MELITA THEOLOGICA

The Review of the Faculty of Theology and the Theology Students' Association
MALTA

MELITA THEOLOGICA

Published biannually since March 1947, treating Dogmatic and Moral Theology, Fundamental Theology, Holy Scripture, Canon Law, Spiritual Theology, Liturgy, Patrology, Ecclesiastical History, Christian Archaeology, Philosophy, Psychology and Sociology.
Books and Articles are accepted for reviewing.

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Theology Students' Association
c/o Foundation for Theological Studies
Tal-Virtù - Rabat
Malta

The price of a single issue is LM 1.00
The annual subscription is LM 2.00

Typesetting: Foundation for Theological Studies, Rabat
Printing: Veritas Press, Zabbar

THE CONCEPT OF THE 'COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND' IN THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL TRADITION

Emmanuel Agius

In his message for the World Day of Peace, 1 January 1990, Pope John Paul II addressed the ecological issue from the ethical perspective of the common heritage of mankind. It is noteworthy that this new year's message was the first papal pronouncement which literally contains all the key notions in Ambassador Pardo's famous 1967 motion at the United Nations.[1] Although there are some allusions to the common heritage principle scattered throughout recent church documents, none of these references is so direct and comprehensive as that contained in Pope John Paul II's message for the 1990 World Day of Peace. In his statement of November 1967, Arvid Pardo suggested that the concept of the common heritage incorporates the following characteristics: 1) non-appropriation of those resources which belong to the common heritage; 2) management of common resources on behalf of mankind; 3) sharing of benefits by all mankind; 4) use of resources for peaceful purposes only; and 5) conservation of resources for future generations.

In John Paul II's message, the concept of the common heritage of mankind is the main ethical principle underlying the discussions about the responsible use of the earth's resources, the urgency of safeguarding the integrity and order of creation, and the need for fostering a new sense of intergenerational solidarity. The Pope clearly stated that "the earth is ultimately a *common heritage*, the fruit

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1 In his motion, Arvid Pardo, who at that time was Malta's Ambassador, urged the United Nations to take action on the seabed issue and to pass a declaration that the seabed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction are a common heritage of mankind. Cf. A. Pardo, "First Statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 1st 1967", in the *Common Heritage. Selected Papers on Ocean and World Order: 1967-1974* (University of Malta Press; Malta 1975) 40-41.

of which are *for the benefit of all.*"[2] Thus, it is an unjust situation that a privileged few accumulate excess goods, squandering available resources, while masses of people are living in conditions of misery at the very lowest level of subsistence. John Paul II continued to argue that "the concepts of an ordered universe and a common heritage both point to the necessity of a more internationally coordinated approach to *the management of the earth's goods.*"[3] The effects of ecological problems transcend national boundaries; hence their solution cannot be found solely on the national level. A supranational body is needed to regulate the use of the earth's resources. Moreover, the Pope observed that "unfortunately, modern science already has the capacity to change the environment for hostile purposes."[4] In view of this, he stressed the urgent need of using the resources of the earth for peaceful purposes since "*peace with all creation* is inseparable from peace among all people."[5] The building up of a peaceful society is linked with respect for the integrity of creation. The papal message has also insisted that the ecological crisis cannot be tackled adequately without seriously considering the "future generations issue." Political and socio-economic decisions and planning must give attention to what the earth and its atmosphere are telling us, "... namely, that there is an order in the universe which must be respected, and that the human person, endowed with the capacity of choosing freely, has a grave responsibility to preserve this order for *the well-being of future generations.*"[6] Indiscriminate application of the advances in science and technology "has led to the painful realization that we cannot interfere in one area of the ecosystem without paying due attention both to the consequences of such interference in other areas and to *the well-being of future generations.*"[7] Thus, the far-reaching effects of technology point to the urgent need of a deeper sense of responsibility for generations yet to be born.

The concept of the common heritage of mankind was introduced in international law in order to reconcile the human race and to put the law of solidarity and cooperation in place of the law of competi-

2 Pope JOHN PAUL II, "Peace with God the Creator, Peace with all of Creation", in *L'Osservatore Romano,* 18-26 Dec 1989, 2.

3 *Idem.*

4 *Idem.*

5 *Ibid.,* 3.

6 *Idem.*

7 *Ibid.,* 2

tion and self-interest. Undoubtedly, these are the objectives of the Pope's message which is inspired by the common heritage principle. John Paul II urged mankind to build a new sense of solidarity which offers "new opportunities for strengthening cooperation and peaceful relations among States."[8] Moreover, the common heritage principle evolved in order to correct the injustices resulting from the greed and selfish attitudes of the technologically powerful. The papal message urges the world community to abandon these attitudes and to share the resources of the earth with all mankind.

The import of the papal reference to the common heritage of mankind principle cannot be fully comprehended unless situating it in the church's traditional teaching on property. The concept of the common heritage is not a theory of property since heritage focuses the mind on receiving something from others in order to pass it on to someone else. It is, however, to the concept of property and ownership that is necessary to hark back in order to understand its Christian roots. Beyond doubt, the central and most fundamental idea implied in the common heritage principle is *mankind's right to use* all those resources of the earth which are considered as part of the common heritage. This concept affirms that all mankind, that is, both present and future generations, has the right *not* to be excluded from access to common resources. All other notions implied in the concept of common heritage are subsidiary to the fundamental right of usage. The ethical principles of sharing and of responsibility to future generations aim to safeguard the right of all mankind to use the earth's resources. The idea of management, though a very important element in the common heritage of mankind principle, is subordinated to the fundamental right to use the common resources. Resources should be administered on behalf of present and future generations in order to guarantee the right of all members of the human species to use the earth's resources. Moreover, the aim of regulating the use of common goods is to conserve the heritage and thus avoid infringing the right of future generations to make use of those resources which belong to all mankind. Thus, it is quite clear that all the characteristics implied in the common heritage of mankind principle converge on one basic tenet: the universal right to use the earth's common resources should be safeguarded because material goods belong to all mankind.

This central concept of the common heritage of mankind is one of the long-established principles of the catholic social tradition. In

8 *Idem.*

the tradition of the church, there are two main tenets with reference to the resources of the world. The first is that by nature, *all* earthly resources have a universal destination, that is, they are intended for the good of mankind as a whole. The material goods of the earth are common to all men and they are destined for the use of all men. The earth is given as a gift from God for the nurture and fulfilment of all, not for the benefit of a few. This implies that everyone has an inherent right to use the resources of the earth. Since the right of usage is primary in character, it ranks among the fundamental rights of man. The concept of the common heritage of mankind was introduced in international law precisely in order to safeguard this fundamental human right.

The second is that some modes of appropriation are allowable and, in certain cases, required, to a limited extent. In the catholic social tradition, only within the context of the universal right to use the resources of the earth can the concept of the right to private property be developed. Property is seen as the institutional actualization of man's fundamental right to use the material goods of the earth. Property should always be administered for the benefit of all. Though the right of property is important, the universal right to usage is prior to and conditions the right to private property. Since private property is a means to an end, it must always remain subordinate to its proper end, namely the universal right of usage.

This article attempts to trace the Christian roots of the ethical principles implied in the concept of the common heritage of mankind. A survey of the patristic, Thomistic and recent papal social teachings on the universal destination of created things and on property reveals the church's constant concern to defend man's fundamental right to use the goods of the earth.

The Patristic Tradition

The teachings of the early Fathers of the Church set forth a concept of property which dominated the Christian thought until the time of St. Thomas Aquinas. The early Fathers did not find in the New Testament a ready-made theory of property, but they did find an attitude toward wealth and its use with which any Christian theory of property had to conform.9 The theory of property developed by the Fathers was mainly influenced by the prevailing philosophical theories

9 R. SCHLATTER, *Private Property: History of an Idea* (Rutgers University Press; New Brunswick 1951) 33.

of the period. In their thought, the ethics of the Old and New Testament was blended with Stoic philosophy.

If one were to attempt to find a phrase which might represent the gist of the patristic theory of property, one might say that it lies in the distinction between nature and convention. In order to understand this distinction, one must bear in mind that, according to stoic thinking, nature meant the primitive or original form of a thing. This phrase was used to convey the suggestion that a primitive or original form has some continuing superiority over the conventional institution or custom which has grown out of it. According to the Stoics, in the original state of nature or the 'golden age', men were still happy and innocent and there was no need for private property, or the great conventional institutions of society. But as this innocence passed away, they found themselves compelled to organize society and to devise institutions which should regulate the ownership and use of the good things which men had once held in common. This is the philosophical theory from which the patristic concept of property is derived. The Fathers argued that common ownership and use were the natural condition; private property was a convention demanded from the sinfulness of man. By the institution of property, human society takes a right common to all and transforms it into an exclusive individual right. The conventions of positive laws which establish private property were justified only because human corruption made instruments of social domination necessary to preserve law and order. This whole idea about property is put quite succinctly by St. Ambrose as follows:

> Our Lord intended the world to be the common possession of all men, and that it should produce its fruits for all. Avarice, however, has made distribution of property. It is just, therefore, that if you claim something for yourself as a private possession which was bestowed upon the human race, indeed even to all living beings, in common, you should at all events distribute some of it to the poor, so that you do not deny sustenance to those who ought to be fellow sharers of your possession.[10]

The early Christian theologians repeatedly emphasized that possessions and earthly goods are all from God; they were originally destined for all, and it is only due to sin and greed that they have drawn

10 *Commentary on Psalms*, CXVII, 8. Quoted by C. AVILA, *Ownership: Early Christian Teaching, (Sheed & Ward; London 1983) 74.*

into the present oppressive state of affairs in which there are such differences between the rich and the poor.11 God created the earth for the common use and benefit of all mankind so that all should receive from it what they require. Everyone has therefore an equal right to use the resources of the earth. The universal destination of the earth's resources is explained by St. John Chrysostom as follows:

> Mark the wise dispensation of God ... He has made certain things common, such as the sun, air, earth, and the water, the sky and the sea ... Their benefits are dispensed equally to all brethren ... And mark, that concerning things that remain in common there is no contention but all is peaceable. But when one attempts to possess himself of anything, to make it his own, then contention is introduced, as if nature herself were indignant.[12]

In the patristic tradition, though it was admitted that the earth's resources are destined for mankind as a whole, a threefold classification of goods emerges in terms of their relative appropriability. This classification always remained in subordination to the universal right of usage. First, the Church Fathers considered certain things that, because of their nature, *ought* to be individually appropriated and owned. But those are only such things as are most naturally thought of as extensions, or supplements of deficiencies, of the human body, essentially clothes, tools and a dwelling place. Clement of Alexandria used the following words to explain the limits of the right to ownership: "Just as the foot is the measure of a sandal, so the physical needs of each are the measure of what one should possess."[13] By these words, Clement meant that there are natural limits beyond which the possession and use of material goods does not and cannot make sense. Just as it is absurd to try to use a pair of sandals that are too large for one's feet, since the purpose of a sandal is to fit and be useful for one's foot, so everyone should realize that the limits of essential needs are concrete and real. According to the early theologians of the church, private proper ty should be limited to the absolute necessary minimum of exist ence; all that is superfluous must be given away.

11 E. TROELTSCH., *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, vol. I (Harper & Brothers; New York 1960) 116.

12 *Commentary on St. Paul's First Letter to Timothy.* Quoted by AVILA, *Ownership,* 95.

13 "The Educator". Quoted by AVILA, *Ownership*, 42.

Secondly, according to the early Fathers of the church, there are other things that, because of their nature, *need not* to be appropriated or owned, but which, in dependence on the changing social context, may be appropriated and managed by individuals, groups or the State only because of the corruption of human nature. For instance, Clement of Alexandria permitted a certain amount of luxury within the limits of natural life. But all the Fathers of the church repeatedly stressed that ownership of these things "is not according to nature, for nature has brought forth all things in such a way that all things be possessed in common. Nature therefore is the mother of common right, usurpation of private property."[14] Balance ought to be redressed as far as possible. According to St. Gregory the Great, "when we give necessaries to the needy, we do not bestow upon them our goods; we return to them their own; we pay a debt, rather than fulfil a work of mercy."[15]

Thirdly, there are goods which *should not* be appropriated at all because of their nature. They are such that they can best be used to the common advantage if nobody, individual or collective, can make them his own. As St. John Chrysostom said:

> But what is the meaning of "mine" and "not mine"? For, truly, the more accurately I weigh these words, the more they seem to me to be but words ... And not only in silver and gold, but also in bathing places, gardens, buildings, "mine" and "not mine" you will perceive to be but meaningless words. For the use is common to all. Those who seem to be owners have only more care of these things than those who are not. The former, after so much effort, obtain but just as much as those who have expended no effort.[16]

Accordingly, the central concept of the common heritage of mankind, namely the universal right of usage of earthly resources, can be traced back to the patristic era. The early Fathers of the church harshly attacked the idea of ownership as an exclusive and unlimited right of disposing of material goods. They attempted to develop an

14 "De Officiis Ministrorum". Quoted by AVILA, *Ownership,* 74

15 "Liber Regulae Pastoralis", Part II, 210. Quoted by F. GRACE, in *The Concept of Property in Modern Christian Thought (University of Illinois Press; Urbana 1953) 20-21.*

16 "De Virginitate". Quoted by AVILA, *Ownership* 85.

ethical perspective which aimed to safeguard those who were being deprived of their fundamental right to use the resources of the earth.

The Medieval Period

When we now turn to the medieval theory of property, we find that the patristic principles furnished much of its content. However, the recovery of the works of Aristotle in the thirteenth century had a considerable influence on the Thomistic theory of property. The canon lawyers and the scholastic philosophers, who systematized the social ideas of the medieval world, took over the theory of the Fathers that private property was conventional and the result of sin. Gratian's *Decretum*, the first great compilation of canon law, distinguished between the law of nature and custom, or positive law, in rela tion to property. By the law of nature, all things are common to all men.[17] This does not mean, according to Gratian any more than in the Fathers, that private property is not lawful, but only that it is an accommodation to the imperfect or vicious character of human nature. If man were perfectly good, it would be unnecessary.

The patristic principles of property are related to, but to a certain extent modified, in the more developed treatment of the subject by St. Thomas Aquinas whose aim was both to explain the origin and justification of private property, and to determine more clearly its limitations. Aquinas amalgamated the social philosophy of Aristotle with revelation and with the patristic viewpoint. His theory is based on a distinction in the nature of property which he conceived to be fundamental; that is, the distinction between property regarded as *a right to acquire and distribute*, and property regarded as *a right to use* for one's self.[18] He firmly established the right to private property, but he made it a relative right conditioned by the obligation of property to society. In this manner he achieved a balance between possession and use as well as a clear distinction between the individual and social character of property.[19]

17 GRATIAN, *Decretum,* D. viii, Part I.

18 It should be noted that this distinction is essentially the same as Aristotle's declaration that "it is better that property should be private, but the use of it common", *Politics,* B 5. 1263a, 37.

19 GRACE, *Concept of Property,* 24. Cf. also, CJ CZAJKOWSKI, *The Thomistic Concept of Private Property* (Notre Dame University; Indiana 1939) and J. DE CONCILIO, *The Doctrine of St. Thomas on the Right of Property and its Use (F. Pustet & Co.; New York 1887).*

In the first sense, Aquinas recognised property as legitimate and necessary for three reasons. Firstly, men are more diligent in labouring for that which is to belong to themselves than for that which is to belong to all. Secondly, human affairs will be better ordered if each has his own particular work to do in procuring things. Thirdly, human life will be more peaceable, for there are constant quarrels among those who hold things in common.[20] When he stated that man has a natural right to, or dominion, over nature, he meant that man has a right to consider material things as pure means *(bonum utile)* for his own good and utility.

In the second sense he refused to recognise a private right in property, for a man must hold material things, which are his, as for the common use; he must manage what he has to the needs of others: "In this respect a man ought not to hold exterior goods as exclusively his own, but as common possessions, so as readily to share them with others in their needs."[21] Aquinas argued that private property is not a primary right, but a derived and secondary right.[22] The material goods of this earth are common to all men and they are destined by their nature for the use of all men. It is therefore the common right of mankind to utilize the earth and its fruits. The right of private property, however, is a secondary right that is derived from the indefinite right which all men have to use the goods of the earth. Private property is simply a determination of the universal right of usage.[23] In short, individual possession is a secondary right; common use is a primary right.

Furthermore, Aquinas called the possession of property "common" in the sense that it must be used responsibly for the needs and necessities of all man.[24] Man holds his property not only for his own use, but as a trust for the good of the brotherhood. The Thomistic concept of sharing goods is governed by the law of love and the

20 *S. Th.* IIa - IIae, q.66, art 2.

21 *Idem.* In *S. Th.* II - II,. q. 32,. art 5, Aquinas wrote: "The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours as to the ownership, but as to the use of them they belong not to us alone but also to such others as we are able to succour out of what we have over and above our needs".

22 *S.Th.*IIa - IIae, q.57,art,art.2 & 3.

23 *S.Th.*Ia - IIae, q.94,art.5 Cf.J.KELLHER, *Private Ownership* (M.H. Gill & Son; Dublin 1911) 179.

24 *S.Th.*IIa - IIae, q.66,art.2; S.Th.IIa - IIae, art.I & 7.

solidarity of mankind. It is clear that in pressing need, all things become common, in spite of all conventions or laws of property.[25] This indicates the relative character of ownership rights. Ownership in the Thomistic sense is more good management; the right of property is given to take care of it and not to use is indiscriminately. The purpose of care is use, but use in common. This explains the reasoning behind A. Parel's argument that, according to Aquinas, "the ontological essence of property is common use."[26]

Aquinas is, indeed, so much influenced by Aristotle's conception of nature and the state that he is no longer ready to admit that the great institutions of society are contrary to natural law. To him the state is a natural institution, for man is by nature a political animal, and this principle extends to a great institution like private property. Private property is not, indeed, an institution of the natural law, but it is not contrary to it. It is a thing added to the natural law by human reason.[27] According to Aquinas, the state is possessed with the power to make property laws that promote the welfare of the whole community. Such laws would certainly insure that everyone be provided with the necessities of life. At the same time, the state must work from the premise that "the common interest is to be preferred to private good."[28] Thus the state ought to regulate private property for the common good.

