in the phenomenological activities of forgiving and recollecting (or remembering) is the whole immanently present *as* a whole. Hegel's and Gabler's phenomenology is thus a **HOLISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY** (its equivalent in literature would be Proust's magnum opus *À la Recherche du Temps Perdu*), concerned with how everything relates to everything *in experience*.

The imagery that Hegel provides for this *speech act* of forgiving and recollecting, in the Preface to his *Philosophy of Right* (13 years after his *Phenomenology* and 7 years before Gabler's *Phenomenology*), is the **OWL OF MINERVA**, the nocturnal animal of knowledge which takes flight only *after* twilight has begun to close in, in a retroactive retotalisation.

Table 12: §20

<p>Was in dieser innerhalb des Bewußtseyns vorgehenden Bewegung und Veränderung enthalten und vorhanden ist, besteht in folgenden Momenten:</p>	<p>What is entailed within this movement and transformation of consciousness's immanence consists of the following moments:</p>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) das (unmittelbare) Wissen eines Gegenstandes oder das Seyn desselben für das Bewußtseyn in der Bestimmtheit des Ansichseyns oder der Wahrheit; 2) das Werden dieses Ansichseyns zum bloßen Seyn desselben für das Bewußtseyn (zur bloßen Erscheinung), oder das Wissen, daß das Seyn oder Wesen des Gegenstandes, wie es zuerst im Bewußtseyn war, nicht das Ansich desselben ist, sondern als solches nur dem Bewußtseyn galt (die Erfahrung); 3) die hiermit schon eingetretene Veränderung des Bewußtseyns, wie seines Gegenstandes. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) the (immediate) knowing of an object or its being-for-consciousness in the determinateness of being-in-itself or truth; 2) the becoming mere being-for-consciousness (mere appearance) of this being-in-itself, or the knowing of the fact that the object's being or essence, as initially grasped by consciousness, is in fact not the in-itself of the object, but as such only for-consciousness (i.e. experience); 3) the transformation of consciousness and its object, which was already implicitly in play in (2).
<p>Indem der Gegenstand hiermit ein anderer geworden ist, besteht diese Veränderung zunächst nur darin, daß sein anfängliches Ansich, seine Wahrheit nunmehr nur als Erscheinung gewußt wird;</p>	<p>Because the object has hereby transformed into another, this transformation first only consists in the fact that its initial in-itself, its truth, is from now on known to be only an appearance;</p>
<p>dieß macht seine jetzige Bestimmtheit und neue Gestalt aus;</p>	<p>this constitutes its current determinacy and its new shape;</p>
<p>dieß ist jetzt seine Wahrheit.</p>	<p>this is now its truth.</p>

Section B-3: 'Sensuous Consciousness' (§§38–39)

SENSE CERTAINTY; or, as we like to call it (half seriously, half jokingly): the *John Searle Consciousness of Naïve Realism*. Sensuous consciousness opens its eyes, and experiences the world in its *immediacy*.

Let's briefly consider this initial stage of NATURAL or ORDINARY consciousness. In other words, let's reflect the unreflected from the viewpoint of the reflected, meeting it on its own ground, with its own immanent logic; *forgiving* it. This is consciousness's immediacy, an intimate unity of experiencer and experienced without a mediating third term, and without any criterion for any kind of distinction; no differentiation between knower and known in play, a paradoxical structure in which subject and object have "always already vanished into each other"¹⁸ (Hegel 1833b) as *non-identical indiscernibles*. From 'consciousness (in the narrow sense)' (§§10–35) to 'sensuous consciousness or immediate certainty' (§§39–54)...¹⁹

Just as Hegelian philosophy refers to itself as 'speculative' philosophy (§11; the Latin *speculum* means 'mirror' or 'reflector,' a terminus used by Hegel and Gabler to denote the reflexivity of consciousness's [self-]knowledge), Gabler also carries on the long tradition of employing mirror symbolism to visualise consciousness, in this context:²⁰

Of what philosophical significance is sensuous consciousness *qua* immediate immanence as phenomenology's starting point? At the beginning of this essay, I discussed the problem of the Kantian transcendental framework which had given birth to German Idealism: What are the conditions of possibility for the transcendental method? And this immanent starting point — beginning with *the simplest of the*

18 An oft-cited phrase coined by Hegel himself in his *Science of Logic, Doctrine of Being* (1833), p. 78–79: "[...] *nicht übergeht —, sonder übergegangen ist.*"

19 Translation of Gabler's *Doctrine of Philosophical Propaedeutic* (1827), §§38–39, p. 120–123: "*Das Bewußtseyn (in engerer Bedeutung, im Gegensatze des Selbstbewußtseyns),*" "*Das sinnliche Bewußtseyn oder die unmittelbare Gewißheit.*"

20 SPIRIT is like the NET OF INDRA, a system network in which each jewel reflects each and every other jewel, thereby preserving within itself the essence of this self-differentiating whole. For the role of Hegel's mirror symbolism in his philosophy and its role in the history of philosophy as such refer to: Alper Turken's 9-page essay *The Mystical Content of Hegel's Concept of the Speculative* (2015).

