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LINKS BETWEEN THE THREE MAIN DIVISIONS

GENEALOGY AND CHRONOLOGY

IN OUR previous articles* we analysed the whole of Genesis after dividing it into three major parts, i.e., Patriarchal History 12-36, the kernel and the most important part of the whole work; Primordial History 1-11, introducing the history of the Patriarchs; and thirdly the History of Joseph 37-50 which accounts for the initial stages in the fulfilment of God's promise to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.

Our analytical enquiry into the subject-matter of the work resulted in the discovery of various traditional strands which were merged into one to form our actual Genesis: two lines were disentangled in 1-11; three in 12-36; (three or) two in 37-50, seven threads in all. It remains now to study the relations between the several lines in one section and those in the others. Are they the same strands running throughout the whole work, or simply scattered bits of oral or written documents collected into one book by some compiler?

The clues for the solution of this problem are found in the chronological data and the genealogies scattered throughout Genesis. We start to study the genealogies and chronology of the book, dividing this chapter into two sections dealing with them respectively, without any reference to the division of Genesis established above.

Section I - GENEALOGIES

Genealogy in the first chapter of Genesis is a prominent feature and serves as a connection between Abraham and Adam. Besides these

*Melita Theologica Vol. XI, pp. 1-13; Vol. XII, pp. 14-27; Vol. XIII, pp. 62-74. This series of articles consists of extracts from the Rev. Father C. Sant's thesis for his doctorate in Theology *The Literary Structure of the Book of Genesis*. Hence in this article and the next, which constitute the conclusion of the whole thesis, one finds references to parts which have not been published.

genealogical series we meet others in the rest of the work. Therefore we intend to study the features of these genealogies one by one to see if they could be classified into various groups so that each would form a complete genealogical series extending from Adam right up to Jacob's descendants. If such an enquiry leads to any concrete result, the step will be to enquire into the relations between these genealogical groups and the threads disentangled in the foregoing chapters. If it happens that the single sets of Genealogies correspond each to one of the above traditions and are coextensive with them, then we would have a confirmatory strong argument for our analysis.

In Genesis there are these sets of Genealogies: (1) 4, 1-2; (2) 4, 16-26; (3) 5, 1-32; (4) 6, 9-10; (5) 10, 1-32; (6) 11, 10-27; (7) 22, 20-24; (8) 25, 1-4; (9) 25, 12-17. 19-20; (10) 30, 1-24; (11) 35, 22-29; (12) 36, 1-29. 40-43; (13) 46, 8-27. An examination of the contents of these blocks would show that some of them are simply duplicates of one another; others differ from one another not in their contents but in the way they present names and in their point of view; others consist in a bare list of names and dates. The former are introduced for the sake of the narratives themselves, whereas the latter's writers are interested chiefly in blood relation and lineal descent.

Examination of the several genealogical series.

(1) 4, 1-2. Eve conceived and bore Cain and Abel. It serves as an introduction to the story of Cain and Abel.


(2) 4, 16b-26. Cain's wife bore Enoch and so in this vein as far as Lamech. Historical information is profusely added to some of the names with the aim of accounting for the rise of city life and the discovery of trades. In v.v. 25-26 'Adam knew his wife again and she bore a son Seth', to whom Enos was born. The etymological explanation of some of the names is given.

(3) 5, 1-32. This, as it has been remarked above, consists of a series of stereotyped formulae: 'And A lived X years and begot B and A lived after he begot B for Y years and begot sons and daughters and all the days of A were Z years and he died'. The generations of Seth and Enoch except for their stylistic differences are a repetition of 4, 25-26. Dates and ages are carefully recorded and the series is introduced by the clause 'These are the generations (נַחֲשָׁתַיִם) of Adam ...'. Historical annotation is totally lacking and women are not mentioned.

(4) 6, 9-10, 'These are the generations of Noah', (cfr. 5, 1) is followed

by the list of Noah's three sons: Shem, Ham and Japheth without any reference to the mother. It is the introduction of the protagonist of the flood.

(5) 10, 1-32. This is the table of nations. The clause 'and these are the generations of the sons of Noah' is the inscription for the genealogical table of the posterity of Noah's sons Shem, Ham and Japheth. As we have already noted above (cfr. ch 7) this block has strong evidence of repetition and additional material to the basic scheme, hence we exclude v.v. 8-19, 24-30 from the original or rather underlying line. The characteristics of the latter in sharp contrast to those of the former are: a bare list of names without any historical reference, and the monotonous, though effective, repetition of fixed formulae: 'These are the sons of X after their families, after their tongues, in their lands and after their nations' which occurs three times; a conclusion to the single branches of Japheth, Ham and Shem respectively. These conclusions may be represented in a tabular form.



(6) 11, 10-27. A genealogical series extending from Shem to Abraham follows the introductory clause: These are the generations of Shem. It consists of a series of formulae with changed names and data as in the third genealogy. The emphasis is laid only on lineal descent and their ages. No woman is mentioned.

(7) 22, 20-24. This genealogy seems to be out of place here, unless it might be considered as a preparation to chapter 24 where the same data are given and the betrothal of Isaac and Rebeka are fully recorded. This section has nothing to do either with the sacrifice of Isaac, which precedes it or with the death and burial of Sarah, that follows in Ch.43.

Note the emphasis laid down on the role of women on equal footing with their husbands and the accentuation of their part in the generation of children.

(8) 25, 1-4. Ch.25 opens with a short note on Abraham's late wife Keturah. These verses seem to be added later. In ch.24 Abraham is represented as nearing his death and one may conjecture also, as we shall see later on, that the elder servant of his house, went to fetch a wife for Isaac after and not before Abraham's death (cfr. 24, 3ff); hence it was practically impossible for Abraham to marry Keturah after the nuptials of Isaac who was born when Abraham was already hundred years of age (21,5). Abraham married Keturah much before. This short Genealogy is distinguished for its emphasis on the mother.

(9) 25, 12-17. 19. The wording 'And these are the generations of Ismael' is the title of the genealogical table of Ismael's posterity. Here Hagar is introduced only to draw a distinction between Ismael and Isaac, the son of the promise. The rest is a methodical well-ordered list of names welded together by repetitive clauses or phrases, e.g. 'and these are their names, by their villages, and by their encampments' which reechoes other genealogical tables (cfr. 10, 1ff.) The generations of Isaac, Ismael's half brother, are brought in with v. 19 together with a concise note relative to his age and marriage already recorded in ch.24.


(10) 30, 1-23b. Strictly speaking, here the writer is not concerned with the genealogy as such, but simply with the story of the petty domestic jealousies of Rachel and Leah. Through their childish quarrels in which Jacob is embroiled, the twelve sons of Israel were born. The predominance of women, whose pliable instrument Jacob was, is the outstanding feature of this episode. The writer is interested in the etymological explanation of the names of the new-born babes but careless about chronological data.

(11) 35, 22-29. This is a note on Jacob's sons, repeating what has been already accounted for in 30, 1ff., whose wealth of anecdotal information is totally lacking here. It is only a bare list of names mentioning the wives only in so far as they afford a clue for the classification of the patriarch's sons. Reuben is the first born 'of Jacob' not 'of Leah', Benjamin is born in Mesopotamia, not in Canaan 35, 18. In vv. 28, 29 the writer gives us the sum total of Isaac's years when he died.


(12) 36, 1-30. 40-43. This genealogical list is subdivided into six sections; vv. 38-39 dealing with the Edomite kings. Some of these subsections repeat the same names recorded in others, but all of them have

an introductory formula separating them from one another. These formulae mark the beginning of each branch; 'And these are the generations of Esau' (v.1); 'And these are the generations of Esau the father of the Edomites of mount Seir' (v.9); 'these are the dukes of the sons of Esau' (v.15); 'these are the sons of Seir the Horite, the inhabitants of the land' (v.20); 'these are dukes of the sons of Esau' (v.40). Basing ourselves on this subdivision we have this representation:


(a) These are the generations of Esau (v.1).




(b) And these are the generations of Esau the father of the Edomites (v.9).



(c) These are the dukes of the sons of Esau (v.15).



(d) These are the sons of Seir the Horite (v.20).



(e) These are the dukes that came of the Horites (v.29). Lotan - Shobal - Zibeon - Anah - Dishon - Ezer - Dishan.



(f) And these are the names of the dukes that came of Esau (v.40). Timnah - Alvan - Jetheth - Oholibamah - Elah - Pinon - Kenaz - Teman - Mibzar - Magdiel - Iran.

Tables A.B.C.F. have several names in common referring to the same persons; so also D and E of the Horite. All this points to the merging into one of several sources. Notwithstanding, however, the possible use of different pre-existent documents, the compiler succeeded in giving a uniform style and order to the whole section. It is a bare enumeration of the names of the progenitors of various clans living in Canaan. VV. 6-8 account for the peaceful separation of Esau and Jacob, which is difficult to reconcile with the one in Chapters 27 and 23; hence this genealogy cannot belong to tradition A or B in Patriarchal history. VV. 31-39 show the signs of a later addition in its reference to the Jewish monarchy in these words: 'And these are the kings that reigned in the land of Edom, *before there reigned any king over the children of Israel*'.¹ One may say that the primitive part consists of vv. 9-15; its introduction resembles others in other sections.

(13) 46, 8-27. Before giving an account of Jacob's Flight in Egypt the compiler enumerates in a genealogical list the names of all the immigrants with the patriarchs. This list, however, in its actual context presents several perplexities pointing to later touching. In its actual state, it is neither a complete list of Jacob's descendants because it excludes Er and Onan, nor an Enumeration of the immigrants into Egypt for it includes Jacob and his sons. The problem is further complicated when the LXX is compared with the MT, or when one works out the computation of numbers vv. 26-27. The original computation v. 15, v. 18-21 ($70 = 33 + 16 + 14 + 7$) including Er and Onan, but excluding Dinah and Jacob. The secondary figure 66 ($= 32 + 16 + 11 + 7$) excludes Er and Onan and Joseph and his two sons, but includes Dinah. To make up the original 70 it was necessary to reckon not only the family of Joseph (3) but Jacob himself. (Skinner, p. 495). In this list of the sons of Jacob entering the land of the Pharaohs, Er and Onan are embraced, whereas in reality they died in Canaan. Throughout the whole narrative Benjamin is represented as the youngest son of Jacob, that is, not more than 24 years of age, for Joseph was 30 years; is it possible then for him to have given birth to ten children? Lastly, how can the inclusion of Ephraim and Manasseh be explained if they had been already there?² We may conclude with Hummelauer: 'Quibus luce clarius demonstratum habes textum LXX aliqua exhibere nomina textui sacro de industria addita. Quodsi in textu LXX concedi id impune possit imo necessario debet

¹ Cfr. F. DE HUMMELAUER, l.c., p. 39.

² For further details cfr. F. DE HUMMELAUER, l.c.; SKINNER, l.c.; DRIVER, l.c.



nulla s. textus reverentia prohibemur, quominus in textu etiam hebraeo recepto similes additiones et fieri potuisse et fortasse factus esse adstruamus'. Notwithstanding this handling of the text, the form and spirit of the basic document have been kept: a bare list of men's names and some women's, who are given a secondary importance.

