CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICIES & MILITARY INTERVENTION: TWENTY YEARS
AND TWO ARMED-CONFLICTS LATER

By

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Canadian Defence Policies & Military Intervention: Twenty Years and Two Armed-Conflicts
Later

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# DEDICATION

To my parents, Janice, and Chris, for your endless support, constant encouragement, and unconditional love. To my sister, Julia, for making me want to be someone you are proud to look up to.

 To my grandparents (Wilson & Olive, Lucy & James, Minnie & Scott) for sharing stories, laughing at and with me, and for covering me in prayer.

 And, to my friends whom I consider family, thank you for calling me crazy while pushing me to chase my dreams.

 Lastly, to my dad in heaven (Junior) for giving me the gift of loving life and serving others selflessly.

Without you all I would not be here today and have accomplished all that I have. Near or far I will love you all, always.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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## Abstract

It is no secret that Canada and its military have not placed themselves in a combat role in international conflict missions for quite some time. Therefore, this paper will assess how Canada and its defence policies no longer engage in militaristic intervention in the international security sector. To do so, the researcher assesses Canada and its involvement in two international security missions, Afghanistan, and Libya, through the lens of conflict analysis and resolution theories. The researcher also examines existing literature surrounding Canada and defence. Canada's three infamous defence policies, the 2005 *Defence Policy Statement*, the 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy*, and 2017 *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*, are analyzed and described in the context of when they are written. In addition, the history of the armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya is addressed. Finally, in the analysis component of this paper, the researcher explains Canada's lack of militaristic intervention, citing vast causalities, US-Canada relations, and post-nationalism as the rationale behind Canada's change.

# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMIS – African Union Mission in Sudan
ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces
CA – Canadian Army
CANSOFCOM – Canadian Special Operation Forces Command
CAF – Canadian Armed Forces
CF – Canadian Forces
CSIS – Center for Strategic and International Studies
DART – Disaster Assistance Response Team
DFAIT – Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND – Department of National Defence
EU – European Union
GAC – Global Affairs Canada
GC – Government of Canada
GNA – Government of National Accord
GWOT – Global War on Terror
HMCS – Her Majesty's Canadian Ship
IHL – International Humanitarian Law
IMO – International Migration Organization
IR – International Relations
IS – Islamic State
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force

JTF2 – Joint Task Force 2
LNA – Libyan National Army
MENA – Middle East and North Africa
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP – New Democratic Party
NEO – Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NORAD – North American Aerospace Defence Command
NTM-I – NATO Training Mission in Iraq
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom
PJBD – Permanent Joint Board of Defence
PM – Prime Minister
RCAF – Royal Canadian Airforce
RCN – Royal Canadian Navy
R2P – Responsibility to Protect
SOF – Special Operation Forces
UAE – United Arab Emirates
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund
US/USA – United States/United States of America
WWII – World War II

**CHAPTER ONE**

**INTRODUCTION**

**VIGILAMUS PRO TE –** *We stand on guard for thee*

The security landscape is consistently changing, be it the threats posed or how a country adapts to those challenges. For Canada to be a force and international leader on the global stage, it must be able to combat and adapt its policies to address these needs. For instance, in the past twenty years, we have seen various security challenges, ranging from terrorism to cyber threats, natural disasters, and more. These security challenges threaten Canada both at home and abroad. Canada has been active for years in the international security sector. However, with the consistent emergence of new leadership every couple of years and differing defence policies, it has become evident that Canada no longer engages in international security operations the way it used to. Therefore, this thesis dissertation is set to answer the question: **How has the last twenty years shifted Canada and Canadian defence policies away from militaristic intervention regarding international security?**

For there to be no confusion, we must first define what we mean by militaristic intervention. Throughout this paper, when militaristic is used, it references aggressive military policy—in this case, when Canada takes a combative position or approach in an armed conflict. However, for this dissertation, the definition does not include when they take a peacekeeping or logistics-focused role.

In addition, conviction versus pragmatism is the debate between belief, attitude, and practicality. While this is not the paper's explicit focus, it will be addressed throughout. It provides invaluable insight into why some leaders made specific policy decisions and explain public opinion about Canada, the CAF, and defence policies. Nevertheless, to understand the role

conviction versus pragmatism will play, we must first define them. Conviction is a firmly held

belief or opinion[1]. Whereas pragmatism is defined as dealing with things sensibly and

realistically which is founded on practicality, not theoretical considerations[2]. In addition, this

paper will address the responsibility to protect (R2P) as it plays a role in political decisions made

by the Government of Canada (GC) and connects to the idea of conviction versus pragmatism.

However, for cohesion between the writer and readers, we must first define R2P.

As per the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, R2P "is an international norm

that seeks to ensure that the international community never fails to halt the mass atrocity crimes

of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity"[3]. This definition is

widely recognized and utilized by leaders around the globe. Therefore, this definition of R2P will

be referenced when we analyze policy and conversations around R2P.

By examining twenty years of defence policies, war discourse, influential public opinion

and two armed conflicts, this paper will explain why Canada no longer engages as physically and

militaristically as it used to. To illustrate, Canada has a history of taking combative roles in

armed conflicts. For example, when Britain entered World War I, so did Canada; however,

Canada could determine how involved they wanted to be. Then with Nazi Germany threatening

Western civilization, Canada, of their own free will, joined in the World War II (WWII) efforts.

During the Cold War, the Korean War broke out with North Korean troops invading South

Korea, in which Canada joined the United Nations (UN) to fight. Over 26,000 Canadian military

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[1] "Conviction, n.," in *OED Online* (Oxford University Press), accessed July 26, 2022, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/40829.
[2] "Pragmatism, n.," in *OED Online* (Oxford University Press), accessed July 26, 2022, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/149295.
[3] "What Is R2P?," Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, accessed July 5, 2022, https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/.

members served on land, in the air, and at sea from 1950 to 1953[4]. The Korean War remains one of Canada's bloodiest overseas conflicts. With the Gulf War of the early 1990s, Canada not only served in peacekeeping and embargo enforcement roles but actively assisted in removing forces from Iraq that were invading Kuwait[5]. The Gulf Was also the first time Canadian women were given an active combat role during a conflict. Canada provided troops for peace and reconnaissance support regarding the breakup of Yugoslavia and the war-torn Balkans. However, Canada did assist in carrying out airstrikes, air-to-ground, and air-to-air support in the Kosovo War, making it the first Canadian air combat mission since WWII[6]. Correspondingly, Canada contributed militaristically to the mission in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the War in Afghanistan was an exception, as every mission after resembled that of humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or logistics. Even though the mission in Libya had some combat elements, it adopted a more humanitarian assistance approach. It should be noted that Libya and Afghanistan only paint a small picture of Canada's defence policies' posturing. Even with Canada's remarkable military history and successive governments, their policies have taken a more withdrawn approach. Therefore, this researcher hopes to uncover how the policies have shifted away from armed conflict and why Canada no longer takes combat positions in international security missions.

Furthermore, the structure of this paper is broken into chapters; each chapter is designed to answer the question posed above. The chapters have been drafted methodically with the sole purpose of providing further insight into the focus of this dissertation. Collectively, the hope is

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[4] Veterans Affairs Canada, "Canada Remembers the Korean War Historical Sheet - The Korean War - History - Remembrance - Veterans Affairs Canada," March 7, 2022, https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/korean-war/koreawar_fact.
[5] Veterans Affairs Canada, "Gulf War - Veterans Affairs Canada," July 12, 2022, https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/wars-and-conflicts/caf-operations/gulf-war.
[6] "The Kosovo War – VALOUR CANADA," accessed August 30, 2022, https://valourcanada.ca/military-history-library/the-kosovo-war/.

that all the chapters will provide a dynamic and robust answer to why Canada and its policies have shifted away from combat positions.

To start, Chapter Two – Methodology outlines the research area, the question being asked, the methods used to conduct the research, a brief description of the purpose and usefulness of case studies, the sources and theories used, ethical considerations, and limitations.

Chapter Three – Literature Review addresses the various academic conversations around the topic. It looks at what has been discussed to give colour to the paper topic and to highlight the differing opinions on said topics.

Chapter Four – Theoretical Discussion looks at realist theory and other International Relations (IR) theories, such as constructivist and liberalist theory, to explain Canada's defence policies and rationale behind getting involved in the war. Chapter four also looks at discourses of war theory to examine the language used by politicians to justify war.

Chapter Five – Canadian Defence Policies provides background information. It looks at the significant policies and challenges of the time.

Chapter Six – Empirical Research examines two armed conflicts, Afghanistan, and Libya. The chapter provides a brief history of the conflicts and then examines Canada's role in both.

Chapter Seven – Analysis is a comparative analysis of the contents in chapter six and all the data provided in all the other chapters. Chapter Six also draws connections and conclusions to answer the focus and question of the paper.

Lastly, Chapter Eight – Conclusion ties everything together with a shiny red bow, reiterates some of the main components of the thesis, and details some key takeaways.

# CHAPTER TWO

# METHODOLOGY

## Research Area

This thesis dissertation project will analyze the shifts in Canada's foreign policies, specifically defence policies. It will give evidence of the decline of Canada's involvement in UN peacekeeping. Over the decades, UN peacekeeping has been a significant component of Canada's military reputation. However, there has been a shift since the 2000s, mainly with Canada's focus and interests shifting to Afghanistan, Libya and combatting terrorism. Furthermore, it would be naïve to assume that Canada's policies have only shifted regarding peacekeeping. It will also look at the correlation between a decline in Canadian involvement in UN peacekeeping missions and a possible resurgence of Canadian involvement in NATO missions. Canada has contributed to every NATO mission since its conception. However, Canada looked to revitalize their position within the international community with Afghanistan and Libya. Thus, addressing other security challenges and significantly contributing to the United States' Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the official mission's name for the global war on terror (GWOT). In addition, Canada was engaged with Afghanistan for over a decade. Over that decade, Canada saw three successive governments and leaders: Prime Minister (PM) Jean Chrétien, PM Paul Martin, and PM Stephen Harper. Each government had different security interests and justification for Canadian deployment in Afghanistan. These justifications either influenced the creation of policy or were influenced by policy. This project will also examine the policy decisions made by Trudeau's Liberal government as he came into power after Canada withdrew from Afghanistan and the defence discourse used towards the present war in Ukraine.

Moreover, this project aims to determine how foreign and defence policies have shifted while involved in Afghanistan, Libya, and after.

## Question

This chapter will address the methodology used to conduct the research required and the methods used to answer the overall question this thesis hopes to answer. As outlined in the introduction, this thesis hopes to answer the question: **How has the last twenty years shifted Canada and Canadian defence policies away from militaristic intervention regarding international security?** However, more broadly, this project hopes to provide some insight into questions, such as:

- How has Canada's role in the international security sector shifted?
  - E.g., the Decline in UN peacekeeping.
- What role does Canada currently play when it comes to international security?
- What role do Canada's foreign and defence policies play more broadly in international security?

These sub-questions are not the focus of this dissertation, but they will still be explored as they address the main question being asked. Moreover, the bolded question above and sub-questions will guide this research project and lead to the hypothesis that defence policy has shifted with Canadian involvement in Afghanistan and Libya, as well as after, which is seen with Justin Trudeau's Liberal government.

## Method Used

In order to conduct the research needed to answer the question above, this thesis dissertation will use a qualitative analysis and a desk-based approach. The qualitative methodology will provide the "why" and "how" behind the explored questions. This qualitative method will be able to provide context and content and will provide sufficient and quality data. Some quantitative data is used to support further the arguments made throughout the paper. This

will be evident through charts, graphs, timelines, and statements. Using both quantitative and qualitative data will make the assertions more robust.

Additionally, this dissertation will use Canadian involvement in the war in Afghanistan and the 2011 mission in Libya as case studies. A case study of Afghanistan will be beneficial as it will provide a point of reference and be used as evidence to support the claims made. Furthermore, Afghanistan is a perfect case study as Canada was engaged in Afghanistan for over a decade; it was the most significant war Canada had been in since the Korean war, and it saw three successive governments. Canada first sent troops to Afghanistan in 2001; therefore, this dissertation will focus on policy shifts from 2001 to the present day, covering approximately twenty to twenty-five years. Libya will also be a beneficial case study as it can paint a broader picture of Canada's foreign policies and the rationale behind the justification for war. In addition, it is the last mission in which Canada took a combative role. Finally, even though the mission in Libya lasted only a few months, that was long enough for it to continue to be a mission that is still debated and discussed today.

## Case Study Analysis

Within the case study of Afghanistan, there will be a significant focus on the various operations that Canada has been involved in. For instance, Canada contributed to Operation APOLLO, MEDUSA, ATTENTION, and ATHENA. Each of these missions ran at different times, meaning they saw differing political leaders. Operation APOLLO ran during Chrétien's Liberal government. Operation ATHENA began during Martin's Liberal government. Lastly, Operation MEDUSA, ATHENA, and ATTENTION were active and ended during Harper's Conservative government. Through analyzing these missions, one can understand the foreign policy focuses of the time-period and the nation's interests as expressed by political elites. Since

each party had a differing rationale for Canadian involvement in Afghanistan, the case study of Afghanistan and the missions the CAF participated in will be able to explain those reasons in more detail.

Furthermore, a timeline of all Afghanistan's Canadian missions will be applied to create clarity and provide detail for all CAF missions that occurred. The case study of Libya will provide a brief history of the conflict and what led to international intervention. It will then assess Canada-Libya relations and the roles Canada plays within the country. The Libyan case study will rely on the chart that outlines all Canadian contributions to NATO, statements made by the GC regarding the conflict, and UN Resolution used to justify intervention in the Libyan civil war.

**Sources**

This dissertation project will use a collection of primary and secondary sources. Furthermore, Canadian defence policy has undergone various renewals and adaptions since the early 2000s. From this, three separate defence policy statements have been drafted. Those policies are the 2005 *Defence Policy Statement*, 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy*, and 2017 *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. Therefore, this thesis aims to analyze the shifts in Canadian defence policy. Therefore, addressing how Canada's involvement in Afghanistan and the war in Libya has influenced defence policy and Canada's broader role in the international security sector. These policies are primary sources and will be a huge focus of this paper. The policies will be allotted a chapter where they will be analyzed. Thus, providing the reader with a reference point and background information. Correspondingly, a comparative analysis will be conducted so the reader can assess the conflicting and similar interests laid out in the three distinct policies from 2005, 2008, and 2017.

Other primary sources referenced and analyzed are the House of Commons Canada Committee Report, and Senate of Canada reports. These official documents released by the GC prove the formal opinion and stance the government takes on issues of international security, defence policy, Afghanistan, and Libya.

The Department of National Defence (DND) and GC have released web pages and documents that detail Canada's involvement in Afghanistan; this information will be helpful as it gives specifics on CAF missions, the role Canada took as an international actor and Canada's response to international security challenges. For example, the *GC's Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan – Mission Timeline* will be used as well, as the GC's webpages on Operation Attention and Operation Athena will be utilized. Similarly, the GC has issued official statements on the crisis in Libya and has detailed their involvement in the NATO mission, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR.

Secondary sources will provide background and understanding of Canada's role in international security, the decline in UN peacekeeping, the relationship between NATO and Canada, R2P, observations made regarding policy shifts, public opinion around Canadian involvement in the Afghan mission and Libyan mission, defence policy, and the CAF. For example, some sources used are:

- *An Evaluation of Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan* – Kenneth Holland & Christopher Kirkey
- *Canada's War for Prestige: A Realist Paradox?* – Justin Massie
- *Two Solitudes, One War: Public Opinion, National Unity, and Canada's War in Afghanistan* – John Kirton & Jenilee Guebert
- *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* – Janice Gross Stein & Eugene Lang
- *Afghanistan as a Test of Canadian Politics: What Did We Learn from this Experience?* – Stephen M. Saideman
- *Explaining Canada's Practices of Burden-Sharing in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through its Norm of "External Responsibility"* – Benjamin Zyla

These examples of secondary sources are only a tiny fraction of what this project has used. A wide array of secondary sources has been and will be used as it adds more dimension to the arguments being made and questions being explored.

## Theoretical Sources

Theories will be used as they provide colour to concepts and can be used to create linkages between concepts. Therefore, this research project will use various theories to analyze the contents of this topic and will provide more dynamic answers to the questions being asked, thus making this project well-rounded. The theories and sources used are Hans J. Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* and Diego Lazzarich's *Discourses of War*. It will also look at Liberalism and Constructivism. Morgenthau's realist theory will help readers comprehend the reasoning behind political decisions. Realist theory will also explain the rationale behind foreign policy choices. At the same time, Lazzarich's *Discourses of War* will aid in explaining the language used by political elites around the conflict in Afghanistan and Libya and the responses to international conflict outlined in foreign and defence policy. Liberalism will be used in the contexts of Libya and Afghanistan to explain why Canada participated in the armed intervention in both countries. Lastly, constructivism is a social theory applied to clarify the reasoning for broader international politics.

## Ethical Considerations

When completing a research project of this calibre, one must consider a few ethical considerations. Since this project required research collection and copious amounts of data, a concern regarding anonymity and confidentiality can be raised. However, since my research did not focus on quantitative data or interviews, it is not something I had to hold in such high regard. Besides, all the data I used was already published and source-checked. Since I did use a

qualitative method, meaning I used other individuals' research to support my own, the issue of acquired informed consent can be raised. Keeping this in mind, I got authorization whenever I came across research, I wanted to cite that required permission before use. For example, permission was required for some of the DND sources used. Therefore, I emailed the DND and ensured I got their approval.

Additionally, since this project is built off the ideas and research of others, I must respect and acknowledge them. That is why I often introduced the author and the work I took my information from. Also, by citing them, I give them credit for their work and ideas. Lastly, another ethical consideration is minimizing the risk of harm. Since this project mostly looks at government, states, and policies, not necessarily individuals, it is mostly without critique and does not cause individual harm. These ethical considerations were important to keep in mind while writing to ensure that my work would not cause any undue harm or plagiarize the ideas of others.

## Limitations

Every research project is not without limitations, and this project is no exception. To start, a significant limitation of this project was the time restraint. We essentially had two months to write this dissertation. Two months is not much time to formulate a well-thought-out question, conduct research, write, edit, and perfect a Masters thesis. Secondly, this dissertation only analyzes two countries and does not do justice to all the CF's contributions to international security. Two countries only give the reader such a small piece of a much broader picture. Only focusing on Libya and Afghanistan ignores the evidence that other conflicts Canada has been involved in could provide.

