SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION: THE CASE OF TURKEY

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Among many other things, globalization has paved the way for the promotion and acceleration of migratory movements all around the world. European states, where migrants were welcomed especially after 1960s, started to implement restricted migration policies from 1980s onwards. The Europeanization of migration policies was accompanied by the development of a securitized perception of migration where migrants were stigmatized as threats to political, internal, cultural and economic unity of their host country. The European Union not only adopts and implements policies that would produce and strengthen securitized perceptions of migration but also exports them to candidate states in the form of *acquis communautaire*.

1. Introduction

In May 2007, 27 African migrants had a life and death struggle in the Mediterranean, in front of the eyes of the Western Europe, which is regarded as the *cradle* of human rights. These migrants, whose boat sank in the middle of the sea, were not accepted on board a Maltese boat, but were allowed to cling to the tuna net of the boat. After spending 72 hours on sea without having anything to eat or drink, an Italian boat passing nearby rescued them. The daily *Independent* wrote 'Europe's Shame' in the headlines.[1] It was an appropriate headline. The crime committed had its long established roots, and blaming only Malta for what happened would only help to conceal the responsible. This tragedy that we are forced to witness is very much related to the change in the concept of security which perceives and constructs migrants as a potential threat of security.

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[1] "Europe's Shame," *The Independent*, May 28, 2007.

Among many other things, globalization has paved the way for the promotion and acceleration of migratory movements all around the world. The pace of technological development facilitated the transnational mobility of people and reduced the perceived distance between states. European states, where migrants were welcomed especially after the 1960s, started to implement restrictive migration policies from the 1980s onwards. The completion of the single market, the adoption of the Schengen Convention as part of the EU *acquis,* the eradication of internal borders of the European Union were paralleled by the development of a *securitized* perception of migration, which resulted in the creation of a notion of *Fortress Europe.* More and more, the emphasis was put on controlling trans-border movements, stopping migrants before they put foot on EU territory and sending them back to their country of origin. These developments were often resulted in human rights violations as many asylum-seekers who managed to reach EU countries through illegal means were forced to return to their countries of origin or other third countries. The European Union not only adopted rules that would produce and strengthen securitized perceptions of migration but also exported them to candidate states and other third countries in the form of the *acquis communautaire.*

This paper is composed of three sections. The first part offers a brief analysis of the theoretical debate over the discourse of securitization of migration. The second part examines the path through which migration polices, which mostly focus on the control of migratory movements rather than their regulation, are Europeanized. In the third and final part, the transposition of the restrictive migration policies and the securitization discourse from the EU to candidate states as part of the *acquis communautaire* is analyzed through the case study of Turkey, which is both a Mediterranean country and an EU candidate and exposed to huge annual population flows.

2. The Debate Over the Securitization of Migration

As the post-Cold War period announced the demise of the bi-polar structure of international political system where security had been perceived and defined by military issues such as the possibility of a nuclear war, the arms race and the balance of power; non-

military issues including ethnic tensions, environmental deterioration, population growth, increasing unemployment, and international mass migration began to emerge as new forms of security preoccupations of the new era.[2] During the Cold War period, the focus was on state security whereas it shifted on to individual security in the post-Cold War era which paved the way for the widening of the concept of security.[3] According to Buzan, a new security agenda emerged in this period that has its principal focus on society rather than the state.[4] In this new agenda, military threat is not as prominent as it used to be. However, the emphasis is placed on protecting society from the threats posed by cosmopolitanism, standardizing mass culture and migration on national identity.[5] Kicinger states that this transformation of the concept of security away from a militaristic understanding paved the way for the consolidation of the notion of "non-traditional security threats" where international migration has become one component of it.[6] Having been perceived as a destabilizing factor in West European societies, international migration came to be defined as a threat to external, internal, cultural and social unity of the host country.

Migratory movements are perceived as security threats under various circumstances. Migrants (political migrants especially) are claimed to constitute potential threats that would deteriorate relations between the sending and the receiving countries.[7] To begin

[2] Huysman, J. (2000) "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 38, no. 5, pp. 5.

[3] Ibrahim, M. (2005) "The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse," *International Migration*, vol. 43, no. 5, pp. 168.

[4] Buzan, B. (1993) "Introduction: the changing security agenda in Europe," in Waever, O., B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup and P. Lemaître, eds Identity, Migration and New Security Agenda in Europe, London: Printer Publishers Ltd., pp. 2.

[5] Hassner (1991) cited in Buzan (1993), pp. 3.

[6] Kicinger, A. (2004), "International Migration as a Non-Traditional Security Threat and the EU Responses to this Phenomenon," *Central European Forum for Migration Research Working Paper*, Warsaw, pp. 1.