At this point one may add the genealogical narrative in 38 about Judah and Tamar. The interest of the whole story centres on the foundation of the Judahite tribe; again here as in many other genealogies the woman plays an important part. This is the pedigree resulting from an analysis of the story:

Shua's daughter - JUDAH - TAMAR

Er	Onan	Shelah	Phares	Zerah
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Through this brief survey one can see that not all these genealogical tables are drawn out on the same principles; nor do they betray the same characteristics. Some of them are simply lists of names with ages and dates added to them, couched in fixed formulae with rhythmic regularity; others play a subsidiary part in a larger narrative context, with no dates at all, and no fixed formulae. Taking these criteria as a basis for classification, we have these groups:

GROUP 1	3	4	5 (basic line)	6	9	11	12	13
GROUP 2	1	2	5(sec. parts)	7	8	10		

With respect to genealogy no. 5, which has been analysed into two lines, one secondary, the other primary, the former belongs to group 2, the latter to group 1.

These independent groups may be presented in parallel columns each to form a single genealogy running throughout Genesis.

A careful examination of these two genealogical tables would lead to the obvious conclusion that in Genesis two systems of genealogy are found: the first is complete, without any gaps, without any interest save that of showing the blood relationship of the main personalities of the drama that is being unfolded before us; the other one is fragmentary in character and is only a part of the narrative of the rise of civilization for which it serves only as a source of information. Both of them run throughout the whole work and at times they criss-cross one another. It is noteworthy, however, that series no. 1 grows more voluminous the

more it nears the end of the work: it extends from Adam to sons of Jacob, excluding always the collateral branches, keeping only in view the chosen people of God, who were to be the ancestors of the Hebrew theocratic nation; series 2 does not betray such an interest, it has a more universal appeal, and in fact it includes several names without any importance whatsoever except as founders of clans and tribes that were the neighbours of the Hebrews, or had some ethnic relation with them.

In the above sections Genesis was analysed into eight documents (oral or written), in which these two genealogies are embedded; therefore one may conclude that these lists are affording us a criterion to classify these eight documents into, at least, two groups. Obviously, it may be presumed that all the sections embedding the same genealogical line belong to the same source. Generally speaking genealogy no. 1, consisting of eight parts, clings to tradition 'C' and C of Primordial History 1-11 and of Patriarchal History in 12-36 respectively; it extends also to Joseph's history in 46, 8 ff. Part one (3) 5, 1-32 which we separated from its preceding context is the introduction to the whole line. It is continued in 6, 9-10 (4), the introduction to the deluge story according to line 'C' of primitive history, and recaptured in 10, 1-32 (5), to which other accretions of source 'A' cling. This thread reappears in 11, 10-27 (6) to connect Abraham with the patriarchs of old. At this point the genealogy stops to give place to the new narrative of the call of Abraham by God into Canaan. Genealogy 9 (25, 12-19) follows immediately the recording of Abraham's death, which explains the place of Israel's list of descendants before the history of Isaac is picked up. Therefore this list and its context have a common source. Genealogy no. 11 (35, 22-29) gives a concise list of Jacob's sons in Paddam-Aram (sic), to be followed immediately by the report of Isaac's death. Obviously, now the interest would shift on his sons: Therefore the writer inserts here the enumeration of Esau's posterity gen. 12 (36, 1-40) before starting to account for the history of Jacob's sons; and so the field is clear for Joseph's narrative. The list reappears in 46, 8 (gen. 13). We have already noted that this table cannot belong to the original threads R and J of this section. It may belong to the source of those sections which have been termed 'the third element'. In confirmation of this outline one may add: genealogy 9 with its context 25, 7-11 is intimately connected with ch. 23 of tradition C with its reference to Machpelah, Ephron, Zohar the Hittite, and the burial of Sarah; genealogy 11

with its name Paddan-Aram links with the promise in 28, 1 ff., assigned to C; genealogy 12 is but the sequel to and the continuation of genealogy 11. It is noteworthy that in this list there is no reference to the enmities between Ismael and Isaac ('and Isaac and Ismael his sons buried him in the cave of Machpelah' 25, 9) or Jacob and Esau ('... and went into a land away from his brother Jacob. For their substance was too great for them to dwell together' 36, 6, 7.)

The second series belongs to tradition 'A' and A in Primordial and in Patriarchal History respectively. The genealogical sections pertaining to genealogies 1-11 have already been examined; it remains to account for genealogies 7, 8, and 10. Genealogy 7 has nothing to do with Isaac's sacrifice, which precedes it, neither with Sarah's death following it; it is separated from the former by 'and it came to pass after these things' (22, 20) and from the latter by 'and the life of Sarah was an hundred and seven and twenty years' (23, 1). But it corresponds with the data in ch. 24, assigned to A, to which thread this genealogy is therefore attached. Genealogy 8 follows immediately the nuptials of Isaac with Rebekah. Its connection with its context is not so clear except for its reference to Isaac as the son of the promise in contrast of the son of Abraham's concubines, that were not heirs to the promise. Genealogy 10, or rather the history of the birth of Jacob's sons in Mesopotamia form part of a section identified with A. As we noted above it is very difficult to disentangle and trace any complete strand in this section and our conclusions with respect to it have only a provisional character. Yet since this genealogy compared with the others, manifests common features with them and since the latter have been connected with tradition A, there is a likelihood that the context of this birth-story belongs to A.

To sum up, tradition 'A' of Primordial History (1, 11) is linked with tradition A of Patriarchal History; tradition 'C' is the beginning of C in 11-36. It remains now to find a link between these threads and those in Joseph's history through an enquiry in the chronological data in Genesis.

C. SANT

THE UNIVERSE, DIVINE PROVIDENCE-AND-SIN RELATIONSHIP IN ST. THOMAS

THE problem of evil has so far been treated by several theologians and philosophers in an attempt to define better the 'raison d'être' of a phenomenon whose occurrence defies in many respects man's own intelligence. Strange to say, even those holding beliefs different from the catholic doctrine seem to come closer to the catholic standpoint in their explanations of this thorny problem. JOHN JAMES, a protestant, for example, has of late treated this subject with great competence, and by following a strict exegetical method of Old and New Testament texts has been able to arrive to the same conclusions of catholic thinkers. So too, C.S. LEWIS, although his approach to the problem is quite different from that of the former, comes more or less to the same conclusion: namely that one cannot give a mathematical solution, but only approve of God's behaviour in either permitting moral evil or willing *per accidens* material evil on certain occasions.¹

So too, St Thomas treating the same problem on more or less the same lines of his master St Augustine, arrives at a justification of divine providence on all occasions. Certainly there is a lot that one must add to such a simple statement. He does not merely content himself to assert that – to use Prof. FLICK's words² – man should not discuss God's plan, but accept it in humble resignation. With philosophy at his disposal, St Thomas in his *Quest. Disp. DE MALO* treats of evil *ex professo* and shows its nature, especially by proving *negatively* that evil in itself is nothing; it does not exist in itself, cannot therefore be a cause of anything else; and *positively* that it is the lack of a perfection proper to a substance to which it is bound to appertain. This plotinian positive aspect of evil is of paramount importance and in a sense a sort of 'open sesame' in the hands of St. Thomas while discussing the problem in all

¹ JOHN JAMES – *Why Evil? – A Biblical Approach* (Penguin Books, Middlesex 1960).

C.S. LEWIS – *The Problem of Evil* (Fontana Bk. edit.).

² M. FLICK S.J. – *Teologia della Croce* in *Gregorianum* 37(1956)5: 'L'atteggiamento fondamentale di fronte agli interrogativi che abbiamo posto deve essere quello che Dio reclama da Giobbe una umile accettazione delle vie di Dio, che da noi non devono essere discusse, ma percorse.'

its vastness with a special relation to the Order of the Universe.³

Indeed, this is perhaps the main merit of the Angelic Doctor: the context of the problem for him is not only restricted to that of one specific and singular individual or society. His treatment is more complex because he tries to read God's will by seeing its various repercussions and effects on the whole of the Universe.

We shall also follow his same method and try to look for the reasons of divine providence, controlling and directing moral and physical evils in the actual created order, in which (according to St Thomas in his Comm. on the I Bk of the Sentences, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, c.) all beings are joined together because of a certain interdependence, and because of their ultimate reference to God. Hence every activity and every relationship in this world of created beings plays its role in the constitution of this universe, for everything that takes place promotes the good of the whole universe, and whatever is to be found in this universe bears a relation to the good of the whole. The scope of the good of the entire universe, however, does not lie within the universe itself but ultimately is referred to God, since creatures are only in a sense a certain reflection of divine goodness, which, in human beings, is attained to and participated by acts of intellect and will.

'The entire universe – says St Thomas – is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists of its parts. Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing, secondly; that less honourable parts exist for the more honourable, as the senses for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and thirdly, that all the parts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form, since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore, the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the fruition of God. So also in the parts of the universe every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the less noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire Universe. Furthermore the entire Universe, with all its

³ Cfr. PLOTINUS, III *Enneads*, I Treatise on Providence: τὸ κακὸν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ αγαθοῦ. St Basil has also the same diction Στέρομοις (privation) γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν P.G. 31, 341. The way both express themselves is negative in form but positive in meaning, since evil is bearing a relation to perfection or good, of which it is a privation.

parts, is ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have in some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain to Him by their operations, by knowing and loving Him'.⁴

From this quotation it follows that evil also in some way belongs to the Universe, as we shall explain below, not only in its physical aspect, but also in the moral one: namely, so that goodness and all the degrees of perfection may be fulfilled. The general principle of St Thomas in this matter is that the 'bonum indeficiens' demands also another that is 'deficiens', which in its defectibility concurs to the good of other beings, in turn defectible. Or more concisely: the decay of one being is the generation of another.

'... the perfection of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things, so that every grade of goodness be realised. Now, one grade of goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness, and this grade is to be found in existence itself; for some things there are which cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible.

As therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings; so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely in the fact that a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is found in things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an evil'.⁵

GENERIC OBSERVATION

In the Commentary on the Sentences, treating of divine Providence, St Thomas makes some remarks to explain the possibility of knowing evil in the Universe, which is under the complete control of God. In a generic way he asserts that God has a knowledge of the *entia indefectibilia* and *defectibilia*, lest anything should fall short of its expectations in the created order; and that in connexion with such defectibility God behaves *as knowing beforehand the defect but not purposely intending it* — although He orders such a defect to a good end. Hence, in this way,

⁴I S. Th. q. 65, a. 2, c.

