

ETHNIC DISADVANTAGE IN THE TRANSITION FROM LOWER TO UPPER SECONDARY EDUCATION IN FRANCE

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Abstract – *This paper explores the factors underlying the differences that exist between immigrants and natives in the selective process at work in the transition from lower to upper secondary school in France. The analysis shows that the academic performance of immigrants and natives is unequal. This imbalance, in addition to the inadequate understanding of how the school system functions and the time passed since arriving in the host country, sufficiently accounts for the initial inter-group variation in grades. After controlling for class and immigration related variables, ethnicity was found to have a minor role in the explanation of educational differentials between immigrants and natives. This contradicts the prominent role given to ethnic ascription by the most recent theorising on differentials in status attainment between immigrants and natives.*

Introduction

1mmigrants' disadvantage in education is a well-documented phenomenon in advanced democracies. Immigrants show lower rates of academic performance in comparison to natives (Marks, 2005). They also have high dropout rates and rarely pursue higher types of education (Portes & MacLeod, 1996; Driesen & Geert, 2000). The specialised literature depicts ethnicity, altogether with class, as a significant ascriptive source of educational disadvantage.

France is not an exception (Vallet & Caille, 1996). This is not a minor problem because the proportion of French-born citizens and residents sharing a foreign origin had reached 13.5 million by the end of the last decade (i.e., between one-fifth and one-fourth of the whole French population) (Tribalat, 2004). Over the last forty years, France has moreover consistently increased its net rate of social mobility (Vallet, 1999). In fact, as a consequence of several educational reforms, recent research on social mobility has placed France on a par with Sweden and the Netherlands in terms of absolute social mobility rates (Vallet, 2004). The question though is whether these changes have managed to erase the existing gap between immigrants and natives.

The conclusions reached so far by the French empirical literature on immigration and educational attainment are diverse. Some scholars have argued

that, controlling for class, foreign born populations living in France underachieve in comparison to natives (Thélot & Vallet, 1994). In contrast, others have concluded that immigrants are better off than natives (Mondon, 1984). The most comprehensive study in the field by Vallet & Caille (1996) concluded that, controlling for class, the immigrant population did not show any disadvantage. The present article follows this debate and tries to clarify the existing relationship between class and ethnicity. It also seeks to unravel the mechanisms responsible for ethnic differentials in status attainment, since the statistical significance of the ethnic parameters in multivariate analysis is nothing more than a black-box explanation that must be avoided due to its analytical obscurity.

This paper, which explores the educational performance of immigrants in secondary education, focuses in particular on the transition from lower to upper secondary school. I begin the paper by briefly reviewing the literature on class and ethnic differentials in education. I then present an empirical analysis that shows how immigrants and natives differ in the rates of access to non-compulsory secondary education (i.e., upper secondary school). In the next section, the unequal school performance of immigrants and natives is identified as the major factor behind the differences in the school careers at upper secondary level. This realisation leads me to examine then the group differentials in the grades obtained in lower secondary school. The final section explains these differentials through a combination of class mechanisms and a number of constraints linked to immigration, such as the poorer knowledge of how the school system functions and the year of arrival in the host country.

The insights that emerge from the present analysis indicate that there are few traces of ethnic disadvantage. It follows that the emphasis given to ethnicity in many of the recent explanations of the educational underperformance of immigrants needs to be rethought in order to possibly provide simpler and more parsimonious explanations.

Class and ethnic disadvantage: the theoretical references

The American sociology of ethnicity has been the main source of theoretical inspiration for European scholars of ethnic disadvantage. The most recent and prominent theoretical production is strongly inspired by the hindering role of ethnicity (Borjas, 1992, 1995; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Portes & Rumbaut 1996) and the existence of intra-group interactions that constrain individual chances (Borjas, 1995; Portes & Hao, 2005). Most of these theories claim that there is something intrinsic to ethnic membership that shapes individual life chances in the host

country. This would imply a kind of essentialism that marks individuals across ethnic groups.

The broad irruption of sociological explanations based on the concept of social capital (see Portes, 1998) has clearly influenced this line of reasoning. Moreover, it has favoured non-parsimonious explanations which generally assume that differentials between immigrants and natives in status attainment are provoked by ethnic-related causes instead of other factors, such as the unequal distribution of immigrants in the class structure. Contrary to this general trend, this paper argues that the role of ethnicity can only be properly assessed after controlling for both class and immigration related variables. Unfortunately, the literature on ethnic inequalities in status attainment is not in constant dialogue with other branches of sociology that focus on similar dependent variables. Sociologists of ethnic disadvantage must consequently widen their scope to incorporate in more detail the theoretical production and empirical findings of the literature that studies non-ethnic inequalities.

Without any normative implication, a scenario is defined as free of ethnic disadvantage when the educational differentials between immigrants and natives are due to the unequal class stratification of these two groups (and, in its case, by immigration related variables), but not to ethnic factors. This argument is anchored in the finding that the individual stock of human capital is not perfectly portable as part of it is country-specific (Friedberg, 1996). Immigrants may thus need a period of adaptation to overcome this handicap that is linked to the migration process itself (Chiswick, 1988).

FIGURE 1: Possible scenarios that cause educational differentials




Figure 1 presents two different explanations for educational differentials. Let us first describe the scenario where ethnicity does not account for the different level of attainment (i.e., arrow no. 1). In this case, class is the only source of educational differentials. This means that immigrants are stratified according to their class of origin plus a discount factor ∂ ($\partial = 1$ for natives and $\partial \leq 1$ for immigrants). This discount factor introduces the effect of the handicap derived from the status of being immigrant. ∂ is a function of several variables – such as, having been born in the host society or elsewhere and the type of parental couple, whether it is made up of two immigrants or an immigrant and a native (i.e., mixed) (Chiswick & DebBurman, 2004). If class and immigration do not represent a complete account of educational differentials between immigrants and natives, then ethnicity may play a significant role (i.e., arrow no. 2).

Different theoretical frameworks can apply to each of these two scenarios. The literature on class differentials in education identifies a plethora of causal mechanisms, such as material and cultural deprivation and different tastes for education. *Material inequalities* can still be a cause of disadvantage, even in advanced societies where the direct costs of education are null up to upper secondary school. Although the effect of social origins on the transition from primary to secondary education declined as the completion of secondary education became a universal possibility in many countries, the social selectivity of the educational system did not disappear with regard to access to upper secondary education (Raftery & Hout, 1993). For whenever a certain level of education is universal, the class conflict is replicated in the following stage because individuals relentlessly accumulate resources to face further competition (Lucas, 2001).