An example of this is the CAF in the Balkans. Canadians have served in NATO and UN missions in former Yugoslavia, focusing on nurturing and securing peace. However, these peace efforts turned combative and alone could provide insight into why Canadian defence policies have shifted. These limitations do not hinder the results and analyses made throughout this thesis; however, they can be considered an obstacle to this dissertation reaching its fullest potential.

## Concluding Remarks

This methodology chapter addresses the central question the dissertation project is set to answer while providing insight into some sub-questions being asked. This chapter expresses that a qualitative method will be used to conduct the research. Additionally, a chapter focusing on a case study of Afghanistan and a case study of Libya will be used to provide background and specifics. Various primary and secondary sources will be utilized to add dimension to the claims this project will make and be used as supporting evidence. It will use four theories: Morgenthau's realist theory, Lazzarich's discourses of war theory, liberalism, and constructivism. Lastly, this chapter addresses the ethics and limitations of the project.

# CHAPTER THREE

# LITERATURE REVIEW

Canada has an extensive and changing defence policy which various external factors have influenced. However, this dissertation thesis will focus on how Canada's involvement in the American-led GWOT in Afghanistan and involvement in the NATO-led armed intervention in Libya shifted the posture of Canada's defence policy. To do that, the researcher has extensively examined the topic's literature. This literature review will look at literary discussions around shifts in Canada's defence policy, Canada's role in the international security sector, the decline in peacekeeping, the connection between NATO and Canada, public discourse around Afghanistan and Canada's perception of military action, and lastly, public opinion on Libya.

## Shifts in Defence Policy

This dissertation thesis is focused on how Canada's defence policy has changed since engagement in Afghanistan, making it imperative that we look at literature that expresses these policy shifts. For starters, Kenneth Holland and Christopher Kirkey wrote a journal article titled, *An Evaluation of Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan.* Within the article, Holland and Kirkey explain how engagement in Afghanistan has become one of the most significant Canadian international policy initiatives since the Korean War. Holland and Kirkey further explain how a Canadian-Afghan relationship became the focus of Canadian external relations. Thus, the reader must understand that since Afghanistan, Canada's defence policy has undergone renewal and changes by successive governments, resulting in three separate defence policies. Those policies are the 2005 *Defence Policy Statement*, the 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy*, and the *2017 Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*.

Furthermore, Chris Madsen's article *Military Responses and Capabilities in Canada's Domestic Context Post 9/11* articulates that the security of Canada and continental North America is a priority. Since the terrorist attacks in the United States (US), Canada has invested in developing its counter-terrorism capabilities. They invested in their tactical assault and weapons of mass destruction detection and handling. They ensured that Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) and the Canadian Incident Response Unit were well trained and ready for rapid deployment. Since its engagement in Afghanistan and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Canada has changed its defence policy and realigned its focus.

This section will look at security approaches that have shifted and influenced defence policy over the years. For example, Justin Massie's, *Canada's War for Prestige in Afghanistan: A Realist Paradox?*, articulates that Canada's foreign and defence policy is driven by "forward security"[7]. Whereas Benjamin Zyla's *Explaining Canada's practices of burden-sharing in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through its norm of "external responsibility"* would state that Canada's foreign policies are driven by "external responsibility" and Canada's need to promote and maintain international peace and security[8]. Correspondingly, Bruce E. Barnes' article *Re-Imagining Canadian and United States Foreign Policies* argues that Canada should focus their foreign policies around "comprehensive security." Comprehensive security addresses human security sustainably and universally instead of providing more security to the rich and none to the poor[9]. Alexander Moens, who wrote the journal article *Afghanistan, and the revolution in Canadian foreign policy*, states that in the late 1990s, Canada's foreign policy

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[7] Justin Massie, "Canada's War for Prestige in Afghanistan: A Realist Paradox?," *International Journal* 68, no. 2 (2013): 274–88.
[8] Benjamin Zyla, "Explaining Canada's Practices of Burden-Sharing in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through Its Norm of 'External Responsibility,'" *International Journal* 68, no. 2 (2013): 289–304.
[9] Bruce E. Barnes, "Re-Imagining Canadian and United States Foreign Policies," *Peace Research* 43, no. 1 (2011): 30–50.

shifted towards "human security" with an emphasis on networking and coalition-building among civil society. Therefore, replacing the national interest of aiding conflicting individuals and groups inside failed states. Moens explains that human security has influenced defence policy, shifting it towards a 3D model focusing on diplomacy, development, and defence regarding conflict and failed states[10]. Additionally, Moens articulates that Canadian Forces borrowed a three-block operational approach from the US Marine Corps. Soldiers are trained to move "from peace enforcement to stabilization, to humanitarian assistance, and civil reconstruction operations"[11]. Moens implies that Canada's policies shifted from human security when they committed to Afghanistan to focus on the North Atlantic Alliance and lost interest in EU-led missions. Finally, Moens articulates that Canada's foreign policies now focus on "hard security" and the prevention of failed states and terrorist threats to the west[12]. Lastly, Roland Paris' *The New Canada: Fomenting Fear at Home and Abroad* articulates that under Stephen Harper's government, policies have been influenced by threat inflation[13]. Canada's policies and security approaches are consistently changing and are influenced by the international community and governmental leadership.

## Canada's Role in the International Security Sector

Canada's role in the international security sector has been under constant review and is consistently evolving. For starters, Veteran Affairs Canada created a document called *Canada Remembers: The Canadian Armed Forces in the Post-War Years*; this document details Canada's various roles regarding security. The document states that Canada's focus is the protection of

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[10] Alexander Moens, "Afghanistan and the Revolution in Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal* 63, no. 3 (2008): 570.
[11] Moens, Afghanistan and the Revolution, 570.
[12] Moens, 586.
[13] Roland Paris, "The New Canada: Fomenting Fear at Home and Abroad – Centre for International Policy Studies," accessed June 18, 2022, https://www.cips-cepi.ca/2012/02/04/the-new-canada-fomenting-fear-at-home-and-abroad/.

their country. However, during the Cold war, their primary threat was the Soviet Union, where the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) guarded against Soviet bombers and submarines carrying nuclear weapons[14]. Now, Canada's national focus is terrorism. Veteran Affairs Canada explains that the CAF has international military commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). In the case of natural disasters around the world, the CAF offers aid through their Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)[15]. Thus, giving a brief overview of the role Canada plays internationally.

Furthermore, Zyla explains that Canada's role in the international security sector is that of a middle power. Zyla goes on to insinuate that Canada has a deep-rooted belief that it needs to aid in helping other countries, therefore promoting peace, stability, development, and freedom[16]. Correspondingly, Barnes further supports the claims of middle power, as he states that Canada emulates soft power and middle power approaches when it comes to diplomacy[17]. This position as a middle power provides greater context to Canada's positions regarding its role in the international security sector.

Looking more specifically at Canada's role in international security in Afghanistan, Holland and Kirkey state that Canada concluded their active combat role in Afghanistan in 2011 and is now focused on training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), humanitarian assistance, regional diplomacy, and providing foreign aid[18]. Similarly, Stephen M. Saideman's

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[14] Canada and Veteran Affairs Canada, *Canada Remembers: The Canadian Armed Forces in the Post-War Years*, 2017, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/acc-vac/V32-214-2017-fra.pdf.
[15] Canada and Veteran Affairs Canada.
[16] Zyla, "Explaining Canada's Practices of Burden-Sharing in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through Its Norm of 'External Responsibility'", 46.
[17] Barnes, "Re-Imagining Canadian and United States Foreign Policies."
[18] Kenneth Holland and Christopher Kirkey, "An Evaluation of Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan," *Sage Publications & Canadian International Council* 68, no. 2 (June 2013): 269–73, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702013493755.

article, *Afghanistan as a Test of Canadian Politics: What did We learn from the Experience*, articulates that Afghanistan was the key foreign policy issue for an entire decade, thus occupying the focus of policymakers, politicians, and the media regarding defence policy[19]. Addressing Canada's role in the international security sector regarding relations with Afghanistan and the war adds further colour to how defence policy is changing.

### Decline in Peacekeeping

This section will examine the literature and debates on Canada's decline in peacekeeping as defined by the United Nations. John S. Clark, who wrote a chapter titled *The Nature of Peacekeeping*, insinuates that the UN definition of peacekeeping focuses on restoring or maintaining peace in conflict areas[20]. This definition of peacekeeping is critical as it provides the reader with background information.

Peacekeeping has been observed as Canada's "traditional" role since the end of WWII[21]. Barnes supports this by explaining that Canada's international reputation as a leader in peacekeeping and multilateralist foreign policies stems from Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, who is considered the father of the modern-day concept of peacekeeping[22]. However, further, in the article, Barnes explicitly states that Canada's involvement in Afghanistan has eroded the image of Canada being a peacekeeping leader[23]. Furthermore, Barnes gives numbers to support his claims; he states that in 1991 Canada was ranked number one in UN peacekeeping contribution and stayed in the top ten throughout the 1990s. However, that changed in 2007

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[19] Stephen M Saideman, "Afghanistan as a Test of Canadian Politics: What Did We Learn from the Experience?," *The Afghanistan Papers*, no. 10 (May 2012): 20.
[20] John S. Clark, "The Nature of Peacekeeping," in *Keeping the Peace: Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping* (Air University Press, 1997), 5–12, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13879.8.
[21] Eugene Lang and Janice Gross Stein, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Penguin Canada, 2008).
[22] Barnes, "Re-Imagining Canadian and United States Foreign Policies, 35."
[23] Barnes, 35.

when Canada fell to fifty-ninth place due to military spending in Afghanistan[24]. Michael K. Carroll's article *Peacekeeping: Canada's past, but not its present and future*, supports the notion of Lester B. Pearson being the first to recognize peacekeeping, paving the way for peacekeeping to embed itself in the DNA of the nation[25].

It is no secret that Canada has shifted away from a peacekeeping identity in the last twenty years. This is due to several factors, such as leadership, involvement in Afghanistan, and changing national interests. Furthermore, Tim Donais' journal article *Is Canada Really Back? Committed, Credibility and the Changing Face of Peacekeeping* analyzes Canada's re-engagement with multi-lateral peace operations. Donais explains that with the Liberal Party and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau coming into power in 2015, one of the promises was that he would restore Canada's reputation for being a force concerned with international peace and security, the notion that "Canada is back"[26]. However, Donais argues that many Western countries no longer want to enter open-ended and uncertain peacekeeping quagmires, as they no longer find it appealing or of national interest. Carroll expresses that Canada is a significant contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, yet, their contributions have seemed to decline, especially with the emergence of Prime Minister Stephen Harper's Conservative government[27]. Harper's government focused on the idea that Canada is a "courageous warrior"[28]. Moreover, Moens supports both Donais and Carroll's claims; Moens indicates that Canada's commitment to UN peacekeeping missions has dried up and has been replaced by a commitment to creating

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[24] Barnes, 35.
[25] Michael K Carroll, "Peacekeeping: Canada's Past, but Not Its Present and Future?," *International Journal* 71, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 171, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702015619857.
[26] Tim Donais, "IS CANADA REALLY BACK? COMMITMENT, CREDIBILITY, AND THE CHANGING FACE OF PEACEKEEPING," *Peace Research* 50, no. 2 (2018): 79–103.
[27] Carroll, "Peacekeeping", 174.
[28] Carroll, 175.

security conditions in Afghanistan[29]. Canada's decline in UN peacekeeping is just one example of how the posture of Canada's defence policy has shifted but also goes on to provide further insight into the changing interests of the nation.

## Canada and NATO

This section will examine the existing scholarship surrounding Canada's commitment to NATO. For starters, Loprespub wrote an article titled *Canada and NATO – 70 Years of Involvement*. Within this article, the author expresses that on April 30, 1949, Canada became a founding member of NATO after ratifying the North Atlantic Treaty[30]. The author explains that NATO has been a central pillar in Canada's international security policies. Additionally, the raison d'être of NATO is to safeguard shared values of "individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law"[31]. Since Canada is committed to these values, they have "participated in nearly every NATO mission, deploying thousands of Canadian Armed Forces Personnel in support of NATO's operations around the world"[32]. Paul Nash, who wrote *Trudeau to Reiterate Canada's Commitment to NATO*, supports the claims made by Loprespub. Nash argues that NATO is a cornerstone of Canada's international security policy, and that Canada has proudly contributed to every NATO operation since its founding[33]. In contrast, Nash insinuates that countries such as the United States feel Canada is not contributing enough. For example, President Donald Trump was frustrated with Canada for not having increased defence spending. Colonel John Alexander's journal article, *Canada's Commitment to NATO: Are we Pulling our Weight?*, addresses Canada's defence expenditure commitments to NATO. Alexander argues that

[29] Moens, "Afghanistan and the Revolution in Canadian Foreign Policy", 581.
[30] Loprespub, "Canada and NATO – 70 Years of Involvement," HillNotes, April 30, 2019, http://hillnotes.ca/2019/04/30/canada-and-nato-70-years-of-involvement/.
[31] Loprespub, "Canada and NATO - 70 Years of Involvement".
[32] Loprespub.
[33] Paul Nash, "Trudeau to Reiterate Canada's Commitment to Nato," *Diplomatic Courier* (Washington, United States: The Diplomatic Courier, July 2018).

he believes that based on past precedents set, Canada will not achieve their defence funding

targets, but that cannot be considered a reflection of Canada's commitment to NATO[34]. Top

priorities do not equate to the highest funded. Canada can still contribute to international peace

and security without overcompensating and compromising financially. In addition, Sara Greco's

*Soft Contributions are Hard Commitments: NATO and Canada's Global Security Agenda*

addresses the criticisms Canada faces when NATO commitments are analyzed. Most recently,

Canada has been called a free rider as they are not doing their share to combat terrorism.

However, Ottawa argues that "greater financial inputs do not necessarily produce greater military

outputs"[35]. Meaning that ongoing condemnations should not overshadow their commitment to

NATO. Correspondingly, Greco argues that the nature of defence and security is changing;

therefore, different types of commitments will evolve. NATO should acknowledge these

contributions as they will make member states feel valued and strengthen the alliance.

Furthermore, Christian Leuprecht, Joel Sokolsky, and Jason Derow published a report titled,

*Paying it Forward: Canada's Renewed Commitment to NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence*.

Within this report, they explain how both Canada and NATO need each other. They are co-

dependent, as Canada needs NATO to forge interdependencies between European states, and

NATO needs Canada's willingness to commit to various missions to ensure that shared interests

are met[36]. Leuprecht, Sokolsky, and Derow's findings support the assertions made by others

regarding Canada's commitment to NATO. In conclusion, the literature on Canada and NATO

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[34] John Alexander, "Canada's Commitment to NATO: Are We Pulling Our Weight?," *Canadian Military Journal* 15, no. 4 (2015): 8.

[35] Sara Greco and Stéfanie von Hlatky, "Soft Contributions Are Hard Commitments: NATO and Canada's Global Security Agenda," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 24, no. 3 (September 2, 2018): 274, https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2018.1467837.

[36] Christian Leuprecht, Joel Sokolsky, and Jayson Derow, "Paying It Forward: Canada's Renewed Commitment to NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence," *International Journal* 74, no. 1 (March 1, 2019): 170, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702019834887.

proves that Canada is a committed member, regardless of the scrutiny they have faced about its contributions.

## Responsibility to Protect

This section will examine R2P and the conversations occurring about it. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect provides insight into what R2P is, it expresses that the concept emerged after the atrocities that occurred in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and it was unanimously adopted by the UN world summit in 2005[37]. The Global Centre lays a good foundation for what R2P is.

Further, the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect addresses global humanitarianism's past, present, and future. The centre explains that at the heart of R2P is the belief in human dignity and equality and the commitment to "never again"[38]. Additionally, some of the literature and conversations revolve around the relationship between R2P and Canada. For example, Jose Luis Rodriguez Aquino presented *The Dilemma of the Ideals: Canada and the Responsibility to Protect*. In his presentation, he explains how Canada has promoted and justified R2P since its inception and that R2P is a concept that "attempts to reconcile the notion of sovereignty with the moral obligation to protect human rights abroad"[39]. In *Seven reasons why R2P is relevant today*, Allan Rock writes that R2P is a foreign policy decision that Canada could be immensely proud of[40]. Contrastingly to Rodriguez and Rock, Kristy Duncan, in *The Responsibility to Protect: 10 years on*, expresses that she believes Canada has distanced itself

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[37] "What Is R2P?"
[38] "Seven Reasons Why R2P Is Relevant Today," Open Canada, August 4, 2017, https://opencanada.org/seven-reasons-why-r2p-relevant-today/.
[39] "The Dilemma of the Ideals: Canada and the Responsibility to Protect," accessed July 5, 2022, https://ecpr.eu/Events/Event/PaperDetails/25396.
[40] "Seven Reasons Why R2P Is Relevant Today."

from R2P for either ideological or partisan reasons. These are just a few of the differing opinions that are occurring around R2P.

One must be aware of the ongoing conversations surrounding the dynamics of R2P, Libya, and Afghanistan. Regarding Canada supporting the NATO military intervention in Libya, no public reference was made to R2P. Nevertheless, events in Libya sparked controversy and debate on R2P and the use of force. A prevalent argument is that R2P was abused for political purposes to accomplish a regime change in Libya, thus leading to the claim that R2P died in Libya[41]. In the book *Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention*, Kim Richard Nossal writes a chapter on Canada and the use and misuse of R2P. Nossal starts by expressing that both R2P celebrationists and skeptics agree that the Libya case was unusual. Nossal looks further at the role of Canada in the armed intervention in Libya in 2011. He explains that opposition parties view Canada's involvement in the Libya mission to be driven by R2P, but the leading Conservative government never used the phrase "responsibility to protect" in any official discourse[42]. Lastly, he says that the irony of the success of the Libya mission is that it increased opposition against the R2P doctrine. Now looking at the conversations around R2P and Afghanistan, leading experts joined to explore Canada's role and the responsibility to protect the people of Afghanistan. This conversation was fuelled by the withdrawal of American troops and the Taliban take-over in Afghanistan, making women and children the most vulnerable as humanitarian losses are mounting. Within the panel, it is argued that Canada led the charge for R2P and remained fully engaged in its implementation. It is

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[41] "Canada and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) | The Canadian Encyclopedia," accessed July 5, 2022, https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/canada-and-the-responsibility-to-protect-r2p.

