

OUTLINES OF THE CHRISTOLOGY OF ST. AUGUSTINE

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Part two: Grammatical exegesis and christology in St. Augustine

Part one analysed Augustine's knowledge and usage of the word *persona* and its connections to the grammatical exegesis, which eventually led up to the surmise, that this technique could well have shaped his christology and notion of the *una persona Christi*. Part two will try to prove the accuracy of this assumption by analysing a number of texts, which show the development of Augustine's theology from the grammatical notion of *persona* to the formula *Christus una persona*, and then demonstrate, how the newly found formula became the cardinal point for all his future christology.

1. The transition of *persona* from its grammatical meaning to a term of identity

a. Sermo 288

The first text is taken from Augustine's homily 288, pronounced on June 24th, 401, on the feast of St. John the Baptist.⁶⁷ Augustine explains there the relationship of John the Baptist to Jesus Christ, starting from the following linguistic argument. Any word, that man is about to utter, exists before being spoken as a notion in his mind. Only afterwards it will be

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67. S 288, 4-5 (PL 38, 1306-1307). Cf. Geerlings (note 2) 101-103.

expressed by means of the voice and thus become audible. When a man therefore speaks, the word itself precedes the voice. Regarding the audience it is just the other way. They hear the voice first and then comprehend the word. The relation between John and Christ, says Augustine, can be compared to the relation of word and voice. John is the voice, Christ the word. Being the word, Christ existed in God before John came into being. But in relation to men (as audience) Christ the word came after John the voice. John, Augustine explains further by means of the grammatical exegesis, took upon himself the person of all voices before him, which already had proclaimed the coming of the word (“*personam gerebat Ioannes vocis in sacramento*”). John is the voice in person, which is a *sacramentum*, a mystery and a representation at the same time.

The expression *personam gerere* is clearly a formula of identification. John is not only speaking, he is not only using his voice, he himself is the voice of all the prophets up to him in person. This is no longer a purely exegetical use of *persona*, but rather a metaphysical one. And Augustine continues: “O what a great and wonderful mystery! Behold the person of the voice, in which all those voices were represented and that said about the person of the Word: He must increase, but I must decrease.” Here the parallel of John the voice and Christ the Word is extended to John the person of the voice and consequently Christ the person of the word. At this point, however, “person of the Word” is no longer an exegetical term, but a theological, christological one.

The development of the word *persona* from an exegetical meaning to the concept of identity and unity begins by using the expression *personam gerere* not only as an exegetical term but by applying it to John the Baptist representing the voice in his person. This meaning is consequently transferred to Christ the Word, wherefore *persona Verbi* becomes there an expression of identity, too. Augustine does not yet arrive at using the term *persona* in the sense of describing the unity of manhood and deity in Christ, but he has already got the elements to do so, as the following context shows.

He continues to discuss nothing else if not the problem of the unity of God and man in Christ. The Word of God, he says, was with God in the beginning (cf. *Jn* 1,1) and God equal in form (*forma dei* – cf. *Ph* 2,6). This Word revealed himself to mankind in the form of a slave (*forma servi* – *Ph* 2,7). Nevertheless he stays identical with himself and loses nothing of his similarity to his Father, so that in Christ the Father, too, is manifest (*Jn* 14,8-9). Augustine here discusses the problem of the unity of God and man in Christ and his permanent godhead and similarity to the Father, i.e. the identity of Christ and the preexisting Son of God, not yet using the term *persona* to solve this problem, but already in the context of *persona* as a

notion of unity and identity. And he resumes this passage: "John, therefore, is the person of all voices, the person of the Word is Christ".

b. *De trinitate* 12

The second text that makes clear how the exegetical term *persona* became a metaphysical one, is to be found in book 12 of *De trinitate*.⁶⁸ It cannot be established with certainty, if this passage as preserved was compiled before or after 411, as books 1-12 were published before 412, while the entire Treatise on the Trinity was not however, edited until 420.⁶⁹

Augustine explains *Gn* 1,26 f. "Let us make man in our own image and likeness (ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram). So God created man in the image of God" and states above all the simple grammatical fact, that the plural *nostram* indicates clearly, that man is not created only in the image of one of the persons of the Trinity, but of the entire Trinity.⁷⁰ "It would certainly be incorrect to say 'our', because it is a plural number, if man were made in the image of one person, whether of the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit." It is fairly evident here that the use of *persona* passes from grammar to theology. If one disentangles the different steps made by St. Augustine, he states at first that *nostram* is a plural number. From this he concludes that there is expressed a plural number of subjects, of grammatical persons. Finally he asks who are the subjects (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) and calls them the "persons of the Trinity". This last step, calling them persons of the Trinity, leaves behind the grammatical meaning of *persona* and takes up a rather theological one. Here it becomes quite clear, how grammatical and theological use of *persona* are intimately connected.

