

MELITA THEOLOGICA

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MELITA THEOLOGICA

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THE GENESIS OF THE CONCILIAR STATEMENTS REGARDING THE MUSLIMS

Joseph Farrugia

Nowadays it is no longer surprising to read about Christians and Muslims assembling for encounters in friendship, committing themselves to search for mutual understanding and uttering words of reciprocal appreciation if not, indeed, admiration.

People have come to expect to hear formerly unheard of protestations of esteem and respect issuing from both the Islamic and Christian sides engaged in inter-faith dialogue.

Catholics have become accustomed to learn about the Holy Father welcoming exponents of the Islamic religion and calling upon the Catholic faithful to emulate their Muslim neighbours in their sincere devotion to God and in the firmness of their commitment to live in consonance with their religious beliefs.

Nevertheless, if one were to look back over the fourteen centuries or so of Christian-Muslim history, one would realize with astonishment how far we have come. Throughout these centuries the prevailing attitude of both religions towards one another was one of mutual disregard with spasmodic episodes of violent polemics and even open hostilities. Misunderstandings, misjudgements and mistrust were the order of the day, that is, of each day.

Then, about twenty-five years ago, the wholly unexpected happened.

An ecumenical council of the Catholic Church was convened at the Vatican. Its brief was Church renewal. The world of the non-Christians and their religions as such could not be further from the mind of those who were entrusted with the preparatory work. Nevertheless, once the conciliar ball got rolling, a confluence of 'unforeseen' insights in the Church's relation to the world and startling socio-political events pushed the status of the non-Christians vis-à-vis the Church to the foreground and, quite suddenly,

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Islam and the Muslims¹ emerged as a conciliar theme.

Much went into the conciliar discussions concerning this theme, and many unexpected ups and downs at times favoured, at other times threatened its tempestuous evolution.

Nevertheless, the end-result were two official statements² in which, for the first time in its history, the Catholic Church recognized the presence of spiritual and moral truths in the Muslim faith, confessed the Church's esteem thereof, and called for Islamic-Christian dialogue and collaboration.

The story behind, and leading to, the first tentative texts which subsequently developed into the definitive texts concerning Islam and the Muslims is extraordinary, significant and most revealing.³

Four months after the unexpected announcement of his decision to hold an Ecumenical Council,⁴ Pope John XXIII constituted a Pre-preparatory Commission⁵ to give initiation to the preparations for the Council. An invitation was made to the episcopate throughout the world, to the Roman authorities, to various superiors of religious orders and to Catholic universities and faculties to send their proposals for the definition of the concrete programme of the Council.⁶ The answer to this invitation, taking the form of proposals, wishes and requests, was massive.⁷

1. In its discussion of the final draft of the Declaration on non-Christian religions the respective sub-commission opted in favour of the adjective *Muslim* when speaking of persons adhering to Islam and the adjective *Islamic* when speaking of things since these terms were considered as being of standard usage in this way among the Muslims. Hence: *muslimi* for the Muslims and *islamicus* for their religion or their faith. Cf. R. CASPAR, "La religion musulmane", in A.-M. HENRY (dir.), *Vatican II. Les Relations de l'Eglise avec les Religions non chrétiennes* (= *Unam Sanctam* 61) (Paris 1966) 207.

2. The Declaration on the Relation of the Church to non-Christian Religions *Nostra aetate*, n.3; and the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church *Lumen Gentium*, n.16.

3. The desire of Pope John XXIII had merely been that the coming Council should give a new and positive definition to the attitude of the Church towards the Jewish people. "Giovanni XXIII, in un primo tempo, aveva inteso e desiderato semplicemente una dichiarazione sull'atteggiamento della Chiesa verso il Popolo dell'Antico Testamento, ma nel corso del Concilio, soprattutto nella discussione del relativo schema, i Padri conciliari chiesero che si preparasse una dichiarazione più ampia, che comprendesse pure le religioni non cristiane in generale." A. BEA, "La Chiesa di fronte alle religioni non cristiane", *La Civiltà Cattolica* III/117 (1966) 454-455.

4. "Primus Oecumenici Concilii nuntius", *Acta et Documenta Concilio Vaticano II apparando*, vol. I, series I (ante-paeparatoria) (Vatican City 1960ss) 3-6. The announcement was made in the Basilica of St Paul just outside Rome on January 25th, 1959.

5. "Constitutio Commissionis Antepaeparatoria", *ibid.* pp. 22-23. The commission was actually erected on May 17th, 1959.

6. "Litterae, quibus Exc.mi Episcopi et Prelati rogantur communicare suas animadversiones, concilia et vota circa res et argumenta quae in futuro Concilio Oecumenico tractari poterunt" in *Acta et Documenta*, vol. II, series I (ante-paeparatoria), pars I, p.x. Cf. also: vol. III, p.xiii; vol. IV, pars I, pp.xi-xii.

7. These are published in the fifteen impressive volumes published from 1970 onwards by the Polyglotta Vaticana under the title *Acta et Documenta Concilio Oecumenico Vaticano II apparando*.

1. The First References to Islam

It appears that the very first references to specifically Islamic matters in relation to the forthcoming Council were those made by some bishops and prelates charged with pastoral activity in predominantly Muslim mission countries. These references to Islam and the Muslims were very, very few indeed and constituted only a few sparsely scattered paragraphs in the thousands of pages that made up the volumes of proposals, wishes and requests sent from all over the world to the pre-preparatory commission.

From *North Africa* there arrived four contributions. The apostolic vicar of Heliopolis in Egypt expressed the desire that experts and theologians inquire into the attitude to be held regarding how the Church is viewed by Mohammedans and other 'bona fide' infidels and, also, regarding what relations is the Church to assume with men locally esteemed for their spiritual import.⁸ That of Benghasi, Libya, called the Council's attention to the need of having Catholic experts in Islamic matters able to contest the ever increasing studies in Islam.⁹ The bishop of Oran, Algeria, addressed himself to that which he termed as "the peril of Islamic expansion in Africa and elsewhere". This expansion was being partly helped by what he described as "the naivety of too many Catholics who believed that they should never speak of Islam except in terms of publicly and gratuitously granting it a spiritual value equal to that of Christianity". After referring to "the insuperable boundaries between the dogmas of the two religions" and criticising the above described attitude for its effect of strengthening the Islamic errors by praising them, he asked: "Why not condemn in Islam that which should be condemned?"¹⁰

8. A. HUBERT, Ap. Vic. of Heliopolis: "Optandum est... b) quamobrem optandum est ut peritissimi, et theologi praeclari et docti inquirent quid cogitandum sit de talibus factis actualibus: 1) Quomodo apparet Ecclesia Dei in sua vita quotidiana, Mahumetanis vel aliis infidelibus bona fide, et quomodo iudicatur ab eis;... 2) Quid de relationibus Ecclesiae cum aliis viribus spiritualibus, quae etsi non desint erroribus, tamen multis his incolis apparent ut fax et regimen vitae et intellectus", *Acta et Documenta*, vol. II, series I (antepreparatoria), pars V, p. 398.

9. E.A. GHIGLIONE, Ap. Vic. of Bengasi, Ap. Adm. of Derna: "Mentem Patrum Concilii ad mundum Islamicum velim revocare cum praesenti tempore magis augeantur in dies studia islamica et ex nostris saepe non habeantur viri periti qui de re islamica veleant decertare". *Ibid.*, p. 276.

10. B. LACASTE, Bishop of Oran: "Oserai-je aborder le problème missionnaire en terre d'Islam? Nos missions, cruellement dévastées par le communisme, risquent de faire perdre de vue le péril que constitue l'expansion islamique en Afrique et ailleurs. Tandis que le communisme, fier de ses conquêtes gigantesques, emploie toutes les ressources d'une propagande incomparable, l'Islam, hier humilié, relève aujourd'hui la tête, encouragé d'une part par la diplomatie communiste, malgré les démentis officiels d'une press gagnée à sa cause, et d'autre part, chose curieuse, par la naïveté de trop nombreux catholiques qui croient ne devoir jamais parler de l'Islam qu'en lui octroyant publiquement, alors que rien ne l'exige, une valeur

More to the west the archbishop of Rabat, in Morocco, spoke with regard to missionary activity amongst Mohammedan workers and explained that since in his Mohammedan region the working place provided the only possibility for an intimate conversation between Mohammedan workers and the Catholic priests, the latter should be permitted to follow the life of the workers, working with them in the offices...¹¹

From *West Africa* the bishop of Bathurst in Gambia, after declaring that he had many Mohammedans in his diocese, informed that missionaries did not directly preach the Gospel but performed works of charity, less intent on acquiring conversions than on instilling in the Mohammedans a remembrance of gratitude towards the Christians whom they, mostly ignorant on both Mohammed and Jesus Christ, tended to identify with western culture. Consequently, the bishop suggested that in the Council, Church and Mohammedan doctors discuss the problems of the propagation of materialism "which both Christians and Mohammedans oppose", and the position of Jesus Christ and the Blessed Virgin in the Qur'an.¹² The bishop of Niamey, Niger, substantially converged with the former when he suggested that the Church should seek that which unites and

spirituelle égale à leurs frères chrétiens d'avoir autant de force dans foi et de vigueur dans leurs espérances que les Musulmans eux-mêmes!

"Il y a bien, direz-vous, pour leur éviter semblables excès, la croyance au Fils de Dieu. Ils vous répliqueront que pour les Musulmans, le Christ, s'il n'est pas Dieu, est le plus grande de leurs prophètes. Il y a aussie Marie, Mère de Dieu, insisterez-vous. Ils vous répondront: 'Pour les Musulmans, Marie est comme pour nous la Vierge Immaculée!' Comme si les trois principaux mystères du catholicisme ne tracaient pas une ligne de démarcation infranchissable entre les dogmes des deux religions comparées!

"Un judaïsme rabbinique du VII^e siècle, assorti de quelques séquelles nestoriennes, ne doit tout de même pas faire oublier aux catholiques la richesse unique qu'est, dans l'économie du salut, le Christ et son Eglise. Pourquoi, sous prétexte de ne pas froisser l'amour-propre de ces hommes qui sont nos frères en humanité, fortifier l'erreur par des louanges qui sont, trop souvent, le fait de notre ignorance religieuse ou celui d'ambitions temporelles fort suspectes. Pourquoi ne pas condamner dans l'Islam ce qui est condamnable? Comme nous l'écrivions au début, proclamer la vérité, à tel moment de l'histoire, est la première des charités", *Ibid.*, p. 114.

11. L.A. LEFEVRE, Archbishop of Rabat: "Inter tales opifices arabicae gentis quales invenimus in nostra regione mahumetana, officina quidem est unicus locus possibilis colloctionis inter sacerdotem catholicum et opifices mahumetanos, cum aliqua spe mutuae confidentiae et proximitatis. Quomodo pastor oblivisci posset hos homines praesertim miserabiliores et pauperiores ius habere ad lumen evangelii?"

"Ad tale arduum et periculosum apostolatatum sane et longa probatio necessaria est..." *Ibid.*, p. 315.

12. M.J. MOLONEY, Bishop of Bathurst: "— Missionarii evangelium Mahumetanis directe non praedicant. Sunt contenti caritatis operibus e.g. orphanatrophiiis, nosocomiis, scholis. Grata beneficiorum memoria tantum, minime conversio, consequitur. — Christianis et cultus Occidentalis in animis Mahumetanorum idem significant. — Ecclesia, in Africa, plerumque commercium habet tantum cum Mahumetanis ineruditis — cum illis qui doctrinam neque Jesu Christi neque Mahumed intelligunt....

not that which separates her from the Mohammedans. For example he mentioned the common attitude against atheism and communism.¹³

Still in West Africa, the bishop of Umuahia in Nigeria, appealed on the need of finding a way "to combat the danger of the doctrine of Mohammed" especially by preparing priests specifically for this task.¹⁴ The apostolic prefect of Makeni, Sierra Leone, declared that too much intercourse between the two religions could lead to "religious syncretism" to the detriment of authentic truth and unity. He considered that it would be better "to seek the errors and fables which are found in the text of the Coran and in the Islamic traditions and clearly demonstrate and refute them" given Christian charity and due politeness.¹⁵

From *East Africa*, the apostolic vicar of Rumbek, Sudan, lamented that in his country those who favour Islam had better social conditions and higher probabilities of social advance in society.¹⁶ The bishop of Zomba, Mozambique, inquiring after the best way of conducting the Mohammedans to the doctrine of Christ, proposed the creation of a commission or institute for the studying of this problem. The aim would be at the same time "to combat the heresy (of Mohammedanism) and formulate a method of evangelization particularly adapted for the conversion of the Mohammedans".¹⁷ The bishop of Gulu in Uganda also expressed the need

"Itaque omni cum reverentia moneo ut si fieri potest doctores Ecclesiae, et maxime ii qui in doctrinis Mahumetanorum versantur, in concilio cum doctoribus Mahumetanorum disceptent, praecipue de his questionibus: a) de propagatione Materialismi – cui et Christiani et Mahumetani resistent; b) de statu Domini Nostri Jesu Christi et Beata Mariae Virginis in 'Koran',” *Ibid.*, p. 215.

13. C. QUILLARD, Ap. Pref. of Niamey: Under the heading *Commercium cum Mahumetanis* he writes: "quaerendum est potius quae sunt communia inter nos quam quae nos separant. Duo sunt quae unioni favent: certamen contra atheistas et contra communistas". *Ibid.*, p. 92.

14. N. NWENDO, Bishop of Umuahia: Under the sub-title *De actuositate negotiisque Ecclesiae* he writes: "Ut afferatur methodus pugnandi periculum Macometi doctrinae, specialiter de praeparandis sacerdotibus ad hoc munus", *Ibid.*, p. 353.

15. A. AZZOLINI, Ap. Pref. of Makeni: "Quaerendum videtur medium doctrinaliter sanum – et quidem praestantius – quam quod recenter apparuit in publicationibus crebriusque conventibus ubi Monotheismus islamicus saepius aequiparatus fuit Monotheismo Christiano et 'pons' ad istum, cum et contra Mahumetana conceptio errorem involvat quoad Naturam et Vitam Intimam Dei, et concessionem et dissimulationem quorundam Catholicorum loco favendi Veritati et Unioni aleam praebeant Macometane pravitate confirmandae vel quemdam syncretismum religiosum inducant. Via aptior forte quaerenda est ad errores et fabulas, quae in Coranico Textu et traditionibus islamicis inducta sunt, clare ostendendas et refellendas, salva semper Christiana Caritate et integra urbanitate", *Ibid.*, p. 436.

16. I. DUD, Ap. Vicar of Rumbek: "Maior problemata in Africa sunt *Communismus et Islamismus*.... Islamismus (contrary to communism which made headway amongst the higher educated) offert meliores condiciones sociales et opportunitates iis qui in iisdem scholis ad Islamismen inclinat", *Ibid.*, p. 466.

17. L.P. HARDMAN, Bishop of Zomba: "Quae est via optima Mahumetanorum, praesertim in territoriis Africae habitantes, ad Christi doctrinam adducendi? Ut haec via invenietur, valde

of giving special attention to the problem of discerning the appropriate means for converting the Mohammedans.¹⁸ The apostolic pro-prefect of Eldoret, Kenya, after noting the widespread and numerous Mohammedan conversions, converged with the above bishops on the need of giving attention and study to the problem of “conducting the Mohammedans to the true faith” and of “confronting the danger of the perversion of the faithful”.¹⁹

The apostolic vicar of Mogadishu in Somalia, on the other hand, decried the widespread negative Christian attitude towards the Muslims and insisted that the Christians should also consider the several positive elements present in the Islamic religion and should underline the analogies that exist between Islam and Christianity. He then spoke about the work of his missionaries which was not that of direct evangelization but rather of charitable activities which lead to some conversions and created much sympathy for the Christian religion.²⁰

urgetur commissio vel institutum speciale cuius sit investigare principia fundamentalia doctrinarum et methodum evangelizationis Mahumetanismi; invenire media particularia huius haeresis oppugnandae, et formare methodum evangelizationis Mahumetanorum conversioni specialiter adaptatam. Cum Mahumetani B. M. Virginem honore speciali prosequuntur, haec commissio vel institutum Matri omnium hominum sit dedicatum”, *Ibid.*, p. 371.

18. I.B. CESANA, Bishop of Gulu: Under the heading *De Propaganda Fide* he suggests: “Speciatim considerandum esse videtur problema de convertendis macometanis ac media proponenda, si quae adesse videantur”, *Ibid.*, p. 513.

19. P. CULLEN, Ap. Pro-Pref. of Eldoret: “Cumlate, numeroque conversorum crescenti, Mohamedanismus apud Africanos indigenos Africae tam Occidentalis quam Orientalis divulgatus sit, mihi videtur bonum esse ut commissio sine mora statuatur; quae commissio hoc periculum diligenter inspiciat. Insuper Ordinarios certiores faciat quae necessaria sint ad praedavendum hunc periculum perversionis fidelium, et quomodo Mohamedani ad veram fidem perducentur”, *Ibid.*, pp. 265-266.

20. F. FILIPPINI, Ap. Vicar of Mogadishu: Under the heading *Apostolato fra i Musulmani* he writes: “Da 46 anni vivo fra i Musulmani. Di solito si vede in loro soltanto il male; si è convinti che vi è nulla da fare per la loro conversione; si parla sempre male del loro fondatore, Maometto, e del Corano. Si considerano nostri nemici. Con questi sistemi penso che non si farà mai nulla e ci odieranno sempre.

“Secondo il mio modo di vedere, non bisogna guardare soltanto al male; ma bisogna considerare anche il bene che Maometto ha fatto: distrusse l'idolatria, ha diffuso il culto del vero Dio – come gli ebrei. Il Corano ha dei buoni principi e delle verità, in gran parte prese dall'Antico Testamento ed anche dal Nuovo. Si può osservare nei singoli maomettami il bene che fanno: pregano, vanno alla moschea, fanno elemosine, digiunano, e si amano.

“Per cui i nostri sentimenti verso di loro dovrebbero essere di molto comprensione, di compatimento e di grande carità. I nostri discorsi dovrebbero far risaltare il bene ed il vero che vi è nella loro Religione, sottolineando le analogie fra essa ed il Cristianesimo.

“Bisogna poi fare del bene a tutti, specialmente ai malati, ai poveri, ai bambini abbandonati, con ambulatori.... e quanto la carità di Cristo può suggerire.

“Con queste Opere Assistenziali e di carità i Missionari.... hanno ottenuto degli ottimi risultati: sono molto stimati e bene voluti...; non si preoccupano molto della Religione. Si hanno anche alcune conversioni e molti simpatizzanti della nostra Religione. Abbiamo così un certo numero di cristiani somali impiegati negli uffici del Governo, anche in posti di responsabilità, e godono stima. Tutte le autorità, anche le più alte ci apprezzano e ci vogliono bene.

From *South East Asia* the answers to the invitation of the preparatory commission consisted of two proposals. The internuncio in Pakistan echoed the need for institutions for deeper study of Islamic doctrine and expressed the need of inquiring after the possible ways of converting the Mohammedans.²¹ The apostolic prefect of Sukabumi in Indonesia, after indicating that he had already spent over twenty years amongst "very fanatic" and mythically inconvertible Mohammedans, expressed his deep desire that Rome "promotes some action, discreet but well ordered to stir Islamic souls" especially through the activity of missionaries truly dedicated, pastorally, to the Mohammedans.²²

This contribution from Indonesia exhausts the paragraphs that constitute the proposals, wishes and requests sent by bishops and other prelates with regard to Islam and the Muslims.²³ An analysis of all the

"Questo è il frutto che la Missione ha fatto ai Somali Musulmani.

"Penso che questo sia l'apostolato migliore da usare con i nostri fratelli musulmani", *Ibid.*, pp. 445-446.

21. E. CLARIZIO, Ap. Internuncio in Pakistan proposes that: "Viae conversionis mahometanorum studio perquirantur. Institutiones ad doctrinam islamicam penitus cognoscendam opus dantes, maximis auxiliis corroborentur", *Acta et Documenta*, vol. II, series I (antepreparatoria), pars IV, p. 433.

22. N.J. GEISE, Ap. Pref. of Sukabumi: "Vivens per plus quam 20 annos inter Mahumentanos satis 'fanaticos', quotidie oro Deum Optimum Maximum ut Roma instituat aliquam actionem discretam sed bene ordinatam ad permovendas animas islamiticas. Mythos de inconvertibilitate Mahumetanorum nimis debilitat actionem nostram. Haec actio videtur esse restringenda ad explicationes Ethicae Naturalis, ne Mahumetani ira exardescant. Humiliter rogo ut talis actio, licet indirecta, a Roma missionariis commendetur utpote vere missionalis. Non pauci missionarii parvipendunt talem actionem, non directe intentam ad baptismum, cum sequela uti in Indonesia - et vidi hanc rem etiam in aliis regionibus islamiticis - quod nihil faciunt pro Mahumetanis", *Ibid.*, pp. 270-271.

23. At this stage it should be noted that positive, even if indirect, reflections and proposals were also made by several Catholic universities and faculties.

1) The *Pontifical Gregorian University* (Rome) proposed the introduction, in the ordinary curriculum of theological studies, of an introductory course in non-Christian religions. Cf. *Acta et Documenta*, vol. IV, series I (antepreparatoria), pars I, 1, pp. 74-75.

2) The *Pontifical Lateran University* (Rome) called for the consideration of the history, religion, culture, psychology, customs and traditions of the various peoples, in the formation of priests, to the better service of the Gospel and the Church which, after all, is catholic by nature and shouldn't be foreign to any people. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 175-177.

3. The *Pontifical Athenaeum 'De Propaganda Fide'* (Rome) also called for deeper attention to the "doctrines and traditions proper to the various peoples always in relation to Christianity which is the fullest realization of all the truths of any culture". Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 495-496.

4) The *Catholic University of Paris* submitted two proposals governing the relation of the Church to non-Catholics: "Respuatur omnis doctrina quae usui coactionis temporalis ac temporalis faveret ad propagandam sustinendamque Ecclesiam catholicam". And: "Concilium veram tolerantiam propugnet quae non sit tantum concessio ad tempus respectu opportunitatis, sed iurium conscientiae et personae humanae dignitatis rationem habeat". *Acta et Documenta*, vol. IV, series I, pars II, p. 499.

contributions discloses several important indications. *Firstly*, considering the large amount of paper that arrived at the pre-preparatory commission's offices from all over the world, the few pages that constitute the proposals, wishes and requests regarding Islam – and indeed all the other non-Biblical religions – demonstrate that Islam occupied a relatively humble place in the spheres of interests pertaining to the bishops and organisms consulted. In fact only some bishops and prelates from mission countries in Africa and South East Asia, and some Catholic universities, offered any considerations and suggestions related, directly or indirectly, to Islam and the Muslims.²⁴

Secondly, both the underlying motive and the articulated perspective of the contributions are predominantly “missionary”: the origin and the end of the proposals, wishes and requests are the conversion of the Muslims to Catholicism. Hence, when these proposals, wishes and requests dealing with the Islamic religion came up for classification in the pre-preparatory stage, it was only natural for them to be grouped and inserted into the chapter on the missions.²⁵

5) The *Pontifical Athenaeum of Poona* (India): “...; pressius quoque determinetur habitudo inter unicam Religionem revelatam eiusque depositum fidei ex una parte, et alias religiones earumque valores morales et religiosos ex altera; desideratur praeterea adaequator declaratio dogmatis ‘extra Ecclesiam nulla salus’”. *Ibid.*, p. 727.