⁵I S. Th. q. 48, a. 2, c.

the hierarchical order instituted in the manifold variety of beings in creation is saved, such that, to use St Thomas' own words, God has such a providence that if any evil should occur from the defect of any specific nature, it would be ordered to good.⁶

It is evident that such a statement needs enlargement and further explanations, upon which St Thomas has elsewhere dwelt when dealing with the problem whether evil pertains to the perfection of the Universe. We can summarily assert that here St Thomas teaches that evil of itself (*per se*) does not belong to the perfection of the Universe, since it is not one of its constituent parts (*pars constitutiva*); nor can it of itself be the cause of any perfection. Accidentally, however, (*per accidens*) it can pertain to a perfection or goodness when joined to something of itself pertaining to such a perfection or goodness. This something is explained by the notion of *antecedent* and *consequent good* (*bonum antecedens, bonum consequens*), which respectively signify that defectible nature whose absence would detract some degree of perfection from the universe (e.g. the free will of man); and that good whose occasion is in evil (e.g. the patience shown by a martyr in the face of his persecutor).⁷

Of great importance to us in this study is this *bonum consequens*, which is further described by St Thomas by the *law of contrast*, as when the beauty of the good is more vividly brought to the fore by contrasting it with evil; or by the *notion of perfection*, whose material object, however, is something bad or evil — as in the case of persecution. This consequent good is of such a nature as to require to be found either in a subject different from that in which evil exists, or in the same subject but somewhat changed and in other circumstances.

To explain ourselves better.

The patience of the martyr is certainly not in the cruelty of the tyrant. It is not the direct effect of cruelty. So also when humility flows from the heart of a sinner repenting of his fall, repentance is nowhere to be

⁶ I Sent. d. 39, q. 2, a. 2: 'Si autem Deus contulisset huic naturae quod nunquam deficeret, jam non esset haec natura sed alia: et sic non esset utraque natura, in quo universi perfectioni derogaretur. Unde hanc naturam condidit praesciens defectum contingentem, qui est malum naturae; sed non intendens. Sed ita providet ut si malum contingeret ex defectu alicuius naturae, ordinaretur in bonum: sicut videmus quod corruptio unius est generatio alterius'.

⁷ I Sent. d. 46, q. 3, a. 3; IV Sent. d. 17, q. 2, a. 4, ad4; I Sent. d. 46, q. 1, a. 3 & ad2.

I S. Th. q. 49, a. 3, c; q. 48, a. 1, ad4; IV C.G.c. 14; De Potentia q. 3, a. 6, ad3, &c.

found in the act of sinning, but follows from sin as a *conditio sine qua non*. This is in fact St Thomas' answer to the second objection of I Sent. (d. 46, q. 1, a. 3), from which he deduces that evil 'per accidens' contributes to the perfection of the Universe.

The complex view of the Universe and the organic treatment of the problem, to which we referred earlier, induce St Thomas quite easily to this way of reasoning. His chief guiding principle on this score is that enunciated in the II Sentences⁸: the good of the Universe surpasses the particular good of every created nature, just as the good of a nation surpasses the good of any individual man. Hence, owing to the complex and reciprocal interdependence of beings, God never suppresses defectible natures, which, in point of fact, fall short of their perfection and bring about moral evil, as, for example, in man. Otherwise, by so doing, God by His Providence would destroy and not safeguard and promote all the possible degrees of perfection.

It is also in this context that a reply to the problem 'why does not God remove absolutely temptation and sin from human nature' is given. The Universe would suffer a substantial change and a great loss, because a certain special perfection would be eliminated: namely, that order to the good accruing from the conversion of a sinner. Besides, the actual balance existing between the various parts of the Universe would be lost by having elevated only one part of it, and thus leaving its place blank with no other being to replace it. After all that nature which is free to sin or not to sin is good — '*haec quidem bona est*' would with noticeable emphasis the Angelic Doctor say.⁹

What leads St Thomas to this strange, but sound philosophico-theological reasoning is not any inability from God's side to erase evil, as in the Manichaeian philosophy, but the idea that God is a wise creator of the Universe who aims not only at caring for the order and relationship of the parts among themselves, but also for their relationship to the

⁸ II Sent. d. 29, q. 1, a. 3, ad4.

⁹ II Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, c: '*Si autem aliqua natura a suo gradu translata in altiore per providentiam mutetur, quamvis aliquod bonum illi naturae excresceret, tamen bonitati universi aliquid detraheretur, dum non omnes gradus bonitatis impleti essent, illo gradu ex quo natura illa translata est, vacuo manente. Dico ergo quod si peccatum omnino impediretur, per hoc multi gradus bonitatis tollerentur; tolleretur enim natura illa quae potest peccare et non peccare, quae quidem bona est; tolleretur etiam hoc quod est de peccato posse resurgere, et multa huiusmodi, quibus ablati, bonitati universi multum detraheretur; et ideo ad providentiam divinam pertinet et hominem tentari permittere et peccare*'.

whole.¹⁰ Hence, having created all these various natures, God does not remove those impediments which do not exceed the capabilities of the same natures, since in His wisdom He already knows that they can be removed and overcome in a very *normal* and *natural way*. On the contrary, removing the possibility by completely suppressing evil, God would be depriving the Universe of a certain degree of perfection and goodness, consisting in the praise which the just merit. So the Universe by Him established would be violated in its various relationships.¹¹

But this part dealing with the nature of evil with respect to Providence is more neatly explained in I Sum. Theol. problems 48 & 49 where the precise notion of *per accidens* is introduced. Already in art. 3 of problem 2, answering the first objection, St Thomas argues against the existence of evil by dragging St Augustine's authority in that, since God is the supreme goodness, he would never permit anything evil in His works, unless He were so powerful and good as to obtain good also from evil.

Hence, in the scale of hierarchical values, this good, inasmuch as ordained from evil justifies God's permitting evil. Indeed, Aristotle had already taught that 'the good of a nation is more divine than that of a single individual' – and St Thomas relying on this argument justifies also the existence of original sin. For by His divine wisdom God still infuses souls in human beings, notwithstanding that they are infected with original sin, since this defect is something smaller than the absence of that defectible human nature and of the very natural order of nature.¹²

DOCTRINE OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

On a closer investigation of the *Summa Theologiae* we immediately

¹⁰ II Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad7, this article bears the title: '*Utrum Deus debuerit permittere hominem tentari et peccare.*'

¹¹ Ibid. '*Ad quantum dicendum, quod non tantum per prohibitionem peccati violentam tolleretur laus, sed etiam naturalis ordo rerum; quod nullo modo providentia divina pateretur.*'

¹² II Sent. d. 32, q. 2, a. 2: '*Si autem humani generis naturalis multiplicatio tolleretur, in defectum totius universi redundaret: quia vel subtraheretur natura aliqua de universo quae ad perfectionem universi confert, vel etiam alicui parti universi sua naturalis perfectio tolleretur, secundum quod unumquodque natum est sibi simile generare, et utrumque in defectum universitatis redundaret; et ideo non debuit intermitteri humanae generationis processus naturalis ut infectio originali vitaretur.*'

become aware of St Thomas' consistency to these principles encountered in the Commentary on the Sentences and of the clear explanations on the same subject.

From the general principle requiring various hierarchical degrees of being in the Universe by means of decay and defectibility, St Thomas comes to consider the turning of evil to a good end by means of Divine Providence, without a consideration of which an adequate explanation is not possible. It is impossible to conceive of the existence of evil and of its presence outside the domain of divine providence. Still one can hardly run away with the idea that God is the direct cause of evil by reason of some imperfection in His acts. The only possible explanation lies in the fact that God's intention is bound on that form which, as an effect, *consequenter* and *per accidens*, implies defect and decay. This form of itself, *per se* and *in se*, is the good of the Universe which requires that defectible nature for its completion. So also this same form calls for the order of justice with regard to human actions by meting out punishment whenever sin is committed. In this case St Thomas would have said that God, as it were, *per accidens* is the author of evil of punishment (*poenae*) and not of sin (*culpae*),¹³ because as we read in the QUAEST. DISP. *De Potentia*, the evil of punishment is contrary to the order of only one part of the Universe in its relationship to another, whilst the evil of sin is against the order of the whole order of nature inasmuch as it is referred to God.¹⁴

Fr. J. WRIGHT S.J. of the Gregorian University, in his doctoral dissertation *The Order of the Universe in the Theology of St Thomas* (P.U.G.

¹³ I S. Th. q. 49, a. 2, c: '... Manifestum est autem quod forma quam principaliter Deus intendit in rebus creatis est bonum ordinis universi. Ordo autem universi requirit, ut supra dictum est, quod quaedam quae deficere possint, et interdum deficiant. Et sic Deus in rebus causando bonum ordinis universi, ex consequenti et quasi per accidens causat corruptiones rerum; secundum illud quod dicitur I Reg. 2, 6: "Dominus mortificat et vivificat". Sed quod dicitur Sap. 1, 3 quod "Deus mortem non fecit", intelligitur quasi per se intentam. Ad ordinem autem universi pertinet ordo iustitiae, qui requirit ut peccatoribus poena inferatur. Et secundum hoc Deus est auctor mali; non autem mali quod est culpa, ratione supra dicta'.

¹⁴ De Pot. q. 6, a. 1, ad8: 'Dicendum quod malum poenae est contra ordinem unius partis universi ad aliam partem, et similiter malum cuiuslibet defectus naturalis; sed malum culpae est contra totius universi ad finem ultimum, eo quod voluntas in qua est malum culpae, ab ipso ultimo fine universi deordinatur per culpam; et ideo huiusmodi mali Deus causa esse non potest; contra hunc enim ordinem agere non potest, licet posset agere contra ordinem primum'.

Rome, 1957) pp.110-111, has pointed out that from Chp.124 of the *Comp. Theol.* this permission of evil involves three things:

- i. the production of a nature or order of things in which defect is possible or even in some way required *per accidens* – to which corresponds the integrity of the Universe requiring corruptible nature;
- ii. the conservation and government of this nature or order in its natural condition – for not to rule things according to their natures would be a greater evil than the individual defects which would be eliminated;
- iii. the non-interference with the actual occurrence of evil: in some cases the good of one thing cannot be achieved without evil happening to something else. The generation of one thing is the corruption of another.

From these various ways in which evil may occur and by God is diverted and ordained to a good of a superior degree, there shines more brightly the wisdom of God and His goodness in governing the world. For even at this point we must needs admit another principle expressed by St Thomas in his commentary on Chp.8 of St Paul's epistle to the Romans: 'whatever takes place in the world, even if it be evil, returns to the good of the Universe'.

But this good is not always accredited to the benefit of the being in which evil occurs or is to be found. On the contrary it always returns to the benefit of the Universe, because the order of the Universe is for itself intended by God, and all its parts contribute to its good, as parts subordinate to the whole. God, therefore, sometimes orders this evil to the good of the sinner, or of another human being, or sometimes directly to the good of the whole Universe. Hence, evil is always ordained by God to contribute to the good of the Universe, and St Thomas should be justified in asserting that all things are in turn ordained to the good of the just, who, in his opinion, form the noblest and most beautiful parts of the same Universe, and seem, in a sense, to be synonymous with its very order, which by God is directly and for itself established and intended. The just and the saints, in fact, enjoy this conspicuous position because of their nearness to absolute and divine goodness and because of their immobility in its fruition. It is for this reason that God never fails to promote the order of the Universe, since divine goodness never wants anything more forcefully than its own similitude. On these same grounds St Thomas proposes a special Providence governing the just on earth, in so far as God never permits anything to happen which He does

not turn to their good and spiritual progress.¹⁵

SIN AND THE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE

But so far we have been too generic and our main concern was to show some of the principles helping St Thomas in his treatment of the problem of evil. Now we turn to discuss 'moral evil', which, according to him, seems to be spread far and wide, *esse in pluribus*, when comparing it with the evil of nature in the process of decay and generation, which seems to affect only a small part of the whole Universe. In point of fact, it is only man who, through his intellectual nature, can try to change the established order of beings when giving preference to the good of the body to the detriment of his good as a rational being.