Cultural inequalities are also frequently cited as a relevant factor in the study of educational disadvantage. Bourdieu argued that the distribution of cultural capital is unequal among classes. This happens because of the different disposition that generates practice in accordance with the structural principles of the social world (*habitus*). These disparities are, at the same time, due to diverging socialisation practices across social groups (Bourdieu, 1974; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). The empirical literature has confirmed that unequal stocks of cultural resources shape educational outcomes (Halsey, Heath & Ridge, 1980; Di Maggio, 1982; De Graaf, 1986; Sullivan, 2001)¹.

The third main block of explanations for the existence of inter-group differentials in education highlights the importance of *preferences for education*. Some authors argue that individuals from more privileged social strata value education more strongly than those coming from deprived contexts (Pearlin, 1971; Willis, 1977; Murphy, 1981, 1990; Gambetta, 1987). In contrast, other scholars support the view that preferences for education are homogeneous across groups,

and that groups differ only in the social distance they have to cover in order to reach similar goals or in their aversion to risk (Boudon, 1974; Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997).

In spite of the pre-eminence in the debate on the heterogeneity of preferences for education across social groups, there is sufficient empirical evidence to reject the hypothesis of immigrants' under-ambition with respect to natives. Immigrant families hold high educational expectations with regard to their children's education (Muller & Kerbow, 1993; Kao & Tienda, 1995; Vallet & Caille, 1996). It is thus rather unlikely that the unequal distribution of preferences for education is responsible for the poorer educational performance of immigrant groups in relation to the native population.

If class of origin and immigration leave any unexplained variation in the educational attainment of these two groups, ethnicity may play a significant role. The literature on ethnic disadvantage has also identified several mechanisms that may account for ethnic differentials in socio-economic status including diverging *cultural predisposition towards effort, discrimination* and broader factors that differentiate collective dynamics. *Culture* is maybe the most well known among them. Following the Weberian logic of the Protestant ethic (see Weber, 1985), some suggest that certain cultural constructs are plagued by absenteeism, tardiness or the rejection of effort, while others hold values that enhance the likelihood of success (Sowell, 1981, 1996; Jelen, 1993).

On the contrary, a number of scholars think that the roots of ethnic disadvantage are situational and that *discrimination* is the key to explaining group differentials (Steinberg, 1981). Discrimination can happen at the school level (Troyna & Carrington, 1990) or at the labour market level if there are different returns to education (Heath & MacMahon, 1998; Betts & Lofstrom, 2000).

More recent theorising on the effect of ethnicity on status attainment tried to overcome the traditional dichotomy between culture and discrimination. This is what Chiswick (1988) does in his *child investment model*, inspired by the widely accepted trade off between quantity and quality of children. In this model, what is specific to ethnic minorities is that fertility control may have a different psychological cost across ethnic boundaries, depending on the religious credo in which the group is embedded. Nonetheless, Chiswick also suggests that the importance of religion may vary from generation to generation. A different argument came from Borjas (1992), who defined the concept of ethnic capital. For Borjas, ethnicity is an externality in the human capital accumulation process which operates through what he calls *ethnic capital*. Ethnic capital refers to the quality of the ethnic environment – the average level of human capital – where the immigrants and the children of immigrants are raised (Borjas 1992). Finally, the celebrated *Ωodes of incorporation* by Portes & Rumbaut (1996) hypothesise that

the way in which first-movers are incorporated into the host society shapes the status attainment of future-comers and second generations. The modes are a function of the immigration policies at work against specific groups and their ability to neutralise it through their social capital.

Data and categories for this study

Research on ethnic minorities is hindered by the lack of datasets that are sufficiently large to make inter-group comparisons. France has a long tradition in the production of datasets for the study of all sorts of inequalities in education. For instance, the recent *Panel d'Élèves du Second Degré* (Panel 95) includes in its recruitment questionnaire (1995) explicit information about the family's migration history and allows a proper study of ethnic disadvantage in education (see Caille, 2003).

The survey sampled 18,730 students entering into lower secondary education – the *collège* – in 1995. The information was collected in several stages. Unfortunately, the sampling design is a source of lost cases. A 'recruitment questionnaire' was filled up with administrative data for each student in 1995. Each year from 1995 to 2000, a questionnaire surveyed the students' school performance. In 1998, a 'family questionnaire' extracted more information about the students' family entourage. Approximately 12,981 completed this questionnaire². In spite of the fact that the survey did not over-sample ethnic minorities, it still provides adequate figures for this study.

TABLE 1: Type of student by immigration category

Immigration Categories	Frequency	Percentage
Children of father and mother born in France (French)	12,672	72.19
First generation/mixed parental couple (first-mixed)	87	0.50
First generation/immigrant parental couple (first-immigrant)	426	2.43
Second generation/mixed parental couple (second-mixed)	2,381	13.56
Second generation/immigrant parental couple (second-immigrant)	1,987	11.32
Total	17,553	100.00

Source: Panel 95

Table 1 identifies five types of students according to their parents and their own country of birth. The French-born type, or natives, are children of a French-born father and mother. First and second generation type immigrants can be from mixed (immigrant + French) or immigrant (immigrant + immigrant) parental couples. The logic behind the inclusion of these categories is fairly common in the specialised literature. Being born in the host country has a potentially beneficial effect because the individual's early socialisation happens already in the receiving context (Borjas, 1992; Chiswick & DebBurman, 2004). For similar reasons, mixed parental couples – which are a well-known context for acculturation and increasing integration and understanding of the functioning of the host society – have an effect on any indicator from religious practise to language proficiency (Tribalat, 1995; Chiswick & DebBurman, 2004).

Ethnicity is defined according to the parental country of birth. The children of mixed parental couples are grouped following the ethnic background of their non-native parent. Table 2 gives the ethnicity of the students sampled in Panel 95. Although in some cases the sub-samples by ethnic origin were small, it was decided to include the maximum number of ethnic groups available in order to have sufficient inter-group variation in terms of cultural background and immigration histories.

TABLE 2: *Ethnic groups (father/mother's country of birth)*

Ethnic Group	Frequency	Percentage
France	12,672	80.19
Algeria	828	5.24
Spain	148	0.94
Northern Europe ³	184	1.16
Indochina ⁴	154	0.97
Italy	124	0.78
Morocco	614	3.89
Portugal	391	2.47
Sub-Saharan Africa ⁵	316	2.00
Tunisia	240	1.52
Turkey	131	0.83
Total	15,802	100.00

Source: Panel 95. There were 1751 immigrants whose ethnic group was not sufficiently numerically relevant to be included in the analysis.

