


MELITA THEOLOGICA

The Review of the
Faculty of Theology
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Malta



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MELITA THEOLOGICA

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TO ENTER AND NOT TO ENTER

A Literary and Theological Study of Psalm 95

Alexander Vella, O. Carm.

Psalm 95 is certainly one of the widely used psalms in the Christian tradition. Since the time of St. Benedict¹ it is used as an invitatory psalm in the daily liturgy of the Latin rite. Traditional Christian exegesis, following the interpretation of the psalm in Heb 3,7-4,11, has interpreted it eschatologically. Because of their disobedience and obstinacy, the Jewish people were kept from entering the promised rest. Therefore, this same rest is now offered to the new people of God, the Church.²

Without denying the legitimacy of such an approach, here we would like to bring out the meaning of the psalm in itself and in its own context. The message of the psalm as envisaged by its author, as we shall see, is not bound to the Old Testament but applies also to us who celebrate it today in our liturgies.

Part One: Literary Analysis

All scholars agree that Psalm 95 is divided into two parts: vv.1-7a and vv.7b-11. In this section we shall first analyze these two stanzas separately to bring out the literary beauty and the structure of each. Then, putting together the results of our analysis, we shall consider the problem of the literary unity of the whole psalm.

Fr. Alexander Vella was born in Malta on April 21st, 1960. He joined the Carmelite Order in 1976 and did his philosophical and theological studies at INSERM (Malta) and the Gregorian University in Rome. He received his training in Biblical studies at the Pontifical Biblical Institute (Rome) from where he earned a licentiate in 1988. He is at present working on his doctoral dissertation at the same Institution under the directorship of Prof. Maurice Gilbert SJ. Until his recent return to Malta Fr. Vella taught Old Testament at the Pontifical Institute *Regina Mundi* (Rome). Among his publications: "Elijah's Wilderness Journey and the Desert Ideal" *Carmelus* 37/1 (1990) 4-37.

1 Cf. *Regula Monasteriorum*, IX.

2 Thus St. Augustine in his *Enarrationes in Psalmos*: "Iuravit ergo illis in ira sua, ne intrent in requiem ipsius; et tamen oportet aliquos intrare in requiem ipsius: non enim nulli dabitur requies ipsius; Illis ergo reprobat, non intrabimus" (PL 37, 1226).

1. Stanza I: vv.1-7a

The first stanza is composed of two parallel strophes³: vv.1-5 and vv.6-7a, each of which consists of two parts, a call to worship and its motivation.⁴

The first call to worship (vv.1-2) is made up of four hemistiches of the same rhythm (3). It opens with the imperative *lekû* (come) followed by four cohortatives depending on it. Of these, two are synonymous, *n^eran^enâ* (let us celebrate with shouting) and *nari^eâ* (let us shout for joy in honour of), and the second one is repeated in the fourth hemistich. We may note *en passant* that the structure of v.1 is parallel and that of v.2 chiastic.

Davies has pointed out that, in the Old Testament, calls to worship have a triple pattern: 1) an imperative; 2) the conjunction *kî*; and 3) an affirmation which is not simply a statement of fact, but "also a statement of faith.... an embryonic creed". The simplest form of this pattern can be found in psalms 106,1 and 107,11.⁵ We find this same triple pattern in psalm 95. The call to worship, in fact, is followed, in both strophes, by *l^ekvû* and an affirmation of faith which is the motive for which God is to be worshipped.

The motivation for the first summons to worship is found in vv.3-5. The conjunction *kî* introduces two synonymous hemistiches which affirm Israel's monotheistic belief. God is then specified as the creator in two artistically constructed stitches both of which are introduced by the relative *'ašer* (who). In v.4, through the use of a merism (*mehq^erê 'ares/the depths of the earth/ -tô'apôt harîm/the heights of the mountains/*), the whole of creation is described as pertaining to God, as being his. The structure is chiastic.

3 In distinguishing between stanza and strophe we follow Watson who defines a stanza as "a subunit within a poem" and a strophe as "a subunit within a stanza". Cf. W.G.E. WATSON, *Classical Hebrew Poetry. A Guide to its Techniques* (Journal for the Study of the Old Testament; Supplement Series 26; Sheffield 1984) 161.3.

4 Ravasi proposes a triple division of the two units: a call to worship (vv.1-2//v.6); a first motivation (v.3//v.7aa); and a second motivation (vv.4-5//v.7ab). [Cf. G.RAVASI, *Il libro dei Salmi. Commento e attualizzazione*, II (51-100) (Bologna 1983) 981]. Likewise, Girard writes that "Each stanza begins with a call to worship (1-2//6), continues (introduced by "for") with an overall motive for this worship (3//7a), and concludes with an explanation of this motive (4-5//7bcd)". [M. GIRARD, "The literary structure of Psalm 95", *TDig* 30 (1982) 57]. We do not agree with this division because whereas one may speak of a double motivation for worship in the first strophe (v.3: the LORD is the greatest of all gods and vv. 4-5: he is the creator of everything), this is not the case of v.7a where we have only one basic affirmation: the *berît* relationship between God and Israel.

Verse 5 complements v.4. First, it repeats *lô* and affirms that the sea also belongs to God, but then it makes a step forward to declare that not only does all creation belong to God, but also that he is the creator of everything. This is expressed through another merism (*hayām/the sea/ - yabešet/ the dry ground/*). The structure of the verse is perfectly parallel: *hāyam* (the sea) *w^hhû* (and he) *‘asahû* (made it) *yabeset* (the dry ground) *yādâw* (his hands) *yāsârû* (fashioned).

If we take vv.4 and 5 together we notice that whereas the merism of v.4 takes into account the vertical dimension of creation (depths of the earth - heights of the mountains), that of v.5 contemplates the horizontal dimension (sea - dry ground). Through this literary device the poet is stressing the totality of creation. And this totality belongs completely to God whose hands enclose the two dimensions of creation: this is the meaning of the inclusion between *b^eyadô* (in his hands v.4a) and *yādâw* (his hands v.5b).

The second strophe (vv.6-7a) is parallel to the first. The second call to worship is introduced by *bo’û* (enter) which is synonymous to *l^kkû* (come v.1); to the first call to worship (vv.1-2) correspond three synonymous cohortatives in v.6: *ništahaweh* (let us prostrate), *nikra’â* (let us bow down, *nibr^ekâ* (let us kneel). Watson suggests that the function of this triplet or set of three synonyms is to portray a progression or the various stages in a sequence of actions.⁶

Verse 6 describes God as *‘osenû* (the one who made us) resuming *‘āsahû* (he made us) from v.5a. After the first strophe we know that this God whom we are called to worship is the creator. But v.6 also introduces a new element: he is *our* creator, thus paving the way for v.7a which will speak of the relationship between God and his people.

The motivation for the second call to worship is given in v.7a. The structure of the verse is parallel and correlative: the two hemistiches refer to the two parties of the *berû* relationship, something which is stressed through the explicit use of the pronouns *hû’* (he) in the first hemistich and *‘anahnû* (we) in the second. The second part of the parallelism is bifurcated in two synonymous images: *‘am mar’ûtô* (the people of his pasture)/ *so’n yādô* (flock of his hand).

If we now consider the two strophes together we discover elements which enhance the literary unity of the whole stanza. There is, first of all, a kind of “boomerang” structure in the description of God. The psalmist begins by

5 G.H. DAVIES, “Psalm 95”, *ZAW* (1973) 188.

6 Cf. WATSON, *Classical Hebrew Poetry*, 174.

inviting his audience to worship the LORD who is *sûr yis'enû* (the rock of our salvation). He presents a God who is very well known to his audience (the use of the Name) and who is in some kind of relationship with them (the rock of *our* salvation): he is the God of salvation history, the God of Israel. Then he widens his view and contemplates this same God enthroned in his heavenly court, beyond creation and history. Whatever exists belongs to him. The movement backwards starts with the presentation of the transcendent God as the creator who made the sea and fashioned the dry ground with his own hands. Then, at the end, we are back to our starting point: this great God, the creator, is our God. But this time the poet goes into detail in presenting the relation of this transcendent God with Israel: he is the shepherd of his people. And through the accumulation of personal pronouns (*hû/he, 'anahnû/we/*) and pronominal suffixes (*'elohênû/our God/, mar'itô/his pasture/, yādô/his hand/*) he brings out the intimacy of this relationship.

We may consider the way God is presented in the first stanza in another way. In the reason for worship given in the first strophe he appears as the sovereign lord and creator of everything. In the motivation of the second call to worship he is presented as the God of Israel, the God of history. The parallel structure of the stanza implies a bipolarity here: the two aspects, God of nature and God of history, are complementary and only when they are taken together do we have a complete picture of who the LORD is.

Another instance of bipolarity is found in the different styles of worship proposed in the two parallel invitations to worship. The words used in the first call to worship (vv.1-2), invite the worshippers to raise their voices in jubilation and enhance their worship with the use of musical instruments. The atmosphere created is that of excitement and celebration. The second call to worship (v.6) proposes a strikingly different mode of worship. No musical instruments, not even human voices, but rather gestures - prostration, bowing and kneeling - that express submission, humility and reverence.

We may conclude with Massouh that

the first half of Ps 95 displays balance and symmetry. God is both the great king and the good shepherd. He is the transcendent creator and the immanent redeemer. He works in the vast world and among his people. He deserves to be worshipped in rejoicing and in reverence, with the jubilation and with submission. The two styles of and reasons for worship complement each other very well.⁷

2. Stanza II: vv.7b-11

The atmosphere of the second style of worship - reverent, humble and silent - prepares the stage for the diving oracle that follows in the vv.7b-11.

Girard has suggested that the literary structure of this second stanza is concentric. The centre would be v.9c: *gam ra'û po'olî* (even though they have seen my work) which resumes God's "making" of the world (v.5a) and of Israel as his people (v.6b-7a). Around this centre (D) three antitheses are grouped. In the first series (vv.7b-9b: ABC) God exhorts his people to be faithful to him today. In the second series (vv.10-11: C'B'A') he explains how he turned away from their ancestors because they had been unfaithful".⁸ Auffret retains v.9c as the centre, but he reduces the concentric structure to vv.8b-11 and considers vv.7b-8a as an introduction.⁹

We cannot deny that there are some corresponding elements in what Girard labels ABC//C'B'A', but I think they are not enough to speak of a concentric structure. It seems to me that the poet, who has given us two perfectly parallel strophes in stanza one, continues to play with parallelism and word pairs in the second stanza.

We have the first parallel structure in vv.7b-8a (up to *l'babkem*/your hearts/). Here, *'im b^e qolô tisma'û* (oh that you would give heed to his voice! v.7b) is parallel to *'al taqšû l'babkem* (do not harden your heart v.8a) whilst the structure between the two is chiasmic: *b^e qolô* (his voice)//*babkem* (your heart); *tisma'û* (give heed)//*'al taqšû* (do not harden). The meaning is the same even though it is coined in a positive expression in the first hemistich and in a negative expression in the second. It is a call to obedience in the form of a *double* admonition.

The behaviour that is expected of the people today (*hayôm* v.7b) is then contrasted to that of their fathers on a specific day (*k^eyom*) in the past. And the pairs continue. This day is referred to as the day of Massah and Meribah (v.8) and the behaviour of the fathers is described with two synonymous verbs, *nissûni* (they tempted me) and *b^e honûni* (they put me to the test).

In V.10 God passes judgement on the fathers who are referred to with the pair *dôr* (generation) and *'am* (people). The judgement itself is phrased in two

8 Cf. GIRARD, "The literary structure of Psalm 95", 57-58.

9 P. AUFFRET, "Essai sur la structure littéraire du Psaume 95", *Bibl. Notizen* 22 (1983) 59-63

synonymous expressions styled in a positive and negative form as in the double admonition (vv.7b-8a): *to'ê lebabhem* (their hearts go astray)//*lo' yad'û d' rākāy* (they do not know my ways). The two expressions are joined closely together with the unusual repetition of the pronoun (*hem w'hem*/they and they/).

It is interesting to note how the various images are connected and interwoven. In vv.7b-8a the people of the present generation are called to have a heart that is attentive to God's voice. In v.10 we are told that the fathers did not know the ways of God. These two images are interwoven in v.10a where God judges the fathers as a people whose heart goes astray.

There is also a sharp contrast between the wilderness (*midbār* v.8b) and the resting place (*m' nûhāti* v.11b), that is, the inhabited and fertile land of Canaan. While they were in the desert (which in the Old Testament is considered as a land without ways, without direction¹⁰), on their way to the land of the promised rest, the Israelites went astray (*to'ê*, v.10b) because they did not know the ways of God (v.10c). Therefore they could not enter the promised land of rest (v.11).

3. The Literary Unity of the whole Psalm

Until recently, scholars advocated a complex origin of Psalm 95. The first part (vv.1-7a) would be a hymn of praise and the second part (vv.7b-11) an oracle typical of prophetic and priestly literature (cf. Is 8,11-15; Jer 7,21; Ex 12,46; Lev 11, 4.8.11) later added to the original hymn¹¹. In fact this is the first impression that one has on reading the psalm.

If one analyzes the semantic fields of the two stanzas, one realizes that there is a great difference between them. The first stanza, for example, is full of liturgical terminology (*n' ran' nâ*/let us celebrate with shouting/, *nāri'â*/let us shout for joy in honour of/ (2x), *n' qadmâ pānâw*/go into his presence/, *tôdâ*/thanksgiving/, *zimrôt*/songs/, *ništahaweh*/let us prostrate/, *nikrâ'â*/let us bow/, *nibr' kâ*/let us kneel/). This vocabulary is not present in the second stanza which is dominated by two other semantic fields: that of broken relations (*Meribah* [rîb/to quarrel/] *Massah* [nāsah/to tempt/], *nissûni*/they tempted me/, *behonûni*/they put me to the test/, *'aqû*/I loathed/, *'apî*/my anger/) and that of obedience/disobedience (*b' qolô tišma'û*/give heed to his voice/, *'al taqsû l' bab-kem*/do not harden your heart/, *to'ê lebāb*/hearts that go astray/, *lo' yā'dû*

10 Cf. Ps. 107, 40; Job 6, 18; 12, 24; Deut 32, 10.

11 Cf. for example, H. GUNKEL *Die Psalmen* (HKAT) (Göttingen 1929) 417-420. S. MOWINCKEL, *The Psalms in Israel's Worship* (Oxford 1962) I, 32.76; II, 156-157.

ḏrākāy (they do not know my ways/). But when one reads the text carefully, one discovers many literary elements that show a deep structural and thematic unity.

A first link between the two stanzas is probably the fact that God is described as *sûr yiš'enû* (the rock of our salvation) in the first stanza (v.1) while the second stanza refers to the testing of God at Meribah - Massah (v.8). Here, according to Ex 17,1-7, the Israelites found fault with Moses and God because they had no water to drink and God ordered Moses to strike the *rock* at Horeb and water came out of it. The poet is probably alluding to this incident when he calls God *sûr yiš'enû*.

Mar'itô (his pasture) in v.7a and *m^enûhatî* (my rest) in v.11 are also related for they both refer to the promised land.¹² In Ps 23,2 the LORD-Shepherd leads the psalmist *'al mê menûhôt* (to refreshing/lit. of rest/ waters). But in our psalm the Israelites who are defined as the people of God's pasture and the sheep of his hand in v.7a are kept from entering the LORD's place of rest. The contrast between the two stanzas is evident.

Another case of contrast is found in the fact that whereas in the first stanza the Israelites are defined as the *people* whom the LORD-Shepherd leads (*'am mar'itô w^esôn yādô*, v.7a), in the second stanza God himself attests that they are a people who have lost their way (*'am to'ê lebāb hem w^ehem lo' yād'û ḏrākāy*, v.10). This people, in the first stanza, is called to worship God because of his works: the "making" of the universe (*'asahû* v.5) and the "making" of Israel as his people (*'osenû* v.6). In the second stanza, they are admonished not to follow their fathers who tested God even though they had seen his work (*po'olî* v.9).

But what really keeps the two stanzas together is the semantic field of movement. In the first stanza we have *l'kû* (come) in v.1, *n^eqadmâ* (let us enter) in v.2, and *bo'û* in v.6. All three are invitations to enter the temple and worship God. In the second stanza we are told that the Exodus generation was a people whose heart goes astray (v.10 *to'ê lebāb* from the verb *tā'â*, to wander, to go astray) because they did not know the way (v.10). This wandering in the desert is clearly opposed to the procession to the temple in the first stanza. And the final verse, which comes as a logical result of the people's behaviour described in v.10, is in very sharp contrast with the insistent invitation of the first stanza to *enter*. For at the very end of the psalm God swears: *'im y^ebo'ûn 'el m^enûhātî* (they shall not enter my rest v.11).

12 Cf. Is 49,8-9; Jer 26,36-38; and Ezek 34,14 for *mar ê*, and Deut 12,9; Num 10,33; 1 Kgs 8,56; and also Ex 33,14; Josh 1,15; 21,42; and 22,4 for *m nûhâ*.

There is in fact, a general inclusion between *l'kû* in v.1 and *'im y'bo'ûn* in v.11. It is an inclusion that unifies the whole psalm both structurally and thematically. The meaning of the psalm is to be sought in the ambivalence of "entering the temple" – "not entering God's place of rest".

The relation between the two stanzas, then, is one of contrast and it gives the following structure to the whole psalm¹³:

(Stanza one) *Come*

The people is invited to enter the temple to worship the LORD who made the universe and Israel.

(Stanza two) *Today*

The people are given a double admonition to have a listening heart not like their fathers, who

On that day

even though they had seen God's work, did not recognize his ways and kept erring in their heart (and in the desert) so that God kept them from entering his place of rest.

They shall not enter

Thus, vv.7b-8a seem to be at the centre of the psalm. What precedes is addressed to the people today (*hayôm*) and what follows is an example from the past (*k'yôm*) which the present generation should not follow if they want to enter God's rest as they are entering the temple. The gist of the psalm is the double admonition in these two hemistiches: "Hearken to his voice and do not harden your heart".

Part Two: Theological Analysis

The literary analysis of Psalm 95 has already given us a good insight into its meaning. The aim of this section then, is to deepen our understanding of it by analyzing the psalm line by line in the light of the parallel texts. The results of our literary analysis have to be kept constantly in mind.

13 The structure which we propose here is inspired by that of AUFFRET in his article "Essai sur la structure littéraire du Psaume 95", 64.

1. Stanza I: *The Call to Worship* (vv.1-7a)

The psalm opens with an enthusiastic and insistent invitation to worship (vv.1-2). The introductory *l'kû* sets in motion the procession towards the temple and gives a tonality of movement to the whole psalm. It is followed by a cluster of liturgical terms.

The first verb, *n^eran^enâ* means “to cry out for joy” and is a classical term for expressing the joy and exultation that bursts out in hymns and festive acclamations (cf. Is 12,6; 24,14; 49,13; 54, 1; Jer 31,7; Zeph 3,14; Ps 35,27; etc.). *Nârî'a* is used of a military or liturgical cry in honour of a victorious king (cf. Pss 47,2; 60,10; 65,14; 66,1; 81, 2; 98,4.6; 100,1; Josh 6,5; 10,20; Judg 7,21; 1 Sam 4,5; 2 Sam 6,5). In Ps 68,26 *qidmû* (enter) is used for the procession towards the temple and in Mic 6,6 the same verb is used twice for presenting oneself in the temple to worship God. This is the meaning of *n^eqadmâ pânâw* (let us enter into his presence) in v.2. The temple, in fact, is the place, where, through his participation in worship, the Israelite sees God's face (cf. Deut 12,5; 1 Sam 1,22; Pss 24,6; 27,8; 42,3; Is 38,11). *Tôdâ* is the technical term for sacrifices of thanksgiving or praise (cf. Lev 7,12-15; 22,29; Pss 50,14.23; 56,13; 107,22; 116,17; Am 4,5). But it can also refer to hymns of praise which is probably the meaning here since the context is vocal. Ravasi has suggested that taking into account the second stanza, *tôdâ* here might have a connotation of confession of sins: a hymn acknowledging God's faithfulness and the people's unfaithfulness, like the penitential hymns in Dan 3,26-45; Neh 9,6-37; and Bar 1,15-3,8¹⁴. *Zimrôt* is one of the traditional terms for songs or melodies in honour of God.

The LORD, the object of this exuberant worship, is described as *sûr yiš'enû*. We have already noted that we probably have an allusion to Ex 17,1-7 here. This divine epithet occurs many times in the psalms (18,2.31.46; 19,14; 27,5; 28,1; 31,2; 61,2; 62,3.7.8.; 71,2; 73,26; 78,35; 95,1; 92,15; 94,22; 144,1) and elsewhere (Deut 32,18; Is 26,4; 44,8; 51,1; Hab 1,12). It is an image that depicts the reliability and stability of God, on whom Israel can lean with a sense of security. Considering the texts where this epithet occurs, Davies has concluded that it contains a reference to Jerusalem, and in particular to the rock on which the sanctuary was built¹⁵. In Ps 61,3-4 *sûr* surely refers to the temple and God himself is called *migdâl* (tower) and *'oz* (stronghold).

The first set of motivations for worship follows in vv.3-5. Perhaps one may speak of a certain “chronological” order in these motivations for God is

14 Cf. RAVASI, *Il Libro dei Salmi II*, 985-6

15 Cf. DAVIES, “Psalm 95”, 180-90.

contemplated first in himself (v.3), then as creator of the universe (vv.4-5), and finally as the creator and shepherd of Israel (v.7a). We have already noted that these motivations are confessions of faith¹⁶. In fact, the three motivations are the three basic axioms of the Old Testament creed: God is one; he is the creator; he is our saviour.

In v.3 the psalmist employs the image of the heavenly court to proclaim the monotheistic faith of Israel. The LORD is pictured as an emperor (*'el gādol//melek gādol*)¹⁷ surrounded by minor deities whom he has subjected. This image is quite common in the Old Testament (cf. Ex 15,11; Pss 29,1; 47,3; 77,14; 96,4; 97,9; 136,2) and we do not think that it necessarily presupposes a polytheistic background¹⁸. It could simply be a poetic way of affirming monotheism. Mythical and polytheistic imagery are not missing in biblical poetry. God, then, is to be worshipped first of all for what he is in himself: the one and only God.

The domain of this "great king" knows no limit. It includes the whole universe as the two merisms of vv.4-5 indicate. The only God does not share his sovereignty. The peaks of the mountains, considered to be the dwelling of the gods, belong to him. So also the underworld (probable meaning of "the depths of the earth"), which was considered to be the realm of Death. The same idea is beautifully expressed in Ps 139,7-10 and Amos 9,2-3.

This sovereignty of God is particularly evident in his act of creation. The sea, the classical opponent of the creator in many creation narratives, cannot be more passive here. It is simply God's work and belongs to him (v.5a). The image of God fashioning (*yāsar*) his creatures is dear to the biblical tradition (cf. Gen 2,7; Is 29,16; 45,9.11.18; 64,7; Jer 18,6; Pss 33,15; 119,73; Job 10,8-9; Sir 33,13; Wis 7,1; 2 Macc 7,23). Usually it is applied to the creation of the human person and its consequent dependence on him. In v.5 this same image is extended to the whole platform of the earth (*yabešet*). The distant emperor of the heavenly court (v.3) has suddenly become a cosmic potter!

It is interesting to note how rich and varied the images that the psalmist uses for God are. He is depicted as the rock of salvation (v.1), the heavenly emperor (v.3), the sovereign lord of all (v.4), the cosmic potter (v.5), the shepherd of Israel (v.7a), the saviour (cf. v.9: *po'olī/my work*), the judge

16 Cf. our presentation of Davies' exposition on Old Testament calls to worship on p.2

17 Cf. 2Kgs 18, 19. 28// Isa 36.4.13 where *Melek gadol* means not simply the "king", but the "emperor", that is to whom other kings are subjected.

18 For a different view cf. A.A. ANDERSON, *The Book of Psalms II: Psalms 73-150* (Michigan and London 1972)678

(vv.10-11). He is at the same time distant and near, worthy of jubilant celebration and of reverent worship, of love and of fear.

The second call to worship opens with the technical verb for entrance into the temple: *bo'û* (enter; cf. Pss 96,8; 100,4; 132,7; and also 5,8;24,7.9; 118,19), which is followed by three synonymous verbs of worship. The use of a set of three verbs of worship is found also in Ugaritic texts¹⁹. Although synonymous, each of the three verbs has a nuance of its own.

Ništāhaweh refers to the act of prostration or profound bow before a person of a higher status to express utmost reverence (cf. Gen 33,7; 1 Sam 25,23.41; 2 Sam 14,4.33; 24,20; 1 Kgs 1,16.23; 2 Kgs 2,15; etc.). When the word is used for worship before God (cf. Deut 32,6.15.18; Is 44,2; 51,13; 54,5; Pss 66,4; 99,5.9; 100,4; 132,7; etc.) it indicates the religious attitude of the worshipper and can be simply translated as "to adore"²⁰. *Nikrā'û* is explained by Ravasi as "una prostrazione più profonda, gettandosi quasi a terra"²¹. And *nibr^ekâ* refers to the act of kneeling down, a rather uncommon practice in the Old Testament²². All three postures fit very well the description of God as heavenly emperor, sovereign lord and creator. They are like a response to the presentation of God just made in the first strophe. But now, in the second strophe, God is presented in another way. We pass from creation theology to election theology with '*osenû* (our maker) serving as a link.

One is inclined to take '*osenû* as a reference to the creation of humanity about which nothing is said in the first strophe. But considering the affirmations that follow it as a motivation for the second call to worship, I agree with Anderson²³ that the stress here is upon the making of Israel into God's people. In many other Old Testament texts the formation of the people of Israel is considered as God's "making", as his creation (cf. Deut 32,15; Is 43,15; 44,2; 51,13; Hos 8,14; Pss 100,3; 149,2). In the narrative of the crossing of the Sea of Reeds (Ex 14,21-22 we find the same creation vocabulary of Gen 1 - a hint that the author conceives this event as the "creation" of Israel²⁴. Perhaps we might

19 Cf. *UT* 76: II: 17-18; 51: VIII: 26-29.

20 Cf. H.P. STÄHLI, "MIM *hw* hist. PROSTRARSI", *Dizionario Teologico dell'Antico Testamento* (ed E. Jenni and C. Westermann; Ital. ed. G.L. Prato) Vol. I (Torino 1978) 461.

21 RAVASI, *Il Libro dei Salmi II*, 987.

22 The only instances in the Old Testament where someone kneels to pray are 1 Kgs 8,54; 18,42; Ezra 9,4; and Dan 6,11.

23 ANDERSON, *The Book of Psalms II*, 697

24 Cf. J.L. SKA, *Le Passage de la Mer*. Etudes de la construction, du style et de la symbolique d'Ex 14,1-31 (Rome 1986) 93-96.

say that some "schools" in the biblical tradition considered Israel's formation as God's people as the completion and climax of creation. In this way, there is no dichotomy between creation and election, between the God of nature and the God of history.

