

PREVENTION OF DELINQUENCY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN FRANCE

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A look back through history shows that periods known for insecurity and higher crime invariably saw profound economic or social change, such as industrialisation, rapid urbanisation, economic crisis, political transformations and even war. This simple fact is sufficient to demonstrate that, statistically at any rate, crime as a phenomenon is not unrelated to other forms of disorder or difficulty.

Whether in the United States and western Europe since the 1970s or in central and eastern Europe more recently, the question of "insecurity" has gone hand in hand with economic, social and political upheaval, becoming a matter of priority for many States and decision-makers. All seek better strategies to contend with this phenomenon, but as yet, no one seems to have found the "panacea".

Responses to crime have varied quite widely from one period to another and from one country to another, ranging from a failure to recognise difficulties and an abdication of responsibility on the part of the public authorities to policies focusing exclusively on punishment, involving large-scale reliance on prison and harsh sentencing. Between these two extremes, there have been attempts to deal with the problem by emphasising social and economic development, equal opportunities and, hence, the reduction of social tensions, and by giving priority to crime prevention, the rehabilitation of offenders and the fight against recidivism.

In an effort to deal with crime, France itself has attempted a variety of methods, from which a number of lessons may be learned.

First, however, some comments are called for, as the subject of this paper is concerned with means other than strictly punitive ones to combat serious crime, namely preventive action in the fields of social policy and urban development.

One cannot discuss crime prevention and social development without first making a number of preliminary remarks. For a long

time, no distinction was drawn between the different types of crime; the response was the same: treatment through punishment or nothing. Then, the interest of the international community focused for a while on two types of crime originally perceived as being separate: on the one hand, there is serious crime, whether organised or not, which leads above all to a mobilisation of the state law-enforcement apparatus, at times requires the use of technology and considerable means to fight it and entails international cooperation, harmonised legislation and effective prosecution and punishment. When we talk about this form of crime, we are referring, more or less consciously, to a small number of crime “professionals”. Italy was one of the pioneers in this area. It is a form of crime that is not very visible, but has a heavy impact: the cost of economic crime alone is estimated to amount to 90 % of the overall financial cost of all crime. On the other hand, there is everyday, ordinary, less serious crime, often known as urban crime. It is much less professional, but many more persons, especially young people, are occasionally or regularly involved. It is also much more visible (accounting for 80 % of crime statistics), and is closer to people, engendering a sense of insecurity. It is very directly linked to social development, people’s difficulties, unemployment, consumer attitudes and the sense of a bleak future: in a word, it is intimately associated with the economic crisis.

In the light of this crisis, the usual penal responses often seem inadequate, belated and inflexible, and have a desocialising effect. Treating such crime means treating society and its ills. During the 1980s, France made this type of crime a priority and produced entirely new strategies involving in a local partnership all those active in the penal process and social development.

In an approach that is confined to these two phenomena, it may appear naive or in any case inappropriate to speak of “other means” of combating serious crime: “professional” criminals (large-scale traffickers or financial criminals who offer or accept bribes) often come from a sort of elite which knows no social problems (businessmen, elected officials, lawyers) and thus need no help with social reintegration.

The only reason why this question of “other responses” for combating serious crime makes any sense is because today there is a much better understanding of just how interrelated serious and petty crime are.

For serious crime, petty criminals often serve as a “breeding ground”, one of the first places for recruitment being prison and/or a “support” that major criminals rely on for back-up work: preparing

the crime, being on the lookout, disposing of the merchandise, seeking customers. This essential cooperation is particularly visible in the area of drug trafficking and terrorism, but also in mafia organisations.

One element that is new in this regard is the increasingly frequent involvement, among petty criminals, of entire family or social groups, which at first tolerate and eventually support them. This phenomenon is associated with unemployment and the lack of other resources, in a context in which the fruits of crime constitute a real “substitute income”.

These people regard serious crime as something positive, because:

- 1) it provides income;
- 2) it ensures a degree of local social order, because major criminals do not want to be disturbed in their activities by a too frequent presence of the police;
- 3) those concerned often do not notice the adverse consequences of such activity for society;
- 4) perpetrators of serious crime also often invest in difficult neighbourhoods in order to “launder” money there (shops, restaurants, etc.).

Hence the importance of combating economic stagnation, the social crisis and the growth of less serious crime by conducting a crime and recidivism prevention strategy and attempting to keep serious and petty crime at a distance from one another.