6) The *Catholic University of Nijmegen* (the Netherlands) called for the studying of comparative religion; *Ibid.*, p. 479.

7) The *Catholic University of Lovanium* (the Congo) made the most remarkable contribution of all when it proposed that “the Council.... declares that even in non-Christian religions there is the influx of supernatural grace” and indeed “a preparation for the Gospel”. “Cum viri scientifici historiae comparativae religionum periti nostris diebus omnes agnoscant magnas religiones non-christianas plura elementa valoris authentice religiosi continere et cum habitus mere negativus erga easdem homines bonae voluntatis a sola vera religione catholica potius avertat quam ad eam conducatur, inspecto insuper emolumento quod pro vero bono naturali ac supernaturali humanitatis obveniret ex consociata omnium religionum reluctatione adversus atheismum! nostra aetate grassantem, in votis est ut Concilium, reiterata monitione de indifferentismo in re religiosa vitando, nihilominus etiam declaret in religionibus, etiam non-christianis, agnosci posse influxum gratiae supernaturalis, immo et ‘praeparationem evangelicam’ (cf. iam S. Iustinus, *Apol. II*, 13; *MG* 7, 466)”. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

24. Cf. CASPAR, *Unam Sanctam* 61, 201-202.

25. *De missionibus inter Afros*: (5) Ecclesia in Africa plerumque commercium habet tantum cum Macometanis ineruditis, nempe cum illis qui doctrinam neque Iesu Christi, neque Macometi intelligunt. (6) Cum late, numeroque conversorum crescente, Macometi doctrina apud Afros divulgata sit, bonum esset si Commissio sine mora statueretur quae Ordinarios certos faciat de mediis ad fidelium perversionem praecavendam et Macometanorum conversionem attingendam.

De missionibus inter Macometanos: (1) Foveatur conversio macometanorum. (2) Vitetur syncretismus religiosus et via aptior quaerenda est ad uxores et fabulas quae in Corano et traditionibus islamicis inductae sunt, clare ostendendas et refellendas, salva semper caritate. (3) Saepe desiderantur viri catholici periti qui de re islamica valeant decertare. (4) Si fieri potest doctores Ecclesiae et maxime ii qui in doctrinis Macometanorum disceptent praesertim a) de propagatione materialissimi; b) de statu Domini Nostri Iesu Christi et B.M.V.

Thirdly, one gets the impression that the very consideration which the bishops and prelates had given to Islam and which was then transformed into the lines sent to the pre-preparatory commission, had arisen from conditions that had somehow made this consideration unavoidable. These circumstances appear to have been of an adverse nature, such as: the absolutely overwhelming predominance of the Islamic religion; the mythical and unflinching loyalty of the Muslims to their religion; a possible feeling, justified or not, of unwarranted difficulties that Catholic pastoral activity had to confront, and so on. This impression is furthermore strengthened by the fact that no bishops from Europe or America felt the need to call for the consideration of anything that had to do directly with Islam and the Muslims.

Fourthly, although the nature of the contributions is basically pastoral, they do contain some theological references that regard both the Islamic religion in itself, and also, supposed theological – even if rudimentary – convergences and analogies between Islam and Christianity.²⁶ These theological references are latent in the desire of justifying a given stand taken by the contributor in favour of or against a given attitude towards the Islamic religion and its followers.

Fifthly, the proposals, wishes and requests range from an unequivocal call for a clear demonstration and refutation of the “errors and fables” present in the Qur’an and the Islamic traditions to the less apologetic and more open desire for a recognition of those elements which are not so foreign to and incompatible with Christianity.²⁷ Indeed two basic attitudes predominate. One is fundamentally *negative* and views Islam and the Muslims in terms of “peril”, “perversion”, “errors and fables”, “heresy” and “fanaticism”; for this attitude, too much contact between Islam and

in ‘Koran’. (5) Maior caritas habeatur etiam cum Macometi asseclis et analogiae inter Christi et Macometi doctrinam exprimentur. (6) Missionarii evangelium Macometanis directe non praedicant, sunt contenti caritatis operibus, sed ex his grata beneficiorum memoria tantum, minime conversio, consequitur. (7) Ob analogias cum Macometanorum doctrina ne obliviscamur profundas discrepationes cum doctrina christiano-catholica. (8) Christianitas et cultus occidentalis in Macometanorum animis idem significant. *Acta et Documenta*, series I (antepreparatoria), Appendix Voluminis II, pars II, pp. 640, 641-642.

26. Cf. above the contributions of the Bishop of Oran (Algeria), of the Apostolic Prefect of Makeni (Sierra Leone), of the Bishop of Zomba (Mozambique) and of the Apostolic Vicar of Mogadishu (Somalia).

27. “De l’ensemble de ces voeux, par ailleurs assez disparates, deux attitudes se dégagent. La première et la plus souvent exprimée est plutôt négative et prolonge les tendances apologetiques des siècles passés: l’Islam est une erreur absolue qu’il faut réfuter, un danger pour l’Eglise qu’il faut combattre. La seconde reconnaît dans l’Islam des lumières de vérité et des analogies avec le Christianisme qu’il faut développer. On retrouvera ce clivage dans les attitudes des Pères du Concile,” CASPAR, “La religion musulmane”, *Unam Sanctam* 61, 202.

Christianity can only lead to "religious syncretism".²⁸ This basically negative attitude prolongs the apologetic tendencies of past centuries which invariably viewed Islam as a danger to Christianity and the Church, as a 'new' religion which not only denied the chief dogmas of Christianity but even endeavoured to take the place of the religion of Christ.²⁹

The second attitude is more *positive* and disposed to recognize in Islam those rays of truth and analogies with Christianity which make possible between them a rapport of cooperation with regards to various problems such as the struggle against materialism and atheism.³⁰ This favourable spirit on the part of some bishops and prelates definitely constituted a progress in the attitude of the Church towards Islam.

However when the contributions regarding the Islamic religion and its adherents, after being classified and elaborated by the pre-preparatory commission into "proposita et monita", were submitted to the relevant preparatory commission,³¹ the latter suppressed all references to Islam and to other non-Christian religions. The proposals, wishes and requests had been included in the chapter on the missions. But the preparatory commission for the 'Schema on the Missions' decided in favour of a more generic and less particularized study of non-Christian religions.³² Consequently, Islam and the Muslims did not appear in the schema dealing with the missions and, hence, on the agenda of the Council.

When, indeed, Islam and the Muslims do make their appearance in the Council hall, it would not even be with reference to the schema on the missions!

2. The Emergence of Islam in the Council Hall

The first references to the Muslims appeared in the debates in connection with a draft on the attitude of the Church towards the Jews, during the second session of the Council.

28. Cf. *Acta et Documenta*, vol. II, series I (antepreparatoria), pars IV, pp. 270-271; pars V, pp. 114, 265-266, 353, 371, 436.

29. G.C. ANAWATI, "Excurs zum Konzilstext über die Muslim", *LThK, Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil*, II, p. 485. Also in H. VORGRIMLER (ed.), *Commentary on the Documents of the Second Vatican Council*, III (N.Y./London 1969) 151.

30. Cf. *Acta et Documenta*, vol. II, series I (antepreparatoria), pars V, pp. 92, 215, 445-336.

31. When the classification of the material that had reached the Pre-Preparatory Commission from all over the world was concluded, the *motu proprio* "Superno Dei nutu", 5th June 1960, gave initiation to the immediate preparations for the Council. Ten commissions and three secretariats were created for the task of the redaction of the first schemas to be submitted for Conciliar discussion. Among the commissions there was one charged with the missions. Cf. *AAS* 52 (1960) 433-437. It was on to this commission that the "proposita et monita" dealing with Islam and the Muslims were passed.

32. CASPAR, *Unam Sanctam* 61, 202.

The origin of the draft on the Jews goes back to a very personal desire of Pope John XXIII who, profoundly moved by the various sufferings to which the Jewish people had for centuries been submitted, yearned for a more just and loving attitude from the Christians towards them.³³ This desire assumed its first concrete terms when John XXIII commissioned Cardinal A. Bea, who already headed the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity, with the preparation of a draft declaration defining the inner relations between the Church and the people of the Old Testament.³⁴ Thus the intention behind the initiative of the Pope was essentially pastoral.

However the papal commission had hardly begun to take on flesh that an indiscretion alerted the Arab world's attention to the intended pronouncement.³⁵ The Arab leaders and the Arab press misconstrued the intended statement as "tantamount to a political recognition of the State of Israel by the Holy See and thus as condoning the injustice which a number of Moslems driven from their homes and their land by war have undoubtedly suffered".³⁶ The stubborn hostility of the Arab world, however, did not succeed in obstructing the Sub-Commission entrusted with drawing up the preliminary document so that the first draft of a *Decretum de Iudaeis* was worked out by December 1961.³⁷ This document was then passed on to the Central Preparatory Commission³⁸ for eventual submission to the Council fathers and subsequent discussion during the first session of the Council.

In the meantime the Arab diplomatic and propagandistic activity against the Council statement "in favour of the Jews" was getting more

33. "È e rimarrà grande merito di Giovanni XXIII essersi reso conto di questo secolare problema e averne compresa tutta l'importanza. Fu lui che con personalissima decisione, tolse dalla liturgia del Venerdì Santo l'espressione *pro perfidis Iudaeis*, fonte di tanti malintesi. Procedendo anche oltre, diede personalmente l'incarico di preparare per il Concilio un apposito schema." A. BEA, "Il Concilio e la fraternità fra gli uomini", *Civiltà Cattolica*, 115/II (1964) 219-220.

34. This commission was made orally on September 18th, 1960. Cf. W. BECKER, "Die Erklärung über das Verhältnis der Kirche zu den nichtchristlichen Religionen", *Catholica* 20 (1966) 108.

35. Cf. J.M. OESTERREICHER, "Erklärung über das Verhältnis der Kirche zu den nichtchristlichen Religionen. Kommentierende Einleitung" in *LThK, Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil*, II, p. 415. Cf. also in H. VORGRIMLER (ed.), *Commentary on the Documents of the Second Vatican Council*, III, p. 18. Henceforth all references to Oesterreicher will be made in this latter English edition of his article.

36. G.H. TAVARD, "The Council's Declaration on Non-Christians", *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 3 (1966) 163.

37. OESTERREICHER, in *Commentary*, 40. Regarding the text of the draft *De Iudaeis* cf. *Acta et Documenta*, III, series II (antepreparatoria), pars II, p. 458.

38. This commission had been created by the *motu proprio* "Superno Dei nutu" with the task of seeing all the documents destined for submission to the Council Fathers. Cf. *idem*.

heated.³⁹ But it does not seem that it would have prevailed had it not been for the apparently unwitting aid given it by the World Jewish Congress which uninvitedly and imprudently announced the appointment of an Israeli government official as its representative to the Council. The political situation created thereby induced the Central Preparatory Commission in June 1962 to withdraw the draft decree from the Council's agenda.⁴⁰

As a consequence the *Decretum de Iudaeis* did not appear during the first session of the Second Vatican Council. But it was not doomed to the relative oblivion of the Vatican archives. It had persistent advocates, especially in Cardinal Bea. Moreover, press disclosures of Arab intrigues against the declaration had directed world attention to its importance and turned world public opinion in its favour. In the long run the personal intervention of Pope John XXIII, after a direct appeal by Cardinal Bea, brought the draft declaration once more before the Co-ordinating Commission and thus into the Council hall.⁴¹

During the intersession following the end of the first session of the Council an important event happened which favoured the work on the draft: the election to the papacy on June 20th 1963 of Cardinal Montini. Already Mgr. Montini, in his capacity of Under Secretary of State, had shown his interest in the religious values of the Islamic religion.⁴² After his election Paul VI will continue to give multiple testimony of his interest in Islam, and his discreet and indirect influence will be felt in the subsequent conciliar elaborations of the texts concerning non-Biblical religions and especially Islam and the Muslims.⁴³

Indeed, the attitude of Pope Paul VI is already decipherable in the allocation which he held at the opening ceremony of the second session of the Council. In this allocation he made very positive, even if cautious, references to non-Christian religions "that conserve the sense and the concept of God as One, Creator, Provident, Highest and Transcendent" and "adore God with acts of true piety" and "base their principles of moral and social life on such beliefs and practices". Paul VI declared that the

39. Cf. J.M. OSTERREICHER, "Arabs and Jews", *The Tablet*, August 8 (1964) 895-896.

40. OESTERREICHER, in *Commentary*, 41-42.

41. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 43; A. BEA, "Il Concilio e la fraternità fra gli uomini", *Civiltà Cattolica* 115/II (1964) 220.

42. "Thanks in particular to his relations with Louis Massignon he had a more positive attitude to Islam", R. CASPAR, "Islam according to Vatican II", *Encounter* 21 (1976) 2. "Une vieille et profonde amitié l'avait d'ailleres lié depuis longtemps à Louis Massignon et lui avait permis d'en comprendre la 'spiritualité de substitution' et d'en défendre les nobles initiatives en faveur des Musulmans." M. BORRMANS, "Le Pape Paul VI et les Musulmans", *Islamochristiana* 4 (1978) 1.

43. R. CASPAR, "Le Concile et l'islam", *Études* 1 (1966) 115.

Catholic Church does perceive in these religious expressions “lacunae, inadequacies and errors” but he continues: the Catholic religion gives its appropriate appreciation “to all that which in them is true, good and human”.⁴⁴

When the Council fathers met for this second session they had before them the drafts on the Church and on Ecumenism. Neither of these drafts yet mentioned Islam. The schema dealing with ecumenism included a chapter “on the attitude of Catholics towards non-Christians and the Jews in particular, (*de catholicorum habitudine ad non christianos et maxime ad iudaeos*)”.⁴⁵

This chapter was in fact none other than the first projected declaration on the Jews (*Decretum de Iudaeis*), readjusted in some parts, added to and incorporated as Chapter IV in the Decree on Ecumenism.⁴⁶ This draft still dealt practically exclusively with the Jews. However, it was inserted in the draft on ecumenism with a new introductory paragraph referring in generic terms to “those who are not Christians, but also honour God or, at least, impelled by God’s will, try according to their conscience to keep the moral law implanted in human nature”.⁴⁷

During the second session only the first three chapters of the Decree on Ecumenism were submitted for debate. However, at the first possible moment, even before the fourth chapter on the Jew had yet been presented

44. “Catholica Ecclesia etiam longius respicit, ultra christianae familiae fines; quomodo enim certis terminis circumscribat amorem suum, cum imitari debeat amorem Dei Patris, qui omnibus bona sua dilargitur (Cfr. *Matth.* 5,45), et sic dilexit mundum, ut pro eius salute unigenitum Filium suum daret (Cfr. *Io* 3,16)? Ultra igitur christiana castra oculos suos dirigit, et ad alias religiones respicit, quae servant sensum et notionem Dei, unius, creatoris, providentis, summi et rerum naturam trascendentis; quae Dei cultum exercent sinceræ pietatis actibus; quaeque ex iis usibus et opinionibus morum et socialis vitae praecepta derivant.

“In his quidem religionibus catholica Ecclesia cernit perfecto, nec sine dolore, lacunas, defectus et errores; facere tamen non potest, quin ad eas quoque mentem suam convertat, ut easdem certiores faciat, catholicam religionem debita aestimatione iudicare quidquid veri, boni et humani apud ipsas reperitur; itemque ut moneat, ad tuendum in hominibus huius temporis religionis sensum et Dei cultum – quod civilis cultus necessitas et officium postulant – se in prima acie stare, utpote quae Dei iura in homines validissime defendat.” *ASS* 55 (1963) 857-858.

45. Cf. *Acta Synodalia Sacrosancti Concilii Oecumenici Vaticani II*, vol. II (Periodus secunda), pars V, pp. 431-432.

46. Cf. OESTERREICHER, *Commentary*, 46-47.

47. “Postquam de Oecumenismi Catholici principiis tractavimus, silentio praeterire nolumus, quod eadem, habita ratione diversae condicionis, applicari debent, cum agitur de modo colloquendi et cooperandi cum hominibus non christianis, qui tamen Deum colunt, vel saltem bona animati voluntate, legem moralem hominis naturae insitam, pro conscientia servare student.

“Maxime autem hoc valet cum de Iudaeis agitur, quippe qui cum Ecclesia Christi speciali ratione coniunguntur.” Cf. note 45.

for discussion, those Council fathers who were contrary to the declaration on the Jews rose up in unison against Chapter IV. They emphasized that the Church's attitude towards the Jews was outside the scope of ecumenism which addressed itself to the separated Christians. But the basic and most inducive argument was that the Middle Eastern current political and social situation was such that this text was bound to be misunderstood as politically favourable to the Jews as a political entity and detrimental to the Muslims.⁴⁸

The Patriarch of Antioch Maximos IV, the foremost advocate of the inopportuneness of the declaration, said, moreover, that "if one wants to speak of the Jews, one must also speak of the other non-Christian religions, and especially of the Muslims, who number 400 million and amongst whom we live as a minority".⁴⁹ Several other Council fathers spoke also on these lines⁵⁰ adding that such religions as Bhuddism, Hinduism and Confucianism should be mentioned in the text since "the Church recognizes those seeds of truth present in the various religions which dispose for the acceptance of the Gospel".⁵¹

It is worthy of notice that the objections against this second draft were basically two and that these were primarily of a political nature. First, it was emphasized that one cannot speak of the Jews and remain silent on the other non-Christian religions, particularly Islam. Secondly, it was pointed

48. Cf. the speech made by the Patriarch of the Syriac Rite in Antioch, Cardinal Tappouni, *Acta Synodalia*, vol. II, pars V, pp. 527-528; that made by the Patriarch of Alexandria, Stephanos I, *Ibid.*, pp. 541-542; and that made by the Melchite Patriarch of Antioch, Maximos IV, *Ibid.*, pp. 542-545.

49. "Ensuite, si l'on veut parler des juifs, il faut aussi parler des autres religions non-chrétiennes, et surtout des musulmans, qui sont au nombre de 400 millions et au milieu desquels nous vivons en minorité" (*Patr. Maximos IV*). *Ibid.*, p. 544.

50. E.g. *Cardinal E. Ruffini*: "Si Oecumenismo additur cap. IV, in quo peculiaris et benigna mentio fit Iudaeorum, cur non nominantur illi, quam plurimi, qui adhaerent, et saepissime bona fide, ceteris religionibus?...", *Ibid.*, p. 529. Also *Cardinal P.T. Doi*: "Proponimus... Ut in cap. IV, post tractationem de Iudaeis, addatur nova paragraphus de habitudine catholicorum ad ceteros homines non-christianos". *Ibid.*, p. 540. *Patriarch A. Gori*: "...in Concilio Oecumenico, vel omnes confessiones non-christianae nominandae sunt, vel nulla", *Ibid.*, p. 557.

51. *Cardinal P.T. Doi*: "Insuper, brevis mentio facienda videtur magnorum systematum religiosorum et ethicorum, quae per multa saecula influxum profundum exercuerunt in populos non-christianos, ut v.g. apud nos Buddhismus et Confucianismus. Breviter ergo ostendatur quod Ecclesia catholica debito modo aestimat germina veritatis in iisdem contenta quibus nempe secundum consilia Providentiae ad Christum praeparare videntur; et quod Ecclesia, per praedicationem doctrinae evangelicae, altissimis eorum aspirationibus satisfacere intendit". *Ibid.*, p. 540. *Cardinal L. Rugambwa*: "In campo missionali iam norma existit, traditionalis quae ab origine Ecclesiae agnita est: videte v.g. opera S. Iustini et aliorum Patrum Ecclesiae; et haec norma est: *Quidquid verum, quidquid bonum est super terram et in corde hominum, Christi est, semen Verbi est, et possumus addere: iam in patrimonium Ecclesiae a Christo ipso introducitur*". *Ibid.*, p. 556.

out that the political situation in the Middle East was so highly tensed that it was not opportune to speak of the persecutions against the Jews since this could easily be considered as unduly discriminatory to the Muslims who also considered themselves as victims of Jewish persecution.⁵²

It was in this boiling political context that Islam made its first controversial appearance in the Council *aula*. The roll of calls for the consideration not only of the Jews but also of the Muslims, of other religious adherents, and even of unbelievers,⁵³ was the resulting tremor of the encounter between theology and politics. That which had began as a pastoral desire for the modification of a popular theological attitude seen as unfair to the Jews⁵⁴ was confronted by a hostile political situation which perceived, in the pastoral initiative, not simply *religious* – as Cardinal Bea would insist in his future exposition of the draft⁵⁵ – but primarily political implications. For a time politics seemed to be holding theology in chains.⁵⁶ It was in what could be described as, the attempt to strike a compromising balance between the references to the Jews and the sensitive Muslims, and subsequently other non-Christians, that Islam made its emergence in the Second Vatican Council. Henceforth every mention of the Jews in the Council documents would be accompanied by appropriate references to Islam and the Muslims.⁵⁷

3. Expanding the Declaration to the Non-Christians

As already stated, the texts on Islam are exclusively the fruit of Conciliar activity. Several factors contributed towards their inception and evolution. These factors, including international political intrusions, the world press and other more spiritual interests, induced an astonishing transformation of the Declaration on the Jews as originally intended. This

52. Cf. speech made by Archbishop Heenan of Westminster to the 'Council of Christians and Jews' on March 5th, 1965, *Doc. Cath.*, n. 1424, col 654-656.

53. The Swiss Bishop Jelmini of Lugano thought it desirable that the Council speak not only about the Jews, but also about the adherents to Islam *and* even about unbelievers! "Non solum de Iudaeis nobis videtur esse loquendum, sed de Mahometanis et quidem in diebus nostris atheismi, de omnibus illis qui in Deum credunt et propter suam fidem in Deum persecutionem patiuntur," *Acta Synodalia*, vol. II, pars V, p. 601.

54. For example the accusation against the Jews of having committed deicide, cause of innumerable persecutions of Jews through the centuries.

55. "Ultimo: cum hic agatur de quaestione mere religiosa, patet nullum adesse periculum ne Concilium immisceatur arduis illis quaestionibus, quae respiciunt relationes inter nationes Arabicas et Statum Israel vel sic dictum Sionismum." *Acta Synodalia*, vol. II, pars V, pp. 484-485. Also p. 481.