St. Thomas Aquinas' modification of the patristic theory is important. Speaking broadly, his adoption of the Aristotelian concept of nature and the state had little permanent influence, for the theory of the conventional nature of organised society was too firmly rooted to be shaken, even by his authority, and the patristic and stoic principle continued to dominate political theory till the end of the eighteenth century.[29]

25 W.J. McDONALD, *The Social Value of Property according to St. Thomas Aquinas*, (Catholic University of America; Washington D.C. 1939) 39.

26 A. PAREL. "Aquinas's Theory of Property" in A. PAREL & T. FLANAGAN, *Theories of Property: Aristotle to the Present* (Wilfrid Larier University Press; Waterloo, Ont. 1979) 97.

27 S.Th. IIa - IIae. q.66. art.2.

28 *S.Th.* IIa - IIae. q.32. art.6.

29 A.J. CARLYLE, "The Theory of Property in Medieval Theology" in C. GORE et al., *Property: Its Duties and Rights* (MacMillan; New York 1922) 135

The Church's Social Teaching on the Fundamental Human Right to use Material Goods

The term "social teaching" of the church refers to that body of doctrine which has been built up progressively since the late nineteenth century. One of the social issues which has been discussed fully and systematically by all major social encyclicals since Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum (1891) concerns the problem of the relationship between the right to private property and the fundamental right of all men to use the resources of the earth. The Popes have constantly attempted to redefine the traditional principles concerning the common destination of earthly resources in relation to individual and state appropriation. Though different vocabulary was used by the Popes, their teaching on this issue is entirely consistent with the ancient tradition of catholic thought, which has anxiously sought for precision in examining the role and limits of property. In their social documents, the Popes based their views, implicitly and explicitly, on this tradition, and above all on the views of St. Thomas Aquinas. They have tried to apply this doctrine to the situations and institutions which have appeared as a consequence of recent political and socio- economic changes.

The history of the church's social teaching is characterized by a continuous effort to defend the weak members of society from those political and economic systems which, in some way or another, were threatening their fundamental rights. Both Liberalism, as expressed in selfish capitalism, and Collectivism, as manifested in the theory of Socialism, were strongly attacked because they both denied to many poor members of society their fundamental right to use the material goods of the earth. The Popes considered this denial as an infringement on the universal right which every person enjoys insofar as he is a member of the human species.

The papal social encyclicals reaffirm the Thomistic concept of the institution of property, namely, that it has both a social aspect (insofar as it ought to benefit the whole community) and an individual aspect (by enabling individuals to provide for themselves and their families). On the one hand, capitalism is condemned because it denies the social and public aspect of ownership insofar as it encourages the possession of the resources of the earth in the hands of a few and renders all others helplessly dependent upon them. On the other hand, collectivism is rejected because it denies the private and individual character of ownership by making the state the sole owner of resources. The social encyclicals emphasize that neither the state, nor a small

minority of the population should be in a position to own and manage all the earth's resources. The right of every man to use the goods of the earth must be safeguarded and remain open to all. Since socialistic and capitalistic concentration of ownership were a serious threat to the universal right to use the resources of the earth, the Popes have continuously pleaded for a wide diffusion of material goods. While maintaining that collectivism is unjust and does not safeguard the universal right of usage, the social documents equally insist upon an equitable distribution of material resources and are far from accepting the individualistic belief that the right of property is absolute and unconditional.

Leo XIII began the tradition of social documents which contain a constant reaffirmation that every human person born into the world has, in general with all mankind, a right to the earth, since it was created for all and is necessary for man's bodily existence. But that natural right which each man has in common with all others is obviously not a right to any definite and circumscribed portion of nature. Every person has a general and indefinite right to the possession of private property, but that must be made particular and definite in two ways: by labour and by the law. The law of nature giving to mankind in general a right to the earth would thus be made specific for any individual by the application of his labour. Using the established Thomistic terms, Leo XIII put this view thus:

> God has given the earth to mankind in general, not in the sense that all, without distinction, can deal with it as they like, but rather that no part of it has been assigned to anyone in particular, and that the limits of private possession have been left to be fixed by man's own industry, and by the laws of individual races. Moreover, the earth, even though apportioned among private owners, ceases not thereby to minister to the needs of all, inasmuch as there is no one who does not sustain life from what the land produces.[30]

The fact that private property is a right does not make it an absolute one. The social encyclical letters stressed that private property is limited by the demands of the common good, and that it is the duty of the owner to use his property in the interest of the common good. On this particular point, Leo XIII's teaching on property, though affirming the universal right of usage of material goods, departed from the

30 *R.N.* 14.

Thomistic position. In *Rerum Novarum*, he asserted that property is legitimately controlled only by private individuals who have a right to use it for their private aims. Leo argued for this position by importing the doctrine of John Locke that private property is a natural right into catholic teaching.[31] "Every man", the Pope wrote, "has by nature the right to possess property as his own."[32] Leo XIII held that the duty to use property to meet social needs was only a duty of charity, not of justice, and was therefore subordinate to the moral rights of private ownership. Leo's encyclical, though extremely significant as the church's response to the poverty of the working class that the industrialization of Europe had brought about, was fundamentally conservative insofar as it accepted some of the Lockean premises that underlay the social problems it protested.[33]

Quadragesimo Anno (1931), written by Pius XI to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of *Rerum Novarum* and to interpret its teachings in the changed condition of the early twentieth century, began the process of modifying the Lockean doctrine of Leo XIII. In *Quadragesimo Anno*, Pius XI subtly de-emphasized the private rights of ownership and stressed the social character of property. All property, Pius wrote, must be used to provide for the common good as well as for the individual.[34] Both individual and state appropriation of earthly resources have their own limits in view of the social character of owner-

31 In 1840, the doctrine of John Locke on private property was incorporated into the neo-Scholastic tradirion by the Jesuit theologian Taparelli d'Azeglio and from there into the *Rerum Novarum*. Cf. C. CURRAN, " The Changing Anthropological Basis of Christian Social Ethics", in C. CURRAN & R. McCormick, *Official Catholic Social Teaching,(* Paulist Press; New York 1986) 204-209.

32 *R.N.* 5. It is interesting to note that in 1923, the economist John A. Ryan, the major figure in catholic social ethics in the United States in the first half of the twentieth century attempts to correct Leo XIII's position by refraining the primacy of the common use over individual rights: "...the primary right of property is not the right of exclusive control, but the right of use. In other words, the common right of use is superior to the private right of ownership. God created the goods of the earth for the sustenance of all people of the earth; consequently the common right of all to enjoy these goods takes precedence of the particular right of any individual to hold them as his exclusive possession. To deny this subordination of the private to the common right, is to assert in effect that nature and nature's God have discriminated against some individuals, and in favour of others," in the *Christian Doctrine of Property* (Paulist Press; New York 1923).

33 J. COLEMAN, "Development of Church Social Teaching", in C. CURRAN & R. MCCORMICK (eds.), *Official Catholic Social Teaching* (Paulist Press; New York 1986) 171-172.

34 *Q.A.* 47,49

ship. Since earthly goods have a universal purpose, property-sytems are subject to state-control. From Pius XI onwards, the Popes have unequivocally affirmed that the state should adjust ownership rights in a manner necessary to meet the needs of the common good, the only restriction being that it must neither absorb the individual nor abolish private property. Leo XII's view that the duty to use property for the common good was not to be legally enforced was rejected by Pius XI in the following words: "the public authority, in virtue of the common good, may specify what is licit and illicit for property owners to meet the needs of the public good."[35] Thus, though Pius XI condemned state ownership and management of all resoures of the earth, he did not reject state regulation of private property. The state has the duty to control the use of property and to bring it into harmony with the interests of the common good. Moreover, Pius XI raised another point: the public authorities must exclusively appropriate certain kinds of property which only the state with its great power can manage well. For if some individuals possess these items, the common good may be injured.[36]

It is interesting to note the evolution of the church's social documents concerning the emphasis put on the priority of common use over private possession. Pope Pius XI, in line with the Thomistic tradition, held that the right of usage is prior to and conditions the right to private property. God has created man as a body and a soul, an incarnate being, and as such, man has a fundamental right to use the world's goods for the conservation of his life, the fruition of his talents, and the protection of his health. This right precedes the right of property which is only derivative, or an actualization, of the right of usage. The right to property exists so that an order might be established by which the right of usage is assured and guaranteed. The right of property is a means to an end, and it is therefore subordinate to the right of usage, the end itself. Since every means is relative, the doctrine of the absolute right of private property is a grave social aberration. Clearly, then private property must ultimately promote the right of usage. Since men are only stewards of the gifts which God bestows upon them, they must use

35 *Q.A.* 49. Pius XII, in his encyclical *Firmissimam Constantiam* (1937), stated: "Bear in mind that even while looking always to safeguard primordial and fundamental rights, such as the right of ownership, the common good sometimes demands the imposition of restrictions on these rights and recourse, more frequently than we have seen in the past, to the application of social justice". H.C. KOENIG, *Principles for Peace. Selection from Papal Documents: Leo XIII to Pius XII* (National Welfare Conference; Washington D.C. 1943) 536.

36 *Q.A.* 14.

them to help others as well as themselves. This view was confirmed by Pope Pius XII in his radio broadcast of Pentecost, 1941, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. In his radio message, Pius XII strongly emphasized the social aspect of property as follows:

> Every man, as a living being gifted with reason, has in fact from nature the fundamental right to make use of the material goods of the earth, while it is left to the will of man ... to arrange in greater detail the actuation of this right. This individual right cannot be suppressed, even by other clear and undisputed rights over material goods; undoubtedly the natural order, deriving from God, demands also private property. ... But all this remains subordinate to the natural scope of material goods and cannot emancipate itself from the first and fundamental right which concedes their use to all men.[37]

Thus Pius XII insisted on the universal and fundamental aspect of man's right to use the resources of the earth. This right is universal and fundamental because it is deduced immediately from human nature. Every man, by virtue of his manhood is the holder and the beneficiary of this right: the right is an essential part of the legitimacy of the human person. This right is the simple expression of the connection of the person to the world, even prior to the interventions of the individual's free will and the institutions designed to make this right real in a concrete and determinate way. The words of Pius XII are clear, and Pope John XXIII simply made them his own. In *Mater et Magistra* (1961), he continued to move the church away from Leo's doctrine by emphatically subordinating the private and individual aspects of property to its social purpose:

> Concerning the use of material goods, Our Predecessor declared that the right of every man to use them for his subsistence is prior to all other rights of an economic nature, even to the right of private ownership. It is certain, as Our Predecessor noted, that the right of private property is from the natural

37 Pope Pius XII , "On the Anniversary of *Rerum Novarum* ", in V. Yzermans (ed) *The Major Addresses of Pius XII* (Minnesota St Paul's Press; 1961) 30-31. In this message, Pius XII quothed a passage from his Encyclical *Serum letitiae* which states ""that the good things which God has created for the benefit of all should find their way to all alike, according to the principles of justice and charity", in *Selected Letters and Addresses of Pius XII* (CTS Press; London 1947) 8. Cf. Pius XII's Radio Message, December 24, 1942.

> right itself. Nevertheless, it is the will of God the Creator that this right to own property should in no way obstruct the flow of the "material goods created by God to meet the needs of all men, to all equitably, as justice and charity requires."[38]

He also concluded that property owners may legally be made to put their property at the service of the community's needs, since "in the right of private property there is rooted a social responsibility."[39] *Mater et Magistra* also reminded the world community of their responsibility to share the goods of the earth with future generations. It stated that the common good demanded that "the benefits which make possible a more human way of life will be available not merely to the present generation but to the coming generations as well."[40]

It was Pope John XXIII, in his encyclical *Pacem in Terris* (1963), who developed the full implications of the traditional principles concerning the common destination of earthly resources in relation to individual and state appropriation. The theme of the encyclical was that the changed context of the world situation requires us to think of the common good not primarily of our national community as the guiding principle of our political activities, but that of mankind as a whole. The Pope argued that what was always a truth, namely the solidarity of the human race, has now become a pragmatic reality. *Pacem in Terris* needs to be seen within the context of the sixties when the world was awakened to the awareness of the interrelatedness and interdependence of all reality. It became more and more evident that the individual states of the world are related to the world community as parts are to the whole: the parts are always subordinate to the common good of all men. The social document pointed out that, as a consequence, the moral order demands the formation of a world community which will promote the rights of all man on a universal scale.

Moreover, the encyclical letter suggested that the world situation at the time made it appear both possible and necessary that, despite of the ideological differences, common global actions and initiatives were possible on the basis of a universal acknowledgement of certain universal rights. The new sense of global solidarity requires that people do not close themselves behind national boundaries, but they

38 *M.M.* 43. CF. also *P.T.* 21 & 22.

39 *M.M.* 119.

40 *M.M.* 79.

must enter into mutual dialogue and cooperation. In order to make collaboration among nations more effective, Pope John XXIII appealed for the creation of a supranational power as a coordinating organ. The Pope stated quite clearly that the system of organization of his own times was quite inadequate and that the moral order demanded that there be a public authority able to operate in an effective manner on a world-wide basis. This was the reason behind Pope John XXIII's exhortations for collaboration by all and his appeal for a better organization of a public power charged with assuring the universal common good: "A public authority, having worldwide powers and endowed with the proper means for the effective pursuit of its objective, which is the universal common good in concrete form, must be set up by common accord and not imposed by force."[41]

One of the most interesting aspects of *Pacem in Terris* is the application of the traditional doctrine of the universal right of usage of the earth's resources on an international level. Pope John XXIII's sense of internationalism showed that not only individuals can be deprived from their right to use the earth's goods and resources, but also collectivities, such as a nation or even a continent. He reaffirmed that the world's resources have been created for all men, not for any particular segment of the world community, thus the patrimony of all mankind has to be enjoyed by all members of the human species. Not only do individuals have an obligation in strict justice to respect the rights of others to enjoy the earth's resources, but also developed nations are morally obliged to aid the underdeveloped countries and to respect their rights to have a free access to the earth's resources and goods. Just as the individual right of usage is limited by the common good of the nation, so also the right of a particular nation to possess earthly resources is restricted by the common good of all mankind. A nation cannot seek its own good without seriously considering the consequences of such actions on the universal common good. Since mankind is truly one family, individual human persons, nations, or continents have a moral obligation to share the goods of the earth with all those who are less fortunate and in a disadvantaged position.

It seems that both historically and theoretically, Pardo's motion about the common heritage of mankind at the United Nations and the subsequent discussions in international fora about the need of a supranational regime to manage certain resources of the earth can be seen as the acceptance of the principles implicit in the Pope's encycli-

41 *P.T.* 138.

cal and the effort to translate it into a judicial system capable of practical application in our times. Pope John XXIII's appeal for international cooperation among nations to safeguard the common good of all mankind has immensely contributed in the sixties to the building up of an atmosphere which helped the world community to be more receptive of Malta's proposal at the United Nations to declare certain resources of the earth as the common heritage of mankind. Pope John XXIII's recommendations to protect the right of collectivities to make use the earth's resources reminded the world community of another collectivity, namely, future generations. They also have the right to share the resources of the earth.

Vatican II, in *The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World* ratified the view that the communal purpose of using earthly goods to meet the needs of all humanity takes priority over any private ownership claims. The traditional catholic social belief on the universal right of usage of material goods is summarized as follows:

> God destined the earth and all it contains for all men and all peoples so that all created things would be shared fairly by all mankind under the guidance of justice tempered by charity. No matter what the structures of property are in different peoples, according to various and changing circumstances and adopted to the lawful institutions, we must never lose sight of the universal destination of earthly goods. In his use of things man should regard the external goods he legitimately owns not merely as exclusive to himself but common to others also, in the sense that they can benefit others as well as himself.[42]

Thus, the Vatican Council began by underlining the basic starting-point of Christian reflection on the resources of the world, namely their common destination for all mankind by God. In the second place, the Council goes on to underline the fair share of these goods which is the birthright of every individual. *Gaudium et Spes* summarized the gradual shift in the catholic teaching from the Lockean views of Leo XIII, and back to the more socially oriented the Thomistic tradition that gave communal needs a priority over property rights. Although rights of private property are legitimate, they must be subordinate to the social needs of the community.[43] Article 71 of *Gaudium et*

42 *G.S.* 69

43 M. VALASQUEZ, "'Gaudium et Spes' and the Development of Catholic Social Teaching", in J.A. DWYER (ed.), *Questions of Special Urgency* (Georgetown University Press; Washington D.C. 1986) 179.

Spes reaffirms the duty of the state to prevent anyone from abusing his property to the detriment of the common good. By its nature, ownership right has a social dimension which is based on the common destiny of earthly goods. Whenever this social aspect is forgotten, ownership can often become the source of greed and serious disorder.

The social teaching of the post-conciliar era is characterized by a deeper awareness of the unity of mankind and of the interdependence and interrelatedness of reality. Two novel and important elements were introduced in the papal social documents and speeches which express these characteristics. First, the environmental issue received more attention than before as a result of the ecological awareness awakened during the late sixties and early seventies. Never before has human experience shown that absolutely nothing exists in isolation. Everything affects everything else. Every action, decision and policy whatsoever has far-reaching consequences on the ecosystem. Secondly, the church became more interested in the "future generations issue." This was the result of the awareness of the potential threats which current political and socioeconomic decisions might have on the far-distant future. It became evident that recent advances in technology can not only negatively affect the global community, but they can also create future risks and burdens. This social problem has become one of the most urgent signs of our times. The importance given to these two characteristics, together with the reaffirmation of the traditional social belief on the universal destination of created things, are the main factors which indicate the church's gradual receptivity of the concept of the common heritage of mankind and its process of integration in the catholic social thought.

