

HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENT IN MOROCCO: A NEW ERA?

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Since the death of King Hassan II and the accession of his son Mohammad VI, human rights has become a very important and highly visible subject in Morocco. This paper has two basic purposes. First, I will examine briefly what has been happening in Morocco over the past year or so with respect to the development of human rights. Second, I will attempt to analyse the current reform agenda, both with respect to the government's sincerity and extent of commitment, and with respect to the limits of its viability in practical terms, by considering the influences which have contributed to shaping the process and by looking briefly at the potential ramifications of attempting to introduce what is effectively a Western-derived corpus of human rights into the Moroccan political, economic and social contexts.

1. Introduction

Since the death of King Hassan II and the accession of his son Mohammad VI, human rights has become a very important and highly visible subject in Morocco.¹ The Moroccan government has been quite vocal about the issue, both in the domestic forum and internationally, and, perhaps in keeping with the government's wishes, a number of positive developments have received considerable attention from the international media.² Among a considerable number of other initiatives that might be cited, the regime has made efforts: to extend the range of personal freedoms and to consolidate the rule of law; to amend press laws to allow

¹ King Hassan, who ruled Morocco for nearly 40 years, died in July 1999.

² The new King received very positive coverage from the mainstream press during his trip to the US last June, and was warmly received by President Clinton and other government officials.

greater freedom; to release political prisoners, allow the return of exiles and compensate the families of victims of past repression; to introduce measures designed to educate the population about human rights and to foster the development of a culture of human rights; and to establish co-operative relationships with international human rights organisations and host international human rights conferences.

All of these developments have been well received on the international stage. In March 2000, UN Human Rights High Commissioner, Mary Robinson, publicly praised Morocco's resolve to promote human rights and consolidate the rule of law.³ Shortly thereafter, the Human Rights International Federation, in recognition of the regime's human rights progress, announced that it was considering holding its 34th World Congress in Morocco.⁴ In early October, a Cairo seminar on human rights hailed Morocco's experience in the field, particularly with respect to the measures they have taken to introduce education on human rights issues into the schools.⁵ And finally, in late October, Rabat was scheduled to host a Mediterranean conference on human rights: "Human rights, cultural identity, and social cohesion in the Mediterranean", sponsored by the Moroccan Ministry of Human Rights and the North-South Centre of the European Council.⁶

Although the development of human rights was an issue under King Hassan, particularly during the latter years of his reign,⁷ the current level of activity and the commonly and openly expressed priority being given to the subject must be considered a significant point of departure with respect to Morocco's former policies. Just a few years ago the regime was heavily criticised for its human rights record by a number of international commentators. For example, in an article in *Middle East International* in the summer of 1997, Reinhold Leenders outlined the recent history of Morocco's

³ Arabic News 3/24/00

⁴ Arabic News 3/23/00

⁵ Arabic News 10/17/00

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ King Hassan was under pressure from the EU to improve Morocco's human rights record. For an account of this, see S. Virginia, Cleaning the Face of Moroccan Human Rights Abuses and Recent Developments.

human rights violations, including the torture and execution of political prisoners and the “disappearance” of about 600 political opponents. He also commented on the brutal treatment being given to members of the growing *Association des Chomeurs Diplomes* (Association of Unemployed Graduates).⁸ In June of 1997, the Geneva-based International Labour Organisation placed Morocco in the suspect company of Burma, Iran, Nigeria and Sudan for violating fundamental international labour standards and interfering in union activities.⁹ The renowned novelist, and long-time resident of Tangier, Paul Bowles observed: “You never know who’s listening. Everyone’s suspected of being a spy. It’s a police state, and very heavily policed, rather like Iran under the Shah.”¹⁰

Obviously, all of the recent, apparently quite positive, activities in the sphere of human rights are potentially very significant for Morocco’s future, and deserve closer examination. However, one must also introduce a few caveats and consider a number of questions about the extent of the regime’s commitment to, the motivations behind, and even the ultimate viability of, the new impetus for human rights reform. For example, it should be noted that there are still a number of issues that are clearly not on the reform agenda, and, indeed, that are not even open to discussion. These include, most significantly, the dominant role of the monarchy, the Western Sahara issue and Islamism. In addition, there are a number of problematic areas such as open criticism of government ministers and women’s rights. Furthermore, although it seems that, to at least some extent, the recent developments are the result of a sincere desire on the part of the King and his government to introduce reform, it must also be recognised that a number of other factors may figure prominently in their determination to make the human rights issue a major part of their agenda.