Table 13: §38
Transition to Sensuous Consciousness

<p>Das Bewußtseyn, wie es sich zuerst gibt und findet, — und wie es sich gibt, wird es von uns in der wissenschaftlichen Behandlung seiner Erfahrungen auch bloß aufgenommen, — ist das unmittelbare, bei welchem es selbst sich nicht bewußt ist, noch irgend etwas für sein Wissen von einem Gegenstande gethan zu haben, sondern ihn nur unmittelbar hat, wie er sich ihm darstellt.</p>	<p>Consciousness, as it initially behaves and as what it takes itself to be — and how it behaves is first merely registered in the scientific analysis of its experience — is the immediate, in which consciousness is neither conscious of itself nor contributing anything to its knowledge of an object; it merely takes the object as it immediately presents itself to it.</p>
<p>Es ist nur Ich und ein Andres, welches nicht Ich ist, vielmehr ein ihm Aeußerliches und Fremdes, ein Gegebenes und Vorgefundenes.</p>	<p>There is only the I and the other, which is not the I, but in fact something external or foreign to it: a given and encountered other.</p>
<p>Und so wie dieses Gegebene für das Bewußtseyn ein Unmittelbares oder Seyendes ist, so ist es selbst auch auf diesen seinen Gegenstand unmittelbar bezogen, die einfache unvermittelte Gewißheit desselben.</p>	<p>And just as this given is an immediacy or a being that is for-consciousness, just as much is consciousness itself immediately related to its object, its simple unmediated certainty of the object.</p>
<p>Es ist so mit seinem Gegenstande zunächst noch in unmittelbarer, gediegener Einheit; indem es ihn unmittelbar hat oder völlig in ihm nur ist, noch nicht einmal sich selbst von ihm unterscheidend, nur der wiedergebende Spiegel, der von sich und seinem Wiedergeben nichts weiß.</p>	<p>As such, consciousness is initially in immediate, peaceful unity with its object. Insofar as a conscious being has its object in its immediacy and completely exhausts itself within it, not even differentiating itself from its object, it is only this reflecting mirror that knows nothing about itself nor the reflected.</p>

<p>Denn das Bewußtwerden hievon ist schon Reflexion des Bewußtseyns auf sich, oder die Unterscheidung (vgl. §. 10.), wodurch das Andre erst als Andres dem Ich, und dieses ihm gegenüber tritt.</p>	<p>Thus, the process of becoming-conscious of this would already be a reflection of consciousness about itself, or the differentiation (§10, p. 72) in and through which it first encountered the other as the other of itself.</p>
<p>Eben so wenig unterscheidet es zuerst in dem unmittelbaren Haben seines Gegenstandes, daß es ihn durch sein Sehen oder Hören u. s. w. hat, oder daß der Gegenstand überhaupt durch das Mittel der Sinne an es gelangt: was ebenfalls erst durch eine weitere Reflexion, Erinnerung und Unterscheidung geschieht.</p>	<p>Just as little does consciousness first — within its immediate having of the object — differentiate the object in such a way that it has this object in virtue of seeing or hearing etc. or that the object as such only gets to it via the medium of its senses. This too only occurs with a further reflection, recollection and differentiation.</p>
<p>Da aber Alles, was so unmittelbar Gegenstand des Bewußtseyns wird, nur durch die Sinne ihm zukommt, so bestimmt es sich dadurch als sinnliches Bewußtseyn, und sein Gegenstand im Ganzen als sinnliche Welt (Sinnenwelt).</p>	<p>But insofar everything which happens to become an immediate object for-consciousness only gets to it via the senses, consciousness is determined to be a sensuous consciousness and its object as a whole a sensuous world (sense-world).</p>