[42] Kim Richard Nossal, "The Use — and Misuse — of R2P: The Case of Canada," in *Libya, the Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention*, ed. Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013), 110–29, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137273956_6.

further articulated that the Taliban became a de facto authority, thus meaning they now have the primary responsibility to ensure the protection of everyone living in Afghanistan as it is their obligation under international law[43]. Another argument is that despite Canada's military efforts, the Taliban still won, so should R2P be invoked to help the Afghan people, and should military force not be the first option. Tying the previous two points together, an opinion raised is that many countries were architects in destroying these countries, such as Afghanistan, due to misguided or unintended efforts. Nevertheless, they evaded political responsibility for their actions. Thus, posing the question of what can be done and how will we hold all parties involved accountable for their actions. Furthermore, Josef Kosc's *NATO Post – Afghanistan: R2P, Pertinence & Power* insinuates that NATO exists to respond to the needs of the world, and uphold democracy and human rights, thus embodying the R2P doctrine of protecting citizens from abuses and atrocities[44]. These conversations about R2P, Libya and Afghanistan provide discernment around whether R2P was invoked or even discussed regarding mission justification and what R2P means to Canada in the context of these conflicts.

<h3 style="text-align:center">Public Opinion around Afghanistan and Defence Policy</h3>

This literature review will assess the public dialogue around Afghanistan and defence policy. Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, authors of *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, provide an in-depth exposé on how Canada became involved in Afghanistan, deepening itself in the war. Stein and Lang express that "what is important to military leaders is often irrelevant to civilians, and what is vital to civilians is frequently of no importance whatsoever to the military" they explain that this is not due to trustworthiness but a difference in

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[43] *R2P: Exploring Our Responsibility to Protect the People of Afghanistan*, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8jCLRbXbGGU.

[44] Jozef Kosc, "NATO Post-Afghanistan: R2P, Pertinence & Power," *NAOC* (blog), accessed July 7, 2022, https://natoassociation.ca/nato-post-afghanistan-r2p-pertinence-power/.

worldview[45]. This point by Stein and Lang provides invaluable insights into the dynamics around public perception of both Canada's involvement in Afghanistan and its defence policy. In addition, Carroll claims that Canada's involvement in Afghanistan forced the public to accept the realities of modern warfare and that the Canadian forces do more than keep the peace[46]. Whereas Barnes addresses the Canadian attitudes towards war which he states are grounded in Aboriginal roots. The attitude is "minimal impairment," the ideology of loathing to be drawn in, with a concentration on negotiation and conversation[47]. Finally, Brian Frei analyzed Canada's three distinct defence policies. However, when it came to Canada's most recent defence policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged, Canada's Defence Policy*, he stated that it had enjoyed broader support between both military and civilian officials[48]. These discourses highlight Canadians' attitudes toward military-civil relations, defence policy, and war.

Looking more specifically at public and national opinion around Canadian involvement in the war in Afghanistan, John Kirton and Jenilee Guebert's conference paper, *Two Solitudes, One War: Public Opinion, National Unity, and Canada's War in Afghanistan*, articulates that at its origin it was not difficult to mobilize consent and secure support for Canadian engagement in Afghanistan, as twenty-four innocent Canadian civilians were murdered on 9/11[49]. Furthermore, Yannick Veilleux-Lepage's *Implications of the sunk cost effect and regional proximity for public support for Canada's mission in Kandahar* draws parallels between a short-term increase in public support for the Afghan mission in the wake of increasing Canadian casualties, which

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[45] Lang and Gross Stein, The Unexpected War, 9.
[46] Saideman, "Afghanistan as a Test of Canadian Politics: What Did We Learn from the Experience?", 5.
[47] Barnes, "Re-Imagining Canadian and United States Foreign Policies", 34.
[48] Brian Frei, "The Evolution of Canadian Defence Policy through the Pragmatic Control Theory of Civil-Military Relations" 19, no. 4 (2019): 9.
[49] John Kirton and Jenilee Guebert, "Two Solitudes, One War: Public Opinion, National Unity and Canada's War in Afghanistan" (Quebec and War, University of Toronto, n.d.), 47, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/scholar/kirton2007/kirton-afghanistan-071008.pdf.

resulted from a cost sunk effect[50]. Veilleux-Lepage states that in democratic states, there is a

correlation between how much the public will tolerate in terms of human and material costs of

war and the ability of a state to sustain military operations until victory[51]. Contrastingly,

Saideman articulates that the military operation began with a high degree of public support but

fell dramatically in 2006 when Canadian troops took heavier casualties[52]. Justin Massie's *Public

Contestation and Policy Resistance: Canada's Oversized Military Commitment to Afghanistan*

supports Saideman, as Massie argues that the war in Afghanistan was a non-issue to the public

and Canadian politics until 2006[53]. Moens echoes the claims of Veilleux-Lepage, Massie, and

Saideman. Moens indicates that the polls state that Canadians are proud of their soldiers' skill

and valour yet are still trepidatious if the Taliban can be defeated[54]. Therefore, it insinuates that

the Canadian public has rallied behind the empowered soldier and has national pride but is

unsure about Canada's future in Afghanistan. Whereas Kirton and Guebert imply that as the war

dragged on, public opinion turned into "rally turned reluctance," as Afghanistan became a long,

costly, and casualty-ridden conflict with no clear victory or end[55]. Correspondingly, Jean-

Christophe Boucher's *Evaluating the "Trenton Effect: Canadian and Military Casualties in

Afghanistan* insinuates that collective attitude toward the missions in Afghanistan is reflective of

thanatophobia and a casualty-phobic mindset. However, the statistics prove that Canadians have

been quite tolerant of the mission's fatalities[56].  This ongoing debate around public support

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[50] Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, "Implications of the Sunk Cost Effect and Regional Proximity for Public Support for Canada's Mission in Kandahar," *International Journal* 68, no. 2 (2013): 346.
[51] Veilleux-Lepage, "Implications of the Sunk Cost Effect," 346.
[52] Saideman, "Afghanistan as a Test of Canadian Politics: What Did We Learn from the Experience?", 13.
[53] Justin Massie, "Public Contestation and Policy Resistance: Canada's Oversized Military Commitment to Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 54, https://doi.org/10.1111/fpa.12047.
[54] Moens, "Afghanistan and the Revolution in Canadian Foreign Policy," 577.
[55] Kirton and Guebert, "Two Solitudes, One War," 1.
[56] Jean-Christophe Boucher, "Evaluating the 'Trenton Effect': Canadian Public Opinion and Military Casualties in Afghanistan (2006-2010)," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 40, no. 2 (June 2010): 237, https://doi.org/10.1080/02722011003734753.

provides invaluable insight into how defence policy is influenced by public opinion and how defence policy has shifted since the war in Afghanistan.

The literature also focuses on public discourse on CAF involvement in peacekeeping and explains public support. Carroll addresses public opinion in defence policy; he states that Canadian citizens have consistently supported CAF involvement in peacekeeping operations and have seen Canada as a natural peacekeeper on the international stage[57]. Contrastingly, Donais expresses that many view Canada's commitment to UN peacekeeping as outlined in their defence policies to be lukewarm[58]. Furthermore, Doug Saunders' news article, *Canada picked its Kandahar moment*, explains that governmental and public support for Canadian engagement in Afghanistan is rooted in Canadian desire for international fame and recognition[59]. These findings provide more background information on the shifts in policy and public support.

## Public Opinion around Libya

This section will address the public dialogue surrounding Canada – Libya relations regarding the intervention. The ongoing discourse around Canada and Libya is conflicting. Another argument insinuates that Canada did not do its homework before entering the Libyan civil war. Jeffrey Simpson's *Canada supported this and went into Libya with Lofty Ideals and Little Knowledge*. However, within the article, Simpson states that Canada agreed yet knew nothing of the complexities in Libya.

Similarly, Josh Dehaas' *Canada expected to intervene in Libya, however, experts disagree on how* expresses that many leaders and experts are at a crossroads on the best course of

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[57] Carroll, "Peacekeeping," 168.
[58] Donais, "IS CANADA REALLY BACK? COMMITMENT, CREDIBILITY, AND THE CHANGING FACE OF PEACEKEEPING," 79.
[59] Doug Saunders, "Canada Picked Its Kandahar Moment," *The Globe and Mail*, January 7, 2012, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/canada-picked-its-kandahar-moment/article4085890/.

action when it comes to getting involved in Libya. Some say Canada should be involved militarily; some suggest peacebuilding or training. At the same time, some argue that negotiations or airstrikes might be best, and others say Canada should not get involved[60]. Simpson's argument that there is no desire to keep military forces on the ground to provide stability during a regime change supports Dehaas' article regarding a conflicting opinion about intervention in Libya[61]. Additionally, even though the mission in Libya is fraught with risk, it still garnered collective support from Conservatives, Liberals and New Democrats, with the only concern being mission creep.

In addition, some of the public opinion surrounding Canadian military intervention in Libya stems from the media. For instance, Canadian media outlets such as the Toronto Star, the Globe and Mail and the National Post blindly supported military action in Libya. For example, the stance that Montreal Gazette's Editorial: *Participation in Military strikes against Islamic State is Canada's duty* by Allison Hanes describes Canada's involvement in the Libya mission as crucial to striking ISIS down and defeating the Islamic State[62]. Another example is the National Post's article *Canada's proud role in Libya* articulates that Canada's small military was able to demonstrate that it could work and stand alongside some of the great world powers, a feat in which the CAF should be proud of[63]. Contrastingly, Davide Mastracci's *Canadian Media: Cheerleading Regime Change in Libya* expresses that the NATO-led military invasion in Libya

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[60] Josh Dehaas, "Canada Expected to Intervene in Libya but Experts Disagree on How," CTVNews, February 19, 2016, https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canada-expected-to-intervene-in-libya-but-experts-disagree-on-how-1.2784908.

[61] Jeffrey Simpson, "Opinion: Canada Went into Libya with Lofty Ideals and Little Knowledge," *The Globe and Mail*, June 15, 2011, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/canada-went-into-libya-with-lofty-ideals-and-little-knowledge/article625312/.

[62] Allison Hanes, "Editorial: Participation in Military Strikes against Islamic State Is Canada's Duty," montrealgazette, accessed August 9, 2022, https://montrealgazette.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-participation-in-military-strikes-against-islamic-state-is-canadas-duty.

[63] National Post View, "National Post Editorial Board: Canada's Proud Role in Libya," *National Post*, October 20, 2011, https://nationalpost.com/opinion/national-post-editorial-board-canadas-proud-role-in-libya.

turned "a functioning state into a lawless warzone"[64]. Many of these outlets changed their stance once Libya's collapse became unavoidable. However, there has been no apology or admittance that being involved in a war makes one complicit when the country plunges into turmoil. The media has the power to influence public opinion, and much of the media supports Canada's intervention in Libya, especially in the campaign against terrorism and acknowledging Canada's military capabilities. Therefore, public opinion on Libya was led by the media, where the opinion proved to be confusing.

### Concluding Remarks

The first section focuses on shifts over the years in defence policy and how various security approaches consistently influence it. The second section addresses Canada's role in the international sector security as outlined by the GC and Veteran Affairs and how the international community perceives Canada's position. It also looked at the role Canada took in Afghanistan when it came to Canada-Afghan relations. The third section touches on literature concerning the decline in Canadian involvement in UN peacekeeping, thereby illustrating how the posture of Canada's defence policy has shifted. The fourth section addresses the relationship between Canada and NATO by examining the literature that describes Canada's commitment and contributions to NATO. The section on R2P looks at the concept of Responsibility to Protect and its role in foreign policy, especially in the context of military interventions in Afghanistan and Libya. The fifth literature section tackles public discourse surrounding Afghanistan and defence policy. It addresses military-civil opinions, the changing support around Canadian missions in Afghanistan, reasons for the mobilization of support, and how Canadians have often supported

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[64] Davide Mastracci, "Canadian Media: Cheerleading Regime Change in Libya," *Medium* (blog), November 23, 2017, https://medium.com/@DavideMastracci/canadian-media-cheerleading-regime-change-in-libya-d3a04d69760b.

UN peacekeeping. Finally, the last literature section tackles public opinion surrounding the Libya mission of 2011. The literature explains that the mission in Libya was complex and lacked collective agreement on how to respond. It also addresses the role media played in shaping public opinion.

Since this project focuses on how Canada has shifted away from militaristic intervention in the last twenty years, the literature above provides insight and explains the question. Firstly, the literature focuses on the current shifts in Canada's defence policies and their role in the international security sector. It also explains that there has been a decline in Canada's involvement in peacekeeping operations and that Canada has been a consistently committed member of NATO. Secondly, R2P is discussed to determine involvement in international security missions and if it was invoked in the armed conflicts of Afghanistan and Libya. Lastly, the literature addresses public opinion. Public opinion has the power to shape policy decisions and dictate whether Canada will get involved in specific missions or not.

Moreover, the literature above articulates that Canada's role in international security has changed and explains the various ways it has. Furthermore, it can be argued that there are gaps in the literature. Some of those gaps could be not enough of an emphasis on the bilateral relationship between the USA and Canada and the debate between pragmatism and conviction regarding foreign policy. It could also be argued that R2P could be drawn on further. This topic is quite extensive and can encompass much more. Nonetheless, the researcher believes that the above conservations provide sufficient information in answering the overarching question of the paper. To conclude, this chapter highlighted the ongoing discussions around Canada's defence policy and how that has changed in the subsequent years following involvement in the Afghanistan war and the Libya mission.

# CHAPTER FOUR

# THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

This chapter will continue to focus on how Canada's defence policies have shifted since its engagement in Afghanistan and Libya. This chapter will theoretically analyze Canada's defence policies and military missions. This theoretical discussion will focus on realist theory, liberalism, constructivism, and discourses of war theory. Furthermore, this researcher is aware that other conflict analysis and resolution theories can be applied to provide a different viewpoint of the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Libya. For example, one could use both basic human needs theory and structural violence theory to explain the root determinants of war. However, studies have already occurred using those theories to explain the conflicts. Whereas these theories the researcher will use provide supporting analysis to the research question being asked and seek to fill a gap.

## Realist Theory and Afghanistan

Realist theory addresses the state's role, political power, and national interest. This section will concentrate on the findings of Hans J. Morgenthau and his *Politics among Nations*. Morgenthau's realist theory addresses six principles. Those six principles are:

1. Politics is governed by objective laws which have roots in human nature
2. National interest is defined in terms of national power
3. Interest is always dynamic
4. Abstract moral principles cannot be applied to politics
5. Difference between the moral aspirations of a nation and the universal moral principles
6. Autonomy of international politics[65]

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[65] Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth W. Thompson, and W. David Clinton, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 7th ed (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006).

These principles do an excellent job of providing an all-encompassing understanding of realist theory. However, for this analysis, this section will only focus on principles two, three, four, and six.

Principle two insinuates that national interest and power are vital to decisions and policies. Morgenthau uses the ideology of interest, defined as power, to carry political realism into the arena of international politics. Similarly, principle three argues that the actions and policies of a nation are always governed by national interest. However, principle three argues that national interest is not static but constantly changing—a nation's interest changes with changes in political and social environments. Power dynamics change with the changes in the environment that concerns itself with the securing of national interests. Principle four implies that the primary function of a nation is to satisfy and protect the demands of national interest through national power. Principle six articulates that political realism is not moralistic, legalistic, or idealistic in its approach to international politics; it is only concerned with national interest defined in terms of power. Moreover, realism addresses the struggle for power among nations, where every state either tries to maintain or increase their power and secure their national interests.

One realist approach would argue that Canada only got involved in the US intervention in Afghanistan as it was of national interest. However, combating terrorism was not the national interest being referred to but the fact that Canada wanted to demonstrate its commitment to the US and allied security and ensure they kept their seat at the allied tables[66]. When it comes to war, it is of political interest for a state to be concerned with whom they are fighting alongside instead of whom they consider the enemy[67]. It is in the nation's interest for Canada to ensure they are

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[66] Massie, "Canada's War for Prestige in Afghanistan," 274.
[67] Kirton and Guebert, "Two Solitudes, One War," 6.

fighting alongside Europe or the United States. Thus, making the war in Afghanistan more appealing while protecting their allied relationships. Another argument that realist theory could make is that Canada realized the US-led coalition in Afghanistan could restore its image as a reliable ally. Canada values their alliance with the US and Europe, does not have any regional interests outside North America and will provide legitimacy to operations led by its allies. Realist theory proves the diplomatic need of Canada to maintain ally relationships as the reason for involvement in the Afghan mission.

Another reason is that Afghanistan is of national interest due to terrorism being of Canadian security interest. PM Jean Chrétien's statement on the 9/11 terrorist attacks is as follows: "This was an act of premeditated murder on a massive scale with no possible justification or explanation – an attack not just on our closest friend and partner, the United States, but against the values and way of life of all free and civilized people around the world"[68]. Politicians and citizens alike felt a deep sense of solidarity toward Americans. They felt the need to combat terrorism at home and abroad, thus prompting the Canadian government to support the GWOT fully. With the USA tightening the US-Canada border, Canada felt the economic restraints that came from it, thus prompting Canada to share in the goal to eliminate al-Qaeda. Furthermore, at the outset, Canada's dedication to strengthening security seems to be worthy of applause; however, the initiatives put in place do not ensure Canada's security but instead are a way of attracting the favour of Washington and the White House[69]. Canada wanting to keep their nation safe and secure is of vital interest while ensuring that it is a prosperous nation benefiting from trade. Realist theory and its principles provide insight into a country's interest dynamics.

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[68] Massie, "Canada's War for Prestige in Afghanistan," 278.
[69] Stephane Roussel, "'Honey, Are You Still Mad at Me? L've Changed, You Know…': Canada-US Relations in a Post—Saddam/Post—Chrétien Era," *International Journal* 58, no. 4 (December 1, 2003): 571–90, https://doi.org/10.1177/002070200305800405.

Realist theory would argue that military force is a necessity. It is necessary that a state possesses military power but is willing to use it. Security dictates that a strong military is crucial. Additionally, high politics is essential, thus making state security and foreign policy a priority. Neorealists also support the argument that having a strong military and the willingness to use military force as a foreign policy tool is imperative if a state wants to survive as an international player. A realist approach would insinuate that involvement in Afghan missions was Canada's way of reviving its image as a significant international player. Afghanistan is an "example of Canada's willingness to take on difficult tasks and a leadership role in international affairs"[70]. However, realist theory also argues that a state should contribute proportionally to military operations[71]. This is because a state cannot sustain their troops in times of war to the point of success if they are stretched thin and overcommitted. An argument can be made that due to burden-sharing, Canada felt the need to overpay in Afghanistan as they benefit heavily from US security without the cost. For example, Canada relied significantly on US support in Kandahar as they would not have been able to intervene militarily. Canada then later decided not to be a part of the invasion in Iraq, therefore voluntarily overcontributing a large contingent of troops. This over-contribution saw "limited military capabilities, a heavy death toll, and significant public and political opposition"[72]. Contrastingly, it can be argued that due to continental hierarchy and politics Canada felt pressured into committing troops to the Afghan mission[73]. Furthermore, when it comes to international politics and the position the nation would take on the global stage, Canada wants to be seen as a "constructive force for international peace and security"[74]. Realist

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[70] Jean-Christophe Boucher, "Selling Afghanistan: A Discourse Analysis of Canada's Military Intervention, 2001–08," *International Journal* 64, no. 3 (September 1, 2009): 717–33, https://doi.org/10.1177/002070200906400308.
[71] Massie, "Public Contestation and Policy Resistance," 48.
[72] Massie, "Canada's War for Prestige in Afghanistan," 281.
[73] Massie, 277.
[74] Donais, "IS CANADA REALLY BACK? COMMITMENT, CREDIBILITY, AND THE CHANGING FACE OF PEACEKEEPING", 79.

theory proves that if a country wants to be defined by power, it must not be afraid to utilize its

military to be a favourite player on the global stage.