68. *Trin* 12, 6, 6-7 (*CChr.SL* 50, 360, 1-362, 62). Translation by S. McKenna: *FaCh* 45 (1970 = 1963) 347-350.

69. For the dating of *De trinitate* cf. *Sant'Agostino, La Trinità. Introduzione* (A. Trapè e M. F. Sciacca), (traduzione G. Beschini) (= Nuova Biblioteca Agostiniana 4; Rome 1973) XVI-XVIII; A. Trapè, *S. Agostino: Patrologia*, vol. III, *Dal Concilio di Nicea (325) al Concilio di Calcedonia (451). I Padri latini* (a cura di A. di Berardino con una presentazione di J. Quasten) (Rome 1978) 351; H. J. Frede, *Kirchenschriftsteller. Verzeichnis der Sigel* (= VL 1/1) (Freiburg 31981) 156; W. J. Mountain/Fr. Glorie: *CChr.SL* 50 (1968) LXXXIII; M. Mellet/Th. Camelot, note 2: *BAug* 15 (1955) 557-566.

70. Cf. a similar passage in *Gn litt* 3, 19 (*CSEL* 28/1, 85, 16-86, 4 Zycha). For Augustine's theology of man as the image of God cf. M. Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des Hl. Augustinus* (= *MBTh* 11), (München 1927) 195-200; E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin* (= *EPhM* 11), (Paris 31949) 286-298; G. Bardy, note 51: *BAug* 10 (1952) 730 f.; H. Merki, "Ebenbildlichkeit": *RAC* 4 (1959) 475; R. A. Markus, "'Imago' et 'similitudo' in Augustine": *REAug* 10 (1964) 125-143; A. Solignac, "Image et ressemblance", II. B, "Dans la patristique latine": *DSp* 7/2 (1971) 1418-1420; P. Agaësse, notes 15-16: *BAug* 48 (1972) 622-633; A. Trapè/M. Sciacca: *NBA* 4 (1973) XXXVIII-XL.

It is indeed a trinitarian example, but we shall soon see that for Augustine, especially as regards the terminological development, Trinity and christology are inseparable. For he goes on to reject the current opinion that "in the image of God" should mean "in the image of the Son", as "God" is explicitly repeated: "God created man in the image of God" (*Gn* 1,27 LXX). Otherwise one would have said: "in his own image".⁷¹ Augustine shows instead, that even when the Scriptures obviously speak of one person of the Trinity only, the forms of address can vary in the very same sentence. E.g. *Ps* 17,30 "by thee I can crush a troop; and by my God I can leap over a wall" or *Ps* 44,6 "in the heart of the king's enemies; the peoples fall under you". Eventually he draws upon testimonies of the New Testament and cites *Rm* 1,3 f.: "Concerning his Son, who was descended from David according to the flesh and designated the Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness by his resurrection from the dead, Jesus Christ our Lord." This passage induces Augustine to embark on a systematic explanation of the one Lord Jesus Christ: "For what is the Son of God, predestinated by the Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead, if not the same Jesus Christ who was predestinated the Son of God in power? Therefore, just as when we hear here: "The Son of God in the power of Jesus Christ", or 'The Son of God according to the spirit of sanctification of Jesus Christ', or 'The Son of God by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead', when he could have said in the customary way 'in his power', or 'according to the spirit of His sanctification', or 'by the resurrection from His death', or 'from their dead'. we are not compelled to understand another person (*intelligere aliam personam*), but the one and the same person (*sed unam eandemque*), the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ; so when we hear: 'God made man to the image of God', although it could have been said, according to the more common usage, 'to His image', yet we are not compelled to understand another person in the Trinity (*aliam personam intelligere in trinitate*), but the one and the same Trinity itself, who is the one God, and to whose image man has been made."