There are a number of ways in which this may be done, for example by keeping the two kinds of criminals apart in prison, ensuring that the public authorities control the drug supply and promoting social resistance to crime by furthering education, instilling values and providing people with other ways of achieving social and economic fulfilment so that they can see that, even if they are unemployed, they have the potential for things other than committing crime.

In the light of these two types of crime, there is a need to introduce new, coherent and complementary strategies and ways of organising social and penal machinery. The fight against organised crime calls for specialised police and courts which often need to be organised at a high level, and indeed internationally. The fight against ordinary crime on the other hand calls for local police and courts that are well integrated in the community and in close contact with all elected officials, public and social services, etc.

The police and courts must also be organised for some purposes on generalist lines, and for others (drug addiction, victims of violence, etc) on specialist lines.

We shall now briefly review the various aspects of penal policy in France and then consider in greater depth the strategy experimented with in recent years of crime prevention based on social development.

1. History of the Fight against Crime

1.1. Human rights as foundations of social and criminal policies

The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 recognises a number of fundamental principles, which have been reasserted since then in the various French constitutions and in the Universal Declaration of 1948. These include the principles of equality and fraternity and the principles of liberty and security.

Since then, successive political strategies have sought to give substance to these principles. On the basis of the principles of equality and fraternity (today one would tend to say “solidarity”), a tradition has been built of sound social policies guaranteed by State and community: state-funded compulsory education, a system of social security (to guarantee the right to health), pensions and family benefits, paid holidays, maternity and child welfare, housing benefits, guaranteed minimum wage, etc.

In the name of these principles, the community sets out to maintain a certain balance between citizens and to offset inequalities to the greatest extent possible, usually by providing assistance in the form of benefits for individual recipients. The principle of “safety”, described in the 1789 Declaration as a “natural and inalienable right of man guaranteed by a public power instituted for the benefit of all”, is the foundation of our system of law and criminal justice. At the same time it creates a permanent legal and political tension between safety (now usually referred to as “solidarity”) and “liberty”.

For a long time, the State responded in a completely different manner to these two categories of obligations, which were perceived as unrelated to each other.

Social policies served to “assist” people in danger of becoming alienated from society, while criminal policies were designed to ensure security, punishing those who undermined it by breaking the law; which is another way in which people became alienated.

For many years, combating crime was thus confined to prosecuting and punishing offenders. In actual fact, the choice of punishment was limited to fines, imprisonment – a kind of “banishment” from society – or capital punishment.

Immediately after the end of the second world war (under the impetus, it is said, of “decent people” who had experienced prison), France saw the first signs of change, the two hitherto separate strategies gradually becoming more and more interdependent. Criminologists and those in charge of criminal policy grew increasingly interested in possibilities for treating crime as a social problem.

1.2. Punishment and/or rehabilitation?

The first step, and by no means the least important one, was taken by introducing the possibility for the children’s judge to impose, instead of the usual forms of punishment, educational measures for juvenile offenders and for minors in danger. Later, laws were passed making provision for release under certain conditions (judicial supervision, release on parole and probation), which increasingly took on a socio-educational character, and alternatives to imprisonment (suspension of various licences, confiscation of property, community service). In the 70’s and especially the 80’s, emphasis was clearly placed on the need to give priority to the rehabilitation of offenders; this often implied a better socialisation, i.e. a return to employment, health care, housing ...

All these measures helped and assisted the offender, in exchange for varying degrees of supervision by the police, the courts or social workers. Aimed above all at preventing recidivism, some of these measures may, owing to their coercive nature (“either you comply with them or you’ll return to prison”), violate certain freedoms to some extent (prohibition on frequenting certain places or keeping company with certain persons, obligation to submit to treatment, seek employment etc.). However, given that there are measures applied in accordance with judicial decisions, the restrictions that they place on the rights of the individual, in so far as they do not violate his or her fundamental rights (dignity, privacy, integrity, procedural rights, etc.), do not pose any particular problems.

1.3. From punishment of crime to its prevention

The beginning of the 1980s saw a shift from a policy of treating the offender, of responding *a posteriori*, to one that focused on crime prevention as a social problem.

Crime soared throughout the 60’s and above all the 70’s, and with it came a perceptible heightened sense of insecurity (double the number of offences in 1975 as in 1967, five times as many armed

robberies, double the number of hold-ups). This development affected towns in particular, with a noticeable increase in the less serious offences (theft, damage to property, etc) that created a strong feeling of insecurity among the population, 67% of those questioned stated at the time that they felt less safe.