The protection and responsibility to uphold Canadian values can be used by realist theory

to explain policy decisions. The Canadian values are as follows:

- Respect for the environment
- Commitment to democracy
- Defence of human rights
- A desire to encourage fairness in developing societies (fair labour, business legal, and governance arrangements)
- A recognition of the importance of tolerance and diversity in society, a desire to promote that to others, and
- A strong attachment to the ideas of an engaged civil society both at home and abroad[75]

One could argue that Canadian foreign policymakers have adopted these values and implemented

them into international political decisions. Therefore, deciding that they have the responsibility

to protect and apply these values abroad. For example, Afghanistan can be seen as an

international commitment on behalf of Canada to stabilize failing states[76]. Furthermore, all three

governments justified Canada's role in Afghanistan as the need to create a stable and secure

environment for Afghans. This can be observed by the correlation of efforts to improve security

and achieve development goals. Correspondingly, Prime minister Paul Martin insisted that

Canada wants "to create a world where fairness, justice, and decency reign"[77]. Donais provides

an example of how realist theory can be used regarding policy. Donais argues that Canada's

defence policy has shifted from liberal hubris to liberal humility. Liberal hubris is the notion that

outsiders can fix the problems of conflict states, whereas liberal humility is the idea that

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[75] Alison Howell, "Peaceful, Tolerant and Orderly? A Feminist Analysis of Discourses of 'Canadian Values' in Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 12, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 49–69, https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2005.9673388.
[76] Boucher, "Selling Afghanistan," 723.
[77] Boucher, 726.

outsiders can fix none of them[78]. Realist theory can explain the reasoning behind policy choices which aids in the analysis of the shifting posture of Canada's defence policy.

Moreover, the successive governments of Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, and Stephen Harper used Afghanistan as a front in the war on terror but had other national interests and ideas brewing. Nonetheless, realist theory and Morgenthau's six principles can explain the dynamics of national interests, the role of power, and the reasoning for specific international policy decisions.

### Realist Theory and Libya

A realist approach to Canadian involvement in the military intervention in Libya would state that it was a matter of national interest to protect and foster ally relationships. To illustrate, Jeffery Simpson claims that "Canada went along principally because our traditional allies felt something should be done to stop Col. Ghaddafi from killing some of his opponents"[79]. The United States and European countries (Britain and France) felt that it was essential to do something to solve this humanitarian crisis. Since realism would insinuate that it is in Canada's best interest to ensure they are fighting alongside their war allies, it is not shocking that Canada participated in the Libya mission in 2011. Correspondingly, Harper's government has grasped on to internationalism that stresses national interest and domestic priorities, thus proving that nurturing ally affiliations is of national interest supported by realist claims.

Another argument of realist theory suggests that exercising military force is necessary and crucial to ensuring security. A realist perspective would articulate that Canada participated in conducting airstrikes in Libya and in the armed intervention to emphasize its military strength.

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[78] Donais, "IS CANADA REALLY BACK? COMMITMENT, CREDIBILITY, AND THE CHANGING FACE OF PEACEKEEPING," 97.
[79] Simpson, "Opinion".

Since realism is concerned with power, Canada in Libya can be seen as a way for the country to highlight their political power through military strength.

Realism theorists can use Canada's sense of responsibility to uphold Canadian values abroad to explain policy decisions. For example, Canada believes in defending human rights and is committed to democracy[80]. The mission in Libya was founded on protecting citizens from crimes against humanity who were being threatened by the de facto and authoritarian ruler, Gaddafi. Gaddafi's leadership does not align with the values Canada works to uphold. Therefore, realism would argue that Canada joined its allies in conducting airstrikes in Libya because of a sense of duty and the desire to promote Western values abroad. Realist theory can provide further evidence into why Canada participated militaristically in Libya.

## Liberalism and Afghanistan

Liberalism is a theory that concerns itself with achieving lasting peace and cooperation in IR. International liberalism proposes how a country should and can function. Liberalist tradition also implies that military force is used after international diplomacy fails and international institutions are of greater importance than states[81]. The US did ask the Taliban to turn over al-Qaeda leader bin Laden. However, they refused, proving the point that international diplomacy was first used but failed, thus leading to military intervention. Furthermore, liberalism has a specific stance when it comes to terrorism. Eric Shiraev's *International Relations* states:

> To understand terrorism, liberalism argues, we must examine the conditions that breed political radicalism. Terrorism cannot be defeated by military means alone. It takes understanding the causes of terrorism and using legal means of international cooperation to defeat it. States combating terrorism are likely to succeed when they act together to create a better international environment and engage international institutions and non-state actors[82].

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[80] Howell, "Peaceful, Tolerant and Orderly?"
[81] Eric Shiraev, *International Relations*, Brief edition. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
[82] Shiraev, *International Relations*.

Evidence of liberalism in the case of Afghanistan is when many countries came together to combat the war on terror under the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force. Additionally, the ANSF was trained by Canada to aid in defeating the Taliban to ensure the safety and security of Afghan citizens. This example supports the liberalist claim that international cooperation and institutions make the world safer since they work together to aid the security community. Furthermore, one can use the Canadian values in the section on realism and Afghanistan in the context of liberalist theory to explain why Canada engaged in the war in Afghanistan. Canada upholds the values of a commitment to democracy, the defence of human rights, and encouraging fairness in developing societies, and are attached to promoting civil society at home and abroad. These Canadian values align with the values of international institutions. As well as explain the rationale for why international institutions intervene abroad in various countries. For instance, the Taliban has committed human rights abuses against the Afghan population, and some of the missions in Afghanistan can be explained using the guise of promoting democracy and civil society. Therefore, under the liberalist tradition, it can be argued that Canada intervened in Afghanistan to achieve peace, cooperation, and security in international relations.

## Liberalism and Libya

One of the premises of liberalism in encouraging cooperation is that international institutions make the world safer. It can be argued that the state of Libya prompted a liberalist reaction. The instability of Libya at the hands of the Gaddafi regime sparked a need for the Security Council to gather to protect civilians from crimes against humanity. They were then prompting NATO to action within the country. Since Canada is both a founding member of the UN and NATO, it would have been in their interest to participate in the armed intervention of

Libya. Another principle implies that the spread of democracy will make interstate war less frequent; hence democracy is essential to liberalist theory[83]. Correspondingly, Canada cherishes the value of democracy. Therefore, it can be argued that Canada involved itself in Libya to uphold Canadian values abroad. Moreover, the case of Canadian intervention in Libya is justified by liberalism regarding the importance of international institutions and democracy.

## Constructivist Theory and Afghanistan

This section will use the theory of constructivism. It will build off the ideas of Michael L. Barnett to provide a different understanding of why Canada intervened in the war in Afghanistan. For starters, it is important to note that constructivist theory is a social theory but can be used to explain broader international politics. Constructivists uphold the notion that identities and interests are socially constructed, thus making them changeable[84]. Michael L. Barnett's constructivism also argues that actors are created and influenced by their cultural environment, furthering the debate between nurture and nature[85]. Barnett goes on to further explain the importance of the social construction of interests and identities. The argument is that identity shapes interests. Applying this to the Canada and Afghanistan context, a constructivist argument would insinuate that Canada will always want to uphold the identity of a good and loyal neighbour to the United States. There is collective agreement and consensus that Canada is a vital partner in the North American alliance with the US. For instance, Canada and the US have a 'special relationship' founded on shared security ideals, pluralism, longevity regarding being a continuous ally, economics, and geography[86]. Due to this 'special relationship,' Canadian public

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[83] Shiraev, 207.
[84] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "TAKING STOCK: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4, no. 1 (2001): 391–416, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.391.
[85] Michael L. Barnett, "Constructivism," March 15, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198777854.013.7.
[86] David Haglund, "Canada and the United States: What Does It Mean to Be Good Neighbours?," *Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute*, October 27, 2008, 20.

sympathy was at an all-time high for its American neighbours following the attacks on 9/11.

Therefore, improving Canada's stature in defence and security became a priority for the Chrétien

government after 9/11, especially since its neighbour was still reeling from the shock of the

attacks[87]. The United States saw Canada as a loyal neighbour, and after what they endured, they

were not expecting a minimalist performance. Thereby proving that the socially constructed

identity of being seen as a good neighbour shaped Canada's national interest in involving

themselves in the military intervention in Afghanistan.

## Constructivist Theory and Libya

As stated, a constructivist theory is a social theory that can provide insight into

international political decisions. Therefore, constructivist theory can explain why states did what

they did in times of armed conflict. Continuing to build on Barnett's idea that identity shapes

interest. It can be argued that Canada views itself as a good sport for supporting international

missions. Canada likes to uphold the image that they are a consistent player on the world stage.

For example, Canada has contributed to almost every NATO mission since its establishment and

is a founding member[88]. Consequently, the NATO-led Libyan mission of 2011 was not the

exception. Constructivism would argue that since Canada wants to uphold the identity that they

are a significant contributor to international security; it would be of interest to join the NATO

mission (Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR) in Libya to implement the UN Security Council

Resolution 1973 and put an end to Gaddafi's regime. Furthermore, during the creation of the

North American Transatlantic Organization, Canada emphasized that NATO needed to be more

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[87] Lang and Gross Stein, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, 13.
[88] Global Affairs Canada, "Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," GAC, October 19, 2015,
https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/nato-otan/index.aspx?lang=eng.

than just a military pact. It also needed to promote cultural, economic, and political principles[89].

Émile Durkheim's approach to constructivist theory argues that "shared social ideas, beliefs, and practices form the basis of society"[90]. Therefore, constructivists argue that common values and shared culture bind society. When the Libya mission was announced, the NATO governments shared the same rationale of protecting citizens from crimes against humanity for military intervention. Correspondingly, the need to implement the rule of law, promote human rights, and endorse democratic governance was part of the justification of the Libyan mission. Moreover, constructivism would suggest that this culture and the common values NATO members share would explain why Canada and NATO intervened in the Libyan civil war.

### Discourses of War – Afghanistan

War discourse theory concerns itself with the language used during times of armed conflict. Diego Lazzarich's *Discourses of War* provides insight into the rhetoric behind war, thus giving further explanation into the language used by political leaders. Canada's involvement in the war in Afghanistan lasted for over a decade, thus seeing different successive federal leaders and parties trying to explain Canadian military intervention in Afghanistan. Therefore, war theory discourses help analyze the posture shift of defence policy since it will provide examples of changing security challenges and the rationales behind the policies meant to address the different security challenges.

Jean-Christophe Boucher's *Selling Afghanistan* is a comparative analysis of the level of communication and discourse used by the successive governments of Canada. Boucher argues that when it comes to official communication on Canadian engagement in Afghanistan, both the

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[89] NATO, "Canada and NATO - 1949," NATO, 1, accessed August 18, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_161511.htm.
[90] Barnett, "Constructivism," 94.

Chrétien and Martin governments were less vocal. In contrast, Harper was more active in official

communication. Chrétien's government addressed the importance of Afghanistan, but the

speeches did not primarily focus on Canadian intervention. However, the rhetoric was more

consumed with demonstrating solidarity with the United States and the need to combat

international terrorism[91]. For example, Chrétien stated:

> I have made clear in the days since September 11 that the struggles to defeat the forces of
> terrorism will be a long one. We must remain strong and vigilant. We must insist on
> living on our terms according to our values, not on terms dictated by the shadows. I
> cannot promise that the campaign against terrorism will be painless, but I can promise
> that it will be won[92].

Contrastingly, when analyzing Martin's government, there is an absence of public speeches that

focus on Canada's presence in Afghanistan. This is shocking since, under Paul Martin's

government, Canadian troops were deployed to Kandahar province in 2005[93]. The Martin

government only addressed Afghanistan in four speeches and articulated that the deployment

was aligned with policy revisions outlined in the 2005 international policy statement.

Additionally, a few of Martin's cabinet members, such as Pierre Pettigrew, David Pratt, and Bill

Graham, presented Afghanistan as a model for the government's new integration of the 3D

approach to international interventions[94]. The 3D approach focuses on diplomacy, defence, and

development. Martin's government used the language and promise that Canada would take the

place of "pride and influence" in the world when it came to international security[95].

Under the Chrétien and Martin Liberal parties, war discourse focused on international

security references. Chrétien linked international security to the prosecution of the war on terror.

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[91] Boucher, "Selling Afghanistan," 723.
[92] Lang and Gross Stein, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, 1.
[93] Boucher, "Selling Afghanistan," 723.
[94] Ibid, 724.
[95] Ibid, 729.

Thus, using the discourse argument, the Afghan mission contributed to international security because it was a front for the war on terror. Martin's government saw a correlation between international security and broader global problems, such as failed and fragile states. Therefore, Martin's discourse presented the Afghan mission as a subset of an internal security challenge.

The Harper government was the most active in communicating the rationales behind Afghanistan deployment and articulated that the Canadian mission success is the number one priority[96]. The most prominent form of discourse at the beginning of the 20th century was a positive, heroic, regenerating, and mortiferous association of war[97]. This form of discourse is prominent when looking at Harper and his government's rhetoric. To illustrate, Stephen Harper and his conservative government focused their attention on empowering Canada's soldiers when it came to Afghanistan. Harper invoked the notion of "warrior heritage" and made it known that it was of national interest to win the "campaign against terrorism"[98]. Harper focused his efforts on rebranding. When Harper came into power, he declared that "Canada is back" regarding being a significant international player[99]. Similarly, Harper used the discourse of Canada as a "courageous warrior"[100]. Moreover, all three governments stressed national, internationalist, and altruistic justifications regarding the Canadian mission in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, another rhetoric used throughout Canada's involvement in the Afghanistan missions is the notion of "support our troops." The government used the popularity of the Support the Troops movement and rhetoric to gain consent and support for the ongoing military commitment in Afghanistan, subduing anti-war voices from turning into active protests.

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[96] Boucher, "Selling Afghanistan," 724.
[97] Diego Lazzarich, "Discourses of War," in *Selling War: The Role of the Mass Media in Hostile Conflicts from World War I to the "War on Terror,"* ed. Josef Seethaler et al. (Bristol: Intellect Books Ltd., 2013), 53.
[98] Moens, "Afghanistan and the Revolution in Canadian Foreign Policy," 578.
[99] Boucher, "Selling Afghanistan," 730.
[100] Carroll, "Peacekeeping," 168.

Specifically, Harper would accuse individuals of disrespecting soldiers if they questioned his military policies, demanded public debate about military deployments, or objected to military spending[101]. These examples of the language used during times of war, specifically the language used by political elites in Canada regarding Afghanistan, are imperative when understanding shifting defence policies. It can be argued that there is a correlation between policy changes and the rhetoric used to justify them.

Lazzarich articulates that if a "state wants to wage war, it must first convince its people to support it"[102]. This is supported by the argument that there has been a "historical connection between public relations and war"[103]. Often the legitimacy of war is dependent upon domestic acceptance. Therefore, it insinuates that there is an implication that the battlefield for Canada was not only outside the wire in Kandahar or Kabul but discursively in the mobilization for public support for the Afghan mission. It is crucial to note that many discursive domains include media and news outlets, public debate, and opinion polls. Furthermore, Jean-Christophe Boucher's *Selling Afghanistan* is a comparative analysis of the level of communication and discourse used by the successive governments of Canada. Boucher's work supports Lazzarich's claim; however, Boucher argues that the Canadian government's justification for Canadian involvement in Afghanistan was "at best mixed and worst confused"[104]. Correspondingly, Nicole Wegner says that the political leadership in Canada failed to provide a "convincingly coherent narrative to justify military involvement in Afghanistan," and any attempts made were "rhetorically ambiguous"[105]. This evidence proves Lazzarich's point, to paraphrase that

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[101] Nicole Wegner, "Discursive Battlefields: Support(Ing) the Troops in Canada," *International Journal* 72, no. 4 (December 1, 2017): 444–62, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702017741512.
[102] Lazzarich, "Discourses of War," 52.
[103] Wegner, "Discursive Battlefields," 444.
[104] Boucher, "Selling Afghanistan," 730.
[105] Wegner, "Discursive Battlefields," 460-461.

regardless of difference and contradiction, in the end, all discourses of war tend to affirm the necessity of war and that winning over the public sphere is the prerequisite to the start of the war[106]. Even though the reasoning and communication behind Canada's involvement in Afghanistan was diverse, the discourse found a place where it could be rationalized in Canadian citizens' minds.

### Discourses of War – Libya

As stated in the above section, war discourse theory focuses on the language used during times of war. This is evident through the language used by the Harper government to justify military intervention in Libya in 2011. For starters, given the changes occurring in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) with the Arab Spring, the NATO governments needed to swiftly explain their rationale for military intervention with a focus on peaceful transformation. Stephen Harper's response to Libya was that of a highly normative-oriented and value-based approach. It addressed democratic ideals, such as the rule of law and human rights. The rule of law and human rights have been a cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy. Correspondingly, an argument is that Canada's foreign policy shifted towards romanticism that emphasized placing values at the top of the agenda. For example, during a World Economic Forum, PM Harper discussed the idea of enlightened sovereignty, which "refers to the responsibility of countries to be cognizant of their domestic practices and to ensure their consistency with the global good and global norms"[107]. Although enlightened sovereignty was not directly evoked in the context of military intervention in Libya, one can see how it has influenced the government's stance and approach to Libya. Harper's rationale for Canadian involvement in Libya exhibits devotion to democracy and

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[106] Lazzarich, "Discourses of War," 52.
[107] Cooper, Andrew F. Momani, Bessma,Andrew F. Cooper and Bessma Momani, "The Harper Government's Messaging in the Build-up to the Libyan Intervention: Was Canada Different than Its NATO Allies?," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 20, no. 2 (2014): 176–88, https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2014.934855.