[7] Weiner, M. (1992/93) "Security, Stability and International Migration," *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 105; Lohrmann, R. (2000) "Migrants, Refugees and Insecurity: Current Threats to Peace?," *International Migration*, vol. 38, issue 4, pp. 4.

with, the mere act of granting refugee status is argued to carry the danger of being perceived as a potential source of tension between the host country – the shelter for people running away from persecution; and the home country - the source of persecution.[8] According to this argument, stigmatization of home country as the source of persecution may worsen bilateral relations between the two countries. Moreover, it is indicated that a home country may hold a host country responsible for the activities its citizens are engaged in.[9] The issue of ROJ TV, a Kurdish television channel which is claimed by Turkish officials to broadcast in favor of PKK (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* - Kurdistan Worker's Party) from Denmark, strained and continues to strain the relations between Turkey and Denmark. By looking at the Middle Eastern history, Pollack and Byman argue that large number of refugee re-settlements can introduce instability and import war to host countries.[10] They point out Arab-Israeli conflicts in 1956 and 1967 as examples where the conflicts were provoked by cross-border attacks of the Palestinian refugees to Israel.[11] Refugees are asserted to be political threats when they get dissatisfied with the host country's policies pertaining to their country of origin, and/or when they feel they were not supported enough.[12] They are claimed to establish alliances with people from the local community that they have ethnic and/or religious affinity with and engage in actions against the host country.[13]

Migration may also be perceived as a threat to the internal security of a country. Immigrants are said to create uneasiness in their host societies by getting involved in criminal activities such as drug trafficking, human smuggling, robbery and even terrorist attacks. In the new security agenda that is focused on societal insecurity, influxes of migrants are perceived and depicted as threats to national identity.[14] However, Lohrmann indicates that

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[8] Weiner (1992/93), pp. 107.

[9] *Ibid*, pp. 108.

[10] Pollack M, Byman, D. (2006) "Iraqi Refugees: Carriers of Conflict," *The Atlantic Monthly*, November.

[11] *Ibid*.

[12] Weiner (1992/93), pp. 109.

[13] Pollack & Byman (2006).

[14] Buzan (1993), pp. 3.

there is an overestimation and misrepresentation of the impact of international migration on the internal security of the host country.[15] The securitization of culture stems from the homogeneity discourse of West European societies where migrants are depicted as the intruders of the genuine societal unity.[16] Cultural identity, defining "who belongs to or who can be admitted into" a country, is a mechanism through which inclusion/exclusion practices operate.[17] Homogeneity discourse perceives people with different racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic or cultural characteristics as potential threats to cultural unity of a society. Kicinger gives the headscarves affair in France as an example where the homogeneous cultural identity of the French people was challenged by immigrants.[18]

The securitization of social welfare, on the other hand, renders immigrants into a situation in which they are recognized as "illegitimate recipients or claimants of socio-economic rights".[19] It is argued that the economic burden caused by migrants leaves states in a reluctant situation pertaining to immigration.[20] According to Fauser, in times of economic bottlenecks, it is the immigrants that lose their jobs easier than the natives, and as a result, become dependant on social security payments.[21] Goodhart indicates that in order to sustain the welfare state at a time when group solidarity has been weakened by increasing diversity in society, native people have to be reassured that immigrants feel the same responsibility towards payments of taxes and they will not abuse the welfare system by free-riding.[22]

According to Michel Foucault, societies are playgrounds for multiple forms of power relations whose construction,

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[15] Lohrmann (2000), pp. 8.
[16] Huysmans (2000), pp. 762.
[17] Weiner (1992/93), pp. 110.
[18] Kicinger (2004), pp. 2.
[19] Huysmans (2000), pp. 767.
[20] Weiner (1992/93), pp. 114.
[21] Fauser, M. (2006), "Transnational Migration: A National Security Risk? Securitization of Migration Policies in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom," in *Reports & Analyses 2/06*, Center for International Relations, Warsaw, pp. 4.
[22] Goodhart, D. (2004), 'Too Diverse?,' *Prospect*, pp. 3.

intensification and implementation occur through the establishment, functioning and perpetuation of a discourse.[23] Therefore, in order to comprehend the processes that paved the way for the redefinition of migration as a security threat, one has to concentrate on the power relations through which the securitization discourse was produced, and in turn, began to be treated as a factually established truth. As Weiner rightly argues, security is a social construct.[24] The threat perceptions are all products of a process of construction. Therefore, security is not an essential characteristic of migratory movements and the link between the two concepts is not a given fact. Rather, securitization of migration is "the mixed result of discourses and practices by given social groups and institutions in a particular cultural, socio-economic and political context".[25]

In order to follow the traces of the ways in which securitization discourse influenced and continues to influence immigration and asylum policies of the European Union, an analysis of the communautarization processes of these policies beginning from the 1980s is essential and imperative. Therefore, the following section focuses on Europeanization of immigration policies in the EU context.