The 1971 Synod of Bishops discovered a new 'sign of the times', namely, that "men are beginning to grasp a new and more radical dimension of unity; for they perceive that the resources, as well as the precious treasures of air and water - without which there cannot be life - and the small delicate biosphere of the whole complex of all life on earth, are not infinite, but on the contrary must be saved and preserved as a unique patrimony belonging to all mankind."[44] The Synod observed this "new worldwide preoccupation which will be dealt with for the first-time in the conference on human environment to be held in Stockholm in June 1972. It is important to see what right the rich nations have to keep up their claim to increase their own material

44 "Justice in the World", in A. FLANNERY (ed.), *Vatican Council II. More Post Conciliar Documents,* Vol. II (Liturgical Press; Collegeville 1982) 696.

demands, if the consequence is either that others remain in misery or that the danger of destroying the very physical foundation of life on earth is precipitated. Those who are already rich are bound to accept a less material way of life, with less waste, in order to avoid the destruction of the heritage which they are obliged by absolute justice to share with all other members of the human race."[45]

Then, in his message to the Stockholm Conference, Pope Paul VI insisted that "no one can take possession in an absolute and specific way of the environment, which is not a *res nullius* - something not belonging to anyone -, but a *res omnium* - the patrimony of mankind; consequently those possessing it - privately and publicly - must use it in a way that rebounds to everyone's real advantage."[46] The Pope pointed out that "our generation must energetically accept the challenge of going beyond particular, immediate objectives in order to prepare a hospitable earth for future generations."[47] Paul VI referred to the same issue in *Octogesima Adveniens* (1971), noting that "man is suddenly aware that by an ill-considered exploitation of nature he risks destroying it and becoming in turn the victim of his own degradation. Not only is the material environment becoming a permanent menace, ... but the human framework is no longer under man's control, thus creating an environment for tomorrow which may well be intolerable. This is wide-ranging social problem which concerns the entire human family."[48] The theme of Pope Paul VI's message for the occasion of the 1977 World Day of the Environment was on our responsibility to give future generations a healthy environment. The Pope appealed "for a universal sense of solidarity in which each person and every nation plays its proper and interdependent role to ensure an ecologically sound environment for people today, as well as for future generation. ... It is our earnest prayer ... that all people everywhere ... commit themselves to a fraternal sharing and protection of good environment, the common patrimony of mankind."[49]

45 *Ibid.*, 709.

46 Pope PAUL VI, "Man's Stewardship of his Environment", in *The Pope Speaks* 17 (1972) 102.

47 *Ibid.*, 101

48 *O.A.* 21

49 Pope PAUL VI, "Give Future Generations a Healthy Environment" (Message on the Occasion of the Fifth World Day of the Environment, 5 June 1977), in *Paths to Peace* (Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to the United Nations), (Brookfield Liturgical Publications; Brookfield 1987) 468- 9. In his message to H.E. Mr Kurt Waldheim, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, on the

In Laborem Exercens (1981), Pope John Paul II reaffirmed the priority of the universal right of usage of material goods. He stated that the church has always upheld the right of private property. But "the Christian tradition has never upheld this right as absolute and untouchable. On the contrary, it has always understood his right within the broad context of the right common to all to use the goods of the whole of creation: the right to private property is subordinate to the right to common use, to the fact that goods are meant for every one."[50] The Pope said that the church's position is radically different from the collectivism of Marxism. The church's position also differs from liberal capitalism. Rigid capitalism maintains the exclusive right to private ownership as an untouchable dogma. This position is unacceptable to the church. The only legitimate title to the possession of private property, whether private, public or collective, is that it should serve labour, and make possible the achievement of the first principle: the universal destination of goods and the right to their common use.

The future generations issue is coming more and more to the foreground of Pope Paul II's social documents and speeches. He made several allusions to unborn generations, reminding the present generation of its responsibility to be the guardian of the earth: "Is pointing out the problems for future generations enough to awaken a readiness to accept this responsibility?"[51] In his address to the United Nations Centre for the Environment, in Nairobi, Pope John Paul II stated that "it is a requirement of our human dignity, and therefore a serious responsibility, to exercise dominion over creation in such a way that it truly serves the human family. Exploitation of the riches of nature must take place according to criteria that take into account not only the immediate needs of the people but also the needs of future generations. In this way, the stewardship over nature, entrusted by God to men, will not be guided by short-sightedness or selfish pursuit; rather, it will take into account the fact that created goods are directed to the good of all humanity. The use of natural resources must aim at serving the integral

occasion of the Special Session of the General Assembly, Paul VI stated: "Though the good will of all, the riches of this world must serve the true benefit of all - as they were indeed destined by the Creator who, in his bountiful providence, has put them at the disposal of the whole world of mankind", in *Ibid.*, 216.

50 *L.E.* 14.

51 Pope JOHN PAUL II, "Towards a True Ecology" (An address of Pope John Paul II to representatives of science, art and journalism 26 June 1988) in *The Pope Speaks* 33 (1988) 324-5.

development of present and future generations."[52] To the participants in a Symposium on the Environment, held in Rome in December 1989, Pope John Paul II reminded his audience that "our generation has been blessed by having inherited from the industry of past generations the great wealth of material and spiritual goods which stand at the foundation of our society and its programme. Universal solidarity now demands that we consider it our grave duty to safeguard that inheritance for all our brothers and sisters and to assure that each and every member of the human family may enjoy its benefits."[53] For this reason, the Pope continued that "within this broad perspective man bears a grave responsibility for wisely managing the environment."[54]

In *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* (1987), John Paul II continued to develop the social teaching of Paul VI's encyclical *Populorum Progressio* (1967). Both encyclical letters deal with the moral dimensions of development. They both emphasize that development cannot be limited to mere economic growth. In order to be authentic, it must be complete and integral, that is, it has to promote the good of every person and of the whole person. Both Popes pointed out that development should never lead to the environmental destruction. After affirming the principle of the universal destiny of the goods of the earth, *Populorum Progressio* maintained that all other rights including that of private property are subordinate to this principle.[55] Paul VI remarked that private property is not an absolute right, indeed is no right at all when others are in need.[56] In *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, Pope John Paul II reaffirmed this position in the following words:

> The dominion granted to man by the Creator is not an absolute power, nor can one speak of a freedom to "use and abuse", or to dispose of things as one pleases. The limitation imposed from the beginning by the Creator himself and expressed sym-

52 Pope JOHN PAUL II, " Environmental Programmes to Ensure Food and Settlement are Concrete Way for future Peace" (Address to the United Nations Centre for the Environment, Nairobi, 18 April 1985) in *Paths to Peace, 55.*

53 Pope JOHN PAUL II, "The Exploitation of the Environment" in *L'Osservatore Romano,* 8 January 1990, 10.

54 *Idem.*

55 *P.P.* 22.

56 *P.P.* 23, 24.

> bolically by the prohibition not "to eat of the fruit of the tree" (cf. Gen 2: 16-17) shows clearly enough that, when it comes to the natural world, we are subject not only to biological laws but also to the moral ones, which cannot be violated with impunity."[57]

In view of this, the Pope pointed out that "the usage of natural resources as if they were inexhaustible, with absolute dominion, seriously endanger their availability not only for the present generation but also for generations to come."[58]

Conclusion

In the course of one hundred years of official social teaching, the catholic church has radically relativized the right to private property and called attention to the need to judge all property in accord with the universal destiny of the goods of creation to serve the needs of all mankind. Especially since Pius XI, the church in her social teaching continued to refer to the right of all to use the goods provided by nature and regarded it as a right that is more radical and basic than the right of ownership which is exercised by some. The universal good of all mankind restricts the right to ownership of individuals, nations or continents. Every member of the human species has the right to use the goods of the earth because these goods are by nature destined to all mankind. This is the most essential tenet of the common heritage principle. This is likewise the most basic and constant principle of the catholic social tradition.

Beyond doubt, there is truth in A. Dolman's statement that "today the catholic church is among the most evolved advocates of the common heritage concept."[59] Indeed, the common heritage of mankind has its roots in the catholic social tradition which for many centuries has defended constantly the universal right of all members of the human species to use the resources of the earth.

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57 *Soll. Rei Soc.* 34.

58 *Idem.*

59 A. DOLMAN, *Resources, Regimes, World* (Pergamon Press; New York 1981) 228.

HEGEL'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 1830 §§ 40-51 : AN EXEGESIS

Rolf Ahlers

This paper moves in three stages. In the first stage the relation of the 1830 Encyclopedia to Hegel's early writings is examined. In the second stage the author discusses the origin of this important work of Hegel. In the third stage (to appear in the next issue of Melita Theologica) the author offers an exegesis of §§40-51 of the Encyclopedia of 1830.

1. The Relation of the Encyclopedia of 1830 to Hegel's earlier writings: The Central Point of Hegel's Philosophy.

Dieter Henrich wrote in his important book *Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis*:[1]

"To be sure, Hegel always held on to the opinion that the *Phenomenology of the Spirit* ought to be the introduction to the *Logic*. This opinion is understandable in view of the meaning of the content of this work, announced as such an introduction. Nonetheless, Hegel considered meaningful and convincing also this other form of an introduction: "Skepticism, a negative science carried through all forms of the finite knowledge, would also present itself as such an introduction."[2]

Henrich is referring to the inevitability of the *Logic*, not the *Phenomenology* being the real introduction to Hegel's system. This inevitability is prefigured,

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1 (Mohr; Tübingen 1960, ^{2}1967,): This work is henceforth referred to as *OG*.

2 *Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (Heidelberg,^{2,3}1827/30 ed. Henning 1840 with explanations and additions, quotation from Henrich, *OG*) 210.

but not executed in the *Phenomenology*, where Hegel masterfully describes the aporetic entanglements of reason trying 1. to proceed without any presuppositions, as the Kantian transcentental idealism had programmatically proclaimed any true philosophy to *have* to proceed, while at the same time 2. proceeding with such presuppositions as the "thing-in-itself" and its correlate, the "synthetic unity of apperception". Hegel understood that Kant's criticistic philosophy was not so at all. It presumed to be capable of overcoming the dogmatism of empiricism by showing that contrary to concepts orienting themselves by objects or experience, the latter of necessity have to orient themselves by concepts, which have to be "presupposed *a priori"(KdrV*, B, xvii). Kant had called this "inversion" and "Copernican Revolution of thought" (ibid). But Hegel realized that this revolution was at best half completed, and therefore no revolution at all, for the bifurcation of "thing-in-itself" and "transcendental synthesis" still is maintained. Hegel suggested this solution in the *Phenomenology.*

"If we designate knowledge as the Notion, but essence or the True as what exists, or the object, then the examination consists in seeing whether the Notion corresponds to the object. But if we call the essence or in-itself of the object the Notion, and on the other hand understand by the object, the Notion itself as object, viz, as it exists for an other, then the examination consists in seeing whether the object corresponds to its Notion. It is evident, of course, that the two procedures are the same."(*Phen.* 53, *Phän.* 71.)

Hegel had discovered the concept of the concept, in Miller's translation, the Notion of the Notion, using and simultaneously rejecting Kant's concept *"an sich"*, "in itself", and had understood that the essence, truth and dignity of reality "in itself" is nothing but the Notion's objective criterion with which the subjective notion has to be brought into correspondence. Seeing whether the object corresponds to its Notion is identical to the act of seeing whether the (subjective) notion corresponds to the object *if* that identity is a process of verifying the subjective notion by is objective criterion, which verification simultaneously also can distinguish the phenomenal appearance of an object from its objective essence and truth, i.e. its Notion. But this process is identical with the movement that takes place in the logic, i.e. the logic of the concept or the Notion. Hegel had discovered that movement in the *Phenomenology*, but it gained self-evidence only in the *Logic*, for the stringency of the idea really is disturbed by subjective and psychological contaminants reflecting on "consciousness" or "spirit", as the new Miller translation states. But if the Nürmnerg *Logic* of 1812/16 is the heart of Hegel's system, the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* builds on that centrality of the logic of the concept. For it is divided

into three parts: Part I, "The Science of Logic" (often in English-speaking circles called the "Lesser Logic"), §§19-244; Part II, "The Philosophy of Nature", §§245-376; and Part III, "The Philosophy of Spirit", §§377-577. We shall deal only with the first, most important steps of the first part, of the "Science of Logic". I chose to concentrate in our discussion on this portion for two main reasons: 1. as illustrated, both the *Logic* of 1812/16 as also Part I of the *Encyclopedia* ("Lesser Logic") are central to Hegel's system. They are central 2. because of the double negation, or the critique of the critique or the self-revelation of the Concept ("Notion", in A.V. Miller's translation). Also experience suggests that a thinker's mature thought is the goal that must be presupposed as the beacon guiding incipient trials.

During the second half of the 19th century Hegel was almost totally forgotten in Germany and abroad, particularly in Anglo-Saxon lands, where the idealistic turn was only half-heartedly taken, if at all. But in Germany, the *Encyclopedia* became in 1870 the first and only book representing Hegel's writings in the newly founded standard "Philosophische Bibliothek" of the Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg. It dominated the German interest in Hegel, scant as it was. Only in 1907 did the *Phenomenology* join the late work; it quickly gained the reputation as Hegel's preeminent work, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, paradoxically and unjustly eclypsing the earlier fame of the *Encyclopedia*. Why was this so? Good reasons can be given for this historical and systematic injustice:

a) Hegel's early works became known only through Nohl's publication of Hegel's *Theologische Jugendschriften* in 1907. This fact stimulated a renewed interest in Hegel, but now focusing on his early thought.

b) That also explains the publication of the *Phenomenology* in the "Philosophische Bibliothek" in 1907. This work quickly took centre stage.

c) The teens and twenties are characterized by a concern with Hegel's social and political philosophy (Franz Rosenzweig's *Hegel und der Staat*, 2 vols. München and Berlin, 1920, written 1908-14, but published only in 1920, is a good example). To understand this phenomenon we must take into consideration the political turmoil between 1914 and 1933 in Germany. But concern with Hegel's social and political philosophy was prejudicial against the purposely more basic and systematic content and structure of the *Encyclopedia*.

d) These same reasons also favoured Hegel's great lecture series on *World History*, on the *History of Philosophy* and on *Religion* with their predominant social concern with the "objective" and "absolute spirit".

But these accidents of the historical, social and political environment within which Hegel was more recently studied tended and still tend to provincialise Hegel's true concern with an all-encompassing philosophic system; this tendency is tenacious even today, where Hegel is criticised because his "putative presuppositions are not adequate to the real world experienced in natural, everyday experience."[3] Flay shows that

> "the absolute standpoint" has not been reached by Hegel, "and the whole system (has therefore been)...brought into question."[4] Flay concludes that the "natural attitude", which Hegel also purports to make the starting point of his analysis, "denies validity to the project of articulating the structure of comprehensive intelligibility. While it may seem at first sight that this projected result affects only the *Phenomenology,* it will in fact affect the system as a whole."[5] Flay summarizes his criticism this way: "Put in a formula, the presupposition (in Hegel) *is that the referents for the principle or ground of totality and for the principle or ground of intelligibility are one and the same*. The presupposition is that intelligibility and totality, in the ultimate sense of each, are grounded in the same locus, and thus that there is such a thing as a comprehensive principle of intelligibility or some common ground on the basis of which particular perspectives, interest frameworks, comportments, and domains of reality are held together as a whole. Put in common sense terms, the presupposition is that the world out there is a whole and makes sense as a whole".[6]

Flay would deny that presupposition. As he said elsewhere, in reply to my reading of Hegel, "There is no guarantee in either the religious or the philosophical doctrine. Hell still exists.." And Flay ultimately finds it necessary

3 Joseph FLAY, *Hegel's Quest for Certainty* (State University Press;Albany 1984) see pg ix, x, and *passim*, see esp. 249ff.

4 *Ibid,* 251.

5 *Ibid,* 252.

6 *Ibid*, 171,172.

to put not only Hegel's, but all "rational insight into question".[7] Underlying this view, expressed in Flay's more recent book, as quoted, is an irreconcilability, i.e. a lack of mediation between the reason and reality, and between the concept (Notion) and the object. This renunciation of mediation is reminiscent of Schelling. It is characteristic of Schelling's influence on Marxism. It is characteristic of the broad influence of Existentialistic philosophy's renunciation of reason in favour of the "absurd". And it is characteristic of the various forms of amalgamations of these schools of thought. Flat argues that Hegel hopes to assert the "natural attitude". But if this attitude is identical with the renunciation of mediation and reason, then Flay's argument cannot be convincing, nor can his critique of Hegel.

But what *is the reason why our time too returns to Hegel*? What is the "Bedürfnis" of our time that we should find Hegel's thought of interest? There are two main reasons, both closely interrelated:

1. One might be called a crisis in the concept of freedom, which is variously labelled as the crisis of liberal democracy, a crisis in the concept of an understanding of freedom as without commitment or bondage. For Hegel this crisis is identical with the commitmentless (pardon the formulation) "*simple negativity*" or also "pure negativity".[8] Hegel saw this negativity as realized politically in the terrors of the French Revolution, which he calls "Absolute Freedom and Terror".[9] Also, reality has lost "substance and truth" through the progress of the positive sciences. Tangibly we experience this in the "suffering" of the "separation" of man from nature, which is the severance of "reason" (*Verstand*) from conceptless nature. *Verstand* relates only "negatively" to nature. (This problem is exemplifiable in the "ecology crisis"). *Philosophically*,

7 *Ibid*, 171, 172., of his "Comment" to my "The Dialectic in Hegel's Philosophy of History", 149-172 in Robert L. PERKINS (ed.), *History and System. Hegel's Philosophy of History*. (State University Press; Albany 1984).

8 "Vorrede zum System der Wissenschaft", *Phänomenologie*, ed. Hoffmeister (Hamburg 1952) 20, 21.

9 *Phän*, ibid, 414ff, see esp. 418 on "pure negation."

Hegel sees this unmediated negativity to gain dignity in Kant and Fichte.