The motivation for the second call to worship (v.7a) is the special relationship that exists between the LORD and Israel as a result of his "making" Israel. This relationship is expressed in a phrase which echoes the classical "covenant formula" or "formula belonging": *hû' 'elohênû w'ananû 'am marîto* (He is our God and we are the people of his pasture: cf. Ex 6,7; Lev 26,12; Deut 26,17-19; 29,12; 2 Sam 7,24; Jer 7,23; 11,4; 24,7; 30,22; 31,1; 32,38; 37,23.27; Ezek 11,20; 14,11; Zech 8,8). The origin of this formula and its relation to the Sinai *berît* has been the subject of long studies and discussions among scholars.²⁵ What seems important to us in our context is that the formula marks the exclusive relationship that exists between the LORD and Israel as a result of the *berît* and that there is a connection between this relationship established by the LORD and Israel's observance of the law.²⁶ Then, the admonition that follows in vv.7b-8 is not an abrupt change of mood but the natural consequence of the main assertion in the motive for the second call to worship.

The "covenant formula" is here developed and enriched with pastoral imagery. The LORD himself is not identified as the shepherd of Israel but this is implied by its counterpart: the Israelites are *'am mar'itô w'so'n yadô* (the people of his pasture and the flock of his hand). In fact, only four times in the whole Old Testament is the title "shepherd" applied to God (Gen 48,15; 49,24; Pss 23,1; 80,2), but the theme is common. The relationship between the LORD-Shepherd and Israel-flock is very similar to that set up by means of the Sinai *berît* and expressed in the "covenant formula".

Today most scholars agree that the Sinai *berît* was a type of vassal treaty by which the LORD imposed his law on the Israelites assuring them of his protection. As the book of Deuteronomy insists, the people have to obey, to give heed to the voice of their God, and he, in turn, will guard them against any harm and make them prosper (cf. for example Deut 11, 13-15.22-25; 28,1-14). Likewise, the relationship shepherd-flock evokes the idea of guidance and concern on one side and docility on the other. From the time of the exodus from Egypt, when "he made his own people to go out like sheep, and guided them in the wilderness like a flock, and led them on safely so that they feared not" (Ps

25 Cf. R. SMEND, "Die Bundesformel", *ThSt* 68 (Zürich 1963); N. LOHFINK, "Dt 26,17-19 und die 'Bundesformel'", *ZkTh* 91 (1969) 517-553.

26 Cf. for example Deut 26,17-19.

78,52-53), God showed continual solicitude for Israel, “as the shepherd who feeds his flocks, gathers the lambs in his arms, puts them on his breast, and leads to repose those that are with young” (Is 40,11). And Israel could feel secure even amidst dangers because “thy rod and thy staff comfort me” (Ps 23,4). However, her response was not always that of a docile flock: “for Israel is stubborn like a stubborn heifer; now shall the LORD feed them as a lamb in a broad pasture?” (Hos 4,16). This theme leads us on to the second stanza of our psalm.

2. Stanza II: The Oracle (vv.7b-11)

The divine oracle is predated by an introduction typical of the prophetic style (cf. Is 1,2; Jer 2,4; Hos 5,1; Amos 3,1; 4,1; 5,1). The opening *hayôm* changes the mood of the psalm from one of worship into one of reflection. It is useless to try to imagine a particular day to which the psalmist would be referring here, as some scholars have done. In the style of the book of Deuteronomy (cf. Deut 4,4.10.40; 5,3; 6,6; 7,11; 10,13; etc.), the poet is referring to any day on which the psalm might be celebrated, the everlasting “today” typical of Jewish and Christian liturgy which renders actual God’s salvific acts of the past and postulates a response to them here and now²⁷

This response is what the psalmist solicits from his audience with his exhortation: *’im b^e qolô tišama’û* (oh that you would give heed to his voice! v.7b). For the expression is not simply an invitation to hear the forthcoming oracle, but a call to obedience. To listen to God is to do what he commands (cf. Judg 2,2; 1 Kgs 20,35; Jer 7,23.28; Hos 9,17; Zeph 3,2; Hag 1,12; Zech 1,4).

The oracle itself opens with an admonition that is likewise an invitation to obedience: *’al taqsû l’bābkem* (v.8a). Usually in the Hebrew Scriptures, it is the neck (*’orep*) that is said to be made stiff or hardened (cf. Ex 32,9; 33,3.5; 34,9; Deut 9,7.13; 10,16; 31,27; 2 Kgs 17,14; Jer 7,26; 17,23; 19,15; etc.). The image is taken from the ox which was used as a beast of burden and which was believed to hold its energy in its neck. When the ox stiffens its neck it is impossible to make it move. Hence, whoever is rebellious to the yoke of obedience is said to be stiffnecked (cf. Jer 5,5; Hos 4,16).²⁸ In Ex 7,3, Prov 28,14, Ezek 3,7 and our

27 The same opinion has been expressed by DAVIES, “Psalm 95”, 193; L. JACQUET, *Les Psaumes et le coeur de l’Homme II*, 793; E. BEAUCAMP, *Le Psautier II*, Ps 73-150 (Paris 1979) 119; G. RAVASI, *Il Libro dei Salmi II*, 990.

28 Cf. A.S. VAN DER WOUDE, “*qsh* ESSERE DURO”, *Dizionario Teologico dell’Antico Testamento II*, 622.

text, it is the heart that is hardened. In the first of these passages it is God who hardens the heart of man, but in the other three texts it is man himself who hardens his own heart and the meaning is the same as that of hardening the neck, that is, disobedience. With much the same meaning, Jeremiah speaks of the stubbornness of the heart (*s^erirût leb*; cf. Jer 3,17; 7,24; 9,13; 11,8; etc.), Zechariah of hearts rendered as adamant stone (*libban sāmû āamûr*) “lest they should hear the Torah” (Zech 7,12) and Ezekiel of a stiff heart (*hizgê leb*, Ezek 2,4) and a heart of stone (*leb ha ’eben*, Ezek 36,26). Only when God removes this heart of stone from the flesh of Israelites and gives them a new heart, a heart of flesh, will they learn to be obedient (cf. Ezek 36,26-27).

The worshippers celebrating our psalm are admonished not to harden their heart as their fathers of the exodus generation had done. In Exodus and Deuteronomy this generation is constantly rebuked for being stiffnecked (cf. Ex 32,9; 33,3,5; 34,9; Deut 9,6,13; 10,16; 31,27). From all the incidents in which they had proved themselves disobedient and rebellious, the psalmist chooses only one, that of Massah-Meribah, which, in fact, seems to have become emblematic of the stubbornness of the exodus generation (cf. Deut 6,16; 33,8; Ps 81,8).

At Massah-Meribah (cf. Ex 17,1-7²⁹) the Israelites contended (*yareb* v.2) with Moses because there was no water for them to drink. The text makes it clear that the contention was in fact directed against God (cf. vv.2,7). On the theological level, the verb *rîb* (to contend, to dispute) is usually used with God as its subject. God contends with the enemies of his people (cf. Is 49,25; Jer 25,31; 50,34; Ps 74,22; etc.) or of the pray-er (cf. Pss 31,21; 35,1,23; 43,1; 119,154; etc.) or with his own people (cf. Is 3,13; 27,8; 57,16; Jer 2,9; Hos 4,1; 12,3; Mic 6,2; cf. also Ps 50). But in Ex 17 God is the object of the contention as if he had committed some injustice against his people! They are dissatisfied with him and his ways. Psalm 95 does not use the verb *rîb* directly, but there is a hint to the contention in the name Meribah which comes from the same root. But it does use the other verb, *nās’â*, which forms a pair with *rîb* in Ex 17.

Nās’â means “to examine”, “to put to the test”, “to tempt” in order to see whether someone is capable of a certain achievement. God puts men to the test, he tempts them, so that he may know their mind (cf. Gen 22,1; Deut 8,2,16; 13,4; 33,8; Judg 2,22; 3,1,4; Ps 26,2; 2 Chron 32,31). But also men can tempt God (cf. Ex 17,2,7; Num 14,22; Deut 6,16; Is 7,12; Pss 78,18,41,56; 95,9; 106,14). The

29 It seems that originally there existed two different and separate traditions, one concerning Massah and the other Meribah. The Massah incident had to do with putting to the test God's presence among his people and it is mentioned alone in Deut 6,16. The Meribah incident was a rebellion against God because of lack of water and it is found alone in Num 20,1-13

connotation seems to be that of expecting God to solve a problem by performing a miracle. In Ex 17 the meaning of such a test is explicitly stated in v.7: the Israelites tempted God saying, Is the LORD among us or not? The miracle of providing water for them in the desert was to be the proof of God's saving presence among them.

In parallelism with *nās'â*, we find in Ps 95,9 the verb *bāhan* which does not occur in Ex 17. *Bāhan* means "to scrutinize", "to probe", "to examine", in order "to determine the degree of value and strength inherent in another"³⁰ It is God's right, as creator and lawgiver, to scrutinize men, or their words (cf. Gen 42,16; Job 12,11; 34,3), or their heart (cf. Gen 12,3; Ps 17,3; 1 Chron 29,17), or their reins and heart (cf. Jer 11,20; 20,12; Ps 7,10). However three times in the Old Testament we find men scrutinizing or testing God (Mal 3,10.15 and our psalm). The use of *b^ehonûnî* in the context of the incident at Massah-Meribah implies that by asking for a miracle, the Israelites were doubting God's capability of providing for their needs and ultimately of leading them into the land which he had promised to them. They doubted the strength and stability of the "Rock of their salvation" (v.1).

And all this happened in the very wilderness (v.8) where they were continually experiencing God's saving power, where they were seeing his work (v.9). The word *po'al* (work) occurs fourteen times in the Hebrew scriptures in reference to God's action.³¹ Most of these occurrences to God's action in history, past, present, or future (cf. Is 5,12; Hab 1,5; 3,2; Pss 44,2; 77,13; 90,16). In Ps 95,9 *po'alî* refers to God's saving action in the exodus from Egypt and all through their wandering in the wilderness. All through this long period the Israelites saw without understanding (cf. Is 6,9-10), and being never really convinced of the undertaking (cf. Ex 14,11-12; Num 11,4-6; 14,2-4; 16,13-14; 20,4-5; 21,5), they never ceased requiring new proofs from God that he was really able to lead them to the promised land.

In our psalm God judges this generation of Israelites as a people with a wandering heart who do not know his ways (v.10). The verb *ta'â* means "to wander", "to roam", (cf. Gen 20,13; 21,14; 37,15; Ex 23,4; Ps 107,4). But it is also used in a figurative sense. In Ps 119,176, the psalmist asks God to seek him out because "I have gone astray (*ta'îfî*) like a lost sheep". Like a sheep that goes

and Ps 81.7. The two traditions were joined together in Ex 17.1-7 and are found together also in Deut 33.8 and in our text. Cf. DAVIES, "Psalm 95", 193-4.

30 S.R. HIRSCH, *The Psalms II*, 176.

31 In reference to God's action, *po al* occurs only in the singular and therefore there is no reason to change it into the plural to follow the LXX reading *ta erga*.

astray from the way in which the shepherd is leading it, the sinner goes astray from the way of God's commandments (cf. also Is 53,6). In a figurative sense, then, *ta'â*, takes on the meaning of sin and of its consequences³².

In our psalm it is the heart that goes astray (*to'ê lebāb*). *Leb* has a wide range of meaning in the biblical language. As the seat of decision-making and responsibility (cf. for example Gen 20,5; a Sam 24,6) it can be translated as "conscience". Those who have a pure conscience, who act in accordance with God's law, are referred to as *yisrê leb*, "upright of heart" (cf. Pss 7,11; 11,2; 32,11; 36,11; 64,11; etc.). To the contrary, those who act independently of God's law, who do not walk in his ways, are said to be *to'ê lebāb*.

The image is completed by saying that they do not know God's ways (*w^hem lo' yad'û d' rākāy*). God's ways are his plans for men and more specifically his commandments (cf. Deut 5,30; 8,6; 10,12; 11,22,28; Josh 22,5; 1 Kgs 2,3; 3,14; 8,58; Is 2,3; 42,24; 58,2; 63,17; Zech 3,7; Pss 25,4,9; 27,11; 37,34; 51,15; etc.). Man is to walk in God's way (cf. for example Ex 32,8), that is, he is to direct his conduct in obedience to God, to live in accordance with God's commandments which show man the way (cf. for example Deut 5,33). To abandon God's way or ways is to wander away from God's commandments (cf. for example Num 22,32; Deut 11,28)³³. The exodus generation did not know God's ways. Among the various shades of meaning of the verb *yad'a* (to know) there is that "recognizing" in the sense of understanding or comprehending. It is one of the main functions of the heart to recognize or understand (cf. Deut 8,5; 29,3; Josh 23,14; 1 Kgs 2,44; Isa 32,4; Jer 24,7; etc.). But when the heart is one that goes astray, it cannot accomplish its function. In plain language, stubbornness renders a person incapable of "knowing", that is, of understanding (cf. Deut 29,4; Is 29,9-12; 42,18-25; 48,8; Jer 5,3-5; 10,14; etc.).

Thus, both expressions ("they are a people whose heart goes astray" and "they do not know my ways") refer to disobedience to God's law just as the two admonitions of vv.7b-8a ("Oh that you would hearken to his voice!" and "Do not harden your hearts") are calls to obedience. What characterized the exodus generation - disobedience - is what the present generation should not imitate.

In fact, in biblical tradition, the exodus generation became the symbol of Israel who, though loved by God, is always rebellious (cf. Deut 1,2; 2,7; 8,2; 29,4;

32 Cf. J.F.A. SAWYER, "r^h VAGARE", *Dizionario Teologico dell'Antico Testamento II*, 953-4..

33 Cf. G. SAUER "derek VIA, *Dizionario Teologico dell'Antico Testamento I*, 397-8

Num 14,33; Am 2,10). The LORD was disgusted with this generation (*'aqût b^edôr*, v.10a) and, since they did not recognize his ways and their hearts went astray, he made them wander in the wilderness for forty years (v.10a; cf. Num 14,33,34; Deut 2,7; Josh 5,6; Am 2,10). The generation who had witnessed his work but continued to doubt that he was really able to lead them to the promised land and even despised the project itself, attempting once and again to return to Egypt, was not worthy to enter the promised rest (v.11).

The very last word of the psalm, *m^enûhatî*, is pregnant with meaning. Literally, the word means “a place of rest”, or even “tranquillity”, “calm”. In many Old Testament passages it refers to the promised land and all the goods connected with it (Num 10,33; Deut 12,9; 1 Kgs 8,56; cf. also Ex 33,14; Deut 3,20; Josh 1,15; 21,24; 22,4). In others it refers to Jerusalem and more specifically, to the temple (cf. Is 66,1-2; Ps 131,8.13-14; 1 Chron 28,2). In the first case, the rest is provided by God for his people: he gives Israel the land which he had promised and which belongs to him. In the second case, it is the people who provides a resting-place for God. However, the two aspects are closely connected.

In Deut 12,9-11 the land which the LORD is giving to his people as inheritance is called (*ham^enûhâ*/the resting-place/). There the LORD will give Israel rest (*henîah*) from all her enemies that she may dwell in safety. An important part of this idyllic image of rest and safety shall be “the place which the LORD your God shall choose to cause his name to dwell there”. Later, when Israel was dwelling safely in the resting place promised to her, David had in mind “to build a house of rest (*bêt m^enûha*) for the ark of the covenant of the LORD”, but God did not permit it. It was Solomon who built this house for the LORD in Jerusalem and during the rite of its consecration, he stood up and said: “Blessed is the LORD who has given rest (*'ašer nātan m^enûhâ*) to his people Israel, according to all that he promised: there has not failed one word of all his good promise, which he promised through his servant Moses” (1 Kgs 8,56). This passage seems to say that only with the building of a house of rest for the LORD, when the glory of the LORD dwelt amidst his people, was the promise of giving Israel *m^enûhâ* completely fulfilled. Thus, the temple seems to be both the LORD’s resting-place and the resting-place of Israel perhaps as the symbol and the culmination of all the goods included in the gift of the promised land.

The fact that *m^enûhâ* refers to both the promised land and to the temple is very significant for the understanding of psalm 95. Verse 11 refers God’s reaction to the disobedience of the exodus generation: he swore that they will not obtain what he had promised them, the land where they were to enjoy rest

and security. But the verse forms part of the example from the past (vv.8-11) given to the present generation that they might act in a different way from their fathers. This being the case, v.11 is not simply a report of God's punishment to the exodus generation, but it is also intended as a threat to the present generation who is worshipping in the temple, God's resting-place and their own resting-place. If they harden their hearts as their fathers had done, if they are not obedient and do not conform their lives to God's law, then it is useless to go to the temple because God will not let them enjoy the rest of which the temple is the culmination and symbol and he will not let them experience his presence in his resting-place.

Thus, the theme of entering (*l'klû*, v.1; *bo'û*, v.6) and not entering (*'im y^ebo'ûn*, v.11) God's *m^enûhâ* which is both the temple (stanza one) and the promised land (stanza two) is the main issue of the psalm. The condition for entering both is obedience (vv.7b-8a) placed at the centre of the psalm to unite the two generations, the two aspects of *m^enûhâ* and the two stanzas.

Conclusion

Ps 95 is an entrance liturgy. The oracle, that is the second stanza, has the function of preparing the people to have the right disposition for worship, and corresponds to the series of requirements for access to the temple which we find in other entrance liturgies (cf. Pss 15;24).

The psalm, then, is a warning to the people who are entering the temple. If they are disobedient as their forefathers were, it is useless to enter the temple physically because they will experience neither the *m^enûhâ* of which the temple is the symbol and culmination nor God's presence in his place of his rest.

The message of the psalm basically is that the nature of true worship is not ritualism but obedience, a message that was sounded again and again by prophets (cf. for example 1 Sam 15,22; Jer 7,2-26; Hos 6,6; Amos 5,21-24).

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WAS UR-MARKUS THE SOURCE FOR LK 19:45 - 20:47?

James M. Dawsey

There is a growing consensus that the literary relationship of Luke to the other gospels is more complicated than previously thought. This was clearly evidenced by the Trinity College Colloquy of 1977 which first brought into focus the discontent that exists with the so-called two document, and Griesbach hypotheses.¹ Now, a decade later, there is widespread unease among New Testament scholars with the accepted theories explaining the literary relationship of Matthew, Mark, and Luke.²

One possibility that was once generally rejected, but which might in fact be worth resurrecting is the idea that Luke used as a source an earlier form of Mark

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- 1 William O. Walker, Jr., (ed.) *The Relationships Among the Gospels* (San Antonio 1978). Some of the more significant studies leading up to the Trinity College Colloquy were: George Wesley Buchanan, "Has the Griesbach Hypothesis Been Falsified?" *JBL* (1974); B.A. Butler, *The Originality of St. Matthew* (1951); "St. Luke's Debt to Matthew," *HTR* (1939); David Dungan, "Mark--The Abridgement of Matthew and Luke," *Jesus and Man's Hope*, I (1970); William R. Farmer, "The Lachmann Fallacy," *NTS* (1967/8); "Modern Developments of Griesbach's Hypothesis," *NTS* (1977); *The Synoptic Problem* (1964, reprint 1976); Austin Farrar, "On Dispensing with 'Q'," *Studies in the Gospels*, ed. D.E. Nineham (1957); Robert L. Lindsay, "A Modified Two-Document Theory of Synoptic Dependence and Interdependence," *NovT* (1963); *A New Approach to the Synoptic Gospels* (1971); Thomas R.W. Longstaff, *Evidence of Conflation in Mark?* (1977); Frans Neirynck, (ed.), *The Minor Agreements of Matthew and Luke Against Mark* (1974); Pierson Parker, *The Gospel Before Mark* (1953); R.T. Simpson, "The Major Agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark," *NTS* (1966); W. Philip West, "A Primitive Version of Luke in the Composition of Matthew," *NTS* (1967/8).
- 2 See the collection edited by William R. Farmer concluding the work of the Cambridge Conference and anticipating the Jerusalem Conference *New Synoptic Studies* (Macon; Georgia 1983). In my estimation, one of the most important books on the Synoptic problem to have appeared in recent years is Hans-Herbert Stoldt's *History and Criticism of the Marcan Hypothesis*, trans. and ed. Donald L. Biewyk (Macon; Georgia 1980), originally published as *Geschichte und Kritik der Markushypothese* (Göttingen 1977). See also Arthur J. Bellinzoni, Jr., (ed.), *The Two-Source Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal* (Macon; Georgia 1985). This work provides an extensive bibliography.

which was slightly different from canonical Mark. In his very fine article on "The Case for the Priority of Mark," Joseph Fitzmyer indicated "some recent studies that have been supporting one or other aspect of (Ur-Markus)".³ It will be my purpose in the following essay to add to these one section of Luke (Lk 19,45 - 20,47) that seems to be pre-Markan. I hope to show that the parallel section in Mark (Mk 11,11 - 12,40) is a later redaction of an earlier version of the gospel that is better preserved by Luke. To do this, I plan to draw on the six principles of criticism set forth by Ernest De Witt Burton.⁴ These have been generally accepted by synoptic scholars,⁵ and seem to me to be particularly valid when applied to questions of plot and characterization--that is to the story elements of narratives. These principles affirm that when two documents are compared, evidences of a secondary character are: "(1) manifest misunderstanding of what stands in one document on the part of the writer of the other; (2) insertion by one writer of material not in the other, and clearly interrupting the course of thought or symmetry of plan in the other; (3) clear omission from one document of matter which was in the other, the omission of which destroys the connection; (4) insertion of matter the motive for which can be clearly seen in the light of the author's general aim, while no motive can be discovered for its omission by the author if he had had it in his source; (5) vice versa omission of matter traceable to the motive natural to the writer when the insertion (of the same matter in the other Gospel) could not thus be accounted for; (6) alterations of other kinds which conform the matter to the general method or tendency of the author."

The Markan Story

A generation or two ago, scholars generally held that the Markan narrative was confused and thus did not represent a unified piece of writing.⁶ Today, however, a new community of Markan literary critics has helped us modify this stark perception of the second gospel by successfully identifying a coherent

3 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, "The Priority of Mark," from the "Priority of Mark and the 'Q' Source in Luke," *Jesus and Man's Hope*, I (Pittsburg Theological Seminary; Pittsburg 1970) 134-47, 164-66; reprinted in Bellinzoni, *The Two-Source Hypothesis*, 37-52. Fitzmyer did not indicate, however, as I do that Ur-Markus stands behind Lk 19:45 - 20:47.

4 Ernest De Witt Burton, *Some Principles of Literary Criticism and Their Applications to the Synoptic Problem* (Chicago 1904). The quotation of these principles is taken from Farmer, *The Synoptic Problem*, 229.

5 See Farmer, *The Synoptic Problem* 229; Joseph B. Tyson, "The Two-Source Hypothesis," 450-51.

6 In fact, Form Criticism was in part based on the view that the Markan account does not represent a unified narrative. See Rudolf Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition*, trans. John Marsh (New York 1963); Martin Dibelius, *From Tradition to Gospel*, trans. Bertram Lee Woolf (New York 1965) 280, n. 1; Willi Marxsen, *Mark the Evangelist*, trans. James Boyce et al. (New York 1969) 73, n. 71; Mgr. de Solages, *La composition des evangiles*

narrative, built systematically by an author whose style included specific types of openings and conclusions, repetitions, and parenthetical remarks.⁷ Werner Kelber, for example, in his popular study entitled *Mark's Story of Jesus*, shows how the section of the gospel with which we are concerned, Mk 11,11-12,40, plays an important part in the gospel story as a whole.⁸ After an early ministry in Galilee and a journey "on the way," Jesus arrives at the temple in Jerusalem.

The gospel's author showed some artistry in this section, as he worked with his materials to portray "Jesus' strained relationship with the temple and the temple mount".⁹ Kelber reminds us that the author purposefully presented Jesus making three visits to the temple. During the first one "he merely looks at everything in the temple, then leaves at nightfall."¹⁰ During the second visit, Jesus shuts down "the business and religious functions of the temple."¹¹ This visit is framed by the story of "The Cursing of the Fig Tree" (Mk 11,12-14; 11,20-25) which the author used to interpret Jesus' activity (Mk 11,15-19). The literary device of breaking up one story with another occurs elsewhere in Mark and was used here to show that "as the tree has withered 'from the roots up,' so is the temple adjudged by Jesus to be beyond hope."¹² In his third visit to the temple Jesus "holds up his own authority over against that of the temple and its authorities";¹³ he sets "himself up as the cornerstone of the new temple, the Kingdom of God" which is antithetical to the old temple;¹⁴ and continues his "critique of the temple which has failed to serve the needs of all the people."¹⁵

According to Kelber, the purpose of Jesus' three visits is to dissociate the kingdom of God from the temple. That perhaps is why Jesus is portrayed as

(Leiden 1973) 35-36. 41. Perhaps the most common view regarding this section of Mark (Mk 11,11-12,40), however, is that the author appropriated a collection of controversy stories that had already been assembled and used them for his own purpose. See Eduard Schweizer, *The Good News According to Mark*, trans. Donald H. Madvig (Richmond; Virginia 1970) 243.

7 For recent surveys of Markan interpretation see Sean P. Kealy, *Mark's Gospel: A History of its Interpretation* (New York 1982), and William Telford (ed.) *The Interpretation of Mark* (Philadelphia 1985). Vernon K. Robbins' *Jesus the Teacher: A Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation of Mark* (Philadelphia 1984) is especially helpful in identifying patterns in the Gospel.

8 Werner H. Kelber, *Mark's Story of Jesus* (Philadelphia 1979), divides the narrative into five parts. He entitles section four, Mk 11,1-13,37, "The End of the Temple."

9 Ibid., 59

10 Ibid., 58-59.

11 Ibid., 60.

12 Ibid., 62.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., 63.

15 Ibid., 64.

coming and going from the temple, spending his nights away. Since the temple and its custodians are irreconcilably opposed to the kingdom, they are disqualified.

Literary Difficulties with the Markan Account

As Kelber helps us see, the Markan account is not a motley collection of separate pericopes roughly sewn together, but is a narrative which has been constructed with some literary sensitivity. Nevertheless, even a superficial reading of Mk 11,11-12,40 discloses a variety of problems with the account, some of which are of peculiar concern to the story-line. As I hope to show, these raise doubts about the priority of canonical Mark. As a way of concentrating attention on the Markan plot, I will focus attention on three types of difficulties.

1) *There are statements in Mark that assume a different setting or context than is offered by the story.* For instance, the question that the chief priest and the scribes and the elders ask Jesus at Mk 11,28 does not exactly fit the Markan setting. "By what authority are you doing these things, or who gave you this authority to do them?" they say. Of course, as readers who have followed the story from the beginning, we realize that this question refers to all the things that Jesus has been doing in Mark from Mk 1,21-28 until this point in the temple. Thus, the question fits within the theological framework of the gospel as a whole. But, if we think in terms of the characters in the narrative and their knowledge of Jesus, then why did the author have the temple-authorities ask Jesus concerning what he is doing (*poieis, poies*) when the only thing that he is doing is walking in the temple?¹⁶ Certainly they did not have the walking itself in mind. Kelber's answer is that in context, "these things' can only refer back to Jesus' condemnation of the temple"¹⁷ -- and this must certainly be right. But if that is the case, why did the author have the temple-authorities use the present indicative, *poieis*, when the violent activity disqualifying the temple had occurred on the day before?