In I S. Th. q. 49, a. 3, in a somewhat pessimistic vein, we find this passage:

'In solis autem hominibus malum videtur esse ut in pluribus: quia bonum secundum sensum corporis non est bonum inquantum homo, i.e. secundum rationem; plures autem sequuntur sensus quam rationem'.

On account of this assertion J. MARITAIN calls St Thomas 'serenneiment pessimiste', and is quite right.¹⁶ For if we examine human nature we

¹⁵ Rom. 8, lect. 6, prin: 'Non autem semper cedit malum in bonum eius in quo est, quod sicut corruptio unius animalis cedit in bonum universi inquantum per corruptionem unius generatur aliud, non tamen in bonum eius quod corrumpitur: quia bonum universi est a Deo volitum secundum se, et ad ipsum ordinantur omnes partes universi.

Et eadem ratio esse videtur circa ordinem nobilissimarum partium ad alias partes, quia malum aliarum partium ordinatur in bonum nobilissimarum. Sed quicquid fit circa nobilissimas partes, non ordinatur nisi in bonum ipsarum, quia de eis propter se cura habetur, de aliis autem propter ipsas: sicut medicus infirmitatem pedis sustinet, ut curet caput.

Inter omnes autem partes universi excellunt sancti Dei, ad quorum quemlibet pertinet quod dicitur Matth. 25, 23: 'super omnia bona sua constituet eum'. Et ideo quicquid accidit, vel circa ipsos, vel alias res, totum in bonum eorum accidit; ita quod verificetur quod dicitur in Prov. 9, 29: 'Qui stultus est serviet sapienti', quia scilicet etiam mala peccatorum in bonum justorum cedunt. Unde et Deus specialem curam de justis habere dicitur, secundum illud Ps. 33, 16: 'oculi Domini super justos', inquantum scilicet sic de eis Deus curat, quod nihil mali circa eos esse permittit, quod non in eorum bonum vertat'.

Cfr. also I-II S. Th. q. 79, a. 4, ad 1.

¹⁶ Cfr. J. MARITAIN - 'De Bergson à Thomas d'Aquin' (Hartmann, Paris 1947) p. 276: 'Eh bien donc, au point de vue de l'univers de la nature, ou de l'univers oeuvre d'art créateur, il faut dire, selon la conception, plutôt pessimiste à la

find that there are several internal and external agencies alluring it to sin. But this is only one side of the picture. One might perhaps better call it pessimism derived from actual fact. On the other hand we must not neglect the theological optimism of the 'bonum consequens'. Dealing with the plan of Divine Providence, one cannot speak in terms of time, and if God has willed to permit original sin and its transmission, He, by means of one and the same eternal decree, has willed to confer His Grace. Fully aware of both of these facts, St Thomas insists on God's wisdom in maintaining His present order of Providence, since as things actually stand God manifests better His kindness and power by leading corrupt human nature to its ultimate end, notwithstanding the countless hindrances trying to divert its course from it.¹⁷ God, therefore, prefers to save the actual universal order of creation with all its defects, rather than create another which may be more perfect.

Similarly, God wills to permit personal sins in man to whom He, at the same time, never fails to administer the help of His Grace. But why does not God positively in some way or other render sin impossible, to have a simpler solution? — one might logically object.

To this we have a reply in IV C.G. c. 55, by pointing out that God does not want to violate man's free will, and that He regards it a greater good that the company of saints be a union of those enjoying divine life as a consequence of adoring love freely given them than that there be no moral evil. So God does not even remove the occasions of sin from the present order of the Universe, lest it would be imperfect in that common good would be sacrificed for the sake of a particular good.¹⁸

Besides, St Thomas thinks of man in terms of a special Providence in his regard. God governs man in a special way, called explicitly 'secundus Dei effectus', by conferring to him His Grace and pardoning

verité, mais sereinement pessimiste, que Saint Thomas se fait de la nature, il faut dire que l'homme et l'ange sont des parties de l'univers créé, et qu'en tant que parties de cet univers, il est normal, il est dans l'ordre des choses qu'ils soient faillibles, . . .'

¹⁷ I-II S. Th. q. 83, a. 1, ad5: 'Bonum commune praefertur bono singulari. Unde Deus secundum suam sapientiam non praetermittit ordinem rerum qui est ut tali corpori talis anima infundatur, ut vitetur singularis defectio huius animae . . . Melius est autem ei sic esse secundum naturam quam nullo modo esse, praesertim cum possit per gratiam damnationem evadere'.

¹⁸ I S. Th. q. 92, a. 1, ad3: 'Si omnia ex quibus homo sumpsit occasionem peccandi, Deus subtraxisset a mundo, remansisset universum imperfectum. Nec debuit bonum commune tolli, ut vitaretur particulare malum; praesertim cum Deus sit adeo potens, ut quodlibet malum possit ordinare in bonum'.

his sins.¹⁹ This, being in the supernatural order, surpasses the good of the entire Universe, though regarding just one individual man; 'bonum gratiae unius maius est quam bonum naturae totius universi'.²⁰

If man, in turn, does not accept God's grace, his non-corresponding attitude, being already ordained to good by divine Providence, will either be at the service of the sinner's own humility in repentance or directed to his own punishment after adhering more fixedly to sin. To explain how this occurs it is of no small importance to take heed of the hierarchic order followed by Divine Providence in the thomistic system. According to him man renounces to his human dignity in governing other creatures only by thwarting their ends (himself not excluded), and in the case of impenitence he will be bound to enter another order of divine government whereby, he, as a sinner, will be ordained to the good of other creatures much the same way as brute life is intended to the good of man.²¹

For St Thomas there seems to be an analogous way in which God sets right a disorder in inanimate beings and in humankind. Whenever these inanimate beings, driven through sheer necessity, observe the right order of their nature's principles and actions, there follows also through necessity their conservation and respective good. But if they go against this order, their corruption and subsequent evil confer to the good of another being's generation. So also in man. If he follows the dictates of the law imposed on him by the one governing him (ex dispensatione gubernantis), he will be promoting his own good in reward. On the contrary, ignoring or trespassing the order laid down by the law would make him

¹⁹ Comp. Theol. c. 147: 'Hic est igitur secundus Dei effectus, gubernatio rerum, et specialiter creaturarum rationabilium, quibus et gratiam dat et peccata remittit'.

²⁰ I-II S. Th. q. 113, a. 9, ad2.

²¹ De Ver. q. 5, a. 7: 'Si autem (homines) providendo ordinem non servant, quod congruit creaturae rationali, sed provideant secundum modum brutorum animalium, et divina providentia de eis ordinabit secundum ordinem qui brutis competit, ut scil. ea quae in eis vel bona vel mala sunt, non ordinentur in eorum bonum proprium, sed in bonum aliorum, secundum quod in Ps. 48, 13 dicitur: "Homo cum in honore esset non intellexit: comparatus est jumentis insipientibus et factus est similis illis". Ex hoc patet quod altiori modo divina providentia gubernat bonos quam malos; mali enim dum ab uno providentiae ordine exeunt, ut scil. de eis divina voluntatem non faciant, in alium ordinem dilabuntur, ut scil. de eis divina voluntas fiat; sed boni quantum ad utrumque sunt in recto ordine providentiae'.

Cfr. also De Ver. q. 5, a. 6.

guilty of punishment. (Cfr. II C.G. c. 140).

Since, however, as we have already observed, all things concur to promote the good of the just, God while punishing man's sinful activity, reduces evil to a certain order so that the equilibrium of justice is saved between moral evil on the one hand and physical evil of punishment on the other. Evidently, such an evil is purposely induced by God against man's will in order to set right man's wilful transgression of divine law.²² Yet this punishment is willed by God not for its own sake, but to help secure the order of the Universe, clamouring for a restoration by an administration of justice. For 'God — teaches St. Thomas — does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He delights in the order of His justice, which requires them'.²³ This assertion is only a logical conclusion of what he elsewhere in I C.G. c. 96 states about the love with which God holds His creatures: namely, that He loves and wants more some greater good which cannot be brought about without a privation of some smaller good.²⁴

Still, evil in itself does not contribute to the good of the Universe, and so the equilibrium sought by God is not found in the moral-evil-punishment relationship. Rather one must go further and find it in their relationship to the universal order, inasmuch as it is referred to God. This is no gratuitous statement. It is St. Thomas, who, asking whether sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, insists in that sin does, due to the disturbance caused not only in order itself, but in its very principle. 'Consequently, if sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man's will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to be considered in

²² III C.G.c. 140: 'Cum igitur actus humani divinae providentiae subdantur, sicut et res naturales, oportet malum quod accidit in humanis actibus sub ordine alicuius boni concludi. Hoc autem convenientissime fit per hoc quod peccata puniuntur; sic enim sub ordine iustitiae, quae ad aequalitatem reducit, comprehenduntur ea quae debitam quantitatem excedunt. Excedit autem homo debitum suae quantitatis gradum, cum voluntatem suam divinae voluntati praefert, satisfaciendo ei contra ordinationem Dei; quae quidem inaequalitas tollitur dum contra voluntatem suam homo aliquid pari cogitur secundum ordinationem divinam. Oportet igitur quod peccata humana puniantur divinitus, et eadem ratione bona facta remunerationem accipiant'.

²³ I-II S. Th. q. 87, a. 3, ad3.

²⁴ Loc.cit. art. 8 'Deus vult aliquod majus bonum, quod esse non potest sine privatione minoris boni, et sic dicitur odire, cum magis hoc sit amare. Sic enim in quantum vult bonum iustitiae vel ordinis universi, quod esse non potest sine punitione vel corruptione aliorum, diceretur illa odire quorum punitionem vult, vel corruptionem'.

itself irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the principle of this order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity'.²⁵

This way of argumentation is no novelty to thomistic thought, either. It is aligned to the foregoing principles and is also an extension of what in III C.G. c. 140 in a psychological strain he remarks about punishment and reward in their relation to God's wisdom. If man does not want to observe wilfully the order of divine mercy, he will be forced by God to undergo the hardships of divine justice.²⁶ In this way man will be the cause of others in praising God for His justice, for 'neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no injustice'.²⁷

PREDESTINATION AND REPROBATION IN THE UNIVERSAL ORDER

1. So now we come to our last problem: why does God permit some to be eternally damned if earlier we have emphasized God's special providence in regard to rational nature because of its destiny to enjoy God Himself in eternal happiness; and if this last destiny is also the ultimate perfection of the Universe?

Let us note from the outset that the Dominican school has not been alien to the thomistic doctrine of the order of the Universe to furnish a suitable answer to the problem of predestination and reprobation. As late as the 17th century, Fr. Alvarez Didacus O.P. seems to repeat St Thomas' words by admitting that 'if all were indiscriminately saved, the universal good of providence and the perfection of the Universe would suffer a loss therefrom'.²⁸ He does not make use of the trite notion of 'decretum', which when adduced to explain St Thomas has given rise to an unjustified condemnation of thomistic doctrine in this matter as leading to Calvinism.²⁹ But St Thomas' genius is too great to be

²⁵ I-II S. Th. q. 87, a. 3, c.