2. This development is identified by Hegel as a "loss of substance and truth", embodied for Hegel in the "irony of the Romantics", which needs both to be affirmed as also to be rejected. It needs to be affirmed because the "substance" of the old political and social and religious institutions are overcome.[10] Simultaneously, the French Revolution, as the *Zeitgeist* generally, of which Hegel considered the German idealistic philosophy from Kant to Fichte the most significant expression, is hopelessly Romantic. Herein lies the "irony"[11] of Romanticism, which really just continued and hightened the "purely negative" separation and reflexivity of the Enlightenment.

In reply to this development, Hegel said: "In my view,...all depends on understanding and expressing the True not only as *Substance*, but equally as *Subject*." [12] This means that the negativity of pure reflexivity, as of the Enlightenment, as of "pure freedom", must be negated. The awkwardness of the Kantian separation of the transcendental subjectivity (knowing subject) and the "thing in itself" must be overcome. It is awkward, because it claimed to proceed without presuppositions, knowing only what *can* be (empirically) known, and yet *postulated* theoretically the "transcendental unity of apperception" and the "thing in itself" lying behind the phenomenon, and *postulated* practically the *necessity* to *assume* "God, freedom and immortality" *if* freedom is to be real at all. Hegel knew that this is neither the road to true knowledge, nor to moral freedom.

But for Hegel this development is not simply to be "purely negated" or destroyed. One cannot go behind the development of the Enlightenment, trying to restore a pre-Enlightenment frame of mind. It was the "irony" of the Romantics to believe they could do this, for they only accentuated in this endeavour the fallacy of "pure negativity". No, the negativity must be *truly*

10 J. RITTER, *Hegel und die Französische Revolution* (Suhrkamp Verlag; Frankfurt 1962) 22, 33, 58.

11 See H.G. GADAMER, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Mohr; Tübingen 1965) 162ff, 172ff, 258, see also G. ROHRMOSER, *Emanzipation und Freiheit* (Goldmann; München 1968) 80, 166: "Romantic irony is for Hegel a product of the infinite reflection within the subject itself, a reflection by means of which it keeps substance at a distance. For its incapacity to externalize itself it pays with the emptiness of its arrogant absoluteness".

12 *Phenomenology*, tr. A.V.. MILLER, 9f, my modified transln., *Phän*, ed. Hoffm., Hbg, 1952, 19).

overcome, it must be "aufgehoben", i.e. made to be one of the elements of the new thought. Hegel did this by recognizing that the "essence", i.e. *substance* behind the Kantian "phenomenon", its "concept (A.V. Miller: "Notion") is identical with the knowing *subject*, i.e. with the "concept" that knows the phenomenon, but this identity is now recognized as retaining a difference (i.e. "negativity") within it: Knowledge (or also modern human freedom) has an objective criterion by means of which to "measure" or "examine"[13] whether it is "*substantial*", i.e. "truthful" knowledge. Simultaneously, the appearing object can in that recognition also be measured, for it has become "different" from what it originally was through negative contrasting or comparing it to its "essence" and "substance", i.e. "concept". Hegel expresses this with the famous Kantian terms "in itself", derived from Kant's "thing in itself", which he modifies with the negative "for itself", to arrive at the systematic "in and for itself". In the "Preface" to the *Phenomenology* Hegel expresses this negative movement thus:

> "Thus the life of God and divine cognition may well be spoken of as a play of love with itself; but this idea sinks into mere edification, and even insipidity, if it lacks the seriousness, the pain, the patience and the labour of the negative. *In itself*, that life is indeed one of untroubled equality and unity with itself, for which otherness and alienation, and the overcoming of alienation, are not serious matters. But this *in itself* is abstract universality, in which the nature of the divine life *for itself*, and so too the self-movement of the form, are altogether left out of account. If the form is declared to be the same as the essence (i.e. content, RA), then it is *ipso facto* a mistake to suppose / that cognition can be satisfied with the in-itself or the essence...Just because the form is as essential to the essence as the essence is to itself, the divine essence is not to be conceived and expressed merely as essence, i.e. as immediate substance or pure self-contemplation of the divine, but likewise as *form*, and in the whole wealth of the developed form. Only then is it conceived and expressed as an actuality...The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a *result*." [14]

Elsewhere Hegel expresses this same thought with the famous theological words:

13 *Prüfung*!, *Phën.* A.V. MILLER 52f, *Phen* Hoffm., 70:11-72: 42.

14 *Phen*, A.V. MILLER, 10f, *Phen*, ed. Hoffm., 20-21.

> "But that an accident as such, detached from what circumscribes it, what is bound and is actual only in its context with others, should attain an existence of its own and a separate freedom - this is the tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of the pure 'I'. Death, if that is what we want to call this non-actuality, is of all things the most dreadful, and to hold fast what is dead requires the greatest strength. Lacking strength, Beauty hates the Understanding for asking of her what it cannot do. But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and deems itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself."[15]

If I may just interject a refresher of memory here: What is called today the "choice movement", allied with much, often unreflected jargon of the American Civil Liberties Union, as also most - so I am told - of the "ideology" of the legal establishment in this country (represented by such constitutional lawyers as Norman Cantor and such biologists, dabbling in philosophy and politics as Garrett Hardin), is squarely addressed by Hegel's just-quoted words: "But that an accident as such, detached from what circumscribes it, what is bound and is actual only in this context with others, should attain an existence of its own and a separate freedom - this is the tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of the pure 'I'." [16]
But that our US Constitution can also be interpreted with the help of Hegel, in such a way that the individual gains its "substantiality and truth", not at the expensive, but rather at the gain of true freedom and true "choice", I have shown elsewhere.[17] There are many lawyers and law professors who support my view (without specific reference to Hegel), such as Paul Freund and Howard Berland, both of Harvard Law School, and Milner S. Ball of the University of Georgia School of Law, Athens.

2. *The Origin of the Encyclopedia.*

Hegel had published at Jena, where he was from 1800 to 1808, the *Phenomenology* which was to be the "introduction" to the "System of Science".

15 *Phen,* A.V. MILLER, 19, *Phen,* Hoffm., 1920.

16 *Ibid,* 19.

17 ROLF AHLERS, "The Dialectic in Hegel's Philosophy of History", 149-172, including J. Flay's Comment, in Robert L. PERKINS, *History and System. Hegel's Philosophy of History.* (State University Press; Albany 1984).

The *Logic* was to be the first part of that system. When Hegel came to Nürnberg as Rector of the "Gymnasium", i.e. high school, in 1808, he carried out this goal and published a three volume work, the *Logic*, in 1812, 1813 and 1816. But Hegel was confronted with another task during his Nürnberg obligations. The Bavarian Ministry of Culture had determined that the four upper classes of the Gymnasium students should be prepared for a decent study of philosophy at the university. The Ministry established guidelines for such an instruction. Part of these guidelines determined that "the previously individually taught subjects of speculative thought should be gathered together into a *philosophical encyclopedia*."[18] A clue to the structure of the *Encyclopidia* dividing it into paragraphs is Hegel's comment in the "Vorrede" of the *Phenomenology*, where he says: "Only what is completely determined is at once exoteric, comprehensible and capable of being learned and appropriated by all."[19]

Hegel was faced with the task of educating high school students according to government guidelines. To fulfil this task, he prepared several manuscripts, and the present *Encyclopedia* appears to be an edited collation of several of these manuscripts. It appears that in 1810/11 the lecture cycle of the "Encyclopedia" was complete and in "systematic order".[20] During the first Nürnberg years, Hegel lectured on "Philosophical Preparatory Science" or simply on "Philosophy". But during the last years at Nürnberg he lectured consistently on "Philosophical Encyclopedia".

Hegel was called to the university of Heidelberg in the Fall of 1816. Since he had prepared the "Encyclopedia" so carefully and intensively over several years, it is not surprising that he began lecturing on this topic right off. Simultaneously Hegel began preparing his material for book form and publication, and the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* appeared quickly after, in the summer of 1817. This is the Heidelberg edition. The full title in fact included two more words: "...*in Outline*." Hegel knew that his total system needed far more space to elaborate, but for text-book purposes this "outline" could suffice, and Hegel had accomplished a condensed version of his system, no small feat. In the introduction he specifically mentions that only the desire to give a text-book to students caused him to publish the *Encyclopedia* earlier than he would otherwise have wanted to do.

18 K.ROSENKRANZ, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* (Berlin 1844-1969) 254-255.

19 7, MILLER, 17, Hoffmeister editions.

20 NICOLIN/PÖGGELER, *Enzyklopedie von 1830* (Hamburg 1969) xxiv cfr. Bibliography.

Originally, at the stage of the planning and writing of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel had hoped to write the "system" in these parts: 1. Logic, 2. Philosophy of Nature, and 3. the Philosophy of the Subjective Spirit. The *Logic* was the only part of that original plan that was finished. Both other parts were never tackled. The *Encyclopedia* sidetracked those original plans. In fact, after the *Encyclopedia* Hegel published only one more complete book, the *Philosophy of Right* of 1821. Hegel was at Berlin since 1818. The *Encyclopedia* however contains all of the parts which Hegel originally wanted to tackle: The *Logic* appears again, in different form, in Part I of the *Encyclopedia* (§§19-244) - in Anglo-Saxon lands it is often called the "Lesser Logic", the "Philosophy of Nature" is Part II (§§245-376), and the "Philosophy of the Subjective Spirit" as also the Philosophy of Right (the Philosophy of the objective spirit) are both contained in Part III of the *Encyclopedia*,(§§377-577), the first section of which (§§387-482) is the "Philosophy of the Subjective Spirit", the second (§§483-552) is the "Philosophy of the Objective Spirit", and the third (§§553-577) is the Philosophy of the Absolute Spirit. Hegel wrote at Berlin a separate *Philosophy of Right*, because it had been very condensed in the *Encyclopedia* of 1817. It also became necessary as the natural explication of issues he had raised in a lecture on the "Philosophy of World History". As Hegel lectured on this issue separate from the "Encyclopedia", so also on "Aesthetics", "Religion" and "History of Philosophy". All of these topics are also contained in the *Encyclopedia*, albeit very condensed. But these topics were not published, at least not yet.

In Berlin the *Encyclopedia* became *the* book. In 1827 the second edition was published. It was completely reworked and expanded. It had almost twice as many pages and 100 §§ more than the first edition. And it was very difficult for Hegel to complete the work for this second edition; as with all of his publications, almost sheer force was necessary to make him complete the work. Hegel asked his former colleague Daub to read and correct the galleys.

The work was quickly sold out and in July, 1829 the publisher contacted Hegel for a third edition. The third edition appeared in 1830. It was again completely worked over. Whole paragraphs were switched around, added, formulations were changed, and other changes took place. The desire had been throughout, however, to retain the "outline" character of this work. That meant that Hegel did not want to go into detail, and there is testimony in his correspondence that he was unhappy with the successive expansion of the work, because through this expansion the "outline" character was in jeopardy.

To understand the *Encyclopedia* correctly, I must emphasize once more that it was intended as a "compendium", as a "guide" to his lectures. In England

and in America, and in English speaking lands, a "textbook" in philosophy is not strange. In Germany this is today a strange notion. But the *Encyclopedia* really contains both ideas: Modern German philosophy lectures usually bring something original, an interpretation of philosophy or a portion of it quite original to that lecturer. For this reason "textbooks" are not often used in modern German universities. English and American universities use textbooks that sometimes attempt to refrain as much as possible to present the author's opinion and present philosophy "as it really is or was". The stress is to help the student to understand. Hegel's *Encyclopedia* is both: It is original, highly original in presenting Hegel's thought. Similtaneously it has "textbook" quality, insofar as it attempts to make understandable - in conjunction with the lectures - what Hegel attempts to say.

Hegel read before his classes a paragraph either wholly or in part, and then added free explanations. The printed explanations in our German text were not read before the group of students.

The third sub-section of this article - the exegesis of §§ 40-51 of the *Encyclopedia* - will appear in the next issue of *Melita Theologica*.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PASTORAL CARE

Victor Shields

This article is concerned with the rediscovery of pastoral care, a rediscovery made necessary by what Alistair V. Campbell (1981) calls "a contemporary sense of confusion about the true nature of christian caring and by a feeling of alienation from the traditional understanding of the pastoral task." Traditionally the term pastoral care referred to the broad activities of a pastor in his relationships with parishioners. The confusion has been partly caused by the extraordinary successes of the behavioural sciences - in particular psychology and sociology - in shedding light on the causes of human distress and the nature of helping relationships. I intend to show that insights gained from modern psychology can help to clear the ground for modern pastoral care.

Ambiguities of Pastoral Care

Today we seem to have a much more sophisticated view of social interaction and of the ambiguities of care and counselling (Lake, 1981) than the simple rural image of a shepherd tending his flock, from which the phrase "pastoral care" derives. Although the sociologist Max Weber wrote of pastoral care as "the religious cultivation of the individual," that individualistic notion tends to be softened considerably in the contemporary life of the church where pastoral care includes caring for society and for other larger systems of life (Struck, 1984, p.14). In our day and age, we often find ourselves reacting against what we regard as unwarrented paternalism and authoritarianism of the not too distant past. We want to discover a style of Christian caring which treats us as adults rather than as errant sheep (Jacobs, 1987). Obviously, much practice of psychology either ignores the person's religious belief system because it is incompetent to handle it, or at worst considers it symptomatic of illness. But this is not to deny that there is much truth in the discoveries of psychology and the other behavioural sciences. They have shed much light on what it means to be human. All science, (but particularly behavioural sciences), is capable of becoming faith's ally (Dominian, 1975), shedding light on the statement in Genesis 1,31: "God saw all that he had made and indeed it was very good."

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The Nature of Psychology

Stated briefly, psychology is the scientific study of behaviour and experience (Carlson, 1990). Psychology is relatively a young science. It has been only a little more than 100 years since Wilhelm Wundt established the first psychological laboratory in 1879 at the University of Leipzig. Before that the discipline of philosophy and physiology merged to form the core of psychological studies, studies that dealt primarily with how stimuli from the physical world produced "sensations", the elements of "mental life". From those early beginnings the subject matter of psychology has grown immensely. As the science developed, more complex functions were included, such as learning, emotion, motivation and thinking. World Wars I and II gave impetus to the study and practice of clinical psychology. Today, hardly an area of human behaviour exists which is not subject to psychological scrutiny.

Dialogue Between Psychology and Theology

The interface between psychology and religion is a wide open frontier for scientific research. In reality, studies in clinical literature and theological research (Estadt, Compton, Blanchette, 1987) have been striving for quite some time now, to integrate the implications of the fundamentally *religious* character of man's reality and meaning with the profoundly *human* character and needs of every person. However, in the first half of this century (Goreman, 1985), psychologists and religious thinkers engaged in almost constant warfare over the value of religious belief in human life. Freud declared that religions were mass delusions, and many other psychologists were equally critical. For their part, theologians charged that psychology reduced God to a mere psychological phenomenon (Meissner, 1984).

In more recent years, however, there has developed a renewed interest in the dialogue between psychology and theology. This interest is expressing itself in two ways. One way is the psychological investigation of religious phenomena. The other is the integration of psychology and theology - particularly the integration of Christian theology and clinical psychology. Especially the last three or four decades have brought about a spirit of dialogue in areas of concern common to both groups: human development in general, the stages of faith and moral development, guilt, prayer, spiritual health, and religion as a factor of psychological well-being. Theologians usually not noted for their attention to the practical or empirical have been forced to take some notice of mental health and of the fact that the clinician may often lead his patient to consider matters of "ultimate concern". The best-known theologian to encourage dialogue with

therapists was the late Paul Tillich, particularly in his book, *The Courage To Be*. And several great names in psychology, including Carl Rogers, Hobart Mowrer, Erich Fromm and Rollo May have responded to his dialogue.

The Biblical Concept of Love

In the meantime, Psychology has come to a point where certain characteristics of psychological theories correspond to the biblical concept of love and therefore may be used as indicators, if not validators of biblical love (Newton Moloney, 1977). Skilled or experienced therapists of divergent schools of psychotherapy agree on the elements of an ideal relationship, which they characterize as being warm, accepting and understanding. Like our body, our spirit is also interpersonal and is influenced by social factors. Particularly as spirit, we have a respectful reverence for one another. Love, the central motivating force of a healthy and good person, integrates the various dimensions of personhood and enables us to grow together in wholeness (Kelsey, 1981) as well as to suffer and rejoice in community. Prominent psychologists of the stature of William James, Carl Jung, Abraham Maslow, Viktor Frankl and Gordon Allport, all imply or refer to the spiritual process of love.

Hence, spiritual experiences are not an escape into fantasy or an exercise in magical thinking but rather a way of experiencing reality. As a matter of fact every individual born into this world, somehow or other, strives to pursue his or her well-being. Human beings interact with reality in three distinct and interrelated ways: physically, psycho-socially and spiritually. Wellness in its totality calls for a human being to operate optimally as a complete person - physically and physiologically, emotionally, intellectually and volitionally. Everyone wants health and happiness. At the same time, one's spirituality must become as much the focus of attention as one's emotional and body functioning are. Although sick people may have many physical and psychological problems they are able to become involved with reality which draws them out of themselves, making possible for them to experience life beyond their problems.

Clinical Pastoral Psychology

Meanwhile, a great influence on the psychology of religion (W.H. Clark, 1977), one especially strong in theological schools and churches, has been exerted by clinical pastoral psychology. This movement has had an interesting history. In the early 1920's, Anton Boisen, a middle-aged clergyman in the United States, considering his life a failure, was hospitalized with a diagnosis of cathatonic schizophrenia. Through his stay in hospital he became convinced of

the need of many psychologically disturbed patients of adequate pastoral care. His sickness gave him an incomparable opportunity to observe a psychosis from inside. In addition to this, having a scholarly cast in mind, as he recovered Boisen had the occasion to observe his fellow sufferers and to reflect on his observation. The result was his *Exploration of the Inner World*, a contemporary minor classic filled with original observations on the nature of schizophrenia and on the value of religion as a dynamic aspect of many cures. After his recovery Anton Boisen was appointed the first chaplain at a mental hospital in the United States. Shortly after his appointment, the chaplain persuaded several theological students to study this special ministry under his direction.