R2P principles. More specifically, the Harper government justified participating in the NATO-led mission as it protected citizens from the Gaddafi regime. Another one of the official government positions on Canada-Libya relations is that the bilateral relationship is founded on a mutual interest in the respect for human rights, the rule of law, the promotion of democratic governance, and the desire to strengthen business relations[108]. This focus on values and national interest creates a lens for understanding the language used by politicians in response to Libya and military involvement.

Following the attacks on civilians at the hands of the Gaddafi regime, the Canadian government and Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrence Cannon issued a statement stating:

> Canada strongly condemns the violent crackdowns on innocent protesters, resulting in many injured and killed. We call on the Libyan security forces to respect the human rights of demonstrators and uphold their commitment to freedom of speech and the right to assembly. The Libyan authorities must show restraint and stop using lethal force against protesters…We support the rule of law; we support freedom …. We also put forward our considerations in terms of promoting democracy[109].

Furthermore, Global Affairs Canada (GAC) issued a statement where they expressed concerns over the situation in Libya. The statement calls for a ceasefire and details the need for a reconciliation process and accountability under international humanitarian law (IHL) (See Appendix A for the complete statement). The statement states, "Canada fully supports the Libya people's desire to build a peaceful, stable, democratic, and prosperous Libya"[110]. These statements support the claims made regarding the Harper government taking a values-based approach to foreign policy regarding the language and justifications used when analyzing the discourse used to explain Canadian military intervention in Libya. Moreover, War discourse

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[108] Global Affairs Canada, "Canada-Libya Relations," GAC, May 21, 2021, https://www.international.gc.ca/country-pays/libya-libye/relations.aspx?lang=eng.
[109] Cooper and Momani,"The Harper Government's Messaging in the Build-up to the Libyan Intervention," 181.
[110] Canada, "Canada-Libya Relations."

theory not only provides a foundation for the rationale behind the language used in the case of Libya but also explains the language used in statements by politicians.

## Concluding Remarks

Realist theory, liberalism, constructivism, and discourses of war theory provide an in-depth analysis of how theory can explain states' decisions in times of war and, by proxy, how defence policies are shaped. Realist theory proves that Canada only got involved in Afghanistan and Libya as it was of national and security interests, as outlined in defence policy documents. Liberalism ascertains that the spread of democracy, participation in international institutions, and the security community were the reason for Canada's engagement in Libya and Afghanistan. Constructivism demonstrates how identity, shared culture, and common values can be reason enough for a country to involve itself in armed conflict. It must be noted that realist theory, liberalism, and constructivist theory intertwine. These theories support and provide different reasons for a states' action. For example, Canadian military intervention based on values can be explained by both realism and liberalism while providing a differing rationale for why the GC would implement them in policy and encourage Canadian involvement in combat missions. Finally, war discourse theory demonstrates that the language used in times of war influences policy decisions and vice versa. The three successive governments that dealt with Canada's involvement in Afghanistan used differing and similar language to reiterate Canada's security interests. When it came to Libya, Harper's language reflected the ideals of governance, promotion of human rights and the rule of law while maintaining a supportive tone. Moreover, these theories are used to analyze the changing posture of Canada's defence policies while using Afghanistan and Libya as evidence to support the claims made.

# CHAPTER FIVE

## CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICIES

Over the last twenty to twenty-five years, Canada has seen four governments. Those are:

1. Jean Chrétien – Liberal Party (1993 – 2003)
2. Paul Martin – Liberal Party (2003 – 2006)
3. Stephen Harper – Conservative Party (2006 – 2015)
4. Justin Trudeau – Liberal Party (2015 – Present)

Three of these four governments dealt with the war in Afghanistan, and three issued well-known defence policy statements. Chrétien, Martin, and Harper justified Canadian engagement in Afghanistan, and much of their term was plagued with policy decisions regarding international security. Correspondingly, Martin, Harper, and Trudeau released defence policy documents regarding the changing face of security at home and abroad and the vision for the CF. This chapter will assess the 2005 *Defence Policy Statement*, the 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy*, and the 2017 *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. The assessment will address the significant foreign policy decisions implemented. It will also describe the security challenges Canada and the world faced when the policy documents were released. Finally, this chapter also examines the defence policies before the Chrétien era and those during Chrétien's leadership. Additionally, this chapter will conduct a comparative analysis of the similarities and differences between the policies. It will provide an analysis of the defence policies and how they relate to the central question of this paper. Finally, this chapter will look at the correlation between defence policies and the literature. The hope is that this chapter will provide a clear and in-depth example of how Canadian foreign and defence policies have shifted their posture.

### Defence Policy during the Pre-Chrétien and Chrétien Era

Canadian defence policy was built on the ideals of Canadian character, which is why every White Paper on defence places the nation's defence as the number one priority.

Additionally, Canada has assured protection from the United States, thus allowing the Canadian government to explore opportunities to develop its military capabilities and defence strategies. Thereby giving them the freedom to withdraw from these ventures when the cost became too burdensome or when the benefits of said venture evaporated. Finally, Canada's defence policies adopted the ideals of Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier and the Laurier doctrine "there is no threat, and if there were one, the Americans would save us"[111]. Laurier's rationale was that Canada should leave its defence in the hands of its trusted American neighbour. Nonetheless, Prime Ministers such as John Diefenbaker and Pierre Trudeau worked to separate themselves from past defence policies and Laurier tradition by approving NORAD and becoming a member of the G7. Canada's defence policies before the Chrétien era focused on placing Canada first. They made foreign policy decisions that put them in the position of being a valuable world actor while maintaining the posture of being a "free rider" off the United States defence systems and spending.

The Chrétien decade was defined by messy geo-strategic realities post-Cold War era, the horrors of 9/11, the rigours of a campaign against global terrorism, and the declination of an American invitation to participate in the invasion of Iraq. Also, the Chrétien years saw a high operational tempo. For instance, Canada was busy with peace support missions, humanitarian operations, and armed interventions abroad and was concerned with disaster-relief efforts at home[112]. It also saw military personnel burnout, equipment disintegration, and a myriad of embarrassments. However, its defence policies were reminiscent of Laurier tradition as Chrétien made it clear that he observed the military as a low-rung necessity. Chrétien's White Paper on

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[111] Douglas Bland Originally published on Policy Options November 1 and 2010, "In Defence of Canada's Defence," Policy Options, accessed August 16, 2022, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/afghanistan/in-defence-of-canadas-defence/.

[112] "The Chretien Legacy," accessed August 16, 2022, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo4/no4/comment-eng.asp.

defence took the stance of downsizing and retrenchment. It was evident to the masses that Chrétien's government was indifferent to defence and failed to provide financial resources to the DND and the CF. To illustrate, in his memoir Chrétien stated that he was unsure if the Canadian Forces' self-interest was the same as national interest in defence spending, which is why he did not succumb to the pressure of spending more. Regardless of Chrétien's frugal spending, he did not shy away from Canada's international obligations and authorized military contribution to the GWOT at the end of his term in 2003. Moreover, even though Chrétien's time as prime minister was met with a rapidly changing world in need of security contributions, his defence policies were reminiscent of Laurier tradition and proved to be parsimonious.

## Security Challenges Outlined in the 2005 Defence Policy

The world is unpredictable, with new security challenges facing Canada. First, there are threats to the nation's well-being, interests, and values. Second, failed and failing states overwhelm the international landscape, creating instability and despair. Third, global terrorism is the most prominent adversary to Canadians now than ever before. Fourth, there is a deep concern over the future increase in civilian and military causalities due to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Lastly, intra – and inter – state conflicts continue to riddle the world. Finally, it is hinted that there are security challenges at home. However, they are not explicitly noted. Regardless, the threats and emergencies above are the security challenges the GC outlined in the 2005 defence policy statement.

## 2005 Defence Policy Statement

In 2005, Defence Minister Bill Graham and Prime Minister Paul Martin released *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: DEFENCE*. The GC states, "above all, this policy is about change and providing our military

with a bold vision to deal with an increasingly uncertain world"[113]. There is an emphasis placed

on the defence of Canada and North America. The policy also states that the fundamental

responsibility of any government is to keep its citizens safe and secure. This policy document

lies on the notion that "security in Canada ultimately begins with stability abroad"[114].

Since every strong military requires investment, the 2005 budget articulates that the

"government made the largest reinvestment in Canada's military in over 20 years, totalling

approximately $13 billion"[115]. The $13 billion includes baseline funding and resources for

capital programs. Along with the reinvestment in the defence budget, the GC plans to expand the

CF by 5,000 regular and 3,000 reserve personnel. These reinvestments into defence and the

Canadian military aid in the transformation process, as the GC describes.

The plan for transformation does not just include technology and equipment

modernization but cultural change as well. The transformation plan is as follows:

- Adopt a fully integrated and unified approach to operations by:
    o Transforming their command structure
    o Establishing fully integrated units
    o Evaluate their force structure on an ongoing basis
    o Improve coordination with other government departments and interoperability with allied forces
    o Update their command, control communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (C41SR)
    o Place greater emphasis on experimentation
    o Continue to invest in people[116]

This transformation plan was designed to assist the CAF address complex security challenges in

the world and give them a vision for the future. Additionally, for Canada to be a strong leader at

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[113] Canada, ed., *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. Defence* (Ottawa: Govt. of Canada, 2005).
[114] Canada *Canada's International Policy Statement*, 2.
[115] Ibid, 1.
[116] Ibid, 11.

home and abroad, the GC and the DND have adopted the ideology behind the words: effective, relevant, and responsive.

The policy implies that Canada will explore new ways to enhance its relationship with the United States, as a Canada – US defence partnership is imperative to its security. Correspondingly, Canada plans to continue to improve bilateral cooperation when it comes to North America's defence. For example, Canada made amendments to the NORAD agreement and continues to utilize the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). Further, the policy document insinuates that the Canadian military can play an important role internationally, and that diplomacy is preferred to achieve international peace and security. Similarly, Canada will continue to invest in UN Peace Operations, NATO, and the European Union (EU). Some international operations that Canada is capable of assisting in are:

- Combat operations
- Complex peace support and stabilization missions
- Maritime interdiction operations
- Traditional peacekeeping and observer operations
- Humanitarian assistance missions
- Evacuation operations[117]

These operations outlined in the defence policy document provide examples of Canada's foreign interests and contributions to combatting threats to international security. Moreover, the purpose of *Canada's International Policy Statement: Defence* is to continue to support and transform a tradition of military excellence while building up the country's leadership within and outside its borders and addressing any security challenges that may arise.

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[117] Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement*, 28.

**Security Challenges Outlined in the 2008 Defence Policy**

The *Canada First Defence Strategy* outlines various security challenges at home and abroad. The world is full of volatility, unpredictability, and uncertainty, a world plagued by the emergence of changing security dilemmas. Many global challenges were failed states, civil wars, and terrorism. Fragile states, ethnic and border conflicts, resurgent nationalism, and global criminal networks threaten international stability. Additionally, unequal access to resources and uneven economic distribution have become points of regional contention in South Asia, Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East. Additionally, weapons proliferation and the rise of new nuclear-capable adversaries led by unpredictable regimes are another security threat.

Canada is not exempt from security challenges on the home front. Canada has experienced catastrophic events, such as forest fires, earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes. These natural disasters have the potential to upset local capabilities. Domestic security is also challenged by terrorist attacks, potential outbreaks of infectious disease, foreign encroachments on Canada's natural resources, and human and drug trafficking. Finally, climate changes in the Arctic, while economically beneficial, create opportunities for illegal activity that threatens Canada's sovereignty and security. These are a few international and domestic security challenges outlined in the 2008 defence policy document.

**2008 Canada's First Defence Strategy**

In 2008, Defence Minister Peter MacKay and Prime Minister Stephen Harper released *Canada's First Defence Strategy*. The overarching theme of this defence policy, as explained by Harper, is as follows:

> This government took office with a firm commitment to stand up for Canada. Fulfilling this obligation means keeping our citizens safe and secure, defending our sovereignty,

and ensuring that Canada can return to the international stage as a credible and influential country, ready to do its part[118].

The *Canada First Defence Strategy* aims to defend Canadians from threats to their safety. Due to this responsibility, the government is committed to restructuring the CF into a first-class, modern military, recognizing that the military is an important national institution critical to Canada's security and prosperity. The GC hopes this defence policy will better prepare and equip the CF for anything they may face today and tomorrow.

In addition, the GC states that with these defence strategies, the military can conduct six core missions at home and abroad. As the 2008 policy indicates, the military will have the capacity to:

- Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including the Arctic and through NORAD;
- Support major international events in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics;
- Respond to a major terrorist attack;
- Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada, such as a natural disaster;
- Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period; and
- Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods[119].

These missions, as outlined by the GC and the DND, reflect Canada's national interests and what they decided would be the current defence focus of their term. Similarly, The DND and GC believe that to defend Canada; they must deliver excellence; the model they outlined is to be aware, deter, and respond. This looks like:

- Provide surveillance of Canadian territory and air and maritime approaches;
- Maintain search and rescue response capabilities that can reach those in distress anywhere in Canada on a 24/7 basis;
- Assist civil authorities in responding to a wide range of threats – from natural disasters to terrorist attacks[120].

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[118] "Canada First Defence Strategy" (Government of Canada, 2008), https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/migration/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/about/CFDS-SDCD-eng.pdf.
[119] "Canada First Defence Strategy," 3.
[120] Ibid, 7.

A resilient military is not only tested abroad but at home. The GC is trying to prove and implement policies that emphasize that not only does Canada have the potential to be an invaluable international leader but a strong force at home.

Being a strong force at home requires investment. Therefore, the policy strategy looks more specifically at the CAF and defence spending. Furthermore, unfortunately, it is argued that Canada under-invested in the CF, leaving them unprepared to combat the complex global environment effectively. However, the conservative party has built a reputation of being focused on economics; this is reflected in the fiscal plan they have for defence spending. They have designed a strategic investment plan to increase funding over twenty years. The government plans to increase defence spending to 2 percent from 1.5 percent, taking the annual budget of $18 billion in 2008-09 to over $30 billion in 2027-28, totalling approximately $490 billion in defence over the twenty years. Therefore, the hope is that the CF, DND, and GC can reach their goals with the proposed investment plan. Alongside the increase in the defence budget and twenty-year investment plan, the GC has promised to:

- Increase the number of military personnel to 70,000 Regular Forces and 30,000 Reserve Forces;
- Replace the Forces' core equipment fleets, including:
  - 15 ships to replace existing destroyers and frigates;
  - 10 to 12 maritime patrol aircraft;
  - 65 next-generation fighter aircraft; and
  - A fleet of land combat vehicles and systems.
- Strengthen the overall state of the Forces' readiness to deploy and their ability to sustain operations once deployed; and
- Improve and modernize defence infrastructure[121].

The GC believes that with the right equipment, training and funding, Canada's military will become a competitive force in the defence industry.

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[121] "Canada First Defence Strategy," 4.

Lastly, the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy addresses bilateralism and being a reliable defence partner is a significant focus of Canada's defence policy. To ensure the security of North America, the CF is to:

- Conduct daily continental operations (including NORAD);
- Carry out bilateral training and exercises with the United States;
- Respond to crises; and
- Remain interoperable with the US military[122].

Canada relies heavily on the USA regarding defence due to politics and geography, thus making it imperative that Canada invests in bilateralism and a relationship with their closest ally. Moreover, the overall hope of the *Canada First Defence Strategy* is that the CAF will be able to meet government commitments and address a wide array of defence and security challenges facing Canada presently and in the future. At the same time, they are enhancing security for Canadians at home and giving Canada a stronger voice on the world stage.

### Security Challenges Outlined in the 2017 Defence Policy

The international landscape is shifting, and the current security environment is prone to threats. Economic inequality is still increasing around the globe, along with instability. Violent extremism is a scourge that undermines civil society and threatens to destabilize entire regions. With the evolution of technology, new vulnerabilities form. Mass migration has the potential to damage states and can lead to humanitarian crises. The risk of weapons proliferation is still an ongoing security challenge worldwide. Lastly, climate change is set to disrupt the livelihoods of millions.

Security challenges are still present at home, as the GC and CAF are working tirelessly to ensure that the cyber and space domains do not penetrate Canadian defence and disrupt security

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[122] "Canada First Defence Strategy," 8.

objectives that align with strategic interests. Domestic emergencies are also still a concern that the military can address. Furthermore, these global and domestic security challenges are outlined in the 2017 defence policy.

**2017 Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy**

In 2017, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau released *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. The policy document's goal in an unpredictable and rapidly changing world is to provide a new vision for the defence team, emphasizing staying strong at home and engaged in the world. Correspondingly. Canada's new strategic vision for defence is strong, secure, and engaged. The vision is:

- Strong at home – its sovereignty is well-defended by a Canadian Armed Forces also ready to assist in times of natural disaster, other emergencies., and search and rescue
- Secure in North America – active in a renewed defence partnership in NORAD and with the United States
- Engaged in the world – with the Canadian Armed Forces doing its part in Canada's contributions to a more stable, peaceful world, including through peace support operations and peacekeeping[123]

Along with this vision of being strong, secure, and engaged, the GC and DND adopted anticipate, adapt, and act as its approach to defence. Thereby adopting this vision and approach, Canada is aligning itself to be a force for stability, security, prosperity, and social justice.

Furthermore, unlocking the full capabilities of the CAF investment in defence funding is essential. For example, the 2017 defence policy document describes how the government plans to grow the defence budget over ten years on an accrual basis from $17.1 billion (2016-17) to $24.6 billion (2026-27) and on a cash basis, the rise would look like $18.9 billion (2016-17) to $32.7 billion (2026-27). As well as expand the regular force by 3,500 personnel to 71,500 personnel. Additionally, another long-term investment into the CAF is:

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[123] Canada and Department of National Defence, *Strong Secure Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy.*, 2017.

- Acquire 15 Canadian Surface Combatant ships for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) to replace existing frigates and retired destroyers
- The Canadian Army (CA) will undergo recapitalization of its land combat capabilities and aging vehicle fleets.
    - Modernization of command-and-control systems
    - Expand light forces capabilities to become more agile and effective
- Acquire 88 advanced fighter aircraft and recapitalize the aircraft fleets for the Royal Canadian Airforce (RCAF)
- The Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) will expand operational capacity and invest in capabilities that enable rapidly deployable and agile Special Operation Forces (SOF)[124]

The purpose of the long-term investments is to grow Canada's security capabilities. With these investments, Canada puts itself into a position to become a favourable actor on the world stage and a military not to be messed with.

Additionally, Canada plans not only to invest in bilateralism with the United States but wants to put multilateralism into practice. This looks like renewing its engagement with the UN, contributing to peace operations, continuing NATO membership, and fulfilling obligations. Lastly, continue to participate in the Five-Eyes Network. The Five-Eye Network partners are Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Moreover, the *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* introduces one-hundred-and-eleven new initiatives. These policy decisions were designed to ensure Canada's security at home and lend a hand in combatting any security challenges globally.