Also, the narrator's statement that "no one dared ask Jesus any question" in Mk 12,28-34). But why should Jesus' approval - or perhaps his good answer to an honest question--have discouraged further questions?¹⁸

16 Rudolf Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition*, trans. John Marsh (New York 1963) 19-20.

17 Kelber, *Mark's Story*, 63.

18 Ernest Best thought that Mark joined this incident with several others with the purpose of showing "the discomfiture of those who approach Jesus" *The Temptation and the Passion*

2. *The motivation of Jesus' enemies is not clear in this section of Mark.* It is almost incomprehensible, for instance, that Jesus' enemies who want to kill him and who obviously do not believe in his authority should ask him a sincere question concerning his authority.¹⁹ Thus, the question is perhaps insincere. But if that is the case, why would they question him at all? Likewise, it is strange that Sadducees who do not believe in the resurrection should ask Jesus a question about the resurrection.²⁰

It is especially difficult to discern what occasions the fear of Jesus' enemies. According to Mk 11,18, the chief priests and the scribes wished to kill Jesus because "they feared him because all the multitude was astonished *ekseplesteto* at his teaching". But, why should the people's astonishment have led the leaders to fear Jesus? Moreover, the explanation of Mk 11,18 seems weak, since the supporting crowd is not introduced into the story until later (cf. Mk 12,37).²¹

The difficulty with this "fear motif" is even more apparent in Mk 11,32 where the chief priests, scribes, and elders are described as being afraid of the people. Why should they be afraid when the author has given no evidence that their exchange with Jesus (Mk 11,27-33) had been overheard?

These same problems re-occur at Mk 12,12. The author's comment leads the reader to believe that the only reason that the leaders did not immediately arrest Jesus was their fear of the crowd. But up to this point in the story Jesus has been described only as walking in the temple (Mk 11,27). The author had not yet provided a frightening multitude to the temple setting.²²

(Cambridge 1965) 86-87. Thus theology would have been more important than the story-line to the author.

19 John R. Donahue, *Are You the Christ?* (SBLDS 10: 1973) 117-119 suggested that the author of Mark was responsible for placing the debate in its temple setting. The motive behind the question would have been secondary to Mark's purposes.

20 To my mind, Kelber's answer that the Sadducees are "trying to convince Jesus of the absurdity of belief in the resurrection" (*Mark's Story*, 64) makes too little of the violent opposition of the temple aristocrats to Jesus (cf. Mk 12,12-13).

21 The crowd's amazement seems to be attached to the episode as an afterthought. Why would the author have introduced the main motive explaining the "leaders'" desire to kill Jesus in such a way? The difficult phrasing of the passage has been taken to indicate that it was Mark who first tied the plot to kill Jesus with the "cleansing" of the temple (cf. Werner H. Kelber, *The Kingdom in Mark* (Philadelphia 1974) 101).

22 Theodore J. Weeden showed that Mark often redacted his sources in order to contrast the response of the Jewish hierarchy with the response of the crown to Jesus *Mark - Traditions in Conflict* (Philadelphia 1971). 21, n. 7, 22-23. Also, the phrasing of Mk 12,12 is somewhat peculiar. One would expect that the statement that Jesus told the parable against the leaders

3. *The supporting cast is not well defined in the Markan account.* I have already noted that the multitude features in a confusing way in this section of Mark. Sometimes the author seems to have assumed what is never stated in the story, namely that Jesus was at all times surrounded in the temple by a large group of supporters.

But there are other instances of poorly defined character groups in Mk 11,11-12,41. For example, the author wrote in Mk 11,19 that “when evening came *they* went out *ekseporeuonto* of the city.” But, who went out of the city? Mk 11,18 would indicate that the chief priests and scribes left. The next pericope, however, makes it clear that it was Jesus and the disciples who left (Mk 11,20-21; 11,14).²³ Thus, we are able to stumblingly follow the story even though the grammar and, to a certain extent, the context misinform us.

Later, Jesus and the disciples return to Jerusalem. As Jesus is walking in the temple, he is approached and questioned by the chief priests, scribes, and elders (Mk 11,27-33). There is a shift in the story from the third person plural, “they,” to just Jesus. But what happened to the disciples?

The confusion surrounding the definition of the characters in the narrative is perhaps greatest with the scribes. The episode where the scribe asks Jesus about the most important commandment (Mk 12,28-34) presents several problems. The transition into the passage (Mk 12,28a) is very awkward.²⁴ Moreover, the positive opinion of the author concerning the scribe contradicts Mark’s usual view, and is without parallel in this section of the gospel. Oddly, this positive view is sandwiched in between some very negative statements about scribes (cf. Mk 11,27; 12,12. 35. 38-40).

Very strangely, Jesus asks in Mk 12,35-37, “How can the scribes say that Christ is the son of David?”²⁵ He then answers his own question by reminding

of the temple would have been placed in the sentence immediately after what it explains, that is their desire to arrest Jesus (D.E. Nineham, *Saint Mark*, 314). Why then did the author place the motive after the second clause in the sentence?

- 23 Later copiers noted the difficulty and substituted a third person singular for the plural *ekseporeuonto*.
- 24 There are too many third person pronouns in the sentence, and the material that follows has little (or nothing) to do with the disputes (H. Anderson, *The Gospel of Mark* (London 1976) 280; Nineham, *Saint Mark*, 323-324; Eduard Schweizer, *The Good News According to Mark*, trans. Donald H. Madvig (Richmond; Virginia 1970) 250).
- 25 D. Daube has suggested that this section makes part of a fourfold pattern sometimes found in Talmudic literature, cf. *The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism* (London 1956) 158-163.

his hearers that David himself had called the messiah “Lord.”²⁶ But what in the preceding section could have triggered Jesus’ question?

In Mk 12,38-40. Jesus intensifies his attack on the scribes, but there is no explanation of what caused the assault.²⁷ At last, the author has introduced a great crowd into the narrative (Mk 12,37b), and this crowd hears Jesus gladly. But what is it about Jesus’ strange words that makes the crowd happy?²⁸ Could they be happy with the claim that the messiah was not the son of David? Could they be happy, then, that Jesus was attacking the scribes? But why would they hear such an attack gladly?

The Lukan Account

Many of the difficulties just identified in Mk 11,11 - 12,40 are not present in Lk 19,45 - 20,47. Actually, this section of the Gospel of Luke represents a tighter narrative than does the parallel section of Mark. I have shown the unity of this section of Luke at length in an article for *Perspectives*, “Confrontation in the Temple,” and will here only rehearse some of the main elements of the plot.²⁹

- 26 What in the preceding section could have triggered Jesus’ question? Why is Jesus re-introduced in this section? Further, what sense is there to the saying in Mark? Is Jesus implying that he is not descended from David? (C. Burger, *Jesus als Davidsohn* (Göttingen 1970) 52-59). Or, is Jesus implying that he is not the Christ? (Vincent Taylor thought that there was perhaps a connection between Mk 12,35-37 and the theme of the messianic secret, *The Gospel According to St. Mark*, (London 2 1977)492-493: “(The saying) half conceals and half reveals the ‘Messianic Secret’. It suggests, but does not state the claim, that Jesus is supernatural in dignity and origin and that his sonship is no mere matter of human descent.”) Can Jesus be offering an insoluble riddle meant to befuddle his audience. (perhaps D. Daube, *Rabbinic Judaism*, 158-163)? But why would the author have included such a theologically difficult passage in his gospel? And why would he have done so immediately following the one instance in his narrative where a scribe appears in a favourable light?
- 27 Some have suggested that the author collected his material around the catchword “scribe(s)” (VV.32, 35, 38). Cf. Anderson, *The Gospel*, 280.
- 28 Etienne Trocme’s suggestion that the scribes in Mark, do not have the “ear of the crowd” seems speculative. *The Formation of the Gospel According to Mark*, trans. Pamela Gaughan (Philadelphia 1975) 98, n. 1. Ernest Best has perhaps been more helpful in *The Temptation and the Passion* (Cambridge 1965) 87-89. He suggested that the author had christian believers in mind. Thus, the conflict in Mark is really between Jesus and the Jewish leaders, and the crowd is not among Jesus’ enemies. Vincent Taylor suggested that the delight of the crowd should not be read in conjunction with the discomfiture of the scribes (*The Gospel*, 494). Thus, C. F. D. Moule, *The Gospel According to Mark* (Cambridge 1965) 100 translates v. 37b as: “There was a great crowd and they listened eagerly.” Could they be happy with the claim that the messiah was not the son of David? Could they be happy, then, that Jesus was attacking the scribes? But why would they hear such an attack gladly?
- 29 “Confrontation in the Temple: Luke 19:45-20:47,” *Perspectives in Religious Studies* 11,2 (1984)153-165.

The cleansing of the temple is more closely associated with Jesus' teaching in Luke than in Mark. Thus, in Luke, Jesus drives out the sellers from the temple by reminding the people of Isaiah's message of salvation and Jeremiah's message of judgment. Whereas, in Mark, the message of the prophets is joined to the cleansing episode with a conjunction, *kai*, in Luke it is joined with a participle (Lk 19,45-46./ 11,15-17). Jesus' teaching is the means by which the temple is cleansed.

The event in Luke is eschatological, and matches what had been foretold by the prophecies of Zech 14,21 and Mal 3. It was expected that God would purify his house at the time that He brought his rule to earth. It is because of this end-time content that all of the people in Lk 19,48 hang on Jesus' words. It is good news to their ears. To the leaders of the temple, however, the message of the coming time of judgment and salvation seems dangerous (Lk 19,47). They set out then, not only to oppose Jesus, but also to disprove his message. This is the setting for the confrontation that follows (Lk 20,1-45).

The confrontation is of three parts. First, the temple authorities ask Jesus concerning his authority (Lk 20,2; see Mk 11,28). The question is not an honest question, for the chief priests and the scribes and the elders do not believe in Jesus' authority. The purpose of the question, rather, is to discredit Jesus and his message before the people. Thus, different from Mark, the confrontation is carefully staged in front of Jesus' audience in the temple, as the sanhedrin sets its official authority off against Jesus. Jesus recognizes the trap, however, and escapes it by appealing to the prophetic authority of John the Baptist (Lk 20,3-4). The leaders of the temple fall silent because the people believe that John was a prophet (Lk 20,5). Jesus then takes the question concerning authority and reverses it against his accusers by telling the people the parable of the wicked tenants (Lk 20,9-18). As the leaders of the temple themselves understand the parable, they are the ones whose authority should be questioned (Lk 20,19).

There is a pattern to this episode that will be twice repeated in Lk 20. The sanhedrin confronts Jesus with the purpose of discrediting his message in front of the people. They ask him a trick question. But Jesus escapes the trap, and in such a way that his enemies fall silent. Moreover, Jesus reverses the hidden accusation of the question back upon his opponents.

The sanhedrin watches Jesus and sends spies to trap him (Lk 20,20-26) by asking a question concerning the giving of tribute. "Is it lawful for us to give tribute to Caesar, or not?" Jesus perceives that it is a crafty question (Lk 20,23). If he were to answer that it was not lawful to give tribute to Caesar, he would

give the sanhedrin an accusation that could be taken to the governor (Lk 20,20). But, if he were to answer that it was lawful to give tribute to Caesar, he would in effect undermine his own message of the in-breaking kingdom of God, for in the mind of the people the reign of God meant also the end of foreign rule in Israel. Jesus escapes the trap by asking for a Roman coin and by saying “render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s” (Lk 20,25). But this answer represents more than a clever escape from a difficult situation. Seen within the context of first century Israel, Jesus is perhaps accusing the temple authorities of being too much involved in Caesar’s business and not enough involved in God’s business. After all, Jesus is the one in Luke who is about God’s business (cf. Lk 2,49). That is why his accusers then fall silent at his answer (Lk 20,26).

Some Sadducees come forward and ask Jesus concerning the resurrection (Lk 20,27-38). Again, the question is not an honest one, for the author makes clear that the Sadducees do not believe in a resurrection (Lk 20,27). Likewise, the Sadducees do not represent a new group of opponents. They are simply one faction from the sanhedrin, namely that of the high priests. The pattern holds up, as Jesus answers in such a way that his opponents fall silent (Lk 20,40). Jesus then turns the hidden accusation of the Sadducees’ question back on his opponents (Lk 20,41-44). Their purpose had really been to disprove Jesus’ proclamation of the coming kingdom. Did not the Law itself disprove a resurrection such as Jesus was announcing? Jesus turns this accusation around and asks, how is it possible for the Sadducees to believe in a coming messiah of the lineage of David, and not believe in the type of kingdom that he is announcing?

The scribes participate in this exchange. In the manner of Paul in Acts 23, Jesus is successful at this point in dividing his enemies over the question of the resurrection. The scribes perhaps forget for the moment their opposition to Jesus in delight at his answer to their ancient rivals, the Sadducees (Lk 20,39). But, Jesus does not allow the moment to slip, and very carefully makes clear to his audience that the whole sanhedrin stands opposed to God’s will. Thus, while the Sadducees will receive condemnation, the scribes will receive the greater condemnation (Lk 20,40).

The Question of Dependence

It is noteworthy that not a single one of the earlier mentioned difficulties in the plot of Mark are present in Luke. Thus, 1) the statements that seem out of place in Mark fit snugly in their Lukan context. For example, the present tense used in the temple leaders’ question concerning authority makes more sense in Luke than it does in Mark, because the cleansing of the temple is closely related

to Jesus' teaching and is something of a process in Luke (Lk 20,2/Mk 11,28). And although the statement that "no one dared ask Jesus any question" has little meaning appended to the end of Jesus' saying to the scribe in Mk 12,34, it does fit nicely with its context in Lk 20,40 where it refers back to the silence of the Sadducees following Jesus' answer to the question concerning the resurrection.

2) The motivation of Jesus' enemies is also much clearer in Luke than it is in Mark. In Luke, the leaders of the temple want to kill Jesus because of his teaching, which again is eschatological and inseparable from his activity in cleansing the temple. They do not kill him because of support from "all of the people" (Lk 19,45-48/Mk 11,18). In part, the difficulties in Mark are difficulties of staging. Thus, the episode concerning authority in Mark appears to be a private exchange between Jesus and his enemies. On the other hand, in Luke, Jesus' enemies ask the question in front of "the people" with the purpose of discrediting Jesus' authority (Lk 20,1-8/Mk 11,27-33). The motives of the temple authorities in Luke are also clear at the end of the parable of the wicked tenants. Jesus and his opponents are in front of an audience which supports Jesus, so that there is good reason for the sanhedrin's fear (Lk 20,19/Mk 12,12).

3) Along with a better explanation for the actions of Jesus' enemies, one also encounters a much more careful definition of the character groups in the Lukan story. As the episode concerning the most important commandment is not located in this section of Luke, but rather falls much more appropriately before the parable of the good Samaritan (Lk 10,25-28/Mk 12,28-31; Lk 10,29-37), the characterization of the scribes becomes clear in Luke. The scribes make part of the sanhedrin. In an attempt to discredit Jesus, they have allied themselves with the elders and with their traditional enemies, the Sadducees. The Markan section where Jesus asks "How can the scribes say that Christ is the son of David?" comes off with a very different meaning in Luke where Jesus asks the scribes "How can they (i.e., the Sadducees) say that the Christ is David's son?" (Lk 20,41/Mk 12,35). The following attack on the scribes is also appropriate in Luke, although not in Mark, since it brings back into focus the united opposition of the sanhedrin to Jesus.

Thus, there is some contrast in the movement of the story in Mark and in Luke. Although both gospels tell a story, their story lines are different, and in Mark the transitions from one scene to another are rougher, the character groups are not as well defined, and the plot itself is not always as clear as in Luke.

It has often been argued that the roughness of the Markan story is an indication that it was original to Luke.³⁰ Luke, then, according to this way of thinking would have smoothed out of difficulties of Mark and polished the gospel story.

This is a possible explanation of what one encounters when comparing this section of the two gospels, but in my estimation, not the best explanation. Again, the story lines are different. The author of the third gospel would have had to have unsurpassed writing ability to have changed so few things in the Markan account and yet have made it into such a tightly knit narrative - but yet one with a different story line than Mark. More importantly, however, the evidence in this case does not seem to be of the type which cuts two ways. The difficulties in Mark seem to have arisen because its author was interested in making a point that was different from that of his source(s). In this sense, Luke is the hidden reference that explains difficulties in Mark. This perhaps is what is most significant. It is not a matter of a rough plot which Luke has polished. Rather Mk 11,15 - 12,40 seems to depend (for its plot) on a story akin to that found in Lk 19,45 - 20,47, and the difficulties in Mark exist because its author changed the story to make an entirely different point.

The different intentions of the gospels are most easily seen with reference to the temple. The emphasis on the temple is central to Luke, which begins and ends there. As a boy, Jesus teaches in the temple. In Luke, Jesus comes fulfilling the prophecies made in Malachi, taking back God's house for God.³¹ The story builds from the beginning towards Jesus' manifestation in the temple, and the confrontation in the temple leading up to Jesus' death is an essential element in Luke's story.

Mark's gospel, however, emphasizes the rejection of Jesus. Already in Mk 3,6, the Pharisees and Herodians search for a way to kill Jesus. Their role is taken up in the temple by the chief priests and the scribes (Mk 11,18). Controversies surround Jesus throughout his ministry but build as he heads to Jerusalem. He is opposed by his family (Mk 3,20-21. 31-35), his home town (Mk

30 Examples are extensive and a sampling include many worthwhile studies: William A. Beardslee, *Literary Criticism of the New Testament* (Philadelphia 1971) 68-69; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke (I-IX)* (New York 1981) 66-72; *The Gospel According to Luke (X-XXIV)* (New York 1985) 1260-1319; Werner G. Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament*, trans. Howard Clark Kee (Nashville 1975) 60-62. Also some very find older works, such as Henry J. Cadbury's *The Style and Literary Method of Luke* (Cambridge 1920) and W.L. Knox, *The Sources of the Synoptic Gospels* (Cambridge 1953-57), draw heavily of this criterion.

31 Rene Laurentin, *Jésus au temple: Mystère de Pâques et foi de Marie en Luc 2, 48-50* (Paris 1966).

6,1-6), and Peter (Mk 8,32) among others, and in the temple the controversies continue with the chief priests, scribes, and elders (Mk 11,27), the Pharisees and Herodians (Mk 12,13), and the Sadducees (Mk 12,18). Jesus is misunderstood throughout the gospel. Group after group rejects him, until finally he goes to the cross alone.

Thus, our difficulty: there is no room in the Markan story for a supporting crowd, soon before Jesus' death. The supporting crowd in the Markan account presupposes a plot more like what we encounter in Luke.

To me, it seems likely that the difficulties in the Markan account arose from certain insertions that the editor of Mark made into Ur-Markus. I tend to think of two principal insertions, the episode of the withered fig tree (Mk 11,12-14, 20-25), and the episode of the most important commandment (Mk 11,28-34).³² Both insertions, perhaps, would have been occasioned by the desire to show that temple worship was something of the past. Thus, again the meaning of Jesus' temple activity is different in canonical Mark from that in Luke. In Luke, the meaning is to be found in the Jewish expectation that God would someday come and purify His house. But in Mark, the meaning is to be found in God's rejection of Israel.³³ The temple is being replaced by the Church. The meaning is more closely aligned with what one encounters in John. Thus, the cleansing episode becomes briefer and more violent. The temple cult is being destroyed.

This fundamentally different outlook concerning the significance of what occurred in the temple explains several changes in the narrative. Jesus' citation from Isaiah in the temple is fleshed out in Mark so that the emphasis falls on the promise of a place for the gentiles--"My house shall be called a house of prayer for all nations" (Mk 11,17/Lk 19,46). Also the description of the vineyard is fleshed out in terms of Is 5,2 so that the evil tenants become in Mark the people of Israel (Mk 12,1/Lk 20,9).³⁴ Thus, Jesus' teaching gives the motive for what he does in the temple. In a sense, he is destroying it to make room for the gentiles. But in Luke, the teaching is also the means by which the temple is being purified. Since this particular eschatological function of the proclamation is lost in

32 Most often, it has been thought that Luke omitted or displaced these passages (cf. de Solages, *La composition*, 75,78.

33 Hugh Anderson, *The Gospel of Mark*, 267; John Bowman, *The Gospel of Mark* (Leiden 1965) 241; Etienne Trocme, "L'expulsion des marchands du temple," *NTS* 15 (1968/69):3-5.

34 Joachim Jeremias also took the connection with Is 5:1-2 as a secondary addition to the original parable, *The Parables of Jesus*, trans. S.H. Hooke (New York 1963) 70-71.

canonical Mark, the part that the crowd plays in the narrative becomes unimportant.

The confrontation in Luke between Jesus and the leaders of the temple played against the backdrop of an audience that is hanging on Jesus' message of impending judgment and salvation is replaced in canonical Mark by a confrontation concerning true worship. Faith in God is much more important than sacrifice. The fig tree is cursed in Mark and dries up. Prayer takes the place of sacrifice (Mk 11,20-25). And loving God and one's neighbour are affirmed to be much more than burnt offerings (Mk 12,28-34).

With these Markan emphases in mind one can almost trace the steps by which the editor changed the Ur-Markan account that in this instance is better preserved in Luke and which led to the difficulties enumerated earlier. Thus, 1) the editor introduced the account of the fig tree, lessened the importance of Jesus' teaching activity, and shortened the purification of the temple into a quick symbolic destruction, but left the question "By what authority are you doing these things?" in the present indicative (Mk 11,27/Lk 20,2).

In a similar manner, Mk 12,38-40 represents an appropriation of the words of Lk 20:46-47, but without the Ur-Markan story line that is preserved in Luke. Thus, *perissoteron* as a comparative comparing the scribes with the Sadducees (Lk 20,47) is out of place in Mk 12,40 and takes on the vernacular meaning of a superlative.³⁵

Lk 20,39-40 allowed for the strange introduction of Mk 12,28-34 into the narrative. The Markan episode is an illustration of the approval indicated by the scribes' statement in Luke that Jesus had spoken well (*Kalos*, Lk 20,39/Mk 12,28). Since the editor omitted the concept of an audience in the temple which is, in Luke and I imagine Ur-Markus, the real subject of the exchanges between Jesus and his opponents, and since the editor also had the scribes leave and go away after Jesus told the parable of the wicked tenants, canonical Mark's introduction of the scribe is awkward. The very odd closing in Mk 12,34 "And after that no one dared to ask him any question," was simply taken from the earlier form of the gospel preserved in Lk 20,40, where it makes sense--especially if referring back to the Sadducees.

35 For the superlative meaning of the comparative forms in the New Testament see F. Blass and A. Debrunner, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and other Early Christian Literature*, trans. R.W. Funk (Chicago 1961) 32-33. J.D.M. Derrett suggested that the comparative *perissoteron* is used this way to mean something like "all the greater." See "Eating up the houses of the widows: Jesus' comment on lawyers?" *NovT*14(1972) 1-9.

2) Since the editor of Mark changed the emphasis on the eschatological purification of the temple seen in Luke to its destruction and its replacement with the Church, he also changed the position of the crowd in the story. From hanging on Jesus' words (Lk 19,48), they become astonished at his teaching (Mk 11,18). Thus, the motive explaining why the leaders of the temple do not destroy Jesus becomes very difficult in canonical Mark.

The confrontation in Mark, as it now stands, is between Jesus and the temple cult. Room is being made for the Gentiles. Therefore, there is a sense in which a supporting cast for Jesus in the temple is irrelevant to the editor's message. But the function of the multitude in protecting Jesus is still necessary in Mark, as in Luke. Because of this tension between the story and the editor's use of it, the reasoning of the temple authorities becomes at points hard to follow.

3) The roughness of the transitions at Mk 11,19-20 and Mk 11,26-27 results from the editor's insertion of the episode of the withered fig tree into the Ur-Markan narrative. Also the roughness of the story at Mk 12,28-30 stems from the author's reworking of Ur-Markus. These difficulties are not in Luke. Because of the insertion of the episode of the great commandment into canonical Mark, the question about David's son is separated from the Sadducee's question concerning the resurrection and loses its original meaning. In Mark there is no longer an audience of approving scribes who hear Jesus' answer to the Sadducees. Therefore, Jesus' direct statement to the scribes was changed into teaching before a vague audience (Lk 20,41/12,35). The "scribes" in turn became for the editor the subject of Jesus' saying. In this way, the saying about David's son was made part of the attack on the scribes which follows (Lk 20,45-47/Mk 12,37-40).

By applying the saying about David's son to the scribes instead of the Sadducees, the editor of Mark has made this section of the story very hard to understand (Mk 12,35/Lk 20,41). The editor might have understood this passage as indicating that Jesus' message was open to the Gentiles. Thus, the messiah, was not Israel's Christ, but Israel's Lord--and by extension, the Lord of other peoples too.³⁶ Certainly, the meaning found in Luke which is tied in with the Sadducees' question concerning the resurrection completely disappears in Mark. But, the Markan change was probably not so much occasioned by theology at this point, as by the introduction of Mk 12,28-34 into the narrative.

36 Kelber, *Mark's Story*, 65 suggests that the editor related the question to the scribes because they were "experts in matters of Davidic messiahship."

The scene of David's son was thus separated from the scene of the Sadducees' question about the resurrection, and sandwiched between materials pertaining to the scribes. It then was made to apply to the scribes also.

The Place of Matthew's Account

Although the purpose of this study is to examine the relationship of Lk 19,45-20,47/Mk 11,11-12,40 in light of the possibility of Ur-Markus, it would be inappropriate to close without a few remarks concerning Mt. 21,10-23,39. Matthew's account, like Luke's is much less difficult than Mark's. The story line remains episodic, however, and the smoothness of the first gospel seems to me to result from the author's editing of canonical Mark. On the one hand the author seems to have eased the story by such stylistic artifices as unifying Mark's episode of the withered fig tree (Mt 21,18-22/Mk 11,12-14, 20-25),³⁷ having Jesus cleanse the temple at the time of his first visit (Mt 21,10-17/Mk 11,11,15-19),³⁸ and toning down Jesus' approval of the man who asks him about the great commandment (Mt 22,34-40/Mk 12,28-34).³⁹

On the other hand, the confrontation scenes completely lose their purpose as confrontation scenes in Matthew. As preserved in Luke, the conflict centres on Jesus' message of the in-breaking kingdom. In canonical Mark, this conflict was redirected toward the Church and the Gentiles. As I have already pointed out, this change by the editor of Mark left some rough edges to his plot. One of these concerns the fear of Jesus' opponents. It is never quite clear in the second gospel why the crowd supports Jesus. In Matthew, however, this difficulty is cleared up. The people recognize that he is a prophet (Mt 21,12. 28-32. 46; 23, 37-39).⁴⁰ Opposition to Jesus centres on the indignation of the temple's leaders at Jesus' message that they were not producing fruits befitting the kingdom and that some people of low religious status would enter the kingdom before them (Mt 21,28-32. 43-45; 22,1-14). Jesus in Matthew, like the prophet that he is, denounces the duplicity of the religious leaders of Israel (Mt 23,1-36).