The analysis

Differences in the track chosen in upper secondary school

Secondary schooling in France is divided into two blocks: lower secondary education (i.e., the *collège*: 6th to 3rd year for ages from 11 to 16) is compulsory and universal, but upper secondary education is a track system (i.e., the *lycée*: 2nd to final year). At the end of lower secondary school, a board formed by teachers and inspectors (*class council*) decides which track the student is invited to follow in upper secondary. The decision is made within the so-called *orientation process*. This selective process, which is becoming increasingly more demanding, is the cornerstone of the French school system (Prost, 1992). The orientation process begins when the students' families express their preferred option. The class council makes the final decision in the light of the family's preference and the student's performance in lower secondary school. Although this very rarely happens, in case of disagreement with the final decision, the families can launch an objection, thus opening an administrative process (Masson, 1997). Some French authors have criticised this process for amplifying the effect of family level constraints leading to inequality (Duru-Bellat & Kieffer, 2000; Merle, 2002). In the 1990s, some 89.3% of the children from top-executive classes followed the upper track, compared to only 54.6% from a manual background. Again, while 65.1% of French natives proceeded to the academic track, only 51.7% did so among the immigrant students (Duru-Bellat & Mingat, 1990)⁶. Some sociologists have argued that the family's expectations work as a 'binding information' and this is why students from lower social strata have a greater likelihood of being sent to the vocational option rather than to the more academic one (Duru-Bellat & Mingat, 1985, 1988).

Two different dependent variables were used to study this process: one for the family's preference and another one for the final decision made by the class council. A dummy variable *family-choice* is set to 1 if the first option desired by the family at the beginning of the orientation process is the academic track, and 0 if otherwise. Merle (2002) has argued that the study of the democratisation of access to upper secondary education in France cannot focus on leaving or staying at school after the *collège* period, but has to take into account the different tracks followed as deprived families are more likely to prefer shorter and more applied educational options.

Table 3 introduces stepwise the ethnic (M1) and immigrant (M2) groups to measure group differentials in the likelihood of choosing either of these two tracks with respect to the children of French-born families (*reference category*).

TABLE 3: LOGIT – family's first wish in the orientation process

Family Choice 1: academic 0: vocational	M1	M2	M3	M4
Algerian	-0.7187***	-0.1860	-0.7160	-0.0909
	0.103	0.126	0.129	0.149
Tunisian	-0.6024**	-0.0290	-0.0896	-0.1245
	0.198	0.209	0.210	0.242
Moroccan	-0.6510***	0.0239	-0.0150	0.1647
	0.126	0.151	0.153	0.170
Spanish	-0.4058	-0.0144	-0.0833	-0.1570
	0.224	0.237	0.241	0.276
Portuguese	-0.4248*	0.1705	0.1031	0.3295
	0.172	0.188	0.188	0.201
Italian	-0.1388	0.2176	0.1624	0.2492
	0.253	0.264	0.272	0.256
Northern	0.0961	0.5066*	0.3363	0.0211
	0.192	0.205	0.209	0.234
Indochinese	0.1730	0.8202**	0.7525*	0.4487
	0.224	0.287	0.295	0.315
African	-0.1864	0.3846*	0.3478	0.4691*
	0.179	0.194	0.201	0.227
Turkish	-1.3640***	-0.5793	-0.6885*	-0.2650
(Reference category: French)	0.295	0.311	0.320	0.338
First-immigrant		-0.8838***	-0.8258***	-0.7712***
		0.187	0.191	0.202
Second-immigrant		-0.8499***	-0.7896***	-0.6144***
		0.109	0.111	0.123
First-mixed		-0.5414	-0.4709	-0.4453
		0.305	0.303	0.354
Second-mixed		-0.5226***	-0.2340**	-0.2015*
(Reference category: French)		0.081	0.082	0.090
Log(income)			0.5847***	0.3157***
			0.047	0.051
Level/family- situation				0.1750***
				0.042
Mean-branch				0.3082***
				0.013
Repeats-college				-0.2627***
				0.018
Constant	0.3507***	0.4027***	-0.1011*	-5.7062***
	0.023	0.024	0.047	0.132
N	9465	9465	9465	9465
R ²	0.0691	0.0149	0.0277	0.1898
χ ²	108.55***	175.44***	318.01***	161.70***

SE & SE

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

The column marked M3 introduces information about the household income. Indeed, families may differ in their willingness to make economic sacrifices for their children's education (Hauser, 1993; Kane 1994). The value of the variable *income* is set to 1 when the respondent to the 'family questionnaire' thinks that the resources available at the household level are 'very insufficient' for the student to continue his studies for as long as he wants (it is set to 2 if considered 'insufficient', to 3 if 'sufficient', and to 4 if 'perfectly sufficient'). Given the non-linear effect of this variable, it is introduced in its logarithmic form.

Finally, the column marked M4 introduces a complete set of academic-performance controls. The literature has shown that the student's subjective perception about the probability of succeeding is a determinant factor in the educational choices decided within families (Morgan, 1998; Breen, 1999). The variable *level-family-estimation* is the family's estimation about the student's performance⁷. To correct for any information deficiency about the student's performance, the model also controls for the mean grade obtained in the examinations that take place at the end of lower secondary school (i.e., the *brevet des collèges*). The *mean-brevet* ranges from 0 to 20, and the number of years that the student has repeated in lower secondary education (i.e., *repeats-collège*) ranges from 0 to 6.

The first model (M1) reveals a strong pattern of ethnic disadvantage. The Algerian, Moroccan, Portuguese, Tunisian and Turkish groups are significantly less likely to wish their offspring to follow the academic track. Also, most of the non-significant ethnic groups hold negative signs (African, Italian and Spanish) – the Indochinese and the Northern groups are the only two exceptions. Nevertheless, the second model (M2) shows that this predominance of negative signs is mostly due to different migration experiences rather than to ethnic membership. Students coming from non-mixed parental couples are the most likely to be sent to the vocational track. The second generation immigrant students from mixed parental couples are also significantly more likely to do so, but this effect is clearly smaller in size. The third model (M3) shows that these differences are not clearly explained by the different economic resources that each household devotes to education. Although the sign obtained for $\log(\text{income})$ is the predicted one, the third column demonstrates its scant effect on the immigration categories, which remain highly significant.

The last column (M4) shows that after controlling for the student's school performance, the Africans (positive correlation) are the only ethnic group to present any significant difference with respect to the native population. Again, students coming from exclusively immigrant parental couples remain significantly less likely to follow the academic track. Thus, contrary to what the cultural literature on ethnic constraints suggests⁸, the present results provide no empirical grounds for arguing that ethnic groups differ in their preferences for education. In any case, the differences that remain significant after controlling for academic merit are mostly an immigration effect, but not an ethnic one⁹.