²⁶ Cfr. supra note 22.

²⁷ S. Th. q. 48, a. 2, ad 3.

²⁸ ALVAREZ DIDACUS O.P. — *De Auxiliis Divinae Gratiae et Humani Arbitrii Viribus* (Rome 1610) lib. 5, disp. 34, p. 261: 'Si omnes universaliter salvantur, impediatur bonum universale providentiae ac perfectio universi, ad quam requiruntur diversi gradus in rebus et quod ex illis quaedam supremum quaedam infimum gradum teneant; impediretur etiam manifestatio justitiae divinae et maior splendor misericordiae eius circa electos, quae bona sunt multo maiora quam salus aliquorum'.

²⁹ Cfr E. TOWERS in *'The Teaching of the Catholic Church'* (Burns Oates, London 1956) p. 610 ff.

judged from what his commentators say or from one single context of his voluminous works. His theology is a systematic whole, such that if one is not well conversant with his genuine and entire principles, one is dismally apt to misinterpret him. For St Thomas, in the classical text on predestination and reprobation in I S. Th., q. 23, a. 5, has these three points of reference:³⁰

i. God has created everything for the sake of His goodness, so that divine goodness may be diversely represented in creatures;

ii. the will of God is absolutely free in communicating itself *ad extra* to other creatures;

iii. the unequal participation of this divine goodness does in no guise spell injustice in ordaining some rather than others to eternal joy, since salvation is in the order of Grace to which man can have no strict claim.

From the first point St Thomas deduces the necessary various grades

³⁰ 'Ad tertium dicendum quod ex ipsa bonitate divina ratio sumi potest praedestinationis aliquorum, et reprobationis aliorum. Sic enim Deus dicitur omnia propter suam bonitatem fecisse, ut in rebus divina bonitas repraesentetur. Necesse est autem quod divina bonitas, quae est in se una et simplex, multiformiter repraesentetur in rebus; propter hoc quod res creatae ad simplicitatem divinam attingere non possunt. Inde est quod ad completionem universi requiruntur diversi gradus rerum, quarum quaedam altum quaedam infimum locum teneant in universo. Et ut multiformitas graduum conservetur in rebus Deus permittit aliqua mala fieri, ne multa bona impediatur...

Sic igitur consideremus totum genus humanum, sicut totam rerum universitatem. Voluit igitur Deus in hominibus, in quantum ad aliquos, quos praedestinat, suam repraesentare bonitatem per modum misericordiae, parcendo; et quantum ad aliquos, quos reprobat, per modum justitiae, puniendo. Et haec est ratio quare Deus quosdam eligit, et quosdam reprobat, Et hanc causam assignat Apostolus, ad Rom. 9, 22-23...

Sed quare hos elegit in gloriam, et illos reprobat, non habet rationem nisi divinam voluntatem. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Joan. quare hunc trahat et illum non trahat, noli velle diiudicare, si non vis errare. Sicut etiam in rebus naturalibus potest assignari ratio cum prima materia sit tota in se uniformis, quare una pars eius est sub forma ignis, et alia sub forma terrae, a Deo in principio condita; ut scilicet sit diversitas specierum in rebus naturalibus. Sed quare haec pars materiae est sub ista forma; et illa sub alia, dependet ex simplici divina voluntate. Sicut ex simplici voluntate artificis dependet, quod ille lapis est in ista parte parietis, et ille in alia; quamvis ratio artis habeat quod aliqui sint in hac, et aliqui sint in illa.

Neque tamen propter hoc est iniquitas apud Deum, si inaequalia non inaequalibus praeparat. Hoc enim esset contra justitiae rationem, si praedestinationis effectus ex debito redderetur, et non daretur ex gratia. In his enim quae ex gratia dantur, potest aliquis pro libito suo dare cui vult, plus vel minus, dummodo nulli subtrahat debitum, absque praeiudicio iustitiae'.

amongst creatures, which being 'actus imperfecti' are needed to represent analogically and as a whole God's simple and infinite goodness. Indeed, God wants to preserve such a vast and graded scale of beings that he permits 'some evils to occur lest much good would be hindered' in the universal order. An application of this principle to the sphere of human activity shows how God wants to manifest His goodness by acts of mercy in the predestined and by acts of justice in the reprobate. From the second principle we gather that emphasis is laid on the total dependence of creatures on their creator: for all creatures are in a state of passivity in respect of God. In some sense they are like the 'materia prima' which is indifferent to receive any form. From the last principle however, it is the intention of St Thomas to inculcate God's justice in communicating itself unequally to creatures, which always share its goodness in a higher or lower degree because of their act of being.

2. To these principles we should add another observation. According to the Angelic Doctor God has a special providence for the predestined to glory, regarding them individually, for the reason that they belong to the nobler part of the Universe. Hence even their definite number is certain for God, without however denying God's knowing the number of the reprobate. In fact in I S. Th. q. 23, a. 7 we read the simile of the builder who (a) first and foremost determines the number of the parts required for the perfection of the whole, and (b) secondly cares for the secondary parts which are necessary only for the sake of the whole.

God, therefore, as an effect of the act of his activity in creating this universe has determined the number of its essential parts which enjoy a certain degree of *perpetuity*. (So, for example, are the spheres, the elements, and the species of beings). Of the other corruptible beings God's intention does not extend itself to their definite number (although He also knows it!), for He has only willed enough of them to come into being as are required for the conservation of their respective species. The principal reason for this is that individual and corruptible beings are not ordained primarily (principaliter) for the good of the universe, but only secondarily in order that the good of their species be saved.

This same simile is applied to rational beings which, being incorruptible, for a certain special reason are ordained to the good of the Universe. Amongst these beings in a more special way are ordained to the good of the Universe those who come up to their ultimate end by attaining to beatitude. God, therefore, behaving like the aforesaid builder in connexion with the nobler parts, not only knows the predestined, but

also has predetermined their number. Of the reprobate, on the contrary, he has predetermined no definite number, since they are 'praeordinati a Deo ad bonum electorum, quibus omnia cooperantur in bonum'.³¹

Predestination, then, may be rightly defined with St Thomas, as an arrangement of things chosen by God in which He knows that certain men will most certainly be saved and others most certainly lost, the salvation of the elect being only desired, the damnation of the lost not directly desired but permitted.³²

3. Even so one might correctly observe that earlier in this study we underlined God's special providence in connexion with human nature in general, and this now seems to have shifted to a special providence only in so far as the predestined are concerned. It is at this point that we reach the climax in the mysterious aspect of the problem of evil, even when referred to the universal order. Fr. J. WRIGHT (op. cit., pp. 172 ff) misses to point out this serious predicament by simply discussing the problem of predestination from two aspects:

i. the Universe does not *per se* require that any one be punished eternally, but *per accidens*, for God foresees the actual sin and impenitence of some and wills the order of justice which requires that these be punished;

ii. God requires of all those to be saved freedom from unrepented mortal sin at the moment of death. Yet due to human selfishness and frailty this freedom can be the consequence of unmerited grace freely given by God.

These reflections are quite true and genuine to St Thomas' teaching, but to treat more adequately this problem and to extricate St Thomas from his seemingly odd position at this juncture, we shall demonstrate that there is no case for contradiction by discussing a genuine thomistic triple aspect of the problem: namely, (1) from the part of rational nature, (2) from the part of evil, and (3) from the part of divine providence-and-universal order relationship.

(1) RATIONAL NATURE

i. It was one of the basic tenets of St. Thomas that beings should be *primarily* treated according to what they are *per se* and not what they are *per accidens*. *Per se*, however, all creatures are good because they represent divine goodness in varying ways and grades of perfection in

³¹I S. Th. q. 23, a. 7, c.

³²I S. Th. q. 23, aa. 1, 2, 3.

the universal order. In man, as a rational being, this participation of divine goodness transcends the very limits of human understanding. But God has wilfully and bountifully made man, as far as his intellectual nature goes, participate in His absolute goodness that he may be able to give praise and glory to Him. This brings about a neat distinction between rational and irrational nature: as an effect, the former is moved by love towards the attainment of its end, whilst the latter, having no reason in itself, has all its activity directed blindly and instinctively towards its specific end by means of laws imposed to its nature by the superior intelligence of its creator.³³

ii. Besides, having received the first gift of divine goodness in its act of being, rational nature, owing to a special way of divine providence, is further moved to its activity by God that it may give this praise and glory to Him. Yet Divine Providence, like divine Grace, *non est destructiva naturae, sed eius salvativa*. It caters for a perfection and an elevation of human nature. Wherefore God, keeping Himself in line with the laws of the same nature as by Him created, does not frustrate its natural activity that good will always and unfailingly ensue, or that it refrain from falling into the evil of sin. Hence God's activity in moving man to the good will be according to the laws of human nature which is *essentially free*: 'ea ergo quorum natura est ut sint liberae voluntatis, dominium suorum actionum habentia, movet libere ad operationes suas'.³⁴

Indeed, this is the efficacy with which divine will governs creatures: that 'not only things are done which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way He wills... Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contin-

³³ Eph. 1, lect. 1, fin.: 'Qualiter autem intelligatur, quod Deus omnia fecit et vult, propter suam bonitatem, sciendum est, quod aliqua operari oportet propter finem, potest intelligi dupliciter. Vel propter finem adipiscendum, sicut infirmus accipit medicinam propter sanitatem, vel propter amorem finis adipiscendi, sicut medicus operatur propter sanitatem alteri communicandam. Deus autem nullo modo exteriori a se bono indiget, secundum illud Ps. 15: "Bonorum meorum non eges". Et ideo cum dicitur quod Deus et facit omnia propter bonitatem suam, non intelligitur quod faciat aliquid propter bonitatem sibi communicandam, sed propter bonitatem in alios diffundendam. Communicatur autem divina bonitas creaturae rationali proprie, ut ipsa rationalis creatura non cognoscat. Et sic omnia quae Deus in creaturis rationalibus facit, creat ad laudem et gloriam suam, secundum illud Is. 43: "Omnes, qui invocant nomen meum, in gloriam meam creavi", ut scilicet cognoscat bonitatem, et cognoscendo laudet eam'.