37 John C. Fenton, *Saint Mathew* (London 1978) 336; David Hill, *The Gospel of Mathew* (London 1978) 294.

38 Eduard Schweizer, *The Good News According to Mathew*, trans. David E. Green (Atlanta 1975) 406.

39 Ibid.

40 Trocme, "L'expulsion," 5; p. Bonnard, *L'évangile selon saint Matthieu* (Neuchatel 1963) 305-306.

The confrontation in Matthew is over ethics in the kingdom. But the subject matter of the exchanges between Jesus and his opponents does not really fit this concern that the author has transported into this section of the story. Thus, the exchanges become in Matthew clever repartees proving Jesus' superiority over his opponents. His opponents marvel (Mt 22,22), the crowd is astonished (Mt 22,33)--and finally, no one dares to ask him anymore questions (Mt 22,46).

Conclusion

It seems to me that the two document and Griesbach hypotheses do not adequately explain the literary relationship of Mt 21,10-23,39/Mk 11,11-12,40/Lk 19,45-20,47. The two document hypothesis, especially, seems highly unlikely once one begins to think in terms of character groups and the plot of the story--that is, unless one hypothesize an earlier version of Mark which was used by Luke. Then, many of the difficulties with the Markan account become understandable. In any event, it is my view that in this particular section of the synoptic gospels Luke represents the more original of the three accounts. Certainly, I do not enjoin with this the formulation of a Lukan (or Proto-Lukan) hypothesis. There are too many other sections in the synoptics which seem to point to a Markan original. It seems rather that in this instance Luke has preserved a more original form of the story than has Mark. Lk 19,45-20,47 points to Ur-Markus.

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In this article the following abbreviations are used: *HTD* for J.L. Austin, *How to do Things with Words*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2nd Ed 1976); *PhP* for J.L. Austin, *Philosophical Papers*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 3rd Ed 1979).

MEANING AND SPEAKER'S INTENTIONS

J. Friggieri

In "Meaning and Truth"¹ Strawson draws a contrast between what he calls "communication-intention theories" and "formal semantics theories" of meaning. According to the former

it is impossible to give an adequate account of the concept of meaning without reference to the possession by speakers of audience-directed intentions of a certain complex kind.²

The opposite view is based on the thought that the sense of a sentence is determined by its truth-conditions.³

Strawson described the conflict between these two theories as a "Homeric struggle", and groups together Grice, Austin and the later Wittgenstein as exponents of the first type of theory, and Chomsky, Frege and the earlier Wittgenstein as exponents of the second.

It is not quite clear that Austin would have approved of this classification. Austin had very little to say about meaning - but what he says goes in a direction which is quite different from that followed by "communication-intention theorists" like Grice and Searle. When Austin mentions meaning, he always

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1 P.F. STRAWSON, 'Meaning and Truth', in *Logico-Linguistic Papers* (Methuen Co, 1971) 170-189.

2 Ibid., 171.

3 Ibid.

thinks of it in terms of the Fregean notions of sense and reference.⁴ And Austin was quite consistent in keeping apart the notions of locutionary meaning and illocutionary force.

It was Searle who (a) regarded the study of meaning as coextensive with the study of illocutionary acts and (b) cast doubt on Austin's fundamental distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts.

(a) ...A study of the meaning of sentences is not in principle distinct from a study of speech acts. Properly construed, they are the same study.⁵

(b) In attempting to explore Austin's notion of an *illocutionary act* I have found his correspondence notion of a *locutionary act* very unhelpful... In this paper I want to explain my reasons for rejecting Austin's distinction...⁶

Again, in *Speech Acts* Searle states that he employs the expression "illocutionary act" "with some misgivings", since he does not accept "Austin's distinction between *locutionary* and *illocutionary* acts",⁷ and he refers to his article in the *Philosophical Review* in which, as we have seen, Searle says quite explicitly that he wants to "reject" Austin's distinction. Nevertheless, in the same article he writes:

The concepts *locutionary* act and *illocutionary* act are indeed different, just as the concepts *terrier* and *dog* are different. But the conceptual difference is not sufficient to establish a distinction between separate classes of acts, because just as every terrier is a dog, so every locutionary act is an illocutionary act.⁸

Here Searle seems to accept that the distinction can be made, at least conceptually. This impression is confirmed by an earlier passage in the same paper where he says:

The *concept* of an utterance with a certain meaning (that is, the concept of a locutionary act) is indeed a different concept from the concept of an

4 See *HTD*, pp.93. 94. 95. 100. 109. etc; and there are accounts of conventions of reference and conventions of sense in 'How to Talk' (*PhP*, 135-6) and of their analogues (demonstrative and descriptive conventions) in 'Truth' (*PhP*, 121-2).

5 J.R. SEARLE, *Speech Acts* (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge 1969) 18.

6 J.R. SEARLE, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts", in I. Berlin et al., *Essays on J.L. Austin* (Clarendon Press; Oxford 1973.) 141. Searle's paper was first published in *Philosophical Review*, Vol.77, No.4 (October 1968) 405-424. References in the text are to Berlin et al.

7 SEARLE, *Speech Acts*, 23, f.n.1.

8 SEARLE, "Austin on Locutionary", 149.

utterance with a certain force (that is, the concept of an illocutionary act).⁹

But then he goes on:

For cases such as the performative use of illocutionary verbs the attempt to *abstract* the locutionary meaning from illocutionary force would be like abstracting unmarried men from bachelors.¹⁰

So in the case of at least *one* class of utterances - those marked by the performative use of illocutionary verbs - even the *concepts* are the same. Moreover, later on in the essay Searle claims that not only *some* but

all the members of the class of locutionary acts ... are members of the class of illocutionary acts, because every rhetic act, and hence every locutionary act, is an illocutionary act.¹¹

So the "apparent hiatus"¹² which critics have observed in Searle's views ultimately resolves itself in favour of his recommendation that the concept of a locutionary act should be dispensed with.

Let us, therefore, trace the steps by which Searle arrives at his conclusion that Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts is unfounded. Searle develops his attack on Austin mainly in his 1968 paper;¹³ and it is on this paper that I shall concentrate.

Searle on meaning and force

Searle starts by recalling Austin's point that a sentence which is not ambiguous with regard to meaning can nevertheless be used with different forces on different occasions.

A serious literal utterance by a single speaker of the sentence "I am going to do it" can be (can have the force of) a promise, a prediction, a threat, a warning, a statement of intention, and so forth.¹⁴

For this reason

Utterances which were different tokens of the same locutionary type could be tokens of different illocutionary types.¹⁵

However, Searle says, not all utterances have this characteristic "openness" with regard to force. In the case of *one* class of utterances, namely, explicit perfor-

9 Ibid., 144.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., 148-9.

12 DAVID HOLDCROFT, *Words and Deeds*. (Clarendon Press; Oxford 1978) 33.

13 See f.n.6.

14 SEARLE, "Austin on Locutionary", 142.

15 Ibid., 143.

matives, meaning determines at least one illocutionary force of the utterance. A sentence like "I hereby promise that I am going to do it" *may* perhaps on occasion be used as a threat, but it *must* at least be a promise - that is, an illocutionary act of a certain type.

The meaning of the sentence determines an illocutionary force of its utterances in such a way that serious utterances of it with that literal meaning will have that particular force.¹⁶

Why does Searle consider this to be a difficulty for Austin? The distinction between meaning and force as Austin defines it does not depend on the fact that on some occasions the force of an utterance may be ambiguous. Austin's examples of utterances whose meaning is perfectly clear but whose force must be determined in the context of the utterance (e.g. "The bull is about to charge") is useful from a pedagogical point of view because it brings out sharply the point of the distinction which he wants to make. But once we grasp the distinction we can apply it to *all* cases, not just to the ones whose force is yet to be determined.

Now the characteristic feature of explicit performatives is precisely this: that they make explicit the force of the embedded primary utterance. And they do this *via* the meaning of the performative prefix. We need not deny, then, that there is a close connection between the meaning of an explicit performative and the force by which it is uttered. But nothing in this shows that meaning and force are the same thing. Searle is right in calling our attention to a special feature of a special class of utterances; wrong in thinking that such utterances raise a problem for Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts.

At the beginning of the discussion Searle focussed his attention on explicit performatives because he thought of them as constituting an exception to Austin's definition of locutionary and illocutionary acts. If what he said about explicit performatives was true, then, Searle argued, Austin's distinction could not be completely general.¹⁷

This implied that there were many other kinds of utterances (i.e. non-performatives) to which the distinction could still be applied. There were, after all, all these other cases where meaning and force *did* "come apart"; and for them at least Austin's distinction seemed to work well enough. But in Section II Searle goes on to claim that the distinction collapses even for non-performatives. This is how he performs the hazardous leap:

We saw above that the original locutionary-illocutionary distinction is best designed to account for those cases where the meaning of the sentence is, so to speak, force-neutral - that is, where its literal utterance

¹⁶ Ibid., 143

¹⁷ Ibid.

did not serve to distinguish a particular illocutionary force. But now further consideration will force us to the following conclusion: no sentence is completely force-neutral. Every sentence has some illocutionary force potential, if only of a very broad kind, built into its meaning.¹⁸

Searle re-iterates his conclusion in a number of ways:

there is no specification of a locutionary act performed in the utterance of a complete sentence which will not determine the specification of an illocutionary act.¹⁹

there are (in the utterance of complete sentences) no rhetic acts as opposed to illocutionary acts at all.²⁰

... it does not seem that there are or can be acts of using those vocables in sentences with sense and reference which are not already (at least purported) illocutionary acts.²¹

there is no way to abstract a rhetic act in the utterance of a complete sentence which does not abstract an illocutionary act as well, for a rhetic act is always an illocutionary act of one kind or another.²²

... every rhetic act and hence every locutionary act, is an illocutionary act.²³

Every serious literal utterance contains some indicators of force as part of meaning, which is to say that every rhetic act is an illocutionary act.²⁴

Searle's argument for the abolition of the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts hinges round this central point:

Every sentence has some illocutionary force potential if only of a very broad kind, built into its meaning.²⁵

18 Ibid., 148.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 149.

24 Ibid., 148.

25 Ibid.

Every serious literal utterance contains some indicators of force as part of meaning ...²⁶

Searle claims that there should be at least one very general force indicator which could be extracted from the meaning of each and every sentence, one illocutionary verb of such wide connotation as to include all possible illocutionary verbs within its meaning and be related to them as genus to species.²⁷ Such a verb, however, does not exist. Searle suggests that in the case of imperatival illocutionary verbs, "tell one to" is the generic verb and "order", "insist", etc. the specific ones. But as David Holdcroft shows, "tell one to" is insufficiently general to qualify as the generic verb.²⁸ And if "tell one to" does not qualify it is very unlikely that any other verb will. The same applies to indicative illocutionary verbs.²⁹

Searle, then, fails to establish that every sentence contains an illocutionary force indicator, if only of a very broad kind. But even if non-performatives did contain such general indicators of force as part of their meaning, it would still be impossible to tell, on the basis of that, what the *specific* illocutionary force of the utterance was.

Take the sentence "I am waiting for Joseph". I may use that sentence, whose meaning is perfectly clear, to (a) inform you about my present business; (b) refuse your invitation to go to the cinema; (c) express my frustration that Joseph is late again; (d) express my delight that Joseph is coming back after a long absence; (e) tempt you to stay with me; (f) warn you that a row is going to break out soon; (g) seek your advice about how to behave when he arrives; (h) let you know that I have made it up with my friend; (i) reveal a secret; (j) hint that I may be getting married soon. And so on. Even if it was always the case that if someone said seriously "I am waiting for Joseph" then he must have been asserting (at least) that he was waiting for Joseph, we would still not be able to tell, from understanding the meaning of the very general illocutionary force indicator "He asserted that", which of the variety of things (a) to (j) - and, indeed, which of the greater variety of things not mentioned in that list - the speaker intended to

26 Ibid., 149.

27 Ibid.

28 "Maybe to order someone to do something is to tell him to do it. But to dare him to do it is not to tell him to do it, any more than to request him to do so is to tell him to do so". Holdcroft, *Words and Deeds*, 39.

29 The most plausible candidate here would be "asserting". "But though, for instance, hinting may involve asserting, what is hinted is not asserted, and neither is what is suggested. Estimating is not asserting; and, sometimes anyway, neither is ruling, since what is ruled to be so is so only in virtue of the ruling". Holdcroft, *Words and Deeds*, 40.

achieve.

The same problem would arise in connection with imperatives. Consider:

“Give me that weapon”.

In issuing that utterance, whose meaning is, once again, totally unambiguous, I may be (a) ordering you to lay down your arms; (b) inviting you to start negotiations; (c) hinting that you are ambushed; (d) making it clear that it is too early to go hunting; (e) suggesting that we should go fishing instead; (f) asking you to lend me your pistol; (g) pleading with you not to shoot the piano-player; (h) daring you to fight unarmed. And so on. There is no *particular* speech-act which can be determined by the meaning of the sentence.

Even if we knew that the speaker *asserted* that he was waiting for Joseph, we would still not be able to tell whether he was expressing his frustration, revealing a secret, expressing his delight, warning that a row was about to break out, etc. The same could be said about the imperative “Give me that weapon”. The meaning of Searle’s “general force indicators” could never determine the specific force of an utterance. None of the specific aspects of the force of an utterance are contained in, or “built into”, the meaning of the words.

Searle seeks to close the gap between the literal meaning of a sentence and the intended force of its utterance (as illustrated by the example “I’m going to do it”) but arguing that

that is only a special case of the distinction between literal meaning and intended meaning, between what the sentence means and what the speaker means by its utterance.³⁰

But if Searle wants to prove that meaning determines force, even if only partly, then he must show that the meaning of the sentence itself - not what the speaker means by it - can do the job. On pain of arguing in a circle, Searle cannot appeal to the intentions of the speaker at this point.

To make his strategy work Searle needs to convince us *not* that by saying “I am going to do it” the speaker may have meant (i.e. intended) to alarm us, or warn us, or assure us, or threaten us, or whatever, but that we can discover all this for ourselves just by attending to the meaning of the words “I am going to do it”. Since Searle does not seem to have shown this, Austin’s distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts remains untouched by Searle’s criticism.³¹

³⁰ Searle, “Austin on ...”, *op.cit.*, p.149.

³¹ In a later paper, “Indirect Speech Acts” in P. COLE and J. MORGAN (eds.), *Syntax and Semantics*, Vol.3, (New York 1975) 59-82 Searle claims that primary illocutionary acts are

Grice on speaker's intentions

Grice's main concern is with connecting linguistic meaning with the notion of a speaker's having certain intention and beliefs.³² Grice's original analysis of speaker's meaning was:

S means something by uttering x if he intends

- (i) to produce a response r in an audience A;
- (ii) A to recognize S's intention (i);
- (iii) A's recognition of S's intention (i) to be part of his reason for producing r.³³

Put less formally this means that the speaker must intend his audience to believe that he believes something; he must also intend his audience to arrive at this belief in virtue of recognizing the speaker's intention.

performed by performing secondary illocutionary acts. This distinction seems to be intended to replace Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts. For example, noticing that I may request you to get off my foot by saying "You are standing on my foot", Searle proposes that my stating literally that you are standing on my foot is the *secondary* illocutionary act, by which I perform the *primary* act of requesting that you get off my foot (whereas Austin would say that my saying literally, i.e. with a certain fixed sense and reference, "You are standing on my foot" is the *locutionary* act). For Searle, the primary act is performed *indirectly*, and captures what is meant that goes beyond the literal statement made. Thus, "I mean not only: you are standing on my foot, but also: please get off my foot". Searle gives this as an uncontroversial case in which what is meant exceeds what is literally stated. The primary utterance ("Please get off my foot") is not being literally expressed but nevertheless it is implied by what the secondary utterance ("You are standing on my foot") means. As ROD BERTOLET has shown, Searle's argument on this occasion turns on an equivocation on "mean". "The speaker clearly *intends* that his utterance will result in less pressure on his foot, and perhaps he *intends it to be* a request, but equally clearly he does not *mean* that the man should please get off his foot *in the same sense* that he means that the man is standing on his foot". (ROD BERTOLET, "Referential Uses and Speaker's Meaning", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 31 (1981) 254-255. See also DENNIS STAMPE, "Meaning and Truth in the Theory of Speech Acts", in P. COLE and S. MORGAN (eds.), *Syntax and Semantics*, vol.3, *Speech Acts* (Academic Press; London 1975).

- 32 H.P. GRICE, "Meaning", *Philosophical Review* 66 (1957) 377-88; "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", *Foundations of Language* 4 (1968) 225-42; "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions" *Philosophical Review* 78 (1969) 147-77.
- 33 GRICE (1957) On this account the speaker would be held to intend his utterance to get his audience to believe that, e.g., the cat is on the mat, by means of recognition of the intention. Later Grice proposed two different ways of dealing with relevant counter - examples. In his second version (1969) the speaker intends that his audience should think that he believes, e.g., that the cat is on the mat, again as a result of recognizing that intention. The differences between the two versions need not concern us here.

But now we ask ourselves: what is it to say that S means something by uttering x? A little reflection will show that it is impossible to explain what it is for a *speaker* to mean something by using certain sentences without explaining what it is for the *sentences* to mean what they mean. If I say "You're standing on my foot", my hope that you interpret the utterance as a request that you step off my foot clearly presupposes your understanding, your grasping the meaning, of what I have said.

An account of the meaning of one's words is not given by an account of what it is to mean what one says, yet it is only on the latter that [Grice's] style of analysis appears to have any hearing.³⁴

Grice criticizes C.L. Stevenson's causal theory of meaning³⁵ on the grounds that in it

No provision is made for dealing with statements about what a particular speaker or writer means by a sign on a particular occasion (which may well diverge from the standard meaning of the sign).³⁶

He adds that

One might even go further in criticism and maintain that the causal theory ignores the fact that the meaning (in general) of a sign needs to be explained in terms of what users of the sign do (or should) mean by it on particular occasions.³⁷

Grice concludes that "the latter notion", i.e. the notion of "what users of the sign do (or should) mean by it on particular occasions", which is unexplained by the causal theory, "is in fact the fundamental one".³⁸

Immediately problems arise for Grice over the use of the word "standard" and of the phrase "what users of the sign *should* mean by it". It is clear that one can mean something by using a certain utterance where what he means (what he intends to convey) is quite different from what that utterance normally means. But can we say of a sentence what it is normally used by speakers to mean without saying what the sentence normally means? But if we have to invoke the notion of what a sentence normally means, then we are involved in circularity. As Mark Platts pointed out:

Grice's work ... will play a crucial role in our understanding of one element in the theory of force; but it is inherently ill-equipped to play any role within the theory of sense.³⁹

34 BEDE RUNDLE, *Grammar in Philosophy* (Clarendon Press; 1979 Oxford) 407.

35 See C.L. STEVENSON, *Ethics and Language*, (New Haven 1944) Ch.3.

36 GRICE, "Meaning", 381.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 MARK PLATTS, *Ways of Meaning*, (RKP: 1979, London) 93.

In discussing locutionary meaning before illocutionary force Austin recognized the primacy of semantics in the philosophy of language. Any project which blurs the distinction between the two concepts, or reverses the order of their definition, or attempts to derive one from the other, or reduce one to the other, is bound to fail. Speakers can use almost any sentence to do almost anything. They may even use meaningless noises to achieve certain effects. Consider Paul Ziff's strange character, George, the academic who pretends to be insane in an attempt to avoid conscription.⁴⁰ On being asked to identify himself George replies "Ugh ugh blugh blugh ugh blugh blugh". He *means* to achieve something by his utterance. But, of course, his utterance *means* nothing. One cannot give an account of the meaning of one's utterance by giving an account of what one (i.e. the speaker) means to achieve by it. While a person may mean something by a nonsensical utterance, such an utterance will not, by virtue of that fact, mean anything.

Or take Searle's American soldier captured by Italian troops, who imagines that he can trick his captors into believing that he is German by addressing them with the words "Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen blühen?"⁴¹ What the soldier intends to convey to his captors is the impression that he is German. What the words mean, however, is "Do you know the land where the lemon-trees bloom?"

X says at a party: "I prefer it if you left very soon". But X could use practically any sentence to draw the attention of the people at the party that he wants them to leave. "We must all wake up early tomorrow", or conversely, "I have no desire to watch the sunrise", would serve his purpose just as well.

Let us go back for a while to Austin's classification of what one does when one says something.

S uttered these noises: ...

S said "....."

S said that _____.

On the first and second levels we are not yet thinking of ourselves as understanding anything, or as producing meaningful utterances. Understanding and

40 PAUL ZIFF, "On H.P. Grice's account of meaning", *Analysis* 28 (1967) 1-8.

41 JOHN SEARLE, "What is a Speech Act?", in Searle (ed.), *The Philosophy of Language*, (Oxford 1971) 45-46. Also in *Speech Acts*, 44-45.

meaning (understanding the meaning of the utterance "...") only comes in at the third level. What someone who doesn't understand a language lacks is the capacity to move from level two to level three. An English speaker who knows no Latin can make a report of what he saw at the churchyard by faithfully reproducing the words of a Latin inscription engraved on one of the tombstones. And he can write in his diary: "The inscription said: "Non omnis moriar"". What he cannot produce is a report of the meaning of those words for the sake of someone who, like himself, does not understand Latin.

The situation becomes more vivid if we think of ourselves as listening to a group of people conversing in a language which we do not understand. In such a situation we are impressed by the force and vitality of the language. Because we are not able to understand, we feel left out, cut off, isolated, even though physically we may form part of the group. It is in this kind of situation that we often wonder: what is it that they know and we don't? Obviously they must know the meaning of the individual words and understand their mode of combination. And this is what we must learn in order to be able to participate in their conversation, make ourselves understood, and understand what they are saying.

Or we may think of the signs on the wall of some prehistoric cave and ask ourselves

are they merely marks made at random by a stonemason testing a chisel, or do they collectively form part of a language whose script this is?⁴²

The hypothesis that they are signs in a language, not merely random marks, can only be entertained on the basis of a belief that we may (one day) discover what they mean. But in order for this to be possible, they have to have a certain feature which, as it were, *dictates* their meaning to us. I may, of course, mistakenly believe certain marks to be a script of a language and interpret them on the basis of that false belief. In that case, however, I would be inventing a new language⁴³ rather than understanding one which is already there.

When a fluent speaker of a language understands a sentence ... he is ... guided and directed by the signs themselves.⁴⁴

Wittgenstein wrote:

Every proposition must *already* have a sense: it cannot be given a sense by affirmation. Indeed its sense is just what is affirmed.⁴⁵

42 The example is from BERNARD HARRISON, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language*, (London 1979 Macmillan) 3.

43 In the sense in which this can clearly be done, i.e. by coining new words and stipulating their meaning. Something like this happened when Esperanto was invented.

44 HARRISON, *Introduction*, 5.

45 L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 4.064

When we say that a study of semantics is fundamental to a study of language, clearly we are not saying that semantics could tell us all we need to know about language. We realize this the moment we pass from elucidating each word in turn and explaining how it combines with other elements in the sentence to examining the *use* of language, for example in conversation.⁴⁶ As Austin saw, we have to attend not just to the locutionary aspect of speech, but to its illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects as well. We need to elucidate not only what words and sentences mean but also what we use our sentences for (e.g. to ask questions, issue warnings, give orders, etc.), what we achieve in and by using them. We need another component of our theory which will deal precisely with these aspects of language. This component is the theory of force. And insofar as we need such a theory, there is reason to think that we need it even in the case of indicative sentences. Austin discovered this need half-way through *How to Do Things with Words* when he came to deal with assertions. On Austin's account, then, the two theories which Strawson saw as rivals can actually form part of one system; and an account of meaning of the kind Strawson imputes to formal theories can interact with a Gricean type of analysis of speaker's intentions, rather than act against it.

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46 H.P. GRICE's notion of conversation implicatures and David Lewis's idea of *rules of accomodation* are both intended to throw light on the various mechanisms which make conversation a rational enterprise. Grice developed his views in the William James lectures at Harvard in 1968, especially in Lecture II. (Parts of Grice's lectures were subsequently published under the title "Logic and Conversation" in P. COLE and J. MORGAN (eds) *Syntax and Semantics*, Vol.3, *Speech Acts*, (Academic Press; London 1975). See also H.P. GRICE, "The Casual Theory of Perception". *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supp. Vol.35, (1961) 121-168, esp. section 3. For LEWIS's idea see DAVID LEWIS, "Scorekeeping in a Language Game", *Journal of Philosophical Logic* (1979).

HEGEL'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 1830

§§ 40-51 : AN EXEGESIS

Rolf Ahlers

This paper moves in three stages. In the first stage the relation of the 1830 Encyclopedia to Hegel's early writings is examined. In the second stage the author discussed the origin of this important work of Hegel. Melita Theologica is printing today the third stage of this paper where the author offers an exegesis of §§40-51 of the Encyclopedia of 1830.

3. Exegesis of §§40-51 of the Encyclopedia

These paragraphs are part of the “*Vorbegriff*”, in the Wallace edition, the “Preliminary Notion”. This “*Vorbegriff*” is the introduction to the philosophical system, the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. The aim of this introduction contains several problems:

1. The *Phenomenology* was supposed to be just such an introduction. Why does Hegel feel constrained to repeat another introduction here? Hegel himself addresses this issue in §25 of the *Enc.* as also in a note on a manuscript of 1831, reprinted on p.578 of the *Phän*, ed. Hoffmeister, indicating that Hegel had considered at that time the revision of the *Phenomenology*, but had rejected the plan, because it represents only “the *abstract Absolute*.” The problem here can be condensed with these words: In 1831 Hegel knew that in 1807 his concern with the “phenomenology of consciousness” is a merely psychological approach to the nature of thought and the Concept. That approach undercuts the nihilistic element in the movement of pure thought, expressed in part I of the Nürnberg and also the Heidelberg and Berlin *Logic*, i.e. in the later two versions, the first part of the *Encyclopedia*. Negativity is in the mature concept of the concept just one element in the movement of thought.

2. Hegel had already in the *Phenomenology* asserted that philosophy must commence without presuppositions. This idea was a cardinal notion in the post-Kantian Idealism, i.e. with Schelling, Fichte, Jacobi, Hegel. That programme is traceable to Kant himself, who admitted empirical date, i.e. ultimately the “thing in itself” as the only legitimate “presupposition” of

philosophizing, therewith, however, introducing new “presuppositions”, i.e. the “thing in itself” and the “transcendental subjectivity”. The mature Hegel realizes that the concept is its own presupposition, but it can be this only if within it “being” and “nothing” are identical, which identity is perceptible only if the concept is understood as a process of becoming. To *understand* this, one cannot write an “introduction” to philosophizing. For making “introductory remarks” on this issue means stating the presuppositions of it. The thought must proceed by itself, without presuppositions. Yet, Hegel felt constrained to write such an introduction, and he is rather self-conscious in a letter to his friend Daub of August 15, 1826 (*Briefe* vol. III, p. 126) of the inordinate length which this new introduction - that ought and *cannot* in truth be - is attaining.