3. Communautarization/Europeanization of Migration Policies

Migration is one of the primary policy areas where states do not want to give up their sovereignty. However, the completion of the internal market and the eradication of internal borders paved the way for the EU to delineate policies and practices that would enhance the control over population flows in and out of the Union. In this respect, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) established a three pillar system where the first pillar was composed of *common* policies such as customs union, single market, agricultural policy, fisheries policy, etc. The second pillar included security and defense issues

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[23] Foucault 1980, cited in Ibrahim (2005), pp. 164.
[24] Weiner (1992/1993), pp. 103.
[25] Lohrmann (2000), pp. 5-6.

titled as the 'Common Foreign and Security Policy,' and the third pillar was composed of policies pertaining to migration, asylum and judicial cooperation, under the title 'Justice and Home Affairs.' Contrary to the first pillar, the policies of the last two pillars were not Europeanized. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) moved some policy areas of migration, asylum and judicial cooperation in civil matters from the third pillar to the first one; and hence communautarized them. In addition to that, the Amsterdam Treaty incorporated the Schengen Convention, signed in 1990 and came into force in 1995, into the communautarized first pillar of the Union structure.

The European Council Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere Summit (1999) delineated four areas of action for the implementation of a common migration and asylum policy: partnership with countries of origin, a common European Asylum system, fair treatment of third country nationals, and management of migration flows.[26] Of these four areas, only the third one concentrates on the mechanisms for the inclusion of immigrants in EU member states, whereas the remaining three areas concentrate on ways of controlling population inflows into the Union. The Laeken Summit Presidency Conclusions asserted the European Council's desire to adopt a common policy on asylum and immigration and called for an action plan on illegal immigration and smuggling of human beings while emphasized the need for a better management of external border controls in order to prevent illegal migration.[27] Two years later at the Thessaloniki European Council, the emphasis was again on the development of a common policy on illegal immigration and external border controls, and additionally, on the return of illegal migrants and the establishment of cooperation between the EU and third countries where readmission agreements form an important part of the policy.[28]

The Hague Programme, adopted in 2004 provides a further step in the formation of a common migration and asylum policy. The

[26] Council of the European Union (1999) Tampere European Council, October 15-16, Presidency Conclusions.

[27] Council of the European Union (2001) Laeken European Council, December 14-15, Presidency Conclusions.

[28] Council of the European Union (2003) Thessaloniki European Council, June 20, Presidency Conclusions.

Hague Programme Action Plan for the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, designed for the period between 2005 and 2010, is composed of ten policy areas for which measures are deemed necessary to be taken[29]. Some of these policy areas are the following: migration management; internal borders, external borders and visas; common asylum policy; and integration of immigrants. The Presidency Conclusions of the EU Brussels Summit in December 2006 also underlined the urgent need for a Europeanized migration policy by stating that concentration on both the challenges and benefits of migration is a priority concern for members of the EU in the 21st century.[30] In addition to the policy areas stated in The Hague Action Plan; the presidency conclusions included a section for policies necessary for the management of legal migration.

The analysis of EU policy proposals and action plans displays six main areas of concern pertaining to the issue of migration. These include the scrutinization of the Union's external borders; the fight against illegal migration; cooperation and signing of readmission agreements with third countries; asylum; management of labor migration and integration of immigrants into their host societies. Among these six areas, only the last two are focused on inclusionary policies, whereas the remaining four are concentrated on the mechanisms that would keep potential *unwanted* migrants outside of the European Union.

Europeanization of migration policies paved the way for the adoption of a restrictive perspective rather than a liberal one with regards to migration, focusing on strengthening the external border control in order to stop migratory flows before they enter EU territory. Policies adopted as part of this communautarized policy realm not only binds member states, but also obligate candidate states to transform their migration policies and align them to that of the European Union. Through the transfer of EU policies in this domain, candidate states enhance their abilities to control external

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[29] The Hague Programme Action Plan, see <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/ information_dossiers/the_hague_ priorities/index_en.htm>.

[30] Council of the European Union (2006) Brussels European Council, December 14-15, Presidency Conclusions.

borders, develop the necessary infrastructure and technological know-how in order to detect fraudulent documents, and sign readmission agreements with migrant sending third countries, before becoming members of the Union.

4. Securitization of Migration in Turkey

Although Turkey is well known as a country of emigration due to its past history, it started to transform into a country of immigration and transit beginning from the 1980s. It attracts not only legal migrants but also asylum seekers and irregular migrants. Having been granted candidacy status in 1999, Turkey started to align its migration policy with that of the European Union. However, currently, there is not only a process of harmonization of migration policies but also a tendency to adopt and internalize the mentality which perceives migrants as a security threat to the unity of the country.

4.1 Migration History of Turkey

Contrary to the generally held belief that emigration from Turkey started back in 1960s in the form of labor migration to west European countries, Turkish records of emigration date back to the late 18th century.[31] The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey accelerated migratory movements from Turkey. Before the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, which officially established the Republic, Turkey signed the Convention concerning the Exchange of Turkish and Greek Populations on January 30, 1923 in Lausanne, Switzerland with Greece which foresaw the exchange of Greek-Orthodox residing in Anatolia and Turkish-Muslims living in Greece.[32] As a result, 149,851 Greek-Orthodox and 456,720 Turkish-Muslims were repatriated in two years time.[33] The departure of non-Muslim

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[31] Akgunduz, A. (1998) "Migration to and from Turkey, 1783-1960," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 24.