³⁴ II Cor. 3, lect. 1, fin.

gently'.³⁵ God, therefore, to free human nature – which is a contingent cause – has attached contingent causes to produce contingent effects, so that together with necessary causes on the other side God may give rise to a right ordering of things for the building up of the Universe.³⁶

Still it remains mysterious and obscure to human understanding how God moves rational creatures efficaciously but of their own free will. It is only too evident that St Thomas in the quoted passages is mainly concerned with showing the non-contradictory and possible concurrent activity of God with the nature of created beings, irrespective of their being necessary or contingent causes.

iii. So that it follows that corporeal creatures, considered as to what they are by nature, are good, though this good is not universal, but *partial* and *limited* if compared with the *universal good* of the entire Universe of beings. And precisely because of its possessing a partial good it can be subject to an opposition of contrary qualities, so that what is, in one respect, evil to one person notwithstanding its essential goodness, is beneficial to the same person or to another. Which, as St Thomas concludes, could not be verified if bodies were essentially evil or harmful.³⁷

(2) EVIL

One could here run to great length, but we shall limit our modest investigation to the principle often repeated by St Thomas, viz. that evil *per se* does not operate towards the good or perfection of anything. Hence it is not necessary for the perfection and beauty of the Universe except *accidentally* and *per accidens*.³⁸

But one should not forget that St Thomas is insistent in declaring that God in no way wills sin – not even *per accidens*. Otherwise God would be willing 'per accidens' some good or perfection outside of His own goodness, which is in contradiction with His very nature.³⁹ On the other hand one cannot have evil without the good as its *subiectum inhaesioni*.⁴⁰ So it is fairly easy to understand that God governs and

³⁵ I S. Th. q. 19, a. 8, c.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ I S. Th. q. 65, a. 1, ad2.

³⁸ I S. Th. q. 19, a. 9, ad2: '... dicendum quod malum non operatur ad perfectionem et decorem universi nisi per accidens, ut dictum est. Unde et hoc quod dicit Dionysius, quod malum est ad universi perfectionem conferens, concludit inducendo quasi ad inconveniens'.

³⁹ I S. Th. q. 19, a. 12, c; I Sent. d. 45, a. 4; De Ver. q. 23, a. 3.

⁴⁰ II Sent. d. 34, q. 1, a. 2, c; & ibid. a. 1, c.

ordains the evil of creatures inasmuch as they possess a certain goodness in their act of being. It is in the light of this reasoning that one can safely arrive at a real justification of God's government extending also to the devil and temptation, without falling into a contradiction. In fact St Thomas replying to two objections in I S. Th. q. 109, 1, teaches that:

'Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist without good, so there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature.'

'If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for Himself; but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing, because they abuse their nature for evil.'

(3) DIVINE PROVIDENCE-AND-UNIVERSAL ORDER RELATIONSHIP

i. The good of the Universe is ordained in such a way by God that it does not have its complete fulfilment and perfection only in the internal order of the parts as related to other parts or to the whole. This is indeed required, but not enough. St Thomas acknowledges another superior good to be attained to outside of the very universe. This is God, who, in relation to the Universe and its various parts, is like the general in command of an army. It is the general, we learn in the *De Spirit Creat* c. 8, c, who co-ordinates the particular and individual good of the soldiers and caters for their general welfare by making the particular good lead to the common good of the army and to his own glory. It is likewise God, who, from the reciprocal relationships of creatures amongst themselves and in respect of the whole, establishes for the sake of His own glory the universal order.⁴¹

Here another problem awaits St Thomas, since his belief, as expressed in III C.G.c. 112, is that 'intellectuales substantias propter se a divina providentia ordinari'. A satisfactory solution could logically be found to it only in the light of the former simile. For creatures, rational notwithstanding, are not self-sufficient to the extent of being their own ultimate end. They are further referred to God and to the perfection

⁴¹ *De Spir. Creat.*, loc. cit.: 'Manifestum est enim quod duplex est bonum universi: quoddam separatum, scilicet Deus, qui est sicut dux in exercitu; et quoddam in ipsis rebus, et hoc est ordo partium universi, sicut ordo partium exercitus est bonum exercitus. Unde Apost. dicit Rom. 13, 1: "Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt". Oportet autem quod superiores universi partes magis de bono universi participant, quod est ordo. Perfectius autem participant ordinem ea in quibus est ordo per se, quam ea in quibus est ordo per accidens tantum'.

of the universal order. For this reason Divine Providence is extended to them for their own sake inasmuch as all other creatures are surrendered to them for their use and benefit, provided they are not by them alienated from God and from the perfection of the Universe.⁴²

ii. The essential and existential reference of beings to God, resulting from the creation of the universal order, leads us to consider Him as the consummation and perfection of His work. God, though being of a simple nature, i.e. one and undivided, is manifold in the external manifestation of His attributes, which could not otherwise be sufficiently represented in just one creature or created nature. Hence, just as to manifest His infinite goodness He has called into actual existence innumerable beings – whether rational or irrational – in different grades of being for the completion of the Universe, so also He expresses in a better way His same goodness by administering His mercy and justice. These are the attributes which more specifically regard rational beings, who, by their deeds, bring now one or the other of these simple attributes to relief in reward or punishment. Then, if we consider the whole of the human race as we consider the whole of the Universe, we find sheer logic inducing us to justify St Thomas in saying that:

'God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, in sparing them; in respect of others, whom He reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others'.⁴³

Damnation, therefore, or the eternal punishment of evil-doers, belongs to the universal order by helping to justify the order of justice by which God fulfills another of the Universe's grades of perfection. This grade would otherwise remain vacant, and so lessen some degree from the universal order's perfection and beauty. Here St Thomas is very explicit when he says that 'the order of justice belongs to the order of the Universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault'.⁴⁴ So there is no place for contradiction between

⁴² Per hoc autem quod dicimus substantias intellectuales propter se a divina providentia ordinari, non intelligimus quod ipsa ulterius non referuntur in Deum et ad perfectionem universi. Sic igitur propter se procurari dicuntur et alia propter ipsas, quia bona quae propter divinam providentiam sortiuntur, non eis sunt data propter alterius utilitatem; quae vero aliis dantur, in earum usum ex divina ordinatione cedunt'.

⁴³ I S. Th. q. 23, a. 5, ad3.

⁴⁴ I S. Th. q. 49, a. 2, c.

God's special Providence with regard to man and the exercise of His justice in punishing the wicked.

iii. It is punishment which fundamentally reduces sinful activity to order, by establishing an equality of justice between the moral evil of sin and the physical evil of punishment. It is in no way *per se* the evil of punishment that God wills, but the good of order, which requires this evil.⁴⁵ He finds no pleasure in the suffering as such, but in the order.⁴⁶ For God hates nothing that He has created. But He loves the good of justice and the order of the Universe, as 'aliquid maius bonum', more than the particular good, as a 'minus bonum', of a rebellious creature.⁴⁷ So, since God prefers His justice to the salvation of some individuals, permits some to be damned and reprobated for the completion of the Universe. A more explicit specimen of this doctrine is to be found in I.S. Th. q. 22, a. 2, ad 2, wherein, God, as one whose Providence is universal, allows some little defect to remain, as in the case of reprobation, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. On the contrary, one who has care of a particular thing, being himself a particular provider, excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can.

iv. Finally, the truth and sincerity of God's universal salvific will are to be considered in the actual order of Divine Providence. Hence, given the present order in which some do sin, we necessarily feel that the exercise of divine justice clamours for its execution, because the good of justice by far surpasses the lack of punishment of one single sinner. To this — it seems to us — one must add that the exercise of justice acknowledges in sin only *an occasion and by no means a cause*, since the evil of fault ~~does~~ not form a part of the universe. Therefore it follows ~~that the~~ created universal order would be more perfect without an evil of this sort, since, according to St Thomas, it is of such a kind that *ex se* and *immediate* does not contribute to anything's good, except of a lesser degree. For sin deprives the sinner of divine Grace and Glory and confers to another the *bonum comparationis* or the good by comparison (as for example, in the case of persecution wherein the sin of the tyrant is greater than the good of the martyr, since the tyrant is deprived of Grace and the martyr can attain to beatitude in various other ways).⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ I-II S. Th. q. 87, a. 3, ad 3.

⁴⁷ I C.G.c. 96, arg. 4; fin: 'Alius autem modus est ex hoc quod Deus vult aliquid maius bonum, quod esse non potest sine privatione minoris boni; et sic dicitur odire, cum magis hoc sit amare...' etc. Cfr. (24).

⁴⁸ I Sent. d. 46, q. 1, a. 3, ad 6.

CONCLUSION

Bearing the foregoing exposition in mind, we must be led to admit a fact of utmost importance: God wills a certain order of things which *de facto*, though *per accidens*, requires some to be damned. God foresees the sin and impenitence of some, and simultaneously wills the order of His justice, requiring the punishment of them. It is very hard and dangerous to commit St Thomas to any *ante praevisa merita* predestination, as if God were blind to man's part in working his salvation.⁴⁹ One would be thinking of God in too anthropomorphic and improper terms; — which is certainly not true to St Thomas. It is everywhere as clear as daylight that he attributes the ultimate responsibility and fault — in the case of damnation — to man's final impenitence, which of itself requires a punishment owing to an abuse of his free will.⁵⁰ Indeed, as regards reprobation, to be loved less in no way implies that one is in no way loved — observes Fr. Jean Nicolas O.P.⁵¹ — and the reprobate is in no way excluded from God's love so that he may be damned. God never fails to make His love at the service of all human beings by giving them His Grace, and only those will be deprived of it who wilfully and knowingly close their hearts to His divine inspirations.

We can therefore conclude this study by stressing that the dimensions of the sin-and-Providence relationship in respect of the order of the Universe are vast enough to allow St Thomas to give a satisfactory and praiseworthy attempt at justifying the present order which to the profane is fraught with evil and imperfections. Even in the last part of this study, dealing with predestination and reprobation, one should especially note that the loss of some is not due to God's unwilling to save them, nor to divine grace's inadequacy to free them from sin, but to the wilful indisposition and reluctance of sinners, freely preferring to abstain themselves from corresponding with the summons of love in Divine Grace, and so making amends for their sins.

The only way left open to God so that this disorder is set right will be that of punishment: first by retracting from them His Grace in this world because of their wicked disposition, and then by eternally punish-

⁴⁹ Cfr D'ALES in DAFC vol. 4, col. 230 for his 'Simul cum praevisione meritorum' which might be to a certain extent accepted as more genuinely thomistic.

⁵⁰ Cfr J. LEGRAND, S.J. — 'L'Univers et l'homme dans la philosophie de saint Thomas' (Desclée 1946) vol. II, pp. 179 ff.

⁵¹ J. NICOLAS, O.P. — 'La permission du péché' in Revue Thomiste 4(1960) p. 534.

ing them in the next.⁵²

This is the only logical conclusion, since we have been dealing with a thomistic Universe, which, as described by J. MARITAIN⁵³, is a work of art, a work of creation, and a work of relationships between human beings, and between these and God.

CARMELO BIANCO

⁵² Cfr St. Thomas' s doctrine on the sin of 'hardening of one' s heart' in his Commentary on St. Paul' s Ep. to the Rom. 9, lect. 3, fin. et alibi. As to the psychological aspect of this state in the sinner cfr I-II S. Th. q. 79, a. 3, c; and J. WRIGHT S.J. in op.cit., pp. 161-162.

⁵³ J. MARITAIN - '*De Bergson à Thomas d' Aquin*', op.cit., pp. 275 ff.

NOTA SCRITTURISTICA

PROVERBI 3, 8 ed ECCLESIASTICO 30, 14-16

BASTA leggere i principali commenti¹ a *Prov.* 3, 8 per accorgersi che la traduzione e la spiegazione del testo ebraico non sono eccessivamente facili. Una prova eloquente dell'imbarazzo da parte degli studiosi è offerta dai tentativi di correzione in base alla versioni antiche².