56. A. WENGER, *Vatican II, Chronique de la Deuxième Session*, (Paris 1964) 175.

57. CASPAR, *Encounter*, 2.

transformation was characterized by two essentially correlative aspects. On the one hand there was a *change of orientation* so that from a declaration about Jews it became a declaration concerning non-Christians, Jews included. On the other hand, and as a necessary consequence of this, there was a *widening of perspectives* so that what was originally meant to deal solely and exclusively with Jews evolved into a statement about non-Christians in general and Hinduism and Buddhism, Muslims and Jews in particular.⁵⁸

This *change of orientation* and at the same time *widening of perspectives* was already decipherable by the end of the Second Session of the Council. From an independent *decretum de Iudaeis* treating exclusively of Jews, the declaration had become the fourth chapter of the schema dealing with ecumenism, headed by the title: *De catholicorum habitudine ad non-Christianos et maxime ad Iudaeos*⁵⁹ containing explicit, even if over-cautious and fleeting references to non-Christians other than Jews.

In his introductory elaboration of this draft on November 18th 1963, Cardinal Bea delineated the history of the declaration from its origin in John XXIII to the setbacks it had to suffer before it arrived in the Council hall. He elaborated on the Jewish question making a good case for it "with the authority he had as a great exegete"⁶⁰ and indeed limited himself to that which was exclusively of Jewish relevance. He did not make any mention of the other monotheistic non-Christians to whom the draft made fleeting reference in its first paragraph.⁶¹

This first paragraph constituted the introduction which tied the fourth chapter on non-Christians and especially Jews to the central and primary theme of the draft of the intended decree on ecumenism.⁶²

After having dealt with the principles of Catholic ecumenism we do not desire to pass over in silence the fact that these same principles, taking into account the diversity of conditions, should be applied with regard to the manner of dialogue and cooperation with non-Christians, who nevertheless honour God, or at

58. TAVARD, *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, 163.

59. *Acta Synodalia*, vol. II, pars V, pp. 431-432. This draft was distributed to the Council Fathers on November 8th, 1963.

60. R. ROUQUETTE, "La Deuxième Session", *Études* 320 (jan. 1964) 115.

61. *Acta Synodalia*, vol. II, pars V, pp. 481-485. "Il s'agissait essentiellement alors de se (le Concile) prononcer sur les Juifs, qu'une tenace tradition, à la fois populaire et liturgique, avait stigmatisés comme 'perfides' (c'est-à-dire parjures à la fois) et comme *déicides*...." J. MASSON, "La Déclaration sur les religions non-chrétiennes", *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, 87/10(1965) 1068.

62. G. M.-M. COTTIER, "L'histoire de la Déclaration" in *Unam Sanctam* 61, 45.

least, animated by good will, seek to observe according to their conscience the moral law written in the nature of man. Now this is true, above all, when it concerns the Jews because these are tied to the Church of Christ by a special bond (*speciali ratione*).⁶³

It is to be noted here that the reference is made not to the non-Christian religions but to the non-Christians. Moreover the mention is generic and does not refer to any particular religious adherence.⁶⁴ This insertion was suggested by Cardinal Bea apparently as an explanation of the relevance of the statement on the Jews to the schema on ecumenism with which, it was then considered, lay the chance of guaranteeing the survival of the declaration on the Jews.⁶⁵ Thus it was with a rather low-key entrance that the short and generic statement on non-Christians made its way into the draft of the declaration on the Jews. Nevertheless, this does not in any way eliminate but rather enhances the remarkability of this event which saw through not only the survival of the declaration but also the stepping stone for the first formal recognition of positive spiritual and moral factors in the non-Christian sphere, that is, outside the ambit of Christianity and in the world of other religions.

When the second session of the Council came to an end on December 4th 1963, the first three chapters of the schema on ecumenism had already been accepted as a basis for further discussion, but the fourth chapter had not made it "for lack of time".⁶⁶ Only the procedural vote of acceptance of a given draft as a basis for future conciliar discussion would have withdrawn Chapter IV from the competence of the Co-ordinating Commission and turned it into an unalterable part of the Council proceedings.⁶⁷ As it happened, however, the Second Session ended without a discussion of the fourth chapter on the Jews and non-Christians but with an invitation to the Council Fathers to send their observations regarding it, in writing, to the relevant commission.⁶⁸

4. Pope Paul VI's Vision and Initiatives

During the Intersession following the Second Session, three events took place which, although not directly connected with the Council, would prove

63. Cf. note 47.

64. A.A. ROEST CROLLIUS, "Vaticano II e religioni non cristiane", *Rassegna di Teologia* VII/2 (marzo-aprile 1967) 65.

65. Cf. OESTERREICHER, in *Commentary*, 46.

66. Cardinal A. BEA in *Acta Synodalia*, vol. II, pars V.

67. Cf. OESTERREICHER, in *Commentary*, 54.

68. Cf. COTTIER, *Unam Sanctam* 61, 47.

to be determinant on the immediate redaction and final form of the text of the declaration on the Jews. All three events had their origin in the initiative of Pope Paul VI and attracted the attention of the world on the problem of non-Christian religions and, consequently, on the attitude of the Church towards the Muslims and their religion.⁶⁹

The brilliant idea of making a *pilgrimage to the Holy Land*, the “cradle of Christianity”⁷⁰, gave the Pope the opportunity of encountering the Jewish and the Islamic-Arabic world. The Pope made history with various actions, manifestations and statements of his during the pilgrimage⁷¹, and the world was moved by his courage and frankness especially in his appeals for peace. From Bethlehem he launched a message of peace to the Christians and to the world. In an explicit way he addressed himself to those who adhered to monotheism, among them the Muslims:

This respectful greeting, he said, we address in a particular way to whoever professes monotheism and with Us worships the one and true God, the living and supreme God, the God of Abraham, ... ‘the Most High God, the Creator of heaven and earth’ (Gen 14, 19). We Christians, instructed by revelation, know that God subsists in Three Persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, but today we praise the divine nature as one, we proclaim the one, living and true God. May also to these peoples, worshippers of the one God, go Our wishes of happiness and peace.⁷²

The Pope had already anticipated the nature of this message to the Jews and the Muslims in his recent Christmas radio-message when he had said:

Our heart will stretch forth beyond the flock of Christ. It will have high and good thoughts about all the peoples of the earth, whether they be near or far away, to manifest to them Our

69. Cf. R. CASPAR, “Le Concile et l’Islam”, *Études* 324 (Jan 1966) 116.

70. M. MACCARRONE, *Il Pellegrinaggio di Paolo VI in Terra Santa*, (Roma 1964) 25.

71. “This Pope is a man of spirit. He is making history. Christendom is taking hold... of new powers of action.” Thus wrote the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of January 4th 1964. As cited in OESTERREICHER, in *Commentary*, 58.

72. “Ce salut déferent, Nous l’adressons d’une manière particulière à quiconque professe le monothéisme et avec nous rend un culte religieux à l’unique et vrai Dieu, le Dieu vivant et suprême, le Dieu d’Abraham, le Très-Haut, celui que justement sur ce sol – en un jour lointain que rappellent la Bible et le Missel – un personnage mystérieux, dont l’écriture ne nous a transmis ni la généologie ni la fin, et dont le sacerdoce royal a servi à qualifier celui du Christ lui-même, Melchisédech, célébra comme ‘le Dieu Très-Haut, créateur du ciel et de la terre’ (Cfr. *Gen* 14, 19). Nous chrétiens, instruits par la révélation, nous savons que Dieu subsiste en trois Personnes, Père, Fils et Saint-Esprit, mais toujours nous célébrons la nature divine comme étant unique, nous proclamons unique le Dieu vivant et vrai. Qu’à ces peuples adorateurs d’un Dieu unique aillent aussi Nos vœux de paix dans la justice,” *AAS* 56 (1964) 178.

sentiments of respect and love and also Our wishes of happiness and peace.⁷³

Both this previous message from the Vatican and the one from Bethlehem were in conformity with the attentive and respectful attitude of Paul VI towards "all men of good will"⁷⁴ including those "beyond the horizon of Christianity".⁷⁵ Indeed, referring to the religion of those non-Christians who retained the notion of the one God, supreme and transcendent, who worship Him and base their moral and social life on Him, Paul VI had said at the opening of the Second Session of the Council: the Church esteemed all that which in them was true, good and human.⁷⁶ On the Maundy Thursday following his pilgrimage he would again address himself to Jews and Muslims who had welcomed him in the Holy Land.⁷⁷ This address "to the believers in God" would in turn acquire a clearer context and a deeper elaboration on the following Easter Sunday when the Pope would declare that

"each religion possesses a ray of light which we must neither scorn nor extinguish even if it does not suffice to give a man that light which he is in need of nor to realize that miracle of Christian splendour wherein meet the truth and the life. Indeed every religion raises us towards the transcendent Being, the only reason of existence, of thought, of responsible action, of non-delusive hope.

73. "E il Nostro cuore si allargherà anche oltre l'ovile di Cristo, e avremo pensieri buoni e grandi per ogni popolo della terra, per i vicini e per i lontani, con senso di riverenza e di amore, e con augurio di bene e di pace," *AAS* 56 (1964) 62.

74. Cf. the radio-message that Pope Paul VI addressed on the very next day of his election: "Splendescat in hominum familia fidei et caritatis fulgidissima flamma, quae homines bona voluntate praeditos incendat, eorumque itinera collustret ad mutuam populorum coniunctionem provehendam, quaeque universis gentibus supernae benignitatis copiam, ipsumque Dei robur conciliet, sine quo nihil validum nihil sanctum", *ASS* 55 (1963) 577.

75. Cf. the *allocutio* which Paul VI made at the opening of the Second Session of the Council: "Catholica Ecclesia etiam longius respicit, ultra christianae familiae fines;..." *Acta Synodalia*, vol. II, pars I, 198.

76. "Ultra igitur christiana castra oculos suos dirigit, et ad alias religiones respicit, quae servant sensum et notionem Dei, unius, creatoris, providentis, summi et rerum naturam transcendentis; quae Dei cultum exercent sinceræ pietatis actibus; quae ex iis usibus et opinionibus morum et socialis vitae praecepta derivant.

"In his quidem religionibus catholica Ecclesia cernit perfectio, nec sine dolore, lacunas, defectus et errores; facere tamen non potest, quin ad eas quoque mentem suam convertat, ut easdem certiores faciat, catholicam religionem debita aestimationem iudicare quidquid veri, quidquid boni et humani apud ipsas reperitur;..." *Ibid.*, 198.

77. "Ed un saluto cordiale mandiamo anche, con memore riconoscenza, ai credenti in Dio, dell'una e dell'altra confessione religiosa non cristiana, i quali accolsero con festante riverenza il Nostro pellegrinaggio ai Luoghi Santi," *AAS* 56 (1964) 362.

Each religion is a dawn of faith, and we await its brightening into morn and into the radiant splendour of Christian wisdom”.⁷⁸

In all of these speeches, which he delivered at some critical stage in the evolution of the Council Fathers’ attitude regarding the intended pronouncement on the Jews and other non-Christians, the Pope; consciously or unconsciously, in just simply disclosing his mind and heart regarding non-Christians in general and monotheists in particular, succeeded to indicate – unobtrusively – the direction and content of the intended declaration on non-Christians and Jews, and thus helped in no small way towards the further definition of the conciliar document.

Translating his extraordinary statements into concrete action the Pope proceeded in the realization of his intention to create a *Secretariat for Non-Christian Religions*.⁷⁹ In his homily during the 1964 Liturgy of Pentecost, Paul VI announced the creation of the new secretariat, which he entrusted to Cardinal Marella, and indicating its purpose, declared: “No pilgrim, however distant, religiously or geographically, his country of origin, shall be completely stranger in this Rome, still faithful today to the historical design which the Catholic faith preserved for it as ‘patria communis’.”⁸⁰

Speaking to the Cardinals, some time later, the Pope elaborated on the actual task of the new Secretariat: “that it may lead to some sort of loyal and respectful dialogue with those who ‘still believe in God and worship him’....”⁸¹ The Pope continued by expressing his recognition of the fact

78. “Ogni religione ha in se bagliori di luce, che non bisogna ne disprezzare ne spegnere, anche se essi non sono sufficienti a dare all’uomo la chiarezza di cui ha bisogno, e non valgono a raggiungere il miracolo della luce cristiana, che fa coincidere la verità con la vita; ma ogni religione ci solleva alla trascendenza dell’Essere, senza di cui non è ragione per l’esistere, per il ragionare, per l’operare responsabile, per lo sperare senza illusione. Ogni religione è alba di fede; e noi l’attendiamo a migliore aurora, all’ottimo splendore della sapienza cristiana,” *AAS* 56 (1964) 394.

79. Cf. *Acta Synodalia*, vol. II, pars I, 9-13; *AAS* 55 (1963) 740-744.

80. “Vi daremo un annuncio a questo proposito (i.e. the universality of the Church and more precisely “lo sforzo che la Chiesa fa per accostare, anche con semplici contatti umani, gli appartenenti ad altre religioni”), affinché esso abbia voce e valore di Pentecoste; ed è questo: come tempo fa annunciammo, Noi istituiremo, e proprio in questi giorni, qui a Roma il ‘Segretariato per i non-Cristiani’, organo che avrà funzioni ben diverse, ma analoga struttura a quello per i Cristiani separati. Lo affideremo al Signor Cardinale Arciprete di questa Basilica, che alla saggezza e alla virtù, che lo fanno caro e venerato alla Chiesa romana, aggiunge una rara competenza dell’etnografia religiosa.

“Nessun pellegrino, per lontano che sia, religiosamente e geograficamente, il Paese donde viene, sarà più del tutto forestiero in questa Roma, fedele ancor oggi al programma storico che la fede cattolica le conserva di *patria communis*,” *AAS* 56 (1964) 432-433.

81. “Intanto, quale segno di quella universale sollecitudine che Ci fa interessare anche dei problemi e dei bisogni spirituali di tutti gli uomini, a somiglianza di quanto era stato già fatto per i Fratelli separati, con i quali continueremo con serenità gli amichevoli colloqui

that this Secretariat was born of the atmosphere of the Second Vatican Council, an atmosphere "of union and concord", but specified that its terms of reference were outside the Council itself.

The Secretariat for Non-Christians was precisely instituted by the Pope on May 19th 1964 and right from its beginning included a special section dedicated to Islam, a section which would in due time develop into a fully-fledged Commission for Islam dependent on the same Secretariat.⁸²

The aim of the Secretariat for Non-Christians got a solemn formulation and explication in the *Encyclical 'Ecclesiam suam'* which Pope Paul VI signed on August 6th 1964 and wherein he elaborated on and underlined the need of dialogue with all men. After referring to humanity in general the Pope turned his attention to those, also vast in number, who

"adore the one, supreme God whom we too adore. We refer briefly first to the children of the Hebrew people, worthy of our affection and respect, faithful to the religion which we call that of the Old Covenant. Then to the adorers of God according to the conception of monotheism, the Moslem religion especially, deserving of our admiration for all that is true and good in their worship of God. And also to the followers of the great Afro-Asiatic religions".

The Pope continued by saying that obviously the members of the Church cannot share in these various forms of religion. Nor could they give equal value to all forms of religion so that their followers are absolved from the duty to seek God in the perfect and definitive form in which he has revealed himself and in which he demands to be known, loved and served.

"But we do, nevertheless, recognize and respect the moral and spiritual values of the various non-Christian religions, and we desire to join with them in promoting and defending common ideals of religious liberty, human brotherhood, culture, social

avviati, Noi abbiamo determinato di istituire anche un distinto Segretariato per i non cristiani, che sia mezzo per venire a qualche leale e rispettoso dialogo con quanti 'credono ancora in Dio e lo adorano', per usare le parole del Nostro Predecessore Pio XI di felice memoria, nella Enciclica *Divini Redemptoris*.

"È chiaro che, data la sua precisa destinazione, questo Segretariato si colloca al di fuori del Concilio Vaticano II, ma esso è sorto dall' atmosfera di unione e di intesa, che ha nettamente caratterizzato il Concilio stesso.

"Con queste e con altre simili iniziative Noi pensiamo di dare una chiara dimostrazione della dimensione cattolica della Chiesa, che in questo tempo e clima conciliare non soltanto si stringe in vincoli interiori di intesa, di amicizie e di fraterna collaborazione, ma cerca anche al di fuori un piano di colloquio e di incontro con tutte le anime di buona volontà," *AAS* 56 (1964) 584.

82. Cf. M.L. FITZGERALD, "The Secretariat for Non-Christians is Ten Years Old", *Islamochristiana* 1 (1975) 87-88.

welfare and civil order. For our part, we are ready to enter into dialogue on these common ideals, and will not fail to take the initiative where our offer of discussion in genuine, mutual respect, would be well received.”⁸³

In his encyclical Paul VI provided what may be called a *theological* and at the same time *pastoral charter* expressing and explaining the new will for encountering, for listening, for understanding.⁸⁴ Without wanting to anticipate the pronouncement of the Council, the Pope sought to say something of those to whom this invitation for dialogue was addressed.⁸⁵ Evidently this initiative of Paul VI was bound to have a powerful influence on the task of the Council Fathers regarding the problem of non-Christian religions. And it did have! In fact all those who read and reflect upon the texts of the Council regarding non-Christian religions cannot fail to be struck by the convergence of attitudes and expressions that is found in the conciliar documents and the Pope’s statements.⁸⁶

5. The First Tentative Texts on Islam

The Second Session of the Second Vatican Council had been dominated by the schemes *de Ecclesia* and *de Oecumenismo*. Neither of them yet spoke of Islam.

83. “Circa nos deinde circum idem amplissimum prospectamus, qui a nobis est minus longinquus. Eo imprimis homines comprehenduntur, qui Deum unum et summum adorant, quem nos quoque colimus. Mentionem scilicet inicimus de filiis gentis Iudaeae, reverentia et amore nostro sane dignis, qui eam retinent religionem, quam Veteris testamenti propriam esse dicimus; deinde de iis, qui Deum adorant religionis forma, quae monotheismus dicitur, maxime ea qua Mahometani sunt astricti; quos propter ea quae in eorum cultu vera sunt et probanda, merito admiramur; ac demum de sectatoribus ampliarum religionum Africanarum et Asiaticarum. Liqueat nos variis hisce religiosi cultus rationibus non posse assentiri, neque esse neglegentes et incuriosos quasi cunctae, suo quaeque modo, sint eodem loco habendae et quasi ii qui illas profitentur, sinantur non inquirere, num Deus modum ab omni errore immunem ac certum ipse revelaverit, quo cognosci velit, amari, ministrari. Quin immo, sinceritatis officio ducti, ea quae nos credimus, oportet manifestemus, videlicet veram religionem esse unam eamque esse christianam, atque spem habeamus fore ut ab omnibus, qui Deum quaerant et adorent, ut talis agnoscatur.

“Nolumus tamen reverenter non respicere bona spiritualia et moralia, quae in variis religionibus, christiano nomine non insignibus, insunt; una enim cum iis provere iuvat ac tueri alta et praeclara, quae in campo libertatis religiosae, fraternitatis humanae, eruditionis ac doctrinae, beneficentiae socialis et ordinis civilis sunt communia. Quod ad haec magna attinet, quae nobis sunt cum illis consociata, colloquium a nobis poterit fieri, neque omitemus, quominus eius copiam demus quotiescumque, mutua sinceraque reverentia servata, benevole accipietur.” *AAS* 56 (1964) 654-655.

84. Cf. M. BORRMANS, “Paul VI et les Musulmans”, *Islamochristiana* 4 (1978) 4.

85. Cf. COTTIER, *Unam Sanctam* 61, 54.

86. Cf. BORRMANS, “les Musulmans”, 5.

The first suggestion to build the text on the Jews into the schema on the Church apparently came out during one of the early sessions of the commission entrusted with the drawing up of the *decretum pro Iudaeis*.⁸⁷ Although there was no opposition to the idea in itself, it was held that this would not absolve the Secretariat for Unity from its duty to propose to the Council a text on the Jews of its own.⁸⁸

The idea appeared again during the discussion of the first three chapters of the schema on Ecumenism – which included as its fourth chapter the declaration on the non-Christians and the Jews. In his vigorous objection to the inclusion of the statement on the Jews in the proposed decree, the Melchite Patriarch Maximos IV argued that “if one really wished to speak of the Jews at the Council, that could be done either in the schema on the Church or in that of the Church in the Modern World”.⁸⁹

Moreover several Council Fathers had insisted that if the Council was to take an interest in any particular non-Christian religion it should either take an interest in all or in none at all. Several maintained the importance of an explicit reference to the Islamic religion.⁹⁰

In the meantime the Arab world had been stepping up its campaign against the intended declaration on the Jews. The overtures of Pope Paul VI to the Arab-Islamic world, the manifestations of “his personal concern for non-Christian religions”⁹¹, his appeals for peace and understanding throughout the world apparently failed to induce a relaxation in the Arab opposition to the intended conciliar pronouncement. Indeed, the particularly positive attitude of the Pope with regards to Islam especially became more and more evident when one considers the fact that it was he who “took the initiative of personally asking the conciliar commissions to prepare a text on Islam each time there was to be a mention of the Jews”.⁹²

During the Intersession following the Second Session, the commission entrusted with the preparation of the schema *de Ecclesia* introduced a small statement on Islam in the chapter dealing with the People of God. This

87. Cf. OESTERREICHER, in *Commentary*, 36-37.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

89. *Patriarch Maximos IV*: “Ce chap. IV doit donc d’urgence être élevé du schéma de *Oecumenismo*.”

“Si l’on tient cependant à le conserver pour une cause que nous ignorons, il faut a) d’abord l’insérer dans un autre schéma où il serait mieux à sa place, par exemple dans le schéma de *Ecclesia* en parlant de l’histoire du salut ou dans le schéma en préparation sur la *présence de l’Eglise dans le monde*, comme témoignage de l’Eglise contre les racismes”, *Acta Synodalia*, vol. II, pars V, 544.

90. Cf above notes 49, 50, 51, and 53.

91. “The Muslim-Christian Dialogue in the Last Ten Years”, *Pro Mundi Vita Bulletin* 74 (Sept.-Oct. 1978) 11.

92. CASPAR, *Encounter* 21 (1976) 2.

second chapter considered how the Mystery of the Church (first chapter) is accomplished in the course of history and in the realization of its own catholicity.⁹³ The text was inserted, more exactly, in the paragraph dedicated to the consideration of the relationships to the People of God of “those who have not yet received the Gospel”.⁹⁴ The text reads thus:

“The sons of Ishmael, who recognize Abraham as their father and believe in the God of Abraham, are not strangers to the Revelation made to the Patriarchs”.⁹⁵

A note was intended to indicate that these “sons of Ishmael” were actually the Muslims.⁹⁶ It was thus formulated so that the text on the Muslims in connection with the draft of the constitution on the Church could be presented to the Council Fathers for the Third Session of the Council.⁹⁷

The wounds inflicted by the opponents of the declaration on the Jews, in the meantime, were making themselves even more felt. When the Secretariat responsible for the schema on Ecumenism met to consider the controversial draft on the Jewish question it decided to maintain the text because of its importance and of the expectations it had raised in the world.⁹⁸ However, in order to “appease its enemies the text was not only watered down but also “banished” to the appendix of the schema on Ecumenism.⁹⁹ The latter would henceforth deal solely with *unity amongst Christians*. The appendix, called “Second Declaration” – the “First Declaration” being the one on Religious Liberty – would consider *not only the Jews but also the other non-Christian religions and “especially” Islam*.¹⁰⁰

When the “Second Declaration: On Jews and non-Christians” came before the Co-ordinating Commission it underwent another “whittling

93. G. PHILIPS, *La Chiesa e il suo mistero*, vol. I (Milano 1969) 51.

94. Cf. *Schema Constitutionis De Ecclesia*, Caput II, *De Populo Dei*, n. 16 (De non-christianis): “Ii tandem qui Evangelium nondum acceperunt, ad Populum Dei diversis rationibus ordinantur (Cf. S. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.* III, q. 8, a. 3, ad 1)...” *Acta Synodalia*, vol. III, pars I, 158-192, here 189.