The weaker students may drop out before reaching the end of lower secondary education. If this is the case, the above models can suffer from an endogenous selection bias. For that reason, these models were re-run using bi-probit estimation in STATA 8.2. This is an application of the well-known Heckman's selection models. This technique is able to correct for potential biases derived from a

TABLE 4: LOGIT – final choice in the selection process at the end of the lower secondary school

Family Choice I: academic 0: vocational	M1	M2	M3	M4
Algerian	-0.4342*** 0.107	-0.0234 0.129	0.2940 0.174	0.2173 0.291
Tunisian	-0.2814 0.209	0.1633 0.223	0.3405 0.323	0.3222 0.331
Moroccan	-0.4894*** 0.127	-0.0412 0.151	0.4306* 0.200	0.3839 0.250
Spanish	0.0579 0.260	0.3554 0.273	0.4438 0.335	0.5197 0.395
Portuguese	-0.4693** 0.172	0.0034 0.189	0.2382 0.230	0.1852 0.283
Italian	-0.1088 0.266	0.3575 0.280	0.0698 0.315	0.1086 0.410
Northern	0.6535* 0.258	0.9358*** 0.272	0.1382 0.310	-0.0691 0.316
Indochinese	0.1910 0.304	0.6952* 0.315	0.2655 0.379	0.0484 0.471
African	-0.3044 0.182	0.1398 0.193	0.3743 0.244	0.1555 0.520
Turkish	-1.4456***	-0.8400**	-0.5971	-0.7729
(Reference category: French)	0.758	0.273	-0.375	0.415
First-immigrant		-0.6640***	-0.3304	0.2312
		0.174	0.215	0.263
Second-immigrant		-0.6595***	-0.1680	0.2742
		0.108	0.144	0.173
First-mixed		-0.1709	0.4394	0.6477
		0.375	0.397	0.541
Second-mixed		-0.2298***	0.0170	0.1904
(Reference category: French)		0.088	0.134	0.134
3franc-brevet			0.8009***	0.7930***
			0.020	0.023
Repeats-college			-0.1663***	-0.0256
			0.020	0.023
Family-choice				3.4082***
				0.097
Constant	0.9049 0.025	1.0367 0.027	-7.4514 0.212	-8.2043*** 0.154
N	9827	9827	9827	9827
R ²	0.0071	0.0108	0.3937	0.5542
χ ²	77.14***	119.09***	2048.50***	2554.00***

β & SE

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

deficient measurement in the dependent variables, such a dropouts. It improves the estimation by enlarging the sample with those cases where the dependent variable is lost. But no changes were detected with respect to sign and statistical significance¹⁰.

We now examine the school board's final decision. The dummy variable *final-choice* is set to 1 when the final decision taken by the class council is the academic option, and 0 if otherwise. The same protocol as in the previous analysis was followed. Thus, after first introducing ethnic membership, the immigrant status

variables were introduced. Following this, the model included two measures of successful school outcomes: the number of times any course was repeated in lower secondary school (the *repeats-collège* ranging from 0 to 6) and the grades obtained in the general examinations taken in the 3rd year (the *mean-brevet* ranging from 0 to 20). Finally, the family's preferred option expressed at the beginning of the process was introduced in order to test if this preference has a determinant effect on the board's decision, thus reinforcing the constraints placed at the household level.

The results shown in Table 4 are somewhat similar to those in Table 3. The first model (M1) shows a clear pattern of ethnic disadvantage: the vast majority of the groups hold negative signs, even if only the Algerian, Moroccan, Portuguese and Turkish coefficients are significantly negative. These negative signs disappear, however, after controlling for the dummies for the immigration categories (M2). In fact, with the only exception of the Turkish, all groups become either non-significant or significantly positive. Although the larger disadvantage exists among the students coming from non-mixed parental couples, *second-mixed* is also a moderate source of disadvantage. Not surprisingly, after controlling for the student's previous academic performance (M3), there is no unexplained variance among ethnic and immigrant groups. The Moroccan coefficient is now significantly positive. As can be seen the ethnic and immigration disadvantage disappears without making further reference to any additional factor.


The fourth model (M4) shows that the track which any native or immigrant student will follow in upper secondary school is simply a function of his performance in the *brevet* examinations and his family's wishes (which depend in turn on the family's impression about his or her academic success)¹¹. The graph in Figure 2 shows the determinant effect of the family's first choice on the final decision made by the class council¹².

As this graph shows, the probability of following the academic track is higher than that of being sent to the vocational one when the grades obtained in the *brevet* examinations reach the value of seven for the families that expressed the preference for the academic track, while it is over twelve for those that preferred vocational education. This gap of five points shows how the family's preferences work as a shaping element of the final school decision.

These models were also re-estimated using bi-probit selection models. Again, no changes were detected with respect to sign and statistical significance¹³.

In sum, school results (i.e., grades) are the main reason for the unequal distribution of immigrant and native students in the academic-vocational tracks in upper secondary school. This confirms the findings of previous studies of high school choices arguing that pre-high school academic performance is a key variable determining future educational paths (Zietz & Joshi, 2005).

FIGURE 2: The effect of school performance on the probability of following the academic track across family's preferences



Source: M4 in Table 4. The remaining independent variables and controls are set equal to the mean value given in the sample included in the models.

Consequently, the crucial question is why immigrants obtain lower grades in secondary school.

Differences in school performance: grades in French language

At the beginning of lower secondary school, the students undergo a number of evaluation examinations in order to make the teachers aware of possible deficiencies and particular needs that should be addressed before entering upper secondary school. The study of grades is normally done using the registers from mathematics and language¹⁴. Panel 95 collected information on the grades obtained in examinations in both subjects at several points in time¹⁵. This paper only includes the results of the analysis for French language¹⁶. The grades in French ranged from 0 to 78.

Table 5 presents the results of a number of linear regression analyses. While column M1 includes ethnic groups, column M2 controls for the immigration dummies. The third model (M3) controls for a number of class related factors. For the sake of analytical clarity, class was not operationalised using any of the standard class schemes that are built from the head of the household's occupation.

Instead, it was decided to use some of its most widely accepted proxies in the field of class differentials in education.

Income, *accommodation*, *siblings* and *mother-works* capture the constraining effect of material-economic-disadvantage on educational attainment.