This paper has two basic purposes. First, I will examine briefly what has been happening in Morocco over the past year or so with

⁸ Brain Edwards, “The Obscure Language of Survival” *One World News Service* 9/29/1997

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

respect to the development of human rights. Second, I will attempt to analyse the current reform agenda, both with respect to the government's sincerity and extent of commitment, and with respect to the limits of its viability in practical terms, by considering the influences which have contributed to shaping the process and by looking briefly at the potential ramifications of attempting to introduce what is effectively a Western-derived corpus of human rights into the Moroccan political, economic and social contexts.

2. Recent Human Rights Developments

2.1 *The Political Process and the Rule of Law*

It should be observed briefly that there were a considerable number of positive developments over the last few years of King Hassan's reign with respect to the easing of censorship and the opening of the political process generally. In 1998, for the first time, the monarch allowed the opposition parties to form a government under the leadership of Abderrahmane Youssoufi, leader of the socialist party and one-time human rights attorney. Under the new political arrangement, termed *alternance*, the monarch and his allies agreed to form a partnership with respect to governing Morocco.¹¹ Clearly the monarchy remained the dominant partner in the relationship, controlling all of the key ministries, including the interior ministry, and defining the major points of policy. However, the traditional opposition elements were allocated a number of important ministries, and were allowed to pursue their own policies so long as these were not greatly contrary to wishes of the King or his more powerful allies. These policies included some progress on the development of human rights, such as an easing of censorship, the release of political prisoners and some measures taken to improve the plight of workers.¹²

Since the accession of Mohammad VI, these policies have been continued, and a number of further significant developments have

¹¹ For a succinct, but excellent account of the *alternance* system, see Remy Leveau, "Morocco at a Crossroads" *Mediterranean Politics*

¹² *Ibid.*

occurred that are highly likely to improve human rights in the country. To begin with, even before his accession, the new King made an effort to develop an identity as a man concerned with humanitarian issues, particularly the plight of Morocco's poor.¹³ Upon ascending to the throne, he immediately made a point of including the human rights issue as a very important component of his agenda, stressing it in his first speech from the throne. Some measures were taken very quickly to reinforce the impression that this was considered a very serious priority. For example, the King established an independent commission to deal with the compensation of the families of victims of past repression. A further development, and probably one of very great significance, was the King's decision to sack the long-time Interior Minister, Driss Basri, a widely despised figure strongly associated with excessive repression during Hassan's reign. Basri was long considered the second most powerful figure in Morocco after the King, and, in fact, many people consider him to be the true architect of the political repression Moroccans have experienced over the past quarter of a century. Suffice it to say, his departure was met with great enthusiasm by many observers of the Moroccan scene. The sacking seems to have been initiated as part of the new King's general desire to make a clean break with the excesses of the past and to demonstrate, both to the Moroccan people, and to outsiders, that he is serious about developing human rights in Morocco.¹⁴

The government's Human Rights Minister, Mohammad Aujjar, has gone as far as claiming publicly that the changes could be described as a "white revolution" and that they were being conducted on a new concept of "authority at the service of the people" developed by the sovereign.¹⁵ These claims perhaps exaggerated both the real scope of the changes and the extent of the government's commitment to substantive change, but a public statement of this kind once again served to highlight the change of direction initiated by the King, and to portray him as a

¹³ *The Economist* 07/31/99

¹⁴ The sacking of the former Interior Ministry was widely reported on, and celebrated throughout Morocco.

¹⁵ *Arabic News* 6/28/00

progressive and modernising ruler, both to his people and to the outside world.

2.2 Freedom of Expression and the Press

Even under Hassan II, it should be noted that Morocco had a very active press, which, judged by Middle Eastern standards, was reasonably independent of government control, as long as certain critical topics were avoided. The new King, upon acceding to the throne, expressed his desire to allow for greater freedom of expression, particularly with respect to the Moroccan press, and there are some indications that measures are being taken to revise the press laws in accordance with this objective.