95. “Nec revelationi Patribus factae omnino extranei sunt filii Ismael, qui, Abraham patrem agnoscentes, in Deum quoque Abrahe credunt.” *Ibid.*, p. 190.

96. “Haec phrasis respicit ad Islamistas,” *Ibid.*, p. 206.

97. The schema on the Church had dominated the Council discussions of the Second Session and at that time it contained just four chapters and made no mention of the Muslims. Subsequently it had six chapters and finally it had eight chapters and it was at this stage that the first insertion on the Muslims was made, in time for the initiation of the Third Session on the 14th September 1964.

98. Cf. COTTIER, *Unam Sanctam* 61, 47.

99. OESTERREICHER, in *Commentary*, 59.

100. Cf. COTTIER, *Unam Sanctam* 61, 48.

down”¹⁰¹ so that the draft which was presented by Cardinal Bea during the Third Session of the Council was actually the fruit of not only the Secretariat for Unity but also, and more immediately, the Co-ordinating Commission under whose hands it suffered the latest definition.¹⁰² It appeared in the Council *aula* in three parts: the *first* section dealing with the question of the Jews, the *second*, the relations with non-Christians and more particularly with Muslims, and the *third* condemning discriminations for racial and religious motives.¹⁰³

As has already been indicated, the evolution of the drafts that brought forth the texts which included statements on Islam and the Muslims was sharply dominated by the Jewish problem. The development of the declaration from a document intended solely as a statement regarding the Jews to a document dealing with “Jews and non-Christians” suffered many setbacks. But these setbacks spurred the Council Fathers on to newer efforts and deeper reflection and these gave forth fruits which, although not instantly ripe, did constitute a step forward in the tortuous path which the declaration was destined to follow.

Just as it was in the context of tense opposition to the declaration that the first *oral* conciliar references to Islam and the Muslims were made, so it happened that it was also in the implacable continuation of this opposition that the first tentative statements on the Muslims were written.

Thus it can be said that it was during the Intersession between the Second and the Third Sessions of the Council that the definitive conciliar initiatives regarding Islam and the Muslims were taken.¹⁰⁴

From what we have just seen above, and from what followed in the next Sessions of Vatican II¹⁰⁵, one cannot but conclude that the textual statements dealing with Islam and the Muslims contained in the conciliar documents promulgated in the Second Vatican Council are, in a most particular way, an achievement of the Council. It is a fact that, at its inception, the Council had no intention of considering Islam or any other

101. Cf. OESTERREICHER, *Commentary*, 60.

102. Cf. *Acta Synodalia*, vol. III, pars II, 559.

103. *Declaratio altera: De Iudaeis et de non-christianis*: n. 32 De communi patrimonio Christianorum cum Iudaeis; n. 33 Omnes homines Deum ut Patrem Habent; n. 34 Omnis species discriminationis damnatur, *Acta Synodalia*, vol. III, | pars II, 327-329.

104. Cf. CASPAR, *Unam Sanctam* 61, 203.

105. This second part of the evolution of the Council statements on Islam and the Muslims will be the object of a second article to be published in the subsequent issue of *Melita Theologica*.

non-Biblical religion. Indeed, the first distinctive feature which sets these texts apart from the other conciliar statements is that they did not constitute an object of intent in the preparatory and early stages of the Council and are wholly the result of an evolution of successive drafts determined by a course of events which could not have been anticipated.

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PRAYER AS A LIVED RELATIONSHIP

A Psychological Study

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Questions about the contents and the various dimensions of a relationship lived with God in prayer can be asked and indeed they ought to be asked, even from the psychological point of view. How, indeed, is prayer structured? Does prayer vary from one sex to the other? Or from one culture to another?

Questions such as these shaped my investigation into the phenomenon of prayer.¹ My empirical project had a two-fold objective. The first was the development of a research instrument to be used in such an investigation.² The second was an application of this tool to religious experience and the phenomenon of prayer.

The first objective was necessary because the science of the psychology of religion has been notably lacking in studies on prayer. The few studies that do exist have, for the most part, been merely descriptive and they have been relatively deficient in the use of scientific methodology. These few studies have tended to concentrate on children and adolescents.

Raymond Kuhlen has, however, stressed the importance of various factors in the religious life of adults. He has underscored the need to describe and define religion with greater clarity.³ Kuhlen cited the importance of data in the description and specific identification of the religious nature of adults, and suggested factor analysis as a means of investigation of the data. My own study has made use of factor analysis in the hope that, not only would it contribute to the development of scientific methodology in the psychology of religion, but also that it would contribute to a deeper understanding of prayer, the core of religion.

1. Fuller details are contained in my doctoral dissertation, *Prayer as a Lived Relationship: A Psychological Study* (Louvain 1986).

2. *The Religious Experience and Expression in Prayer Scale (REEPS)* is the name which I have given to the instrument.

3. See Raymond G. Kuhlen, "Trends in Religious Behaviour During the Adult Years," in Lawrence C. Little, ed., *Wider Horizons in Christian Adult Education* (University of Pittsburgh Press; Pittsburgh, PA 1962) 15-62.

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A Point of Departure

As we begin with some basic operational aspects of the study, religion can be considered to be a felt practical relationship with what is believed to be superhuman being(s).⁴ It has its roots in a life that is experientially lived. Antoon Vergote has correctly emphasized that the origin of religion is in the experience and existence of life.⁵ He has stressed that that experience is dynamic and vital. As such, it exists in sharp contrast to inanimate objects and static artifacts. Thus, a very important first characteristic of religion is that it is a vital and very real fact of human life, as it is actually lived.

Another quality of religion is that it encompasses the whole person in his or her relationship with God. Religion and its various expressions are a response of the total human personality, with its individual and collective dimensions. Religion is a comprehensive experience and expression of life itself. One's relationship with God, represented and experienced affectively, is expressed through, and depends on, concrete symbols.⁶ The all-pervasive nature of religion is bonded together in a dynamic unity of various elements. This unity consists of language, feelings, behaviour, and signs which refer to a supernatural being(s).

Accordingly, religion appears to be a specific cultural phenomenon. As a cultural phenomenon, religion has its nuances and its culturally-pertinent aspects. Moreover, religion comprises a symbolic system expressed in individual life and social institutions. Religion, then, is a complex and dynamic human reality with language, belief, feelings, symbols, and praxis.⁷

Prayer

And what is prayer? "Prayer," according to the typical dictionary, is an address (as a petition) to God in word or set of words and thought; an earnest request; an act or practice of praying to God; or a religious service consisting chiefly of prayers. "To pray," as a transitive verb, means to entreat or implore, to get or bring about by praying; while the intransitive verb means to address God or a god with adoration, confession, supplication, or thanksgiving. Etymologically, the English terms derive from the Latin *precare* (to supplicate), a word which suggests the attitude of the

4. See R. H. Thouless, *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* (University Press; Cambridge 1971) 11.

5. See *Religie, geloof en ongeloof: psychologische Studie* (Nederlandsche Boekhandel; Antwerp 1984) 30.

6. See Vergote, *Religie*, 52-53.

7. See Vergote, *Religie*, 15-16.

human person who is aware of his or her own frailty before the Almighty.⁸ Accordingly, "Prayer expresses the consciousness that man has in speaking to his God of his precarious condition. The significant intention which animates prayer is the consciousness of a lack, even if one does not know what is lacking and prays only in order to know."⁹ The fisherman's prayer is indeed apropos: "O God, thy sea is so great and my boat is so small."

Communication

Prayer is a mode of communication, an encounter with the divine.¹⁰ It is, as Vergote states, the activity by which a human being enters into communication with a supernatural being.¹¹ Communication includes an exchange of sentiments, ideas, and the like. It is truly interaction. Thus prayer is a dialogue,¹² conversation par excellence,¹³ a conversation with Christ.¹⁴ *Magna ars est conversari cum Deo*, said Thomas a Kempis. The root meaning of *conversatio* is keeping company with. Thus prayer is not merely a simple conversation; it is an intoxicating dialogue that unfolds through filial conversation and concentrated silence with God.¹⁵ The essential pattern of prayer is that of a conversation between a human person and God, a conversation which arises from a bilateral and beneficial relationship rooted in God's graciousness and an individual's trust.¹⁶

Experience and Expression of the Whole Person

Prayer explicitly involves the total human personality; it engages the whole being.¹⁷ All human experiences are expressed in prayer, Vergote says.¹⁸ For Vergote, prayer is an act which expresses the total human person. Prayer relates everything to God: one's desires, religious experiences, doubts, conflicts of faith,... etc.

8. See Y. Raquin, *How To Pray Today* (Abbey; St. Meinrad, IN 1973) 5.

9. Vergote, *Religie*, 259.

10. See Anthony Bloom, *School for Prayer* (Darton, Longman and Todd; London 1972) 63.

11. *Religie*, 256.

12. See D. Saliers, "Prayer and Emotion: Shaping and Expressing Christian Life," in John Gallen, ed., *Christians at Prayer* (University Press; Notre Dame, IN 1977) 46.

13. See P. Penning de Vries, "Experience of the Living God: The Core of Prayer," *Review for Religions* 37 (1978) 237-246.

14. See P. Rohrbach, *Conversation with Christ: An Introduction to Mental Prayer* (Dimension; Denville, NJ 1965).

15. See Paul VI, in *The Teachings of Pope Paul VI*, 3 (Vatican City 1971) 145.

16. Paul VI, 1976.

17. See Edgar N. Jackson, *Understanding Prayer: An Exploration of the Nature, Disciplines, and Growth of the Spiritual Life* (SCM; London 1980) 52.

18. Vergote, *Religie*, 256.

Prayer does indeed express many of the dimensions of being human. Different authors attest to this in various ways. For Charles A. Nash, for example, prayer is a unique experience of the internal awareness of God.¹⁹ Prayer is an expression of desire, wrote Knight Dunlap.²⁰ Prayer focuses and expresses intention.²¹

As a reflective process, prayer is a functionally motivated behavioural event in order to achieve self-adequacy.²² It focuses on a need.²³ Described in existential terms like awakening, awareness, an consciousness, prayer is not only an expression of one's being, it is also an experience of one's being. It relates to every possible circumstance of life.²⁴ It vividly describes a person's state.²⁵ All prayer is conscious, but it also expresses both unconscious urges and the real self.²⁶

Prayer is the living embodiment of what one believes. It is an instrument by which faith expresses itself. The language of prayer is the primary language of faith,²⁷ yet the language of prayer is embedded in the fundamental gestures of the self and the community. Prayer not only expresses, it also forms, critiques, shapes, and refines emotions, beliefs, and one's way of relating to the world. A dialectic exists between the expression and the experience.

Activity of the Human Person and God

Classically,, prayer is the elevation of the mind and heart to God.²⁸ It is an activity by which one enters into communication with God.²⁹ Prayer is both a human activity, and a gift, a way of being and of letting be, an expressing and a being formed.

Humanly speaking, prayer is an activity in which humans explore their life unto God. Prayer is the human person in the totality of its being stretching out to possess the transcendent God in the intimate inwardness or

19. *The Relation Between Dynamic Psychological Structure and the Spiritual Life* (Pontifical Gregorian University; Rome 1961) 30.

20. *Religion: Its Function in Human Life* (McGraw-Hill; New York 1946) 126.

21. See Gordon Allport, *The Individual and His Religion: A Psychological Interpretation* (Macmillan; New York 1964) 133-134.

22. See O. Strung, *A Redefinition of the Psychology of Religion with Special Reference to Certain Psychological Theories of G. Allport* (Ph.D. Dissertation; Boston University 1962) 104.

23. See Paul E. Johnson, *Psychology of Religion* (Abingdon; New York 1959) 131.

24. See B. Jarret, "Meditation for Lay-Folk," *Review for Religious* (1975) 34, 43.

25. See de Vries, "Experience," 237-246.

26. W. Clark, *The Psychology of Religion: An Introduction to Religious Experience and Behaviour* (Macmillan; New York 1958) 307-327.

27. See Saliers, "Prayer and Emotion," 46.

28. Eugene Boylan, *Difficulties in Mental Prayer* (Newman; Westminster, MD 1967) 1-2.

29. See Vergote, *Religie*, 255.

the deepest consciousness. The art, techniques, and methods of prayer emphasize how one can pray better.

On the other hand, however, prayer is also a gift. It is letting God speak. It is an attitude of receptivity: of waiting, listening, and responding to God's movement. It is active and expectant awareness. It is active availability before God.³⁰ The primary attitude of Christian prayer is receiving, learning to truly listen and wait.³¹ Prayer is not a useful tool for bargaining, but a useless time of guilt, solitude, of sitting still and doing nothing in God's presence. It is not grabbing hold but letting go, not clamoring for attention, but learning the wordless art of silence.³²

Experience and Expression of a Lived Relationship

The core of prayer is the experience of the living God. Specifically, it is the experience of the presence of God and the discovery of God in the depth of one's self. As an experience of the presence of God, prayer actualizes the presence of God.³³ With its fundamental definition rooted in God, prayer is consciously being and living one's true self as having one's origin in God and finding completion only in Him. As Thomas Merton said, the purpose of prayer is experienced communion with God.³⁴ A person seeks intimacy or union with God in prayer. As spiritual writers have pointed out, the beginning of prayer is the discovery of God at the centre of one's very existence.

Within the context of Christian reflection, the experience of prayer can be explored by means of an analysis of its classic functions: adoration, confession, thanksgiving, intercession and petition.³⁵ Prayer is relationship and communication. Our working definition of prayer is that it is both an experience and an expression of a lived relationship with God. This experience and expression involves some complexity. It is not a matter of one single element. Rather there is a complexity of multi-faceted and interpenetrating psychic processes expressed in experience, thought, feelings, language, behaviour, signs and attitudes. All of these are caught up in the net of prayer.

30. See Vergote, *Religie*, 261.

31. See George Maloney, *Listen Prophets!* (Dimension; Denville, NJ 1977) 76.

32. See Nathan Mitchell, "Useless Prayer," in John Gallen, ed., *Christians at Prayer* (University Press; Notre Dame, IN 1977) 1-25.

33. See Abhishiktananda, "Prayer: The Presence of God," *Review for Religious* 34 (1975) 544.

34. *Spiritual Direction and Meditation* (Liturgical Press; Collegeville, MN 1960) 61-62.

35. See, for example, Gordon Wakefield, "Prayer: Confession," in G. Wakefield, ed., *A Dictionary of Christian Spirituality* (SCM: London 1983) 307-313; Adolphe Tanqueray, *The Spiritual Life: A Treatise on Ascetical and Mystical Theology* (Desclee; Tournai 21930) 243-248; Carl J. Pfeiffer and Janann Manternach, *Living Water: Prayer of Our Heritage* (Paulist; New York 1978) 62-80.

An experience is an act of trying, a direct participation in events, a conscious perception or apprehension of reality or of external, bodily or psychic events, of something personally encountered, undergone, or lived through. The very term implies not only that one has gone through something, but also that one has discovered something and retained the knowledge thereof. Psychologically, religious experience involves a mode of knowing through an intuitive and affective grasp of meanings and values perceived in a world which emits qualitatively differentiated religious or divine signs.³⁶

Glock and Stark consider religious experience to be one of the five dimensions of religion.³⁷ Under religious experience, they include "all of those feelings, perceptions and sensations which are experienced by an actor or defined by a religious group as involving some communication, however, slight with a divine essence, i.e., with God, with ultimate reality, with transcendental authority."³⁸ They go on to say that "the essential element characterizing religious experience and distinguishing it from all other human experience is *some sense of contact with a supernatural agency.*"³⁹

Religious experience is necessarily complex. It has a wide and varied fabric. It is composed of several interrelated and overlapping elements. Despite its complexity, we can, nonetheless, identify certain basic modalities of religious experience. Vergote has, in fact, identified five such basic modalities:

First, there is the intuitive and habitually accessible knowledge of a Transcendental Reality. The Transcendental Reality is perceived as immediately inherent in the world and/or in one's personal life, and as a mystery which is apparent through its manifestations. Second, there is a lived experience which is a profound affective knowing of a Supernatural Reality, which, in unveiling itself in its novelty, takes the person by surprise, summons him in his personal existence, and transforms him momentarily or in some lasting way. Third, there is the remembrance which is the fruit of personal and prolonged contact in which one is involved. Fourth, there is the mystical experience, expressed in the sustained event and systematic writings of the well-known mystics. Finally, there is the immediate knowledge coming from perception, for example, sight and hearing. For Vergote, each and every modality of awareness which is presented as instant knowledge is a form of experience.⁴⁰

36. See A. Vergote, *Psychologie religieuse* (Dessart; Brussels 1966) 8, 36.

37. The others are the ritualistic, the ideological, the intellectual, and what they call the consequential dimensions of religiosity. See Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, *Religion and Society in Tension* (Rand McNally; New York 1965) 20.

38. *Ibid.*

39. Their emphasis. See Glock and Stark, *Religion*, 41.

40. See Vergote, *Religie*, 116.

**A Method of Analysis:
The Construction of a Prayer Scale**

In order to study the dimensions and structure of a particular form of religious experience, namely, prayer expressions at a conscious level, a fitting research instrument was needed. The construction of the *Religious Experience and Expressions in Prayer Scale (REEPS)* had its origins in Pieter Van Ginneken's 1976 study. After the administration of an initial questionnaire to groups of religious men and women, Van Ginneken⁴¹ identified thirteen categories (with one hundred sub-categories), as follows: 1) the self-manifestation of God to the person; 2) communication between God and the person; 3) the recognition of God by the person; 4) the active relationship between God and the person; 5) the absence or refusal of relationship between God and a person; 6) the restoration of the God-person relationship; 7) the conquest of death; 8) struggle and effort; 9) activity and passivity; 10) God's fulfillment of the (human) needs of the person; 11) the social dimension; 12) evangelical life; 13) personalizations. Study of these categories by Van Ginneken and his team of collaborators⁴² resulted in the formulation of a 79-item questionnaire which was then used in an investigation of the prayer expressions of male and female religious living in Belgium and in Holland.

Factor analysis was used to examine the results of the survey. In the process, the most intensive or most expressive family or group of words within the constructed factor was combined each time with one or two other family/group of words within the factor. This was done for both positive and negative items. Each factor included both more important and less important items. It was considered that five items per factor provided a good expression or image of the contents of the whole factor.

In order to assess and develop the intercultural utility of the questionnaire, I had it translated by four different translators, working independently of one another.⁴³ The resultant translations were compared and analyzed. This was done in order to test the validity of the questionnaire and to determine whether the items of the original questionnaire would be significant for lay people (Van Ginneken had worked only with religious) and for lay people in different cultures, specifically the Filipino and the American, as well as to lay the ground work for the possible identification of new categories.

41. Van Ginneken's questionnaire was distributed in French and in Dutch.

42. The team included Van Ginneken, Antoon Vergote, Dirk Hutsebaut, Lieve Leys, and myself.

43. None of the translators knew that others were involved in a similar task.

Methods similar to those originally employed by Van Ginneken were used to explore the possible expansion of the questionnaire by the addition of new items. A pre-testing group of ten respondents⁴⁴ was asked to identify the fundamental core of their prayer life by a choice of five texts from among fifty (eight from the Bible, ten from religious poetry, two from prose, and thirty from profane literature). The selection was to reflect God's presence in their lives and their attention to God.

The analysis of this pre-test revealed eleven of Van Ginneken's thirteen categories and thirty-six of his sub-categories. Seven new categories with twenty-nine sub-categories were also identified. In addition to the three relational dimensions identified by Van Ginneken, i.e., God to the person, the person to God, and a reciprocal relationship between God and the person, a fourth relational dimension was discerned, namely, an inter-personal relationship. This led to the formulation of thirty-nine new items for the questionnaire.

In pilot studies (Pretests 2 and 3), the questionnaire was administered respectively to a group of Filipinos and to a group of Americans.⁴⁵ Apart from some minor modifications, the proposed instrument was found to be useful for an investigation of how Filipinos and Americans experience their personal relationship with God in prayer. The definitive 118-item questionnaire, to be self-administered, was prepared for distribution in a sixteen-page booklet.

346 subjects, of whom 43.4% were American and 56.6% were Filipino, 47.1% female and 52% male, participated in the test. Ranging in age from 19 to 64 years, they had a median age of 36. The respondents were asked to provide, anonymously, certain biographical information, for example, with regard to their education as well as their religious beliefs and practices.⁴⁶ An open question⁴⁷ allowed them to describe expressions of prayer not explicitly covered by the questionnaire. The questionnaire contained 118 items, to which the subjects were asked to respond on an eight-point scale.⁴⁸ For example:

44. The sample comprised then Filipinos, six men and four women, with an average age of 27.2 years. One was a university student, four had completed their university studies, and three were M.A. candidates. According to occupation, there was one student, one librarian, three counsellors, and five teachers.

45. Subjects in pretest no. 2 were eight Filipinos, three men and five women, all unmarried. All but one were university graduates. The subjects in pretest no. 3 were ten Americans, five men and five women, four of whom were married while the others were single.

46. The questionnaire was administered to a Roman Catholic population, of whom 35% occasionally attended Mass on weekdays in addition to Sundays, 44.5 regularly attended Sunday Mass, 15.6% attended irregularly, while 4.1% attended hardly or never at all. 87.6% had an absolute belief in God, while 10.7% had questions, and 0.9% had doubts.

47. "Do you have any other expressions which have not been tapped in this questionnaire? If so, please describe or write them. Why do you find them important?"

48. The full questionnaire is contained in my dissertation, pp. 218-231.

1. I live God's presence as a mutual relationship of speaking and listening.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

10. The word of God always means to me a claim to conversion.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

14. Self-denial is necessary for me to reach God.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

35. The thought of death occupies a great part of my relationship with God.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

50. Prayer is a central part of my life and I try to keep it alive.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

70. "I praise you and I adore you, Lord" expresses exactly my attitude in prayer.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

101. I feel remorseful when I have spent a day without God.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

118. I am convinced that perfection is the unity and harmony of all my experiences.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

An analysis of the 346 responses was conducted by means of the Factor Analytic Procedure. This allowed for the reduction of the variables a smaller number of hypothetical and interpretable values.⁴⁹ Essential to the statistical analysis was the transformation of the raw data to a correlation or covariance matrix, the computation of the initial factor loading coefficients, and the rotation to a final solution.⁵⁰ Initially fifteen factors were identified, and these were subsequently reduced to twelve or thirteen, depending on the subject group under specific examination.⁵¹

The application of the instrument was admittedly limited. It was administered to a uniquely Roman Catholic population, with a higher than average socio-educational status. Nonetheless the instrument which had been designed seems to have been adequate to measure that which it was designed to measure and, in that sense, must be considered a valid instrument.⁵² The reliability⁵³ of the test was confirmed by the consistency

49. See H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (University Press; Chicago 1967); K. Gorsuch, *Factor Analysis* (Saunders; Philadelphia 1974).