3. Thirdly, this “*Vorbegriff*” is in the “Table of Contents” (pp. 29-32 of the Nicolin/Pöggeler edition of the *Enzyklopädie*) included in the body of the *Logic* itself. The “*Vorbegriff*” is comprised of §§19-83 of the “Science of Logic”, which is the “First Part” of the *Encyclopedia*. But §§1-18 are also called “Einleitung”, i.e. “introduction”. These first eighteen paragraphs are therefore an introduction to an introduction.

Within the “Preliminary Notion”, i.e. “*Vorbegriff*”, §§19-25 develop the logic of the Concept as moving from “immediacy”, i.e. unconceptual experience (*Erfahrung*), “feeling” (*Gefühl*) or “representation” (*Vorstellung*) to the conceptual determination of the content of experience feeling and, representation. Insofar as experiences, feelings and representations are not without reality, but nonetheless only *potential* reality, they are abstract. Their real content is identical with the content of philosophical knowledge, but it is the “work of the concept” to sluff off the abstract nature of a reality still in a state of conceptless disarray. The concept recognizes itself in realizing experience’s, representation’s and feeling’s content. The movement of the Logic is the logical disclosure of the Concept’s own inner truth and reality. Insofar as that truth is always identical with the truth experienced by “us” in everyday life, as also throughout the history of humankind and of philosophy the Concept’s self-recognition has historical dimensions. It is here where the *Logic* of the *Encyclopedia* begins.

The first part of the “Preliminary Notion” (*Vorbegriff*) is comprised of §§26-36, “A”, the “First Attitude of Thought to Objectivity” (pp. 47-59 in the Wallace-Findlay edition, pp. 59-64 in the Nicolin/Pöggeler edition). It bears in the original German edition the title “Metaphysics”. (Wallace-Findlay leave out this title, as also the category “A”. Why?) The second section, “B” in the Nicolin/Pöggeler edition, has the title “Second Attitude of Thought to Objec-

tivity". It runs from pp. 64 top. 85, 37-60 (pp. 60-94 in the Wallace-Findlay edition). The "Preliminary Notion" is rounded out with "C, The Third Attitude of Objective Thought to Objectivity", §§61-78 (pp. 86-102 in the Nicolin/Pöggeler edition, pp. 95-112 in Wallace-Findlay). §§ 79-83 has the heading: "More Precise Concept and Subdivision of the Logic".

From here, the work proceeds to its three parts: Logic, §§ 84-244, Philosophy of Nature, §§ 245-376, and the Philosophy of the Spirit, §§377-577. The Wallace-Findlay version has only the first part, called simply *Logic*. The whole *Encyclopedia* is capped off with a quotation in Greek from Aristotle's *Metaphysic*, Book XII, 7. It does not bear a §sign. It is the part of the *Metaphysic* where Aristotle speaks of "thought thinking itself" being the "highest and best" activity. Hegel wants to indicate with this quotation that the whole of western metaphysics is "conceptualized", i.e. realized in his own thought. And surely realization is more than the unrealized form it had in Aristotle.

Back to the "Preliminary Notion" (*Vorbegriff*): As indicated, the "First Attitude to Objectivity" carries the title "Metaphysics" in the German edition. As for Hegel Logic is not only a process of thought but simultaneously the process as it has historically realized itself in the history of philosophy, "metaphysics" refers not only to a segment within the subject "Philosophy". Hegel lectured at Nürnberg, Jena and Heidelberg on "Logic and Metaphysics". Traditionally, these were two separate sections within philosophy. But already the Nürnberg *Logic* in fact draws these two together. In the mature Hegel Logic and Metaphysics are one and the same thing. But historically, there was an epoch in the history of philosophy that can be called the epoch of "metaphysics" §§26-36 is appropriately labelled "metaphysics". Wallace-Findlay should not really have omitted that title, however confusing Hegel's own chapters and subdivisions might be. For "Metaphysics", the "First Attitude of Thought to Objectivity", is followed by two parts within the "Second Attitude", namely "Empiricism" (§§37-39), and "Critical Philosophy", (§§40-60).

Hegel locates his own thought, the Logic of the Concept, within the "Critical Philosophy" that built on "Empiricism" which itself is an outgrowth of continental "Metaphysics". For the sake of philosophy-historical nature of Hegel's own logic, which has simultaneously a historical, i.e. developmental, processual quality, I turn our attention to §§40-50 of Hegel's *Encyclopedia*, i.e. the *Logic*.

§40: Kant further developed "empiricism", i.e. experience was to be the "sole foundation for cognition". The "critical turn" in philosophy arises from the fact of an inconsistency: a) empirical sensation does not...apprehend more

than individuality." Simultaneously, however, "universality and necessity" are apprehended. Critical philosophy therefore assigned the latter to the "spontaneity of thought". Thought itself is "*a priori*". Hegel calls these categories of thought those of the *understanding* (*Verstand*), and he sharply distinguishes them from *reason* (*Vernunft*). But moving from understanding to reason, Hegel's own unique move, does not yet happen in §40. Hegel only *hints* at his critique of Kant and of "critical philosophy" with the concept "underivative connections of opposites". Hegel's own explanation of Kant's "synthetic judgments a priori". For the "opposites" connected or mediated in Hegel's concept are nothing but the "thing in itself", which Kant had to "presuppose" (without wanting to presuppose anything but sense-perception", but which Hegel discovers as nothing but the concept itself. In the mediating process, which is a process of the double negation (for the juxtaposition of knowing subject and known object is a "negative activity" that needs to be negated), the logic of truth reveals itself.

§41. The juxtaposition (Wallace: "contrast", p. 66:2) between subject and object remains operative, but the inconsistency arose in the critical philosophy of perceiving the "universal" among the experienced individual data as an "a priori constituent" (Wallace, 66:7ff), i.e. as the contribution of thought, while simultaneously presuming to be an "objective" quality of universality and necessity. The Wallace-Findlay version expresses this inconsistency (p. 66:14-12 from bottom) as "already knowing before you know - the error of refusing to enter the water until you have learnt to swim." What is meant here is that the Critical Philosophy (Kant) had not recognized that investigating thought-determinants, i.e. categories and concepts, is mind investigating itself. You cannot merely investigate the mechanism of thought. That is the famous reduction of philosophy to "epistemology" in Kant. Hegel realized that this "reduction" misses the true nature of philosophy, for philosophy is nothing but the Concept's self-recognition. This is what Hegel means when he says:

The forms of thought must be studied in their essential nature and complete development: they are at once the object of research and the action of that object. Hence they examine themselves: in their own action they must determine their limits, and point out their defects. This is that action of thought, which will hereafter be specially considered under the name of Dialectic, and regarding to which we need only at the outset to observe that, instead of being brought to bear upon the categories from without, it is immanent in their own action. (p. 66:9-bottom of p.).

Hegel summarizes his analysis of the Kantian "critical philosophy" as a pre-critical critique with these words:

Up to this point, the discussion has shown three meanings of objectivity: First, it means what has external existence, in distinction from which the subjective is what is only supposed, dreamed, &c. Secondly, it has the meaning, attached to it by Kant, of the universal and necessary, as distinguished from the particular, subjective, and occasional element which belongs to our sensations. Thirdly, as has just been explained, it means the thought-apprehended essence of the existing thing, in contradistinction from what is merely our thought, and what consequently is still separated from the thing itself, as it exists in independent essence. (Wallace-Findlay, p.68:4ff).

§42. *The Theoretical Faculty.*

Kant had pointed to the content of the “intuitions” (*Anschauungen* to be *multiple*, but the “Transcendental Analytic” of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* had shown that that multiplicity has unity and cohesion in the “synthetic unity of apperception”, which is *a priori given*. That “primary synthesis” Kant finds to be *accomplished* in the “categories”. Hegel asks legitimately, how the synthetic unity of apperception arrives at the categories? Hegel moves from Kant, who merely provided the “quarry” (RA) of the “common logic”, to Fichte, who exhibited “the *necessity* of these categories”, “giving a genuine *deduction* of them. (Fichte had shown Kant to be still “precritical” insofar as he had shown at the “transcendental subjectivity”, supposedly “free” in its “spontaneity” to produce the categories (like space and time) in terms of which the “multiplicity” (i.e. fragmentariness) of reality can be *understood* (i.e. seen as unified), is in reality totally *dependent* on the “thing in itself” i.e. on “empirical sense-reality”; Fichte had thus shown that the Kantian subject was not at all free, but rather bound.)

Hegel praises and criticizes Fichte at the same time. The “merit” (Wallace-Findlay, p. 69:2) I have just pointed out. The shortcoming, in my own words: Fichte has *not shown* how the deduction of the categories, as also logical judgements, are no longer “taken merely from observation and so only empirically treated, but be deduced from thought itself.” I.e.: Such logical process is an activity of thought itself, an *objective* activity, and activity in which I participate subjectively.

§§43, 44. The Kantian “categories” are supposedly objective and subjective: subjective insofar as they are provided by the “transcendental subjectivity”, objective insofar as they are conditioned by the material that is supposed to be known. For this reason they “are incapable of being determinants of the

Absolute.”²¹ Because of this inadequacy, which is an inadequacy of inconsistency, they are “incapable of knowing the Things-in-themselves.”

In the *Zusatz to §44* Hegel expresses for the first time how he moves from “unity of apperception”, or from the unifying concepts to “God”, or, expressed differently, to his “theological” logic. But he had already expressed it in the first sentence of § 44, for the “Absolute” and “God” are identical. For this reason, Hegel also says: “The Thing-in-itself (and under ‘thing’ is embraced even Mind and God) expresses the object when we leave out of sight all that consciousness makes of it...” (Wallace, p. 72:5ff). To repeat something I had suggested before: The unsatisfactory nature of the postulated “thing in itself” is nothing but the Absolute, God, the Concept (Notion), which knows itself in the subjective knower. Hegel says that the Kantian version of the “Thing in itself” is completely abstract, *negative*. *It is important to observe this element of negativity, for it becomes an important element in Hegel’s “negation of the negation”*.

Hegel shows that both: the thing in itself, as also the reflexive subjectivity are “purely abstract” and “negative”, they are without any content whatsoever. Furthermore, these two forms of negativity are closely related: The *caput mortuum* of the artifact of the “thing itself” “is only a product of thought...it is the work of the empty ‘Ego’ which makes an object out of this empty self-identity of its own.” (Wallace-Findlay, 72:11ff, my emphasis, RA). Hegel continues: “One can only read with surprise the perpetual remark that we do not know the Thing-in-itself. On the contrary there is nothing we can know so easily” (end of §44, p.72). For it is as a conceptual product essentially identical with it.

§45. *Understanding* does not recognize this, however. Only *Reason*, the faculty of the Unconditioned...“discovers” this. Subjective understanding knows itself in the “thing itself”, and this “knowledge” is identical with the higher category of understanding. However, this insight is still completely indeterminate, not yet having any experiential knowledge at all.

§46. The path to recognition is the path to *determinate concreteness*. But the realm of determinate concreteness is the realm of plurality, Wallace translates “*mannigfaltigen Zusammenhang*” with “complex interconnection” p.(74:5f). Hegel moves in the following to the “application” of the Kantian

21 Wallace. 72:1f; I have modified his translation to render more adequately the original, RA

insight to “metaphysics”, for the “application” to empirical entities is for the Logic only the first step to an all-emcompassing concept of the Concept.

§47. Hegel has in §46 moved away from the “application” of the concept to only an empirical entity, and toward its “application” to metaphysics itself. That application dealt in §33 with the “first” part of metaphysics, “ontology”. §34 dealt with “rational psychology”; §35 dealt with “cosmology”; and §36 with “natural or rational theology”. The point of §47 is now to interpret the Kantian “epistemology” in terms of the problem of metaphysics as such, not only to “concrete” objects. But metaphysical reality deals with infinite entities:

1) The first infinite is the soul. Hegel’s “critique” of the Kantian critique (§46, *Zusatz*, end) concentrates on Kant’s transferral of *empirical* categories into those of *thought*. That transferral “suffered” from a certain error, the error of “fallability”, referred to by Hume, who had observed that such categories as “generality” and “necessity” cannot be encountered in the empirical realm, only in thought, and that is a “fallacy” to mix the one with the other. Hegel supplies in the second sentence of §47 his critique of that fallability, and it is in its brevity a masterpiece of his method. Furthermore, it discloses the “identity-in-difference” of the finite with the infinite subject, or, as he said in the “Einleitung” to the *Phenomenology*, the identity of subject and substance. This “identity” is referred to *verbatim* in points (3) and (4) (Wallace-Findlay, p.75:1-2, Nicolin/Pöggeler, p.71:12-14). The four ways in which the subject is identified. In abbreviated shorthand, the subject is identified as (1) *determining*, and as (2) *singular* or an abstractly simple. But this knowledge of singularity is possible only on the basis of knowledge of *multiplicity* outside of me.²² *Only over against* that plurality, that is, in a real sense only together with that plurality, the “self-samehood” (Wallace-Findlay: “one and the same”) is the “identity” of the subject specified. This thought is expressed more fully in (4), where that *identity* is qualified as “distinguishing”, i.e. as *differentiating* itself from all the things outside me. In this way the Kantian critique of “rational psychology” is completed. Kant had criticized the tradition of rational psychology with special reference to Mendelssohn²³ as incapable of resolution of the problem of the nature of the subject. This incapacity emerged in Mendelssohn as what Kant characterized as a “paralogism”, i.e. as a “fallacious conclusion” or also as the “illusion” of thinking that the problem of claim contradicted by counter-claim

22 Wallace-Findlay has p. 75:2 instead of *Mannigfaltiges*, “variety”, which only partially renders the plurality of Hegel’s formulation.

23 *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, ed. Vorländer, Meiner Verlag; Hamburg 1956 370; B, 399)

rested with the object under consideration, in this case with the nature of the human soul. The famous Kantian resolution was identical with his “transcendental” turn: We cannot know anything at all of the “things in themselves”, in this case of the “soul”. The “illusion” of attempting to resolve the “paralogisms” of reason by paying attention to the nature of the thinking subject (or soul) rests in *not perceiving that the “error” rests in thought itself, which of necessity introduces contradictory, i.e. different judgments into the identity of the subject*. Kant says: The “error”, i.e. the “different” judgments that can be made about the identity of the subject, rests with thought itself, not in the subject at all. Kant had arrived at this conclusion through his discovery of the Humeian “fallaciously” applied to a specific empirical datum like the soul (Wallace-Findlay, p. 75:10-20). Hegel resolves the issue, as indicated above, by showing that the essence or substance of the “subject (Kant’s “thing in itself”) is identical with the concept of the subjective thinker reflecting on this “thing in itself”; recognizing this “identity” is the “determining activity” of the “subject” itself, which is therefore both *substance* and *subject*. But in §47 this self-identifying activity of the logical process is not yet clearly specified.

§48. 2) The second infinite is the “world”. As with the first infinite, also here “antinomies” are encountered. Antinomies are encountered when two contradictory statements about one and the same thing are claimed to be true *of necessity*. The Kantian antinomies are fourfold:²⁴ I. (*Thesis*) The World has a beginning in space and time, and (*Antithesis*) The world is eternal in time and space; II, (*Thesis*), All parts of the world are simple, joined parts; and (*Antithesis*) nothing is simple in the world, everything is complex and conjoined; III (*Thesis*) Things happen in the world not only through the laws of cause and effect, but also from freedom, and (*Antithesis*) everything in the world is completely determined. Hegel observes, as he did in §47 in the *Zusatz*, that the problem *appears* to be solved in seeing that the contradiction does not adhere the object itself, but only thought. Hegel says this solution is “trivial” (Wallace-Findlay, p. 77:11, Nicolin/Pöggeler, p. 72:41); the triviality rests in the (profound) contemporary predisposition to treat the appearing world with great “tenderness” (*ibid*), whereas thought is qualified as the falsifying villain: No objection is found in tracing the error “only” to reason. The categories themselves that know the “world” contain the contradictions, according to this way of thinking, characteristic of the naive, i.e. unreflected, as also to Kant’s disposition.

Hegel again here, in this §48, reveals his solution to the issue:

Probably nobody will feel disposed to deny that the *phenomenal* world presents contradictions to the observing mind; meaning by the world as it presents itself to the *senses* and the understanding, to the *subjective mind*. But if we compare the *essence* of the world and the *essence* of the mind, it does seem strange to hear how calmly and confidently the modest dogma has been advanced by some (Kant et al, RA), and repeated by others, that the thinking essence, and not the worldly essence is that which contradicts itself.²⁵

What Hegel is suggesting here is that Kant had indeed seen correctly the contradiction - the "paralogism", the "antinomy" - to rest in reason itself, but he specifically suggests that the contradiction, (i.e. "differentiation") originates not only in the "thinking essence", but also in the "wordly essence". Furthermore, this differentiation which proposes a "*thesis*" against an "*antithesis*" in the Kantian antinomy of reason is not a differentiation (i.e. "contradiction" of two essences, but rather of one essence only, of the "concept", as Hegel says later. *Position* and *negation*, thesis and antithesis are activities of *Vernunft* (Reason), and the "sensual" *Verstand* cannot comprehend, because it is too limited in scope, that it fallaciously keeps the antinomy away from Reason out of a misguided "tenderness" for the "appearing", phenomenal world, assuming in that misguided perception that what glitters is also true gold. The determining, delimiting, defining qualities of reason are not only subjective, but rather inhere the "essence" of the world itself, its "essence", its "concept" being identical with the "essence" of reason itself. Hegel further elaborates this in the First Part of the *Encyclopedia*, the "Science of Logic", where he elaborates the process of logic in three parts, the doctrine of being, the doctrine of the essence, and the doctrine of the concept and of the idea. The first sentence of the doctrine of the essence is "Being is the Concept only *in itself*" § 84 (p.123, Wallace-Findlay, p. 105 Nicolin/Pöggeler), § 112, the first sentence of the "Science of Essence", states that "Essence is the concept as *posited* Concept." And § 160, the first sentence of the "Science of the Concept", begins with the statement: "The concept is the *freedom* which as the *power, being substantially for itself*, is in its identity with itself that which is *determinate in and for itself*." [p.223, Wallace-Findlay, p.151, Nicolin/Pöggeler]. The important thing to observe is that being and essence, concept and the differentiating specificity of a thing known are one and the same thing. But this means that reason is not an

25 Wallace-Findlay, 77:16-24; Nicolin/Pöggeler, p. 73:6-11. Accents original. My translation (RA) is true to Hegel's original. Wallace's is frankly in need of improvement.

empty, *indeterminate* form, the *empty identity*, to which Hegel refers in §48, [Wallace-Findlay, p. 77:9 from bottom, Nicolin/Pöggeler, p. 73:17-18]. If reason is only an empty form, it thinks nothing. Rather, determinate and determining specificity is an "activity" of reason itself, so that we must say as Hegel says in §48:

The Antinomies are not confined to the four special objects taken from Cosmology: they appear in all conceptions, notions, and Ideas. To be aware of this and to know objects in this property of theirs makes a vital part in a philosophical theory. For the property thus indicated is what we shall afterwards describe as the Dialectical element in logic.

One final point about the end of §48 in the Wallace-Findlay edition, specifically p. 79:15-16 from bottom (This *Zusatz* is missing in the Nicolin/Pöggeler edition. It stems from the Hotho/Henning/Hinrichs/Michelet lecture notes and cannot be considered authoritative. Nonetheless, it is a valuable passage.) The Kantian categories are "empty" forms without which we cannot know determinate reality; these forms must yet be filled with determinate *content*. Hegel emphasizes here (as elsewhere) correctly:

It is quite correct to say that we can go beyond every *definite* space and beyond every *definite* time (that is to say, there is some legitimacy in Kant's notion that time and space like other categories lies beyond the specific "here and now" just as the *form* always lies *beyond* the specific *content* contained in the form, RA): but it is no less correct that space and time are real and actual only when they are defined or specialized into 'here' and 'now' - a specialization which is involved in the very notion of them.

This statement is important because *Kierkegaard's* criticism of Hegel as slighting the "here and now" and the specifics of reality has caused our time to neglect the profound relation between Kierkegaard's and Hegel's concern. It is high time that the proximity of Kierkegaard to Hegel is perceived, a proximity recently highlighted by Stephen Dunning, *Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages*.²⁶

§ 49. 3. "The third object of Reason is God". We know already from Hegel's *Phenomenology*, from the *Nürnberg Logic* and from the *Heidelberg Encyclopedia* that for Hegel "God is identical with the "Absolute Spirit", "truth", "essence" and the "Concept". We also know, as clarified e.g. in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, the "Concept specifies itself", i.e. specification of

reality in its multiple determinedness, is truth's "own doing". This means that "empty", i.e. merely formal "categories" are not "applied" to "specific" contents, as in the Kantian thought. Rather, as phenomenal reality is disclosed *as* merely phenomenal, also the truth, i.e. the essence behind the appearance appears, and *Sein* (i.e. being) "negates" the mere *Schein* (i.e. appearance).

What Hegel says in the second sentence of §49 can be said of all merely "understanding" reason: "For the understanding all determination is merely a *barrier* and a negation." Hegel wants to say: "To place something means to know it in all specificity and determinedness. But getting to know it as such is merely the subjective participation in objective act of the Concept's self-revelation.

The traditional view of God was to view him as limitless, i.e. as *indefinite*. Since God is known traditionally as the "sum of realities", i.e. as the most real *essence* (*Wesen* in the German, hence "being" in Wallace's rendition is wrong). As completely indeterminate *essence*, God remains the *simple abstractum*. [Wallace-Findlay, p.79:7 to end of p., Nicolin/Pöggeler, p.73-74] God, understood as pure essence, must necessarily remain purely abstract, if he is known *specifically*, i.e. *as* God. But such specificity is traditionally, also in Kant, accorded only to *being* (i.e. to the material *content* of the supposedly empty *essential forms*.) That material *being*, traditionally always standing over against conceptual forms, is therefore also available only as the equally abstract *being*. In the context of this way of thinging, exemplified by Kant, thought and being, essence and existence, can never be "united".

Hegel is quite correct: That unity was called by Kant the "Ideal of Reason", (*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, *ibid*, B 595). Hegel goes beyond Kant in §§ 50 and 51 insofar as he overcomes the "form-content", "thought-matter" and "ideal-reality" dichotomy. He overcomes this dichotomy in two ways, the first proceeding in §50 from *being* to thought, the second in §51 from *thought* to being. Both procedures must be seen as dialectically happening simultaneously. That simultaneity is the "Beginning of Hegel's Logic",²⁷ §50. We must remember here that Hegel does not talk only about God, as one would talk about "tree" or about "this tree". Hegel is talking here about the method to reflect the relation of thought and being *per se*.)

27 See my essay "The Absolute as the Beginning of Hegel's Logic", *Philosophical Forum*, VI:2/3 (Spring, 1976) 288-300

§ 50 deals with the first path, proceeding from being to thought. The unreflected assumption about “being” is the “immediacy” of the world in infinite multiplicity or variety. Wallace just avoids (p.80:13) the concept *Unmittelbare* p.74:15 in the Nicolin/Pöggeler rendition. That avoidance is unfortunate. For it is often not understood what “mediation” and the “immediate” mean. Just briefly: Anything “immediate” is abstract. Conceptualizing something *as* something, i.e. knowing it in its essence and truth is for Hegel²⁸ just as much an activity of that essence and truth itself as it is of the thinking subject, which in reality just participates in that revelatory process. That process itself is identical with mediation. Mediation makes concrete, just as thinking is for Hegel an act of making concrete, specific.²⁹

That process if *mediation*, i.e. “elevating” (*aufheben*) the world out of its plural immediacy to “God” is the mechanism of the traditional “proofs of God, i.e. the cosmological and the physico-theological proofs. Those “proofs” are for Hegel identical with the process of *thought*. I am deviating in the following from the Wallace-Findlay translation. Hegel says literally in §50: (in the sentence begun by Wallace with “Suppose”, p.80:19, middle of p.)

To *think* means to strip (this fullness) of the form of its isolated unconnectedness and accidental nature, and to grasp (i.e. understand) it as a universal and absolutely necessary being which determines itself and acts by general purposes or laws - to grasp it as different from the being at the commencement, as God.

Hegel correctly refers once more to Hume’s critique of the cosmological and the physico-theological proofs, most simply (oversimplifyingly, in fact) statable thus: From plural data general laws cannot be derived; in ethics, this “fallability” takes the form: prescriptive sentences cannot be derived from descriptive ones. Hegel refers to Hume and to his previous elaboration of Kant’s “paralogisms” in § 47.

Hegel’s *Zusatz* - not identified by Wallace by smaller print, as in the Nicolin/Pöggeler rendition, criticizes the Kantian-Humeian critique. Hegel uses in this critique words that are central to his thought, i.e. to the *progression of the logic of the Concept*. [Wallace-Findlay, p.80:2 from bottom ff; Nicolin/Pöggeler, p.74:2 from bottom ff]. The central concepts are “transition” or “passage”

28 as for H.G. Gadamer see e.g. *Wahrheit und Methode*, Mohr; Tübingen 1965

29 I have clarified this process of mediating concretization of truth in Hegel’s thought in the essay “Endlichkeit und Absoluter Geist in Hegels Philosophie” *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* 29:1 (1975) 63-80

(*Übergehen*), “leap” (*Sprung*), a genuinely Kierkegaardian concept, “conclusion” (*Schluß, Schlüsse*), “negative activity” and “negation”. The basic point of Hegel’s critique of the Kantian-Humeian critique can be summarized this way: 1. That “transition” is not “syllogistic reason” only, but just as much the “activity” of the substance, essence, truth of that about which the conclusion is made. For the concept determines itself in Hegel’s logic, and this act is primarily an *objective, a substantive* act, hence an act of truth, and only therefore an act in which the subject can participate. 2. That “rising” or “concluding” of the *substance* “negates” the appearance of the world, “demotes” it in the process of revealing its “essence and truth”. The error of the physico-theological and the cosmological “proofs” rested in moving “from one thing which *is* and continues to *be*, to *another thing* (i.e. God, or the general judgement or the prescriptive sentence) which is *supposed to be also*.” [Wallace-Findlay, 81:11f, Nicolin/Pöggeler, p.75:27f] Hegel specifically identifies such a method of logical “concluding” as merely “*affirmative*” [80:10; 75:26]. His critique can be formulated more specifically thus:

But the great error is to understand the nature of thought only in this form of reason. To think the empirical (phenomenal) rather means to recast its form and to transmute into a universal. And thus the action of thought has also a *negative* effect upon its basis: the matter of sensation, when it receives the stamp of universality, *does not remain* in its empirical (i.e. phenomenal) form. By the removal and negation of the shell, the kernel within is brought to the light (see §§ 13 and 23). And it is because they do not express the *negative moments* implied in the elevation of the spirit from the world to God that the metaphysical proofs of the being of God are defective interpretations. If the world is accidental (*zufällig*), it follows that it is only *something falling*, i.e. fallible, phenomenal, which is in itself *nothing*. The meaning of the elevation of the spirit is that the world should indeed have being, which is, however, only appearance, not true being, not absolute truth. (This elevation) signifies that the being resides beyond that phenomenal appearance only in God and that God alone is that true being [81:10ff; 75:28ff].