This situation came about and worsened against the backdrop of an incipient economic crisis. In this context, the usual means for fighting crime seemed insufficient: reliance on the police and the courts to respond to urban crime, whose perpetrators are difficult to identify (success rate in solving cases: about 20%), remained the exception. Procedures and penalties were often considered too cumbersome and ill-suited to "petty offenders", and imprisonment was denounced as encouraging recidivism (approximately 50%) and even the transition to serious crime.

Politicians could not remain indifferent to these developments, insecurity having become a major concern of the State. The government of the time, after attempting a strategy that focused on treating the phenomenon as a social problem rather than relying on punishment after the fact (Peyrefitte's report on violence)¹, yielded to the pressure of public opinion and eventually, just before the presidential election of 1981, passed a repressive "security and freedoms" act which was sharply criticised by the opposition. Several months later, the Left came to power and immediately was faced with an outbreak of urban violence, demanding novel responses to a number of problems. It had to deal with the problem of crime, not ignore it, cut short the exploitation of this phenomenon for political purposes and come up with new and more effective ways of combating crime, not through massive additional expenditure, given the already difficult economic situation, but through a redeployment of resources.

1.4. A pragmatic approach and partnership structures

Aware that France's problems were not confined to a problem of urban crime but also reflected real difficulties of urban social development, the government of the time commissioned two reports. In May 1982, the Prime Minister entrusted 36 mayors of all political leanings with the task of carrying out, under the guidance of Mr Gilbert Bonnemaïson, a study of problems relating to security and

¹ *Réponse à la violence; Documentation Française 1977.*

making proposals for contending with the growth in the less serious types of crime. More than 800 mayors were consulted, and the final report, unanimously approved in December 1982, proposed specific measures, based on the local experience of the members of the commission and their colleagues. The main thrust of the report² can be summarised as follows:

“Security must not be a matter for the police and the courts alone: it must be a matter for all. Criminal acts must not go unanswered”.

Another mayor, Mr Dubedout, was asked to analyse the difficulties that certain urban neighbourhoods were encountering in all spheres and to make proposals for furthering their social and economic development. This report laid the foundations for an integrated, partnership-based urban social development policy.

At first, these two problems – crime prevention and urban social development – were addressed independently. Then, in 1988, the two national commissions were merged, to form the “Interministerial Delegation for Urban Affairs”. This body received fresh impetus in 1991 with the setting up of a Ministry of Urban Affairs, which has continued in different forms under all subsequent governments, including the present one.

Today, “crime prevention” is one of the priorities of the Ministry of Urban Affairs, alongside urban planning and social and economic development, this all being part of one and the same overall integrated approach, known as “urban policy”.

2. The Fight against Crime since 1982

The recommendations of the Mayors’ Commission on Security have profoundly marked French strategy in fighting crime, and urban crime in particular. The very title of the report was highly programmatic: “Combating crime: prevention, punishment, solidarity”.

2.1. The diagnosis

The most important elements of the diagnosis, drawn from the experience of all these mayors and forming the basis for the new strategy, are as follows:

- The traditional approach in terms of police and the courts is insufficient for controlling crime.

² *Face à la délinquance, prévention, répression, solidarité – Commission des maires sur la sécurité – Documentation française 1983.*

- The factors involved in crime are very similar to those that lead to suicide, alcoholism, drug addiction and mental illness, notably: grave changes in family life, worsening housing conditions, unemployment, the disappearance of informal or traditional methods of social control and the absence of leisure or cultural activities. Needless to say, these factors are exacerbated in a context marked by large-scale and long-term unemployment, expanding drug trade and the presence of more and more consumer goods which are inaccessible to a large part of the population.
- To be effective, a long-term policy for curbing crime must combat these factors and must be open-ended and able to adapt to local circumstances. Such a challenge must bring together all those involved at the local level: the police, the courts, social services, the departments responsible for public health, education, youth and sport, culture, housing etc., but also elected officials and other representatives of the population, such as trade unions, associations and voluntary organisations. Such a strategy must prevail over bureaucratic behaviour, facilitate the redeployment of resources and educate the public so as to overcome the stereotypes which media exploitation of crime helps to perpetuate.
- To fight crime effectively, punishment must be combined with an approach that tackles the phenomenon preventively as a social problem and the law must be applied in a clear-sighted unambiguous and consistent manner.
- Lastly, the report stressed the fact that to reduce the sense of insecurity, an effective strategy to combat crime must not focus solely on offenders and their treatment but must also contain a strong component of assistance to the victims of crimes.