Here again we have the same double meaning of *persona* both in a trinitarian context and in a christological context. Would it be surprising then, if St. Augustine did pass from this clearly grammatical statement that the different sons Paul speaks of form only one subject, to the statement that the two Sons, begotten by the Father before the aeons and the Son born

71. Augustine argues e. g. against Philo of Alexandria, Irenaeus of Lyons, Clement of Alexandria, Origen and Athanasius. Cf. Merki (note 70) 466 f. He himself, however, supported the same view in earlier writings: *diu qu* 51, 4 (*CCL* 44 A, 81, 70-72 Mutzenbecher): "neque inscite distinguitur, quod aliud sit imago et similitudo dei, qui etiam filius dicitur, aliud ad imaginem et similitudinem dei, sicut hominem factum accipimus." Cf. Schmaus (note 70) 197; Merki (note 70) 467.

by Mary are one and the same subject, one and the same person, *una persona*?

c. *Enchiridion*

The third text that carries the development even further was written roughly ten years later: ch. 14 of the *Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide et spe et caritate*, compiled between 421 and 423.⁷² Augustine explains there *Ps* 2,7 in connection with the baptism of Christ in the Jordan: "Hence, too, those words of the Father spoken over Him at His baptism: *This day have I begotten thee*, pointed not to that one day in time on which He was baptized, but to that of changeless eternity, to show us that this man was identical with the person of the Only-Begotten (ad unigeniti personam pertinere monstraret)". *Ad personam pertinere* is clearly a term of the grammatical exegesis,⁷³ but here it obviously expresses the metaphysical unity of the man Jesus with the only begotten Son of God. The exegetical and the christological meaning of *ad personam pertinere* merge into one another.

d. *Contra Maximinum*

This surmised transition is confirmed by a text in *Contra Maximinum*, written another five years later (427/28).⁷⁴ It discusses one of the vital issues of the Arian controversy, the relationship of Father and Son, i.e. their equality resp. subordination. Maximinus refers to two quotations from the book of Psalms in order to proof the subordination of the Son under the Father, using himself the means of grammatical exegesis: *Ps* 21,11: from my mother's womb you have been my God" (the Son addressing the Father) and *Ps* 109,3: "from the womb before the drawn I have begotten thee" (said by the Father to the Son).

Augustine argues against this exegesis that in *Ps* 21,11 it is not the Son who is speaking (non enim est Filii persona dicentis) as the substance of the begetter and the begotten is always the same. Therefore the Son must be equally God as he was begotten by God Father and he is man at the same time because he was born by Mary. Regarding *Ps* 109,3 Augustine concedes that this verse could be attributed to God Father, but "either the prophet speaks himself (*ex persona sua*) or he speaks on behalf of the Father (*ex persona Patris ad Filium*)". If so, one must nevertheless avoid applying

72. *Ench* 14, 49 (CChr.SL 46, 76, 14-17). Translation by L. A. Arand: ACW 3 (1947) 54.

73. Cf. e. g. *b coniug* 10, 11 (CSEL 41, 203, 7 Zycha); *b uid* 1, 1 (CSEL 41, 305, 12 Zycha).

74. *C Max* 1, 7 (PL 42, 749 f.).

human conceptions to the "womb of God". For as the Father is immaterial the Son must be immaterial, too, as he was begotten from the substance of the Father.

This text shows quite clearly that even a few years before the death of St. Augustine the notion of *persona* in christology is still conceived both in its grammatical and metaphysical meaning at the same time. Determining the persons speaking in the Psalms cited the basic question of grammatical exegesis is answered: "Who speak? (quis dicit?)". The application of the expressions *persona Filii* and *persona Patris* to the problem of the two natures (substances) in Christ, however, transfers the terminology to a metaphysical context.

2. *Christus una persona*

So far we have tried to discover how the grammatical exegesis influenced the development of the new christological formula of the *una persona* and could even show quite exactly how the transition from an exegetical notion of *persona* to a metaphysical one was operated. We will now see what effects this new detection had on the christology of St. Augustine, which problems he is not able to solve, in which contexts he used the formula, and understand perhaps, why this new conception became thus important up to the present day. I should like to do that again by means of a few key-texts of his from the *Epistula* 137, *Sermo* 186, *Contra sermonem Arianorum*, the *Enchiridion* and *De dono perseverantiae*.

a. *Epistula* 137

St. Augustine became a bishop in 392, and then at the latest he began to think theologically and think about the person and work of Christ. It took him, however, not less than twenty years to arrive at the *una persona*. The first time he mentions it is in his Letter 137, addressed to the proconsul of Africa, Volusianus, in the year 411/12.⁷⁵ The proconsul asked Augustine to teach him the Christian faith and Augustine answered by this letter, above