[32] For further details see, < http://www.hri.org/docs/straits/exchange.html>.

[33] Geray cited in Akgunduz (1998).

minorities from Turkey continued even after the population exchange. In addition to the Armenians and Greeks that have continuously fled the country; between 1948 and 1950, 33,159 Jews emigrated and settled in Israel.[34]

Beginning from the 1960s, population movements from Turkey changed in terms of content and destination. Contrary to the population flows that took place in the early Republican era, migrants that left the country during 1960s-70s were predominantly Turkish-Muslims seeking employment and the destination was west European countries. They were recruited as *guest workers* following the economic boom and the consequent labor shortages that took place after the Second World War.[35] The bilateral contracts signed between Turkey and Germany, Austria, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland, in principle, intended to provide temporary workers who will eventually return to their home country. Although European countries terminated worker recruitment programs due to the economic recession that occurred following the oil crises of 1973, emigration from Turkey continued in the form of family reunification/formation throughout the 1980s and 1990s.[36]

From the 1980s onwards, an acceleration in the asylum applications from Turkey to the EU countries was observed. The 1980 military coup which was followed by the armed conflict between PKK and the Turkish armed forces in the southeast of Turkey and the subsequent institution of a state of emergency in the region paved the way for many Kurds holding a Turkish citizenship to seek asylum in European countries.[37]

The 1980s also marked a turning point in the history of migratory movements as Turkey gradually evolved from a country of emigration to one of immigration and transit migration. The

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[34] Weiker cited in Akgunduz (1998).

[35] Abadan-Unat, N. (2002) *Bitmeyen Göç: Konuk İşçilikten Ulusötesi Yurttaçlığa*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari, pp. 37-69.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] Kirişci, K. (2003) 'Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration', *Migration Information Source*, see <http://www.migrationinformation.org>; Mannaert, C. (2003) "Irregular Migration and Asylum in Turkey," *Working Paper No. 89*, UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, pp. 6.

Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the following Iran-Iraq war poured 1.5 million people from Iran to Turkey between 1980 and 1991.[38] In 1988 and 1991, Iraqi Kurds fled Iraq and came to Turkey in search of a shelter. UNHCR indicates the number of Kurdish asylum seekers in 1991 as 460,000.[39] A year later, in 1992, around 25,000 Muslim Bosnian asylum seekers flowed into Turkey escaping from war.[40] Furthermore, the Kosovo crisis in 1999 forced approximately 10,000 Kosovo Albanians to leave their lands and come to Turkey.[41] Beginning from the early 1980s, asylum seekers from places as distant as Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Bangladesh and Pakistan began to enter Turkey.[42] Another group of immigrants coming to Turkey are the citizens of Russian Federation and former Soviet republics like Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Romania and Ukraine. These people usually enter legally, on tourist visas, but engage in commercial activities, while some of them overstay their visas and become illegal immigrants.[43]

Turkey has also become a waiting room for irregular migrants on their journey to Europe. Icduygu studies irregular migrants coming to Turkey under two groups.[44] The first group is composed of transit migrants that are coming from the Middle East (Iraq and Iran) and various Asian (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, etc.) and African (Nigeria, Somalia, Republic of Congo) countries and try to reach EU countries. The second group consists of migrants from Romania, Moldova, Ukraine and Russian Federation who enter legally but overstay their visas. They are usually employed in the insecure informal market where most of them work as nannies or housekeepers.

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[38] Mannaert 2003, pp. 2.

[39] UNHCR, Turkey, see <http://www.unhcr.org.tr>

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] Mannaert (2003), pp. 3; Kirisci, K. (2004) "Old and New Patterns Immigration into Turkey: EU as a Vehicle of 'Post-National Transformation' in Turkey" draft paper presented at on *Turkey – Towards Post Nationalism*, Basel, 14-16 October, pp. 7.

[43] Kirisci (2004), pp. 7.

[44] Icduygu, A. (2005) "Transit Migration in Turkey: Trends, Patterns and Issues," European University Institute, CARIM-RR 2005/04, pp. 8-9.

Another recent trend of migratory movements directed to Turkey includes professionals and students.[45] According to the data provided by UNHCR Turkey and the Department of Foreigners, Borders and Asylum, 168,100 people received resident permits in 2000. Among this number, 24,200 resident permits were given due to work permits, 24,600 due to education, and 119,300 for other (according to Icduygu, this number includes families of those who received resident permits for education and employment) reasons.[46] In 2005, the number of residence permits issued reached 131,594 including 22,130 for employment, 25,240 for education and 84,224 for other reasons.[47]

As the data clearly indicates, Turkey was a country of emigration from the 1920s, the establishment of the Republic, until the 1980s. However, the 1980s mark a turning point in the history of migration where Turkey was transformed from a country of emigration into a country of immigration and transit. Today, not only asylum-seekers or irregular migrants who perceive Turkey as a waiting room on their journey to western countries but also irregular labor migrants and professionals who choose Turkey as their destination point are coming to the country.