Overlapping Area of Concern

The two sciences of clinical psychology and pastoral care, share an overlapping area of concern and have quite a number of presuppositions in common. Both are concerned with the efforts of people to give meaning and direction to their lives. Hence the two disciplines have some degree of natural kinship in terms of content and method. Both clinical psychology and pastoral care operate within the practical or applied fields of psychology and theology respectively. If pastoral care may be said to give somewhat more attention to the real than to the ideal, yet both are ultimately concerned with the tension between the real and ideal. If pastoral care-givers might learn something from psychology, the opposite is also true. Any psychological theory includes, in so far as it is complete, some definition of the meaning of life, and of success or failure in achieving this meaning. In other words, the question of values necessarily arises within psychological practice itself, and in this question the pastoral care-giver specializes. So, the two disciplines ought to be able to correct and enrich each other. And it is only natural, that when it comes to mental health, the role of the priest, as a primary pastoral care-giver, appears to be very similar to that of the clinical psychologist.

Similarity of Roles

We often hear it said that in the contemporary, secular world, the psychotherapist has assumed the role and functions of the priest, as confessor and interpreter of subjective reality (Cole, 1984). Psychoanalysis has even been accused of being a substitute religion for some, an accusation that is valid in those instances in which the analyst and analysis become the final court of appeal, where questions of value and meaning are concerned. Today Freud's attempts to reduce the Eucharist, rites, and hope of eternal life to cannibalistic fantasy, obsessional mechanisms, and wishful thinking are common knowledge.

But since the two vocations are so often counterposed, it seems refreshing to consider some of their commonalities.

Particularly, the role of the priest and the clinical psychologist in mental health could be stated simply if there was not so much overlap of interest and training. These two professions are interested in helping a person live a fuller life. The distinction of interest, then becomes a matter of emphasis. The training of these professionals cannot neglect any aspect of personality without ending up with a lopsided view of man. The priest who realizes that grace builds on nature will be interested in grasping the fundamentals of psychology. The clinical psychologist explicitly devoted to the promotion of mental health cannot neglect the religious aspect of man since man's universal concern for religion is a fact.

Adjustment

Hence, we should recognize that the essential function of both priest and psychotherapist towards the person who requires care is to provide a secure environment that allows the greatest possible freedom of choice as a hallmark of ego autonomy and personal adjustment. Many psychologists researching the field of personality development consider the encouragement of ego autonomy to be the goal of human growth and development. Ego autonomy is a concept that means a person is able to control his or her own life by adaptive choice and independent action. With ego autonomy, one has the inner freedom to develop one's potential both emotionally and intellectually. This is a capacity to acknowledge reality in the process of making choices, far from the simple "adjustment" to the status quo or to the specific social environment. Ego autonomy implies the ability to accept interdependence with other persons, and in the process to benefit from these dependencies rather than be crippled by them.

Obviously, adjustment both by the individual and his group is essential to personal development (Feldman, 1989). But while group development changes with changing circumstances, no human being is exactly like any other and so there must be some individual component in his or her new acts. Often, the individual will do well to conform with group adaptation: on occasion he would do better to act alone. A compromise must be struck between his tendencies to conformity and his individuality. But the most important principle is that the individuality of every person is valuable and must be defended when it is attacked by pressures in order to conform.

Unique Position

From the point of view of many psychologists one of the greatest assets to therapy is to find a patient sympathetic priest who will try to understand the difficulties confronting a person who is thoroughly confused in matters of religion. It would seem that of all professional persons, the priest should be more concerned about promoting mental health than any other person. Charity demands this of him. But he is in the unique position of having the answers to the most profound problems affecting the life of the individual as well as society. The priest knows by reason of his profession the meaning of life, suffering and death. Although the principal skill of the clinical psychologist is research, diagnosis and psychotherapy, his efforts will never tell us what "ought" to be. The best he can do is to confirm the fact that by following the teaching of Christ, man gets along better in his environment.

Integration

Perhaps we are moving out of an age of excessive specialization into an age of integration. The opposite of "to integrate" is "to compartmentalize" - that remarkable capacity which we human beings have to take things which are properly related to each other and stick them in separate airtight compartments in our mind so they don't rub up against each other and cause any pain. In the meantime though, integrity is never painless. It requires that we do let things rub against each other - that we fully experience life's conflicting demands and attempt to integrate them into resolutions of integrity. The way of integrity is a way of tension. It is inevitable therefore, that there should exist some tensions as we strive to integrate the insights of psychology and religion. Through their integration pastoral carers could become 'generalists' rather than 'specialists' - a need for the pastoral worker to continue to be willing to suffer the tension of an identity that is not always clear but remains often open to new possibilities. Perhaps, moving in the direction of integration and integrity, those working in the field of pastoral care today, will need to come to think of themselves not only as psychotherapists who are people of God but also as scientists.

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MARRIAGE AS SACRAMENT: A THEOLOGY IN TRANSITION

Brennan R. Hill

The theology of marriage as sacrament seems to be in a crucial period of transition. Catholic theology has gradually moved from the highly legalistic position of the medieval and Tridentine period to the more personalistic perspective of Vatican II. Still, the current thinking seems to be often a blending of traditional and contemporary insights, resulting in a theological perspective that has severe limitations. Those engaged in teaching often find it difficult to deal with the theology of marriage in a manner that is compatible with contemporary experience. Those involved in canonical and pastoral work also find that the current theological thinking does not allow them to deal adequately with modern marital dilemmas. As a result, discussion of marriage as a sacrament is often left a moot question. What Rahner pointed out some years ago is still true: with all the discussion about marriage in our time, little attention is paid to the crucial sacramental dimension.[1] In light of all this, I would agree with Orsy that the time has come to look for new insights, new categories and broader horizons in our considerations of marriage as a sacrament.[2]

In this article I would like to focus on some of the key factors that are coming into play in this reformulation of a sacramental theology of marriage. These factors are as follows: 1) the dynamic nature of marriage; 2) the integration of the secular and sacred dimensions of marriage; 3) the centrality of love, especially romantic love in today's marriages; 4) the relational and inclusive view of faith; 5) the growing linkage between ministry and marriage; and 6) the effect of liberation themes of sexism, oppression and social justice on marriage.

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1 Karl RAHNER, *Theological Investigations*, Vol.X (Herder and Herder; New York 1973) 199.

2 Ladislas ORSY, "Faith, Sacrament, Contract, and Christian Marriage: Disputed Questions," *Theological Studies* 43 (1982) 398.

Moving from a static to a dynamic perspective

Central to the Christian view of marriage is the belief that marriage is a sacred symbol of Christ's presence and power. Traditional theology, however, has tended to describe this symbol more as a static reality. Marriage in fact has often been looked at as a "state", a reality created by God and then instituted or raised to the level of sacramentality by Jesus. This traditional view seems to have been built largely on the thinking of Augustine, who first described marriage as a "sacramentum", or an indelible sign or sealing of an irreversible commitment. This commitment, in Augustine's view, is not primarily of the spouses to each other, but rather it is a joint commitment of the couple to God.[3] The two Christians making such an irreversible commitment have already been "sealed" indelibly in Baptism, and now by virtue of the baptismal "sacramentum" enter into another sealed commitment to be married indissolubly. From this thinking the traditional point of view has taken the position that marriage is a pre-ordained 'state' that is irrevocably "entered into" by the vows of marriage, and that the agreement is finally "sealed" through sexual intercourse.

The traditional sacramental theology of marriage seems to have been largely formulated during the medieval period, at which time marriage was for the first time declared to be one to the Church's seven sacraments. At this time Augustine's view of "sacramentum" was reclaimed, largely because it was compatible with the rather legal mentality toward marriage then current. The "sign" now became interpreted as a contract, which once made and consummated became an irrevocable commitment to God. Out of this contractual agreement arose the obligations toward the three "goods" of marriage as enumerated by Augustine: offspring, fidelity, and permanence. In addition, the contractual agreement included duties towards what were considered to be the "ends" of marriage: the procreation and nurture of children; mutual help; and the remedy for concupiscence. The "sacramentum" or seal of this contract then became also the cause of the graces needed to carry out these obligations. This medieval view gained verification and emphasis at the Council of Trent, which was attempting to defend the sacramentality of marriage against the denial of the Protestant Reformers. This perspective was strongly promulgated by Pius XI and prevailed until the time of Vatican II.[4]

3 Theodore MACKIN, *What is Marriage?* (Paulist Press; New York 1982) 20.

4 For an overview of this historical background, see Denise LARDER CARMODY, "Marriage in Roman Catholicism", *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 22 (1985) 28-40.

Granting that there is much of value in this classical approach to marriage, sufficient attention is not given here to the dynamic nature of marriage. The terms "seal", "bond", "indelible sign" and "sacred contract" are rather static terms, and when they are used the emphasis is usually placed on the ceremony wherein the sacrament "is conferred". Thus the classical view tends to "thingify" both the sacrament of marriage as well as the grace which is described as being "given" by the sacred sign.

Marriage as a dynamic reality

Marriage is one of the oldest social institutions, existing in one form or other in all cultures. As a human institution, it has existed in several forms; polygamist (including polygyny and polyandry), as well as the more common monogamist model. It has undergone significant changes throughout the centuries. In the past this institution has largely been patriarchal and male-dominated, while today there seems to be a shift more toward egalitarian forms, with radical changes taking place in the roles exercised by each spouse. Mate selection was at one time largely in the hands of families, while today in many cultures it is more common for individuals to select their own spouses. Motives for marriage have ranged from concerns for property rights, inheritance, and procreation of heirs, workers, or even soldiers to today's more widespread motive of romantic love. The extended family of the past now is gradually being replaced in the West by the nuclear family. And the traditional permanency of marriage is now often giving way to what some call the "serial monogamy" that has come about from the increasing divorce rate.[5]

Not only is the institution of marriage itself changing and dynamic, but each individual marriage is itself an individual process. Each couple gradually builds its own unique marriage, bringing together the individual characteristics of both spouses, varying family systems, and the visions of the spouses into a new union. Moreover, each marriage passes through a number of stages of development.[6] The marriage lived by newlyweds will certainly differ once the couple has children, once children have grown and left home, and later when the couple become grandparents and enter the elderly years together. Marriage, then, both as an objective institution and as an individualized reality is a dynamic process which develops and changes, which can go through periods of growth or deterioration. Healthy marriages are "built" over a long period of time and

5 See Jeffrey S. TURNER and Donald HEIMS, *Marriage and Family: Traditions and Transitions* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; New York 1988) Chaps. 1 and 2.

6 See Jack DOMINIAN, *Marriage and Faith: A Basic Guide to Christian Marriage* (Crossroad; New York 1982) 107-151.

through a great deal of effort and self-sacrifice: they do not come about automatically by a mere contractual agreement.

A dynamic view of sacrament

Contemporary sacramental theology has moved away from the mechanistic and automatic tendencies of the past to a more personal, relational and communal notion of sacrament. Since Schillebeeckx' seminal study, we have become accustomed to speak of sacraments as "encounters", as living experiences of the presence and power of Jesus, rather than as symbolic rituals that "give grace". Moreover, theology has moved from a literal view of "institution by Christ", to a more nuanced interpretation whereby the Church in the name of Jesus gradually develops its sacred symbols, with each having its own complicated and varied history.[7]

Applying these notions to marriage, this sacrament is viewed as a unique union involving two lovers who wish to join their lives, and encounter each other "in the Lord". The language, therefore, shifts from contract to covenant, to a living relationship in grace and faith, a relationship which must be freely chosen and actively nourished if it is to remain alive and life-giving. Relationships neither come about nor are they sustained automatically. Rather, they must be gradually built through mutual effort, dedicated love, unselfish sacrifice, and an ongoing commitment to fidelity in its broadest meaning. As a sacrament, marriage is a dynamic and living sign of the presence of the couple to each other and to the Lord.

This understanding of marriage as a dynamic covenant implies a departure from the traditional view of how this sacrament was created by God and instituted by Christ. In this newer view, marriage is not crafted by God as an unchangeable institution, nor is it made into a sacrament explicitly by Jesus. Rather, one sees God revealing self through the human institution of marriage from the beginning as well as now. Marriage thus becomes a living image of the loving relationship which God has for all people; and each individual marriage acts uniquely as a revelation of this covenant. As Kasper puts it: "Marriage, then is the grammar that God uses to express his love and faithfulness".[8] The Christian disciple sees this covenant realized in Jesus Christ in a unique and unrepeatable manner. Christ becomes the epitome of the loving and sacrificing

7 See Jared WICKS, "Marriage: An Historical and Theological Overview", in Michael J. TAYLOR (ed.), *The Sacraments: Readings in Contemporary Sacramental Theology* (Alba House; New York 1981) 189ff.

8 Walter KASPER, *Theology of Christian Marriage* (Crossroad; New York 1981) 27.

spouse and expresses his saving power within marital unions. It is in this sense that Christ institutes marriage. As Kasper writes: "The sacramental nature of marriage cannot be proved by using individual words of institution. It is more important to show that marriage is a sacrament because it is fundamentally related to the saving work of Jesus Christ".[9] Thus Paul maintained that those who are married "in the Lord" experience and mirror the love which Jesus has for his Church. (1 Cor 7,39; Eph 5, 21-33) The work of Jesus is dynamic as well as manifold, varies from one marriage to another, reveals itself differently in all stages of marriage, and is expressed differently in various cultures. In this sense, marriage is a living and changing symbol wherein God is powerfully bestowed on the couple and through them on the world which they touch.[10]

This dynamic view of marriage as sacrament shifts its focus from the ceremony and the vows to the daily living out of the commitment. The ceremony is but a beginning of a long process wherein the couple sacramentalize their lives together. As Lawler puts it: "...it is a married life, much more that a marriage ceremony, that is both the prophetic symbol which proclaims and makes real and celebrates in representation the community between Christ and his Church and the life situation in which married men and women encounter Christ and God and grace".[11] Rather than being a static reality, then, marriage is a dynamic process wherein "God promises to stand by the couple, to be their strength in their weakness, so that they can initiate a union, grow into it through successes and failures, consummate it in grace, and bring it to maturity in love".[12] The sacramental dimension is more than a seal on the union, it is an integral factor in the development of the union.[13] It is the very life-blood of the union, the living source of God's power and love in the everyday life of the couple.

This dynamic view of marriage as a sacramental is compatible with our contemporary awareness of the evolutionary and relative nature of things. It better fits in the context of today's insights regarding the stages of developmental growth. Moreover it reflects the contemporary experience of marriage as an ongoing process in constant need of nurturing. In addition it helps us in part understand the contemporary phenomenon wherein so many marriages either

9 *Ibid*, p.28.

10 RAHNER, *Investigations*, 201.

11 Michael G. LAWLER, *Secular Marriage, Christian Sacrament* (Twenty-Third Publications; Mystic Ct. 1985) 57.

12 ORSY, *Christian Marriage*, 383.

13 Karl LEHMANN, "The Sacramentality of Marriage: The Bond between Baptism, Faith, and Marriage", in Richard MALONE and John R. CONNERY (eds.), *Contemporary Perspectives on Christian Marriage; Propositions and Papers from the International Theological Commission* (Loyola Univ. Press; Chicago 1984) 99.

never acquire or in fact seem to lose their sacramentality. Most certainly it provides motivation for the Church to move beyond mere involvement in the ceremony of marriage and begin to meet its serious responsibilities to minister to marriages in all stages of development.

The secular and sacred in marriage

It would seem to me that our view of marriage becomes distorted when marriage's secular and sacred aspects become separated and dichotomized. So often this appears in studies of marriage. When one reads secular accounts, little if any attention is given to the religious dimension of marriage. Conversely, in many of the theological studies of marriage, scant attention is paid to everyday human experience of marriage or to the many valuable insights gained from modern psychology, sociology and cultural analysis. Certainly, the Catholic tradition in maintaining a classical tradition regarding the sacramentality of marriage often finds itself isolated from the perspectives of other churches and religions as well as from the outlooks of modern society.

Background on the separation

The dichotomy between the human and divine aspects of marriage has a long history. Schillebeeckx, in his classical study of marriage, points out that Christianity first had to deal with marriage as a human reality, largely under the control of families. The emerging Church viewed marriage as a secular and human reality that took on a new dimension when entered into by the baptized, and this view prevailed for many centuries. Rather than speak of Christian marriage, the Church approached this reality as "marriage by Christians". As Schillebeeckx puts it: "For the first eleven centuries marriage was seen--both in Christian experience and in Western theology--above all as a secular reality to be experienced 'in the Lord' and meriting special pastoral care in the moral and religious sphere".[14] For centuries no religious ceremony was required, and it was only after the collapse of the Roman Empire that the Church began to assume legal and religious authority over the institution of marriage. As we know, it was not until the twelfth century that the Church finally declared that marriage could be considered to be one of the seven sacraments. A number of reasons seemed to contribute to the Church's distancing itself from the institution of marriage. O'Callaghan lists some of these as "distrust of the body and its sense, the tendency to identify concupiscence of fallen man with sexual passion,

14 Edward SCHILLEBEECKX, *Marriage: Human Reality and Saving Mystery* (Sheed and Ward; New York 1965) 338.

the need to extol virginity".[15] It was only when extreme heretical cults carried these prejudices against sex to the extreme and taught that things of the flesh were evil, that the Church was moved to defend the sanctity of marriage and declare it to be one of the sacraments.