75. *Ep* 137, 9-11 (CSEL 44, 108, 13-110, 11). Rufius Antonius Agrypnius Volusianus was proconsul of Africa before 412, *Quaestor sacri palatii* before 412, 411/12 he stayed in Carthage, November 417 till the middle of 418 he was *Praefectus urbis Romae*, 428-429 *Praefectus praetorio Italiae et Africae*, in 436 he travelled to Constantinople, where he was baptised at the beginning of 437 and died on January 6th, 437. Cf. Martindale (note 13) II 1184 f.; A. Mandouze, *Prosopographie de l'Afrique chrétienne (303-533)*, II (= *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire*, 1), (Paris 1982) 1228.

all, of course, explaining the mystery of Christ. Christ, he says, appeared as mediator between God and man in this way, that he united in his personal unity both natures (in unitate personae copulans utramque naturam). These two natures, however are not of the same rank, so that there was operated a parallel process of mutual approach from each side. The natural part, i.e. manhood, is elevated by the supernatural. But in an opposite movement the supernatural part, i.e. divinity, is mitigated by the natural (“ut solita sublimaret insolitis et insolita solitis temperaret”). With this explanation the basic problem of how those different natures can be united is touched upon. For it is not sufficient to find a new formula and be able to state the fact of the unity of manhood and deity in Christ. One will ask as a consequence, how this unity could be achieved. Above all Augustine presupposes that the Word remained unaltered from the beginning and was not turned into flesh. The changeable man is allowed to approach the unchangeable God, but God does not part with his very essence (“homo quippe deo accessit, non deus a se recessit”). In order to make clear the mode of unity, Augustine uses the comparison of the unity of body and soul in man for the first time, which he most probably adopted from the neoplatonist Porphyrios.⁷⁶ God and man are joined in one person like soul and body, so that man is called one person (“does homini permixtus sit, ut una fieret persona Christi, ... quo modo misceatur anima corpori, ut una persona fiat hominis”). The relationship of both parts is described as “making use of”: in Christ God makes use of man, in man the soul makes use of the body. In this mixture, however, both parts do not lose their specific characteristics like in a mixture of two liquids, but stay themselves like light and air, when the sun shines.

The comparison of soul and body to deity and manhood in Christ, which is taken from neoplatonic doctrine, is in so far a very suitable choice as already there the soul was considered pre-eminent over the body as the godhead is over the manhood. Nonetheless Augustine will not repeat this model very often (only three times),⁷⁷ which shows the rather small

76. Cf. E. L. Fortin, *Christianisme et culture philosophique au cinquième siècle. La querelle de l'âme humaine en occident*, (Paris 1959) 113-128; Newton, *Thesis* (note 7) 72-75, 84 f., 89, 102, 108 f. and *passim*; id., “The Importance of Augustine’s use of the Neoplatonic Doctrine of Hypostatic Union for the Development of Christology”: *AugSt* 2 (1971)3.

77. *Ep* 169, 2, 8 (CSEL 44, 617, 14-17), *gr nou t* 4, 12 (CSEL 44, 164, 10-13); *Io eu tr* 19, 15 (CChr.SL 36, 199, 25-31). Cf. van Bavel (note 3) 30-32; T. J. van Bavel/B. Bruning, “Die Einheit des ‘Totus Christus’ bei Augustinus”: *Scientia Augustiniana. Studien über Augustinus, den Augustinismus und den Augustinerorden* (Festschrift A. Zumkeller), (ed. C. P. Mayer and W. Eckermann), (= Cassiciacum 30), (Würzburg 1975) 46-55; A. Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, vol. 1: *From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)*, (London-Oxford 1975) 409-413.

influence of neo-platonic doctrine on his christology. He will never again use the vocabulary of mixture and intermingling either, nor that of the "making use" of the body resp. manhood. It seems to have been clear to him that this first attempt of describing the unity in Christ run too great a risk of misinterpretation. What he will keep is the *una persona*, the theology of the soul as mediator between God and man and the concept of unity on the basis of the natures of Christ.