4.2   Policy Implications of the Europeanization of Migration

4.2.1   Visa Policy

Fortification of the European Union against the *invasion* of unwanted immigrants underlines the significance of two components of the Europeanized migration policy that directly deal with the prevention of irregular migrants upon entry; visa policy and border management. In 2001, the EU adopted the Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, which includes a list of third countries whose nationals must possess visas when crossing the external borders of the Union (negative list) and those for whose

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[45] Icduygu, A. (2006) *Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri Bağlamında Uluslararası Göç Tartışmaları*, Istanbul: TUSIAD, pp.76.

[46] *Ibid*, pp. 73.

[47] *Ibid*.

nationals there is no such requirement (positive list).[48] Following the annual revision of the list, the regulation was amended by the Council Regulation (EC) No 453/2003 of 6 March 2003 which has transferred Ecuador from the positive list to the negative list.[49]

Although there was a wide gap between the negative and positive lists of Turkey and the European Union, in September 2002 Turkey took important steps in aligning to the Schengen acquis and introduced visa requirements for the nationals of Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Omar and Saudi Arabia. The Commission's 2002 Regular Report indicated the discrepancy between the two negative lists as twenty one and called Turkey to align its visa list further with that of the European Union.[50] The alignment process continued and in April 2003 Turkish government introduced visa requirements for the nationals of Indonesia, South Africa, Kenya, Maldives, Seychelles, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, Fiji Islands and Mauritius and hence reduced the discrepancy deriving from the differences between the negative lists to seven.[51] In November 2003 a visa requirement was established for the nationals of Azerbaijan and the difference between the negative lists shrank to six countries which include Bosnia Herzegovina, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Morocco and Tunisia.[52] In 2006, Turkey lifted visa requirements for Guatemala and Czech Republic and introduced visas for the Marshall Islands and Micronesia. Visa exemption agreements with

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[48] Council of the European Union, 2001, Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those nationals are exempt from that requirement, *OJ L 81 21.03.2001*.

[49] Council of the European Union, 2003, Council Regulation (EC) No 453/2003 of 6 March 2003 amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those nationals are exempt from that requirement, *OJ L 69 13.03.2003*.

[50] Commission of the European Communities, 2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, 09.10.2002, SEC (2002) 1412.

[51] Commission of the European Communities, 2003 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession.

[52] Commission of the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, 06.10.2004, SEC (2004) 1201.

Venezuela and Paraguay came into force and another one was signed with Columbia. Moreover, visa requirement for Andorra was lifted. However, the six-country-gap between the negative lists of Turkey and the EU continues to exist.[53]

In addition to aligning to the negative and positive lists of the European Union; ensuring the security of the travel documents constitutes a significant aspect of the visa policy. As a result, the EU adopted the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1683/95 of 29 May 1995 which delineates a uniform format for visas. In 2002, the Council adopted a regulation that amends Regulation No. 1683/95 by incorporating a photograph into the uniform format of the visas. In 2004, Turkey started to implement a twinning project with a budget of EUR 1,918,667, pertaining to the amelioration and alignment of its visa policy. Under the project, which was completed in 2005, around 300,000 consular staff received trainings on new visa instructions, on how to detect forged and falsified travel documents and how to use the technical equipment in order to ensure document safety.[54] The project also provided diplomatic missions abroad with anti-forgery equipment and relevant hardware and software. Moreover, a new visa sticker with higher security characteristics was developed as one of the components of the twinning project.

Turkey has a flexible and yet at the same time a complex visa system, composed of three components, and each including different regulations applied to different groups of nationals.[55] The first component encompasses countries whose nationals are not required to obtain visas in order to enter and stay for a defined period of time in Turkey while the second group consisted of countries whose nationals are obliged to acquire visas. The third component, on the other hand, includes sticker visas (bandrol) issued at the borders. However, the application of sticker visa regime is contrary to Schengen standards and Turkey was obligated to terminate the

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[53] European Commission, Turkey 2005 Progress Report, 09.11.2005, SEC (2005) 1426, pp. 111; Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2006 Regular Report, 08.11.2006, SEC (2006) 1390, pp. 60.

[54] 'Visa Policy and Practice', Twinning Project No: TR-03-JH-05, pp. 5.