Il testo, dopo aver raccomandato una saggezza effettiva che consiste nel timor di Dio e nel tenersi lontani dal male (*Prov.* 3, 7) continua nel v. 8.

Essa (la saggezza) sarà una medicina l^eshorreka
e shiqqûj per le tue ossa.

I due termini ebraici traslitterati costituiscono una discreta difficoltà non tanto per il senso generale quanto per la ricerca della sfumatura adatta a interpretare il pensiero dell'autore con esattezza. Solo difatti attraverso una individuazione precisa del significato si può ricostruire con sicurezza una mentalità, una teologia che pretenda di affermarsi anche nei chiaroscuri del testo.

La versione alessandrina, che nei riguardi del libro dei Proverbi ha dimostrato una libertà piuttosto larga³, rende il primo termine con «al tuo corpo» (τῷ σώματί σου) ed è stata seguita dalla Peshitto e da numerosi commentatori⁴. La Volgata invece, seguita dal Targum e da Ibn Ezra⁵, ha tradotto con «ombelico tuo» come d'altronde Rashi che ha connesso il termine con shar^ereka di *Cant.* 7, 3 (cfr *Ez.* 16, 4) che viene tradotto generalmente con «ombelico». Il testo è stato citato da *Pirgê*

¹ F. Delitzsch, *Das Salomonische Spruchbuch*, Seppia, 1873.

Cfr D.G. Wildeboer, *Die Spruche*, Friburgo (Br.), 1897; W. Frankenberg, in *Handkmentar zum alten Testament*, Gottinga, II, 3, 1898; T.T. Perrowne, *The Proverbs*, Cambridge, 1899; Muller e Kautzsch, in *The Sacred Books of the Old Testament* (P. Haupt), Lipsia, 1901; C.H. Toy, *The Book of Proverbs*, Edimburgo, 1904; W.O.E. Oesterley, *The Book of Proverbs*, Londra, 1929; J.H. Greenstone, *Proverbs*, Filadelfia, 1950; A. Cohen, *Proverbs*, Londra, 1952; J. van der Ploeg, *Spreuken*, Roermond, 1952; E. Jones, *Proverbs and Ecclesiastes*, Londra, 1961; B. Gemser, *Spüche* Tubinga, 1937 e 1963.

² Cfr A.J. Baumgartner, *Etude critique sur l'etat du texte du livre des Proverbes*, Lipsia, 1890.

³ Cfr G. Gerleman, *Studies in the Septuagint*, III. *Proverbs*, Lund, 1956.

⁴ I LXX avrebbero letto lib^esar^eka (Oort) o lish^eer^eka: secondo Frankenberg, Wildeboer, Toy, Gemser (1937), Jones. Si adduce generalmente *Prov.* 4, 22b e il parallelismo tra bāsār e 'āsem di *Gen.* 29, 14; di *Prov.* 14, 30; *Giob.* 2, 5; *Giud.* 9, 2, 2; *Sam.* 5, 1; 19, 13. D'altronde שָׁרַע traduce bāsār 21 volta e in *Eccli.* 30, 14; 48, 13; sh^eer in *Prov.* 5, 11; 11, 17; *Eccli.* 7, 24; 38, 16.

⁵ Così anche Perrowne, Oesterley e Greenstone.

Abôt 6, 7.

Una delle interpretazioni più positive e stata offerta già da molti anni da I. LEVI⁶ nella sua opera sui frammenti ebraici dell'Ecclesiastico ed è stata seguita da pochi, tra i quali G.R. DRIVER⁷ e dalla recente edizione di B. GEMSER. Chi studia la letteratura sapienziale biblica resta colpito dalle affinità dei due libri, Proverbi ed Ecclesiastico, e pensa che la soluzione di molte difficoltà del primo libro possano essere risolte alla luce del secondo.

Per quanto riguarda il testo in esame, I. LEVI ha richiamato giustamente *Eccli.* 30, 14-16 che stabilisce un confronto tra la ricchezza e la salute e non esita a dichiarare la salute come qualcosa di superiore a ogni ricchezza. Tale posizione non è pienamente condivisa da *Sap.* 7, 10 che pone la saggezza anche al di sopra della salute. Il testo greco dell'Ecclesiastico afferma:

Meglio un povero sano (ὕγιης) e forte nella potenza
che non un ricco percosso nel suo corpo.
La salute (ὕγιεια) e il vigore (εὐεξία) sono migliori di ogni oro
e un corpo robusto (è meglio) di una fortuna smisurata.
Non c'è ricchezza preferibile alla salute (ὕγιειός) del corpo
e non c'è contentezza al di sopra della gioia del cuore.

Il testo ebraico presenta alcune varianti:

Meglio un meschino e vivo (h) nelle sue ossa (b'šmw)
che non un ricco e colpito nella sua carne.
Vita di salute (shr)⁸ desidero più dell'oro (pz)
e spirito di bontà più delle perle.
Non c'è ricchezza al di sopra della ricchezza della salute (shr)⁹ della ossa
e non c'è bontà al di sopra di un cuore buono.

Il problema sta nella traduzione dell'ebraico shr che N. PETERS¹⁰ ha vocalizzato sher mentre altri leggono shor. Non c'è alcun dubbio che le varianti marginali dei vv. 15-16 ebraici hanno praticamente suggerito la interpretazione «carne» che un copista affrettato ha lasciato cadere anche al posto di «cuore» nel v. 16. D'altronde non fa meraviglia perchè nei nuovi frammenti pubblicati da J. SCHIRMANN¹¹ si nota una tendenza ad

⁶ *L'Ecclésiastique*, Parigi, 1901.

⁷ In *Biblica* 32 (1951) 175.

⁸ Si hanno come varianti marginali bšr e sh'r.

⁹ Si ha come variante marginale sh'r.

¹⁰ *Das Buch Jesus Sirach oder Ecclesiasticus*, Munster, 1913.

¹¹ In *Tarbiz* 27 (1958) 440-443; 29 (1960) 313-323; cfr F. VATTIONI, in *Rivista*

acostarsi al testo greco.

Il v. 15 offre maggiori difficoltà. L'ebraico inizia con hjj shr : in base a *Prov.* 14, 30, poichè il testo dell'Ecclesiastico non appare completamente sicuro, si è letto hjj bsr . Non si vede tuttavia come tale lettura si possa imporre poichè shrr' della Peshitto (salute) e *salus* del latino sostengono la necessità di shr. Assicurata la lezione, rimane il prolema della traduzione. Il greco traduce il costrutto ebraico (hjj shr) con una coppia di sostantivi (ὕγιετα καὶ εὐεξία) che potrebbero rappresentare un'endiadi. Quale dei due traduce shr e hjj rispettivamente? Difatti mentre uno dei sostantivi (εὐεξία) ricorre per tutto il greco dell'Antico Testamento solo in questo caso, il secondo (ὕγιετα) traduce con certezza solo nel v. 16 shr mentre rende hjjm in *Eccli.* 34, 20 e *Gen.* 42, 15. 16. L'aggettivo (ὕγιος) traduce hj nel v. 14 e in *Lev.* 13, 15 (due volte). Per sè quindi una prova certa dal confronto non si ha; la si può ottenere solo con il sostegno delle versioni siriana e latina e pensare che ὕγιετα rende shr.

Per il v. 16 il contesto esige la corrispondenza shr/ὕγιετα , nonostante la interpretazione della variante marginale. Non si spiegherebbe infatti la «came delle ossa».

Se shr nel brano di ben Sira significa «salute», può benissimo ricercarsi anche in *Prov.* 3, 8a dove due astratti (medicina e salute) sono equilibrati da due concreti del secondo stico.

G.R. DRIVER ha addotto un sostegno extrabiblico: la radice shrr , attestata dall'accadico, arabo, siriano, si riscontra anche nell'aramaico di alcuni documenti del V sec. a. C.¹² sotto la forma shrrt^{13} e shrjr^{14} . La forma shrrt ricorre nelle formule di saluto: $\text{shlm wshrrt šgj}'$ (pace e salute molte) e $\text{shlm hj}' \text{ħdh wshrjr}'$ (pace... vita, felicità e salute)¹⁵. Questo secondo testo offrirebbe un riscontro più stretto con hjj shr di *Eccli.* 30, 15.

G.R. DRIVER¹⁶ ha tentato, con il sostegno di un manoscritto ebraico (Kennicott), di leggere shor anche in *Sal.* 28, 7 ma mi pare senza acces-

Biblica 8 (1960) 169-179.

¹² G.R. DRIVER, *Aramaic Documents of the Fifth Century B.C.*, Oxford, 1957, 44; cfr S. SEGERT, in *Archiv Orientalni* 24 (1956) 392 s.

¹³ DRIVER, loc. cit. III, 1 e, secondo lo stesso, in A. COWLEY, *Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C.*, (= AP), Oxford, 1923, 42, 1.

¹⁴ Cfr COWLEY, AP 30, 3: ħdh wshrjr ; idem in 31, 3; 62, 2.

¹⁵ *Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum* II, 144, 1-2, almeno secondo la lettura di COWLEY, AP 70, 2. Diversa è la lettura di E. SACHAU, *Aramaische Papyrus und Ostraka...* Lipsia 1911.

¹⁶ In *Die Welt des Orients* 5 (1950) 414 s.

sivo successo. Tanto meno in *Sal* 82, 7 en in *Giob.* 4, 15,¹⁷

Il secondo termine di *Prov.* 3, 8 non molto chiaro è shiqquj. Anche in questo caso le versioni antiche riflettono un'incertezza notevole nella ricerca del significato preciso. I LXX hanno tradotto con ἐπιμέλεια, Aquila con ποτιούδος, Simmaco con πύσης, Teodoziona con καταβεοχή, la Volgata con *inrigatio*, il Targum con dāhānā e la Peshitto con dāhnā. È evidente che la maggior parte ha intravisto la radice shqh/j (=far bere)¹⁸. Si dovrebbe trattare di qualche cosa di liquido, come il midollo, di cui l'osso ha bisogno per sopravvivere e la cui mancanza, l'aridità, è sintomo di decadenza (cfr *Prov.* 17, 22; *Ez.* 37, 11)¹⁹. Tale ragione spinge a considerare l'osso in se stesso e dal punto di vista letterale anziché come una figura letteraria che rappresenta il corpo, almeno sulla scorta dell'assiro esimtu e di qualche testo biblico (cfr *Sal.* 139, 15).

Il termine in questione (shiqquj) ricorre nel testo ebraico biblico solo due volte: qui e in *Os.* 2, 8²⁰. Nel libro del profeta minore il termine è accoppiato a shemen (olio) e ha fatto pensare che possa tradursi senza difficoltà come «balsamo», cioè un liquido piuttosto spesso, un unguento. Anche in *Prov.* 3, 8b non ci dovrebbe essere difficoltà a prendere il significato di «liquido» o, se si vuole seguire la più diffusa traduzione degli inglesi, di «midollo». Il pensiero del v. discusso dovrebbe essere questo: la saggezza, fondata sul timore di Dio e la lontananza dal male, rappresenta per l'uomo ciò che la medicina svolge in funzione della salute e ciò che il midollo o il liquido osseo rappresenta per la resistenza e l'azione delle ossa. La traduzione dovrebbe quindi concepirsi in tal modo:

Essa (la saggezza) sarà una medicina per la tua salute
e un liquido (oppure midollo) per le tue ossa.