For example, the Journalists' Protection Committee indicated that the accession of King Mohammad has had a positive impact on freedom of the press, noting that he has broadened the easing of censorship initiated in 1998. The general climate of openness has allowed the Moroccan press to report on a range of sensitive issues such as joblessness, human rights, and, to some extent, corruption.¹⁶

Early in the summer of 2000, in a discussion with members of the Arab journalists' union in Cairo, Communication Minister Larbi Messari gave assurances that press laws in Morocco would soon be revised to cancel prison penalties for crimes related to publishing, and to shift some of the authority concerning press oversight from the executive to the judiciary. He indicated that the revised laws were being drafted and would be sent to Parliament once the cabinet approved them, and also suggested that further legislation allowing for privately run television and radio stations was being developed.¹⁷

However, the extent of positive developments in this area should not be exaggerated. Journalists still tend to avoid reporting on subjects that might be embarrassing to the government, and a whole range of issues, including criticism of the monarchy, the Western Sahara, and Moroccan Islamism are still classifiable as forbidden areas. Partly, this is a result of a long-standing cultural practice

¹⁶ Arabic News 3/24/00

¹⁷ Arabic News 6/9/00

of self-censorship, which is not likely to disappear anytime in the near future, and partly it is the result of active measures taken by the government to clamp down on reporting in some areas.

For example, in May 2000, the international press watch-dog RSF (*Reporters Sans Frontieres*) launched an appeal directly to the King about lack of press freedoms, citing the censorship of seven Moroccan and foreign newspapers, and the treatment of two journalists who were threatened with prison sentences and forbidden to practice their profession (the latter penalty apparently being a first in Moroccan history).¹⁸ There have been a number of specific incidents that have indicated that the Moroccan government is still prepared to pounce on any press elements that report on areas that they deem to be off-limits. To cite only a few of many possible examples: On 5 February 2000, two French-language weeklies were seized by police for having reproduced, partially or wholly, the text of a memorandum from the controversial Islamist leader Sheikh Abdelssalam Yassine, which was highly critical of the former monarch. On 15 February 2000, an issue of *Jeune Afrique-L'Intelligent* was banned for containing text from a dissident Moroccan intellectual who questioned the capacity of King Mohammad to bring about real reforms and to punish those who violated human rights under the reign of his father. On 15 April, the weeklies *Le Journal* and *Assahifa*, both printed in France, were forbidden entry into Morocco because the previous issue of *Le Journal* had published an interview with the president of the Western Saharan Polisario Front.¹⁹

2.3 Political Prisoners

One area where there has undoubtedly been a considerable number of significant developments involves the release of prominent political prisoners, decisions concerning the return of political exiles, and, probably most significantly, the establishment of an independent commission to compensate the past victims of arbitrary imprisonment and/or their families.

¹⁸ RSF (*Reporters Sans Frontieres*) 4/16/00

¹⁹ Ibid.

With respect to the release of political prisoners, there were obviously developments of considerable significance. Between his accession to the throne last summer and March of 2000, King Mohammad released some 10,000 prisoners all tolled.²⁰ Perhaps the most significant prisoner release was that of the Islamist leader Sheikh Yassine, who had been under house arrest for ten years, in the Spring of 2000. This was quite perceived by many as being quite important, in terms of demonstrating the government's commitment to its prisoner release policy, because Yassine is, perhaps, the most vocal critic of the regime and has called for the creation of an Islamic state in Morocco. However, it should be noted that, even though Yassine has now been released, his Islamist movement, *Al Adl Wal Ihsan*, remains illegal, and it can be assumed that the authorities are continuing to monitor his activities very closely.²¹

Concerning the return of some political exiles, there were two particularly significant developments. The first was the announcement in late 1999 that the prominent Marxist-Leninist dissident Abraham Serfaty would be allowed to return to Morocco. The second was the announcement that the family of Mehdi Ben Barka would be allowed to return. Ben Barka was an opponent of Hassan II's rule who disappeared in mysterious circumstances in 1965, amid widespread speculation that the regime had him captured and executed.²²

Perhaps the most significant development in this area involved one of Mohammad VI's very first actions as King, the setting up of an independent commission for compensating the past victims and/or families of arbitrary imprisonment by the regime. From its inception in August of 1999 until the last deadline for receiving complaints in January of 2000, the commission handled nearly six thousand complaints related to political events, trades union cases and financial compensation for persons secretly detained or killed for their political views since Moroccan independence in 1956. Early reports indicated that 68 cases had been settled, with compensations that ranged between \$100,000 and \$250,000 for each claimant,