- *Log(income)* corresponds to the variable already presented in the previous section. Recall that *income* is only the respondent's view about the sufficiency of the economic resources available at household level for the student to continue studying for as long as he or she wants to (variable values are set from 1 to 4, with 1 representing 'not sufficient' and 4 representing 'perfectly sufficient'). As such, this variable is appropriate for the analysis of the family's preferences in upper secondary school. But a finer approach is required for the study of school attainment, because the mechanisms in place could be less evident. For this reason another control corrects for any bias, such as, unequal family willingness of affording the material costs of education across groups.
- *Accommodation* measures the respondent's satisfaction with the family residence (variable values are set from 1 to 4, with 1 representing 'not at all satisfied' and 4 representing 'very satisfied'). In order to control for the possible bias linked to the different availability of space in rural and urban areas, it was decided to introduce *town-size* which registers the population in the family's area of residence. *Town-size* ranges from 0 (rural area of less than 5000 inhabitants) to 7 (cities with less than two million inhabitants); the value assigned to Greater Paris is 8.

In order to control for the beneficial effects of cultural resources existing at the household level, the 'parental level of education' and the 'consumption of highbrow activities' was included. The concept of cultural capital has traditionally been operationalised in many different ways because of the obscurity of Bourdieu's work (Jenkins, 1989). An effort was made to capture the effect of the elusive concept of cultural capital by the combination of two variables.

- *Father's education* introduces the highest diploma obtained by the father¹⁷. Although taking the father's education as a proxy for cultural capital maybe is not the finest option, it is a common practise in the literature (Halsey, Heath & Ridge, 1980)¹⁸.
- Another way of thinking of cultural capital is by attendance at highbrow cultural activities (De Graaf, 1986). *Art-activities* is a dummy variable that is

TABLE 5: OLS – grades in French in the evaluation examinations (i)

French Examination (0 – 78)	M1	M2	M3
Algerian	-2.7018***	0.2411	1.2148
	0.630	0.776	0.686
Tunisian	-2.8955*	0.3664	-0.2456
	1.410	1.419	1.262
Moroccan	-5.7210***	-1.6295	0.5656
	0.729	0.890	0.814
Spanish	-2.6688*	-0.8230	-0.3419
	1.196	1.310	1.143
Portuguese	-2.5411***	0.8581	1.5912
	0.730	0.903	0.859
Italian	-2.4706	-1.3333	-1.0762
	1.508	1.597	1.341
Northern	2.5310*	3.8194***	1.5639
	0.990	1.147	1.039
Indochinese	1.0530	5.0669***	5.3050***
	1.213	1.317	1.171
African	-3.8113**	-0.6081	-0.6226
	1.193	1.213	1.096
Turkish	-10.9289***	-5.5523**	-2.8658
(Reference category: French)	1.842	1.941	1.903
First-immigrant		-6.1417***	-4.1569***
		1.235	1.104
Second-immigrant		-5.4135***	-1.7724**
		0.684	0.625
First-mixed		1.7206	1.1541
		2.097	1.677
Second-mixed		-0.7320	-0.7436
(Reference category: French)		0.538	0.479
Log(income)			2.0303***
			0.244
Father's education			1.8624***
			0.070
Town-size			-0.0671
			0.038
Accommodation			0.4516**
			0.164
Art-activities			2.6245***
			0.213
Siblings			-0.8621***
			0.109
Sex			4.0457***
			0.201
Constant	47.7109***	47.8522***	36.0362***
	0.119	0.122	0.756
N	9848	9848	9848
R ²	0.0184	0.0291	0.2094
F	14.87***	16.79***	108.12***

β & SE

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

given value 1 if the student has attended any of these activities: conservatories, school of music and dancing, youth cultural associations and courses of artistic disciplines in 1998. The survey did not include information about parental attendance at this type of activities. It was assumed that the correlation between the children's attendance at these activities and the parents' cultural capital is likely to be strong.

Finally, the student was assigned value 1 if female and value 0 if male. This *sex* distinction was based on the understanding that women tend to show higher educational results than men (see Tizard et al., 1988; Entwisle, Alexander & Olson, 1994).

The column M1 signals the existence of a significant degree of ethnic disadvantage: the results of Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, Italians, Turks, Portuguese and Black Africans in French are significantly worse than those of native students. For the Spanish the sign is also significantly negative, but it is close to the consensual level of statistical significance. As before, the subsequent models try to provide an explanation for this finding.

The second model (M2) shows how this initial disadvantage is absorbed by the variables that measure the immigration characteristics. The size of the ethnic parameters decreases enormously and many of them become not significant. Only the Turks remain significantly negative, while the Indochinese and the Northern European immigrants present positive and significant coefficients. As for the immigration categories, again those students coming from immigrant + immigrant parental couples suffer greater disadvantage, especially for first generation ones. Second generation immigrant students from mixed parental couples also obtain lower grades in French than the children of French-born families, but this effect is not significant. Finally, the third model (M3) shows that stratification effects absorb part of the immigration effect. After controlling for class factors, none of the ethnic statistically significant coefficients present negative signs. This indicates that the underperformance of the pupils from immigrant origin is mostly due to their unequal stratification across social strata, and a number of constraints derived from the migration process. Ethnicity does not seem to have a major negative impact. On the contrary, the only group that presents a significant difference with respect to the native population are the Indochinese, whose sign is positive. This is probably due to the very particular nature of the Indochinese fluxes that arrived in France¹⁹.

With respect to the class independent variables, all the initial hypotheses are confirmed here. Both material and cultural disadvantages appear statistically linked to poorer school performance²⁰. The results obtained in the last model (M3)

in Table 5 also reject the importance of ethnicity in explaining grades differentials between ethnic and native groups. After controlling for this set of class variables, only the Indochinese coefficient remains significant.

Some could argue that ethnicity is only relevant when in combination with low socio-economic profiles or depending on the family structure (Chiswick, 1988). Nevertheless, Appendix A includes an expanded version of this model that tried to find interaction effects with some of the class variables (*father's education, income, number of siblings* and *sex* – see Table A.3). None of these interactions were significant²¹.

The unequal distribution of information about the educational system

The results so far have shown how the ethnic disadvantage in education is mostly reducible to disadvantage resulting from the immigration process itself. Therefore, the roots of the statistical effect identified as ethnic disadvantage are not ethnic-group specific, but common to all immigrant students and their families. Socio-economic disadvantage is able to account for the largest share of the ethnic and immigration categories. However, the reasons why first and second generation immigrants from non-mixed parental couples obtain lower grades than the natives is still unexplained.