### Comparative Analysis

Even though these defence policies have been designed by different governments and were released at different times, they still pose some similarities. Firstly, one of the things all three defence policy documents can agree upon is that we live in a world of uncertainty. In this world, security challenges are constantly changing. Many themes, visions, and policies that make

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[124] Canada and Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, 13.

up these defence policy documents are similar; the differences are minute. Much of the wording differs, but the intent and heart behind them are the same. These documents were designed with the period they were written in mind. However, they still posture themselves to be able to adapt to changes in the world. In conclusion, these documents embody many of the same policy principles while distinct.

## Analysis

Canada has promised to invest financially in its military since the Chrétien era. However, financial investments into defence are not always representative of Canada's existing military commitments. As stated earlier in the chapter, Chrétien's government saw an increase in operational tempo. If we have learned anything from Martin's, Harper's, and Trudeau's White Papers, the world is consistently changing, and so are the security challenges. After the attacks on 9/11, the international community, Canada included, hurried to aid the world superpower in the campaign against terrorism. Thus, explaining how Canada ended up in Afghanistan. The same can be argued for why Canada contributed to the armed intervention in Libya. However, Libya has an exception as the oppositional parties cited R2P as justification for military engagement.

Further, both the 2005 and 2008 defence documents address CF transformation and describe the type of missions that Canada will have the capability to conduct. Contrastingly, the 2017 defence document highlights do not tackle Canada's military capabilities in the same way. Therefore, one can conclude that Canada is not concerned with putting itself into combat positions like in the past, and the defence White Papers of the past twenty years is reflective of that.

## Correlations between Defence Policies and the Literature Review

To compliment both the comparative analysis and analysis of this chapter, this section will look at how Canada's distinct defence policies align or contradict the discussions in the literature review. For starters, within the literature review, Madsen argues that the security of Canada and North America is a priority for the government[125]. This is reflected in the three defence policies, as it is noted that Canada has promised to enhance and invest in bilateralism with the United States. In addition, Zyla describes the importance Canada places on assisting other countries[126]. This is also supported by all three defence policies, as the 2005 document articulates that for Canada to be seen as a strong leader, it must involve itself in international security missions. Whereas the 2008 document implies that security at home starts with stability abroad, the 2017 document states that Canada plans to be engaged worldwide. The literature review also explains that Canada is a committed member of NATO; the defence policies can support this as they outline ways Canada can contribute to this international institution. Lastly, each defence White Paper states that Canada promises to invest in UN peacekeeping. However, the literature discussion implies that the opposite has occurred, that there is a visible decline in Canadian involvement in UN peacekeeping missions (See Appendix B for a visual decline of Canadian personnel in UN peacekeeping operations). This chapter and the literature review chapter correlate as they provide supporting or contradictory evidence to claims made.

## Concluding Remarks

Over the past twenty to twenty-five years, three defence policy documents were released. Martin, Harper, and the Trudeau government each designed and released defence documents to

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[125] Chris Madsen, "Military Responses and Capabilities in Canada's Domestic Context Post 9/1" 13, no. 3 (2011): 18.

[126] Zyla, "Explaining Canada's Practices of Burden-Sharing in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through Its Norm of 'External Responsibility.'"

address the changing security challenges worldwide and at home. The three documents are the

2005 *Defence Policy Statement*, the 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy*, and the 2017 *Strong,*

*Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. These documents describe the vision they have for

Canada regarding defence. They also discuss their CF investments and defence spending to

increase Canada's capabilities. In addition, these documents state Canada's role in bilateralism

and multilateralism. An analysis was conducted, concluding that the language and focus of the

defence White Papers prove that Canada no longer involves itself in combat missions like it did

in Afghanistan and Libya. Finally, Canada's defence policies are analyzed in the context of some

literature from the literature review chapter to prove that these two sections can complement one

another. To conclude, this chapter was designed to provide background information on what the

defence policies state and provide evidence on how they have shifted to suit a changing world

while proving that armed intervention is no longer the focus of the Canadian government.

# CHAPTER SIX

# EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Over the past twenty years, Canada's military has been involved in various military operations, whether under the umbrella of NATO or the UN or engaged in other missions that align with their strategic interests. Further, this project is looking at how the past twenty years have shifted Canada away from aggressive action. Therefore, it will use two countries as case studies. This chapter will analyze the wars in both Afghanistan and Libya by providing a brief history of the conflicts and what led to them. It will also examine Canada's role in the armed conflicts and the more significant international security challenge they were combating. By exploring Libya and Afghanistan, the hope is that they will provide some insight into how and possibly why Canada no longer engages 'militaristically' in the international security sector.

## War in Afghanistan

Tensions in Afghanistan started before the September 11 attacks and US-led international military intervention. For instance, Afghanistan has a history of conflict, starting with tensions between anti-Communist Islamic guerrillas and the Afghan communist government. Due to these tensions, insurgencies arose known as mujahideen (those who engage in jihad)[127]. In response to these insurgencies, the Soviet Union invaded in the hopes of supporting their client state. This allowed for rebellions to grow and gain power. Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the breakdown of civil order and the collapse of Afghanistan's communist regime, another group emerged known as the Taliban (Pashto for "Students"). The Taliban is a puritanical Islamic group that seized control of the country in the 1990s. The Taliban wanted to purify Afghanistan

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[127] "Afghan War | History, Casualties, Dates, & Facts | Britannica," accessed July 21, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghan-War.

of its corruption and violence. Tensions quickly escalated when the Taliban refused to meet the demands of the US to extradite Saudi national Osama bin Laden. This stems from investigators concluding that the terrorists responsible for the attacks on US soil in 2001 were orchestrated by al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden who was harboured in Afghanistan during the times of the attack. The Taliban was known to provide sanctuary for al-Qaeda members.

The War in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 was a response to the terrorist attacks in the United States. From the declaration of the "war on terror," Operation Enduring Freedom was formed. The GWOT was designed to topple the Taliban-ruled Islamic Emirate. This international conflict hoped to collapse the Taliban that ruled Afghanistan, defeat the Taliban militarily, rebuild core institutions, and protect civilians[128]. OEF is mainly associated with the war in Afghanistan but is also affiliated with counterterrorism operations in other countries. The decade-long war in Afghanistan saw withdrawal plans, changing security initiatives, power transitions, stabilization missions, the death of bin Laden, and various Taliban attacks[129]. Most recently, the US officially withdrew their troops from Afghanistan in 2021, signally an official end to their interests and engagements within the country. Like any conflict, the war in Afghanistan is complex. Its history of tension has been recognized as a threat to international security and stability.

### Canada in Afghanistan

Many know the war in Afghanistan was a repercussion of the GWOT following 9/11, attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in the United States of America. However, it is not as commonly known that Canada was involved in Afghanistan for over a decade. Initially,

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[128] "Afghanistan War | History, Combatants, Facts, & Timeline | Britannica," accessed July 21, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War.
[129] History com Editors, "Afghanistan War," HISTORY, accessed July 21, 2022, https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/afghanistan-war.

the widely held belief was that Canada would be "early in, early out"[130]. For instance, Canada

had no Afghanistan policies or plans beyond 2002. One of the first CAF contributions to the

campaign against terrorism was Canadian ships in the regional waters. The ships were to support

and defend the international fleet operating there. The other role of the ships was to search and

locate unknown boats. Air Command was also active as they provided marine surveillance,

transported supplies and personnel, identified merchant vessels, and evacuated casualties[131].

Additionally, as the world was reeling from the events in America, Canada secretly sent JTF2 to

Afghan soil. The JTF2 joined American and British troops to eliminate terrorist operations,

topple the Taliban regime, and establish peace. It can be argued that the GC did not make the

Canadian public aware of commandos on the ground due to the deep public distrust in the CF

after some soldiers deployed in Somalia in the 1990s broke military discipline and tortured and

killed a Somali teenager[132]. The decisions made by politicians to send the CF to Afghanistan

were not made lightly as it snowballed Canada to be engaged in the country for over a decade

despite surrounding opinions.

Furthermore, with the fall of the Taliban, efforts turned towards country stabilization and

establishing a new government. The UN-mandated ISAF, a mission that flirted between combat

and peacekeeping, was designed to fulfil the abovementioned goals. Canada's contributions to

ISAF started in Kabul, where they provided support by patrolling the city's western sector,

assisting in operating the airport, and helping rebuild the Afghan National Army. However,

Canada shifted from Kabul to the volatile Kandahar region in 2005 to combat a Taliban

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[130] Lang and Gross Stein, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, 2.

[131] Veterans Affairs Canada, "Afghanistan - Canadian Armed Forces - History - Veterans Affairs Canada," May 27, 2021, https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/canadian-armed-forces/afghanistan.

[132] Lang and Gross Stein, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, 12.

resurgence[133]. Canadian troops quickly multiplied to help defeat the enemy, where they

conducted large-scale offensives and supported the Provincial Reconstruction Team operating

there. The CAF also participated in humanitarian efforts, such as digging wells, distributing

medical supplies, and rebuilding schools while stationed in Afghanistan. Canada's involvement

in combat ended in 2011 when it shifted its attention to training Afghanistan's Army and police

force. Then by March 2014, all Canadian service members had left the country (For the complete

mission timeline of the Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan, see Appendix C). Overall, more

than 40,000 CAF members served in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan between 2001 and

2014[134].

The dangers and threats in Afghanistan were genuine; service members were at risk

anytime they went outside the wire. For example, Afghanistan was Canada's first combat

mission in fifty years; it was largely uneventful except for the tragic event that occurred on April

18, 2002. A group of Canadian soldiers were performing a live-fire night training exercise at the

former home of bin Laden (Tarnak Farms), then mistakenly, an American F-16 fighter dropped a

bomb on the troops[135]. In addition, Operation MEDUSA was one of the deadliest missions the

CAF has conducted. Op. MEDUSA was a NATO battle launched in 2006 that was a combination

of ground and aerial offensive to reclaim the Pashmal/Panjawyi district from the Taliban[136]. Op.

MEDUSA was critical as it was meant to curb Taliban influence and hinder them from taking

control of the region. The 1,500-person force that the Canadian Army led gathered and was

successful until the forces were ordered further into enemy territory without detailed

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[133] Canada, "Afghanistan - Canadian Armed Forces - History - Veterans Affairs Canada."
[134] Canada, Canada, "Afghanistan - Canadian Armed Forces".
[135] Lang and Gross Stein, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, 19.
[136] Mishall Rehman, "Remembering Operation Medusa," Canadian Military Family Magazine, accessed July 31, 2022, https://www.cmfmag.ca/remember/remembering-operation-medusa/.

reconnaissance. The troops were ambushed and found themselves locked in a seven-hour firefight and became victim to friendly fire as a pilot mistook them for Taliban insurgents[137]. Five Canadians lost their lives during that operation, while forty other Canadian soldiers were wounded[138]. Even though this was a tragic setback, the CAF rallied and changed tactics, thus making them able to destroy and drive out the Taliban. Sadly, over ten years, 158 service members died in Afghanistan as they fought for peace and freedom[139]. Moreover, the complexities and history of the military intervention of Canada in Afghanistan is a perfect example of Canadian interests and policies at play.

## War in Libya

For forty-two years, Libya was under the control of Muammar al-Gaddafi. Gaddafi became the de facto leader of Libya after he led a bloodless coup d'état and nonviolent revolution against King Idris I. Following the King's quick retreat from the country, Gaddafi abolished the monarchy and constitution and declared the new Libyan Arab Republic. However, even though Gaddafi kept peace in the country, his leadership was that of a tyrant.

Due to Gaddafi's harsh leadership, the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 were the perfect time for rebel groups to promote and demand change in Libya and oust Gaddafi. Similarly, a multinational NATO-led coalition was designed to implement military intervention during its first civil war and topple Gaddafi's regime.

Unfortunately, the oil-rich country in North Africa is now amidst a humanitarian crisis while facing mounting political-military instability. With the fall and death of dictator Gaddafi,

[137] "Operation Medusa – VALOUR CANADA," accessed June 29, 2022, https://valourcanada.ca/military-history-library/operation-medusa/.

[138] Rehman, "Remembering Operation Medusa."

[139] "Canada and the War in Afghanistan | Learn | Canadian War Museum," accessed July 31, 2022, https://www.warmuseum.ca/learn/canada-and-the-afghanistan-war/.

Libya became a failed state as the hopes of becoming a democratic state disintegrated into a civil war between rival governments. There was a lack of political consensus among the political actors, and they could not resolve differences through peaceful dialogue. The two political rivals are the Tripoli administration, known as the Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Fayez al-Sarraj, and the Tobruk administration, led by General Khalifa Haftar. The GNA has received international backing from the UN as the legitimate government and militias on the ground. At the same time, Haftar is loyal to the Libyan National Army (LNA). To sum it up, the conflict in Libya has created a power vacuum between two parliaments and governments operating out of the East and West, scrambling for power and wealth[140].

Furthermore, the international community has intervened in Libya, but it has been to defend its strategic and economic interests. Many see the stabilization of Libya as a matter of national security or to gain access to oil reserves. Others support the rival parties due to either allying for or against the spread of political Islam. The UN and western countries support the GNA, and allies such as Turkey, Qatar, and Italy do too[141]. Whereas the LNA is backed by Russia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), France, and Jordan[142]. These foreign powers have sent weapons and drones to Libya, ignoring the UN arms embargo. More specifically, Russia has sent mercenaries to fight alongside the LNA, and Turkey sent some of its soldiers and Syrian recruits to defend the GNA. Foreign intervention has not aided the situation in Libya; it has instead been a detriment and has caused a proxy war.

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[140] Guma El-Gamaty, "Can the New Government Save Libya?," Aljazeera, accessed July 21, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/4/27/libya-the-story-of-the-conflict-explained.
[141] "The Libyan Conflict Explained," POLITICO, January 17, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/the-libyan-conflict-explained/.
[142] "The Libyan Conflict Explained."

Looking at the humanitarian aspect of the conflict in Libya, under Gaddafi's rule Libya had one of the highest standards of living. However, the war economy has significantly increased costs with Gaddafi's ousting. The country faces medicine shortages and power cuts. Additionally, civilians risk getting kidnapped by militias for ransom and caught in the middle of unpredictable fighting. This crisis has displaced over 200,000 people, and 1.3 million need humanitarian assistance. The number of causalities from the conflict is unknown as the numbers are hard to verify, but it is estimated that the number is between 2,500 and 25,000. Furthermore, the International Organization for Migration (IMO) says Libya has approximately 636,000 migrants and refugees[143]. These migrants and refugees are held in government detention centres and unofficial prisons. The conditions are horrific, unhygienic, overcrowded, filled with forced labour and abuse, and lack adequate resources for water and food. With no governing body, migration, human trafficking, and weapons proliferation are rampant. Violence is occurring over oil fields which limits production. Thereby causing concern on if Libya can support itself economically since oil revenues compose over 80 percent of Libya's export[144].

Moreover, "the battle for control over Libya crosses tribal, regional, political, and even religious lines"[145]. Thus, causing chaos, instability, and an array of security challenges for Libya and the international community.

### Canada in Libya

In 2011, NATO established a multinational coalition mission in Libya to implement the UN Security Council's Resolution 1973 (2011). The UN Security Council voted in favour of

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[143] Bethan McKernan and Bethan McKernan Middle East correspondent, "War in Libya: How Did It Start, Who Is Involved and What Happens Next?," *The Guardian*, May 18, 2020, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/18/war-in-libya-how-did-it-start-what-happens-next.

[144] "Instability in Libya," Global Conflict Tracker, accessed July 21, 2022, https://cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya.

[145] "Instability in Libya."

adopting Resolution 1973, demanding a ceasefire in Libya, the tightening of sanctions on the

Ghaddafi regime and supporters, and imposing a no-fly zone[146]. The UN agreed that they must

take all the necessary measures to protect civilians and intensify their efforts to solve the crisis

plaguing the Libyan people. The Council emphasized the need for the Libyan authorities to

comply with their obligations as deemed under international law, meet the basic human needs of

civilians, and allow humanitarian assistance to go unimpeded. Regarding the no-fly zone, the

Council stated that all countries should deny any Libyan commercial aircraft to land or take off

unless given preapproval by the committee (for the complete draft of the Resolution, see

Appendix D).

On the home front, the GC launched a mission called Operation MOBILE. Operation

MOBILE was birthed out of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lawrence Cannon, announcement

that they were arranging for Canadians in Libya to leave the country and that the government had

ordered a CC-177 Globemaster strategic airlifter based in Germany to divert to Rome to standby

for a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO)[147]. Operation MOBILE began on February

25, 2011, as a non-combatant evacuation mission with the CF-based out of Malta[148]. The CF

contributed to efforts led by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)

to evacuate Canadians and other foreign nationals out of Libya. Then in March 2011, the

Canadian Forces moved to a combat position with joint air and maritime out of Italy.

Specifically, Operation MOBILE turned into a combat mission on March 19, 2011, when U.S.

Africa Command led a coalition joint task force under Operation ODYSSEY DAWN that

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[146] "Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' over Libya, Authorizing 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in favour with 5 Abstentions | UN Press," accessed July 22, 2022, https://press.un.org/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm.
[147] National Defence, "Operation MOBILE," education and awareness, July 22, 2013, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/recently-completed/operation-mobile.html.
[148] Defence, "Operation MOBILE".

launched air operations to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya[149]. Correspondingly, Operation

MOBILE eventually changed to focus on participation in a NATO-led operation. NATO put

together a military intervention mission in Libya under Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR.

Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR was the international response to the uprising and civil war

against the Ghaddafi regime. Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR began on March 22, 2011, as a

maritime mission enforcing an arms embargo[150]. Her Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS)

Charlottetown was stationed in the central Mediterranean Sea. Additionally, Canada was already

engaged in the air campaign under Operation ODYSSEY DAWN, thus making them an original

member of the Combined Joint Task Force Unified Protector. Throughout the seven months,

Canada was involved in the NATO-led mission; they provided approximately 635 personnel, two

patrol aircraft, two tankers, seven jet fighters, and two frigates[151]. Operation UNIFIED

PROTECTOR was concluded on October 31, 2011. Canada not only launched their operation

but contributed significantly to the NATO mission. Furthermore, Canada in Libya is a prime

example of the pursual of strategic interests, military action, and the capabilities of Canada to be

a strong leader and team player in the international security sector. This case study of Canadian

engagement in Libya can be argued as military intervention grounded in commitments to NATO,

humanitarian aid, and the desire to stabilize a country plagued by unrest.