2.2. Structures

On the basis of this report, things began to change very quickly. In 1983, a National Crime Prevention Council (*Conseil National de Prévention de la délinquance*) (CNPD) was set up with its own (at first very modest) budget; it was composed of elected local officials from the various political parties, representatives of the voluntary sector, trade unions and employers' associations, and representatives of the various ministries. The purpose of the Council was to propose

to the public authorities appropriate measures for preventing crime and reducing its effects, offer advice and support local crime prevention initiatives.

A Departmental Council (*Conseil départemental*) was set up in each department; most importantly, a Municipal Crime Prevention Council (*Conseil communal de prévention de la délinquance*) (CCPD) was set up at municipal level wherever this appeared necessary, involving all the relevant local officials. One hundred CCPDs were established in 1983; today there are 820, and all major cities have introduced a crime prevention strategy. This highly flexible organisation makes it possible to define very precisely and coordinate the goals of local crime prevention policy and to carry out activities geared to needs, thanks to financial commitments and the pooling of staff and equipment by the various parties concerned.

Starting in 1985, a system of contracts ("contracts for action on crime prevention and security"), at first annual and later several times a year, enabled financial support for local bodies to be organised at national level (first CNPD, and then, as from 1988, the Interministerial Delegation for Urban Affairs).

These contracts, drawn up at local level in the framework of the CCPD and approved by all the local parties involved, describe the local situation, diagnose the most worrisome local forms of crime and their causes and give an account of the coordinated plan of action drawn up at local level to attempt to deal with this problem, as well as the resources that everyone plans to commit.

2.3. *How the Municipal Council works*

The CCPD, a key element in urban crime, operates in the following manner: of the 820 CCPDs, it is generally estimated that one-third are actually inactive, one-third operate on a more or less formal basis and one-third can really bring about change. The Councils are chaired by the Mayor and comprise the Public Prosecutor, representatives of the police, the social services, schools and associations, and all those deemed to be capable to help in the fight against crime. The biggest Councils are headed by an official recruited by the municipality.

The largest cities (such as Marseille) may have a Council in each large neighbourhood. These Councils meet several times a year. Increasingly, the large conurbations also have intercommunity crime prevention councils.

In practice, their functions are to meet with various local officials,

pooling and exchanging information, often from a wide variety of sources, for a better qualitative understanding of local crime; to jointly analyse specific local difficulties relating to crime; to devise coordinated overall strategies involving all participants and to draw up a concerted plan of action in the form of "contracts for action on crime prevention and security".

Every year, the Councils and local officials receive an inter-ministerial circular (Prime Minister, police, the courts, social affairs) identifying national priorities for combating crime and formulating recommendations. All contracts contemplating initiatives consistent with these priorities may receive co-financing from the national level. In 1994, 150 million French francs were earmarked nationally for these initiatives, making it possible to finance some 600 contracts, or approximately 2000 initiatives. It is estimated that on average, for each franc allocated at national level, local officials contribute four. These contracts, concluded between the local authorities and the central government, enable local and national strategies and initiatives in the private and public sectors to be coordinated.

The contracts involve such initiatives as primary crime prevention initiatives: school support, combating illiteracy and school absenteeism, initiatives to promote citizenship, maternity and child welfare; social and occupational integration, assistance in seeking employment and housing, improved access to care and cultural and leisure activities of all kinds. Also there may be assistance to victims, mediation between the offender and the victims; prevention of recidivism, assistance to offenders serving non-custodial sentences, support upon release from prison, promotion of educational activities in prison; situational prevention, of a defensive nature, to reduce opportunities (for example, armour-plated doors, lighting, electronic surveillance, etc.); siting of police and judicial services in neighbourhoods in difficulty; initiatives to combat alcohol and drug abuse and specific crime prevention strategies at sensitive locations, such as shopping centres, schools, public transport, etc.

3. A provisional assessment

3.1. The situation in France

Fifteen years later, despite many changes of government and a number of structural reforms, the spirit in which these

problems are addressed and the method for doing so have changed little.