The hypothesis being put forward here is that immigrants, in comparison to natives, lack the appropriate information about the functioning of the educational system. This means an extra source of disadvantage that will increase the value of the discount factor (θ) mentioned at the beginning of this paper. To test this hypothesis, an index consisting of three indicators that measure the information that parents have about the educational system was constructed. The value given to the variable *information* ranges from 0 (i.e., the family scores 0 in all three indicators) to 3 (i.e., the family scores 1 in all three indicators). This index was created using data about school choice behaviour and parents-teachers relations²². These two variables have specific importance given the particularities of the French educational system, especially in secondary education. The three indicators of the index were:

- **School choice behaviour** is a good proxy for parental information about the school system. Freedom of school choice is thought to increase class inequalities in education because more advantaged families profit from their greater knowledge of the school system to place their offspring in better positions (Coleman, Schiller & Scheneider, 1993). In France, the debate about the normative desirability of the recognition of the right to choose any school was central during the 1980s and the 1990s (Ballion, 1986). Nowadays this

right is widely recognised. One of its main consequences has been the existence of a rating of school desirability leading to schools ranging along a continuum depending on their attributes²³. School prestige is highly appreciated by higher education institutions. Notions about school prestige concern not only academic success, but also the type of individuals attending the institution (Felouzis, 2003). A higher score was given in the index to those families that sent their child to schools for academic reasons, namely, its prestige, the general academic level and the socio-economic profile of its public²⁴.

- The existence of an adequate **parents-teachers relation** is central for the conformation of realistic family's wishes about the children's education, which is in turn of key importance in the so-called *orientation process* at the end of lower secondary school. The information index is higher for those students whose parents met teachers at least once in 1998 – the only available register in Panel 95.
- It is obvious that **parental involvement in the class council** may lead to better information about the school system in general and the selective process at the end of lower secondary education in particular. Although, over time, huge efforts have been made to simplify this selective process, it remains obscure to many students and their families (Masson, 1997).

It is not being suggested here that school choice and parents-teachers relations directly affect attainment through mechanisms such as school effects. The point is simply that these imply a more sophisticated level of information about the educational system that allows parents to channel their offspring towards the more realistic tracks according to their academic outcomes in lower secondary school²⁵.

Finally, one more control was added to the information argument due to the specific handicaps that first generation immigrants face. These are related to the problematic transferability of human capital which have already been mentioned. This seems to have a particularly important effect on educational attainment (Chiswick & DebBurman, 2004). This addition will obviously also increase the value of ∂ for first generation immigrant students. The variable *student-arrival* registers the student's year of arrival in France. Logically, the hypothesis behind this variable is that the closer this date is to 1995 (when the student began his or her lower secondary education), the worse the student's school performance is likely to be. The results are given in Table 6.

TABLE 6: OLS – grades in French in the evaluation examinations (ii)

French Examination (0 – 78)	M1	M2
First-immigrant	-3.7456*** 1.105	2.5557 3.500
Second-immigrant	-1.0116* 0.463	-0.7341 0.462
First-mixed	1.8357 1.600	2.0154 2.273
Second-mixed	-0.1200	-0.0375
(Reference category: French)	0.320	0.318
log(income)	2.0041*** 0.245	1.7795*** 0.244
Father's education	1.8545*** 0.070	1.7541*** 0.070
Town-size	-0.0643 0.038	-0.0734 0.038
Accommodation	0.4520** 0.165	0.3450* 0.165
Art-activities	2.5192*** 0.216	2.3437*** 0.215
Siblings	-0.8253*** 0.107	-0.7953*** 0.105
Sex	3.9659*** 0.203	3.8969*** 0.202
Information		1.7163*** 0.154
Student-arrival		0.0034 0.430
Student-arrival x first-immigrant		-1.7844+ ² 1.104
Constant	36.1159*** 0.760	34.3942*** 0.768
N	9578	9578
R ²	0.2019	0.2130
F	192.90***	162.17***

β & SE

+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

As can be seen in the second model (M2), the introduction of the information argument and the passage of time since the student's arrival eliminate significant differences between the students from immigrant parental couples and natives. The time since arrival effect is only significant when it is interacted with the first-immigrant coefficient (although, in this case, its level of significance is only $p < .10$). Thus, the mixed type parental couples cancels the handicap linked to

recent arrival in the host country. After controlling for all these variables, none of the immigration categories remains significant.

Conclusions

This paper, which explored the existing relationships between class, immigration and ethnicity, has proved the correctness of a non-ethnic approach to the study of the educational differentials of immigrants and natives. Few traces of ethnic disadvantage were detected. As the empirical evidence provided here indicates, after controlling for immigration related variables, ethnicity, if anything, has a positive effect. Most of what can be identified with an 'ethnic effect' is actually linked to the status of being an immigrant – a source of disadvantage that operates across ethnic borders. Within the group of immigrant students, those coming from mixed parental couples are clearly better off. The effect of being born in the host country or abroad is also a key factor, although less important than the type of parental couple.

Controlling for the perceived degree of academic success (i.e., school results), the immigrant families are slightly more prone to prefer the vocational track than the natives. But this is an immigration effect, not an ethnic one. Ethnicity does not have an impact in these processes. In any case, there were no statistically significant differences across ethnic or immigration categories in the track that a student is invited to follow as a result of the selective process that takes place at the end of lower secondary school. The initial differences in access to the academic or the vocational tracks in upper secondary school are simply a function of the academic performance in the lower secondary school. This is true for both natives and immigrants.

A statistically significant gap separates the school performance of students across ethnic minorities. This is mostly absorbed by the immigration status categories. Following that, class related mechanisms explain most of the unexplained variance. Two further elements account for the remaining negative effect of the immigrant students coming from non-mixed types of parental families. First, the impact that migration represents for young first-movers requires the passage of time in order to reach the natives' level of academic performance. The second element, which is specific to first movers, is that immigrant families have a deficient knowledge of the educational system. This mechanism is not immigration-specific. It operates equally for immigrants and for French-born families, but it affects immigrant families in a bigger proportion. This is why the students coming from immigrant + immigrant types of parental couples are more disadvantaged.

To conclude, the role of ethnicity in the explanation of the educational disadvantage of immigrants is at best modest. In no case could ethnicity be understood as a constraining factor. On the contrary, most of the times it was non-significant or positive. The mechanisms producing what is frequently known as *ethnic disadvantage* are not really an ethnic effect. This is due to the combination of immigration related mechanisms – including a lack of country specific knowledge – and the unequal stratification of immigrants across class segments. Thus, the recent proliferation of theories focusing on the essential role of ethnicity on educational attainment should be revised. Theoretical work in this field of research needs to look for more straightforward and parsimonious explanations.