²⁰ Arabia On Line 02/06/00

²¹ Arabic News 05/18/00

²² Arabia On Line 02/06/00

coming to a total of around \$14 million.²³ Regarding the subject of missing persons the non-governmental Moroccan Human Rights Organisation issued a statement indicating that they were encouraged by the monarch's frank admission and candid treatment concerning the history of abuse in this area, but observed that the independent commission suffers from a number of shortcomings, and does not, in itself, constitute an adequate policy for redressing the long-standing problems relating to political detentions, etc.²⁴

2.4 Human Rights Education

I already mentioned in the introductory section that a seminar on human rights in Cairo in the middle of October 2000, praised Morocco for the steps that the government has taken to introduce education on human rights into the schools. The policy this referred to was an ambitious project that targets 5.5 million pupils in Moroccan primary and secondary schools over the next four years.²⁵ A pilot project is currently being implemented in some schools, while the government has taken steps to begin training sessions for 4,000 teachers and education executives. A parallel initiative has been introduced to eliminate racial and sexist stereotypes from school textbooks.²⁶

The Moroccan government is ostensibly committed not only to the promotion of human rights education in the short and long-terms, but also to the long-term creation of a human rights culture in Morocco. Obviously, it remains to be seen just how feasible such a goal is given Morocco's existing cultural and political circumstances.

2.5 Contact and Co-operation with International Human Rights Organisations

In order to help promote the development of human rights in Morocco, and to publicly demonstrate the regime's concern and commitment in this area, the government has established contacts

²³ Arabic News 06/22/00

²⁴ Arabic News

²⁵ Arabic News 10/17/00

²⁶ Arabic News 9/11/00

and co-operative links with a number of international human rights organisations, and has either attended, or offered to host, a significant number of human rights conferences and meetings. I will cite a few prominent examples.

The most recent was the Mediterranean conference on human rights, held in Rabat at the end of October, and co-sponsored by the Moroccan government and the North-South Centre of the European Council. The conference included a number of high-profile participants, including the former Portuguese president, Mario Soares and former Spanish premier Felipe Gonzalez.²⁷ In August, Prime Minister Youssoufi received a delegation from the Human Rights Watch to discuss women's rights.²⁸ In July, the Moroccan Human Rights Ministry and the Swedish Human Rights Institute of Raul Willingbourg discussed co-operation in matters dealing with human rights promotion and training.²⁹ Another important event, was the International Workshop on Human Rights in Geneva in March, in which, as I have already noted, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the former Irish president, Mary Robinson, praised Morocco's progress in the development of human rights.³⁰ As I also mentioned previously, the Human Rights International Federation announced that it was considering holding its 34th World Congress in Morocco, in recognition of the recent progress being made by the regime.³¹ Finally, Amnesty International held a youth forum for the promotion of human rights awareness in Morocco over the summer.

2.6 *Women's Rights*

One of the more controversial aspects of the Moroccan government's drive to develop human rights in Morocco has to do with the proposed introduction of legislation to give women more rights, particularly in areas traditionally governed by Islamic family law. For example, the proposed legislation would ban polygamy,

²⁷ Arabic News 10/17/00

²⁸ Arabic News 07/08/00

²⁹ Arabic News 06/15/00

³⁰ Arabic News 03/24/00

³¹ Arabic News 03/23/00

would raise the minimum legal age of marriage from 14 to 18, would allow women half their husband's wealth in the event of divorce or death, and would put the right to divorce in the hands of a judge rather than the husband.³² Obviously, all of these measures would be considered fairly minimal by Western standards, but in Morocco they have drawn a great deal of criticism, particularly from Muslim theologians who have argued that the plan would be against Islamic law. The Islamic movement was able to rally 500,000 people for a mass demonstration in Casablanca against the proposed legislation. It could be observed that the issue was probably being used as a pretext by the Islamists, to demonstrate their potential influence to the government. The rally was timed to coincide with a government-organised rally staged in Rabat to support the women's reform legislation. The government rally attracted only 40,000 supporters.³³

The King managed to stay above the fray concerning this particular issue, letting the socialist government and the conservative elements argue the matter. I would note at this point however, that this is one example of the kind of Western-derived human rights issue that the government has to be very careful with, due to their potentially very unpopular and socially disruptive consequences. I will return to the consideration of this issue in the final section of the paper.