Even though marriage was eventually declared to be a sacrament in the twelfth century, there remained a marked legalism in the theological approach. As Boff points out, the declaration that marriage was a sacrament comes across more as a "doctrinal addition" to the human reality of marriage, rather than as a recognition of the intrinsic sanctity of marriage.[16]

The role of the Reformation

The dichotomy between marriage as a human reality and as a sacred mystery was further deepened by the Reformation and its separation of the order of creation from the order of redemption. Luther, even though recognizing that marriage was "God's work and commandment," declared that marriage was a "wordly affair".[17] He recognized marriage as being in the realm of God's creation, but not as part of the order of redemption. Salvation was gained through faith alone, not through marriage. Luther and the other Protestant reformers thus denied Christ's institution of marriage as one of the Christian sacraments of redemption. The Council of Trent, in its efforts to defend the sacramentality of marriage and its institution by Christ, reasserted the classical tradition regarding the sacramentality of marriage and further set up barriers between marriage as a secular reality and as a sacrament, between Christian and non-Christian marriages, and even between Catholic and Protestant marital unions. This exclusive approach to the sacramentality of marriage often prevails even today, and is perhaps one of the reasons why it becomes to difficult to discuss the sacramentality of marriage in contemporary terms. Referring to this classical approach to the sacramentality of marriage, Boff points: "...it is difficult today to see how this doctrine applies the concept of marriage to the fact of marriage".[18] The classical approach to the sacramental aspect of marriage often seems spiritualized and so cut off from human experience that it becomes difficult to relate it to married life as it is experienced today.

15 Dennis O'CALLAGHAN, "Marriage as Sacrament", in Franz Bockle (ed.), *The Future of Marriage as Institution. Concilium* 55 (1970) 101.

16 Leonardo BOFF, "The Sacrament of Marriage", in Michael TAYLOR (ed), *The Sacraments: Readings in Contemporary Sacramental Theology* (Alba House; New York 1981) 193ff.

17 KASPER, *Theology*, 33ff.

18 BOFF, "Marriage", 193.

The role of secularism

The Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the rise of Nationalism, and other secularistic movements further separated the "wordly" aspect of marriage from the religious. These movements went beyond the Reformers and denied the "order of creation" altogether, viewing marriage as a secular reality under the jurisdiction of the state. As a result, the Church was moved even more to the defensive in protecting its traditional views on the sacramental notion of marriage and has become increasingly more isolated from the secular aspects of marriage. Its central concern has thus been more often with the protection of the bond or more recently with decisions on validity, than with the ongoing pastoral attention to the everyday needs of marriages as they are lived in contemporary society.

A need for integration

Further reformulation of the Catholic sacramental theology of marriage will have to move beyond the classical dichotomy between the secular and the sacred, the natural and the supernatural. Marriage, and indeed all reality, will have to be seen as multi-dimensional. Marriage is indeed a secular affair that is undergoing marked changes in the midst of an extremely complicated society and is facing financial, social and political challenges never before encountered. Studies in anthropology, science, psychology and many of the other disciplines have offered extremely valuable insights with regard to marriage, and all of this must somehow be incorporated into the sacramental theology of marriage. Moreover the experiences of those who experience marriage in contemporary society need to be listened to as a new theology of marriage "from below" becomes formulated.

Those who process Christian faith generally believe that marriage is of God's creation. This is not to say that marriage is to be identified with the Holy or with Mystery. The Judeo-Christian tradition did desacralize marriage, refusing to accept pagan views that marriage and sex is a divine participation in the life of the gods. Marriage is indeed a human reality, with its weaknesses and limitations.

Nevertheless, it is a real and effective means of experiencing the Kingdom, the saving power of God through Christ in our midst. The married Christian does indeed enjoy a unique opportunity to share in the life, death and resurrection of the Lord.[19]

19 LAWLER, *Secular Marriage*, 71ff.

From this perspective it is not so much a case of a human reality "being raised" to the level of sacrament by Church as it is a gradual recognition on the part of the Church of the inner depths of marriage wherein there is access to the presence and power of God. As Lawler points out, there are two tiers in marriage: "The first, the human tier proclaims and makes real and celebrates the intimate community between this man and this woman. The second, religious tier proclaims and celebrated in both the Jewish and Christian traditions, the steadfast covenant and loving community between Yahweh and his holy people, and between Christ and his holy people, the Church".[20] These are not two separate realities, but two dimensions of the one reality of marriage, and the two experiences overlap and so-mingle. As Rahner says, human love and divine love are connatural in that the love of human leads to and indeed makes possible the love of God. Applying this notion to marriage, Rahner writes: "Now this personal love, which creates the state of marriage as the mode in which to manifest itself, is in fact in the present order of salvation sustained by the grace of God which always imbues this love with its salvific power, exalts it and opens it to the immediacy of God himself. Now this can take place even before this love encounters the message of the gospel proclaimed and made known in such explicit words".[21] For Rahner, all moral acts are in fact salvific acts in virtue of God's grace and universal salvific will. There are no "merely natural" acts, in that all moral acts are upheld by grace and thus oriented toward God. We might then add that there are no "natural marriages". There is a sacramental dimension to all marriages, even though there are those who choose to ignore this sacred level of marriage. From this perspective, marriage is a human reality at the depths of which is the experience of the Kingdom of God and the Church of Christ. For unbelievers, and even commonly for believers these depths remain hidden. At the same time, for those who are open to it, the experience of salvation, which is the basis of the sacramental dimension of marriage, is available.[22] This sacramental dimension marriage is, then, not extrinsic to marriage. Sacramentality, or the experience of the sacred, is intrinsic to marriage and is accessible not only to the baptized but to all spouses. If this be true, does it not provide an avenue to address some of the more difficult ecumenical and pastoral questions regarding marriges between the unbaptized and the baptized, the status of annuled marriages and the children of such marriages, the situation of second marriages where there has not been an annulment, and the common occurrence today where baptized unbelievers have

20 *Ibid*, p. 69.

21 RAHNER, *Investigations*, 205.

22 See Bernard HÄRING, *Free and Faithful in Christ* (Crossroad; New York 1982) 534ff.

only the option of a sacramental marriage? Might we not say that marriage is one, a human reality with access to the experience of mystery. Some believe and choose to have access to these depths, while others for one reason or other choose not to realize this experience of Mystery. In light of religious freedom, whatever the choice, it should be recognized and honoured, and all marriages should be held in esteem.

Love and marriage

One of the most crucial problematics in the reformulation of the sacramental theology of marriage will be the area of love. While it is true that Christian love has always been part of our theology of marriage, in the past insufficient attention has been given to married or conjugal love itself. Married love was mentioned in Pius XI's influential encyclical on marriage, but the letter's emphasis on the primary and secondary ends of marriage had much more impact, and there love was not included. It was only at Vatican II that conjugal love was given a central role in marriage, and marriage was described as "a community of love" and an "intimate partnership of married life and love".[23] The Council recognized that conjugal love is a unique kind of love that is warm, intimate, self-giving, and both expressed in and nurtured by sexual acts. It was recognized out of this unique love come offspring, and that this love also enables the couple to experience the divine of their lives.

Romantic love

The Council's emphasis on conjugal love in marriage shifted the emphasis away from what had formerly been the dominating purpose of marriage, the procreation of children. This change of emphasis was most certainly welcome in contemporary society where having a large number of children is often not the central concern. At the same time, the Council made not mention of "romantic love", which seems to be the major factor in the decision to get married today. Especially in Western countries, people do not think of marriage until they have "fallen in love", that is experienced what is usually a highly emotional experience of being attracted to an individual and wanting to be at one with that person psychologically, socially and physically. Furthermore, as Dominian points out, most couples have high hopes of maintaining these romantic feelings throughout the course of the marriage.[24] They expect that this romantic love will include mutual and social support, an intimate sharing

23 See "Gaudium et Spes", in Walter Abbot (ed), *The Documents of Vatican II* (Guild Press; New York 1966) 249ff.

24 See DOMINIAN, *Marriage and Faith*, 271ff.

on all levels, and an exciting sex life. Even though couples eventually experience a certain loss of the original thrilling and idealized love as they move from love as an "atmosphere" to love as a daily commitment, most couples want to sustain a modicum of romantic feelings. "Falling out of love" causes great distress and possibly even disintegration in the marriages of today.

It would seem that any reformulation of the theology of marriage would have to take romantic love into consideration. Does the experience which young people, and many not so young, have of falling in love have any connection with the life of faith and with the sacramentality of marriage? Is there any connection between the cooperation, commitment, trust, loyalty and fidelity that the couple experiences and their religious commitments? How do the passionate feelings associated with romantic love relate to one's covenant with God, and with Christ and the Church. Unless these connections can be made realistically and in the language of the modern young person, somehow the sacramental theology of marriage will seem distant and perhaps irrelevant. It is clear that in order to make these connections theology will have to do a great deal more listening to the cultural experience of love, to other disciplines which deal with love, and indeed consult with those involved in such experience themselves. Most certainly advances such as Rahner's personalistic view of love and Cooke's analysis of conjugal love in terms of human friendship are encouraging.[25] However, a great deal needs to be done to integrate the contemporary experience of love into the theology of marriage.

Canon law's difficulty with love

Canonists in particular seem to be having difficulty integrating the crucial factor of love into their dealings with marriages. In fact, some canonists maintain that love does not belong to the essence of marriage.[26] The classical position on marriage, as enunciated by Augustine, does not include love as one of the so-called "goods" of marriage. Since these "goods" are essential for a valid marriage, one might conclude that in this outlook on marriage love would not be necessary. The marked limitations to this approach was demonstrated fifty years ago by an Italian jurist, A. C. Jemolo, in a case which he presented to his students. The case involved a man who married a woman out of a vendetta, wanting to subject her to a life of cruelty and thus pay back her family for all the injuries they had inflicted on him and his family. But by the old rules this would be a valid marriage since he intended to have children, be sexually faithful, and

25 RAHNER, *Investigations*, 303ff and Bernard COOKE, *Sacraments and Sacramentality* (Twenty-Third Publications; Mystic, Ct. 1983) 81ff.

26 MACKIN, *Marriage*, 333.

live with her until death. Obviously something was missiong--he did not love the woman. Jemolo had demonstrated the severe limitations of the classical approach to the validity of marriage.[27]

We have seen how the classical Augustinian formulation was changed by Vatican II's inclusion of conjugal love as being central in Christian marriage. Subsequent to the Council's new approach, the revised canon law saw need to add a fourth "good" to the Augustinian list. Canon 1055 states: "The matrimonial covenant, which a man and a woman establish themselves a partnership of the whole of life, is by its very nature ordered to the "bonum conjugum" and to the procreation and education of offspring".[28] It is true that there is a new element added, yet the work "conjugum" is ambiguous and does not necessarily refer to love. Many would conclude that we have here only half a loaf. That conclusion is confirmed when we listen to Paul VI's allocution to the Rota in 1976, where he challenged those who would consider conjugal love to be essential for validity, since "conjugal love is not included in the province of law.[28] Some canonists would agree, since love is such an elusive reality and very difficult to deal with in determining the validity of a marriage. However, I would concur with the position of Mackin who points out: "Those churchmen and canonists who insist that love and the intimate community do not belong to the essence of marriage must as a consequence rethink the theology of marriage quite thoroughly. For centuries Popes, Bishops and theologians have explained that the marriage of two baptized persons is a sacrament in this; that their union is an earthly image, a sacrament, of the love union of Christ and the Church. But obviously a marriage cannot be such an image unless love is in it".[30] Once we separate love from the discussion of the contract of marriage, we also separate it from the covenant. In marriage contract and covenant are inseparable. In sum, unless we can incorporate christian, conjugal and indeed romantic love into our discussion of the sacramentality of marriage, it will never be suitable to address contemporary Christians.

Faith as relational and inclusive

The classical sacramental theology of marriage has not kept pace with the contemporary understanding or experience of faith. The past theology of faith developed during the time of Christendom when it was assumed that the majority of civilized people were baptized and thus had the faith. The contem-

27 Lawrence WRENN, "Refining the Essence of Marriage", *The Jurist* 46 (1986) 532ff.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 535.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 547.

porary situation is quite different and we now observe the phenomenon wherein many people are indeed baptized but show little sign of faith. Pastoral ministers constantly are confronted with such persons, who nevertheless want to be married in the Catholic form. At the same time there are increasing members of petitions for declarations of nullity filed with tribunals on the grounds that one or both parties were not qualified to have a sacramental marriage because of lack of faith. [31]

This modern faith dilemma first became noted about twenty-five years ago in France, a so-called "Catholic country" where most were baptized and yet only 2% attended liturgy. At the same time about 40% of the people in France wanted Catholic church weddings. In 1969 the French hierarchy addressed this cricis by proposing three forms of marriage vows: one for those with faith; one for those with some feeling for the Christian religion; and a third civil ceremony for unbelievers. One diocese, Autun, allowed couples these choices and considered only the first choice of ceremony to be sacramental. In 1977 the International Theological Commission criticized this practice of having weddings on different levels, pointing out that when the baptized celebrate a non-sacramental wedding they do not have a valid marriage.

The Commission stated: "For the Church no natural marriages separated from the sacrament exists for baptized persons".[32] At the same time the Commission maintained that the absence of faith casts doubt on whether one is capable of making a sacramental intention and on whether such marriages are valid.[33] The Commission took the position that the intention to marry validly arises out of a living faith. The dilemma for many young people today is obvious. If they are baptized unbelievers they cannot enter a "natural marriage", yet neither do they have faith enough to enter into a valid sacramental marriage. Generally the pastoral recommendation in such cases is to take time to renew and strengthen the faith before the wedding. For many pastors this is hardly a realistic solution for the many situations they face today.

Subsequent official statements attempted to deal further with this dilemma of faith. In 1980 the Synod of Bishops pointed out that the very request for a wedding for religious reasons may be a sign of faith, and they reiterated the traditional view that to receive a sacrament it is sufficient to have the intention "to do what the Church intends to do".[34] In 1981 John Paul II in his official

30 MACKIN, *Marriage*, 333.

31 ORSY, "Christian Marriage", 383.

32 Quoted in Denis F. O'CALLAGHAN, "Faith and the Sacrament of Marriage", *Irish Theological Quarterly* 52 (1986) 175.

33 MALONE and CONNERY, *Contemporary Perspectives*, 20.

reflection on the Synod took the position that by baptism engaged couples are sharers in Christ's covenant with His Church and need only implicitly consent to what the Church intends to do. The Pope noted that only those should be turned away who explicitly and formally reject what the Church intends to do. Significantly, at no time does the Pontiff invoke the principle that a valid marriage between baptized persons is always a sacrament.[35] However, from this it has not been concluded that baptized unbelievers have had their dilemma solved.

Beyond minimalism

In light of the current theological advances regarding both sacraments and faith, it would seem that the present pastoral practice is settling for a considerable minimum when it comes to sacramental weddings. Have we not moved beyond a magical notion of sacraments, whereby rituals work automatically and mechanically. Are not sacraments dynamic encounters with the Lord, "graced events" that endure in their effects long beyond the ritual celebrations. In order to celebrate and participate in these sacred symbols, it is not necessary for one to have a living and active faith and to make a delibrate and free choice to enter into these mysteries? Moreover does not the contemporary theology of Christian faith indicate that genuine faith involves the free acceptance on the part of the whole person of a covenanted relationship with God as revealed in Christ Jesus? Baptism may indeed plant the seed of faith, but authentic faith, the faith needed to enter into a sacramental marriage, implies a mature and free acceptance of this faith relationship with the Lord.

Religious freedom demands that we allow people to make conscience choices. If a baptized couple with genuine faith wishes to enter into a sacramental union, such a choice is welcomed by the community. However, in the case of so many baptized young people today who for one reason or other are at a time of their lives when they have not yet made a faith choice, these should be able to enter into a natural union that is valid and yet not recognized by the couple or the Church as officially a sacrament. I would agree with Orsy that being baptized would not take away one's right to marry validly. In order to right this situation, of course, it will be necessary to revise the new code of 1980, which requires only baptism for a valid marriage and ignores the crucial question of faith. The contemporary theology of marriage cannot tolerate a return to the

34 Denin F. O'CALLAGHAN, "Faith and the Sacrament of Marriage", p. 163.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 174.

legal notion of marriage which does not take into consideration living faith and love.[36]

Marriage and ministry

In the past marriages and families have been more the object of ministry, and the pastoral focus has been on assisting couple in the everyday maintenance of their sacramental marriages. In recent times new developments are beginning to take shape. Since Vatican II there is a new awareness that marriage itself is an authentic "vocation" and that married couples serving each other and their children are indeed engaged in an important ministry. Moreover the Council's call for a more active role on the part of the laity as well as its reclaiming the teaching of the priesthood of all have given married couples a new sense of responsibility to minister beyond the family to the larger world. As the Whiteheads put it: "To be married in the Lord is to have eyes to see a deeper meaning and presence of our love. It is also to respond to this presence--a presence which calls us, together, beyond 'just ourselves', into an awareness of our involvement in the work of God in the world. As believers, we participate in the mission of Jesus".[37] The recent decline in the numbers of clergy and religious available for ministry have even more shifted the responsibilities for church ministry to those who are married. We might well see in the future that marriage and family will become the main source for ecclesial ministry. Since the emerging sacramental theology of marriage recognized marriages as a living symbol of Christ's power and presence, such a shift in minisry is perfectly logical and acceptable.

The domestic Church

The basis of sacramental thinking regarding marriage has been the teaching of *Ephesians* that marriage mirrors the union of Christ and his Church. As the Catholic community becomes more aware of the reality of the "domestic church", new levels of meaning begin to be derived from this text. As Rahner points out, marriage has a definite function in the Church and belongs to the "full constitution and full accomplishment" of the nature of the Church.[38] Marriage in a very true sense is Church and make the Church present in the world. "It is the smallest community, but for all that, a genuine community of the redeemed and sanctified, whose unity can build on the same foundation as

36 ORSY, "Christian Marriage", 390.

37 Evelyn EATON WHITEHEAD and James D. WHITEHEAD, *Marrying Well: Stages on the Journey of Christian Marriage* (Doubleday; New York 1983) 442ff.

38 Karl RAHNER, *The Church and the Sacraments* (Herder and Herder; New York 1963) 293.

that on which the Church is founded".[39] If it be true that the family is a true Church in miniature, obviously it carries the ecclesial responsibilities of carrying out Christ's mission to the world.