[55] Kirisci, K. (2007) "Border Management and EU-Turkish Relations: Convergence or Deadlock," CARIM-RR-2007/03, pp. 32.

issuance of visas at the border during the harmonization process. In the National Program of 2003, the Turkish state promised to bring this application to an end by 2005. However, the cost of abolishing the sticker visa regime or initiating new visas to neighboring countries as well as other third countries that Turkey has close social, economic and cultural relations, accompanied by uncertainty regarding full membership, created reluctance on the Turkish side in aligning to the EU visa policy.[56] As a result, following a *tacit* agreement made between Turkey and the EU, full adoption of the negative list was decided to be achieved towards the accession, not before it.[57]

4.2.2 External Border Management

Following the eradication of internal borders with the Schengen Agreement, the management and control of the external border of the European Union gained utmost importance. European Council of October 2003 made a novel decision by supporting the Commission's proposal for the establishment of a Border Management Agency.[58] In that respect the Commission initiated a proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of a European Agency for the management of external borders of the Union which was adopted in October 2004.[59] This legislation is a significant development with regards to the promotion of cooperation between the member states for the external border control.

Turkey has a 2,949 km long land border with Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Among its neighbors, only Greece and Bulgaria are members of the European Union. Therefore, upon Turkish accession Greek and Bulgarian borders will become internal borders and the Turkish border with

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[56] *Ibid*, pp. 42.

[57] *Ibid*, pp. 42.

[58] Council of the European Union (2003) Brussels European Council, March 20-21, Presidency Conclusions, pp. 10.

[59] Council of the European Union, 2004, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, *OJ L 349 25.11.2004.*

the remaining six countries will constitute the external border of the EU. As a result, Turkey is responsible for the protection and control of a 2,477 km land border (excluding Greek and Bulgarian border) and a 6,530 km sea border. Beginning from the 1980s, Turkey became a country of transit migration where the majority of the migrants enter illegally from the eastern border. Consequently, the European Union has increased its calls for Turkey to strengthen its border control and surveillance.

One of the most important criticisms directed to Turkey in the progress reports focused on the scattered structure of the border guard units. The control and surveillance of the Turkish border is divided between the responsibilities of the army (land forces), gendarmerie, police, navy and the coast guard. The navy and the coast guard is responsible for the protection of the sea border, the army and the gendarmerie is responsible for the surveillance of the green border and the police is responsible for the control of border crossings at crossing points and airports.[60] Turkey introduced a time table in the National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) where the creation of a unified, non-military Border Guard Unit is foreseen at the end of 2005.

In 2003, the Task Force on Asylum, Immigration and External Borders produced a strategy paper on the protection of Turkish external borders.[61] Encouraged by the strategy paper, Turkey started to implement a twinning project entitled 'Support for the development of an Action Plan to implement Turkey's integrated border management strategy' in 2003 which was completed in 2006. The twining project produced an Action Plan defining the necessary legal and institutional measures as well as the infrastructure and equipments for the effective implementation of the border management strategy in March 2006.[62] Moreover, in line with the directives of the strategy, Directorate for Integrated Border

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[60] Commission of the European Communities, 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, 08.11.2000.

[61] Kirisci (2007), pp. 20.

[62] "Support for the development of Action Plan to implement Turkey's integrated border management strategy," Twinning Project No: TR-02-JH-02, pp. 3; Progress Report 2006, pp. 60

Management, which would supervise the implementation of projects pertaining to the creation of a border guard unit, was established in June 2004 under the Ministry of Interior.[63] In 2005, Turkey started to implement another twinning project with the objective of developing a training strategy, program and curriculum in EU standards for the new border police that will be established during the harmonization process.[64] The project is aimed to be completed in 2007.

Turkey still has a long way to go before providing full alignment with the *acquis* on external border management. To begin with, the establishment of a unified, non-military Border Guard Unit has not been achieved yet. In addition to that, cooperation between the agencies responsible for the protection of different parts of the border is newly developing.[65] The strengthening of the training of the border guards and the deployment of conscripts are highly recommended by the European Union.[66] Upgrading of infrastructure at some checking points and adaptation of surveillance equipment at crossing points and along the green border is requested.[67]

4.2.3 Re-admission Agreements

Re-admission agreements are an essential component of the Europeanized migration policy which is mainly focused on keeping the unwanted outside of the EU borders. Readmission agreements are one of the oldest mechanisms used by the European Union in order to control the flow of people and prevent the border-crossing of irregular migrants.[68] The development of the mechanism of readmission agreements dates back to 1994, when a Council Recommendation of 30 November 1994 regarding specimen bilateral

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[63] Regular Report 2004, pp. 139.
[64] 'Development of a Training System for Border Police', Twinning Project No: TR-2004/IB/JH/05
[65] Progress Report 2006, pp. 60.
[66] *Ibid.*
[67] *Ibid.*
[68] Apap, J., Carrera, S., Kirisci, K. (2004) "Turkey in the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice," *EU-Turkey Working Papers No. 3,* Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), pp. 9.

readmission agreements between a Member State and a third country was adopted. The aim of the recommendation was to facilitate the repatriation of the third country nationals to their country of origin. The recommendation was followed by the adoption of guiding principles regulating the drafting of protocols for the implementation of the agreements in 1995.