3. Human Rights Developments in Morocco: A New Era? — Some Caveats and General Observations

Obviously the list of positive initiatives presented in the last section is quite impressive, particularly given that King Mohammad has only been in power in Morocco for a little over a year.³⁴ However, as I have observed previously, the scope of the reforms is somewhat limited by design. Important issues such as the

³² Arabia On Line 03/14/00

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ A far more pessimistic account of the new regime can be found in K.Mezran, "Morocco after Hassan II" *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin* vol.2, no.8 (September 5, 2000).

continuing dominance of the monarchy in the Moroccan political system, criticism of, or substantive change with respect to, the government's policies in the context of the Western Sahara conflict, and the inclusion of Islamist elements into the "legitimate" opposition, are clearly not on the reform agenda, and probably will not even be open to discussion for the foreseeable future. In addition, as the above review of developments clearly demonstrated, the government's policies even in the areas that they are avowedly committed to improving, such as freedom of the press and the resolution of issues pertaining to political prisoners, have gone only so far to date, and have been criticised by independent observers as being less than adequate. It should also be noted that there seems to be considerable popular opposition to, or at least concern about, some of the proposed reforms, such as those in the sphere of women's' rights. Furthermore, while there have been some encouraging developments in the sphere of basic political rights, whole classes of social human rights have so far been neglected. To cite just one critical comment advanced with respect to this potentially huge issue, the *AMDH* (Moroccan Human Rights Association) chairman Abderrahmane Benamar publicly indicated in June this year that a report by his organisation on human rights violations in the Garb Area of West Central Morocco highlighted the lack of government policies to guarantee rights to free education, health care, social security and employment, as provided for by the Moroccan Constitution and international conventions signed by Morocco.³⁵

The point of raising these caveats is not to denigrate the welcome progress that has been made in a considerable number of areas, but rather to make some attempt to define the apparent limits of the current government's reform agenda, both with respect to the sincerity and ultimate extent of the regime's commitment to improve the human rights situation in Morocco, and with respect to the agenda's overall viability in practical terms. In this section, I will first consider the sincerity and extent of the government's commitment by looking at the different forces that have helped to shape the reform agenda. I will then proceed to consider some

³⁵ Arabic News 06/09/00

factors related to the ultimate viability of the reform program in the current Moroccan political, economic and cultural contexts.

3.1 Influences Shaping the Development of Human Rights

The point that needs to be emphasised with respect to the sincerity and ultimate extent of the government's commitment to human rights reform is that the policy initiatives introduced recently were certainly not purely the result of idealistic altruism on the part of the Moroccan regime. Although one should take care not to overstate the issue by dismissing entirely the possibly quite sincere desire of the new young King and his advisers to bring about positive changes and establish a more genuine rapport between the regime and the people of Morocco, one must also recognise that a number of different forces, some relating to foreign influences and some to domestic political imperatives, also played a role in shaping the new human rights agenda.

The first influence which has undoubtedly played a quite considerable role in shaping the new reform agenda is the active impact of the ongoing globalisation process, specifically the establishment, by many Western countries, aid donors, and investors, of human rights reform as a basic precondition for unrestricted trade and full integration into the emerging world economic system. Since the end of the Cold War, it is no longer possible for countries to establish healthy trade relations with, and to attract massive development aid from, the major economic powers simply by adopting the appropriate rightist or leftist political stance. Countries that wish to be competitive in the new international economic system have to take measures to ensure potential aid donors and investors that they have sound economic potential and are politically secure in the long-term. Whether or not long-term developments will bear out the validity of the theoretical linkage, human rights reform is often perceived by Westerners as an important component of long-term political stability, and developing countries, including Morocco, have had to adjust their policies accordingly.³⁶

³⁶ The EU has long pressured Morocco into adopting a more liberal human rights policy. See P. Magnarella, Paul J. Middle East and North Africa: Governance, Democratization and Human Rights; W. Zartman, The Political Economy of Morocco.