It is unfortunate, as Orsy notes, that this teaching that the family is the domestic church is generally presented in exalted fashion and then "quitely disregarded--and discarded".[40] If the domestic church is to ever move from rhetoric to reality, the official church will have to begin to realize the authentic priestly and ministerial gifts that exist within marriages and families. We will have to move beyond our persistent reluctance to recognize a married clergy and beyond our refusal to allow resigned priests to participate in ministry. In addition, the official Church will have to provide much more pastoral care, support and assistance to families than it has in the past. The vast majority of Christians live out the gospel as married persons, and somehow this fact has never been sufficiently recognized by a Church which still often centres on the clergy.

The impact of liberation themes

The revision of our sacramental theology of marriage will also have to include the recent insights gained from the theology of liberation. Equality, freedom from oppression, and resistance to injustice and violence are becoming major themes in the Church throughout the world. Since marriage is indeed the "Church in miniature" these themes are impacted them as well.

A new feminine awareness

Many Christian women are pointing out that the classical theology was formulated at a time when women were viewed as inferior, a time when they were "handed over" in marriage as property. Even as the early community theologized about marriage in *Ephesians*, the husband was considered to be the "image of God" and the representative of Christ, while the wife was given the image of the Church. As Schillebeeckx points out, it was for this reason that the brides were the ones who needed to be veiled and blessed at the wedding. They were the "brides of Christ", and therefore in need of blessing, while the male spouses stood in the place of Christ and were thus in no need of such consideration.[41] Many women are quite dissatisfied with their position of inferiority and

39 *Ibid.*, p. 294.

40 ORSY, "Christian Marriage", 381.

41 SCHILLEBEECKX, *Marriage*, 305ff.

with the patriarchal thinking which exists in this classical interpretation of marriage. They call for a revised theological understanding of marriage that will stress equality and partnership rather than dominance and submission.

Rahner has recognized the inadequacy of the classical views in *Ephesians*. He points out that assigning the role of Christ to the husband and Church to the wife is conditioned by the historical and social factors of the times, and is not the heart of the revelation. The core of the teaching, according to Rahner, is that the love between husband and wife parallels the love for Christ and his Church. The very foundation of the Christian tradition is God's covenant with people, and this covenant is fully manifested in the life of Christ. It is the dynamics and characteristics of Christ's love that serves as both model and sustenance for marriage, and not the assignment of specific roles for husband and wife.[42] In other words, conjugal love parallels and is sustained by the love of Christ, a love that was and is caring, compassionate, faithful, forgiving and sacrificing. Christ's love is not characterized by prejudice, domination, or oppression of any kind, and therefore none of these legitimately belong in conjugal love.

Feminists call for a reformulation of the theology of marriage that will focus, not only on Christ's love for his Church, but also on his role as liberator of the Church and world. As Silbermann points out, many women are discovering that they are in sacramental marriages wherein Christian values are not experienced. Instead of experiencing love, equality and justice, women often experience cruelty, domination and abuse. Marriage for these women has lost its redemptive qualities, and is instead still another encounter with the oppressive of a male-dominated and patriarchal society. [43] Silbermann and many other theologians advocate a rethinking of the classical theology of marriage. This reformulation should not, as it has been in the past, be done primarily by male ecclesiastics and theologians. The sacramental theology of marriage for the future should primarily be done by women and men who not only know the resources, but who also have had first-hand experience of the challenges of marriage. Their task is to formulate a model of marriage wherein both women and men can hope to experience equality, freedom and love "in the Lord".

The Third World experience

The Church that is emerging in the Third World brings with it further challenges to the classical theology of marriage. First of all, looking at that severe poverty, the oppression and the brutal violence in many of these areas makes

42 Karl RAHNER, *Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity* (Crossroad; New York 1978) 419ff.

one wonder what connection there is between the sacramental theology and real life as it is experienced. Much of the injustice here is done by families to families.[44] In the oligarchies of these countries the land, wealth and power are in the hands of just a few families, while the vast majority of households live in the depths of poverty and powerlessness. Moreover, if the marginalized majority attempt to stand up for their rights, they are subjected to terrorism, torture, and even death, often by people who consider themselves to be "good Christians". No doubt sacramental weddings continue for the members of the wealthy classes in these countries. One wonders how this can all go on in the midst of such contradiction and scandal on the part of these controlling families. At the same time, is it not incongruous how those living in sacramental marriages in South Africa generally do not see the contradiction of their support of Apartheid. Closer to home, what impact does out Christian view of marriage have on our own attitudes toward materialism, racial prejudice and the struggle for justice in our own country?

The family as unit of resistance

We see in Central and South America a church emerging in base communities, a church centred in homes and consisting largely of families. No doubt the future reformulation of the theology of marriage will be affected by this phenomenon. Here the relationship between Christ and the Church takes on new meaning. Many of these people know poverty, suffering and death as daily companions and turn to the Lord for strength, courage and hope. For them Christ is the lover that sustains them, but also the liberator that empowers them to struggle for peace and justice against overwhelming odds. Perhaps it is here "from below" that the Church will begin to learn a new and fresh sacramentality of marriage that will connect with life and be a powerful symbol of freedom, peace and justice. In my opinion the main line liberation theologians have not given sufficient attention to how "liberation begins at home" and should include the freeing of women from what is often an oppressive situation in their marriages. If the liberation movement is to find its strength in the home churches, it must first offer freedom to the women who live in these homes, women who are an integral part in the movement to struggle against social injustice and oppression.[45]

43 Eileen ZIEGET SILBERMANN, *The Savage Sacrament: A Theology of Marriage after American Feminism* (Twenty-Third Publications; Mystic, Ct. 1983) 7ff.

44 Juan Luis SEGUNDO, *The Sacraments Today* (Orbis Books; Maryknoll, NY 1974) 72ff.

45 The new consciousness of the sacramentality of marriage among the basic communities of El Salvador is discussed in Pablo GALDA MEZ, *Faith of a People: The Life of a Basic Christian Community in El Salvador* (Orbis Books; Maryknoll, NY 1986) 15ff.

Summary

In this article I have attempted to show the transitional movement of the sacramental theology of marriage from a classical position to one with broader horizons and fresh insights. I maintain that a relevant and effective sacramental theology of marriage will have to take into consideration the dynamic aspect of marriage, provide an integration of the secular and sacred, consider the contemporary experience of love and faith, be attuned to urgent needs for ministry, and carefully listen to the themes of liberation so prevalent in the contemporary church.

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THE MUSEUM AS AN AUDIO-VISUAL CULTURAL CENTER*

Francis Cachia

An interview by Dr. Francis Cachia with Dr. Rainier Budde, Director of Wallraf-Richartz-Museum, Dr. Sigfried Gohr, Director of Museum Ludwig, and Mr. Franz Xaver Ohnesorg, Director of the Cologne Philharmonic.

Cachia: Dr. Rainier Budde, as Director of the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum, Dr. Sigfried Gohr, as Director of Museum Ludwig, and Mr. Franz Xaver Ohnesorg, as Director of the Cologne Philharmonic, I felt that I ought to interview all three of you in order to find out the deeper implications of this monumental project you have realized together along radical lines.

Budde: You are referring of course, to the combining of the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum, the Ludwig Museum and the Cologne Philarmonic in one single building complex which was officially inaugurated on 6th September, 1986.

Cachia: Not to mention also the housing under the same roof of the "Agfa Foto-Historama", a Library, a Cinema, and a Video Centre. The concept behind this undertaking is surely the conviction that the audio and the visual arts are so closely related to one another that they actually should be treated as a unity. Who conceived of the idea of combining two art museums and the

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*The ensuing contribution may appear strange to the regular readers of *Melita Theologica*. Its form as an interview, which it was in reality, offers an original way of putting ideas across and its subject-matter, the unity of art, is culturally relevant indeed.

The Editor

Cologne Philharmonic Orchestra Concert Hall in one large single building complex?

Gohr: Actually, what we had in mind has some parallels: the Centre Pompidou in Paris, for instance.

Budde: I was the first to put forward the idea. You see, I am a trained musician as well as an art expert and museologist. I have actually given concerts myself.

Ohnesorg: One reason why the audio and visual arts should not be considered as separate and unrelated to one another is precisely because people who are talented in one area are often found to be exceptionally gifted also in the other. Dr. Budde is a living example of this.

Cachia: But Dr. Budde is exceptionally many-sided in his talents and interests. Dr. Budde, you've just published a historical novel, called *Meister Stefan*, haven't you?

Budde: Well yes, among other things I'm a writer too. The journalist's profession is not entirely foreign to me.

Cachia: Not all journalists are talented musicians or art critics!

Ohnesorg: I see what you're driving at Dr. Cachia. An individual's versatility in different artistic fields does not prove that the arts themselves are related. But don't forget people like Liebermann, Kandensky and Picasso, to mention some obvious examples.

Budde: Please consider also that there is what one can call a vertical and a horizontal line uniting painting and music. You can consider the relationship between them historically and see how the same spirit at different times pervaded them both. Take Impressionism.....

Cachia: The composers of music took over the term from the painters, did they not?

Budde:Exactly! The two Claudes, Debussy and Monet breathe the same spirit. It is most appropriate therefore to have Debussy's music played in a hall where some of Monet's paintings are exhibited. Another example, Canaletto's paintings would create a very fitting atmosphere for Bach's music.

Cachia: I see. So, musical performances are held not only in the Kölner Philarmonie Hall, but also in the Museum Section as well. Who is responsible for the organization of these musical performances?

Ohnesorg: I'm in charge of all musical performances, including Chamber music played in the Museum Exhibition Halls.

Cachia: Dr. Budde, by using the terms, vertical and horizontal relationship, you implied that there is an intrinsic, as well as a historical bond uniting music and painting.

Budde: Precisely!

Ohnesorg: Think of the cooperation of Chagall and Stravinsky in the production of the ballet, *The Firebird*, with the composer writing the score and the painter designing the scenery. Bartok took great care to match the scenery to his music when his Opera *Duke Bluebeard's Castle* was produced. He was deeply interested in "visualization of music", as the term goes. Incidentally, expressions transferred from the audio to the visual arts and vice-versa are indicative of the close relationship between them. Fontana spoke of "Klang-Skulpture" - sound sculpture. Dr. Budde and I can go on for ages talking about the relationships between the visual arts and music.

Cachia: Very good then. Now that you have explained so well the general background thinking behind your project, let's move on to another point. I will therefore come directly to details about the Cologne audio-visual cultural complex that you have brought into being and that you direct together. Wasn't it a clean break from the past when the two arts of sound and sight were usually considered to be separate?

Budde: It may have been a departure from the past practice; but this is where the future lies. I am convinced that the unity of the arts will be more and more stressed as time goes on even in the organization and administration of museums.

Cachia: Dr. Budde, can you please mention some salient facts about the history of the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum which you direct?

Budde: Like almost all museums in Cologne, the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum owes its origin to a private collection which was donated to the city. The collector was Canon Franz-Ferdinand Wallraf. The donation was made in 1824,

but it was only in 1861 that the collection was housed in a building open to the public. The building itself was a gift to the city made by a merchant, Johann-H.-Richartz.

Cachia: Hence the name, the Wallraf-Rochartz-Museum!

Budde: Exactly. Among its most treasured items, it possesses an extensive collection of medieval paintings of the Cologne school.

Cachia: Most appropriate for one of the oldest German museums, which, what is more, was founded and based here! When I went through the Museum, I was deeply impressed with the pictorial illustrations of incidents in the life of St. Ursula, the patroness of Cologne.

Budde: We have works of the Gothic period from other regions as well, so that we can offer an almost unbroken survey of the development of panel painting from 1300 to 1550. Already in the late Gothic period, the portrait was emerging as a new genre.

Cachia: Your Medieval Department is not confined to German masters, is it?

Budde: Indeed, no. The Italian and Dutch masters are well represented too, with Martini, Lorenzetti and Daddi on the one hand, together with Jan de Beer, Joos van Cleve and Jan Mostaert on the other. Then of course, there are the Dutch and Flemish painters from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, with such towering figures as Rembrandt, Rubens and van Dyck among them.

Cachia: Coming as I do from Malta, I was particularly glad to note that the art of Mediterranean Europe is also well represented.

Budde: Yes, we have paintings by Canaletto and by Tiepolo among other Italians; we have Murillos and Riberas from Spain; we also have Rigauds and Bouchers from France, to mention but a few.

Cachia: The Wallraf-Richartz-Museum takes us up to the nineteenth century, does it not?

Budde: Yes, it does. It covers the most important artists and artistic currents of that century, especially the French and German. The collection of works by the Cologne painter Leibl is particularly comprehensive and extensive. The

German variant of Impressionism is well illustrated by Liebermann's and Slevogt's paintings. France is well represented with paintings incuding works by Renoir, Monet, Cezanne and Degas.

Cachia: Thank you very much, Dr. Budde. Now I come to another point. I happened to be present at your press conference in which you gave the news of the exchange of a number of paintings with museums in the German Democratic Republic.

Budde: Yes, that is the most significant and exciting development since we moved into the new building just a couple of years ago.

Cachia: A fascinating story, as exciting as the best written thriller.

Budde: As one author of fiction based on cultural facts to another, I must agree with you that in this case fact proved to be stranger than fiction.

Cachia: At least more exciting any way. Remembering what you said in the press conference, the whole affair could be given the title of my own work of fiction: *Mystery of the Vanished Paintings*! Please mention the most important facts from your point of view as Museum Director.

Budde: Gladly. The story of the "vanished paintings" which are finally being returned to this Museum actually takes us back to World War II. The story of the two paintings which we are handing over to the German Democratic Republic goes even as far back as 1921, when sailors on mutiny broke into the Wiemar Castle Museum and stole Rembrandt's self-portrait as well as a picture by Johann Friedrich Tischbein and one by the Dutch painter, Gerhard Terborch. Then in 1945, Dürer portraits, that of Hans and that of Felizita Tucher (painted in 1499) disappeared mysteriously from Schwarzburg Castle where they had been stored to protect them from war damage.

Cachia: In the press conference you said that the Rembrandt self-portrait mysteriously turned up in the U.S.A.

Budde: In Dayton, Ohio, to be precise. A young woman discovered two rolled-up canvasses in her husband's warehouse. When she took them for identification to a museum of fine arts, they were recognized as Terborch's and as Tischbein's missing paintings.

Cachia: How did such famous paintings find their way into the warehouse in the first place?

Budde: The husband's story was that they had come into his possession mysteriously when he was in a bar in New York harbour area at the time when he was still a bachelor. The art experts found it hard to believe his story. They sent the pictures for restoration to the National Gallery in Washington. Then in 1967, the American Government handed them over to West Germany. They were stored for safe-keeping here at the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum. No photos were allowed to be taken of them and it was forbidden to exhibit them to the public. Now we are handing over the Rembrandt to the Grand Duchess of Saxony-Weimar Eisenach from whose family it had been stolen. We are sending the other two paintings back to the Weimar Museum in East Germany in exchange for 17 paintings which were originally the property of this Museum.

Cachia: I will not ask you to tell the story of all the paintings involved in the exchange, as I am sure there is enough mysterious material there for the writing of a whole thick book full of thrills.

Budde: Quite. I'll just mention that according to the agreement signed on 29th October 1987 by the Governments of the two German states, the German Democratic Republic will be giving 300 paintings to museums in the Federal Republic of Germany and will be receiving 130 works of art in exchange. I must say that in the protracted negotiations involved in which I have taken part, the museum authorities of the German Democratic Republic proved to be most understanding and helpful.

Cachia: Which do you consider to be the most important painting that is being handed over to the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum?

Budde: To my mind it is the famous portrait of Goethe by Heinrich Kolbe. You can have a photograph of it to illustrate your article.

Cachia: Dr. Gohr, it is your turn to give me some details about the Ludwig Museum.

Gohr: With pleasure.

Cachia: Dr. Gohr, I understand the Ludwig Museum is really an offshoot of the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum, so again it is really not at all surprising that the two Museums are now housed under one roof.

Gohr: You're right. It started as the Department of Modern Art of the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum. Although interest in Modern Art was keen even before World War I, the National Socialists in 1937 confiscated much that was of value. The gap they created was closed thanks to an important collection of works by German Expressionists donated by the Cologne lawyer Dr. Josef Haubrich.

Cachia: But the Museum is called Ludwig, not Haubrich.

Gohr: That's because in 1976 it acquired over 300 items of recent European and American art which had been put together by Peter and Irene Ludwig. So my Museum acts as a bridge between American and European art.

Cachia: Do you not find that it might confuse visitors when no clear distinction is made between 20th century art to which your Museum is exclusively dedicated and art all the way from the medieval up to the 19th century?

Gohr: Dr. Budde and I were agreed from the start that a museum should not be regarded as a temple of the muses, open only to devout worshipers. A museum is meant for the general public, embracing that is, people who are not experts in any one particular field, but who are keenly interested in all, as all-rounders in the vast area of general culture.

Cachia: But is not the general public confused when, as is the case in the audio-visual complex, you pass almost without noticing it, from a hall with classical paintings to one exhibiting pop art?

Budde: You are referring I suppose to the central stair-case. We meant it to be that way.

Cachia: I know, but does that not confuse visitors?

Gohr: Not at all; they are well aware of what we had in mind when we fused the two museums.

Budde: The unity of art is what we wanted to stress most particularly, and as Dr. Gohr indicated, the lay-out of the building, especially the central staircase brings this out very well.

Gohr: We advise visitors to follow the chronological order when going through the exhibited paintings and sculptures. We want them to return again

and again to our audio-visual complex. We also hold, from time to time, special exhibitions devoted to particular aspects of art.

Cachia: Yes, I visited your special exhibition of historical paintings. Moreover, I understand that the whole section of your Museum is dedicated to the art of photography, the "Agfa Foto-Historama", I believe you call the section.

Gohr: That's right. It boasts not only photographs of unique artistic value from the past 150 years, but also an extensive range of historical cameras, viewing and projection equipment as well as a specialized library. Altogether, the collection consists of about 12,000 photographs, circa 20,000 cameras and instruments, as well as over 3,000 books.