## Comparative Analysis

Regarding Afghanistan, the broader security goal stemmed from Canada's stance of

being a champion in the campaign against terrorism. Additionally, it can be argued that since

Canada greatly benefits from sharing a border with the US, it was imperative and, in their self-

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[149] Defence, "Operation MOBILE".
[150] Ibid.
[151] C. B. C. News ·, "Canada's Military Contribution in Libya | CBC News," CBC, October 20, 2011,
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canada-s-military-contribution-in-libya-1.996755.

interest, to assist the Americans during their time of need. Another argument one could use to explain armed intervention in Afghanistan was a matter of ego on behalf of Canada. When the original ISAF mission was announced, the European powers stated that Canada could not contribute what was required and needed to fulfill the operation[152]. This would not sit well with Ottawa as they wanted to be seen as Washington's most loyal and trusted friend. Since Canada was involved in Afghanistan for over a decade, one could see a shift in the mission. For example, the combat mission changed to one of training and humanitarian assistance. Thereby aligning with initiatives outlined in defence documents. Afghanistan is a complex case as various arguments can be made on how it does or does not coordinate with broader foreign policies.

Furthermore, Canada has contributed to every NATO mission in some capacity, and Libya would not be the exception (See Appendix E for the complete list of Canadian contributions to NATO). NATO contributions make up a significant portion of Canada's foreign and defence policies, thus making it of the nation's interest to continue. However, it raises the question of why Libya was Canada's last and most recent combat mission. Correspondingly, in the media, it argued that intervening in Libya is helping put an end to extremist Islamic states. Thereby the mission would align with the defence White Papers as terrorism is still a constant threat in the changing international landscape, and counterterrorism is something that Canada has significantly invested in since the horrors of 9/11. Correspondingly, Canada is a member of the UN and sees itself at the forefront of promoting human rights. The NATO mission in Libya was part of the implementation process of a UN resolution. Therefore, the NATO mission aligned with Canadian-held values. Moreover, Canada wants to be seen desperately as a strong and

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[152] Lang and Gross Stein, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, 16.

powerful international actor and leader. Libya and Afghanistan were the perfect opportunities to showcase their skillset and resilience.

## Concluding Remarks

The purpose of this chapter was to provide background on two case studies/countries: Afghanistan and Libya. The hope was to explain why Canada participated in combat military intervention missions and what roles they took in these operations. Therefore, this chapter examines a brief history of the armed conflicts in Libya and Afghanistan. This chapter also addresses the engagement that Canada took in those countries. Canada in Afghanistan and Canada in Libya sections outline mission details, the international organization umbrella that the mission fell under, and the objectives of the Canadian government and the CF. Finally, this chapter provides a comparative analysis that explains the rationale behind Canada's armed intervention and how it correlates to broader foreign policies. In conclusion, this chapter was designed to lay the foundation for the analysis chapter by providing the necessary information and context needed to analyze the case studies against the overarching research question of how the last twenty years Canada and Canadian defence policies away from militaristic intervention in the international security sector.

# CHAPTER SEVEN

## ANALYSIS

This chapter will analyze the data and research conducted in the subsequent chapters. At the same time, it will draw conclusions to answer the main question this project set out to answer.

### Comparative Analysis

As stated throughout the paper, this researcher intends to answer the proposed question: **How has the last twenty years shifted Canada and Canadian defence policies away from militaristic intervention regarding international security?** Nevertheless, this comparative analysis will examine case studies and how they fit into broader foreign and defence policies. Afghanistan was the first defining war of the 21$^{st}$ century and the first Canadian combat mission in fifty years. Libya is excluded from this statistic as it only lasted a few months, and it was a NATO mission with a focused purpose. In addition, Afghanistan had a definitive enemy, the Taliban. Whereas Op. UNIFIED PROTECTOR was an operation for UN-Resolution implementation and a call to end crimes against humanity. Therefore, leading the researcher to explain the militaristic involvement in both conflicts.

### Analysis of Afghanistan

Afghanistan alone is an interesting foreign affairs decision for Canada. For instance, it was the first time Canada's special forces, JTF2, were sent abroad in a combat mission. In addition, ISAF proved compelling enough for the Harper government to decide to involve themselves in the already lengthy intervention under the watchful eye of Chrétien and Martin's governments. The Canadian defence minister described ISAF as "not an offensive mission, not a

front-line mission. This is a stabilization mission to assist in opening corridors for humanitarian assistance"[153]. ISAF was a comfortable resting place for politicians. However, the invitation to join ISAF never came. The world would later learn that Canada's allies believed they could not meet the military requirements to sustain a long-term presence in Afghanistan. Instead, the Pentagon invited the Canadians to assist at the Central Command Headquarters for the Afghanistan theatre in Tampa, Florida. It was later announced that the Americans wanted the Canadian Army fighting alongside them in Kandahar. Due to feeling like they needed to show more extensive support for American efforts in Afghanistan, especially since the Canadians' public sympathy for their American neighbours was at an all-time high and they had yet to contribute to ISAF, Ottawa agreed. Canada in Kandahar "would allow the Canadian forces to show the public that they were a well-trained fighting force and not just blue beret-wearing peacekeepers"[154]. Afghanistan shaped foreign policy issues, influenced the creation of defence policies, and impacted how the Canadian military saw itself. For example, Major General Omar Lavoie states that Afghanistan

> Really defined a new generation of soldiers for the Canadian Army because, for most of us, it was really our first experience in combat operations, even though most of us had experience in peace support type of operations in the Balkans etc. It really changed the culture and character of the Canadian Army, reinforcing what it is we are really in the end and, as a last result, trained to do[155].

More specifically, Op. MEDUSA garnered international respect but moved the CAF from its traditional peacekeeping roles. Thereby redefining the culture. Moving towards combat operations allowed the CF to see "themselves first and foremost as a combat-capable fighting force"[156]. Furthermore, the attacks on 9/11 and Canadian engagement in Afghanistan left Canada

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[153] Lang and Gross Stein, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, 15.
[154] Ibid, 19.
[155] Rehman, "Remembering Operation Medusa."
[156] Lang and Gross Stein, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar,* 19.

more concerned with security at home. The position of focusing on combat operations heavily influenced Canada's foreign policy decisions, while defence policy was shaped by the redefined culture of the Canadian Armed Forces.

## Analysis of Libya

Through this researcher's analysis, Libya was the last time Canada took an armed combat position in an international mission, with the exclusion of Afghanistan. Every NATO or UN operation since Op. UNIFIED PROTECTOR did not require Canada to take an armed position. Instead, Canada has focused on training and logistics. Canada's involvement in the Libya mission sparked great controversy between political parties and experts. The mention of R2P did not explicitly justify Canada's contribution to the NATO mission. Harper's Conservative federal government did not address international responsibility to protect and failed to make it public knowledge if the government supported R2P. Whereas the Liberals, New Democratic Party (NDP), and Bloc Québécois were vocal about invoking R2P to justify Canadian intervention in Libya[157]. Many argue that Libya tainted R2P, and that the terminology no longer has credibility. Furthermore, although Canada was reluctant to invoke R2P to justify its involvement in Libya, the UN Security Council was not shy. For instance, R2P has been invoked over eighty times in UN Security Council Resolutions, over fifty times in Human Rights Council Resolutions, and thirteen times in General Assembly Resolutions[158]. The mission in Libya received a high degree of support from NATO allies, such as Qatar, Denmark, Norway, and Belgium. Correspondingly, the United Kingdom (UK) and France drafted the resolution, with sponsorship from the US[159].

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[157] "Canada and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) | The Canadian Encyclopedia."
[158] "What Is R2P?"
[159] Bruno Pommier, "The Use of Force to Protect Civilians and Humanitarian Action: The Case of Libya and Beyond," *International Review of the Red Cross* 93, no. 884 (December 2011): 1063–83, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383112000422.

Looking more specifically at the invoking of R2P when it comes to Libya, the leader of France made it clear that the French public was "ready to understand the need to intervene"[160]. Even though Canada was reluctant to invoke R2P, it still participated in the initial coalition in implementing the resolution in Libya. Therefore, one can argue that the case of Canada and its skepticism to invoke R2P concerning Libya is an outlying example.

Correspondingly, arguments of a sense of duty, a moral imperative to act, international credibility, and homeland security were echoed when it came to other justifications for joining the mission in Libya. To further support this point, the Montreal Gazette articulates:

> No matter how reluctant this war-weary nation maybe after a long, costly engagement in Afghanistan, nor how proud we are of our decision to say no to George W. Bush's 2003 invasion of Iraq, Canada cannot – and should not – avoid assuming its international responsibilities in the battle against IS[161].

Experts would argue that it was in Canada's self-interest to contribute to the Libya mission because the Islamic State is a threat at home and abroad. Furthermore, often contributing to wars abroad tend to plunge a region into turmoil instead of providing stability like initially planned and hoped for; that happened to be the case for Libya. Libya still faces instability due to violence and a lack of governance. The future of Libya is unknown and has sparked concern in the international community. Canada contributed to the current state of Libya, so it can reason that Canada has a responsibility to the Libyan people to continue to play a role in aiding in their stability process[162]. Therefore, explaining Canada's provision of humanitarian assistance and advice to Kurdish Peshmerga fighters. Any mission in Libya is fraught with risk, nor is Canadian participation popular, desirable, or easy, but strong arguments can be made for why it is needed.

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[160] Camille Grand, "The French Experience: Sarkozy's War?," in *Precision and Purpose*, ed. Camille Grand et al., Airpower in the Libyan Civil War (RAND Corporation, 2015), 183–204, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt16f8d7x.13.
[161] Hanes, Allison,Hanes, "Editorial."
[162] Dehaas, "Canada Expected to Intervene in Libya but Experts Disagree on How."

The nature of the current state of Libya and the rationale for Canadian involvement provides insight into the toll Canada's militaristic contribution played and the impact it had on foreign affairs.

**Conclusions Drawn**

One could argue that the world needs Canada at the forefront of international security as they have been an indispensable player in making the world a better and safer place. Given Canada's status in the world and good relations with various countries across the globe, they have demonstrated that they are a friendly and reliable country with strong leadership qualities. Canada is also an impactful member of the G7. In addition, Canadians are proven peacekeepers and leaders with the UN. To illustrate, Canada aided in the founding of the UN in 1946, they led the draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and Lester B. Pearson won a Nobel Peace Prize for inventing the modern concept of UN peacekeeping[163]. These examples support the argument that Canada should have a leading role in international security. Furthermore, Canada holds on to the identity that they are a consistent world player and allows that identity to structure the way they approach defence policy, but that does not always translate into political action. Therefore, this conclusion will examine R2P and the debate between pragmatism and conviction.

The position that the responsibility to protect plays more broadly in foreign and defence policies can be seen as minimal. Using Afghanistan as an example, R2P terminology was not used to justify Canadian intervention. However, it has recently been referenced in debates around protecting the Afghan people after the withdrawal of US troops and the Taliban takeover. Even though these debates are occurring, the government has no solid proof that they are ready to

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[163] "Seven Reasons Why R2P Is Relevant Today."

contribute resources to future military interventions under the guise of R2P. Furthermore, the correlation between Libya and R2P was seen as a corrupting influence on the military-industrial complex and the war economy. Should Canada want to be instrumental in maintaining dialogue at the international level on R2P, it would need to regain a seat on the UN Security Council. By seeking a prominent seat with the UN Security Council, Canada would be in the position to have firm foreign policy and bilateral relations and thus be able to lead the charge when it comes to R2P. Furthermore, it can be argued that a pragmatic implementation of R2P post-Afghanistan and Libya would be for Canada to act and provide refuge to individuals fleeing those countries. Canada is a world leader when it comes to resettling refugees[164]. Canada also has a sizeable geographical land mass and a history of providing asylum to those in need. When it comes to Afghanistan, women and children are the most vulnerable due to Taliban oppression. Additionally, the case with Libya is more complex as there is no safe route for refugees to escape to Europe, and the journey to Canada is long, and often requires visas and passports. Therefore, a realistic and pragmatic approach would be for Canada to welcome Afghani and Libyan refugees and not involve themselves in war.

Pragmatism versus conviction provides a more robust insight into Canada's shift away from militaristic intervention in the international security sector. When Justin Trudeau and his Liberal government were elected in 2015, they ushered in a new era of change. Trudeau appointed a cabinet that screamed diversity and inclusion. He selected individuals from various ethnic groups and ensured that an equal number of men and women existed[165]. Trudeau welcomed government scientists' opinions on climate change and happily answered journalists'

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[164] "Refugee Statistics," UNHCR Canada, accessed September 2, 2022, https://www.unhcr.ca/in-canada/refugee-statistics/.
[165] Guy Lawson, "Trudeau's Canada, Again," *The New York Times*, December 8, 2015, sec. Magazine, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/magazine/trudeaus-canada-again.html.

questions in the Parliament Press theatre. Canada's current defence White Paper, *Strong, Secure and Engaged*, was unexpected from the Liberal government due to its robust nature[166]. Trudeau's initiatives of tax policies, embrace of the LGBTQ+ community, and relations with China were all cognizant of a changing nation and did not carry any remanent of the previous administration.

Furthermore, many dismiss Trudeau because they believe his surname is his only qualification for holding office, thus making it easy for the public and the international community to discredit the pseudo-intellectual ramblings of what they consider to be an unserious mind[167]. Nonetheless, Trudeau has worked to prove that he and his government are an example of an underdog victory. His leadership and policy directives proved to be a catalyst to being seen as a post-nationalist state. Post-nationalism is defined as the process by which nations and national identities lose their importance because of multiculturalism and cross-cutting cleavages[168]. This implies that Canada is becoming a new state not defined by European history but by the multiplicity of identities from all around the globe. Trudeau stated:

> There is no core identity, no mainstream in Canada…There are shared values — openness, respect, compassion, willingness to work hard, to be there for each other, to search for equality and justice. Those qualities are what make us the first post-national state[169].

Post-nationalism is a governing principle where Canada fills its unified geographical landscape with diversity. It is not about hand-holding or passport shredding. Instead, it is a different lens

[166] Eugene Lang Originally published on Policy Options June 23 and 2017, "The Shelf Life of Defence White Papers," Policy Options, accessed August 16, 2022, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/june-2017/shelf-life-defence-white-papers/.

[167] "Gormley: In Trudeau-Land, Maybe This Really Is Post-National Canada," the StarPhoenix, accessed August 18, 2022, https://thestarphoenix.com/opinion/columnists/gormley-in-trudeau-land-maybe-this-really-is-post-national-canada.

[168] David Bennett, *Multicultural States : Rethinking Difference and Identity* (London: Routledge, 1998).

[169] Lawson, "Trudeau's Canada, Again."

used to "examine the challenges and precepts of entire politics, economy, and society"[170]. Even though the European nation-state model is sacrosanct; post-nationalist practices have been around for centuries. For example, post-nationalist thought stems from colonialism, and from when Europeans arrived in North America, and were welcomed by indigenous peoples. Diversity can fuel prosperity instead of undermining it.

Likewise, one can argue that Canada has the luxury of adopting the ability to think outside the nation-state box courtesy of its neighbours to the South. Canada does not need to defend its borders forcefully or have an enormous military, and its economic prosperity comes from trade with the United States[171]. Hence, Canada is liberated from economic and military stressors and has the freedom and capacity to experiment with radical approaches to society. Additionally, to reiterate a point made throughout this project, Canada contributed to the GWOT as it wanted to support America in its hour of need. Canada relies heavily on the United States defence systems, military, and money. It is no secret that Canada greatly benefits from the security and safety of being neighbours with the US. However, Canada has been seen as a "free rider." Due to this identity of being a "free rider" would mean that Canada's voice would not be taken seriously, which is disastrous as their security challenges are predominantly global[172]. Nonetheless, no relationship is more important than the one between the United States and Canada. Canada is one of America's largest trading partners, an essential ally in global affairs and a peaceful neighbour. Thus, making it a pragmatic choice for Canada to answer the phone when America calls. Trudeau using rhetoric focused on post-nationalism, can be seen as

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[170] "The Canada Experiment: Is This the World's First 'post-national' Country?," *The Guardian*, January 4, 2017, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/04/the-canada-experiment-is-this-the-worlds-first-postnational-country.
[171] Foran, Charles, Foran.
[172] John Geddes, "Just How Seriously Is Canada's Voice Taken Now?," *Macleans.Ca* (blog), October 10, 2014, https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/just-how-seriously-is-canadas-voice-taken-now/.

pragmatic, as he sensibly explained to the nation why Canada is a post-nationalist state and why they are adopting those ideals. Pragmatic elements are weaved into politics through official government discourse. Moreover, pragmatism versus conviction sparks a conversation that allows Canada to take liberties that either align with their beliefs or force them to make sensible and realistic decisions.

In conclusion, through analysis of the data provided in this paper, the researcher would conclude that Canada has moved away from militaristic intervention when it comes to the missions, they involve themselves in and in the posturing of their defence policy because of changing strategic interests, guilt and pressure from the international community, and the number of casualties that occurred from the Afghan mission. Canada and the Liberal government tend to stay grounded in inertia and are risk-averse. In addition, Canada, under the guidance of Trudeau, moving towards the ideology of being a post-nationalist state would explain why Canada and its defence policies have shifted away from militaristic intervention in the international security sector. Canada is now practicing a new approach to foreign affairs and defence. They are calling their new approach "muscular pragmatism." Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird stated that we will "intervene where our involvement can make a difference; no longer worry what the moralistic — but largely useless — United Nations thinks of us; are redirecting the efforts of our foreign service to expanding Canadian trade"[173]. Moreover, Canada took the combat approach in Afghanistan and Libya; but they are now focusing on trying something new.

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[173] National Post View, "National Post Editorial Board: A Better, Prouder Canadian Foreign Policy," *National Post*, January 1, 2012, https://nationalpost.com/opinion/national-post-editorial-board-a-better-prouder-canadian-foreign-policy.

## Concluding Remarks

This chapter has completed a comparative analysis of the conflict in Libya and Afghanistan while observing how they fit into foreign and defence policies. The analysis of Afghanistan proves that involvement in the GWOT redefined and shaped military culture and defence policies. The analysis of Libya insinuates that debates around R2P played an influencing role in Canada's involvement in Op. UNIFIED PROTECTOR and sparked controversy around future use and if Canada should assist in liberating the current failed state. The conclusions drawn section provides a definite answer to this paper's focus. Should Canada want to be a leader in the R2P conversation and international security, it must look at involving itself more heavily in international institutions. Lastly, pragmatism versus conviction articulates that American influence, tragic outcomes from military operations, and the notion of Canada being a post-nationalist state has moved Canada away from aggressive military action in the international security sector.