50. See P. Nie, et al., *Statistical Package for the Social Sciences* (McGraw-Hill; New York, 21975) 468-508.

51. Details of the application of the procedure can be found in my dissertation, pp. 72-73 and *passim*.

52. It could be legitimately administered to other populations with different religious, intellectual, social, and characteristics from those of the groups in my study. Indeed, the

of the factors as they emerged from an analysis of the prayer expressions of the different groups (Filipinos, Americans, males, females, Filipino males, Filipino females, American males, American females).

Some Results and a Discussion

In response to the basic question which prompted the research, i.e., What are the contents and structure of a lived relationship with God in prayer, it is clear that it would be useful to examine all eight groups and make a comparison among them.⁵⁴ In the present article, the results of the analysis of the female and male subject groups will be analyzed. Intensity scores point to the differences between the two groups.

Women:

Analysis of the contents of the factors resulted in the following profile:

Factor I: The personal presence of God, marked by dependency and efforts in prayer; a positive attitude towards God; intimacy, yet there are also mediators in the relationship.

Factor II: A strong focus on ethical behaviour, coupled with a slight reference to religious values.

Factor III: A very dominant theme of intimacy with God, with a slight religious-ethical facet.

Factor IV: An experience of guilt and fear before God, linked with a desire to encounter Him through individual and social expressions of faith.

Factor V: The expressions of faith experience.

Factor VI: A dominant exercise of self-autonomy, linked with a slight dependency on God.

Factor I: Interpretation

The dependency is expressed in the woman's approach to God as the source of help, rest, peace, blessings, hope and mercy. There is a trustful

results of Van Ginneken's original study confirm the potential of application of the more refined instrument.

53. The reliability of an instrument is generally checked by the readministration of the test, or by the administration of a parallel test. The anonymity of the present subject group, and the wide geographical distribution of the subject population, preclude the possibility of retesting. Had a retest been possible, the results would have been somewhat skewed because of the subject groups familiarity with the instrument itself. Thus, internal consistency must be considered the primary criterion for judging the reliability of the instrument.

54. That has been done in my doctoral dissertation. See pp. 80-167.

surrender and recourse to the transcendent, but reliable, God who supports human beings in trying times. Since prayer facilitates intimacy with God, women make efforts to pray and to be regular in prayer. The Stations of the Cross were identified as a meaningful form of prayer.

A broad positive attitude towards God is marked by praise, adoration, joy, and the importance of being called God's child and finding a new identity in Him. There is an awareness of keeping God as life's objective, and remorse which is felt in God's absence. Detachment and attentiveness are necessary in order that God be reached; woman's choice of God is based on her personal freedom.

Intimacy with God is characterized by union, the experience of God as He is, in a mutual and personal relationship of indwelling. Relational mediation is effected through the personhood of Christ and of Mary. The mediating channels are the inspiring Word of God (the Bible) and woman's conscience, where God's presence is manifested.

Factor II: Interpretation

A strong focus on ethical behaviour is found together with but slight reference to religious values. An ethical orientation can be discerned in three areas:

First, with regard to themselves, women experience a need to work out of their personal egoism in order to gain the full appreciation of others and of the world at large. Sincerity and honesty are essential. Attention must be paid to needs, which must be understood and taken seriously. A full life is desired. Commitment to a meaningful value system and one's life objective facilitates this full life.

Secondly, with regard to her relationships, woman needs to have confidence in her fellow human beings, within a context of respect for the interdependence and uniqueness of persons. Love is expressed explicitly by means of attention and responsiveness, as well as care, respect, responsibility, loyalty, and productivity.

Thirdly, with regard to her tasks, woman experiences a need to implement her great ideas and her ideals. Through career and work, women can improve the world. Immortality is based on the realization of good deeds.

The slight religious reference is expressed in the praxis of Christian love, that is, especially compassion. There is some desire to learn from God, whom woman approaches with affection despite the fact that God is seen as beyond her. God's will is discerned through woman's solitude and her awareness that religious values are to be integrated in one's day-to-day life.

Factor III: Interpretation

Intimacy with God is articulated as a mystical experience or union with him, as evidenced in the attraction to a spirituality of the desert, as an experience of the world together with God, or as seeing God as the Mother to whom women can cling.

The slight religious-ethical facet focuses on the woman's relationship with herself, i.e., the awareness that she needs to be gentle with herself. This is a form of authentic and healthy love of self. Intimacy with God finds expression in Christian ethical praxis in a woman's loving those who are perceived as hating her.

Factor IV: Interpretation

Women experience strong feelings of guilt and fear in the presence of God. Specifically, there is a fear of wasting His gift of life and its opportunities. Occasionally there is a desire to hide from Him, to escape his terrifying and critical glance. In her relationship with God, woman is aware of death and life's fragility.

The opposite facet of desiring to meet God's revealed in an individualized pattern of self-denial, renunciation, and discernment. Woman's identity is placed in the presence of God; she needs to understand His will with tranquility of mind. The social or institutional expression of faith is manifested in obedience to ecclesiastical laws and in religious vocations. In the celebration of the sacraments with others, woman's faith takes on its true form.

Factor V: Interpretation

The significance of the woman's faith experience is expressed in three areas. First, in regard to herself, achieving a living faith means to be open or vulnerable in her life experiences. Specifically, she embraces the full life through a *loving-doing-hoping* package. A sense of gratitude is also important. Secondly, with respect to others, her love is expressed in the giving of her time, attention, and presence to a significant other. Finally, as regards her relationship with God, her prayer is relative to her personal needs and the daily experiences of her life. Although God is always present, He is clearly different from others. Woman brings her self-identity into God's presence, i.e. she brings to Him who she really is and who she is able to become.

Factor VI: Interpretation

Strong personal autonomy is shown in the development of a *fighting spirit* in order to tackle life's burdens. There is a quest for perfection, i.e. the unity and harmony of life's experiences. There is an awareness of the importance of discipline in education; this is achieved only by means of personal struggle and self-mastery. Encountering God is based on her joy of living and her personal freedom.

The slight dependency on God is manifested in a trustful approach to Him as benefactor and refuge.

Men:

Analysis of the contents of the factors resulted in the following profile:

Factor I: The personal presence of God, characterized by intimacy, a positive attitude, efforts in prayer, and dependency.

Factor II: Ethical valency with a light religious touch.

Factor III: Guilt and fear before God, linked with dependency upon Him.

Factor IV: A desire to reach God in a distant relationship between Him and man.

Factor V: Dialectical tension between reliance upon God and the exercise of self-autonomy.

Factor VI: Receptivity and affection for a transcendent God.

Factor I: Interpretation

The demension of the male's intimacy with God is characterized by a mutuality of speaking and listening, a strong desire to be united with God, a belonging to and a new identity in God, a mystical experience of mutual dwelling, an attraction for the spirituality of the desert, a personal relationship in which man experiences the world together with God and where he experiences God as He is, a mutuality of affection, and the importance of being called a son of God.

A positive attitude is expressed in openness and receptivity, in trust and joy. There is praise and adoration. God is seen as a source of rest, warmth, peace, and love. There is a desire to learn from God, and the Christian praxis of loving those by whom one is hated.

Men put effort into the regularity, intimacy, and vividness of prayer. For them the celebration of sacraments with others and the Stations of the Cross are valuable forms of prayer. Mediating elements in men's relationships with God are God's word and the personhood of Christ.

Dependency is seen in approaching God confidently as for help and guidance. God is seen as one who supports men in difficult periods. God gives men what they need. He is the source of all. The male feels remorse in God's absence.

Factor II: Interpretation

In terms of his relationships, the male recognizes a need for confidence in his fellow men. Love is seen as a specific expression of care, respect, responsibility, loyalty, and creativity. It includes an attentiveness and responsiveness to the loved one's deepest needs and desires. There is an awareness of the individuality and interdependence of persons. The only specifically religious aspect was the praxis of Christian love which speaks of compassion, particularly to strangers.

With regards to tasks, man desires to strive for and realize his noble ideas and his ideals. In worthwhile actions he can build upon his immortality, for example, through work or the pursuit of his career, he can improve the world. Fidelity to a true value system is called for, especially in the interrelated values of a loving, active, and hoping praxis.

In regards to himself, man realizes the importance of sincerity, honesty, and the transcendence of his egoism in order to fully understand others. Man sees life as uncertain and desires to live a full life despite its fragility. Man needs to cultivate an attitude of gratefulness for blessings received. The deeper needs of the self are recognized, such as the need to be listened to, or the need to be understood or taken seriously. There is need for a purpose in life and a need to be gentle with oneself.

Factor III: Interpretation

Generally the man has a strong feeling of guilt or fear before God. Specifically this guilt results from the disobedience to church law and the denial of religious vocation. Dependency is manifested by man's approaching God as a source of help and blessings, especially in difficult times.

Factor IV: Interpretation

Longing for an encounter with God and the desire to understand Him is realized in receptive modes of detachment, self-denial, renunciation, solitude, and attentiveness towards God. The distance between man and God points to a God who sees men from everywhere, who is omnipresent but who is also unapproachably different from others.

Furthermore, the distance is widened when man, through sin, transgresses against God's fatherly love. God's look, then, can be either liberating or frightening.

On the other hand, man meets God through life itself. On the positive side, man needs to be open and vulnerable to his experiences. He needs to integrate his religious values into his day-to-day life. His prayer is relative to his needs and experiences of the day. On the negative side, man fears that he might waste God's gift of life and its opportunities.

Factor V: Interpretation

There is a dialectical tension between reliance upon God and the exercise of self-autonomy. Trusting recourse to God is experienced as confidently approaching Him as help, benefactor, and refuge in difficult times. Man is aware of the finitude of life. He experiences God like a mother to whom he can cling. Observance of parental teachings are considered to be important in religion.

Autonomy is manifested in a *fighting spirit* to face one's troubles in life. The discipline of struggle and self-mastery is necessary to the quest for perfection, which is the harmonious unity of all one's experiences. Man actively seeks God through his efforts in prayer. It is through Mary's mediating person that man becomes familiar with Christ.

Factor VI: Interpretation

A transcendent God is approached by man with an attitude of receptivity, the attraction to discern God's will in solitude, and affection in a relationship that is considered personal.

A Comparison

There were specific differences between males and females on the scores of some ten items in the testing process, for example, with regard to items 6, 11, 13, and 49, that is: (6) "I try to regularly maintain an intimate relationship of prayer with God;" (11) "I like to pray to Mary as the one who makes us familiar with her Son;" (13) "Sometimes I experience God as a mother in whom I can hide myself and to whom I can cling;" and (49) "The fact that God dwells in me never ceases to amaze me but I rejoice nonetheless in His presence."

In the process of factor analysis, it was discovered that among men there was an emphasis within factor IV, that is, the desire to reach God in the distant relation between Him and man. On the other hand, there was

an accentuation discerned among the female respondents with regards to factors III, "Very dominant theme of intimacy with God with a slight ethical-religious facet," I, "Personal presence of God marked by dependency, efforts in prayer, a positive attitude towards God, intimacy, and mediators in the relationship," and II, "Strong focus on ethical praxis together with but a slight reference to religious values."

What differentiates women from men are women's efforts in prayer, their tender affection for God, and their reliance upon Him. Their striving in prayer reflects a desire to maintain the presence of God and intimacy with Him. The nature of these women's tender affection is evident in the significance attached to being identified as God's children, experiencing God like a mother to whom one can cling, and experiencing God as He is. There is, in addition, particular reliance upon God, that is, the conviction that God helps in times of trouble. For these Roman Catholic women, Mary, in particular, serves as a mediator in the prayer relationship with God through Christ.

While motifs such as freedom generally distinguish the psychological profile of the American prayer experience from that of the Filipino and feelings of inferiority and insecurity characterize the Filipino profile in comparison with that of the American, some additional differences can be discerned when the tests of American women are compared with those of American men, and the tests of Filipino women with those of Filipino men.

When the prayer experiences of American women are compared with those of American men, among women there was a dominant emphasis with regards to four factors: (I) A personal presence of God marked by intimacy, dependency, and affection, along with efforts in prayer, (VI) the recognition of deep needs associated with seeing God as the norm for life, (V) a great attachment to a transcendent God and a dependency upon Him along with confidence in one's own efforts, and (III, bipolar) an awareness of a strong guilt before God, coupled with affection, as opposed to an awareness of self-confidence.

Among the men there was likewise a dominant emphasis with regards to four factors, as follows: (II, bipolar), with realization of ethical values in life, as but slightly opposed to seeing God acting in the conflicting roles of father and judge, (VI, bipolar), an active receptivity towards God, but slightly opposed to an active disposition towards others, (I) the personal presence of God, marked by dependency, receptivity, affection, modes in the relationship, and mystical experience, and (V) a refinement of one's attitude towards the self in order to facilitate a full appreciation of others and God.

What generally distinguishes the prayer experience of American women from that of men is the strong desire for union with God. The union

that is hoped for is characterized by mystical experience, the nearness of God's presence, and feelings of warmth and happiness. With that intimacy comes a certainty that God helps in difficulties. Secondly, God is seen as the norm for life, the locus for the unfolding of the self. Thirdly, a need for self-development is realized through the significance of expressions of love, the loss of self-centeredness in order to facilitate the appreciation of others and the world.

When Filipino women are compared with Filipino men, the mutuality of the relationship with God, characterized by intimacy and reciprocity, is seen to be particularly significant among women. There is, moreover, a desire to deepen that intimacy, a desire for union with the God who is unapproachably different from others. Striving for union with God leads to a discipline of prayer and self-renouncement, particularly in working through faults and weaknesses. Finally, the relationship with God is experienced as beneficial, that is, His presence leads to peace, rest, and other blessings in life.

In sum, affectivity and desire for union seem to be the prevalent mode in the religious relationship among women. Generally the results indicate that, in prayer, women strive for a deeper intimacy with God. This intimacy is characterized by tender affection along with a reliance on divine assistance. For women, the relationship with God is organized around a modal element with love as a central focus, that is, affective intimacy with a desire for union. Thus sexual differences do seem to imprint their psychological character on the relationship with God in prayer.⁵⁵

A General Reflection

It is obvious that not every aspect of religion, nor of prayer, can be reduced to the psychological. Yet religion and prayer are human phenomena and, as such, are subject to psychological inquiry. When it does so, it reveals the complexity of the religious phenomenon. Not only does it exist within a particular symbolic system, the Roman Catholic system in the present study, but it is also concretely subject to the variables of gender and cultural differences.

Specifically, the lived relationship with God in prayer seems to be structured in function of the psyche, as well as in function of religion.

55. The results of this empirical study thus seem to generally confirm the insights of Vergote who wrote that "in presenting God in the masculine, religion surely puts "Him" within the compass of a woman's heteroerosexual love; in this way, the desire for union seems to be a predetermined mode for women to live their religious faith," Vergote, *Religie*, 246.

From a pluriform religious experience a religious attitude arises. Religious feelings are experiences in which a person is aware of God's living presence as expressed in the affective modes. The lived relationship with God engages the totality of the person; it is the total human person which is expressed in prayer.

In short, prayer is an expression of a dynamic and complex relationship with God. This complexity is manifest in the tension of various bipolar elements brought into view by our study, for example, the experience of intimacy with God and an awareness of distance in the relationship, the need for self-autonomy and reliance on divine assistance, feelings of tender affection and the experience of fear and guilt before God. In sum, lived faith, as this is expressed in a lived prayer relationship, encompasses the real human person with the totality of his or her psyche.

OUTLINES OF THE CHRISTOLOGY OF ST. AUGUSTINE¹

Hubertus R. Drobner

Introduction:

The major studies on the Christology of St. Augustine and the *status quaestionis*

The number of studies on the christology of St. Augustine is surprisingly small, compared with the total amount of works on his life, person and writings, which is already immense.² The reason for this discrepancy seems to be that his life and person, philosophy, doctrines on trinity and grace were considered as of original interest. His christology, however, was regarded as rather "traditional",³ i.e. of no new impact on the development of the christological doctrine and therefore of little interest for research.

A small number of studies has nevertheless been published during this century. In 1901 Otto Scheel published the monograph "*Die Anschauung Augustins über Christi Person und Werk*",⁴ in which he deduced

1. This article is the publication of a series of three lectures given at the Faculty of Theology in Malta in April 1988. I should like to thank the Faculty, its Rector and my colleagues very cordially for their kind invitation and very amiable reception and accommodation. The text and division of the lectures have remained substantially unaltered, the notes were added for publication. All abbreviations of periodicals, series etc. are taken from *Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Abkürzungsverzeichnis, zusammengestellt von S. Schwertner* (Berlin/New York 1976). Augustine's works are abbreviated according to the *Augustinus-Lexikon*, I (ed. C. Mayer and others) (Basel-Stuttgart 1986 ff.) XLII-XLIV.

2. Cf. R. Lorenz, "Augustinusliteratur seit dem Jubiläum von 1954 =", *ThR* 25 (1959) 1-75; id., "Zwölf Jahre Augustinusforschung (1959-1970)", *ThR* 238 (1973) 292-333; 39 (1974) 95-138, 251-286; 40 (1975) 1-41, 97-149, 225-261; C. Andersen (ed.), *Zum Augustin-Gespräch der Gegenwart I-II* (= *WdF* 5, 327), (Darmstadt 1962 (1975)-1981); W. Geerlings, *Christus Exemplum. Studien zur Christologie und Christusverkündigung Augustins* (= *TThS* 13) (Mainz 1978).

3. Cf. e.g. J. A. Dörner, *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi*, 2 (Stuttgart-Berlin 1853) 88 f.; H. Reuter, *Augustinische Studien* (Gotha 1887) 230; O. Scheel, *Die Anschauung Augustins über Christi Person und Werk. Unter Berücksichtigung ihrer verschiedenen Entwicklungsstufen und ihrer dogmengeschichtlichen Stellung* (Tübingen-Leipzig 1901) 274. Criticized by T. J. van Bavel, *Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin. L'humain et le divin dans le Christ d'après saint Augustin* (= Par. 10) (Fribourg 1954) 176; Geerlings (note 2) 1.

4. Cf. note 3.

Augustine's christology from his knowledge and conception of the neoplatonic philosophy. Only in 1954 was this thesis critically examined by the great Dutch scholar Tarcisius van Bavel in his study *Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin. L'humain et le divin dans le Christ d'après saint Augustin*.⁵ He showed that Scheel had probably overestimated the influence of neoplatonic philosophy on the development of the christology of St. Augustine, as becomes especially clear by his rejection of the description of the unity of godhead and manhood in Christ comparable to substance and accident.

At about the same time W. Scholz wrote a thesis on *Christus bei Augustin*,⁶ where he tried to give a survey over the entire christology of St. Augustine, especially in connection with his doctrine of the Trinity and his ecclesiology. This thesis, however, was never published. He was certainly right in pointing out the influence of tradition (the *regula fidei*) and biblical exegesis, but had nearly inevitably to fail in attempting a treatise of all the christology of St. Augustine.

In 1976 an American scholar took up this line of research in returning once more to the question of the neoplatonic influence on the christology of St. Augustine: J. T. Newton, *Neoplatonism and Augustine's doctrine of the person and work of Christ: A study of the philosophical structure underlying Augustine's christology*.⁷

Wilhelm Geerlings in 1978 took up another starting point to approach the christology of St. Augustine, the history of piety, and called his book *Christus Exemplum. Studien zur Christologie und Christusverkündigung Augustins*.⁸ He intended to show how Augustine believed in Christ, conceived him personally and proclaimed this faith to his congregation, rather than philosophical issues, though he could not escape dealing with them, either. Geerlings already pointed out that so far the ancient rhetoric and education had not been taken into account, but might have had a considerable impact on St. Augustine.

So far, however, the christology of St. Augustine had been so little investigated, that only very few questions had been put and even less answered. But this train of thought was followed up by Basil Studer in Rome, who inspired his pupils to inquire into the christology of St. Augustine. In 1983 Pio de Luis Vizcaino completed his thesis on "The works of Christ in the preaching of St. Augustine. The classical rhetoric as tool of

5. Cf. note 3.

6. (Kiel 1956).

7. Thesis, Emory University 1969.

8. Cf. note 2.

patristic exegesis”⁹ and in 1984 I myself on “The grammatical exegesis in the christology of St. Augustine. The discovery of the formula *una persona*”.¹⁰

The basic idea to inquire into the rôle of grammatical exegesis in the christology of St. Augustine originated from the article by Carl Andresen “Zur Entstehung und Geschichte des trinitarischen Personbegriffs”.¹¹ He made apparent that Tertullian first developed the formula *una persona*, though in a trinitarian context, basing himself on grammatical exegesis. As Tertullian’s discovery on grounds of his personal history as well as the further development of the history of doctrine did not become commonly known and was to be re-detected only by Augustine, it seemed worthwhile to put the same question to St. Augustine. He, too, was excellently educated in ancient rhetoric and was certainly well acquainted with this exegetical technique, which already the exegetes of the Homeric poems had employed. Might not Augustine, too, have arrived at the *una persona*, now in a strict christological sense, by the same means as Tertullian? If so, one should be able to show, in how far Augustine was acquainted with the grammatical exegesis and employed it in his works, but also a direct influence on his christological concept of *persona* on the background of his contemporary theology.

This shall be attempted in three steps:

1. The grammatical exegesis in Augustine’s education and usage.
2. Grammatical exegesis and christology in St. Augustine.
3. Christological concepts prior and contemporary to St. Augustine.

Part one:

The grammatical exegesis in Augustine’s education and usage

1. Augustine’s knowledge of grammar and grammatical exegesis

The education and life of St. Augustine are far too well known as to dwell on them profusely. I should only like to call to mind the major stages of his education important for his knowledge of grammar. Born in 354, he learned the Latin language as a child easily, taught by his nurse. The first formation of this native language he received, as was usual, from the

9. *Los hechos de Jesús en la predicación de San Agustín. La retórica clásica al servicio de la exégesis patristica* (Thesis Lateran University, *Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum*; Rome 1983).

10. *Person-Exegese und Christologie bei Augustinus. Zur Herkunft der Formel una persona* (= PhP 8) (Leiden 1986) (Thesis Lateran University, *Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum*; Rome 1984).

11. *ZNW* 52 (1961) 1-39.

grammaticus, the teacher of grammars, from about 364 to 369, in his home town Thagaste. There he learned more of the language itself and its rules, read and learned to explain the most important classical authors like Cicero, Virgil and Sallustius. Being 15 years old he entered into the second stage of education going to the *rhetor* in Madaura, and two years later to Carthage, the capital of Northern Africa at that time. From the *rhetor* he learned the rhetoric and the other arts (*artes liberales*) of the antique encyclopaedic education (*enkyklios paideia*), i.e. arithmetics, music, geometry, astronomy and philosophy.¹²

What precisely Augustine learned in terms of grammar and grammatical exegesis can easily be established from the schoolbooks of his times preserved to us, e.g. the *Partitiones duodecim versuum Aeneidos principalium* by Priscianus, a contemporary scholar of Augustine.¹³ The text, in this case a verse of Vergil's *Aeneis* was read aloud according to the appropriate rhythm and then minutely analysed:¹⁴

“Teacher: Recite the verse.