Cachia: So your complex includes a unique "Museum of Photography", a library, and, I have discovered, also a Video Centre as well as a Cinema.

Gohr: We wanted to offer the public an audio-visual cultural Centre that would be as all-embracing as possible. We had institutions such as the "Centre Pompidou" in Paris and the Wiener Symphoniker all along in mind.

Ohnesorg: Again music and the visual arts coming harmoniously together! The Cinema of course, unites them very well, movement in sound and movement in sight!

Gohr: In our cinema, we offer films about the history of filming itself and what we call "Landeskunde" in Germany.

Cachia: A term I find it hard to translate in one single expression. It implies knowledge about a particular country, its national identity, its own special cultural heritage and historical development, as well as its economic and political situation: a very wide term indeed.

Gohr: Yes. What we do is to concentrate for a period of time on one particular geographical area and show films for instance from South America, Eastern Europe, etc. We had a very successful special series dedicated to films from Poland.

Ohnesorg: We have actively participated in the composition of film music, which is very important from the point of view of the relationship of the arts of

sound and sight, for there the tempo of music and movement takes place in the same perimeter.

Budde: Our audio-visual cultural complex looks very much to the future as well as to the past and present. We do not only want to document the process of artistic creation, but also contribute creatively to its development. We encourage young composers to write music for special occasions.

Cachia: I have one last question. It is about broadcasting facilities in your audio-visual complex. I understand Westdeutscher Rundfunk is involved; how exactly?

Ohnesorg: Westdeutscher Rundfunk has contributed money for the building and installed permanent facilities for sound broadcasting. The Kölner Rundfunk-Sinfonie Orchester and the Kölner Rundfunk-chor transmit programmes regularly from the Hall. There are also facilities for recording.

Cachia: This is as far as radio is concerned. I have spoken to Mr. José Montes-Baquer, who directs the WDR television musical programmes. He told me that there are no permanent facilities for TV. However, three or four times a year, television programmes are made there.

Ohnesorg: That is right.

Cachia: Your idea was not to build a television studio to which the public is invited, but rather an audio-visual complex where the public are the regular occupants. What you have succeeded in creating will surely remain a valuable model for many future projects throughout the world. Your complex unites harmoniously the audio and the visual arts; museums and media; the old and the new in artistic achievements of many kinds.

I am most grateful to you for giving me so much of your precious time. I hope you will consider it has been well spent also from your point of view.

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Francis I. ANDERSEN/David N. FREEDMAN, *Amos*. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (Anchor Bible 24A; New York 1989) XLII.979pp.

On the face of it this volume would seem to join without clamour the Anchor Bible commentaries cluster. It's true that the preface by David Noel Freedman would create the impression that within the "AB canon" there exists (or will exist) a separate 'canon' consisting of a series of exegetical enterprizes on the eight-century prophets of Israel (Hosea-AB23A -; Amos - present book; Micah-work on it is 'already well advanced', p.viii - and Isaiah). But before one reads it, the book appears as a normal AB Commentary with the characteristic extended introduction that expounds the interpretative apparatus adoperated, an original translation of the biblical text, notes and comments, and an exquisite indexing service. Besides, this volume offers a number of photographs and maps (cfr. list of illustrations).

Perhaps the only peculiar 'formal' feature which could be regarded as a slight departure from the customary genre is the reproduction of the entire text of the Book of Amos at the very beginning of the volume (pp. XXV - XLII), ahead of the introduction itself. The present reviewer considers this editorial option as fortunate and very useful to readers who would like to get a global view of the biblical text to be studied (The text is then reproduced unit by unit within the commentary itself, pp. 183 onwards; it could have been better to print the text always at the head of the page, instead of the present disposition) before the reading of the commentary starts. The numerous sub-headings and the minute enumeration of the subunits (sometimes consisting of single verses) tend to weigh down the perusal of the text and to create the impression of fragmentation, so that the experience of wholeness of this 'highly structured unity' (p.144) evaporates as one proceeds with his readings.

In their Introduction to the commentary (pp.1-178) Andersen and Freedman (AF) address the standard background issues one would like to be enlightened upon before embarking on a close reading of an ancient text: outline history of research (pp.3-9), literary and form criticism (pp.9-18), social and political context of the prophet to whose name the biblical text has been attached by tradition (pp.18-23) the theological contribution of the Book (pp.88-139), the prophet himself as a historical figure (pp.83-87) and textual criticism (pp.139-141). AF dedicate the greater part of their introductory discussion to the contents of the Book of Amos taken unit by unit (pp.23-73), and to Amos' geopolitical terminology (pp.98-139). A good slice is also left to an examination of the book's theology under the rubric 'The God of Israel in the Book of Amos' (pp.88-98).

AF's main concern in the Introduction, however, is not to provide the necessary background and hermeneutical information to the biblical

text under study; rather they write here an apology for their rapture with the traditional historical - critical approach to the Book of Amos. Just to quote a qualified representative of the established 'tradition-historical-critical' method concerning the formation process behind the present shape of this prophetic text, James L. Mays: "The final form of the book was thus the result of a process of formulation that reached from Amos down at least in the exilic period. A precise and detailed reconstruction of the course which that process took would have to be conjectural in large part. But at least an outline of the stages along the way can be suggested , *Amos*. A Commentary (SCM Press; London 1969)13. And it is the conjectural nature of this reconstruction that led AF to abandon the efforts to enter behind the text in order to discover the intricate process of its formation, and to concentrate on the present form of the text as the sole object of their research. They express their admiration and appreciation of the work of former scholars, 'but we concentrate now on the text itself. By this we mean the traditional masoretic text, not a revised form of the text produced by modern scholars, which is more commonly used in contemporary translations" (p.3). "Like all critical scholars, we are naturally interested in the forms of prophetic speech and in the original oral declarations of the prophets. But these are not what we now have:... It is a legitimate exercise to attempt to recover the original speeches that were given out during the prophet's life time, and which supplied the material for the book, although we do not believe that much certainty can be achieved in such a venture, and we do not think that it would be the scholar's prime task. Attention remains rather on the book we now have" (pp.10-11).

AF's main concern in the Introduction is to defend the overall authenticity of this biblical text. They contend that 'the book itself (on something very close to it) comes from Amos himself, representing a comprehensive synthesis and testament prepared either by him or by an immediate disciple' (pp.11). 'Amos himself had a major hand in the selection and organization of his messages into something fairly close to the book we now have' (p.24). Of course they do not pretend to have here a transcript of Amos' oracles and stories about his experience recalled directly by him or through an amanuensis. They admit that the book is the outcome of "a significant editorial process". "An editor is at work putting the book together, certainly using materials taken directly from the prophet" (p.74). AF assume that the role of the editor was to make and maintain the centrality of Amos, man and prophet, words and deeds. The relationship between author and editor must have been close. Again it seems likely that the prophet and his editor were in close contact, and that the editorial work proceeded with the authorization and approval as well as the critical appraisal and connections, of the principal. To the extend that this is the way matters developed we can speak of the prophet as his own editor, one

who was heavily involved in that process (p.75). This means "that the transition from first oral presentation to ultimate or at least stable written form will have been done with the prophet's supervision and approval" (ibid). While admitting the presence of editorial activity within the text AF contend that "it would be a mistake to relegate automatically the revised or updated form in which the oracles now appear to the hand of a later editor - and to deem it of less value than the reconstructed original" (pp.75-76). Our two scholars accord little value to such reconstructed originals as they remain ultimately hypothetical and since the "revised form may be as much the work of the prophet as the original presentation. The editing or altering may well have been done with his approval and authorization if not with his direct participation" (p.76). The prophet could have well revised and rearranged his materials. "Thus the intermixture of elements deriving ostensibly from different occasions may not be the work of clumsy later editors or contributors, but rather the revisions and rearrangements of the prophet himself, making the book serve purposes other than those of the originally presented oracles" (p.76).

This constitutes the basic presumption of the commentary as a whole so that the greatest efforts in the Introduction are spent in refuting objections to authenticity raised on the basis of internal literary frictions, plurileveled doctrine, multiplicity of literary forms, and the presumed complex tetrial history of the Book. *Literary frictions*: "There is no reason...to believe that items that break up otherwise continuous series are later additions, of dubious authenticity as Amos traditions" (p.13). The three hymnic interludes (4,13; 5,8-9; 9,5-6) situated at strategic points within the global structure of the Book, offer a good case. AF do not lobby for Amos authorship of the hymnes, but insist that their inclusion within the final form of the Book could have been the work of the "prophet or compiler" (p.16). AF prefer to give the benefit of the doubt to the literary character of the book in question of authenticity. *Changes in mood*: AF are especially critical of scholars who found the true voice of this eighth century prophet in the messages of doom and not in ideas of survivors, remnant, return or recovery which must therefore be deemed secondary and unauthentic. AF instead aim in their commentary to relate the changes in mood, focus and emphasis to development in Amos' own career (p.7). While admitting that in the Book of Amos we have a literary rather than a chronological presentation of the prophet's life and ministry (pp.8-9), and that it will be unwise to force identifications of events in life of the historical Amos into a scheme that is too tight (p.7), they attempt to outline this career on the basis of the scant biographical information scattered throughout the book and the four changes in point of view they distinguish within this biblical text (i) passages celebrating God's faithfulness and exhorting the people to conversion; (ii) passages which tes-

tify to the failure of Amos' early ministry and which warn that punishment is now inevitable; (iii) passages which announce the coming doom (cosmic and military); (iv) passages which express hope that notwithstanding the severe judgement, Yahweh's people still have a future (pp.5-6; p.8) (cfr pp.83-88). More than anything else this option involves a methodological stance: "...the assumption that for Amos the future beyond the doom was empty and blank is not self-evident. But more is involved here than simply a critical decision about the authenticity of this passage or of any other. Each such case must be judged on its own merits, and such questions are open, but they should not be prejudged by assertions that Amos was only a prophet of doom" (p.7).

Style:AF's chapter on the use of poetry and prose in the Book of Amos (pp.144-149) is likewise geared to sustain the authenticity thesis or rather to undermine the inauthenticity hypothesis. Their essay takes in consideration modern prosodic and rhetorical studies, especially those of F.I. Andersen (1983). AF contend that the writing of units in prose, poetry or formulaic language does not justify the distinction between authentic and old editorial and later. "The division between prose and poetry does not mean that the poetry belongs to Amos and the prose to the editor" (p.147). They feel confident, though, to assign the headings (1,1; 3,1; 4,1; 5,1) to the editor and "whatever poetry or nonprose compositions there are" to the prophet. But formulaic structures (1,3-2,8; 4,6-11) and mixed genres could well belong to both. Amos was capable of composition all across the range, from pure prose to pure poetry (p.148). "The book as we have it is the product of editorial labour including selection, modification, expansion, adaptation and especially the incorporation of headings, closings, liturgical formulas, and the like...Drawing the line between what Amos said and did and may have written and what the editor may have contributed has proved to be a difficult and ultimately unrewarding task. In the end we must deal with the book of Amos, not Amos and his editor, but what the two or more of them together produced' (p.148). *Text*: AF declare their confidence that the Masoretic Text (MT) as handed down by tradition "has been preserved with a high degree of fidelity to its original, or at least early state" (p.4). And they state several times (pp.3.139-141 for instances) their reluctance to emend the text or to comment on an emended text. Their caution, they say, arises from concern for sound empirical method. "The textual evidence we have, in manuscript and versions, always has a better claim on our attention than readings that have been made in order to solve a problem" (p.3). Of course they are quite aware that the transmission process could not have left the text immaculate: "The MT enjoys prestige but not privilege" (p.4) and they do propose a small number of changes here and there (cfr commentary). But they refuse to count among secondary readings textx which prove to be difficult or obscure. "The fault could be with the author, who went

too far in being enigmatic or who did not realise than an idea, clear to him, would not come across in the language he selected" (p.140). Or the fault could be with out ignorance of the language. When difficulties of this kind present themselves AF "prefer to leave some problems unresolved rather than attempt to explain the unknown by the unknown" (pp.3-4).

AF's discussions of Amos' geopolitical terminology, which takes up quite a consistent slice of the Introduction (pp.98-139), is ultimately aimed is to bring grist to the authenticity mill. The authors attempt to prove that the prophet had not only the northern kingdom for the object of his oracles, preaching and ministry in general. In this subsection they develop a hypothesis which presumes that when the term *yiśrāel* is used alone it designates the northern kingdom only, but when the term is qualified by other words or expressions such as *bayit*, *bny*, *btwlt* or *'ammî*, the reference could be to the Israel of the Exodus, the twelve-tribe league, the United Kingdom rather than to the political entity of the month. "It can also refer to an ideal entity of the future or even the two kingdoms together conceived of or interpreted as a whole, the combined descendants of Jacob/Israel" (p.99). In this discussion other terms are included such as *yaaqob*, *yosep* and *yishaq*. AF proceed by examining text by text wherever any of the listed terms or expressions feature, and attempt to establish their semantic force (pp.99-126); then they offer an evaluation of the hypothesis (pp.126-139); according to their analysis most instances examined would support their hypothesis or at least provide no hindrance to it. Only Amos 6, 8 and 9, 7 would seem to create difficulties for the hypothesis and AF were able to offer a rationale for these two exceptions (for a synthesis cfr pp. 126-129).

According to the authors of this commentary the selection and arrangement of the names for Israel (AF divide the Book of Amos in four major units : I, chapters 1-4; II, chapters 5-6; III, chapters 7,1-9,6; IV, Chapter 9,11-15 - p.132 -) and its variants, including related terms, were deliberate, carefully and artistically disposed by the author and editor - for the distribution cfr. pp.132-135. The use of geopolitical terms in Amos prove that the northern kingdom was the primary though not exclusive target of the prophet's message. Judah as well was taken as addressee. "In the many instances that reference is made to the 'house of Israel' or 'the Israelites' both nations are included and both are intended as the object of criticism and condemnation" (p.137). This discovery precludes the excising of the oracle against Judah (Amos 2,4-5) and the few references to the southern kingdom (1,1; 7,12) as necessarily belonging to the book's post-history - cfr Mays, *Amos*, 40. AF consider the procedure which label similar abstracts from Amos as inauthentic as circular reasoning that "can only convince the converted and cannot be defended as serious scholarship" (p.137).

AF try to explain the lack of uniformity in focus and emphasis in

the Book of Amos by relating the changes in presentation to developments in the prophets career (p.7). They distinguish four perspectives within the biblical book, which they presume to be corresponding to four different moments in Amos' ministry: (i) There are passages celebrating God's faithfullness in the past, and appealing to the people to honour this past experience. Visions 1 and 2 (7,1-6) fit this stage (p.6; 1 refer the reader to pp.83-85 for a detailed analysis and explicitation of correspondences) (ii) Then there was a turning point brought about by repeated refusals on the part of the people to repent (cfr.4,6-11 for instance) as well as by the prophet's unfortunate encounter with Amaziah (7,10-17) during which Amos was presumably silenced forever. During this stage reflected in Visions 3 and 4 (7,7-9; 8,1-3) the prophet declares that the time of probation has ended, the time of judgement is about to begin. (iii) The period of judgement is echoed in the warnings of cosmic convulsions (earthquake) (Vision 5:9,1-4) and in warnings of utter defeat by military means (2,14-16). I refer the reader to pp.336-337 for an entire list of similar warnings. According to AF the oracles against the nations (1,3-2,8) belongs to this stage in Amos' career.

(iv) In this fourth moment AF fit those few verses towards the end of the Book, which sound a positive note, that announce that God's judgement is not after all the last word.

The logic of this reconstruction is that no part of this biblical book could be condemned to certain inauthenticity because it cannot fit Amos theological perspective. Former scholarship labelled Amos as prophet of doom so that whatever went beyond this perspective was judged to belong to a more recent redaction. AF refuse this procedure even though they are aware that the Book contains a literary presentation of the prophet's message rather than a chronological account of his life (p.68).

The present reviewer regards this volume as highly provocative, and one may allow himself be lured into the tricky labyrinth of endless debate over a great number of details. There is for instance AF's systematic refusal of emendations suggested by other scholars (on p.142 are listed "the ones non commonly doubted") to render the text more clear. On the wisdom of prefering an unclear text to an amended text that reads better on the presumption that its obscurity could be laid upon the original author's shoulders (p.140). The present reviewer would limit himself to a brief discussion of AF's basic presumption of the overall authenticity of the Book of Amos. The Introduction as well as the commentary seem geared to prove the reasonableness of this presumption. On the other hand AF obstructly exclude the alternative version of the redaction history of the book, which envisages a wider span of time for its formation process, and which presumes to explain the plurality of perspectives by plurality of authorships operating in different historical situations. The fact is that as long as our information upon the historical prophet draws exclusively upon this

book which tradition rightly or wrongly [pseudonymity was a strong reality in biblical tradition, cfr David C. Meade, *Pseudonymity and Canon*. An investigation into the relationship of Authorship and Authority in Jewish and Earliest Christian Tradition (W.B. Eerdmans; Grand Rapids, Michigan 1987), the protests of some conservative currents to the contrary - cfr for instance William J. Larkin Jr., *Culture and Biblical Hermeneutics*. Interpreting and Applying the Authoritative Word in a Relativistic Age (Baber Book House; Grand Rapids, Michigan 1988) 336 - notwithstanding] links to this prophet of the eight century BC, we shall never leave the realm of the hypothetical in our reconstruction of his thought, and of the redactional history of the script itself. So that with AF's reconstruction we have still to cross the threshold of historical certainty. Their attempt to ignore the post-history of this prophetical book, built with great fatigue by colleagues, [for this concept I would refer to L. Alonso Schökel/J.L. Sicre Diaz, *Profetas*. Commentario, 1 (Ediciones Cristianidad; Madrid 1980) 22-24] reminded the present reviewer of the opening sentence in R.N. Whybray's monograph *The Making of the Pentateuch*. A Methodological Study (JSOT Supplements 53; Sheffield 1987) : "It is easier to cast doubt on earlier theories than to offer a satisfactory alternative" (p.9).

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

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