**CHAPTER EIGHT**

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter concludes the dissertation. Its purpose is to summarize everything, reiterate the main points, and provide key takeaways. Finally, it will detail and explain how this paper contributes to the conflict analysis and resolution field.

**Conclusion**

*Canadian Defence Policies: Twenty Years and Two Armed Conflicts Later* addresses how the last twenty years have shifted Canada and Canada's defence policies away from militaristic intervention in the international security sector as it is no secret that the CAF has not intervened in combat role in an international conflict in recent years.

Chapter One – Introduction explains that the security landscape is constantly changing, and that Canada has been an active member of the international security community for years. Chapter One provides definitions and introduces each chapter while providing a brief synopsis of what is to come.

Chapter Two – Methodology outlines the research area pertaining to the analysis of Canada's defence policies, including the dramatic shift that occurred with Canadian involvement in the Afghanistan war and the Libya conflict. The chapter also covers the research question and any sub-questions that may be explored. The methodology used to conduct the research throughout the project is predominantly a qualitative approach with some elements of quantitative data. This chapter explains the case studies, Afghanistan, and Libya, and how they play a more significant role in shifting Canada and its defence policies away from militaristic action. It addresses some primary and secondary sources that provide supporting evidence to

claims made throughout the paper. It also uses conflict analysis and resolution theories to elucidate the topic's contents. Finally, Chapter Two addresses the ethical considerations and limitations of this project.

Chapter Three – Literature Review assesses various literary discussions that surround the topic of Canada's shifted defence policies posture. The literature focused on shifts in defence policy insinuates that the security of Canada and North America is a priority. Shifts in defence policy literature tackle whether Canada's foreign policies are influenced by "human security," "external responsibility," "forward security," "comprehensive security," or "hard security." The section on Canada's role in the international security sector explains how the position changes with the changes in the security landscape. It also explains that Canada is a middle power, and that the country focuses on more than just combat roles but humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and training. The decline in UN peacekeeping literature describes how peacekeeping was Canada's "traditional" role since WWII, and this identity stems from Lester B. Pearson. However, Afghanistan soured Canada's image as a peacekeeping leader. The section articulates that the decline in peacekeeping is due to changing governmental leadership and interests, thereby indirectly influencing shifts in defence policy. The literary discussions occurring in the Canada and NATO subheading insinuates that NATO is a significant aspect of Canada's international security policies and that it will continue to be a contributing and committed member. The responsibility to protect portion defines R2P and draws on conversations supporting or opposing R2P doctrine and justification regarding the conflicts in Libya and Afghanistan. The public opinion around Afghanistan and defence policy analyzes the dialogue surrounding Canada's intervention in the war and fluctuating support the government received around the Afghan mission. It also explains how public opinion can shape defence

policies. Lastly, the public opinion around the Libya segment is complex. It is argued that Canada failed to do its homework before intervening in Libya and that media consistently shapes public opinion. Correspondingly, there is an ongoing debate surrounding the role Canada should take when it comes to involvement in Libya. The Libya mission received collective support from the major political parties. Therefore, Chapter Three – Literature details various literary conversations that speak to Canada's defence policy shifts and illustrates some of the rationale or lack of Canadian militaristic intervention in international conflicts.

Chapter Four – Theoretical Discussion provides a theoretical analysis of Canada's defence policies and military missions in Libya and Afghanistan. Libya and Afghanistan can be analyzed through the lens of conflict theories. Realism implies that military engagement in those countries is explained by the desire to fulfill national interests. Liberalism is applied to Afghanistan and Libya to explain that military intervention was used to uphold peace, democracy, international cooperation, and security abroad. In addition, Afghanistan, through the lens of constructivist theory, articulates that the notion of being a good neighbour shaped Canada's desire to assist the US in the fight against terrorism. Similarly, Libya, through the lens of constructivist theory, would insist that Canada sees itself as a good sport and consistent player on the world stage. It would also argue that Canada participated in the NATO-led mission to uphold the image of being a vital contributor to international security and that shared values and culture explained intervention. War discourse theory can be used to assess both the language used by the Canadian government during the conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya. Afghanistan's discourse is a bit more complex as the period saw three successive governments and their rationale for war. Chrétien, Martin, and Harper all expressed the importance of the Afghan mission, citing support for the US, the need to combat terrorism, and international security.

Lastly, war discourse theory in the context of Libya focuses on Harper's government. Harper's rationale for sending troops to aid in the NATO mission was influenced by the ideals of enlightened sovereignty, the rule of law, human rights, and democracy. These conflict analysis and resolution theories are helpful lenses for understanding Canada's defence policies and missions in Afghanistan and Libya.

Chapter Five – Canadian Defence Policies describes the security challenges Canada and the world faced in 2005, 2008, and 2017, thus providing evidence on how the security landscape is consistently changing. It looks at the defence policies before Chrétien came into power and during his administration. Before Chrétien, many prime ministers assumed the United States would protect them and rested their policies on that notion. They also ensured that they placed Canada first. The Chrétien era was defined by frugal spending and high operational tempo. Additionally, this chapter describes some of the central policies, functions, and investments in the CAF that are outlined in the 2005 *Defence Policy Statement*, the 2008 *Canada's First Defence Strategy*, and the 2017 *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. The similarities between the three White Papers agree that we are living in a world of uncertainty and are posturing ourselves to be able to tackle any challenges that arise. Furthermore, military investments are not always reflective of military commitments. For example, the 2005 and 2008 defence documents address CF transformation and mission capabilities, whereas 2017 does not. Finally, this chapter draws correlations between the defence policies and literature from Chapter Three – Literature Review. This chapter helps the reader to conclude that Canada is not concerned with placing itself into combat positions like in the past.

Chapter Six – Empirical Research provides insight into the wars in Afghanistan and Libya by providing a brief history of the conflicts. The chapter also examines the missions in

those countries and Canada's role in each one. These case studies are perfect examples of Canadian interests and policies, as they showcase their ability to be a strong and decisive leader in the international security sector.

Finally, Chapter Seven – Analysis sets out to find common threads that explain Canada's reason for no longer engaging militaristically like it used to. The chapter concludes by explaining the broader role that R2P and pragmatism play in politics, mainly Canada's defence policies. Justin Trudeau calling Canada a post-nationalist state influenced the creation of new approaches that his Liberal government is taking regarding foreign policies. Thereby insinuating that Canada has moved away from militaristic intervention due to post-nationalist ideals. In addition, Canada's number of casualties during the Afghan mission is reasoning enough for risk-averse governments to stray away from combat missions. Canada took up arms in Afghanistan and Libya as it aligned with their interests at the time, but it does not align with their interests now. However, Canada will see other leaders and government parties, and there will be other major international conflicts. So, this researcher and the world will have to continue to watch and see how Canada reacts.

Moreover, Canada has moved away from militaristic and combative intervention in the international security sector over the past twenty years. However, Canadians need not worry as their government and military will always 'stand on guard for thee.'

## Contributions to Field

Throughout my studies, I often felt that third parties, civilians in a specific country, and non-government-affiliated organizations conducted conflict analysis and resolution. However, through this dissertation, I was able to further look at the role governments play when it comes to conflict resolution. Firstly, I want to say that this dissertation can contribute insight into the

restraints and advantages states have when it comes to armed conflict. The second contribution

this project makes to the field is by examining policies. This project provides insight into how

policies can hinder or promote conflict, particularly armed conflict, in pursuing international

security. Thirdly, it can provide the field with an in-depth analysis and case study of Canada and

its defence policies. Finally, this dissertation hopes that the research conducted can contribute to

the conflict resolution field as a basis for gauging Canada's engagement in future conflicts and

the posturing their defence policies will take. For instance, this research can be applied to the

current war in Ukraine and Canada-Ukraine relations. The notion that the Canadian government

is afraid of war casualties and that Canada is a post-nationalist state reinforces Trudeau's Liberal

government's position regarding the war in Ukraine. Since the invasion of Ukraine on February

24, 2022, the Government of Canada announced that the nation pledged $320 Million in

humanitarian assistance, $620 Million in bilateral loans, and $35 Million to development

funding. $7 Million to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), $2 Million to support food

security efforts, $52 Million for grain storage, and $39.7 Million for the security and stabilization

of Ukraine[174]. Furthermore, current Defence Minister Anita Anand recently announced that

Canada had sent troops to train Ukrainian forces in their fight against Russia. Thus, supporting

claims made in the analysis that proves why Canada and its defence policies have shifted from

militaristic intervention. Furthermore, the war in Ukraine does not seem to be ending soon.

Therefore, the question remains of what Canada will do next regarding support to Ukraine. If

America sends troops to fight, will Canada follow suit? Or will they stick to our post-nationalist

ideals and not succumb to the pressure of the international community? Will Canada continue to

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[174] Global Affairs Canada, "Development, Humanitarian, Peace and Stabilization and Financial Assistance - Russian Invasion of Ukraine," GAC, February 4, 2022, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/ukraine-dev.aspx?lang=eng.

move away from combative approaches? Or will the war in Ukraine be the next Afghanistan for

Canada? Overall, this dissertation can benefit the conflict analysis and resolution field by

providing a guide on dictating how Canada will react in the future.

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**Appendix A**

## Canada concerned by situation in Libya

From: **Global Affairs Canada**

## Statement

May 21, 2019 - Ottawa, Ontario - Global Affairs Canada

Global Affairs Canada today issued the following statement:

"Canada is gravely concerned by the escalation of violence in and around Tripoli, Libya, including the indiscriminate shelling of residential areas, and attacks against medical personnel. As UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General Ghassan Salamé said today at the UN Security Council, there can be no military solution to the crisis.

"We urge all parties to the conflict to immediately implement a ceasefire, and to work towards reconciliation through a peaceful and inclusive political dialogue, facilitated by the United Nations.

"We call on all parties to the conflict to respect their obligations under international humanitarian law, for which they are accountable. This includes ensuring the protection of civilians, including migrants and refugees; and allowing humanitarian access to those in need. We further call on all parties to allow civilians wanting to leave conflict areas to do so safely.

"Canada fully supports the Libya people's desire to build a peaceful, stable, democratic and prosperous Libya."

The image above is the full GAC statement about the civil war in Libya[175].

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[175] Global Affairs Canada, "Canada Concerned by Situation in Libya," statements, May 21, 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/05/canada-concerned-by-situation-in-libya.html.

**Appendix B**

Total Canadian uniformed personnel in UN peacekeeping missions, by government, 2000-18, six-month averages



Source: Walter Dorn, based on UN data[19]

This graph demonstrates the various contributions made by Canadian successive governments to UN peacekeeping missions since the year 2000 to 2018. Graphics from Walter Dorn and the 2019 Munich Security Report[176].

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[176] Munich Security Conference et al., "Munich Security Report 2019: The Great Puzzle: Who Will Pick Up the Pieces?," Munich Security Report, Munich Security Report (Munich Security Conference, 2019), https://doi.org/10.47342/RYTY8045.

# Appendix C

All images and data are taken from the Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan – Mission Timeline[177].

| | |
|---|---|
| September 11, 2001 | Suicide attacks by Al-Qaeda take place in the United States. |
| October 7, 2001 | On the same day that the United States begins operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Canada announces that it is prepared to contribute sea, land and air forces to America's Operation Enduring Freedom under the Canadian operation named OP APOLLO. |
| October 9 2001 | The first Canadian asset, HMCS HALIFAX, already at sea with the NATO Standing Force Atlantic, is directed to detach from this force and proceed to the Arabian Sea. Halifax begins counter-terrorism operations as part of Operation APOLLO on 2 November. Halifax is joined by two more frigates, a destroyer and a replenishment ship, bringing the Canadian Task Group to full strength. HMCS Vancouver is also in theatre as part of an American Aircraft Carrier Battle Group. |
| Late-2001 | First Canadian Special Forces members arrive in Afghanistan. |
| February 2002 | First elements of the Canadian Battalion Group based on 3 PPCLI arrives in Afghanistan and becomes an integral part of the 187th Brigade Combat Team of the US 101st Airborne Division. |
| August 2003 | Canada contributes combat forces to the ISAF mission in Kabul as part of Op ATHENA. |

| | |
|---|---|
| February 2004 | Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, assumes command of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). |
| August 2005 | CAF operating under Op ATHENA in Kabul begin transitioning to Kandahar Province. |
| August 2005 | Canada assumes leadership of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team. Approximately 350 military, police, foreign affairs, correctional services and development personnel assist Afghans with the provision of governance, security and development. |
| January 2006 | CAF members begin conducting combat operations in Kandahar as part of Op ATHENA. At its height, nearly 3,000 CAF members were deployed at any one time in Kandahar. For more than five years, CAF members operated as part of a multinational force.CAF members begin conducting combat operations in Kandahar as part of Op ATHENA. At its height, nearly 3,000 CAF members were deployed at any one time in Kandahar. For more than five years, CAF members operated as part of a multinational force. |

| | |
|---|---|
| February 2006 | Canadian medical personnel assume command of the Role 3 Multinational Medical Unit at Kandahar Airfield. Canadians would remain in command until 2008 and medical personnel continued to serve until December 2011. |
| February 2006 | Brigadier-General David Fraser assumes command of the Multi-National Brigade (Regional Comand South), based in Kandahar as part of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). |
| August 2006 | The first Canadian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) deploys to Kandahar. OMLTs worked with Afghan soldiers and police to deliver individual and group training, to mentor leaders at every rank level, and to provide liaison with ISAF forces in partnered operations. |
| January 28, 2008 | The Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan (commonly known as "The Manley Report") is published. |
| February 2008 | Major-General Marc Lessard assumes command of Regional Command (RC) South in Kandahar as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). |

| | |
|---|---|
| June 2008 | Canada establishes six strategic priorities and three signature projects that will guide its whole-of-government Afghanistan engagement until 2011. |
| December 2008 | The Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air Wing deploys to Afghanistan to provide air mobility support to coalition troops, as well as airlift, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. It stood down in August 2011. |
| November 16, 2010 | Government of Canada announces Canada's role in Afghanistan until 2014 based on four priorities: education and health; security; regional diplomacy; and humanitarian assistance. |
| May 2011 | Operation ATTENTION begins – Canada contributes the second-largest contingent to the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan which delivers training and professional development support to the national security forces of Afghanistan. |
| July 2011 | Canada ceases combat operations in Kandahar. The Mission Transition Task Force arrives in Afghanistan to prepare, repair, pack and ship vehicles, equipment and material elsewhere in Afghanistan or back to Canada. |

| | |
|---|---|
| December 2011 | Op ATHENA ends – MTTF completes mission closeout activities in Kandahar. |
| June 18, 2013 | The fifth and final tranche of transition is announced. Afghan national security forces assume security across the whole country with coalition forces providing support. |
| June 2013 | The final rotation of CAF members to Afghanistan begins deploying, including the mission closure team to pack-up and recover equipment to be returned to Canada. |
| March 2014 | Canada's military mission in Afghanistan ends. |

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[177] National Defence, "Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan – Mission Timeline," education and awareness, February 26, 2014, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/recently-completed/canadian-armed-forces-legacy-afghanistan/mission-timeline.html.

**Appendix D**

For the full text of UN Resolution 1973 (2011) adopted to address the first Libyan civil war, see the above link.

**Appendix E**

| NATO Operation Name | Date | Contributions |
|---|---|---|
| Operation ANCHOR GUARD | August 1990 – February 1991 | 66 members of the CF |
| Operation Allied Goodwill I & II | 4-9 February & 27 February to 24 March 1992 | Two CAF CC-137 Boeing flights delivering aid |
| Operation MARTIME MONITOR | July 1992 – November 1992 | MPA – CP 140 Aurora to the Mediterranean |
| Operation PALLADIUM | December 1995 – December 2004 | 1,700 Canadian military and civilian personnel & 300 local employees |
| Operation ECHO | June 1998 – 21 December 2000 | Six CF-188 Hornets and 130 personnel |
| Operation KINETIC | June 1999 – June 2000 | 1,400 CAF personnel |
| Operation FORAGE | August 2001 – September 2002 | 200 CAF personnel |
| Operation ATHENA | July 2003 – December 2011 | 40,000 CAF personnel from 2001-2014, totaling 18 billion dollars |
| NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) | 2004 – 2011, renewed in 2018 | 60 CAF personnel, 30 instructors to train outside of Iraq, totaling $810,000. In 2018, 2018 250 CAF personnel were posted to Baghdad |
| Operation SIRIUS | October 2004 – December 2004, February 2005 – March 2005, and November 2005 – December 2005 | 40 surveillance missions and 65 CAF personnel |
| Operation ALTAIR | January 2004 – September 2008 | 7 warships |
| Operation BRONZE | March 2004 – March 2010 | 1,300 CAF personnel |
| Operation PLATEAU | 14 October – December 2005 | 500 tonnes of humanitarian aid supplies, purified and distributed 3,811,535 litres of drinking water, and provided medical treatment to 11,782 people |
| The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) | June 2005 – 31 December 2007 | $255 million in voluntary support and 105 armoured vehicles |
| Operation SEXTANT | January 2006 – June 2009 | 5 warships |
| Operation Allied Protector | March 2009 – June 2009 | HMCS Winnipeg and Navy frigate |

| Operation SAIPH | October 2009 – May 2012 | Rotating contribution of warships and 36,200 tonnes of food |
| Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR/Task Force Vancouver | October 2011 – January 2012 | Deployment of HMCS Vancouver frigate |
| Operation MOBILE & Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR | February 2011 – October 2011 | 635 personnel, 7 jet fighters, 2 patrol aircrafts, 2 tankers, and 2 frigates |
| Operation ATTENTION | May 2011 – March 2014 | 950 Canadian personnel |
| Operation OPEN-SPIRIT | May 2014 | 10-15 clearance divers and support personnel from the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) |

The chart above details all past NATO operations that Canada was involved with, the date of active involvement and the contributions made. Whereas the chart below shows the current NATO operations that Canada is involved in and their contributions to said missions. The data for both charts has been collected from the NATO Association of Canada webpage[178].

| NATO Operation Name | Contributions |
| --- | --- |
| Operation IGNITION | Airborne surveillance and interception, 160 CAF members, 6 aircrafts and a CF-188 Hornet |
| Operation KOBOLD | 5 CAF members |
| Operation REASSURANCE | 835 CAF members |
| Operation IMPACT | 850 CAF members |
| Operation SEA GUARDIAN | Canadian Ship (HMCS) Charlottetown |

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[178] Sivan Ghasem, "What Has Canada Contributed to NATO?," *NAOC* (blog), accessed July 1, 2022, https://natoassociation.ca/what-has-canada-contributed-to-nato/.