Table 14: §39 Sensuous Consciousness or Immediate Certainty	
<p>Das sinnliche Bewußtseyn, wie es als solches sich giebt und die allererste Weise eines Wissens von Etwas ist, tritt auf als die unmittelbare Gewißheit aller Gegenstände der Aussenwelt; und da ihm der ganze Reichthum dieser sinnlichen Welt angehört, so besitzt es hieran auch einen Reichthum und eine endlose Fülle unmittelbar gewisser Wahrheiten.</p>	<p>Sensuous consciousness, the first mode of a knowing-of-something, erupts as the immediate certainty of all objects in the outer world. And since the whole richness of the sensuous world participates within it, consciousness also has a richness and endless abundance of immediately certain truths of it.</p>
<p>Da ferner am Gegenstände wesentlich von ihm weder etwas davon noch dazu gethan wird, der Gegenstand vielmehr vollständig und unverändert genommen und gelassen wird, wie er sich darbietet: so scheint es nicht bloß das reichste, sondern auch das vollständigste, wahrhafteste und allerrealste Bewußtseyn zu seyn.</p>	<p>Since nothing is intentionally added nor taken away from the object, and since the object is in fact taken in its completeness and left unchanged, just as it presents itself: it appears to be not only the richest, but also the most complete, truest and the most real consciousness.</p>
<p>Der Gegenstand ist daher nicht bloß ein unmittelbarer für dieses Bewußtseyn, sondern er gilt ihm auch als ansichsehend, als Wesen und Wahrheit.</p>	<p>The object is therefore not only an immediate object-for-consciousness, but consciousness also takes it to be in-and-for-itself, as essence and truth.</p>

simple, gradually developing into richer and more complex determinations of consciousness — is Hegel's and Gabler's *genetic* solution. Husserl's concept for this is TRANSCENDENTAL GENESIS (*transzendente Genesis*).

After going through the entire development explicated in Hegelian phenomenology, we arrive at FORGIVING SPIRIT and RECOLLECTING SPIRIT (as already seen in Section 1-3 and Section 2-2-3). The ultimate punchline is that this *final* stage of consciousness is yet another "return" (§12, p. 77) to the beginning: a return to IMMANENCE; this time, not as a *sensuous* (i.e. immediate) immanence, but as a *developmental* immanence, which consciousness itself has dynamically developed out of its very own becoming, throughout all its stages and failures (i.e. self-mediation). The *simplest* and *highest* shapes of consciousness (not in the hierarchical sense of a master-slave relation) turn out to coincide: the *absolute* is revealed to have been implicitly in play all along, in each and every shape of consciousness.

Section C-1: Synopsis — 'System'

CONSCIOUSNESS — the phenomenological subject — is an organic system that *is* only *in*, *through* and *out* of the immanence of its own self-development. More specifically, the SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT qua consciousness is nothing but this error-incorporating, system-conceptualising consciousness that *recollects* all of its previous developmental stages by *forgiving* each of them, even though the world-view and logic of each stage of consciousness's stages appears deficient and incomplete in retrospect, it still engages with them based on their own individuality, their own ground, their own immanent logic. By doing so, the categories themselves (Forgiving Spirit, Recollecting Spirit, &c.) are rendered thematic and self-reflexively applied; the form becomes the content; the form *of* the form. This is how object- and meta-level come to coincide (SELF-RELATION); this is the aspect of second-order cybernetics, and the condition for the possibility of the Kantian transcendental method.

In the 'Introduction' to the 'Transcendental Logic' of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant argues that "Concepts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind,"²¹ (Kant 1771). By "empty", Kant means without empirical content, and therefore, without objective validity. But in phenomenology, self-consciousness is to itself its own content. Yet, Hegel reincorporates the Kantian dictum in the sense that the result of the dialectical development is inseparable from its conceptual content. More specifically: The striking difference here is that Kant insists on the fact that the transcendental I (*transzendentales Ich*) cannot give itself its own content, and, therefore, remains purely "empty" or indeterminate without AFFECTION (*Affektion*) from the outside, from the noumenon, the *external thing*; thus, the noumenon is the condition for the possibility of consciousness as such. Consciousness is always a consciousness *of something*; idealism as such must therefore necessarily presuppose a pre-reflexive being. This is the TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT.

Where Kant thinks that he begins with a self-evident starting point, Hegel now introduces an entire science. There are *de facto* forms of (self-)consciousness that take themselves — based on their own first-person perspectives — to be operating without external affection, or with different conceptualisations of what the noumenal realm may or may not be, given their own way of synthesising the chaotic manifoldness of their experience. This is to say that phenomenology investigates the entire conceptual space of *possibilities*, without dismissing any of the (defective) moments of (self-)consciousness from the outset, from 'immediate intuition' (the beginning of phenomenology) to 'thinking thinking thinking' (the end of phenomenology as a propædeutical pre-science, and the beginning of logic and Science proper). The analogy to second-order cybernetics highlights the self-reflexivity and auto-referentiality of this system, and its immanence.

21 Our translation, from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* > *Transcendental Doctrine of Elements* > *Transcendental Logic* > *Introduction* > *Idea of a Transcendental Logic* > *On Logic as such*: "Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind" (KrV B75 / A48).

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