All courts now receive assistance from associations and municipalities, which participate in the implementation of non-custodial measures and take preventive action to help persons in difficulty (community service, support upon conditional release, etc). Apart from one or two exceptions, all the departments in France have set up free arrangements for assisting victims, under which any victim of assault can receive moral support, information and help in carrying out administrative formalities. A national Institute for assistance to victims and for mediation has run this entire network since 1986, working continuously to improve legislation on the protection of victims.

Thus, notwithstanding an economic and social context that relegates more and more people to the margins of society and makes their reintegration increasingly difficult, and in spite of the spread of drugs and related offences, crime, although it has not been stopped, has at least been contained (decline between 1984 and 1988 and reasonable increase since then, followed by a recent renewed downturn).

But over time, problems have changed and with them the priorities, which today are predominantly: the fight against drug addiction and the growth of an underground economy; the prevention of juvenile delinquency (10-15 years of age), strengthening of the role of parents and closer supervision of serious cases (juvenile repeat offenders); the fight against crime at sensitive locations (transport, shops, schools) and the prevention of recidivism and assistance to victims.

Several years of partnership have in some cases led to considerable changes in attitudes and practices. Social workers, teachers and police officers now have greater confidence in each other and work together to prevent crime. The courts and the police have been reviewing their working methods (community policing, court branches in sensitive neighbourhoods, mediation etc.), and the jobs themselves have changed³. Experience has shown that there are no miracle or universal solutions, but that the evolution of crime requires untiring observation and an equally untiring ability to adapt professional

³ *Prévention de la délinquance et modernisation de la justice*, Marie Pierre de Liege – *Revue des Sciences criminelles*, 4th quarter 1992 and 1st quarter 1993.

strategies and practices to local situations, taking their special nature into account.

Thus, alongside a criminal policy based on punishment, which still plays a very important role alongside rehabilitation goals, a socially-oriented crime prevention strategy or, more accurately, a strategy of crime prevention through social development, has also developed.

Attention should, however, be drawn to a number of difficulties encountered. Despite continuous encouragement to work together on a partnership basis, the various public services and government departments, at national and local level alike, have a strong tendency to return again and again to their own specific practices; partnership requires very strong and constantly reasserted commitment and mobilisation. This partnership has, in fact, had little success in involving local people themselves (parents, neighbours, etc); it is often confined to local associations specialising to varying degrees in particular areas of work. People working in the various fields must constantly ensure that they are not isolated and take care not to forget their responsibility towards the others. These crime prevention strategies are of a long-term nature. They call for determined and reliable teamwork. But how can enthusiasm and commitment be maintained in a world in which all too often the media define the “fashion”, dictate priorities and are more interested in reporting than in analysing the policy issues involved? How can exhaustion and discouragement be avoided in a deteriorating economic situation? How can the simplistic call for harsh punishment, so quick to be heard whenever a serious crime is committed, be countered once and for all?

How can a sustained, large-scale effort be made to fight the less serious types of crime when authorities are more concerned with organised crime, gangs and terrorism? After all, serious crime often finds an ideal breeding ground among young people with no prospects who have been relegated to a marginal existence as a result of the recession.

Only a determined and tireless effort on all fronts involving everyone in the field, with the firm support of political leaders, can achieve these goals.

3.2. Assessing these strategies from the point of view of human rights

“Soft” policies do not mean that it is no longer necessary to pose

the question of human rights, in particular social and economic rights. With regard to the prevention of recidivism, measures involving supervision and help with rehabilitation do not give rise to any problems. In France, measures to keep an offender out of prison or provide him with support on his release from prison are always taken under the supervision of a judge. The judge responsible for the execution of sentences monitors the social services in charge of implementing those measures.

The strategy of crime prevention “upstream”, namely through social development, aims above all to restore social equilibrium, facilitate access to housing, education and employment and promote the right of all to family life. In so doing, it tends to strengthen human rights, especially as the method chosen is designed first and foremost to encourage collective prevention arrangements and the provision of services rather than assistance to the individual, which often entails a degree of control of a normative character which may be in violation of individual freedoms. Thus, for example, magistrates, prosecutors or juvenile judges who attend CCPD meetings naturally refuse to make any reference to particular cases, citing not only their independence but also the protection of the individual. Increasingly, however, in both France and English-speaking countries, an effort is being made to involve the community and instil a sense of responsibility for these problems of crime and even to bring the community to participate directly in crime prevention strategies. This is useful and may prove effective, because family and friends constitute a first bulwark against risks of criminal behaviour, but once institutionalised, it can also be dangerous from the point of view of human rights. It is a known fact that in certain contexts, social control by the community may be very constraining, normative and inhibitive, ie it may violate rights and freedoms. This means that the powers of elected and court officials must be limited and closely supervised so as to ensure full respect for human rights and freedoms.