We need to remind ourselves that this “elevation of God” is “nothing but thinking” itself, i.e. the action of the essence and substance of the world itself. Nonetheless the “phenomenal” world is essential for two reasons: *first* as a “mediating” agent, - considered at first to be being per se -, through which truth can be revealed which is, however, *secondly*, to be demoted or “negated” to mere appearance. The appearing world thus is the “mediating agent”; this mediation needs, however, to be mediated. Wallace does not translate this sentence well. I will attempt to do better:

In the fact that this elevation is a *transition* and a *mediation*, it is just as much an *elimination* or *overcoming* (*Aufheben*) of this *transition*, for that through which God could appear mediated, the world, is rather declared as the Not; only the *nothingness* of the *being* of the world is the bon of the elevation. In this way that which is the mediating element (i.e. the world, RA) disappears, and so mediation itself is overcome in this mediating process [82:9ff; 75:42ff].

Hegel proceeds from here once more to reflect on Jacobi and on Spinoza. For brevity's sake, we must skip this part.

§ 51 In reality this "mediation of the mediation" already contains the "ontological proof", for thought gains existence in the self-revelation or self-specification of worldly essence. But this *content* of Hegel's critique of the Kantian-Humeian critique becomes explicit only in § 51, the "second" way of unifying thought and being. This method moves from the "abstractness of thought to determinedness". Once abstractness has specified itself, it has also gained existence or being. We know the being of a thing when we know it concretely and specifically. Hegel specifically calls this method the "ontological proof" [84:12ff; 77:36ff]. The ontological proof is central to Hegel's thought. That Hegel believes to have implicitly already pointed out this "ontological proof" he specifically states when he says that understanding objects to the ontological proof in the same way as it objected to the cosmological and physico-theological proofs: "It denied that the empirical-phenomenal involves the universal" [84:15 from bottom; 78:2ff]. Hegel here elaborates something that he already clarified before, but with specific reference to Kant's critique of the ontological proof. Kant argued that existence cannot be deduced from thought, like the existence of a hundred dollars cannot be deduced out of the thought of a hundred dollars. (Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B, 627). Hegel advances several arguments: first: also he, as any sane man, surely recognizes that thinking a hundred dollars surely does not produce them in fact. But secondly, God must surely be of a different nature than a hundred dollars. Here lies the crux of Hegel's argument: It is an error of the first order to think of God as of the same nature as a tree or hundred dollars or any other object. God is rather the essence, truth, substance of the world, in short, the *Concept*. In the self-specification of that concept the world is "elevated" to God, and to its own truth at the same time, while in the same process the phenomenal world is "negated" or "demoted" to pure appearance, not being. We had clarified this before, and so we can close this section of our analysis.

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ETICA PERSONALISTA*

Bioetica ed Etica all'Ambiente

Attilio Danese

1. *La sfida della persona all'etica*

La persona assume il suo ruolo nella vita in rapporto agli altri se diviene capace di generare dei processi di personalizzazione intorno a sé. Il suo compito non può fermarsi alla morale del dovere per il dovere, ma ad un agire tale da suscitare con gli altri una reciprocità d'intese. Intelletto, sentimento, volontà concorrono ad intuire in modo creativo e circostanziato ciò che può generare legami significativi con una determinata persona, il suo mondo, i suoi valori, i suoi bisogni. L'ispirazione etica personalista antepone l'altro a se stesso e mira ad ottenere dall'altro una risposta etica di pari intensità in modo tale da essere l'un per l'altro nella stessa disposizione. In questa reciprocità c'è il passaggio della morale del dovere e quella dell'amore. La prima si ferma all'adempimento del proprio obbligo morale, la seconda è una tensione che sollecita l'altro e lo coinvolge in una risposta creativa. L'altro non è solo oggetto della mia attenzione o dovere, almeno dal momento in cui egli si pone nei miei confronti nella stessa disposizione di soggetto. Torna in mente quanto Hegel scriveva nel frammento *Die Liebe*: "Amore vero e proprio ha luogo solo fra viventi eguali in potere e che quindi sono viventi l'un per l'altro nel modo più completo".¹ In questa reciprocità realizzata si sviluppa una nuova dimensione del sociale.²

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*Per un più adeguato sviluppo dei temi qui trattati, rimando a: A. DANESE - G.P. Di NICOLA, *Ethique et personalisme*, (Louvain la Neuve, 1989)..

- 1 H. NOHL, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften* (Tübingen 1907, Frankfurt aM. 1966) 379.
- 2 Cfr. T. SORGI, *Introduzione alla sociologia* (Pescara 1985) 189-232. Sulla reciprocità nella concezione personalista rimando a: A. DANESE, *Unità e pluralità. Mounier e la questione personalista*, (Città Nuova: Roma, 1984) Id. (a cura di), *Persona e sviluppo*, (Dehoniane; Roma 1991) G.P. DI NICOLA, *Uguaglianza e differenza. La reciprocità uomo donna*, (Città Nuova, Roma 1988)

Affrontare un rapporto con uno schema fisso, anche se moralmente esaltante, sarebbe di ostacolo alla comprensione di una situazione e di un volto nuovo dell'essere. Si richiede piuttosto l'ascolto delle sue esigenze, del suo ritmo di vita, della sua particolare prospettiva sul mondo, incontrando la quale l'io amplia le sue possibilità di dialogo, si ristrutturata e rigenera insieme se stesso e l'altro.

Si vede bene che una morale che parte dal rapporto con gli altri è difficile da definire. Si tratta di mettere in comunicazione due realtà, due personalità, due mondi nei quali l'altro è sempre un capitolo aperto davanti all'io. Quest'ultimo a sua volta per la sua tensione metafisica tra la trascendenza orizzontale e verticale, per il suo debito nei confronti degli altri ("abbiamo un debito nei confronti di quelli che ci hanno proceduto" ricorderebbe Ricoeur) e dell'Altro non può giungere a negare sul piano orizzontale quanto ha ricevuto sul piano verticale. In altri termini, il debito che egli ha verso gli altri non può giungere a negare il debito che egli ha *in primis* nei confronti del suo stesso essere.

Per l'economia del nostro discorso sull'etica, più che arrendersi davanti al mistero o definire i contenuti positivi (nel senso giuridico o hegeliano del termine) di questa attitudine morale (confermandoli in schemi fissi che sarebbero inevitabilmente restrittivi e sorpassati) preferiamo seguire in questo paragrafo la via negativa, escludendo ciò che è contrario alla direzione etica che si fonda sulla persona.

Un ostacolo per la persona si presenta quando si vuol fondare l'etica solamente sulla **natura**, alla quale si dà una teleologia definita a priori. È noto che oggi il concetto di natura è cambiato a causa del progresso scientifico e filosofico. Ci si è accorti, non senza sorpresa, che l'osservatore - e il metodo di studio che egli utilizza - gioca un ruolo così grande nella conoscenza della natura che può giungere sino a cambiare l'oggetto. Si tratta del "peccato di antropomorfismo" che compare oggi in tutta la sua potenza e modifica profondamente l'attenzione che noi abbiamo nei confronti del progresso scientifico, le sue trappole, i suoi limiti, l'arroganza della sua ambizione neutrale e oggettivista. Si è visto infatti che "la speranza di una oggettività scientifica è vana, indipendentemente dall'osservatore e dal metodo di studio. La ricerca scientifica non descrive il mondo reale, ma è frutto di un dialogo in cui l'osservatore e suoi metodi sono importanti quanto il reale. Nel campo della ricerca, se si dimentica il ruolo dell'osservatore si commette un grave di errore di

ragionamento”.³ La verità scientifica non è mai assoluta ma relativa alle condizioni esplicite o tacite nelle quali si genera. La scienza, sino a ieri orgogliosa della sua chiarezza, oggi confessa i suoi limiti. La natura in effetti non è intelligibile come tale se non in un processo interattivo tra l'uomo e la natura, che non sono più considerati come soggetto e oggetto, attivo e passivo.

Quando si parla di natura umana la si riduce spesso alla natura biologica e non alla natura ragionevole dell'uomo, sottovalutando la dimensione creativa. L'uomo fa parte della natura e può nello stesso tempo trasformarla, studiarla, averne consapevolezza, prendere coscienza di sé. Il compito suo, proprio a causa della coscienza, è di agire sulla natura cercando di trasformare poco alla volta il disordine in ordine, il caso con la razionalità. “La capacità umana di orientare la natura è naturale e lo richiede la natura stessa”.⁴

In un concetto puramente fisico della vita e della storia, la persona è in effetti soggetta alla necessità e al caso. Il compito dell'uomo verso la natura e verso se stesso è di affrontare gli ostacoli, le resistenze della natura al processo di umanizzazione (alleviare la sofferenza, prevedere le catastrofi) anche se con discernimento e obbedienza al ritmo delle cose.⁵

Diviene importante in questa prospettiva l'interpretazione che l'uomo dà del suo rapporto con la natura e quindi la dimensione culturale. Il termine **cultura** è usato per esprimere la capacità umana di superare la dedità della natura creando norme, valori, leggi. In questo caso se si mette l'accento sull'esistenza, sull'azione, sulle scelte, sottolineando la responsabilità etica che l'uomo assume durante la sua vita, soprattutto in quanto parte di un gruppo sociale. “L'uomo è un animale simbolico” diceva E. Cassirer⁶, dal momento che riceve, costruisce e trasmette una cultura. Solitamente si accentua l'importanza della cultura dei valori ricevuti nel processo di socializzazione e quindi il ruolo della società nella formazione della morale. La coscienza collettiva durkheimiana rimpiazza in questo caso la responsabilità individuale dell'uomo. Ma la persona non si impegna come il pezzo di un *puzzle* di un meccanismo

3 J. HAMBURGER “De l'art de raisonner en biologie et en médecine”, in “*Revue des sciences morales et politiques*” 1(1987) 7-24, p.15.

4 E. BONÉ, J.-F. MALHERBE, *Engendrés par la science* (Paris 1985)91.

5 Cfr. ID. *op.cit.*48-53

6 Cf. E. CASSIRER, *La filosofia delle forme simboliche* (La Nuova Italia; Firenze 1961); cf. anche L. LUGARINI, *Cassirer e il problema etico nell'esperienza mitica* (Milano 1967).

fisico, ma selezionando e scegliendo i valori preferenziali ai quali si riferisce e che le sono stati trasmessi.

Giova ricordare che tre sono le componenti classiche della decisione etica: la situazione, la tradizione e la coscienza, che è la più importante. Essa può essere considerata anche come strettamente legata alla coscienza collettiva.⁷ E meglio però evitare di sottolineare in maniera eccessiva il ruolo di una morale di gruppo che negherebbe la creatività e la responsabilità personale. In ogni caso, il punto di vista culturale combatte l'affermazione dei valori assoluti riconosciuti da tutti o imposti in maniera dogmatica alla persona come qualcosa di astratto e talvolta oppressivo. La lotta contro il dogmatismo tuttavia può divenire a sua volta un culturalismo astratto se perde di vista il rapporto tra l'uomo e la natura, l'uomo e gli altri, e può sfociare in un relativismo assoluto.

Dal momento che il relativismo conduce all'individualismo, esso è contrario alla dimensione comunitaria della persona. I valori devono salvare in qualche modo una dimensione universale, con riferimento ai valori della persona più che ai contenuti particolari, ma nello stesso tempo essere flessibili in rapporto all'esperienza e alla coscienza di ciascuno, che li ricostruisce e li modifica a seconda della propria storia personale. Sembra infatti che più che lo sforzo individuale di aderire alla morale ricevuta, più che lo sforzo collettivo di raggiungere il bene comune, il punto di vista personalista sottolinei lo sforzo della ricerca in comune del bene.⁸

Oggettivismo e soggettivismo sono spogliati dei loro ismi: per la persona in effetti è impensabile ridurre tutti i valori al criterio soggettivo. Ciò che, sia il riferimento alla natura che quello alla cultura trascurano è la dimensione comunitaria della vita etica.

Un altro ostacolo contro cui l'etica personalista deve oggi lottare è la diffusione di una mentalità **scienziata** (che continua l'esaltazione della natura in un senso più oggettivista) nella quale si riconosce alla scienza un valore di primo ordine. La padronanza della mentalità tecnologica e scienziata diviene imperativo etico fine a se stesso e conduce all'identificazione tra ciò che è tecnicamente possibile e ciò che è moralmente lecito. Le ricerche scientifiche aprono certamente della possibilità impreviste di intervento dell'intelligenza

7 Su questo punto con più ampiezza cfr. E. BONÉ - J. F. MALHERBE, *Engendrés par la science* (Paris 1985) 93-96.

8 Cf. F. GENTILE, *Intelligenza politica e ragion di Stato* (Milano 1983) 43-48.

sulla vita nelle sue basi genetiche, sulla comunicazione, sulla socialità umana. D'altro canto l'esacerbare il loro punto di vista riduce tutto il sapere a conoscenza scientifico-strumentale. Quest'uomo è spogliato del suo mistero, dei suoi valori religiosi e diviene una cosa in funzione della scienza. Ciò che ha detto l'uno dei due padri della prima bambina concepita in provetta testimonia che la mentalità scienziata domina sempre di più e trasforma inconsapevolmente i valori umani: "Credo che i benefici che ne possono derivare sorpassano ogni obiezione contro lo studio degli embrioni in vitro... credo che la necessità di conoscere è maggiore del rispetto da accordare ad un embrione precoce... questi ovociti sono raccolti e fertilizzati in vitro senza alcuna intenzione di trasferire questi embrioni nell'utero; essi sono utilizzati d'altra parte per scopo di ricerca, per studi osservazionali o sperimentali".⁹

Il dibattito sui rapporti tra la **ragione strumentale** e la ragione etica s'accentua nel momento in cui si ripone in discussione il principio secondo cui il sapere è potere principio che domina il sapere e partire dall'illuminismo. Il risultato della ragione strumentale al servizio del potere è la vittoria della tecnologia e dello scientismo impersonale che rischiano di cadere sempre nel nichilismo. La scienza sperimentale non è neutra e la tecnologia può produrre degli effetti contrari all'uomo se non è sua volta regolata da istanze etiche. Non si tratta perciò di un sapere che ha il suo fine in un'accumulazione di conoscenze e la sua efficacia in termini di potere e dominio (dal momento che questo sapere conduce al dominio dell'uomo sull'uomo e all'autodistruzione genetica o nucleare), ma si tratta di un sapere cosciente di essere subordinato a dei criteri etici differenti ed esterni in rapporto al sapere in sé. "La verità - scriveva Maritain - è che non è proprio della scienza il regolare la nostra vita, ma della saggezza; e che l'opera suprema della civiltà non è nell'ordine dell'attività transitiva ma dell'attività immanente: per mettere realmente la macchina, l'industria e la tecnica al servizio dell'uomo occorre metterle a servizio di un'etica della persona, dell'amore e della libertà. Ma l'illusione razionalistica è proprio nel non capire che è necessario scegliere tra l'idea d'una civiltà essenzialmente industriale e quella di una civiltà essenzialmente umana, per la quale l'industria è realmente solo uno strumento: è dunque sottoposta a leggi che non sono le sue".¹⁰

9 R. G. EDWARDS, "The Ethical scientific and medical implications of human conception in vitro", in C. CHAGAS (ed.), *Modern Biological experimentation* (C.d.v.; Roma 1984) 193-249.

10 J. MARITAIN, *Humanisme intégral* (Fribourg et Paris 1984) 509-510.

È facile capire inoltre che la **tradizione** da sola può essere anche antipersonalista. La ricerca e l'ascolto del nostro passato è attenzione alle nostre radici, è riconoscimento del debito che abbiamo nei confronti dei morti, è comprensione del come e del perchè siamo giunti ad essere oggi così. Il tradizionalismo al contrario, riduce la decisione etica all'esperienza degli anziani, per il fatto che la nostra esistenza si è forgiata attraverso l'esperienza, gli insegnamenti, le testimonianze orali o scritte che i nostri predecessori ci hanno trasmesso. Secondo i tradizionalisti troviamo delle risposte oggi ai nostri problemi obbedendo all'autorità della tradizione. Vi sono in proposito almeno tre obiezioni valide. Innanzitutto è evidente che questa posizione considera la propria tradizione come migliore delle altre e sarà difficile da confrontare con gli insegnamenti di più tradizioni. In secondo luogo, la tradizione si è costituita fornendo delle risposte a problemi differenti da quelli di oggi, quando siamo di fronte a nuove problematiche, sinora sconosciute. Bisogna dunque rinnovare la tradizione di fronte al nuovo contesto tecnico-scientifico e umano. Esiste infine il problema dell'interpretazione della tradizione e quindi di chi la interpreta, dato che si può vedere o meno continuità tra una legge nuova e lo spirito di fondo di una legge antica (non è facile per esempio leggere l'episodio di Cristo che interpreta la monogamia in continuità con le ragioni nascoste della poligamia concessa da Mosé).

Una tradizione viva suppone che l'uomo rigeneri ciò che gli è stato trasmesso. Il limite dei tradizionalisti è di confondere le tradizioni contingenti e particolari con lo spirito che sostiene la linea di continuità con la tradizione. Occorre dunque distinguere ciò che appartiene ormai al passato da ciò che è ancora vivo cercando di comprendere le ragioni che hanno spinto un gruppo ad adottare certi costumi, credenze e leggi come risposta a problemi specifici. È proprio della capacità umana il ravvivare, riattivare la tradizione al contatto con i nuovi problemi che le persone avvertono come più urgenti oggi.

La persona subisce oggi ugualmente subdoli attentati da un **sociologismo** alla moda che comporta tre principali rischi antipersonalisti:

1. Esalta le differenze culturali dei diversi gruppi umani, ma tende a relativizzare tutti i valori in una neutralità che spesso si rivela dannosa. Valga come esempio l'assolutizzazione del relativismo culturale di Malinowski, che da una parte costituiva la giusta reazione all'etnocentrismo europeo e dall'altra finiva col giustificare o accettare il razzismo e il cannibalismo.

2. Un certo sociologismo esalta una cultura quantitativa che si serve della statistica per misurare i costumi e i valori e finisce per presentare la media

aritmetica come regola universale. La numerolatria contemporanea - instancabilmente denunciata dall'esule russo P.Sorokin¹¹ - va oltre la sua funzione limitata e si rivolge contro l'uomo quando confonde la quantità con la qualità e invita indirettamente, soprattutto sul piano politico, alla ricerca spasmodica del consenso, gonfia il ruolo dei mass media e la loro capacità di manipolare la coscienza, quasi che la maggioranza costituirà automaticamente il riferimento morale.

3. Il sociologismo svaluta il ruolo creativo e attivo della persona quando privilegia il sistema nei confronti delle persone, quasi che esso funzioni da solo senza il concorso dell'uomo e anche contro l'uomo (così come sostengono le moderne teorie sistemiche).

Si possono considerare ancora due rischi presenti nella cultura contemporanea che si oppongono all'etica personalista: il **collettivismo**, nel quale la collettività, o spesso la massa, ha l'ultima parola sull'uomo singolo, e l'**individualismo**. Del primo molto si è scritto e parlato e le culture che lo hanno sostenuto, come il marxismo, sono in crisi. C'è una caduta delle ideologie che hanno privilegiato il "noi" sull'io e sul tu.

Nell'individualismo al contrario la libertà del soggetto è considerata come un valore assoluto. Dal momento che non è importante tanto ciò si fa, ma come lo si fa, ne risulta che tutto ciò che il soggetto sceglie liberamente è buono. L'io e la sua libertà divengono la regola assoluta; la libertà viene dissociata dal rispetto dell'altro e cade nel libertinismo. Ciò sia nelle forme più eclatanti dell'individualismo esasperato, sia in quelle più rispettose della libertà altrui, ma ancora imbrigliate in una socialità di tipo contrattualistico o nell'interpretazione del tutto formale della relazione sociale. Il personalismo comunitario, ponendo l'accento sull'importanza della comunità, considera contrarie alla persona tutte le concezioni che la riducono a individuo.

Anche l'etica kantiana che supera l'individualismo - grezzo - e assume il principio della responsabilità e dell'obbedienza dall'imperativo categorico - ha una radice individualistica, poiché il rispettare gli altri come fini e mai come mezzi è una legge inserita apriori nello statuto ontologico della persona indipendentemente dall'agire altrui.

11 Cf. P. A. SOROKIN, *Fads and Foibles in modern Sociology and Related Sciences* (Chicago 1956).

Il rapporto tra gli uomini è fissato in base alla coincidenza della stessa legge universale che risuona all'interno di ciascun soggetto, ma non è articolata in maniera flessibile sul ritmo della relazione interpersonale io-tu, come nel personalismo. Il rispetto del prossimo è un apriori etico che non passa per il crogiolo della relazione (sino al paradosso di rispettare l'altro che è sul punto di suicidarsi senza intervenire per impedirglielo).

In molte teorie che legano la libertà alla responsabilità e al dovere, sottovalutando il ruolo dell'altro, si arriva a una forma di prometeismo etico che potrebbe essere utile per la formazione degli eroi, ma che non lascia spazio per la reciprocità.

Antico e sempre nuovo nemico dell'etica personalista è l'**economicismo utilitaristico** che si regola sul calcolo dei vantaggi e degli svantaggi, dei danni e dei benefici, per ottenere il massimo dei vantaggi col minimo dispendio di energia. È una logica spesso dominante sia nei micro che nei macrosistemi sociali, comportando conseguenze evidenti ad esempio nel commercio delle armi, della droga, della pornografia, degli organi da trapianto, del sangue, dei fanciulli, dei feti e in tutte le forme di reificazione dell'uomo che il personalismo non cesserà di denunciare.¹²

Il riferimento alla persona non conduce certo a negare il valore della razionalità economica e delle sue leggi, contrapponendo un vitalismo irrazionale, di matrice naturalistico-ecologista o velleitaria e sentimentalista. Si tratta piuttosto di integrare le differenti razionalità per fare riferimento all'integralità della persona, nella quale, in un concerto di voci, la dimensione spirituale conserva il suo primato.

Si rimprovera, talvolta giustamente, al personalismo di non aver adeguatamente affrontato il problema economico, anche se Mounier aveva scritto *De la propriété capitaliste à la propriété humaine*¹³ e Sturzo in Sicilia aveva iniziato con l'affrontare praticamente i problemi economici seguendo il principio della solidarietà sociale, per esempio attraverso le classi rurali.

Vi può essere un'etica anti-personalista anche quando **Dio**, viene assunto come principio di una moralità oppressiva dell'uomo. In tali casi Dio appare

12 Sono note le denunce fatte da Mounier negli anni trenta contro le *desordre établis*, come la connivenza tra economicismo e spiritualismo.

13 Su questo argomento cf. AA.VV., *E. Mounier: la ragione della democrazia* (Roma 1986).

come il signore, il cui rapporto con l'uomo, lungi dall'essere amore (*kenosi*) è simile a quello dei potenti. Si vede bene che questo dipende dal processo di proiezione antropologica che attribuisce a Dio le caratteristiche della dominanza (onnipotenza, maschilità, forza), facendone talvolta un sovrano dispotico incomprensibile. Un esempio culmine di questo procedimento lo si vede in certi manifestazioni dell'Islam quando, in nome di Allah, si sacrificano migliaia di vite umane al mito della potenza e della grandezza. La storia è ricca insieme di episodi sublimi di donazione agli altri in nome della fede (missionari, martiri, testimoni) e nel contempo di episodi di fanatismo, di suicidi collettivi, di stermini operati in nome degli "dei falsi e bugiardi", per dirla con Dante.

La prospettiva personalista, nel momento in cui fissa lo sguardo sull'uomo, svolge un'attività catartica nei confronti dei concetti mistificanti della divinità. Essa, riconducendo l'attenzione all'uomo vicino, al "tu" come manifestazione dell'essere, sembra riecheggiare la raccomandazione scritturistica secondo cui non si può amare Dio che non si vede se non si ama il prossimo che è di fronte.¹⁴

2. Etica personalista ed altre etiche

L'antinomia di fondo della morale si combatte tra coloro che sottolineano l'assolutezza delle norme (innate o oggettive) e coloro che ne sottolineano la storicità. L'accento sulla soggettività è tipico del pensiero moderno, che mette in crisi tutto il mondo oggettivo esteriore e quindi anche quello morale.

Il filone di pensiero che si nutre del pensiero classico, platonico-aristotelico e cristiano, fa riferimento all'essere assoluto in quanto Dio rivelato e pensa la morale come scienza del fine, cui la condotta degli uomini deve essere indirizzata. Determinata la natura dell'uomo, se ne deduce il fine e la morale diventa così deduttiva. L'etica di S. Tommaso, per esempio, è dedotta dal principio "Dio è l'ultimo fine dell'uomo".¹⁵ Ora non si tratta di porre in discussione in maniera apriori il concetto di fine, perché gli stessi biologi lo riconoscono (causa finale): *l'oeil est fait pour voir*. Ciò che altera la posizione

14 Cf. 1 Giov 4,20-21.

15 SANCTI THOMAE AQUINATIS, *S.TH.* 11.2, q.1, a.8.

del problema sono le definizioni del fine partendo da un dato pensato, i ragionamenti finalisti posticci, gli assiomi dedotti senza mediazione.

Per Maritain, l'etica deve avere un appoggio extramentale e quindi Dio, la natura delle cose, la legge naturale. Egli, per superare la crisi kantiana, vuole ricreare i legami tra l'universo della libertà e quello della natura, in modo da fondare l'etica sull'essere: "E' assolutamente necessario ricorrere alla metafisica se vogliamo giustificare la validità reale, obiettiva delle norme, dei valori morali".¹⁶ Maritain riafferma la bontà dell'oggetto anche per combattere il sociologismo che dissolve il significato razionale di bene: "Il valore dell'atto, la bontà o la rettitudine dell'atto dipendono dall'oggetto: questa è una verità di importanza superiore che dipende dalla tesi generale che gli atti sono specificati dagli oggetti, tesi assolutamente fondamentale in S. Tommaso".¹⁷ Il personalismo di Maritain è perciò molto legato al concetto di bene di ordine intellettuale. La sua etica viene definita intellettualistica, esistenzialistica e volontaristica.¹⁸ Rispetto al pensiero di S. Tommaso, in cui prevaleva l'oggetto, Maritain mette maggiormente in evidenza l'intenzione del soggetto, senza però annullare l'aspetto oggettivo. Come testimonianza di questo andamento parallelo dei due aspetti, essenzialistico ed esistenzialistico, prendiamo la sua tesi della necessità per il reo di avere un duplice giudizio: uno relativo alla valutazione oggettiva ed esterna dell'atto, l'altro relativo alle intenzioni e alle circostanze, raggiunto più con la saggezza che con la scienza.¹⁹

Il razionalismo realista dell'ontologia classica appare a noi troppo universalistico ed oggettivistico, sia sul piano della ricerca metafisica che su quello dell'etica, data la critica contemporanea alla ragione. La morale, come morale della ragione, ci si rivela riduttiva dell'integralità dell'uomo ed incapace di superare un modello di razionalità che più spesso si mostra culturale o strumentale. L'uomo ha di fronte una concatenazione rigida di precetti che lo vincolano sino a diventare antiumani, se non tengono conto delle sue effettive possibilità e sorvolano sulla dinamica delle condizioni concrete. Ciò che l'etica personalis-

16 J. MARITAIN, *Nove lezioni sulle prime nozioni di filosofia morale* (tr.it. Vita e Pensiero Milano 1979) 67; cfr. *Introduzione* di V. Possenti, 9-47. Anche per Rosmini la regola fondamentale della morale è "volere o amare l'essere ovunque lo si conosca, secondo l'ordine che esso presenta all'intelligenza." (A. ROSMINI, *Principi della scienza morale* [Milano 1941] 78)

17 J. MARITAIN, *op. cit.* 89.

18 Così la definisce, V. POSSENTI, *Introduzione a J. MARITAIN, Nove lezioni sulle prime nozioni della filosofia morale*, cit. 9-47.