Notes

1. Although some authors have argued that cultural capital is a construct that is culturally biased in its definition in favour of natives (Driesen & Geert, 2001), its inclusion in the study of the educational performance of immigrants and ethnic minorities seems very appropriate (Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 1996).
2. As the answer rate decreased dramatically in the second part of the ‘family questionnaire’, Panel 95 includes appropriate weights (POND1 and POND2) to avoid this loss of cases (Caille, 2003).
3. That is, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Austria, Liechtenstein, Belgium, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Monaco.
4. The former territory of Indochina was a French colony. After the French defeat in Dien Bien Phu, this territory was split into three different independent states (i.e., Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia).
5. That is, Liberia, The Gambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zaire, Ecuadorian Guinea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Ivory Coast, Benin, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Lion, Sudan, Chad, Togo, The Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Mauricio Island, Swaziland, Bissau Guinea, Mozambique, Saint Tome and Prince, Angola, Cape Verde, Comoros, Seychelles Islands and Djibouti.
6. But some scholars have also argued that immigrants and ethnic minorities are more often orientated towards the academic track than natives (Vallet & Caille, 1996; Felouzis, 2003).
7. The correlation between this variable and the mean score obtained in the *brevet* examinations (which takes place at the end of lower secondary school) is over 0.65. This proves the quality of this variable. In any case, with or without the inclusion of the *mean-brevet*, the results shown in Table 3 do not change. The fact that the *mean-brevet* and the *level-family-estimation* is not bigger proves that there are information problems existing among certain type of families. The correlation for the immigrant families is, for example, 0.4126.
8. Table A.1 in Appendix A shows that there are no significant interaction effects with the ethnic groups and the income variable. This rejects the possibility that ethnic constraints exist only in the lower social strata, but not in the privileged ones. Interactions were also tried with the family’s estimated level of student’s success to see if certain ethnic groups are more risk averse than others. This possibility was also rejected.
9. This effect disappears after controlling for parental time of residence in France. This is not presented here because it does not contradict the argument made in this paper. These results are available upon request. The results are also robust after controlling for parental education.

10. These models are available upon request.
11. Note that the pseudo- R^2 rises by some 15 percentage points when the mean score in the *brevet* examinations and the number of repeated years are introduced in the model specification. After that, when the family's choice is included, it rises to 56% of explained variance.
12. Again, Table A.2 in Appendix A rejects the existence of significant interactions between the ethnic membership and the family's expressed option. This means that no ethnic group's environment is especially supportive of the less academic options.
13. These models are available upon request.
14. While mathematics is more informative about the student's cognitive abilities, language is more graphic for general cultural background (Dronkers & Robert, 2003).
15. The one in mathematics is the mean of the scores in algebra, numeration and decimal numeration, numeric problems and geometry. The one in French language includes the results of reading comprehension, text production and expression and code knowledge.
16. The results obtained in mathematics simply confirmed the conclusions drawn from the analysis that are presented in this paper. The author decided to use the grades obtained at the beginning of lower secondary school instead of the results of the *brevet* examinations because the frequencies are higher for these initial tests than for the *brevet*. Further analysis showed that the rate of progress throughout lower secondary school is not different between immigrants and natives (these models are available upon request).
17. The values given were: 1 – no education; 2 – primary; 3 – *brevet des collèges* (lower secondary school); 4 – vocational upper secondary (CAP/CAPA and BEP/BEPA); 5 – general and technological (BAC); 6 – university (1st, 2nd and 3rd cycles).
18. Given that educational homogamy is common in the dataset (correlation between father's and mother's education is 0.6), and in order to avoid multi-collinearity problems, only the father's education is introduced in the models.
19. The fluxes of Cambodian, Laotian and Vietnamese immigrants present a very qualified profile with few of them coming from rural backgrounds (Tribalat, 1995).
20. Bear in mind that these results are stable after controlling for a number of ethnic specific variables such as the language spoken with children, ethnic capital (Borjas, 1992) and the different operationalisations for the first-movers modes of incorporation (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). None of these variables had a significant effect. No results were detected among the set of variables included in the models shown in this paper.
21. There are three exceptions to this statement. First, the interaction between the Portuguese coefficient and the level of father's education is significantly negative. This result contradicts the common wisdom in the French specialised literature on ethnicity that tends to present the Portuguese as a group that benefits from its positive ethnic background, most of the times in contradiction with the Algerians for whom the ethnic environment is thought to have negative effects (see Tribalat, 1995). The second exception comes from the African group and its interaction with the number of siblings, for whom the interactive parameter is positive, meaning that the Africans brought up in bigger families obtain better school results. This finding contradicts the widely negative effect of larger family sizes. Finally, in the model where sex is the interacted variable, the Portuguese girls seem to be better off than the boys. None of these significant effects seem to be in agreement with the predictions of the cultural literature on the constraining effect of ethnicity.
22. Some could argue that these variables capture the effect of parental involvement in education. This index was built taking six different variables of parental involvement: (i) frequency of talks about life in class; (ii) frequency of talks about academic and professional future; (iii) help with homework; (iv) parents-teachers relations; (v) involvement in the class council; and (vi) reasons for school choice. A principal component analysis indicated that these variables belong to two different dimensions. The first dimension – that is, involvement at the school level – linked

- parents-teachers relations, involvement in the class council and school choice. The other three variables belong to a different dimension, which corresponds to parental involvement in education in the most intimate sphere. The results of these analyses are available upon request.
23. These attributes can be ascriptive (e.g., tradition, area, and range of study options) or signs of academic success (e.g., number of students that repeated grades and selection into upper secondary school).
 24. Out of all the possible reasons for choosing a school included in Panel 95, these three dimensions appear to be reducible to a single dimension. The results of the principal component analysis that proves this are available upon request.
 25. For example, with respect to school choice, Ballion (1986) points out that the bad or good reputation of certain schools is, with some exceptions, an imaginary representation based on rumours and partial impressions. With respect to the effect of meeting teachers, the link with information can be more evident. This is particularly important in lower secondary school because of the obscurity and complexity of the orientation process (Masson, 1997).