3.3. Transposing this policy

Can such a policy be of use to others? No experience or “solution” to a particular problem is directly transposable. What works in one case might, at most, serve as a basis for what might be tried elsewhere, after having been “adapted”. Nevertheless, the practice developed in France and described above has two features which suggest that it might be useful and usable for others. It is not claimed

that this practice offers universally applicable solutions for crime: there are no “recipes”, models that can deal with all problems of crime in all contexts. But by confining itself to suggesting a “methodology for action”, it proposes a flexible and adaptable approach which appears to be appropriate in many situations. This method was conceived in France precisely in order to respect local diversity and to allow local protagonists to take over the strategies developed for fighting crime and make them their own. It functions both in big cities and in rural areas, in prosperous regions and poor.

This strategy is part of a “subsidiarity” system coordinating the various levels of action.

An inexpensive strategy, this approach is suitable in many contexts, regardless of the level of development, because it does not require the injection of considerable additional resources. It stresses the identification, stocktaking and possible redeployment of existing resources, ie the possibility of putting them to different uses. The point is not to have a large number of services and staff fighting crime, but to mobilise, logically and simultaneously all social forces around the same objectives and to make them work more “intelligently”. These social forces exist in all contexts and at all levels of development, even though they are different and even though, depending on the particular case, they may be answerable to national governments, municipalities or the community itself. Everywhere there are structures or groups, some of them formal and some of them less so, whose objective and function are to ensure public order and respect for the law and to promote efforts in the areas of the family, youth, health care, housing, economic activities, leisure, etc.

These are the persons that must be singled out and encouraged to work together, once there is agreement on the assessment of the local situation. Energy and resources are squandered when efforts are not combined. Introducing more rational approaches improves efficiency, even without additional resources. In those areas in which fresh additional resources are available, they will be better used if they serve to stimulate, notably through agreements on objectives, the mobilisation of all and the development of new working methods aimed at preventing crime rather than financing the consequences of a purely punitive policy. Regardless of the context, a crime prevention policy is invariably less costly than a policy of large-scale incarceration, the cost of supervising and monitoring persons in open institutions being vastly inferior to the cost of keeping them in prison. Lastly, a properly conducted crime prevention policy

is also advantageous in that, in the medium or long term, it perceptively reduces the cost to society: a person in difficulty, treated on time and appropriately assisted, will cost society much less in the long run than a permanent social "outcast" who is incapable of being rehabilitated once released from prison. In the end, investing in development and rehabilitation is less costly than investing in coercion, even if, admittedly, it does require greater political courage.

This approach has aroused interest in the international community, the spirit and the method described above having been embodied in a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly laying down guidelines for cooperation and technical assistance in the field of urban crime prevention (ECOSOC 1995/9). The basic principles here are local, coordinated diagnosis of crime problems); joint framing of integrated crime prevention plans taking into account all the areas concerned (education, health care, employment, housing, police, the courts) and support at national level for local initiatives and centralised policies through agreements on objectives.

In recent years, these principles have also inspired initiatives for curbing crime in Europe (United Kingdom, Netherlands, Spain), North America (Canada and several states in the US), Latin America, Australia and even Africa. In Europe and Latin America, in order to work towards urban security, "forums" of towns and cities have recently been set up, bringing together local authorities with severe crime problems who would like to share their experience and develop a common methodological approach. The French and Canadian governments have also created an "international Centre for crime prevention" (CIPC), an institute affiliated with the United Nations whose goal is to offer advice and training to all those wishing to adopt strategies of this type for combating urban crime.

In many countries, social development and greater social cohesion are essential to fighting urban crime effectively on a day-to-day basis so as to reduce the sense of insecurity in the population and improve the quality of life.

But these efforts are also very useful in connection with the fight against organised crime. In many areas (drugs, prostitution, various forms of trafficking and even terrorism), organised crime exploits the vulnerability of entire sectors of the population, where it finds potential petty criminals who will form the networks on which their pernicious activities are based. Fighting petty crime thus deprives

organised crime of this resource. Hence, all states must strive to wage this battle at both levels simultaneously, because just as serious crime encourages petty crime, the latter serves as a breeding ground for serious crime.

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