In fact, from 411 on, the *una persona* appears like a magic formula to all the christological problems Augustine has to cope with. This might be made apparent by the four following texts, which progressively display St. Augustine's christology after 411.

b. *Sermo 186*

The Christmas Sermon in the Augustinian Corpus numbered 186, was held virtually in the same year 411/12 when Letter 137 was written.⁷⁸ At the very beginning of the sermon Augustine speaks about the virgin birth of Christ: "Abiding with His Father, He made for Himself a mother; and when he was made in the womb of His mother, He remained in the heart of His Father. ... Precisely so, because the Word was made flesh, the Word did not become flesh by ceasing to be; on the contrary, the flesh, lest it should cease to be, was joined to the Word, so that, just as man is body and soul, Christ might be God and man. The very same who is God is man, too, and the very same who is man is God, too, not in confusion of nature, but in the unity of a person ("idem Deus qui homo, et qui Deus idem homo: non confusione naturae, sed unitate personae"). In short, it was one and the same who from all time and forever is the Son of God begotten of the Father, who began to be the Son of man by His birth of the Virgin. And thus, too, was human nature added to the Son's divine nature. Yet the result was not a quaternity of persons, but the Trinity remains."⁷⁹

Four theological problems surrounding christology is Augustine able to solve here by the *una persona*:

1) The question, how the Son of God in his incarnation both stays with the Father, being God himself, and abides on earth, being true man, without dividing himself into two Sons: namely by the unity of person.

2) To explain, how this incarnation is operated, Augustine quotes *Jn* 1,14 "Verbum caro factum est", but the flesh is lifted up to the word in the unity of person.

78. Cf. P.-P. Verbraken, *Études critiques sur les sermons authentiques de saint Augustin* (= TP 12), (Steenbrugge 1976) 98.

79. S 186, 1, 1 (PL 38, 999). Translation by Th. C. Lawler: ACW 15 (1952) 80 f.

3) Christ is coeternal to the Father being the Son of God and has a beginning in time being Son of man, but as these two sons represent not two persons, but two natures, the one person of Christ is not endangered.

4) Therefore the manhood of Christ is not added to the Trinity Father, Son and Holy Spirit as a fourth person, as it forms a single person with the Son.

The basic problem, that has to be solved is the safeguarding of the reality and integrity of the double nature of Christ, without dividing him into two separate sons. This must be maintained above all against the Arians.

c. *Contra sermonem Arianorum*

Partly the same, partly new problems are dealt with in the *Contra sermonem Arianorum*.⁸⁰ Augustine there refutes a *Sermo Arianorum*⁸¹ passage after passage and eventually arrives at the exegesis of *Jn* 6,38 "I have come down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him who sent me". This quotation, Augustine explains, reflects the two natures of Christ. Being God Christ has the same will as the Father, but being man and mediator he does the will of the Father. "Because he is a double substance, but one person, the 'I have come down from heaven' points to the majesty of God, the 'not to do my own will', however, to the obedience as man. For Christ is both, God and man." Here we have got the same problem of the double nature, but under the new aspect of the double and yet unique will of Christ.

Ro 5,19: "As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by one man's obedience many will be made righteous" leads again to the question of the two sons. Because here obviously "man" must mean two different persons. The first man is Adam, the second Christ. If the notion of "man" would be the same, Christ would be only a sinner like Adam. Therefore Augustine distinguishes: "The one and the same Christ is Son of God by nature, and Son of man by his grace. And his manhood has not been created first and then accepted, but by his very acceptance it was created. Therefore, because of the unity of person in two natures it can be said that the Son of man descended from heaven, though he was born of the Virgin. And it can be said, that the Son of God was crucified and buried, though he did not suffer according to his deity, but in the weakness of his human nature". This position is confirmed by *Jn* 3,13 "No one has

80. *Cs Arian* 7-9 (PL 42, 688-690).

81. PL 42, 677-684.

ascended into heaven but he who descended from heaven, the Son of man who is in heaven” and *I Co* 2,8 “None of the masters of this age have ever known Him; for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory”.

Here it is again the problem of the two sons, but again under new aspects. Christ is Son of God by nature, Son of man through his own grace. He creates the man Jesus by accepting him into the personal unity with his godhead and because of this initial and inseparable unity the *communicatio idiomatum* is necessary.