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APPENDIX A

Interaction Effects: Ethnic Parameters

TABLE A.1: LOGIT – family choice

Family Choice I: academic II: vocational	Interaction with Income	Level
First-immigrant	-0.7848***	-0.3566***
	0.201	0.202
Second-immigrant	-0.6243***	-0.9171***
	0.123	0.122
First-ethnic	-0.4996	-0.4309
	0.346	0.341
Second-ethnic	-0.1867*	-0.2028*
	0.091	0.090
(Reference category: French)		
Algerian	0.4486	0.3968
	0.326	0.449
Tunisian	-0.2677	0.4462
	0.387	0.832
Moroccan	0.4774	0.3485
	0.369	0.349
Spanish	0.4874	0.2428
	0.738	1.100
Portuguese	0.1881	0.1501
	0.579	0.781
Italian	0.8217	-0.7903
	0.706	1.176
Northern	0.7361	0.3996
	0.689	0.757
Indochinese	0.986	0.8687
	0.912	1.149
African	1.4587*	1.2264
	0.382	0.803
Turkish	0.9759	-0.4333
(Reference category: French)	1.049	1.130
Log(income)	0.3690***	0.3138***
	0.855	0.851
Level-ethnic-estimation	0.3766***	0.1849***
	0.942	0.944
Minor-ethnic	-0.3081***	-0.1682***
	0.915	0.913
Region-ethnic	-0.2631***	-0.2829***
	0.818	0.919
Interaction with *Algerian	-0.2289	-0.2542
	0.925	0.161
*Tunisian	0.8557	-0.2994
	0.230	0.296
*Moroccan	-0.1141	-0.081
	0.135	0.189
*Spanish	-0.2146	-0.1802
	0.291	0.412
*Portuguese	-0.0226	0.0688
	0.201	0.290
*Italian	-0.2318	0.3801
	0.268	0.451
*Indochinese	-0.052	-0.2142
	0.318	0.274
*Northern	-0.0787	-0.2093
	0.221	0.290
*African	-0.1849	0.0236
	0.205	0.386
*Turkish	-0.3348	-0.1939
	0.368	0.393
Constant	-1.189	-3.3595
	0.134	0.138
N	9485	9483
R ²	0.1802	0.1908
χ ²	1632.87***	1611.76***

β & SE

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

TABLE A.2: LOGIT – final choice

Final Choice 1: academic 0: vocational	Interaction with Family's Choice
First-immigrant	0.1754
	0.578
Second-immigrant	0.5579
	0.252
First-mixed	0.6142
	0.834
Second-mixed	0.1250
(Reference category: French)	0.178
Algerian	0.4907
	0.306
Tunisian	-0.5368
	0.722
Moroccan	0.5011
	0.574
Spanish	-0.0422
	1.084
Portuguese	-0.6840
	0.665
Italian	0.2761
	0.603
Northern	-0.3317
	0.479
Indochinese	-1.1885
	1.209
African	0.2214
	0.552
Turkish	0.2982
(Reference category: French)	0.864
Final-choice	4.0556***
	0.120
Miso-Arrest	0.8176***
	0.031
Repeat-college	0.1311***
	0.039
Interaction with *Algerian	-0.6136
	0.459
*Tunisian	0.7035
	1.146
*Moroccan	-1.0535
	0.625
*Spanish	0.1152
	1.463
*Italian	-0.8296
	1.223
*Indochinese	0.6311
	1.437
*African	-1.3051
	0.754
*Turkish	-1.4765
	1.062
*Portuguese	0.0557
	0.997
Constant	-10.0482***
	0.354
N	9378
R ²	0.6469
χ ²	1950.17***

β & SE

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

TABLE A.3: OLS – school performance: grades in French

French Examination (0 – 70)	Interaction with ...			
	Income	Siblings	Education	Sex
First-immigrant	-0.0469***	-0.1708***	-0.1765***	-0.1928***
	1.097	1.107	1.089	1.103
Second-immigrant	-1.8023***	-1.8516**	-0.8470**	-1.7933**
	0.675	0.637	0.631	0.625
First-mixed	1.0331	1.5231	1.1997	1.1429
	1.709	1.703	1.689	1.689
Second-mixed	-0.7529	-0.7057	-0.7169	-0.7138
(Reference category: French)	0.480	0.484	0.482	0.480
Algerian	2.2498	3.5090	1.3248	1.6993
	1.689	1.212	1.311	0.886
Tunisian	-4.4576	2.1645	-4.0591	-0.2140
	3.555	2.568	2.477	1.897
Moroccan	1.0840	-0.9290	0.7440	0.6572
	1.857	1.623	1.355	0.984
Spanish	3.1093	-0.7942	1.7475	-2.8584
	2.969	3.586	2.388	1.578
Portuguese	1.8935	2.3800	6.3403***	1.6911
	2.436	1.798	1.551	-1.075
Italian	2.5842	1.5009	-3.5217	-2.8023
	2.820	2.631	3.237	2.273
Northern	3.4980	-1.5457	4.3046	1.1743
	3.167	2.499	3.820	1.526
Indochinese	4.0792	4.6800*	8.7504***	5.7676***
	3.393	2.070	2.414	1.636
African	-1.3871	-5.6936*	-1.9450	-1.2308
	3.113	1.575	2.287	1.816
Turkish	2.9267	-5.3286	0.7303	-2.9355
(Reference category: French)	4.090	4.256	3.292	2.461
Log(home)	2.1946***	2.0035***	2.0068***	-2.0284***
	0.258	0.285	0.244	0.244
Parent's education	1.8593***	1.8670***	1.8879***	1.8629***
	0.070	0.071	0.076	0.070
Town size	-0.0665	-0.0673	-0.0652	-0.0661
	0.408	0.038	0.038	0.038
Acquaintance	0.4563**	0.4608**	0.4432**	0.4485**
	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164
Are-arrivals	2.8102***	2.6350***	2.6215***	2.6999***
	0.215	0.213	0.213	0.213
Siblings	-0.8691***	-0.9409***	-0.8521***	-0.8608***
	0.109	0.111	0.101	0.109
Sex	4.0480***	4.0439***	4.0582***	4.0291***
	0.201	0.200	0.201	0.215
Interaction with *Turkish	-2.2506	0.6458	-1.8442	0.1674
	1.506	0.880	1.367	3.585
*African	0.4546	0.8235***	0.3692	1.1968
	1.110	0.309	0.305	2.041
*Northern	-0.6723	-0.0184	1.2685	2.0849
	1.008	0.830	0.765	2.655
*Indochinese	0.5066	1.2311	-0.5847	0.8178
	1.137	0.885	0.755	1.815
*Italian	-1.4423	2.2095	-1.9376	-1.3481
	1.026	0.656	0.528	2.213
*Portuguese	-0.1052	-0.3281	-1.9049***	-0.1712
	0.835	0.615	0.479	1.485
Spanish	-1.4702	0.1712	-0.6516	4.6567
	1.165	1.348	0.588	2.052
*Tunisian	1.6465	-0.7964	1.0688	-0.0459
	0.118	0.725	0.649	2.361
*Moroccan	-0.2084	0.3927	-0.0464	-0.1725
	0.648	0.387	0.348	1.310
*Algerian	-0.4095	0.8066	-0.0883	-0.9223
	0.264	0.323	0.284	1.066
Constant	35.9865	36.1848	35.0070	36.0787
	0.759	0.764	0.762	0.758
N	9848	9848	9848	9848
R ²	0.2102	0.2109	0.2118	0.2098
F	33.83***	34.69***	34.17***	33.5601

B & SE

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$