The second influence is the development within Morocco of a considerable concern about human rights issues among some segments of the general population. This is probably partly a result of the more passive impact of globalisation, that is, the transmission of Western cultural values into the Moroccan context that has inevitably followed both in the wake of greater economic integration, and more importantly, the late twentieth century revolution in electronic communications.³⁷ Unlike a number of other developing countries in the Arab and Islamic worlds, satellite communications and the Internet have not been significantly restricted in Morocco, and this could potentially have a great impact on popular values and expectations. The growing calls among segments of the population for greater rights in some areas is also probably related to developments more indigenous to the Moroccan context. Greater political awareness is a classic feature of societies that have been pursuing the kind of educational and economic development agendas that have been features of Moroccan policy for some time now. In any case, however one accounts for the origin of the increasing awareness of, and concern about, human rights issues, this is clearly a development that the Moroccan government had to respond to in some way. It might also be observed that, given the current international circumstances outlined above (i.e., with respect to the importance of improving Morocco's international profile and image in order to attract aid and investment, to develop trade relations, etc.) a policy of greater accommodation in this area was probably a more viable option than the more effective coercive policy that might have been adopted in other circumstances.

Finally, one must also consider the influence that other domestic political imperatives probably had on the development of the new human rights policy. Again, without questioning that the King's emphasis on human rights is at least partly the result of genuine conviction and concern for his people, I would suggest that the policy generally, and some of the specific measures that have been taken to advance it, probably had something to do with certain political advantages that accrued to the King as a result. To examine this point very briefly, the establishment of human rights as an important

³⁷ See K. Mills, Human Rights in the Emerging Global Order: A New Sovereignty?

priority certainly has helped the new monarch to move out of his father's shadow, to add to the popular legitimacy of his regime, and to represent himself on the international stage as one of a new young generation of dynamic, progressive Arab leaders. Another general advantage of the new emphasis on human rights is that it helps to distract from some of Morocco's ongoing problems, particularly the struggling economy. In addition, to look at just one of many possible specific examples, it might be observed that the dismissal of Driss Basri from the Interior Ministry, which greatly encouraged many supporters of the human rights agenda, was almost certainly not solely motivated by this issue. In effect, that was probably an added bonus of a political move that King Mohammad would likely have considered desirable in any case, in order to eliminate a potential rival and to secure his own dominant position in the Moroccan political system from a very early stage in his reign.

3.2 Western Human Rights and the Moroccan Context

Clearly, a great deal could be written concerning the long-term viability of introducing what is effectively a Western-derived human rights corpus into the Moroccan political social and economic contexts. Because a more thorough consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, I will limit myself to introducing a few general observations here.

First, I have some serious reservations with respect to the current conventional wisdom that human rights reform contributes to political stability, and that the promotion of human rights in developing countries is therefore a practical as well as a desirable policy. One must question the extent to which the introduction of Western-style human rights alone will contribute to the stability of an otherwise closed political system. Since the Moroccan regime, for the present time at least, clearly has no desire to broaden participation in political decision-making to any great degree, the King and his government will have to carefully balance the benefits, in terms of popularity, foreign investment, etc., of any given reform, with the potential risk that it will lead to increasing demands that may become unsustainable without a complete reform of the political system.

Second, I would observe, particularly with respect to the social human rights issue, that it would hardly be just to expect the short-

term emergence of a Western-style state-welfare network in the context of a relatively disadvantaged developing economy like Morocco's. Anyone who expects that the Moroccan economy will soon be able to support the widespread provision of free education, medical care, social security, etc., is expecting too much.³⁸ Even Western economies are struggling with such burdens at present.

Finally, there is the question of the potentially socially disruptive content of some the Western human rights corpus when it is applied to the Moroccan cultural context. I have already alluded to the government's attempts to introduce legislation to improve women's rights,³⁹ and the massive backlash against this policy.⁴⁰ If the government is intent upon pursuing this policy and other potentially controversial Western-derived human rights policies, they run the risk of creating bitter divisions in Moroccan society. Moreover, one might argue that it is not really in keeping with the spirit of human rights to forcefully impose even the most well intended policies on cultures that are, at least for the time being, fundamentally opposed to them.

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³⁸ For an analysis of the Moroccan economy, see C. Henry, The Mediterranean Debt Crescent: Money and Power in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey.

³⁹ L Brand, Women, the State, and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African Experiences.

⁴⁰ See: Washington Post 03/12/00; Panafrican News Agency 03/17/00; Arabia On Line 03/14/00.

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