The Seville European Council concluded that any agreement or cooperation that would be established between the European Union and any third country should include joint management of migratory movements and obligatory readmission in case the movement is deemed illegal.[69] Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement, signed between the EU and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states in 2000 and which came into effect in 2003, indicates that "each of the ACP States shall accept the return of and readmission of any of its nationals who are illegally present on the territory of a Member State of the European Union, at that Member States' request and without further formalities."[70]

The Amsterdam Treaty delegated powers to the Council in order to take necessary measures, by acting unanimously upon the proposal of the Commission or a Member State, pertaining to readmission of third country nationals. Article 63(b) of the Treaty indicates that the Council shall take measures in the area of "illegal immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of illegal residents".[71] The Council has authorized, so far, the Commission to conduct readmission agreements in the name of the European Union with 11 countries including Morocco, Sri Lanka, Russia, Pakistan (September 2000), Hong Kong, Macao (May 2001), Ukraine (June 2002) and Albania, Algeria, China, Turkey (November 2002)[72]. Only five of the negotiations were completed successfully:

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[69] Council of the European Union (2002) Seville European Council, June 21-22, Presidency Conclusions.

[70] Cotonou Agreement 2000. See <http://www.acpsec.org/en/conventions/cotonou/accord1.htm>.

[71] European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and Treaty Establishing the European Community, *OJ C 321E, 29.12.2006*, Article 63.

[72] See <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/immigration/relations/fsj_immigration_relations_en.htm>.

Hong Kong (November 2001), Macao (October 2002), Sri Lanka (May 2002), Albania (November 2003) and Russia (October 2005).[73] The EU has demanded that Turkey sign a readmission agreement with the European Union as part of the membership requirements. The 2003 Accession Partnership document stated the conclusion of a readmission agreement with the Union as a short term objective. Although Turkey objected to signing a readmission agreement with the whole Union at the beginning, in March 2004 rather reluctantly agreed to start negotiations.[74]

Since it is very difficult to open readmission agreements with third countries, the Turkish state was reluctant to negotiate a readmission agreement with the European Union fearing from the idea of being stuck with unwanted migrants. So far, Turkey has concluded readmission agreements with Greece (November 2001), Syria (September 2001), Kyrgyzstan (May 2003), Romania (January 2004) and Ukraine (June 2005).[75] In addition to that, negotiations are ongoing with Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Hungary, Macedonia, Ukraine, Lebanon, Libya, Egypt, and Iran. These agreements are proposed to Bangladesh, India, China, Mongolia, Israel, Georgia, Ethiopia, Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Sudan and Tunisia.[76]

4.3   Securitization of Migration: Signs of a Mentality Change

The completion of the internal market, paved the way for the beginning of a gradual process of communautarization of migration policies. This process not only obligated member states to adopt and implement common policies and practices, but also requested prospective member states to accept them as part of the harmonization process and the *acquis communautaire*. However, the adoption of community rules and regulations in this policy domain can not be viewed as a simple activity of alignment to the European Union since the process of harmonization of migration policies by

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[73] *Ibid.*
[74] Apap, Carrera, Kirisci (2004), pp. 22.
[75] Kirisci (2007), pp. 26.
[76] Icduygu (2005), pp. 28.

the candidate countries goes hand in hand with the adoption and internalization of a securitized perception pertaining to (im)migrants. Although Turkey is at the very beginning of its journey to the European Union, early signs of a transformation of perceptions along the lines of securitization discourse are becoming visible, especially at the level of security bureaucrats.

In December 2005, an international symposium on migration was organized by the Municipality of Zeytinburnu in Istanbul. On the first day of this three-day conference, the then Minister of Internal Affairs, Abdülkadir Aksu, delivered a speech where he indicated that migratory movements had brought forth crimes including terrorism; drug, arms and human smuggling; human trafficking and organized crime.[77] Moreover, he stated that migratory movements had negative impact on the stability and development of regions and countries. Perception of migration as a destabilizing factor is one of the essential components of the securitization discourse. In addition to that, discerning migration as a source for crimes such as trafficking, smuggling and terrorism renders migrants as potential criminals. This paves the way for their stigmatization in their host society.

In December 2006, the Turkish weekly magazine *Tempo* published an interview conducted with the Chief Officer of Narcotics at the Security Directorate of Istanbul.[78] In that interview the Chief discusses various issues including drug use among youngsters; drug dealers and the police operations conducted against them. He also states that some of the dealers captured in the operations were Africans. However, he continues by telling the reporter how uncomfortable he feels whenever he comes across with an African on the street. This is a very dangerous statement that can be made by a high-level security official as the discourse of securitization is not only reproduced and strengthened but also normalized in the eyes of the public. As Huysmans rightly argues, security bureaucrats are the producers of information and

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[77] "Göç, güvenlik konseptini değiştirdi (Migration changed the concept of security)," *Zaman*, December 9, 2005.