FRANCESCO VATTIONI

¹⁷ L'ugaritico non offre nulla de certo anche se la radice vi appare; cfr C.H. GORDON, *Ugaritic Manual*, Roma, 1955 e J. AISTLEITNER, *Wörterbuch der ugaritischen Sprache*, Berlino, 1963.

¹⁸ Per l'equivalnnte ugaritico cfr O. EISSFELDT, in *Journal of Semitic Studies* 5 (1960) 45 e *Palae Royal d'Ugarit* II, 258.

¹⁹ Cfr P. JOÛON, *Deux images relatives aux os en hebreu biblique*, in *Biblica* 6 (1925) 173 s. Sarà utile controllare le nozioni fisiologiche antiche sulla importanza delle ossa, soprattutto presso gli Egiziani; cfr S. SAUNERON, *Le Germe dans les os*, in *Bulletin de l'institut francais d'archéologie orientale* 60 (1960) 19-27; J. YOGOTTE, *Les os et la semence masculine à propos d'une thèorie physiologique égyptienne*, ibidem 61 (1962) 139-146. Per la parte biblica e accadica cfr P. DHORME, *L'emploi métaphorique des noms du parties du corps en hébreu et en akkadien*, Parigi, 1923, 9-10.

²⁰ Cfr A.S. YAHUDA, in *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie* 26 (1912) 358 n.1.

CASUS MORALIS

DE STATU GRATIAE REQUISITO IN SACERDOTE CELEBRANTE

ALPHONSUS sacerdos ad ecclesiam gressus dirigens Missam celebraturus in pravo quodam desiderio tunc temporis oborto sibi plene et deliberate complacuit. Sacristiam ingressus ac proprium confessarium apud quem confessionem libenter institueret ibi non inveniens, Alphonsus perfectae contritionis actum praehabuit atque Missam celebravit. Deinde post Missam quosdam pueros confiteri volentes ad confessionem admisit illosque tamen ficte absolvit cum timeret ne se exinde sacrilegii labe commacularet.

QUAERITUR:

- I. An et quandonam liceat sacerdoti qui peccatum grave commiserit Missam celebrare non instituta prius sacramentali confessione.
- II. Num liceat unquam sacramenta simulare aut dissimulare.
- III. Quid de Alphonsi agendi modo censendum sit.

SOLUTIO:

AD I. Inter dispositiones necessarias ad sacrificium Missae licite celebrandum primo loco recensetur status gratiae in sacerdote celebrante. 'Sacerdos sibi conscius peccati mortalis, quantumvis se contritum existimet, sine praemissa sacramentali confessione Missam celebrare ne audeat; quod si, deficiente copia confessarii et urgente necessitate, elicitio tamen perfectae contritionis actu, celebraverit, quamprimum confiteatur'.¹

Amissus status gratiae ante Missae celebrationem per sacramentalem confessionem, si fieri potest, praecipitur recuperandus. Quae sacramentalis confessio imponitur solum quando sacerdos est conscius, hoc est certus, peccati mortalis. Quaerunt theologi utrum praeceptum istud praemittendi confessionem sit humanum an divinum. Pro praecepto mere ecclesiastico se pronuntiat Regatillo² allegans in favorem sententiae a se propugnatae documenta historica.³ Contrarium, nempe praeceptum

¹ C.I.C., can. 807.

² *Ius Sacramentarium*, ed. 3a (Santander, 1960), n. 131.

³ Apud Osterle in articulo *De oblig. sacerdot. celebrant. confessionem sacram. peragendi vi can. 807*, in *Monitor Eccles.*, 1955, pp. 89-105.

divinum, adducit Cappello scribens: 'Communior et, nostro iudicio, verior sententia tenet, hoc praeceptum esse divinum'. Quod clarus auctor confirmat auctoritate Suarez, Lugo, Vasquez, S. Alphonsi.⁴

Quidquid sit de origine ipsius praecepti, certum est, sicut animadvertit Palazzini, praeceptum hoc habendum esse 'grave et absolutum, quia de lege agitur fundata in periculo communi'.⁵

Ex memorato can. 807 praeceptum peragendi sacramentalem confessionem post commissum peccatum mortale formale, antequam Missa celebretur, sub duabus tantum conditionibus relaxatur, scilicet si copia confessarii deficiat et simul urgeat necessitas celebrandi, quo in casu viget lex subsidiaria, praescribens sacerdoti arctato ad celebrationem, tum actum perfectae contritionis ante Missae celebrationem eliciendum tum confessionem quamprimum post Missae celebrationem instituendam (i.e. intra triduum sequentem iuxta communem sententiam, vel etiam prius si denuo celebrare debeat aut altera et tertia die non habiturus erit confessarium quam pridie habet).

Defectus confessarii existere censetur non si mere absit sacerdos cui celebrans solet et cuperet confiteri; vel alius cui devotius et utilius confiteretur, sed:

- (a) si nullus adsit, et spectatis adiunctis personae, v.gr. debilis, senis, occupatae; viarum, distantiae, brevitatis temporis, etc., absens sine magno incommodo adiri non possit;
- (b) si qui forte adsit sacerdos sit linguae ignarus vel iurisdictione careat vel apud illum confessio institui nequeat absque damno proprio (e.g. scandali, infamiae) vel alieno (e.g. si peccatum accusari non potest sine complicitate manifestatione).

Solum incommodum confessioni *extrinsecum* a confessione excusat, si confessarius adsit; non vero incommodum *intrinsecum* seu verecundia vel infamia quam poenitens apud confessarium patietur, nisi in peculiaribus adiunctis (v.g. si parochus aetate proventus et bonae existimationis debeat confiteri apud proprium coadiutorem iuvenem aut familiarem).

— Ita Vermeersch.⁶

Necessitas celebrandi verificatur v.gr. (i) ad ministrandum viaticum, (ii) ad perficiendum sacrificium ab alio inchoatum, (iii) ad vitandum

⁴ Cappello, *Tractatus canonico-moralis de Sacramentis*, I, ed. 6a (Marietti, 1953), n. 438.

⁵ Palazzini-De Jorio, *Casus Conscientiae* (Marietti, 1958). II, p. 93.

⁶ Vermeersch-Creusen, *Epitome Iuris Canonici*, II, ed. 3a (Mechliniae-Romae, 1927), n. 79.

scandalum vel infamiam, (iv) ut populus praecepto satisfacere possit, (v) in peculiaribus adiunctis uti ratione exsequiarum, primae communionis, prima feria VI mensis, et similibus, (vi) ad vitandam interruptionem mensis gregoriani, (vii) ad vitandam offensionem offerentis eleemosynam, (viii) ad instantiam aliquorum fidelium qui secus sacra communionem privari deberent, (ix) si sacerdos valde pauper indiget Missae stipendio ad sustentationem. — Ita theologi communiter.

AD II. *Simulatio* sacramenti est positio sacramenti ficta et mendax, seu cum praevisione deceptionis aliorum. Habetur simulatio ac proinde non conficitur sacramentum quia occulte deest vel intentio, vel praeterea materia aut forma valida.

Vocatur *stricta* si habetur positio materiae et formae cum manifestatione voluntatis conficiendi sacramentum, quae tamen voluntas reapse deest in ministro. Erit *minus stricta* simulatio si sola materia aut sola forma ponitur cum illa manifestatione voluntatis.

Habetur simulatio sacramenti *impropria* si adhibetur usus alius rei quae apparentiam materiae aut formae continet, eo fine ut quis censeatur sacramentum conficere.

Simulatio est *formalis vel materialis* prout deceptio praevisa aliorum, qui putant sacramentum confici, a ministro intendatur vel solum permittatur.

Dissimulatio est positio alicuius ritus sacramento similis, quin tamen habeatur intentio, materia, forma sacramenti (v.g. benedictio loco absolutionis) eo fine ut minister occultet negationem sacramenti, ubi adiuncta hoc postulent.

Principia de licitate:

I. Simulatio sive stricta sive minus stricta est semper illicita. Ratio est quia importat mendacium graviter sacrilegum et nocivum.

II. Simulatio impropria per se probabiliter non est graviter illicita. Ratio est quia ritus sacramenti nec totaliter nec partialiter adhibetur ac proinde sacramento non fit iniuria. Mendacium tamen committitur. Addunt theologi talem simulationem posse per accidens constituere grave peccatum (v.g. contra caritatem vel iustitiam respectu subiecti cui denegatur sacramentum).

III. Dissimulatio licita est ob iustam causam. Ratio est quia, ut notat S. Alphonsus, in dissimulatione nec fit iniuria sacramento nec committitur mendacium, sed solum occultatur veritas.⁷

⁷ S. Alphonsus, *Opera Moralia*, III, 59.

AD III. Alphonsi agendi ratio minus recta fuit. Ad Missae celebrationem quod attinet non licuit Alphonso ad altare celebraturus accedere, etiam elicitō praevio contritionis perfectae actu, tum quia de facto non deficiebat copia confessarii si proprius dumtaxat confessarius deerat, alius tamen adesset cui Alphonsus posset ac deberet confiteri (iuxta dicta in responsione ad primum) si vellet Missam celebrare. Neque constat ex facti specie quod Missae celebratio tunc urgebat ob quamlibet e causis a theologis et canonistis recensitis. Potius debebat Alphonsus, si alii confessario confiteri nolebat vel si, deficientibus aliis quoque confessariis, Missae celebratio re vera non urgebat, indispositionem physicam vel morbum simulare vel alio praetextu ab ecclesia recedere, modo tamen ut scandulum vel populi admirationem vitaret.⁸

Respectu vero puerorum confessionum quas audivit, Alphonsus non recte iudicavit se sacrilegium commissurum si, ante institutam a se peccati commissi confessionem, absolutionem sacramentalem impertiisset. Pro actuali enim exercitio sacramenti poenitentiae, sicut et ceterorum sacramentorum excepta eucharistia, sufficit status gratiae saltem per actum perfectae contritionis recuperatus, si fuerit amissus.

Attamen, si Alphonsus ante Missam vel ea durante animadverterit se illicite Missam celebrare, non potuit licite absolvere nisi sincere elicitō novo perfectae contritionis actu.

In casu Alphonsus sacerdos simulationem propriam et stricte dictam exercuit. Quae ne metu quidem gravi excusatur uti liquet ex sequenti propositione damnata ab Innocentio XI: 'Urgens metus gravis est causa iusta sacramenti administrationem simulandi'.⁹

Debuisset Alphonsus pueros illos confiteri volentes vel ad alium confessarium dirigere vel, si venialia tantum apud ipsum confessi essent, illos praemonere non esse necessarium absolutionem et sic praemonitos rite benedictos dimittere.

C. MUSCAT

⁸ Ita Zalba, *Theologiae Moralis Compendium*, II (Madrid, 1958), n. 658.

⁹ Denz., 1179.