d. *Enchiridion*

In the *Enchiridion*, the manual of Christian Faith, Hope, and Charity, compiled about ten years after the original discovery of the formula *una persona*, Augustine’s christological language and concepts are more precise and dense than ever before.⁸² For in the *Enchiridion* his task is not the defence against heretical attacks, but rather the concise and systematical display of the positive Catholic faith. Before entering into christology, Augustine had treated the creation and fall of mankind. Then he spoke about Christ as mediator between God and man, and then he consequently goes on to explain the double nature of Christ in one person: “Wherefore, Christ Jesus, the Son of God, is both God and man. He is God before all ages, man in our own time. He is God because He is the Word of God, for *the Word was God* (*Jn* 1,1). But He is man because in His own Person there were joined to the Word a rational soul and a body (“*homo autem quia in unitatem personae accessit verbo anima rationalis et caro*”). Therefore, so far as He is God, He and the Father are one; but so far as He is man, the Father is greater than He. Since he was the only Son of God, not by grace but by nature, in order that He should also be full of grace. He became likewise the son of man; one and the selfsame Christ results from the union of both. For, *being in the form of God, He thought it not robbery to be what He was by nature, that is, equal with God; but He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant* (*Ph* 2,6 f.), neither losing nor diminishing the form of God. And thus He became less and still remained equal, being both in one, as has been said. In the one instance this was because He was the Word; in the other, because He became man. As the Word He is equal to the Father; as man He is less. The one Son of God, He is at the same time Son of man; the one Son of man, he is at the same time Son of God. Being

82. *Ench* 10, 35-11, 36 (*CChr.SL* 46, 69, 48-70, 30). Translation by L. A. Arand: *ACW* 3 (1947) 43.

God and man did not make Him two sons of God, but one Son of God: God without beginning, man with a definite beginning – our Lord Jesus Christ.”

To this very concise exposition of the two sons, the two natures, their attributes and the new argument of the *kenosis*, Augustine adds in ch. 36 a completely new kind of question, which was prompted by a new heresy he had to cope with: Pelagianism. How did mankind earn the grace of the incarnation of the Lord as one person in two natures. Pelagius and his followers considered the merits of each man as earning the grace of God and the consequent salvation of this man. Augustine refutes this position referring to the example of Christ himself. If Pelagius was right, there would have to have been the man Jesus first, who by his extraordinary merits deserved to be united to the Son of God. If, however, we accept the personal unity of both, they can't ever have been separated, but the man Jesus must have been united to the Son of God at his very creation. And then man is united to God only through the overwhelming and undeserved grace of God, granted freely without any merits on the part of man. This position is certainly right in so far it explains the reason for the incarnation of the Lord, but it will lead Augustine into severe problems with the monks of Hadrumetum and Marsiglia and eventually to Semipelagianism, as the rôle of human merits in the achievement of his salvation is not clearly defined because of the sole intention to combat Pelagianism.

Here, however, we notice again, that Augustine's theology and especially his christology never was an academical subject to him, but always developed on the grounds of practical needs: to defend his community against heretical doctrines. This becomes even clearer in the last text we are going to consider.

e. *De dono perseverantiae*

In this relatively short text Augustine explicitly mentions the heretics he is fighting: Arianism, Apollinarianism, Manichaeism and Photinism.⁸³ “For we do not say that Christ is God only, as the heretical Manichaeans do; nor man only, as the heretical Photinians; nor man in such a manner that He lacks something which is essential to human nature, that is, either the soul, or the rational faculty in that soul ... as the heretical Apollinarists.” Augustine does not mention the Arians by name, but as he continues to

83. *Perseu* 24, 67 (PL 45, 1033 f.). Translation by M. A. Lesousky, *The De Dono Perseverantiae of Saint Augustine. A Translation with an Introduction and a Commentary* (= *PatSt* 91), (Washington D.C. 1956) 213-215.

show the equality of the Son of God with the Father, and his inequality being man, he clearly aims at Arianism. I.e. the newly found formula puts Augustine into a position to define the Catholic faith against all heterodox sects. The concept of the *una persona* makes it possible to think of two complete substances (natures) being genuinely united, as the unity is not achieved on the level of natures, but in one person.

Conclusion

With these texts the most important features of Augustine's *persona* christology have been mentioned, though a large number of similar texts could be adduced:

- *Jn 1,14: Verbum caro factum est = verbum homo factum est.*
- Unity of person of the two sons of God and man (*Jn 3,13* no one has ascended into heaven but he who descended from heaven, the Son of man).
- *Communicatio idiomatum.*
- *Christus mediator.*
- The relationship of Father and Son.
- The problem of a quaternity.

That this new concept would offer the solutions to the problems of christology which will be generally accepted in the future, Augustine could already sense himself towards the end of his life in the controversy about the Gallian monk Leporius. This, however, I shall reserve for the conclusion of the third part of this article as an outlook after the exposition of christological concepts prior and contemporary to St. Augustine, which might help to understand how he eventually arrived at his formula *Christus una persona*.

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