19 *Ibid.*, 227.

ta mette in evidenza è la partecipazione integrale dell'uomo al suo essere in relazione che si realizza come corpo, come psiche, come spirito. Essa perciò concorda nel valorizzare la partecipazione dell'intelletto e tuttavia non è intellettualistica, del sentimento e non è sentimentalistica, dell'impulso biologico, ma non è istintivistica. Comprende anche il sentimento di umanità come fondamento della morale, anche se il concetto di umanità tradisce impersonalità e astrazione rispetto alla persona *hic et nunc*.

Circa l'origine psicologica del sentimento morale è da ricordare anche l'intuizione che Maritain ha del cosiddetto "preconscio" morale, distinto dall'attività della coscienza, come anche dall'inconscio freudiano. L'esigenza di ricongiungere la dimensione morale dell'uomo alla sua dimensione biologica si ritrova anche nella psicanalisi di R. Assagioli²⁰ o nel concetto di Superconscio nella teoria della personalità di P. A. Sorokin.²¹ Indipendentemente dall'analisi psicologica, che non è nostro intento sviluppare, ci sembra importante un radicamento della morale nella struttura interiore del soggetto, per non scindere troppo istinto e morale con relativa accentuazione del ruolo della volontà, tipico di una morale troppo intellettualistica.

In una prospettiva personalista perde credibilità ogni concezione etica astratta che non sia radicata nella struttura dialogica umana e che non si giustifichi come strategia dell'attenzione all'essere. Il pensiero che vede la persona al centro del mistero dell'essere, come confluenza dell'io e del tutto, dell'essere e dell'esistere, è un pensiero che procede per analogie e che in morale si svincola sia dall'assolutezza dei principi sia dallo scetticismo.

Compito del pensiero contemporaneo, in cui si innesta il personalismo, è di ritrovare un collegamento tra oggettivismo e soggettivismo. Si avverte il bisogno di riaffermare la realtà oggettiva del bene e insieme la libertà della persona che compie l'atto e per la quale l'intenzione morale è altra cosa dalla specificazione ontologica.

Gli autori personalisti accolgono il significato positivo della critica del pensiero contemporaneo alla moralità data. Di conseguenza, affrontano la difficoltà di mettere d'accordo la morale classica e l'influsso esistenzialista. Da una parte l'etica personalista, nel mettere al centro il principio dialogico

20 Cf. R. ASSAGIOLI, *Per l'armonia della vita: la psicosintesi* (Roma 1971).

21 Cf. P. A. SOROKIN, *Society, Culture and personality* (New York 1947).

dell'amore, comprende le ragioni della ostilità alla morale della virtù in sé, per quel che essa nasconde di particolaristico e spesso deformante la globalità della persona.²² Nello stesso tempo però non rinuncia al fondamento *in re*, senza del quale non si potrebbe nemmeno parlare di una morale comune.

Per riprendere il collegamento tra morale, antropologia, metafisica e teologia, è evidente che una morale razionale ed oggettiva è legata ad una concezione più logica che dia-logica dell'essere.²³ Manca o è secondario il riferimento adeguato alla concezione plurale dell'essere comprensivo di essere e non essere e in campo teologico a quella trinitaria di Dio-amore.²⁴ Abbiamo già sottolineato che una gran parte della cultura cattolica risente ancora dell'influsso delle categorie conoscitive del mondo greco. Quando leggiamo in Maritain: "Dio è la testa di quell'ordine particolare che è l'ordine morale",²⁵ pensiamo a Dio molto più come *Logos* che *Agape*, con relative conseguenze sul piano etico. Mettere al centro la dinamica delle relazioni dell'essere molteplice, piuttosto che la sua definizione monolitica, conduce anche in campo morale a passare dal giudizio (*Logos*) alla attenzione comprensiva (*Caritas*), dalla validità universale dei principi alla persona con le sue caratteristiche, i suoi bisogni, la sua storia, la sua domanda presente di aiuto, la sua sempre aperta (anche se nascosta) possibilità di donazione. Ciò non elimina la valutazione delle azioni nel momento più specificamente razionale, ma la pospone all'attenzione che nel presente viene data all'altro, alla ricchezza umana che gli si riconosce o di cui gli si fa credito.

Rispetto alle filosofie della universalità, della razionalità, del bene oggettivo, l'etica della persona ripropone la singolarità della situazione e la creatività del soggetto, la cui valutazione resta un mistero per la ragione.

L'opposizione fondamentale della morale torna ad essere tra oggettivismo e soggettivismo, assolutezza della norma e relativismo. Il punto di vista personalista conserva l'oggettività contro il neutralismo e il relativismo, giacché la persona fa da riferimento certo dell'agire morale. In effetti è facile ottenere un

22 Vedi la critica di Hegel in H. NOHL, *Theologische jugendschriften* (Tübingen 1907) 139-239.

23 Cf. G. CALOGERO, *Logos e dialogo* (Milano 1950); *Filosofia del dialogo* (Milano 1962).

24 Sottolinea G. Zanghì che nella persona "affiora il mistero dell'essere. Rivelato nella persona come atto, come trascendenza, l'essere si manifesta come dono: l'essere di Dio, infinito dono di sé a stesso e di sé a ciò che viene chiamato ad essere nell'assoluta libertà del dono: l'essere dell'uomo infinito dono (ricevuto) e infinito donarsi". [G. M. ZANGHI, "Poche riflessioni sulla persona", in *Nuova Umanità* 7 (1980) 9-19, p.17.]

25 J. MARITAIN, *Nove lezioni* 118.

accordo sui principi generali come ad esempio: “Occorrè agire in modo che la massima della nostra volontà possa divenire, nello stesso tempo, legge di una legislazione universale”, oppure “È immorale infliggere delle sofferenze senza necessità”. Per quanto questi principi restino a lungo sufficientemente indeterminati, nessuno osa contestarli; le discussioni nasceranno dal momento che bisogna passare da queste regole generali a dei casi singoli. In occasione della *Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme*, molte voci constatano che se si è potuto stabilire un accordo su una lista di diritti dell'uomo tra rappresentanti di diverse ideologie anche opposte, ciò è dovuto al fatto che il loro senso preciso non è stato precisato²⁶.

Un altro aspetto in cui si incappa quando si punta più all'essere, alla coscienza, allo spirito che alla persona è la sottovalutazione del non, del negativo, visto come mancanza di essere. La morale in tal caso si modella su una concezione metafisica di pienezza dell'essere ed è quindi volta all'accrescimento dell'io. Allorché invece si ragiona in termini di persona, si interpreta il negativo come possibilità stessa di relazione, giacché l'ontologia dell'essere personale non è più pensabile in termini di compattezza e monicità. Il limite personale non appare più solo come male, come *privato boni debiti*, quindi mancanza d'essere, sulla linea di Leibniz e di Agostino che ritenevano essere un male per la creature non essere Dio.

Il “non” è una dimensione indispensabile ad una concezione relazionale, non una tappa o un momento di un processo storico finalizzato all'autoaccrescimento o, al contrario, all'autoannullamento. Pensare il negativo nell'essere come possibilità del suo essere da e per, conduce a pensare positivamente al limite di ogni persona. È condizione stessa di esistere della persona in relazione, che vive e si arricchisce del portato di ciascuno singolarità.

Il personalismo ha compreso che la sfida e il compito del mondo d'oggi è rifare un umanesimo comunitario. *Refaire la renaissance*, scriveva Mounier allo scopo di superare gli esiti individualistici dell'umanesimo rinascimentale e come risposta alle cadute nell'individualismo e nel collettivismo. Se la persona realizza la dinamica del farsi l'altro per farlo essere, senza venir meno ad essere se stessa, esse esprime il mistero della compresenza dell'esistenza e della sussistenza, della identità e della alterità, della autonomia e della eteronomia. Ciascuno dei poli di queste antinomie, nella dinamica della vita di relazione,

26 Cfr. AA.VV., *Autour de la Nouvelle Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme*, U.N.E.S.C.O. (Paris 1949).

esprime tendenzialmente libertà e unità. Nella prospettiva della persona, qualificata come dono ("La persona è questo dono" scriveva Mounier) si attenua il contrasto tra teocentrismo e antropocentrismo perchè entrambi caratterizzati dall'etica del dono, in Dio e nell'uomo, nello stesso gioco fondamentale dell'essere personale.

L'etica personalista si sviluppa come un più e un meno della morale tradizionalmente intesa: più totalitaria, più integrale, più elastica; meno oppressiva, meno particolaristica, meno definita. Nella sua essenzialità è un'etica evangelica. Scriveva H.U. von Balthasar: "La dimensione dell'intersoggettività, su cui si fonda l'etica del Vangelo, non poteva trovare nel pensiero antico classico una formulazione filosofica sufficiente, e non è riuscita neppure oggi a farsi tema davvero capitale della filosofia".²⁷ Andare dall'essere alla persona è andare dalla pienezza di sé al dono di sé, dalla sussistenza all'amore, dall'autoaccrescimento alla dimensione kenotica. Il mistero dell'essere personale infatti è nel movimento di donazione nel quale si riassumono tutte le virtù e che, anziché alienare e perdere il soggetto, lo conserva come essere. I suoi frutti non sono l'"anima bella" di stampo pietistico, espressione che indica piuttosto la ginnastica dell'io su se stesso per raggiungere un ideale ascetico e spesso vacuo di perfezione in sé, ma una realtà comunitaria che si instaura come terzo tra due. In questo senso troviamo delle sintonie particolari nello sforzo del pensiero filosofico di superare la concezione restrittiva della morale, come appare in qualche cenno alla "sovramorale" in J. Maritain.²⁸ Tuttavia in Maritain tale superamento della morale è una sorta di eccezione elitaria razionalistica per coloro che hanno raggiunto condizioni particolari di identificazione con il bene.

Parimenti si rende più comprensibile la distinzione di Bergson tra morale "chiusa" e morale "aperta", anche se la prima al confronto con l'impostazione personalistica sembra imbrigliata nello slancio di un vitalismo impersonale.

Un aspetto positivo della elaborazione personalista è dato dal riconoscimento del legame indissolubile tra etica e felicità: agire bene è raggiungere la

27 H.U.v.BALTHASAR. *Herrlichkeit, im Raum der Metaphysik V* (tr.it) (Milano 1978) 81.

28 Scrive Maritain: "Diremo che la morale è situato nell'ordine dei mezzi per il fine ultimo perchè è imperniata sulla ragione e sulla legge naturale... e diremo che la sovramorale è situata nel campo del fine ultimo stesso in cui l'uomo è introdotto già dal presente. Essa presuppone necessariamente e assolutamente la morale. ma la complete dall'alto... E' imperniata sull'amore e sull'unione con la volontà di colui che è amato, così che tutto allora si semplifica" (J.MARITAIN) *Nove lezioni* 248.

perfezione e insieme la felicità. Per S. Tommaso, come già per Aristotele, la felicità è il fine della condotta umana, deducibile dalla natura razionale dell'uomo. Kant invece, che insiste sull'innatezza delle idee, elabora un'etica del dovere puro o dell'essenza universalmente normativa della ragion pura pratica. Anche la ragion pratica, come la ragion pura, è indipendente dal contatto con il reale, quasi che il filosofo la riceva per rivelazione dalla ragione pura. Ma l'uomo non crea la legge, non è né legislatore né succube, mette solo in evidenza l'esperienza morale dell'umanità. La legge apriori kantiana, nella sua rigidità, elimina il concetto aristotelico e tomista della felicità: non vi è più fine ultimo né slancio verso la felicità e il bene, ma solo un'etica del dovere puro, un'etica dell'imperativo categorico. La prospettiva del valore in Kant ha assorbito quella del fine, ma nella realtà, entrambi questi aspetti sono essenziali, poiché la ricerca della felicità è qualcosa a cui l'uomo non può rinunciare facilmente, perché essa è in sé positiva. Questo rimproverano i personalisti a Kant, come sottolinea giustamente J. Maritain, ribadendo tuttavia la subordinazione della felicità al bene. Il solo obiettivo della felicità infatti potrebbe essere interpretato individualisticamente, indipendentemente dalla relazione agli altri, e ciò sarebbe insieme mancanza di bene e di felicità.

Per riprendere un'altra contrapposizione (la distinzione di Abbagnano²⁹, il punto di vista della persona è insieme un'etica del fine, se con ciò si intende il raggiungimento del bene per la persona, ma è anche un'etica del movente, nel senso che può essere formulata come un "se vuoi, se ritieni... fa". L'etica è anche felicità e piacere, se si intendono queste come costitutive della realizzazione dell'essere in relazione. È vero infatti che per sopravvivere, o meglio per vivere ed essere felice, l'uomo deve realizzare relazioni che gli garantiscono una convivenza il più possibile armoniosa. Se conservazione di sé e cura degli altri vanno di pari passo, si può sinotizzare anche con Hobbes: "Il primo dei beni è la conservazione di sé. La natura infatti ha provveduto perché tutti desiderino il proprio bene".³⁰ Spinoza del resto sottolinea che questa tendenza alla conservazione è la stessa azione necessitante della sostanza divina: "La ragione non richiede nulla contro la natura, ma richiede di per sé, innanzitutto, che

29 Cf. N. ABBAGNANO, *Dizionario di Filosofia* (Torino 1964) 352-359.

30 T. HOBBS, *De homine* XI, 6.

ognuno ami se stesso e cerchi l'utile che sia veramente tale per lui e desideri tutto quello che conduce l'uomo ad una perfezione maggiore".³¹

Laddove l'etica tradizionale era carica di "no", l'etica personalista è soprattutto un "sì" alla vita, all'altro, al mondo.³²

In fine l'etica personalista riconosce la persona come centro di relazioni in quanto essa non origina da sé, non si definisce in sé, ma ha ricevuto la sua vita dai genitori, dal gruppo, dalla concatenazione ereditaria che ha contribuito alla strutturazione biopsichica e culturale del suo essere qui ed ora. Nello stesso tempo però la persona riconosce in sé una unicità che la distingue da tutte queste fonti. Essa avverte parimenti in sé un richiamo ad un Tu che non si identifica con nessuno di quelli incontrati. Tale richiamo avvertito più o meno fortemente e in modi diversi è presente in tutte le culture umane, indicativo di un inesauribile bisogno di comunicazione ultra-mondana. Sul piano etico questo richiamo si traduce nella capacità della persona di distaccarsi dalla morale collettiva ed anche da quella individuale, nel momento in cui essa è in contrasto con tale realtà dialogica intima della persona con l'essere. I due esempi classici di questa consapevolezza sono Antigone per il mondo greco ed Abramo per il mondo ebraico.

Antigone sta di fronte a Creonte come colei che riafferma il primato della legge divina (legge religiosa che obbliga al rispetto dei morti) contro la pretesta totalizzante della morale della città.

L'episodio di Abramo è ancora più complesso perchè dal rapporto con Jahvé, Abramo sente capovolte le norme della morale sociale e quelle della morale personale, sino a mancare di qualsiasi riferimento etico esterno ed interno, quasi ad affermare il primato di un rapporto con l'Essere-Dio sulla morale in sé. L'episodio di Abramo è in questo caso emblematico di un'angoscia kierkegaardiana ed esistenzialistica di fronte a scelte nelle quali la norma che la persona ritiene di dover seguire in una data circostanza sembra contraddire la norma universale del rispetto della persona. L'etica della ragione, come quella della tradizione, risultano impotenti di fronto alle ragioni della vita

31 B.SPINOZA, *Ethica*, cit. IV, 18, scol. Anche Locke e Leibniz considerano la virtù necessaria alla conservazione della società e di sé.

32 Anche la prospettiva di Nietzsche aspira alla ricchezza della vita, alla sua divinizzazione, a tutti gli aspetti che la rendono bella e piena, salvo a discernere ciò che arricchisce da ciò che avvilisce [Cf. F. NIETZSCHE, *Frammenti postumi 87/888* (tr.it) (Milano 1971) 265-266].

vissuta dal singolo in relazione ad un tu, ad un gruppo, o, come nel caso di Abramo, alla necessità di scegliere tra il rapporto d'amore con il figlio e il suo fondamentale rapporto con Dio. Le regole della ragione e dell'etica, sinora considerate valide appaiono all'improvviso inutili ed anzi contrarie a quanto gli sembra bene in quella determinata situazione. Una coscienza retta può vivere l'assoluta solitudine della scelta senza appoggi. Nell'etica apriori, in quella postivistica e in quella oggettivistica egli avrebbe un più preciso orientamento e sarebbe avvantaggiato rispetto al carico di angoscia e di incomprendimento che la scelta che sta per prendere gli procureranno. Tuttavia egli avverte con precisione che non potrebbe agire diversamente.

3. *Qualche aspetto di etica medica*

Non si può pretendere di trattare id diversi argomenti di etica biomedica in un lavoro che affronta il problema dei fondamenti personalisti dell'etica. Possiamo però qui selezionare alcune problematiche scelte per esemplificare il punto di vista di una riflessione personalista, carica di stimoli per un ulteriore ripensamento delle questioni oggi sul tappeto.

3.1 *Etica medica*

Per non ripercorre la tappe di un consenso sulla necessità che il medico compia un'azione curativa orientata moralmente al rispetto della persona (lo fanno abbondantemente altri autori di testi di etica medica o di bioetica), ci basta sottolineare la sempre più accentuata sensibilità della scienza verso un orientamento etico. Già a Roma (Novembre 1987) 15 scienziati di varie parti del mondo hanno ufficialmente ribadito l'urgenza di una scienza che riconosca la necessità di essere orientata eticamente, giacché una scienza neutrale, oltre che impossibile, finirebbe con l'essere contro l'uomo. Occorre dunque lasciarsi interrogare dalla domanda sull'uomo nell'impostare e condurre una ricerca.

In campo medico ricordiamo il documento del 6 Gennaio 1987 della Conferenza degli ordini professionali dei medici di 12 paesi della Comunità Europea. La conferenza raccomandò all'Ordine dei medici di ogni Stato membro della Comunità di assumere le iniziative necessarie perché la legislazione del proprio paese attuasse questi principi.³³ Il primo articolo ribadisce: "Compito del medico è la difesa della salute fisica e psicologica dell'uomo e

33 Testo riportato da *Il Medico d'Italia*; 13 Febbraio 1987, p.7 e da "Aggiornamenti sociali" II (1987) 729-732.

il sollievo dalla sofferenza nel rispetto della vita e della dignità della persona umana senza discriminazioni...". L'art.2: "Nell'esercizio della professione il medico s'impegna a dare priorità agli interessi della salute del malato. Il medico non può utilizzare le proprie conoscenze professionali se non per migliorare e conservare la salute di coloro che si affidano a lui". L'art. 17 sottolinea che è conforme ai principi dell'etica che un medico "a ragione delle proprie convinzioni, si rifiuti di intervenire nei processi di riproduzione o in caso d'interruzione di gravidanza o d'aborto". In materia di sperimentazione sull'uomo, si richiede il parere di una commissione indipendente (art.19), il consenso libero e informato del soggetto destinato alla sperimentazione (art. 20) e la impossibilità per il medico di associare la ricerca biomedica alle cure mediche in vista dell'acquisizione di nuove conoscenze (art.21).

Sono principi che possono restare astratti se non si dà possibilità di controllo, sia da parte di organismi appositi che direttamente da parte del paziente. La carta dei diritti dal malato è il corrispettivo strumento di difesa di chi, a causa della sua debolezza fisica, è costretto ad affidarsi ad altri, spesso sconosciuti. Il medico, lungi dall'essere un semplice tecnico della terapia, si accosta al malato oltre che ad una malattia e con la sua presenza, con il suo carico di umanità stabilisce un rapporto curativo che, benché focalizzato al rimedio biochimico, non può non toccare anche le altre dimensioni della sofferenza.

Si costata qui che la specializzazione e il progresso della scienza medica sono andati di pari passo alla perdita di quel rapporto di fiducia medico-paziente che ha caratterizzato le società precedenti, rapporto integrate tra persone, tra famiglie, in cui il medico era coinvolto in tutta la problematica umana del paziente. Siamo di fronte ancora una volta alla scissione tra punto di vista del funzionamento del sistema e rapporti personalizzati.

3.2 Medicina e sofferenza

La storia della medicina è in gran parte quella della lotta contro il soffrire: come può l'uomo combattere la sofferenza, con quali mezzi ridurla. È la domanda centrale della ricerca medica, la quale però deve tenere presente che rimette in discussione il nostro identificarci con il corpo e che quindi la sofferenza si colloca a tre livelli. Il malato si accorge che in lui accadono cose che non sono atti della sua persona, rispetto alle quali è divenuto impotente. Egli avverte dapprima un dolore fisico, ma anche un dolore psichico che lo preoccupa per il fatto che ora il corpo gli appare un oggetto che non può controllare e che lo destruttura come identità personale. Ciò si accentua se gli organi malati hanno un particolare significato simbolico (come l'essere uomo

o donna, la possibilità di avere bambini). Constatiamo però anche un livello di dolore che possiamo chiamare metafisico e che va ancora più a fondo, giacché la malattia ripropone il problema della contingenza dell'esserci e pone di fronte alla morte. A questo livello non ci preoccupa più la forma della nostra identità, ma la possibilità di continuare ad esistere o meno e ciò rivoluziona radicalmente il nostro essere tra passato e futuro, giacché l'angoscia è determinata dall'essere tra passato e nulla. Nella famosa espressione di Heidegger, l'uomo diviene cosciente del suo "*Sein zum Tode*" o anche, secondo Kierkegaard, della sua "*Krankheit zum Tode*" o ancora, secondo la denuncia di Rosenzweig, della irriducibilità della morte, di cui la totalità filosofica non dà alcun senso, dato che ciascuno muore da solo. L'uomo che, come diceva Freud, nel suo profondo crede di essere eterno, affronta la negazione della sua oggettività e si percepisce come impotente, passivo. Ciò che prima sapeva teoricamente (tutti nuotano) ora diviene esperienza di dolore nella propria carne. È un sentimento che si estende alla morte di una persona cara. Gabriel Marcel ha sottolineato che amare qualcuno è eternizzarlo, dargli un valore tale ai nostri occhi per cui ci sembra che non potrà cessare di esistere. Quel valore ontologico che è la persona diviene valore esistenziale sperimentato nel rapporto interpersonale. La sua morte ci appare profonda ingiustizia, non senso.

Sovente, specie nella pubblicità, si lascia credere che la ricerca della soluzioni del dolore fisico risolva da sola anche i problemi legati al dolore psichico e metafisico. Non si può minimizzare l'importanza della ricerca medica, giacché l'unità dell'uomo fa sì che la sofferenza fisica comporti una integrale esperienza di dolore, ma non vanno neanche sottovalutati il dolore psichico e quello metafisico. Il dolore psichico può venire lenito per esempio dalla chemioterapia, dalle nuove ricerche sul vervello (nel quale si localizza l'angoscia), dalle ricerche psicologiche a diversi livelli, da tutti gli sforzi fatti per cercare rimedi adeguati e non solo momentanei (forme di euforia artificiale). I modi con cui può essere affrontata la sofferenza psichica differiscono anche dalla storia personale di ciascuno, dalla sua esperienza e dall'armonia che riesce a ricostruire tra benessere fisio-psichico e bene integrale. È evidente anche l'importanza dell'essere amati, dell'essere riconosciuti da altri come importanti per potere dare ancora un senso al vivere, giacché i malati soffrono la debolezza, le decadenza della bellezza del proprio corpo, l'inadeguatezza mentale, il pensiero di essere per gli altri ormai solo un peso.

Ciò che però risulta dalla ricerca biochimica e strettamente psicologica è la sofferenza che abbiamo chiamato metafisica nella quale è in gioco l'immagine che la persona ha di sé e della vita. Il problema del dolore illumina quello dell'eutanasia sotto la forma dell'interrogativo circa l'utilità dell'ultimo periodo della vita, quando non c'è più speranza di salute e si ha di fronto solo la morte.

La morte, oltre ad essere evidentemente un fatto naturale, è anche un fatto culturale che varia a seconda dei tempi, degli ambienti, della disposizione personale di ciascuno. Essa è intesa sovente come l'ultimo atto che illumina il significato di una vita e segna il passaggio di una eredità. Essa varia che in relazione al significato che ogni persona dà alla vita e alla sua vita personale, fino ad essere sperimentata non più in senso passivo, ma attivo, come nel caso noto di Socrate. Oggi la morte è affrontata in ospedale in un ambiente unamamente meno ricco di quello familiare, spesso senza che il malato sia a conoscenza del proprio stato di salute (talvolta viene alimentata una falsa speranza di guarigione), mentre si tenta di accorciare al massimo lo spazio di tempo tra l'inizio della malattia e la morte o anche di renderlo vuoto di significato. L'esperienza dell'essere di fronte alla morte ripropone al malato la necessità della trascendenza, che gli consente la superiorità rispetto al mondo. Essa gli fa sperimentare anche la sua realtà di essere recettivo che osserva accadere in sé cose non volute, non decise e che quindi negano il concetto di soggettività, come è espresso da una certa filosofia idealistica e moderna. Il principio attivo, conoscitivo o comunque cosciente, ha sorvolato sul significato positivo e al limite attivo di una recettività che è passaggio alla trascendenza del proprio essere, perchè la libertà è comunemente legata al fare, al realizzare opere e viene sorvolata la dialettica del superamento che passa per la negazione di tale pienezza. Viene valorizzata solo una faccia della realtà, mentre rimane in ombra quella che è più qualificante la dimensione umana dell'agire. Per Aristotile gli schiavi di natura sono quelli che non possono opporre resistenza alle loro interne passioni per poter seguire la ragione. Egli vuol dire che l'uomo può riconoscere una verità che supera quella delle sue inclinazioni. La capacità di trascendenza è capacità di superare la percezione di sé come affermazione, per accedere ad un ordine di realtà superiori. A questo passaggio contribuisce ogni dolore ed in particolare quello che affronta la morte, vista così come attività suprema di trasformazione del proprio essere. Ciò permette di accogliere la morte in continuità con una serie di passaggi vitali che l'uomo affronta giorno per giorno e nei quali il dolore ha una funzione generativa di più profonde realizzazioni.

3.3 *Il figlio ad ogni costo*

Non tratteremo qui i problemi giuridici e sociali della fecondazione artificiale poiché abbiamo già considerato la razionalità discorsiva come valida per regolare la sensibilità etica e politica in un senso diacronico (le differenze storiche) e sincronico (le differenze di spazio e di cultura).