Pupil: *Conticu-ere om-nes in-tentique – ora te-nebant* (*Aeneis* 2, 1).

T: Name the caesuras.

P. *Semiquinariae*, after *conticuere omnes*.

T: How many forms has the verse got?

P: Ten.

T: Why that?

P: Because it has two dactyls and three spondees.

T: *Conticuere*, which part of the sentence is that?

P: The verb.

12. For the structure of classical education cf. H.-I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité* (Paris 1948); H. Fuchs, “Bildung”: *RAC* 2 (1954) 346-362; id., “Enkyklios Paideia: *RAC* 5 (1962) 365-398; P. Blumenkamp, “Erziehung”: *RAC* 6 (1966) 502-559; G. Baravelle, *La pedagogia nel suo sviluppo storico*. I: *Dai popoli primitivi alla decadenza scolastica* (Rome 1970) 31-292; H.-Th. Johann (ed.), *Erziehung und Bildung in der heidnischen und christlichen Spätantike* (= WdF 377) (Darmstadt 1976) (rich bibliography). For the education of St. Augustine cf. especially H.-I. Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (Paris 1958). Bibliographical supplement by W. Geerlings in the German translation: *Augustinus und das Ende der antiken Bildung* (trans. L. Wirth-Poelchau in co-op. with W. Geerlings) (ed. J. Götte) (Paderborn 1981) 567-586; Solignac, note 5: *BAug* 13 (1962) 659-661; Baravalle 259-292.

13. Ed. H. Keil: *Grammatici Latini*, vol. III (Leipzig 1859 = Hildesheim 1961), 457-515. Priscianus lived in the reign of emperor Anastasius (491-518). For his life cf. R. Helm, “Priscianus”, 1: *PRE* 22/2 (1954) 2328-2330; for the “Partitiones” ib. 2341 f; M. Schanz/C. Hosius/G. Krüger, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur bis zum Gesetzgebungswerk des Kaisers Justinian*, vol. IV/2: *Die Literatur des fünften und sechsten Jahrhunderts* (= HAW 8, 4, 2) (München 1920) 221-238; J. R. Martindale, *The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*, vol. II (Cambridge 1980) 905.

14. *Prisc aen*, 2, 44 f. (*Grammatici Latini*, III 469, 15-23).

T: Which form?

P: The perfect.

T: Which modus?

P: The indicative of the second conjugation" etc.

After this first analysis of the verse and its words followed the definition and exercises of grammatical phenomena:¹⁵

"Teacher: What is a pronoun?

Pupil: The part of a sentence, that holds the place of a noun, means virtually the same and is personal at times.

T: How many accidents has a pronoun?

P: Six.

T: These are?

P: *Qualitas, genus, numerus, figura, persona, casus.*" etc.

Finally there had to be presented a paraphrase of the verse in the pupil's own words and the explanation of its contents.¹⁶

Augustine, being a rhetor himself, taught according to the same method as is shown by a passage in *De magistro*, where he read Virgil's *Aeneis* together with his son Adeodatus.¹⁷

2. The techniques of the classical grammatical exegesis

Grammatical exegesis forms a part of the literal exegesis of texts as practised in the antique grammar schools since hellenistic times.¹⁸ It inquires after the subject of the sentence, the person speaking. "*Quis dicit?*" Who speaks? is the standard question, which might elicit three different responses:

(1) The subject is explicitly mentioned in the sentence and thus plainly clear.

(2) The subject has to be derived from the forms of the verb, adjectives, pronouns or other indications. In this case it may even happen that the subject of the sentence cannot be one of the persons of the play, but is e.g. the poet himself, who speaks himself (*ex persona sua*).

(3) The subject has to be inferred from the content or the context of the sentence. In this case it might be the same subject as in the preceding sentence, but there might have happened as well a silent *mutatio personae*, a

15. Donatus, *Ars grammatica* (*Grammatici Latini* IV 357, 2-4 Keil). For further examples cf. *Prisc aen* 5, 99-6, 110 (GL III 482-484); 7, 135-142 (491 f.); Don *gramm* (GL IV 359 f.); Maximus Victorinus, *Ars grammatica* (GL V 201).

16. Cf. Augustinus, *Confessiones* 1, 17, 27 (CChr.SL 27, 15, 7 f. Verheijen). "*cogebamur et tale aliquid dicere solutis verbis, quale poeta dixisset versibus*".

17. *Aug mag* 2, 3 (CChr.SL 29, 160, 6-13 Daur).

18. Cf. H. Dachs, *Die lúsis ek tou prosòpou. Ein exegetischer und krisischer Grundsatz Aristacchs und seine Neuanwendung auf Ilias und Odyssee* (Thesis, Erlangen 1913).

changing of subjects. Then it might be the poet speaking or any other person in or outside the play. Criterion for its recognition, next to purely grammatical arguments, is the query to which person the content is suitable (*cui aptum?*).

This criterion is, however, eventually applied to all three cases. It is always asked, even if the grammatical subject is perfectly clear, whether this sentence might not be more suitable (*aptius*) attributed to another person in order to reveal a deeper, inner meaning. That is, one inquires if not the grammatical person represents another person, speaks instead of another person (*loquitur ex persona alterius*). Thus grammatical exegesis comes near to allegorical exegesis whose aim it also is to detect the hidden meaning of a text, though its technique is different.

In order to show how this exegesis actually worked I should like to refer to two passages from antique commentaries which St. Augustine most probably knew as well: one from the *Scholia* on the Iliad, the other from the Commentary on the Letters of Horace by Pomponius Porphyrio.

Regarding Iliad 5,297 "*Aineias de aporouse sun aspidi douri te makrò* – but Aeneas leapt down with shield and long spear" the *Scholion* explains: "This is clearly said by Hector (*ek tou Ektoros prosopon*).¹⁹ Here the person pronouncing the sentence, the poet, Homer himself, is substituted by Hector, because this sentence reports the view of Hector and is therefore more suitably said by him.

In his first letter of the second book Horace asks:²⁰ "If poems are like wine which time improves, I should like to know what is the year that gives to writings fresh value. A writer who departed this life a hundred years ago, is he to be reckoned among the perfect an ancient, or among the worthless and modern?" The answer he gives himself is: "He is ancient and good, who completes a hundred years." This answer is commented on by Porphyrio:²¹ "This is said as if by another person" (*ex alia persona*). Horace goes on: "What of one who passed away a month or a year short of that, in which class is he to be reckoned?" Comment: "This is said by himself" (*ex sua persona*). Answer: "He surely will find a place of honour among the ancients." Comment: "This by another person" (*ex alia persona*).

Augustine employs this kind of exegesis on classical texts three times in his work:

19. *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem (Scholia Vetera)*, II (rec. H. Erbse) (Berlin 1970) 49, 40 f.

20. *Hor ep 2*, 1, 39-45 (trans. H. R. Fairclough) *LCL* 194 (1970) 339.

21. *Commentum in Horatium Flaccum*, (ed. A. Holder) (= *Scholia Antiqua in Q. Horatium Flaccum* 1) (Otting 1894).

(1) In *Contra academicos* he interprets the sea-god Proteus in the songs of Homer, that he is introduced to be an image of the truth (*in imaginem veritatis inducitur*) and discloses and sustains the person of the truth (*veritatis ... ostentat sustinetque personam*)²² – *personam inducere, ostentare, sustinere* all being expressions of the grammatical exegesis.

(2) In *Sermo 105* he speaks about *Luke* 1,33 “and to his reign there will be no end”. As a parallel quotation he adds Virgil, *Aeneis* 1,278 f., where Jupiter promises: “For these I set neither bounds nor periods of empire, dominion without end have I bestowed.”²³ This is, however, contradicted by *Luke* 21, 33 “heaven and earth will pass away”. Augustine solves this divergence by showing that in the *Aeneis* Virgil is not expressing his personal opinion, but speaking *ex persona Iovis*. Virgil’s own belief is rather reported in *Georgica* 2,498, where he says *ex sua persona*: “no power of Rome, no kingdoms doomed to fall” (sc. will endure).²⁴

(3) A third time Augustine explains a classical text using grammatical exegesis, in *De Civitate Dei* 10, 27.²⁵ There he recounts that Christ took upon himself the whole man, but without sin, in order to redeem him wholly from sin, so that not even a trace of sin remained. This event, he says, had already been predicted by Virgil, *Eclogue* 4, 13, though only “through the foreshadowing person of another man” (*in alterius adumbrata persona*): “Under thy sway, any lingering traces of our guilt shall become void, and release the earth from its continual dread.”²⁶

These few tests show quite clearly, that St. Augustine did not only know the techniques of grammatical exegesis (which was to be expected by his education) but actually used it in its original context throughout his life, as *Contra academicos* is to be dated 386/87, *Sermo 105* in the years 410/11 and *De Civitate Dei* in the year 417.

22. *C acad* 3, 6, 13 (CChr.SL 29, 42, 6-13 Green).

23. *His ego nec metas rerum, nec tempora pono, imperium sine fine dedi.* (Translation by H. R. Fairclough) *LCL* 63 (1974) 261.

24. *Non res Romanae perituraque regna.* Translation ib. 151.

25. CChr.SL 47, 302, 33-43 (Dombart/Kalb).

26. *Te duce, si qua manent sceleris vestigia nostri* (Translation by H. R. Fairclough): *LCL* 63 (1974) 31. Augustine follows here the long tradition of Christian interpretation of the fourth eclogue as pointing to Jesus Christ. Cf. E. Norden, *Die Geburt des Kindes. Geschichte einer religiösen Idee* (= SBW 3) (Leipzig-Berlin 1924); J. Carcopino, “*Virgile et le mystère de la IVe Éclogue* (Paris 1930); A. Kurfess, “Vergil, der Prophet. Zum großen Vergiljubiläum (30 v.Chr. – 1930 n.Chr.)”: *PastB* 41 (1930) 262-271; W. M. A. van de Wijnperse, “Vergilius bij Augustinus”: *StC* 7 (1930-31)138-140; K. H. Schelkle, *Virgil in der Deutung Augustins* (= TBAW 32) (Stuttgart 1939) 16-22; A. Kurfess, “Vergils vierte Ekloge bei Hieronymus und Augustinus ‘Iam nova progenies caelo demittitur alto’ in christlicher Deutung”: *SE* 6 (1954) 5-13; P. Courcelle, “Les exégèses chrétiennes de la quatrième Éclogue”: *REA* 59 (1957) 294-319.

3. The grammatical use of *persona* in St. Augustine

St. Augustine uses the word *persona* in his works 1407 times in all.²⁷ If one goes over these citations one notes above all that St. Augustine never makes use of *persona* in its original meaning, viz. the mask that the actor wears on the stage. Moreover he never uses *persona* in the context of the theatre. If he employs the meaning of "mask" at all, he does so only in a figurative sense. This makes it thus highly improbable that "person" meaning "mask in the theatre" has had any influence on the theology of St. Augustine.

In general, Augustine employs *persona* in four meanings or contexts:

- (1) man as a person,
- (2) *persona* as a term of rhetoric,
- (3) *persona* in juridical contexts, and
- (4) *persona* in grammar and grammatical exegesis.

This excludes, of course, solely theological meanings of *persona* as they are found in christology and the doctrine on the Trinity. Those are, by the way, relatively few and here neglected, because the influence of grammar and grammatical exegesis in comparison to other non-theological meanings of *persona* on the theological use of *persona* shall be established in order to show which one of these might have had the most influence on Augustine's christology.

(1) Regarding man *persona* may, as already mentioned, mean the mask he wears in life. "They play foreign rôles like hypocrites, who hide under their mask (*sub persona*) what they are, and show on their mask (*in persona*) what they are not", says Augustine in *De sermone Domini in monte*.²⁸

Secondly, *persona* in the context of man can mean the task or duty of a man, which Augustine employs four times, exclusively in the expression *personam implere* (to fulfill one's task or duty).²⁹

Thirdly, *persona* can be a synonym of *homo* as *homo* in its turn had likewise substituted *vir*.³⁰ This use is comparatively frequent in Augustine. He speaks of a discussion with a person (*disputatio cum persona*),³¹ the

27. Cf. the *Augustinus-Index*, which was compiled as a preliminary study for the *Augustinus-Lexikon* (note 1) and is available on request from: Augustinus-Lexikon, Steinbachtal 2, D-8700 Würzburg, West-Germany.

28. 2, 19, 64 (*CChr.SL* 35, 160, 1461-63 Mutzenbecher).

29. *En Ps* 50, 24 (*CChr.SL* 38, 616, 23-25 Dekkers/Fraipont); *ep* 118, 3, 17 (*CSEL* 34/2, 681, 24 Goldbacher); 20, 5, 1 (*CSEL* 88, 96, 20 f. Divjak); 22, 4, 2 (115, 8).

30. Cf. H. Rheinfelder, *Das Wort "Persona". Geschichte seiner Bedeutungen mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des französischen und italienischen Mittelalters* (= ZRP.B 77) (Halle 1928) 13 f.

31. *Imm an* 14, 23 (*PL* 32, 1033, 2).

comparison of persons (*comparare/conferre personas*)³² and of different kinds of persons (*genera personarum*).³³ Moreover there is a number of cases (about a hundred) where Augustine uses *persona* in connection with the genitive of a name (*persona Moysis, persona Salomonis* etc.),³⁴ with the genitive of the position a man holds (*persona Pharisaei, persona tyranni* etc.),³⁵ an office (*persona episcopi, persona iudicis* etc.),³⁶ a function (*persona auctoris, persona facientis* etc.).³⁷

Further, a person, a man possesses attributes, he might be good, innocent or rather sinful and contemptible etc.³⁸

In all these cases *persona* is synonymous with *homo*, but not quite. While *homo* means man in his entirety, *persona* always picks a certain characteristic, man becomes an object under a certain point of view.³⁹

Finally, there is the expression *persona hominis*, which Augustine uses three times in his works.⁴⁰ It means either the status, rank or importance of a man or is rather a somewhat pleonastic expression for "man", though here, too, a certain objectivation is achieved. One does not deal with man as a whole, but with man as an object.

During the first period of his philosophical anthropology Augustine defines man as "consisting of soul and body" (*constans ex anima et corpore*),⁴¹ but does not call this unity "*persona*" or even "*una persona*".⁴² He does so eventually under the influence of his trinitarian and chris-

32. Ep 66, 1 (CSEL 34/2, 235, 5); 121, 1, 3 (725, 5).

33. *Doctr chr* 3, 17, 25 (CChr.SL 32, 93, 12 Martin); *c Faust* 22, 82 (CSEL 25, 683, 28 Zycha); *ciu* 15, 16 (CChr.SL 48, 478, 77); *mend* 7, 10 (CSEL 41, 427, 24 Zycha); *s* 49, 5 (CChr.SL 41, 617, 118 Lambot); 175, 2, 2 (PL 38, 946, 18 f).

34. *Qu Ex* 154, 7 (CChr.SL 33, 143, 2537 Fraipont); *c Faust* 22, 88 (CSEL 25, 693, 22).

35. Ep 121, 1, 3 (CSEL 34/2, 725, 5); *c Iul imp* 1, 48 (CSEL 85/1, 37, 23 Zelzer).

36. Ep 173, 7 (CSEL 25, 775, 29); *c mend* 920 (CSEL 41, 493, 12 Zycha).

36. Ep 173, 7 (CSEL 44, 645, 20).

37. *C Faust* 32, 16 (CSEL 25, 775, 29); *c mend* 9, 20 (CSEL 41, 493, 12 Zycha).

38. *Io eu tr* 46, 5 (CChr.SL 36, 400, 6 Willems); *gr nou t* 16, 42 (CSEL 44, 190, 15 Goldbacher); *c Iul imp* 6, 26 (PL 45, 1562, 16. 1563, 57); *qu uet t* 7 (CChr.SL 33, 471, 99 de Bruyne).

39. Cf. O. Hey: *Archiv für lateinische Lexikographie und Grammatik*, 15 (1908) 149; Rheinfelder (note 30) 13, 151 f.

40. *Beata u* 2, 16 (CChr.SL 29, 74, 239 f Green): et quia ego invitaveram et magni cuiusdam hominis personam. Ep 118, 3, 16 (CSEL 34/2, 681, 12): remove personas hominum atque ipsam disceptationem constituat. 130, 6, 12 (CSEL 44, 54, 7 f.): propter salutem corporis et congruentem habitum personae hominis.

41. Ep 3, 4 (CSEL 34/1, 8, 3 f): Unde constamus? Ex anima et corpore. *Mor* 1, 4, 6 (PL 32, 1313): ex anima et corpore nos esse compositos. *Conf* 10, 6, 9 (CChr.SL 27, 159, 32-160, 42): Et direxi me ad me et dixi mihi: 'Tu quis es?' Et respondi: 'Homo'. Et ecce corpus et anima in me mihi praesto sunt. *Quant an* 1, 1 (PL 32, 1036): si cum quaeritur, ex quibus sit homo compositus, respondere possum, ex anima et corpore. *Gn c Man* 2, 7, 9 (PL 34, 201): hominem ex corpore et anima factum intellegamus. Cf. Hieronymus a Parisiis, "De unione animae cum corpore in doctrina D. Augustini": *Acta Hebdomadae Augustinianae-Thomisticae (Romae, 23-30 Aprilis 1930)* (Turin-Rome 1931) 273-275; R. Schwarz, "Die

tological theology. After 397 he transfers the term *persona* from God to man, "for person is a common name inasmuch as man, too, can thus be called".⁴³ From 411 on he compares the unity of God and man in Christ to the unity of body and soul in man and calls both unities "*una persona*" respectively.⁴⁴ The fact that in Augustine's anthropology *persona* is never to be found outside trinitarian or christological contexts confirms its entire dependence on them.

(2) In rhetorical context Augustine uses *persona* comparatively little: three times as a *locus* of the *inventio*,⁴⁵ once in the quarrel with Donatist bishops as *locus* of the *argumentatio*.⁴⁶

(3) Much more frequent is his use of *persona* in the juridical context, 244 times in all. Most important is the biblical expression *personam accipere* (to regard the person, to be partial),⁴⁷ which he uses 82 times.⁴⁸ Similar to it are the expressions *distantia personarum* and *respicere personam*.⁴⁹ The formula *nec causa causae nec persona personae praeiudicat* (one case may neither prejudice another nor may one person prejudice another) is used first at the conference of Catholic and Donatist bishops in Carthage 411. Introduced apparently by the Donatist bishops, taken from a

leib-seelische Existenz bei Aurelius Augustinus": *PhJ* 63 (1954) 325 f; R. Champoux, "L'union du corps et de l'âme selon saint Augustin": *Dialogue* 1 (1962) 309 f.

42. Cf. R. J. O'Connell, *St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386-391* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968).

43. *Trin* 7, 4, 7 (*CChr. SL* 50, 527, 74-76 Mountain/Glorie): nam persona generale nomen est tantum ut etiam homo possit hoc dici, cum tamen intersit inter hominem et deum. Cf. E. Benz, *Marius Victorinus und die Entwicklung der abendländischen Willensmetaphysik* (= FKGG 1) (Stuttgart 1932) 381; M. Mellet/Th. Camelot, note 45: *BAug*, 15 (Paris 1965) 589-591. Further references to "man as *persona*" in trinitarian contexts cf. *trin* 12, 6, 6 (360, 6-15); 12, 7, 9 (363, 1-364, 20).

44. *Ep.* 137, 3, 11 (*CSEL* 44, 110, 1-4): Quomodo misceatur anima corpori, ut una persona fiat hominis. *Ep.* 169, 2 8 (*CSEL* 44, 617, 16f.): sicut ... anima et corpus una persona est, ita in Christo verbum et homo una persona est. *Ench* 10, 36 (*CChr. SL* 46, 69, 11 f. Evans): quemadmodum est una persona quilibet homo, anima scilicet rationalis et caro, ita sit Christus una persona, verbum et homo. Cf. E. Dinkler, *Die Anthropologie Augustins* (= FKGG 4) (Stuttgart 1934) 63; Ch. Couturier, *La structure métaphysique de l'homme d'après saint Augustin*: (AugM 1) (Paris 1954) 550; R. Florez, *Las dos dimensiones del hombre agustiniano* (= Colección "Veritas" 1) (Madrid 1958) 165.

45. *Ep.* 82, 14 (*CSEL* 34/2, 363, 23-364, 1); *doctr chr* 3, 12, 18 f. (*CChr. SL* 32, 89, 16-23); *retr* 2, 69, 1 (*CSEL* 36, 181, 9-18 Knöll).

46. *Breui* 3, 18, 36 (*CChr. SL* 149A, 300, 13-18 Lancel).

47. *Dt* 1, 17; 10, 17; 16, 19; 2 *Par* 19, 7; *Iob* 32, 21; 34, 19; *Prov* 18, 5; *Sir* 20, 24; 35, 16; 42, 1; *Is* 42, 2; *Lk* 20, 21; *Act* 10, 34; *Rom* 2, 11; *Gal* 2, 6; *Eph* 6, 9; *Col* 3, 25; *Jm* 2, 1.9; *1 Pe* 1, 17.

48. E.g. *en Ps* 32, 2, 1, 12 (*CChr. SL* 38, 256, 29); 34, 2, 11 (319, 16); *ep* 194 (*CSEL* 57, 201, 19); *Gal exp* 12 (*CSEL* 84, 66, 20. 67, 22 Divjak).

49. *Spec* 4 (*CSEL* 12, 17, 11 Wehrich); *cons eu* 2, 140, 72 (*CSEL* 43, 243, 22 Wehrich); *qu Leu* 8 (*CChr. SL* 33, 181, 212-214 Fraipont).

contemporary juridical maxim,⁵⁰ it is most dexterously inverted by Augustine⁵¹ and from then on constantly used by him in favour of the catholic case, 36 times alone in the *Contra partem Donati post gesta*.⁵²

This short survey of the theatrical, anthropological, rhetorical and juridical use of the word *persona* in the works of St. Augustine shows quite clearly that they form only the smaller part of the occurrences of *persona* in Augustine (about 500 out of 1400) and none of them is in any way connected with christological or trinitarian contexts so that it is allowed to conclude that those meanings of *persona* hardly influenced Augustine's christology or doctrine on the Trinity.

(4) The grammatical use of *persona*, however, covers more than 700 quotations of the word and is most influential on Augustine's christology, ecclesiology and teaching on the Trinity. This cannot be shown here *in extenso* (for the christology it will be done in the second part of these studies by means of a few examples), but only mention the most important formulations. These are:

- *ex persona dicere or loqui*,⁵³
- *personam assumere*,⁵⁴
- *personam suspicere*,⁵⁵
- *personam gerere*⁵⁶ and
- *personam sustinere*.⁵⁷

4. Augustine's rules of grammatical exegesis

For the grammatical exegesis of biblical texts Augustine explicitly gives five directions.