[78] "Uyuşturucu sorununu çözmek bir ütopyadır (Solving the problem of drugs is a utopia)," *Tempo*, no. 50, December 14, 2006.

knowledge on security.[79] Therefore, when a security official indicates his uneasiness about a certain group of people living in that society, he, intentionally or unintentionally, may lead to the development of negative feelings and attitudes towards that group.

A recent public utterance of the securitization discourse regarding migrants took place following the death of a Nigerian asylum-seeker Festus Okey, who was killed in a police station on August 20, 2007 in Istanbul. According to the official statement by the Security Directorate of Istanbul, which was made 17 days after the killing, the police stopped Okey and his Burundian friend due to their suspicious behaviors; searched and found drugs on them.[80] They were taken to a police station and placed in different rooms. While under interrogation, Okey tried to grab the gun of a police officer and he was shot as the gun was fired during the struggle. Okey died at the hospital that day. On the other hand, Okey's Burundian friend who was taken under custody with him claims that he first heard screams which were followed by a gun-shot.[81] The public prosecutor initiated an investigation however he is having great difficulty in collecting evidence.[82] There is no camera recording and the shirt worn by Okey, from which the distance of the shooting will be determined, is missing. While the mystery over what happened is still unsolved, the Governor of Istanbul, Muammer Güler, made a tragic statement.[83] After repeating the official statement of the Security Directorate regarding how the incident took place, he continued by claiming that African migrants in Istanbul are involving in various crimes, including selling of drugs. Governor's statement not only portrays African migrants as potential criminals, but also stigmatizes them as an internal threat to the security of the society they are living in.

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[79] Huysmans (2000), pp. 757.

[80] "Emniyetten Festus Okey açıklaması (Explanation from the Security Directorate on Festus Okey case)," *Radikal*, September 9, 2007.

[81] "Ölüm Yeri: Beyoglu Emniyeti (Place of death: Beyoglu police station)," *Radikal*, August 30, 2007.

[82] "Emniyet de Delil Kaybederse (If the Security Directorate loses evidence)," *Radikal*, September 20, 2007.

[83] "Ölen Nijeryalı için Müfettiş Devrede (Public Prosecutor is in charge of the case over the death of the Nigerian), *CNN Turk*, September 7, 2007. See, <http://www.cnnturk.com/TURKIYE/haber_detay.asp?PID=318&haberID=389614>.

These three recent incidents clearly indicate that there is a strong tendency in Turkey for the adoption of a securitized perception with regards to migrants. The adoption of the EU migration policies which strongly urge and oblige Turkey to prevent the inflow of migrants is going hand in hand with the internalization of the security discourse accompanied by the policies. Although migrants are mostly depicted as threats to internal security of the society rather than to cultural unity or economic welfare in Turkey, current situation presents the initial steps of the adoption of the discourse and signals that more will come in the upcoming years.

5. Conclusion

The age of globalization has facilitated the promotion and acceleration of the migratory movements all around the world. The European Union is one of the most desired territories of destination for many migrants coming from various areas, ranging from Africa to the Middle East, Asia to Caucasus. In 1960s, many west European countries which were experiencing an economic boom and labor shortage after the Second World War were welcoming migrants as guest workers, whereas beginning from the 1980s these countries gradually came to perceive migration as a destabilizing factor and a source of potential threat to their internal, cultural, and economic unity.

The establishment of the internal market and the eradication of the internal borders within the European Union resulted in the placing of an increased focus and attention on the control of border movements. In a process started by the Tampere Summit in 1999 and continued until today, the policy proposals and action plans adopted by the European Union were focusing on how to prevent the movement of migrants to the Union. Rules adopted as part of this communautarized policy domain not only binds member states, but also obligates candidate states to transform their migration policies and align to that of the Union. Through the transfer of EU policies, candidate states enhance their abilities to control external borders, develop necessary infrastructure and technological know-how in order to detect fraudulent documents, and sign readmission agreements with migrant sending third countries, before becoming members of the Union. Since these policies are accompanied by a

securitized perception toward migrants, candidate countries also adopt and internalize this perception which portrays immigrants as potential threats to their host society.

In the 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey was finally declared as a candidate country on the way to full membership. As a result, an intense process of harmonization with the rules and regulations of the European Union started. Since the beginning of its candidate status, Turkey has been advised, among many other things, to strengthen its border control, enhance its visa policy, abolish its sticker visa implementation, and sign readmission agreements with migrant sending third countries. Moreover, there are recent signs of a mentality change in state bureaucrats and security officials indicating their adoption of a securitized perception toward immigrants. This is a serious development since it paves the way for the portrayal of migrants as potential threats not only in the eyes of the state officials but also those of the wider republic. Public stigmatization of migrants as a source of danger to their host country places them in grave situations in which their human rights are violated, as the case of Turkey clearly illustrates.

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