Il punto di vista personalista che guida la nostra ricerca non si fonda sull'opposizione tra naturale e artificiale, ma su un riferimento etico che cor-

risponde a una interpretazione ontologica. Seguiamo dunque due strade: la validità dei principi universali e nello stesso tempo la centralità del riferimento a una persona così come è, con i suoi condizionamenti biologici, psicologici e culturali. Quest'ultimo punto di vista è lasciato sempre alla decisione di ciascuna coscienza che giudica in rapporto ai dati di cui dispone.

Per quel che concerne i principi si è già visto che non può essere il bene di una persona ciò che nuoce ad un' altra, poiché l'essere personale è relazionale e non si realizza se non favorendo il benessere degli altri. Un dovere così inteso va ben al di là del rapporto interpersonale tra due per estendersi a cerchi concentrici a tutta l'umanità presente, passata e futura. Quando un problema interessa un gran parte dell'umanità non è sufficiente rispondere attraverso una scelta tra il bene e il male in sé. Di qui deriva l'esigenza fondamentale di rispettare il più gran numero possibile di persone che sono legate alle nostre azioni, di giudicare perciò se queste azioni sono suggerite da esigenze di autoaffermazione individuale, senza premura per gli altri, oppure se concorrono a sviluppare le relazioni comunitarie sulla linea del processo di personalizzazione.

Per quel che riguarda il desiderio di avere un bambino si è di fronte al medesimo ordine di problemi: sapere se un tale desiderio nasce come affermazione di sé, di identità personale, cioè come *status symbol* (il figlio in mostra), come compensazione di una mancanza di affetto, come salvezza di un matrimonio o come desiderio di donare la vita, di stabilire dei rapporti più soddisfacenti col proprio coniuge e con coloro che sono interessati, senza causare torti agli altri. Nella decisione da prendere bisogna porre attenzione all'intenzione dell'agire, tenendo presente che nelle zone dell'inconscio non è facile distinguere la linea che divide gli istinti dalle buone intenzioni.

Si possono in ogni caso porre degli interrogativi e lasciare aperti dei problemi:

-Il problema commerciale dello sfruttamento della povertà che si pone nel caso di affitti d'utero, come pure per le banche dello sperma. Le *surrogate-mothers* hanno fatto degli affitti dell'utero un lavoro. Sono organizzate da una agenzia fondata da un avvocato di Detroit, Noel Keane, che sta aprendo una

succursale a Francoforte in Germania. Questi problemi hanno conseguenze di ordine psicologico, economico, nonché igienico.³⁴

-Un bambino può nascere molto tempo dopo la morte dei suoi genitori biologici. Questo interrompe la continuità generazionale e rivoluziona i concetti legati al legame di continuità tra rapporti sessuali e procreazione. Dal punto di vista morale, ciò separa la decisione di generare dalla responsabilità relativa.

-Ci si può domandare se è consentito creare degli orfani artificiali (non è certo la stessa cosa perdere il proprio genitore e generare un bimbo sapendo che non avrà mai un padre).

-Per la donna il distacco della procreazione può creare uno sdoppiamento psichico negando la continuità tra amore e procreazione. Essa può sentirsi ridotta a mero oggetto o ancora peggio a "utero in affitto" (l'incubatrice umana). L'affitto dell'utero può ridurre la donna ad una mera funzione riproduttrice che è stata molto condannata dai movimenti di liberazione della donna. E ciò va nel senso contrario al desiderio delle donne di "riappropriarsi del parto", cioè di viverlo nel calore della casa, piuttosto che in un ambiente ospedaliero e medico.

-Se una donna è guidata dalla generosità (dare un figlio ad una coppia di parenti o di amici sterili), ci possiamo porre la domanda se questa generosità è valida oppure conduce a degli intrighi psicoanalitici difficili da sbrogliare. È sintomatico il caso delle gemelle francesi, di cui l'una voleva fare un favore all'altra dandole alle luce un bambino. Quest'ultima fu combattuta dal sentimento materno (voler abbracciare, allattare, stringere ecc.) e la necessità di abbandonare quello che era stato il suo figlio. Essa ha descritto la sua vita come una "*vie d'enfer*".

-Si può constatare anche la contraddizione tra l'accanimento ad avere un bambino proprio ad ogni costo e la tendenza ad accettare la "maternità o paternità sociale", ossia l'adozione di un bambino o di prendersene cura per un determinato periodo (l'affidamento temporaneo).

-C'è anche il caso imprevisto in cui muoiano i genitori prima della nascita del bimbo. Ricordiamo il caso dei due cileni della California, Elsa e Mario Rios.

34 Cf. il libro di E. KANE, *The Sunday's Baby* (New York 1986), che racconta l'esperienza vissuta da una *surrogate-mother*.

Gli embrioni erano stati conservati attraverso il congelamento. Dopo qualche settimana i genitori sono morti in un incidente d'aereo. Questo ha posto il problema degli embrioni orfani.

-Negli Stati Uniti una coppia aveva pagato una ragazza portoricana per farle accettare di farsi impiantare un embrione. L'impianto è riuscito, ma il bimbo è nato mongoloide. La coppia che aveva ordinato il figlio l'ha rifiutato e la ragazza portoricana anche. Ma secondo la legge americana quest'ultima era la madre del bimbo anche contro la sua volontà.

-Il caso di Mary Beth Whitehead madre di "Baby M", negli Stati Uniti è differente. Ella aveva accettato di affittare il suo utero ad una coppia sterile che voleva avere un erede avendo la possibilità economica di farlo. Dopo il parto Mary si rifiutò di consegnare la figlia. Voleva restituire il denaro. Il giudice attraverso la sentenza del 31.III.1987 ha respinto l'istanza di Mary Whitehead. Il conflitto tra i sentimenti e la legge è stato risolto dalla legge contrattuale e dal potere del denaro.

-Recentemente i giornali hanno posto all'attenzione il caso della coppia che aveva avuto un bimbo grazie alle fecondazione artificiale eterologa. Il marito, essendo sul punto di separarsi dalla moglie non ha voluto più riconoscere il bimbo come suo figlio che aveva già l'età di due anni.

Si tratta di problemi nuovi di fronte ai quali non si può utilizzare come riferimento etico la tradizione, la legge, la natura, ma ciascuna persona deve decidere tenendo conto di tutto ciò nel confronto con il punto di vista degli altri. Questi problemi sono oggetto dell'attenzione di giuristi e politici per essere ripensati nell'interesse di ciascuna persona e del bene comune.

3.4 *Rispetto di ogni essere umano - Testimonianze*

Il carattere essenziale della persona non può essere confuso con le sue qualità (le capacità, la moralità, i meriti, la religione, il genio, la bellezza, la coscienza). È per questo motivo che il personalismo sottolinea che l'uomo, anche se malvagio, empio, non può cessare di essere una persona. Dal momento che è impossibile scegliere il momento a partire dal quale si può qualificare l'essere umano della persona e le qualità che definiscono precisamente la dignità della persona, noi preferiamo considerare come persona ogni essere concepito da due persone. Ci sembra che il nostro simile in potenza debbe essere sempre riconosciuto come persona, anche quando non se ne vede che la potenzialità. Anche il bimbo non nato, o che non è ancora divenuto padrone di sé, anche il *minus habens*, portano il marchio indelebile della persona nella

latenza e nel sonno. Anche se non hanno realizzato la pienezza delle loro facoltà personali, ispirano rispetto a causa della dignità che deriva dall'appartenere alla comune umanità. Dal rispetto che viene loro accordato si può misurare il grado di civiltà di un popolo.

Le belle pagine del filosofo e teologo R. Guardini ci possono aiutare: "...La vita dell'uomo non può essere violata perchè l'uomo è persona. Persona significa capacità di autodominio e di responsabilità personale, di vivere nella verità e nell'ordine morale. La persona non è di natura psicologica, ma esistenziale. Non dipende fondamentalmente dall'età o da condizioni fisio-psichiche o doti naturali, ma dall'anima spirituale che è in ogni uomo. La persona può essere inconscia come nel dormiente; tuttavia esige già una tutela morale. È pure possibile che non si attui perchè mancano i presupposti fisio-psichici, come nei pazzi e negli idioti, ma l'uomo civile si distingue appunto dal barbaro perchè la rispetta anche in un simile involucro. Può essere anche nascosta come nell'embrione, ma già vi è col proprio diritto. La persona dà all'uomo la sua dignità; lo distingue dalle cose e ne fa un soggetto. Una cosa ha consistenza, ma non in proprio; effetto non responsabilità; valore non dignità. Si tratta alcunché come cosa in quanto la si possiede, la si usa, e per finire la si distrugge, vale a dire - per gli esseri viventi - la si uccide. La proibizione di uccidere l'uomo rappresenta il coronamento della proibizione di trattarlo come cosa... Il rispetto per l'uomo in quanto persona è una delle esigenze che non ammettono discussioni: ne dipendono la dignità, ma anche il benessere e alla fine la durata dell'umanità. Se queste esigenza viene messa in forse, si cade nella barbarie. Ma è impossibile farsi un'idea di quali minacce possano sorgere per la vita dell'anima dell'uomo se, privo di questo baluardo di rispetto, viene consegnato allo Stato moderno e alla sua tecnica".³⁵

Siamo consapevoli che nell'esperienza vissuta non è facile poter sempre e ad ogni costo vivere il rispetto della persona all'altezza dei principi enunciati. È anche vero però che le incoerenze, i limiti, gli errori non possono assurgere a principi contraddittori. Ad ogni modo, se la realtà sociale e giuridica si regola sul ritmo della coscienza collettiva presente, il personalismo, nel rispetto di tutte le altre convinzioni, supplisce alle lacune giuridiche con la carica etica di chi, singolo o gruppo, si prende cura della persona fino agli estremi. Il personalismo a cui noi ci riferiamo si lascia fecondare da esperienze la cui profondità di significato provocano la nostra intelligenza, la quale ne trae più forti convin-

cimenti circa il significato e il valore della persona. D'altra parte il pensiero si nutre di esperienze, racconti, relazioni, risposte che riceviamo e diamo dietro le provocazioni, attraverso le quali noi costruiamo la storia. Sottolineava Ricoeur in una conversazione: "Penso che l'arte del racconto non è una cosa solo per ragazzi, ma anche per noi che abbiamo bisogno di riunificare le nostre vite, le nostre esperienze con la capacità di farne dei racconti intelligibili". È dunque un lavoro di ricomposizione e di donazione di sé, attraverso il racconto della propria storia. "Non si tratta della storia dell'umanità, ma della nostra storia personale che dobbiamo elevare al rango di storia. Unificando la nostra esperienza in un racconto non facciamo un lavoro di espressione linguistica, ma di autocomprensione".³⁶ È nel racconto storico o fantastico in effetti che l'uomo rievoca l'esperienza ordinaria a causa del potere di trasformazione dell'immaginazione produttiva. La capacità di dire "Io" sembra dunque legata alle relazioni interpersonali nelle quali la persona dona se stessa anche in un racconto di storia vissuta giorno per giorno.³⁷

È possibile sul piano esistenziale giudicare una storia vissuta? Ciò che di essa ci tocca è soprattutto un cammino personale unico e misterioso che passa attraverso la perdita dei legami affettivi e degli ideali e delle ricostruzioni di nuovi rapporti e di nuove capacità d'andare in profondità nella dimensione trascendente gli avvenimenti particolari. La ricostruzione personale della propria storia è un qualcosa di valido in sé e non può essere giudicato con criteri moralistici ed esteriori.

per questo nuovo legame tra filosofia e racconto di vita che ci permettiamo di ricordare l'esperienza formidabile vissuta da E. Mounier senza dare ad essa un valore paradigmatico normativo (la ricostruzione della propria storia è sempre personale), ma come testimonianza di un personalista impegnato.

L'incontro con Paulette Lequerq nel 1935 spinge il giovane Mounier a trasferirsi in Belgio. Ha da lei tre figliole di cui la prima rimane colpita da encefalite a causa della vaccinazione antivaiolosa, con solo vita vegetativa ad appena sette mesi (ed è morta dopo di lui). Questa esperienza rivela che Mounier riconosce una presenza misteriosa e nascosta nella persona, anche se mancano le capacità simboliche e linguistiche. Così scrive nel diario: "È piombata in un grande silenzio, col suo bello sguardo aperto dal mattino alla sera su

36 A. DANESE, *Conversazione con Paul Ricoeur* in *Nuova Umanità* 27 (1983) 92-93.

37 Cfr. P. RICOEUR, *Temps et récit*, III Seuil (Paris 1983-1985) 355.

Dio sa quale mistero, senza un gesto, senza un sintomo di conoscenza”.³⁸ In una lettera a sua moglie così parla di Françoise: “Che senso avrebbe tutto questo se la nostra piccola bambina non fosse che un pezzo di carne smarrita non si sa dove, un pò di vita tormentata, e non questa bianca piccola ostia che ci supera tutti, un’infinità di mistero e di amore che ci abbaglierebbe se la vedessimo faccia a faccia... Se ci limitiamo a soffrire - subire, resistere, sopportare - non ce la faremo e verremmo meno a quanto ci viene chiesto”.³⁹ E ancora: “Sentivo di accostarmi a quel piccolo giglio senza voce come ad un altare, quasi ad un luogo sacro dove Dio parlava con un segno. Una tristezza che consumava profondamente, ma leggera e trasfigurante. E tutto intorno a lei, non ho altra parola: un’adorazione...Mistero, che può essere solo di bontà; bisogna pure osare dirlo: una grazia troppo grande. Un’ostia vivente tra noi, muta come l’ostia, irradiante come essa. Chissà se non ci è chiesto di custodire e adorare un’ostia tra noi, senza dimenticare la presenza divina sotto una povera materia cieca? Mia piccola Françoise, tu mi sei anche l’immagine viva della fede. Quaggiù voi la conoscerete in enigma e come in uno specchio”.⁴⁰

4. *Etica e ambiente*

Dal punto di vista della Tradizione cristiana, il potere è una connotazione positiva dell’essere uomo e donna, immagini di Dio e perciò chiamati entrambi a “sottomettere” la terra: “E Dio li benedisse e disse loro: Siate fecondi e moltiplicatevi e riempite la terra e sottomettetela e siate i signori dei pesci del mare e degli uccelli dell’aria e di tutti gli animali che si muovono sulla terra” (Gn 1,26-28). Questo testo autorizza e legittima una concezione positiva del potere come un dono e insieme un dovere che sancisce la somiglianza con Dio e quindi è essenziale all’uomo e alla donna per manifestare la pienezza della loro umanità, diviene anzi dovere di conoscenza, di dominio delle cose e pienezza di vita.

Ma il potere è anche legato alla conoscenza oggettiva della realtà, alla capacità di penetrare il senso di un oggetto, o le caratteristiche della persona altrui, per rispettarne l’orientamento. Se non è così, il potere è azione manipolatoria che si ritorce contro chi lo esercita. Nei confronti delle cose è evidente la superficialità con cui un certo modo di usare il potere tratta e maneggia gli oggetti ai fini del vantaggio, della comodità, della funzionalità,

38 E. MOUNIER. “Lettera a Carmela Dossee” (11.IV.1940) in *Oeuvres IV* (Paris 1963) 661.

39 ID.. “Lettera a Paulette Mounier” (20. III. 1940)” in *Oeuvres IV*, 660-661.

40 ID.. *Entretiens X* (28.VIII.1940) in *Oeuvres IV*, 670-671.

anche indipendentemente della loro realtà naturale. Subentra così una forzatura tesa a piegare il mondo esterno all'io che si manifesta come violenza. Ma è la stessa realtà che si ribella ad un tale trattamento. La natura si irrigidisce, non risponde più al rapporto con le persone, si sottrae all'uomo e conduce a tutti quegli effetti imprevedibili del disequilibrio naturale ed ecologico che minacciano oggi la vita. "Delle cose non si può fare quello che si vuole, o almeno non lo si può fare in tutto il loro insieme e per un lungo periodo: si possono trattare le cose solo in modo corrispondente al loro essere, altrimenti si preparano delle catastrofi. Chi è capace di vedere, vede come dappertutto si prepari la catastrofe di una realtà falsamente maneggiata".⁴¹

D'altronde il significato etimologico dei verbi «soggiogare» e «dominare» ha la pregnanza del «prendere possesso di un territorio» (soggiogare) e di «pascolare, condurre, guidare, reggere» (dominare). Perciò all'uomo è affidato il compito di pascolare gli animali e di occupare un territorio. Questa benedizione di Dio «non legittima affatto la distruzione di intere famiglie di animali nei diversi continenti, di essere marini, delle innumerevoli specie di animali ed insetti, in nome della trasformazione delle superficie terrestre da parte dell'uomo e della spogliazione perpetrata dalle nostre generazioni... Essa non legittima alcuna esplosione demografica, non parla del diritto di distruggere il paesaggio e di dilapidare tutte le risorse di materie prime nel giro di poche generazioni».⁴²

Tale cattivo rapporto che l'uomo stabilisce con la natura è all'origine dei disastri ecologici che sono sotto gli occhi di tutti oggi e che costituiscono una ulteriore sfida alla coscienza personalista. Nella sensibilità cristiana questo tema è emerso con un certo ritardo. Ha scritto recentemente Mons. Giovanni Volta: "Ci troviamo di fronte ad un fatto epocale, poichè mentre il degrado ambientale poteva costituire nel passato un rischio limitato soltanto ad un determinato luogo, ora esso investe tutta la terra... Si tratta di un fenomeno che investe l'ambiente dell'uomo, e quindi le sue relazioni, la qualità della sua vita, il suo stesso futuro. Non possono quindi i cristiani, che ritengono non solo l'esistenza umana, ma l'universo intero dono di Dio, non interessarsi con gli altri uomini e tra gli altri uomini di questo fatto".⁴³

41 R. GUARDINI, *Il potere* (Brescia 1963) 125-26.

42 N. LOHFINK, *Le nostre grandi parole* (Brescia 1986) 192-193.

43 G. VOLTA, Presentazione a *Questione ecologica e coscienza cristiana* a cura di A. CAPRIOLI e L. VACCARO (Brescia 1988) 11.

Negli ultimi anni il problema ambiente è esploso tra i grandi universali che interessano la quasi totalità degli uomini sparsi sul pianeta. Alcuni dati emegenti, come il buco dell'ozono, l'effetto serra, il pericolo radioattivo, l'inquinamento della acque, la manipolazione dei geni animali e vegetali, tramite il riverbero nei mass media sono emersi all'attenzione delle fasce più disperate di persone. È nato un movimento ambientalista che percorre trasversalmente altri gruppi e associazioni e che, politicamente, si è organizzato nelle liste verdi che raccolgono sempre più consensi in Europa oppure è andato a confluire in settori specifici.

In breve i pericoli sono due: da un lato l'esaurimento delle risorse e dall'altro l'inquinamento. Nel primo aspetto occorre comprendere l'esaurimento delle fonti di energia ed anche quello di alcune specie animali e vegetali che costituiscono parte integrante del sistema di equilibrio ambientale. Nel secondo aspetto comprendiamo il vasto campo dell'inquinamento dell'aria, dell'acqua, del suolo e del sottosuolo. Le interrelazioni che permettono all'uomo di sopravvivere, quando si intrecciano negativamente producono fenomeni ancor più allarmanti, come quello delle piogge acide [interrelazione tra aria (anidride solforosa e ossidi d'azoto) e acqua inquinate]. L'ecosistema si disequilibria e l'uomo ne subisce i maggiori danni.

Poter spaziare su dimensioni interplanetarie, significa prendere coscienza delle dimensioni ridotte biosfera, del fatto cioè che Madre natura non è inesauribile risorsa senza risparmio e che noi possiamo considerarci perciò come ospiti in un'arca o in un'astronave in viaggio nello spazio-tempo, dotata di provviste limitate da salvaguardare oculatamente per poter sopravvivere. La novità dell'epoca contemporanea è quella di guardare alla natura come al nostro più grande corpo organico che non è più il mito materno delle culture precristiane, ma soprattutto non è più l'oggetto distante, astratto e manipolabile della scienza moderna. Vedere la natura come più grande nostro corpo organico significa rapportarla alla nostra vita in una dinamica di reciproche influenze che evitano sia la manipolazione che l'adorazione indiscriminata e idolatrica che vorrebbe ad ogni costo proteggerla, in tutte le sue forme, anche quando queste sono obiettivamente nocive per la vita umana.

Quando si parla di violenza alla natura bisogna infatti distinguere il fatto che in casi di conflitto tra difesa della natura e la necessità umane, bisogna far prevalere ciò che si valuta prioritario e in tal caso una certa violenza ha il fine positivo di ricondurre (per es. nel caso dell'uccisione di un vitello) la natura al servizio dell'uomo. Da qui si vede che la natura ha un suo ordine di valori,

giacché il suo rispetto deve essere compatibile col rispetto primario degli esseri umani e di Dio.

Qui infatti si innestano alcune differenze che i verdi fanno esplodere e che per esempio i sindacati fanno presente, per il fatto che la cultura ecologista propone un ordine di priorità dei problemi in cui la questione ambiente viene a precedere i problemi dell'occupazione lavorativa, della distribuzione della ricchezza, dei modi e tempi di lavoro, delle fasce emarginate in generale. Essa diviene talvolta un assoluto, sotto forma di una ingenua "mistica della natura". Tale cultura ha certamente la sua giustificazione nella contrapposizione alla mistica della tecnica, che intende la natura come un oggetto da manipolare, ma in realtà propone di subordinare la questione dei rapporti tra gli uomini, che nel cristianesimo ed anche nel marxismo è centrale, a quella del rapporto con l'ambiente. Si pone in altri termini il problema dell'ordine dei valori nell'insieme della realtà cosmica (quale il posto della natura?). L'uomo e la donna fanno parte della natura ma non appartengono ad essa, condividono i suoi ritmi grazie alla realtà corporea, ma non si risolvono in essa, grazie alla loro soggettività trascendentale. Ciò significa evitare l'opposizione dualistica tra natura e spirito, sullo stile cartesiano o del meccanicismo in fisica, dualismo che è nocivo all'uomo, che finisce con l'essere interpretato in senso razionalista o spiritualista, e alla natura, che viene privata del suo interno principio vitale e teologico. Si tratta di evitare le forme ricorrenti di naturalismo, in cui la natura è il senso della totalità dell'essere ed evitare insieme il trascendentalismo, il cui pensiero è la totalità e la natura è l'anti pensiero, l'assolutamente altro rispetto alla persona è a Dio. Viene perduto il senso simbolico della natura, altrimenti impercettibile all'uomo, e dell'uomo inteso appunto come "animale simbolico".

Il rispetto per la natura significa riconoscimento del suo valore come cosa buona in sé ("E vide che tutte queste cose erano buone") indipendentemente dalla nostra tendenza all'appropriazione. Ma questa indipendenza (amare come fine e non come mezzo) è valida relativamente. Per la natura non si può prendere la cosa in assoluto perché ciò significherebbe impossibilità per l'uomo di usare dei beni per poter vivere.

Quando si dice che la questione natura deve essere intesa come questione etica in modo ontologicamente contestuale, si intende porre l'accento sull'intreccio delle relazioni che costituiscono i rapporti umani con Dio, con altri uomini, con il proprio corpo, con la realtà esterna. Tutte queste relazioni dipendono le une dalle altre e non possono essere considerate in una innaturale separazione, giacché per l'interdipendenza sistemica il rapporto errato con gli altri intacca anche il rapporto con la natura e viceversa e se assolutizziamo l'importanza del nostro rapporto con la natura, possiamo tradire e intralciare

il rapporto con gli altri e con Dio. La natura non può non essere intesa come luogo dell'accadere del rapporto tra persone e con Dio. Ciò la esalta e la limita.

In questo senso essa merita *rispetto*, ossia «riconoscimento della bontà di qualcosa... indipendente dalla relazione ai nostri bisogni di appropriazione e di consumo. Ciò che si rispetta in effetti - sottolinea Vigna - non si consuma; lo si fa oggetto di fruizione; ossia ciò che si rispetta viene sempre intenzionato come fine e mai come mezzo... lo si ama per sé, non per noi». ⁴⁴

Ma ancora una volta dobbiamo ripetere che trattasi di rispetto relativo, perché inteso in senso assoluto il rispetto spetta solo all'uomo e a Dio, soggetti di assolutezza nell'orizzonte della ragione e della grazia.

C'è da prendere le distanze sia da un atteggiamento predatorio e consumistico della natura, sia da un naturalismo "ecologismo fondamentalista" che coltiva il mito della natura selvaggia e incontaminata. Tornare ad una natura selvaggia e incontaminata non è la forma migliore al servizio dell'uomo: tra selva e giardino c'è una bella differenza: «la natura lasciata a se stessa non solo diventa disumana, ma diventa anche intrinsecamente disordinata: selva, appunto. Compito dell'uomo è invece costruire un giardino, non lasciar posto ad una selva». ⁴⁵

In termini di razionalità etica si deve distinguere un'etica dell'ambiente e un'etica dell'uomo. La prima pone come referente ultimo l'ambiente e in base ad esso regola tutto il resto. Conseguenze assurde sono deducibili, come ad esempio il fatto che, se gli uomini sulla terra fossero in eccedenza, sarebbe alla fine lecito sopprimerli onde non alterare l'equilibrio ambientale, oppure sarebbe oltremodo lecito sopprimere la vita malata o quella non ancora nata. Se invece, com'è più razionale, si privilegia l'etica dell'uomo e per l'uomo, allora anche l'ambiente assume il suo giusto ruolo, perché non è detto che l'uomo debba essere fatalmente nemico dell'ambiente. Egli è «al contrario l'unico essere vivente che può assumerne la responsabilità» ⁴⁶

Sulla base dell'assunzione di tale responsabilità scaturiscono alcune direttrici etiche personaliste:

44 C. VIGNA, "Per la costruzione di un'etica dell'ambiente." in *Questione Ecologica* 176.

45 *Op.cit.* 183.

46 A. BONANDI, "Sulla collocazione dell'etica ambientale", in *Questione ecologica* 191.

a. Non è lecito avviare iniziative ad impatto ambientale nocivo scaricando poi sullo Stato l'onere del recupero e della bonificia, senza pagare il risarcimento dei danni.


b. Occorre conservare un sano equilibrio tra iniziativa economico-industriale e tutela dell'ambiente, facendo serie ricerche per favorire lo sviluppo delle nazioni più povere senza degradarne l'habitat e decentrare il più possibile i benefici del confort senza creare un processo irreversibile di inquinamento: la centralità della persona lancia questa sfida.

c. Occorre favorire la diffusione di virtù sociali che comprendono il rispetto e la tutela ambientale, educando le nuove generazioni a saper fare a meno del superfluo con una mentalità del riciclaggio e dello scambio di beni e servizi. Né può mancare l'educazione ad una sana alimentazione meno consumistica.

Infine c'è da fare un'esame di coscienza da parte dei cristiani d'Occidente soprattutto, che con l'ambiguità della loro connivenza con la cultura borghese si sono resi responsabili dell'inquinamento delle risorse e del loro spreco irresponsabile. Si può concludere con i Vescovi lombardi: «Il vero problema... non è difendere la natura dall'opera dell'uomo, ma... verificare la qualità di tale opera»⁴⁷.

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