First of all one has to bear in mind that all prophetic texts are

50. *Macer, digesta 42, 1, 63*: saepe constitutum est res inter alios iudicatos aliis non praeiudicare ... si ex duobus petitoribus alter victus acqvieverit, alterius petitori non praeiudicatur (ed. fratres Kriegel: *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, pars I (Stuttgart¹⁷1887).

51. *Breucic 3, 16, 28* (CChr.SL 194A, 293-19-294, 23).

52. E.g. *c Don p gesta 2, 2* (CSEL 53, 99, 16 Petschenig); 3, 3 (100, 2.11.14), 4, 4 (100, 23, 101, 12.19).

53. E.g. *en Ps 34, 2, 9* (CChr.SL 38, 318, 3); *pecc mer 1, 24, 34* (CSEL 60, 34, 13 Urba/Zycha); *ciu 17, 12* (CChr.SL 48, 576, 6). *en Ps 75, 15* (CChr.SL 39, 1047, 20); *adn Iob 29* (CSEL 28/2, 570, 2 Zycha).

54. *Lib arb 3, 21, 60, 205* (CChr.SL 29, 310, 37 f. Green); *en Ps 35, 9* (CChr.SL 38, 328, 36-38); *c Iul imp 6, 14* (PL 45, 1525, 43 f).

55. E.g. *en Ps 50, 10* (CChr.SL 38, 606, 9); *trin 3, 10, 9* (CChr.SL 50, 146, 5-15); *s 23, 2* (CChr.SL 41, 309, 22).

56. E.g. *en Ps 138, 8* (CChr.SL 40, 1995, 59. 1996, 64 f.); *qu Ex 102* (CChr.SL 33, 119, 1704); *adn Iob 39* (CSEL 28/2, 626, 29-627, 2).

57. E.g. *en Ps 103, 3, 11* (CChr.SL 40, 1510, 28); *Gn c Man 15, 38* (PL 34, 216, 26); *agon 20, 22* (CSEL 41, 122, 11-13 Zycha).

inspired and therefore speak on behalf of God (*ex persona Dei*). “All those verses the Lord was speaking: a prophet indeed, but in the person (*ex persona*) of the Lord, because in the prophet is the Lord. And even if the prophet speaks on his own behalf (*ex sua persona*), it is the same Lord speaking through him, who dictates to him the truth he says.”⁵⁸ “For just as the Word of God is in the prophet and it is rightly said ‘the prophet spoke’ it is equally right to say ‘the Lord spoke’, because the Word of God, which is Christ, speaks the truth in the prophet. Likewise does he himself speak in the angel, too, when the angel proclaims the truth. And it is rightly said ‘God spoke’ and ‘God appeared’, and equally right to say ‘the angel spoke’ and ‘an angel appeared’, because one is said in the person (*ex persona*) of the indwelling God, the other in the person of the subservient creature. According to this rule the Apostle says, too: ‘Are you seeking to make me give a proof that it is the Christ who is speaking in me?’”⁵⁹

This already leads to the second rule, which regards the theophanies in the Old Testament through angels.⁶⁰ It applies especially, where the Logos bears the title “angel” as Augustine explains in regard to *Malachi 2, 7*. There *Malachi* says about the Son *ex persona Dei*: “... for he is the angel of the Lord Almighty”. Augustine explains: “Nor is it to be wondered at that Christ Jesus is called the Angel of the Almighty God. For just as He is called a servant on account of the form of a servant in which He came to men, so He is called an angel on account of the *evangel* which he proclaimed to men.”⁶¹

The third rule deals with the problem of how to distinguish when it is the grammatical subject speaking and when it is Christ speaking through it. Hereby certainty can only be achieved, when Christ explicitly

58. *En Ps 56, 13 (CChrSL 39, 702, 2-703, 6)*.

59. *C Adim 9 (CSEL 25, 132, 22-133, 3 Zycha)*.

60. Cf. J. Lebreton, “Saint Augustin théologien de la Trinité. Son exégèse des Théophanies”: *Miscellanea Agostiniana*, II (Rome 1931) 821-836; J.-L. Maier, *Les missions divines selon saint Augustin* (= Par. 16) (Fribourg 1960) 101-121, 199-204; L. J. van der Lof, “L’exégèse exacte et objective des théophanies de l’AT dans le ‘De trinitate’”: *Aug(L)* 14 (1964) 485-499; B. Studer, *Zur Theophanie-Exegese Augustins. Untersuchung zu einem Ambrosius-Zitat in der Schrift De videndo Deo* (ep. 147) (= St Ans 59) (Rome 1971).

61. *Ciu 18, 35 (CChr.LS 48, 630, 52-56)* (Translation by M. Dodds) *NPNF* 1/2 (Grand Rapids [Mich.] 1979) (= New York 1887), 381. For the history and importance of the christological title “angel” cf. A. Bakker, “Christ an Angel?”: *ZNW* 32 (1933) 255-265; J. Barbel, *Christos Angelos. Die Anschauung von Christus als Bote und Engel in der gelehrten und volkstümlichen Literatur des christlichen Altertums. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Ursprungs und der Fortdauer des Arianismus* (= Theoph. 3) (Bonn 1941). G. Kretschmar, *Studien zur frühchristlichen Trinitätstheologie* (= BhTh 21) (Tübingen 1956); J. Daniélou, “Théologie et angéologie dans la théologie judéo-chrétienne”; *RSR* 45 (1957) 5-41; J. Michl, “Engel IV (christlich)”: *RAC* 5 (1962) 148 f.

states: “but I say unto you...”.⁶² Apart from that no other clear criterion exists and therefore the sentence can be said to be spoken both by the natural (grammatical) subject and in the person of Christ.

Fourthly Augustine presents a twofold direction in order to decide if the Father or the Son is speaking. (1) When the Scriptures speak of an action of God (e.g. the account of the creation in Genesis) they are always referring to the Son, as the Father is ever immovable and invisible and rather acts through his Word.⁶³ (2) Moreover he applies the rule: “When in the Gospel the Son seems to acknowledge that the Father is greater than him, he speaks either in the person of man (*ex persona hominis*), because God is greater than man, or he speaks in the person of the begotten, to honour him by whom he was begotten.”⁶⁴

The fifth and last rule leads already into ecclesiology as it applies to the *Christus totus caput et corpus* (the whole Christ, head and members). Christ and the church, Augustine explains, are thus intimately united as husband and wife are in matrimony.⁶⁵ Therefore Christ never indicates explicitly, when he is speaking *ex persona capititis* and when *ex persona corporis*, because this would already sever the essential unity.⁶⁶

Conclusion

Augustine was well acquainted with the technique of the grammatical exegesis, as this had been taught at school as means of the interpretation of texts since hellenistic times, and he not only learned it during his own education, but also taught it being a *rhetor* himself. By far the majority of his use of *persona* in his works is covered by the grammatical meaning of it. Augustine uses this technique both for the interpretation of classical and christian texts and even sets up his own rules for a theological interpretation of the Bible by means of the grammatical exegesis.

Thus far it therefore seems quite possible, that grammatical exegesis also formed Augustine’s christological doctrine. If this could be shown by means of a few christological key-texts of his, the general possibility

62. *C Faust* 19, 27 (*CSEL* 25, 529, 7-14).

63. *Trin* 2, 10, 17 (*CChr.SL* 50, 102, 18-103, 34).

64. *S Morin* 3, 7 (*PL.S* 2, 666, 4 f).

65. Cf. note 66 and *en Ps* 74, 4 (*CChr.SL* 39, 1027, 12-33); 138, 2 (*CChr.SL* 40, 1990, 1-1991, 40).

66. *En Ps* 138, 21 (*CChr.SL* 40, 2005, 1-6); 142, 3 (2061, 31 f).

would achieve the status of a high probability. This will be the task of the second study.

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MATHETAI (AUTOU) AND LUKE'S CONCERN FOR THE SOUND OF HIS GOSPEL

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The purpose of this note is to affirm the importance of "sound" to the study of Luke. As is common knowledge, the purely quantitative rhythm of Hellenistic Greek gradually declined after the first century, and was replaced by the Byzantine system of stress and meter similar to our own language rhythm.¹ Because of this change, we have no natural understanding of Hellenistic Greek as it actually sounded, and can only form a mental notion of its recitation. But in practical terms, such a rational reconstruction is only useful in the case of poetic recitation, where the same metric units are regularly repeated² – something, by the way, looked upon unfavourably for prose writing by Aristotle.³

There are at least two reasons that it is unfortunate that we do not have better insight into the sound of the Gospels. First, the best evidence indicates that the Gospels were not intended for silent reading. If silent reading existed at all, it was not widely practiced, and since relatively few people knew how to read, one perhaps should assume some type of oral, and maybe cultic, presentation for the narratives.⁴ And second, Greco-

1. Paul Mass, *Greek Metre*, (trans. Hugh Lloyd-Jones) (Clarendon Press; Oxford 1962), 1-5.

2. Perhaps it would be helpful, however, to search for a repeating rhythmic nucleus in the prose of the Gospels as such a nucleus forms the basic pattern of the aeolic verse, which was common in the chorus of Greek drama. Cf. D. S. Raven, *Greek Metre* (Faber and Faber; London 1968), 71-85.

3. *Rhetoric*, III.8.

4. The orality of the Gospels is a subject of much current debate. A few of the significant works on the subject are: T. Boomershine, *Mark, the Storyteller* (Ph.D. dissertation; Union Theological Seminary 1974); Werner H. Kelber, *The Oral and the Written Gospel* (Fortress; Philadelphia 1983); William O. Walker, Jr., ed. *The Relationships Among the Gospels* (Trinity University Press; San Antonio 1978) 33-192. While most scholars seem to favour some type of cultic setting for the reading of the Gospels [cf. Charles H. Talbert, *Literary Patterns*,

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Roman rhetoric gave much more attention to considerations of proper harmony and rhythm in prose than does education in our age.⁵ Thus, it would seem that the evangelists would have been very much concerned with the sound of the Gospels.

Some evidence of this likely concern for proper sound seems to be present in Luke's use of *mathetai*. Forms of *hoi mathetai autou* appear sixteen times in the narration of Luke.⁶ A favoured expression is *eipen de pros tous mathetai autou*, which is scanned --u/--u/--/-.⁷ One notices, however, that this particularly favoured expression with its well defined meter is entirely lacking from Mark and Matthew.

But what needs to be explained are the instances in the narration of Luke where *hoi mathetai* is not qualified by the personal pronoun. The narrator's tendency is to use the *autou*.⁸ Why, then, does he on occasion leave it out?

In one instance, the narrator does not use *autou* following *mathetai* because it would have been redundant, the two disciples involved being immediately described by name (Lk 9,54). Similarly, there are several instances in which the narrator does not attach the personal pronoun, perhaps because he already uses a form of *autos* near *mathetai* (Lk 9,18; 18,15; 22,39; 22,45).⁹

It is also the sound of the phrasing which seems to best explain the unaccompanied appearance of *ton matheton* in Lk 19,29. 37. In Lk 19,29, *kai egeneto hos engisen eis Bethphage kai Bethanian pros to oros to kaloumenon Elaion, apesteilen duo ton matheton legon*, the sound of an added *autou* would have disrupted the repeating "on" of *ton*

Theological Themes and the Genre of Luke-Acts (Society of Biblical Literature and Scholars Press; Missoula 1974) 111; Philip Carrington, *The Primitive Christian Calendar: A Study in the Making of the Marcan Gospel*, vol. 1, *Introduction and Text* (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge 1952); Aileen Guilding, *The Fourth Gospel and Jewish Worship: A Study of the Relation of St. John's Gospel to the Ancient Jewish Lectionary System* (The Clarendon Press; Oxford 1960); M. D. Goulder, *Midrash and Lection in Matthew, The Speaker's Lectures in Biblical Studies 1969-71* (SPCK; London 1974)], there are many instances of private reading in early Christian History (e.g., Augustine's account of Victorinus, *Confessions*, VIII.2).

5. Donald Lemen Clark, *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education* (Greenwood Press; Westport, Connecticut 1977) 95.

6. Cf. Lk 5,30; 6,1. 13. 17. 20; 7,11. 18;8,9. 22; 9,14, 43; 11,1; 12,1. 22; 17,1. 20,35.

7. Cf. 9,14; 12,22; 17,1.

8. *hoi mathetai autou* appears approximately thirty times in Matthew, and thirty two times in Mark. Mark, especially seems very hesitant to use the unaccompanied *mathetai*.

9. Lk 9,18.... *auto hoi mathetai (autou), kai eperotesen autous....*; Lk 18,15.... *de auto kai ta brephe hina auton haptetai. Idontes de hoi mathetai (autou) epetimon autois; Lk 22,39.... de auto kai hoi mathetai (autou); Lk 22,45.... pros tous mathetas (autou) heuren koimomenous autous....*

matheton legon. Furthermore, it would have destroyed the sentence's balanced assonance of *kaloumenon* with *duo ton*, *Elaion* with *matheton* and *apesteilen* with *legon*, where the long syllables tend to emphasize the final "n" sound of the words.¹⁰ In Lk 19,37, *Engizontos de autou ede pros te katabasei tou Orous ton Elaion erxanto hapan to plethos ton matheton chairontes ainein ton theon phone megale peri pason hon eidon dunameon, legontes* the sound of *autou* would have disrupted the ending rhyme of *matheton chairontes* with *dunameon legontes*.¹¹ One notices also that this section in Luke dealing with Jesus' stay on the Mount of Olives is held together as much by the ending "n" sounds of verses 29 and 37, as it is by a unified content. In this respect, Luke has redacted Mk 11,1f., changing *apostellei* to *apesteilen*, removing the dissonant *autou*, and changing *kai legei autois* to *legon*. He has completely rewritten Mk 11,9, repeating the *Elaion* and the *ton matheton* of Lk 19,29/Mk 11,1, and adding the phrase *peri pason hon eidon dunameon*. Creed, among others, has puzzled over the out-of-place content of this phrase which nevertheless seems clearly to have been introduced by the author's own hand.¹² But in this case, the sound of the passage seems to be significant.

Of greater metrical interest is the non-employment of *autou* after *tois mathetais* in Lk 9,16 and *tous mathetas* in Lk 10,23 and 16,1. In the first instance, it is possible to argue that *autou* is not present in Luke because it was not present in the source, Mk 6,41. One notes, however, that there is a nicely balanced rhythm to the phrasing in Luke which is not taken over from the source.¹³ *Kai edidou tois mathetais parathemai to ochlo* is formed of a chiasmic pattern of long and short syllables, followed by four long syllables:

-uu--u--uu/--/--.

At any rate, it is quite clear that the introduction of *autou* would have disrupted the rhythm of the phrase.

Perhaps it is more clear, however, that metrical considerations were behind the unaccompanied *mathetas* in Lk 10,23 and Lk 16,1, since these sections of the narration are not paralleled by sources. The pattern

10. The lingering "on" of the narrator's prose contrasts nicely with the staccato "hupagate.... heuresete.... agagate" of Jesus' speech (Lk 19,30).

11. The D reading: *peri panton hon eidon ginomenon*, improves the assonance yet further by paralleling *panton* with *hopanto*.

12. J. M. Creed, *The Gospel According to St. Luke* (St. Martin's Press; New York 1957) 241.

13. Mk 6,41.... *kai kateklasen tous artous kai edidou tois mathetais (autou)*, p⁴⁵, A, D^{8r}, K, W, f¹, f¹³, 28, 565, 700, 1009, 1010, 1071, 1079, 1195, 1216, 1230, 1242, 1253, 1344, 1356, 1546, 1646, 2148, 2174.

of Lk 10,23: *kai strapheis pros tous mathetas kat idian eipen* is of an epitrite dimeter with an attached three short, four long:

-u--/-u--/uuu--.

The pattern of Lk 16,1: *Elegen de kai pros tous mathetas* is a pyrrhic foot followed by the same epitrite dimeter of Lk 10,23:

uu/-u--/-u--.

In either case, the introduction of *autou* would have disrupted the rhythm of the phrasing — as would have the substitution of *eipen* for *elegen*, of *kai* for *de*, or the changing of the word order.¹⁴

We must always be careful not to read too much into the hidden motives of the authors of the Gospels. Nevertheless, the importance of sound to recited narratives has been greatly overlooked in the study of the Gospels,¹⁵ and might well explain many of the mystifying literary elements in Luke, such as the superfluous *ho pater autou* after *Zacharias* (Lk 1,67) and *ten metera autou* after *Marian* (Lk 2,34);¹⁶ Luke's irregular use of *Hierosoluma* and *Ierousalem*;¹⁷ many instances of redaction of *kai* and *de*; etc. A comprehensive study of the meter, rhyme, assonance, dissonance, alliteration, etc. of the Gospel would be greatly beneficial to Lukan studies. It seems to me that the author's use of the unaccompanied *mathetai* in the narration of the Gospel shows his concern with proper sound in the narrative, and suggests some justification for further study.

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14. Since Jesus' speech begins with *anthropos*, the inclusion of *autou* would have also resulted in a rather extended string of long sounds.

15. Besides elements of sound, there are many other essential techniques of composition for oral narratives that are inappropriate for a document which is to be read in silence [e.g., frequent repetition (cf. Boomershine, *Mark, the Storyteller*, 322)].

16. The formulas have most often been taken as signs that Zacharias' and Simeon's hymns were already part of the Christian tradition when appropriated by Luke. Cf. Heinz Schurmann, *Das Lukasevangelium*, vol. 1 (Herder; Freiburg 1969) 81.

17. Luke prefers *Ierousalem*. *Hierosoluma* is used four times however, and three of these seem to be the work of the redactor (Lk 2,22; 13,22; 23,7). Cf. Joachim Jeremias, "IEROUSALEM/HIEROUSOLUMA," *ZNW* 65 (1974) 276.

THE INDIVIDUATION OF ACTIONS

Joe Friggieri

A. Austin's problem

There are three passages, the first in 'A Plea for Excuses', the second in *How to Do Things with Words*, and the third in 'Three Ways of Spilling Ink', which have obvious affinities of content and purpose and which I would like to consider together.⁽¹⁾ In them Austin raises the important philosophical problem of the individuation of actions. The passages themselves, however, while containing useful hints as to what Austin's intuitions were about the subject, do not provide any definite, well worked out solution. It is important, therefore, to try to understand the nature of the problem raised by Austin and to examine critically the various solutions which have been suggested.

In 'A Plea for Excuses' Austin calls our attention to a certain feature of actions, to a way of talking about actions, which he finds striking. He says:

....it is in principle always open to us, along various lines, to describe or refer to 'what I did' in so many different ways.... Apart from the more general and obvious problems of the use of 'tendentious' descriptive terms, there are many special problems in the particular case of 'actions'. Should we say, are we saying, that he took the money, or that he robbed her? That he knocked a ball into a hole, or that he sank a putt? That he said 'Done', or that he accepted an

1. J.L. Austin, 'A Plea for Excuses', in *Philosophical Papers*, (Oxford University Press; Oxford 1979) 175-204; 'Three Ways of Spilling Ink', in *Philosophical Papers*, pp. 272-287; *How to Do Things with Words*, (Oxford University Press; Oxford 1976). In subsequent footnotes I shall use the following abbreviations: 'A Plea', 'Three Ways', *HTD* to refer to each of these three texts respectively.

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offer? How far, that is, are motives, intentions and conventions to be part of the description of actions? And more especially here, what is *an* or *one* or *the* action?⁽²⁾

Although Austin felt that this was 'altogether too large a theme to elaborate' in the context of his discussion of excuses, he returned to it briefly in *How to Do Things with Words*. Here he writes:

That we can import an indefinitely long stretch of what might be called the 'consequences' of our act into the act itself is, or should be, a fundamental commonplace of the theory of our language about all 'action' in general. Thus if we asked 'What did he do?', we may reply either 'He shot the donkey' or 'He fired a gun' or 'He pulled the trigger' or 'He moved his trigger finger', and all may be correct. So, to shorten the nursery story of the endeavours of the old woman to drive her pig home in time to get her old man's supper, we may in the last resort say that the cat drove or got the pig, or made the pig to get, over the stile.⁽³⁾

Austin realises that in all these examples something is being redescribed. Although his terminology is imprecise, it is clear that he has raised a genuine problem. In 'Three Ways of Spilling Ink' he is still struggling with it. He shows his puzzlement by putting a number of phrases in scare-quotes and leaves the fundamental question unanswered:

We do not say 'A wounded B for the purpose of killing him'. Why not? Because the killing and the wounding are 'not sufficiently separate' – are 'too intimately connected'; because they are not '*two things*' that are done? But what does this really mean?⁽⁴⁾

Austin's genuine puzzlement shows that we need a more solid theoretical framework to deal with the questions he raises. I think the best framework is provided by the theory of the individuation of actions proposed by G.E.M. Anscombe in *Intention*⁽⁵⁾ and further developed by Donald Davidson in a number of papers now collected in *Essays on Actions and Events*.⁽⁶⁾

2. 'A Plea', 200-1.

3. *HTD*, 107-8. In the paragraph immediately following the quoted passage, Austin says that 'the problem of excuses and those of *the different descriptions of actions* are throughout bound up with each other'. 'A Plea', 201 (my emphasis).

4. 'Three Ways', 275-6.

5. (Blackwell; Oxford 1963).

6. (Clarendon Press; Oxford 1980). This theory has also been defended by Eric D'Arcy in *Human Acts* (Clarendon Press; Oxford 1963) and by D.S. Schwayder in *The Stratification of Behaviour* (Routledge and Kegan Paul; London 1965).

B. The Anscombe-Davidson solution

The reason why we do not say that A wounded B ‘for the purpose of killing him’ is not because, as Austin proposed with some hesitation, the killing and the wounding are ‘not sufficiently separate’, or because they are ‘too intimately connected’, or because, as he even more reluctantly suggested, ‘there are not *‘two things’* that are done’. If A killed B by wounding him, then there were at least *two things* which A did: one thing A did was wound B, another thing he did was kill him.⁽⁷⁾ Austin himself thought of the reasons he gave as purely tentative and ultimately unsatisfactory. (‘What does this really mean?’, he asks at the end of the passage). The right answer, Anscombe and Davidson would suggest, is that in the case where we say that A killed B by wounding him, A’s wounding B and A’s killing B are the same action.

By moving his finger a man flips a switch, turns on the light, illuminates the room, and alerts a prowler.⁽⁸⁾ Davidson thinks that ‘insuperable difficulties stand in the way’⁽⁹⁾ of considering the man’s moving his finger, his flipping the switch, his turning on the light, his illuminating the room, and his alerting the prowler as five different actions. ‘This welter of related descriptions’, Davidson says, ‘corresponds to a single descriptum’.⁽¹⁰⁾

Another man stops the car by pressing a pedal. Here again we cannot ‘saddle the agent’ with two actions.⁽¹¹⁾

A third man, Anscombe’s this time, operates a pump by moving his arm up and down, thus replenishing the water-supply and poisoning the inhabitants.⁽¹²⁾ Moving his arm up and down with his fingers round the pump *is*, in these circumstances, according to Anscombe, operating the pump, replenishing the water-supply, and poisoning the inhabitants. So there is one action with four descriptions.

7. Even Davidson, by failing to distinguish clearly between actions and things done in acting, is not free of the ambiguity which afflicted Austin. This is how Davidson introduces the discussion of his famous switch-flipping example. ‘I flip the switch, turn on the light, and illuminate the room. Unbeknownst to me I also alert a prowler to the fact that I am home. Here I need not have done four things, but only one, of which four descriptions have been given’. (‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’, op.cit., p. 4). But if I flip the switch, turn on the light, illuminate the room, alert a prowler, surely there must be these four things I do: what I do is (1) flip the switch (2) turn on the light (3) illuminate the room (4) alert a prowler. What is redescribed is not the things I do but my doing of them, i.e. the action. The things done correspond to the effects, outcomes or consequences in terms of which the action is described. In this example my action has four effects: it is an action of four kinds.

8. Davidson, ‘Agency’, op.cit., p. 57.

9. *ibid.*, 59.

10. *ibid.*

11. *ibid.*

12. *Intention*, §23 ff.

To avoid misunderstanding one should emphasize that the subject which is being redescribed – what Davidson calls the ‘descriptum’ – is a particular action, e.g. the pumper’s, on a particular occasion. The identity concerns particular actions (doings), not action kinds.

One kind of item, whether object or action, cannot be the same kind of item as another kind of item, but one item can be an instance of more than one kind....⁽¹³⁾ Shooting and killing are different kinds of acts, though one and the same act may be of both kinds.⁽¹⁴⁾

We may put the matter in a slightly different way by saying that since an action is the doing of many things, in cases such as those described by Austin, Anscombe and Davidson, someone’s doing one thing (e.g. the man’s pulling the trigger) is the same as his doing another thing (e.g. the man’s shooting the donkey). A lot of things are done, but only one action occurs. The old woman’s action seen as one kind of doing is the same as her action seen as another kind of doing. When does this happen? When do we discern action identities?

Consider a different case. The man fires his gun and misses. Seconds later a brick falls on the donkey – but not as a result of the shooting⁽¹⁵⁾ – and kills him. The identity we noted in Austin’s story between the man’s firing the gun and his killing the donkey is absent in the later case where the man fires and misses and the donkey is killed through some other means. The crucial word – the word which indicates identity – is ‘by’.

C. ‘By’

It is only when somebody is said to have done something *by* doing something else that philosophers like Anscombe and Davidson have wanted to talk about action-identities.

Consider these two sentences: ‘He poisoned the inhabitants *by* operating the pump’. ‘He poisoned the inhabitants *while* operating the pump’. The first sentence reports that the pumper’s operating the pump *caused* the inhabitants to be poisoned. And if we are then told that the inhabitants died as a result of their drinking the poisoned water, we thereby learn that his operating the pump caused, or brought about, their death. In the ‘while’ sentence, however, there is no causal link between the events introduced by the descriptions on either side of the preposition. Whereas the first sentence gives us more information about the *means* the

13. A.R. White, ‘Shooting, Killing and Fatally Wounding’, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 80 (1979/80)2.

14. *ibid.* 6.

15. The bullet does not break a string from which the brick is suspended.

pumper used to poison the inhabitants, or, at any rate, about the way in which it came about that they were poisoned,⁽¹⁶⁾ the second suggests that the man operated the pump and simultaneously poisoned the inhabitants by some means independent of the operation of the pump.⁽¹⁷⁾

We may further illustrate this point by borrowing Davidson's example, where I turn on the light by flicking the switch. Here two events — the switch being flicked and the light going on — are causally related. But it would be a mistake to think that my (action of) flipping the switch caused my (action of) turning on the light: in fact it caused the light to go on.⁽¹⁸⁾ Having flipped the switch (moved my finger in this way) I did all that was required of me, all I could do, all that was in my power, to bring on the light. The rest, as Davidson put it, was 'up to nature'.⁽¹⁹⁾ The same applies to cases where the effects of the action are not causally related, as when I greet a lady by raising my hat, or apologize by saying sorry. Here 'the rest', rather than being simply 'up to nature', depends on such social conventions, practices and institutions which make our actions the kinds of actions they are.

It has been objected that in order to be able to decide whether to speak of one action or different actions we need to know more about the context, and that maybe in a lot of cases we cannot tell because we have incomplete descriptions.⁽²⁰⁾ The question here is 'How much is enough?', and it can be asked not just in the case of actions, but also in the case of individuals or objects.⁽²¹⁾ 'The man in the brown hat went to the bank this

16. This *caveat* is introduced to avoid giving the impression that the pumper must have poisoned the inhabitants *intentionally*. Any such claim would obviously be mistaken. The pumper need not have known that the water was poisoned, and still poisoned the inhabitants by operating the pump.

17. The contrast is reflected in the grammar; for while the second sentence may be paraphrased in such a way that the verb in the subordinate clause is conjugated in the indicative ('He poisoned the inhabitants while he operated the pump'), the first cannot. For we do not say 'He poisoned the inhabitants by he operated the pump'. 'By' then does not link descriptions of actions, but combines with verb phrases to form verbs out of verbs. We have the verb 'to replenish the water supply', and we can form the more complex verb 'to replenish the water supply by operating the pump'. The phrase 'by operating the pump' retains a constant grammatical form as the verb 'replenish' is inflected for person and tense'. Jennifer Hornsby, 'Verbs and Events', in *Papers on Logic and Language* (ed. Jonathan Dancy), (University of Keele; 1979) 97.

18. Davidson, 'Actions, Reasons and Causes', op.cit., 14.

19. Davidson, 'Agency', op.cit., 59.

20. This objection was made e.g., by Myles Brand in his review of Alvin I. Goldman's *A Theory of Human Action*, in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 69/9 (1972) 252. 'In order to judge whether different descriptions express a single action, it is necessary to have complete descriptions and a complete background story'. Brand directs his criticism at *both* Goldman and Davidson.

21. Myles Brand admits that "adequate description" and "adequate background story" might be better terms than "complete description" and "complete background story", 'since

morning'. Is this an incomplete description? Clearly it doesn't tell us absolutely everything about the man; but if *that* is what we are after, then anything we say will be incomplete. The relevant question is: does the description pick out an *individual*? If it does, then we have enough 'context' to establish his identity. And we could then ask, about the individual picked out in this way, further questions like 'Is he the (same) man wanted by the police?' We adopt the same procedure in looking for action identities. We ask about a *particular* action, e.g. the pumper's moving his arm up and down with his fingers round the pump on a particular occasion: 'Is it the same action as his poisoning the inhabitants?' And we answer 'Yes – if he poisoned the inhabitants *by* operating the pump'. In looking for action-identities, 'by' gives us all the context we need; for it is in cases where we say things like 'He Q-ed by X-ing' ('He did something *by* doing something else') that Davidson and Anscombe think that his Q-ing was the same as his X-ing.

D. Goldman's objections

Goldman begins his book on action⁽²²⁾ by describing a case as follows: Suppose that John does each of the following things (all at the same time): (1) he moves his hand, (2) he frightens away a fly, (3) he moves his queen to king-knight-seven, (4) he checkmates his opponent, (5) he gives his opponent a heart attack, and (6) he wins his first chess game ever.⁽²³⁾

He then asks, 'Has John here performed *six* acts?', and ascribes to Anscombe and Davidson the answer that only one act occurred, whereas he goes on to argue for a much more fine-grained approach.⁽²⁴⁾

But naturally, as Anscombe points out,⁽²⁵⁾ neither she nor Davidson can have any views on the case *as described*. It soon becomes clear from the discussion that Goldman means: 'in a case where John checkmates his opponents *by* moving his queen', or, 'in a case where he frightens away the fly *by* moving his hand', or, in general, as Anscombe puts it,

the latter suggest exhaustive descriptions'. While complaining that 'the nature of adequate action descriptions is rarely discussed', he admits that he does not 'have anything very helpful to say' about the subject, *ibid*.

My discussion is intended to show how *little* is required to provide an 'adequate description' or 'an adequate background story'.

22. Alvin I. Goldman, *A Theory of Human Action* (Prentice Hall; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1970).

23. *ibid.*, 1.

24. See also A. Goldman, 'The Individuation of Action', *Journal of Philosophy* 68 (1971) 761-74.

25. G.E.M. Anscombe, 'Under a Description', *Noûs* 13 (1979) 223.

in a case where he *did* do all that just by what it is rather natural to call one act. He wasn't, for example, playing half a dozen games of chess at once, in one of which he moved his queen while in another he checkmated his opponent, simultaneously frightening away a fly by blowing a raspberry, etc...⁽²⁶⁾

Goldman, however, thinks that in the case when a grandmaster checkmates his opponent by moving his queen, the grandmaster's checkmating his opponent and the grandmaster's moving his queen are two actions; and indeed in any example of this kind Goldman finds as many actions as there are descriptions. Why does he think this?

Much of Goldman's argument against Anscombe and Davidson depends on his analysis of 'by'. 'By', Goldman says, is asymmetric and irreflexive.⁽²⁷⁾ If John turns on the light by flipping the switch, then he does not flip the switch by turning on the light (*asymmetry*). And it would be odd to say that John turned on the light by turning on the light, or that John checkmated his opponent by checkmating his opponent (*irreflexivity*).⁽²⁸⁾

But why should Anscombe and Davidson be required to say any of the things which Goldman finds objectionable? Their theory, as I have emphasised throughout, is a theory about particular actions. But if an action is the doing of many things, then, if we focus our attention on the things done, undoubtedly we shall find that while certain kinds of relation between these things hold, others do not. Goldman's examples show simply (and unsurprisingly) that while action *a* may be of kind *k* by being also of kind *k'*, it may not be of kind *k'* by being also of kind *k*. The man's action of moving his arm up and down with his fingers round the pump is an action of the kind 'poisoning the inhabitants' by (in virtue of) being also an action of the other kind 'replenishing the water supply'; but it is not an action of the kind 'replenishing the water supply' by (or in virtue of) being also an action of the other kind 'poisoning the inhabitants'. This does not show that what is picked out by the descriptions 'moving his arm up and down', 'replenishing the water supply', 'poisoning the inhabitants', is not

26. *ibid.*, 224.

27. Goldman, *A Theory of Human Action*, 5.

28. *ibid.*

the same action. It only shows that the descriptions are related to each other in different ways.⁽²⁹⁾

If an action is the doing of many things, then one thing the man does is flip the switch; and another thing he does is turn on the light. And he does the second thing by doing the first, but he does not do the first thing by doing the second. Again, this does not show that his flipping the switch and his turning on the light are not the same action; all it shows is that *the things done* by him are related to each other in different ways.

Anscombe invites us to consider an analogue.⁽³⁰⁾ The U.S. President is the U.S. Commander-in-Chief by being President, while the Commander-in-Chief is not the President by being the Commander-in-Chief. Does this show that the President and the Commander-in-Chief are not the same man? Certainly not. Then why should the fact that if 'John killed Sam by shooting him' is true then 'John shot Sam by killing him' isn't, be thought of as an argument against identifying the shooting with the killing? If the event of the switch being flipped causes the event of the light coming up, then no wonder the reverse isn't true. But this says nothing against identifying A's flipping the switch with A's turning on the light when A turned on the light by flipping the switch.

All of Goldman's objections follow the same pattern – and elicit the same kind of response. Consider another two of Goldman's examples:

- (1) By playing the piano John puts Smith to sleep and awakens Brown. But, while John's playing the piano caused Smith to doze off, John's awakening Brown did not cause Smith to doze off. Hence, John's playing the piano cannot be identical with John's awakening Brown.⁽³¹⁾
- (2) John answers the telephone and says 'hello'. He says 'hello' because he wishes to greet the caller. But he has been quarrelling with

29. The sentence above "while action *a* may be of kind *k* by being also of kind *k'*, it may not be of kind *k'* by being also of kind *k*" is ambiguous between a strong thesis (I) and a weak thesis (II). These are:

- I It is not possible that both
 - i) *a* is of kind *k* by being also of kind *k'* and
 - ii) *a* is of kind *k'* by being also of kind *k*.
- II It is possible that both
 - i) as above
 - and
 - ii) it is not the case that *a* is of kind *k'* by being also of kind *k*.

(II) is sufficient for my argument, though (I) is arguably true as well. At least it is hard to think of counter-examples to (I) which do not equivocate on 'by'. I am grateful to C.C.W. Taylor for pointing this out.

30. Anscombe, 'Under a Description', op.cit., 224.

31. Goldman, *A Theory of Human Action*, 2-3.

his wife and ... he says 'hello' very loudly ... There is a causal factor of John's saying 'hello' loudly that is not a causal factor of John's saying 'hello'. (Hence they are different actions.)³²

In these examples Goldman purports to give instances of actions I_1 and I_2 such that I_1 has an effect which is not an effect of I_2 (ex. 1), and such that I_1 has a cause which is not a cause of I_2 (ex. 2). Hence by Leibniz's law $I_1 \neq I_2$. Hence Goldman's examples are put forward as counter-examples to that account.

E. Actions and individual substances

In responding to Goldman's objection, let us consider an analogous argument about individual substances. Suppose it is maintained that substance $S_1 =$ substance S_2 , and the objection is put forward that S_1 has a certain property which S_2 lacks. We can meet the objection by showing either that the original theory does not in fact require the claim that $S_1 = S_2$, or that in fact every property of S_1 is also a property of S_2 .

Let us now make the corresponding moves in response to Goldman's examples. Assuming that Davidson's theory commits him to the identity of the actions of John's putting Smith to sleep and of John's awakening Brown, of John's saying 'hello' and of his saying 'hello' loudly, we can show that, contra Goldman, no breach of Leibniz's law is involved in these examples. In the first example, since the event of John's playing the piano was also (in virtue of one of its effects) an event of John's awakening Brown, and since that event also caused Smith to dose off, it is *true* that John's awakening Brown caused Smith to dose off, despite the fact that the sentence 'John's awakening Brown caused Smith to dose off' does not give an explanation of Smith's dosing off (for that we need the sentence 'John's playing the piano caused Smith to dose off').

In the second example we need to distinguish causes of the *occurrence* of the event from causes of the event's having had one character rather than another; i.e., what caused John's saying 'hello' to occur (i.e., what caused him to utter that expression, as opposed to uttering another, or saying nothing) was his wish to greet the caller, whereas what caused him to say 'hello' *in that way rather than another* (e.g. loudly rather than in a normal tone of voice) was his having quarrelled with his wife. This requires that the criteria of identity for events should not be so restrictive that any change in the character of an event necessarily produces a different event. For it is only on that condition that an event could have had some character

32. *ibid.*, 3.

other than the character it did in fact have (e.g. John's saying 'hello' could have been soft when it was in fact loud). Alternatively, if we adopt a restrictive criterion of identity for events, according to which John's saying 'hello' softly would have been *another* event than the event which in fact occurred, then the quarrel *is* a causal factor in the occurrence of *that* event, together with the desire to greet the caller. Hence, whether we adopt the strict or the lax criterion of identity for events, Davidson's claim can be defended against the charge of breach of Leibniz's law.

Anscombe's and Davidson's method of individuating actions highlights the fact that once the agent has moved his body in the appropriate way, *no further action on his part is required* for his movement to become an action of a different kind. Goldman does not seem to focus on this simple and crucial truth. In Anscombe's example, the man at the pump, having moved his arm, did not have to move an extra finger for his action to become one of replenishing and poisoning. Even if he had died as soon as his hand left the pump, he would still have poisoned the inhabitants. The executioner of Charles I, having taken the king's head off, did not have to add any further performances, namely of killing and executing, for his act to become one of killing and executing.⁽³³⁾ This, as Anscombe remarks,

is something that isn't a philosophical thesis at all, and which no one denies. What is under dispute is whether to speak of many different actions ... in the circumstances when Davidson and I speak of only one.⁽³⁴⁾

So what is it that gives rise to the disagreement?

F. Persons, properties and times

The analysis of 'by' is one factor; Goldman's views about 'the exemplification of action properties' another. Goldman defines actions via triples of persons, properties and times. He distinguishes between act-types and act-tokens. The type of an action is regarded as a property of the agent; the action itself is the agent's exemplifying that property at that time. Goldman's thesis is that if the agent exemplifies two such properties at the same time, then there are two exemplifyings-by-him of properties, and this is to say that there are two distinct actions.⁽³⁵⁾

33. Anscombe, 'Under a Description', op.cit., 223-3.

34. *ibid.*, 223.

35. Jaegwon Kim had put forward a similar idea in 'On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory', *American Philosophical Quarterly* 3 (July 1966) 227-235 (esp. p. 231). Richard

If by vigorously pulling the rope I ring the bell in the kitchen, thus giving the cook a fright and making him drop a plate, then according to Goldman, my pulling the rope, my ringing the bell, my giving the cook a fright, and my making him drop a plate are four distinct, particular actions of mine – as for Goldman there will be as many actions as there are exemplifyings of (different) properties.

Indeed Goldman would have us discriminate more finely. ‘Pulling the rope’ does not denote the same type as ‘vigorously pulling the rope’, nor does ‘ringing the bell’ denote the same type as ‘ringing the bell in the kitchen’. So my pulling the rope and my pulling it vigorously on any particular occasion of my pulling the rope vigorously cannot be the same action; nor can my ringing the bell and my ringing the bell in the kitchen. These are different actions, but they are, according to Goldman, rather intimately related; and Goldman develops an account of this relation, which he calls ‘generation’.⁽³⁶⁾

Let us consider some possible combinations of persons, properties and times in the framework of Goldman’s theory.

1. We may have two different players exemplifying the same act-property (or act type) at the same time. At exactly 11.30 a.m. on a particular Saturday morning both John McEnroe, playing on Court 1, and Martina Navratilova, playing on Court 2, hit the ball into the net.

2. We may have exemplifications by the same person of the same property at different times. In the course of playing at Wimbledon, John McEnroe may exemplify the property of hitting the ball into the net at time t and then again at time t' .

In each of these examples, all parties to the dispute would agree, two particular actions of the same type have occurred: one on Court 1 and the other on Court 2, one at time t and the other at time t' . The crucial difference arises in another kind of case.

3. Losing his temper, John McEnroe hits the ball into the net and thereby loses a point.

While Anscombe and Davidson find it perfectly natural to say that John McEnroe’s hitting the ball into the net and his losing a point were one and the same action, Goldman thinks not; for whenever we have exem-

Brandt and Jaegwon Kim once more defended the idea in ‘The Logic of the Identity Theory’, *The Journal of Philosophy* 64 (1967) 516-18. Goldman’s view is that actions are different if the agents are different, or if their times of occurrence are different, or if they are exemplifyings of different properties – whether by the same agent at the same time or not. (See Goldman, *A Theory of Human Action*, 10-11).

36. Goldman, *A Theory of Human Action*, 20-48.

plifyings of different properties, then we must have different actions. Can he be right?

Again, let us consider a case involving individuals, then make the necessary comparisons. Suppose we are told that a bald man in his fifties was found hanging under Blackfriars Bridge in London, and that he was wearing a blue tie. And suppose we are then informed that the man found hanging under Blackfriars Bridge had been identified by the police as the director of the Banco Ambrosiano. We have now learnt that the man who, philosophically speaking, 'exemplified the properties' of baldness, and of being in his fifties, and of wearing a blue tie, also exemplified the (other) property of being the director of the Banco Ambrosiano. We do not for a moment believe that because four properties have been 'exemplified', each one of these has been exemplified by a different individual; or that since the property of being bald is distinct from the property of being director of a bank, anything that has the one property is distinct from everything that has the other property. It is the same individual, we say, who exemplifies the properties of baldness, of being in his fifties, of wearing a blue tie, etc.

Why should we adopt a different kind of vocabulary when we speak of actions? Let us suppose that the director of the Banco Ambrosiano hanged himself, and that by hanging himself he caused a scandal. Goldman, Davidson and Anscombe would agree that hanging oneself and causing a scandal are two quite different *types* of action. 'Hanging oneself' and 'causing a scandal' express different concepts, mean different things; there are more ways of causing a scandal than by hanging yourself, you may hang yourself without causing a scandal, and so on. But the issue separating Goldman from Anscombe and Davidson does not concern types (concepts, kinds) but tokens (i.e. particular actions). And if we apply to actions the same criteria of individuation that we applied to substances, we should see that we have been given some more information about an event that we already knew to be a hanging, namely that it caused a scandal. If we find it absurd to deny that the properties of baldness, and of being in one's fifties, and of wearing a blue tie, and of being the director of a bank, can all be 'exemplified' by the same individual, then why should we take the opposite view with regard to actions? We should feel inclined to assert that just as the same individual (the agent) exemplifies the different properties of hanging himself and of causing a scandal, so the same action exemplifies the properties of being a hanging of oneself and of being a causing of a scandal.

The question 'when is hitting a ball also scoring a point?' is ambiguous: it may mean 'When is the action's property of being the hitting of a ball the same as the action's property of being the scoring of a point?'. The answer

is, of course, never. But it may mean 'When is someone's action of hitting a ball also his action of scoring a point?' Goldman again answers 'never', Anscombe and Davidson 'occasionally, i.e. when someone scores a point *by* hitting the ball'.

Some philosophers have held that it does not make any important difference which view of individuation one holds. On Davidson's criterion, they argue, one will speak of the same action and many descriptions, whereas on Goldman's criterion one will speak of different actions; and one may also choose indifferently between them. Thus, for instance, Lawrence Davis writes:

A conclusive argument in favour of any one of the theories and doctrines surveyed ... remains elusive. Perhaps no position on these matters is 'the' correct one. In practice, it seems that whatever is said in terms of one theory can be restated in terms of any one of its rivals.⁽³⁷⁾

I find this view very unsatisfactory. Though there may be different theories yielding different results in obscure and borderline cases, a theory, if it has to be taken seriously, must at least respect and reflect the way we talk about the normal, unproblematic case. Anscombe gives the following example:

What would we say of a theory which grants that a certain man, Dickens, wrote *David Copperfield* and *Bleak House* and that only this Dickens wrote *Bleak House* but does *not* grant that 'The author of *David Copperfield*' describes the same man as 'The author of *Bleak House*'? We'd say that it is a non-starter: any *theory* of human identity has got to fit in with the correctness of calling the author of *David Copperfield* the same man as the author of *Bleak House*.⁽³⁸⁾

Now Goldman is full of such difficulties. He thinks, for example, that if I said 'Hello' loudly on a given occasion, then my saying 'Hello' and my saying 'Hello' loudly were two actions.⁽³⁹⁾ But whatever one means by 'action', and however one decides to go about individuating actions, one clearly ought to be suspicious of any theory which yields such awkward results. The terminological difficulty is a clear indication that something in the underlying theory has gone seriously wrong.

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37. Lawrence H. Davis, *Theory of Action* (Prentice-Hall; New Jersey 1979) 41.

38. Anscombe, 'Under a Description', *op.cit.*, 222.

39. Goldman, *A Theory of Human Action*, 28.