

## MEDIEVAL MACHIAVELLIANISM: A STUDY IN 14th CENTURY CASTILLIAN DIPLOMACY

by BENJAMIN TAGGIE

NICOLO Machiavelli, born in 1469, wrote his most renowned work, *The Prince*, in 1513. Since the sixteenth century, there have been those who have condemned the work such as Cardinal Reginal Pole, who in 1536 assailed it as a product of the devil. Francis Bacon noted, 'Machiavelli dealt with men as they are, not as they ought to be.' Today, the work remains controversial. One aspect of Machiavelli's work that has stirred less controversy, however, is that it reflected the violent and chaotic political conditions in sixteenth century Italy. In this paper, I will attempt to demonstrate that this political condition, now called Machiavellianism, was indeed practiced extensively in the Iberian Peninsula more than a century before Machiavelli's birth. I am, of course, aware of the anachronistic nature of such a statement. Nevertheless, I believe that I may demonstrate the synthesis of concepts which the term 'Machiavellianism' embraces was indeed practiced in fourteenth century Iberia.

By Machiavellianism I refer to the total divorce of morality from politics. This concept is beyond question the most controversial aspect of *The Prince*. As Machiavelli wrote: 'I thought it better to treat this subject as it really is, in fact, than to amuse the imagination with visionary models of republics and governments that never have existed. A prince that wishes to maintain his power ought to learn that he should not be always good.' Thus, Machiavelli discourages liberality, believing that it is better for a prince to be feared than loved, that a ruler should not keep faith if it is against his interest to do so, that the ends justify the means, and that the ruler is justified in following any course that will serve the state. In short, then, the term Machiavellian has come to signify something opportunistic and cynical, a doctrine clearly expressing the author's low regard for human nature. Using the term

Machiavellian in this context, I will now examine the political conditions of fourteenth century Iberia.

In the middle of the fourteenth century, the Iberian Peninsula was governed by four colorful personalities. Portugal was ruled by Pedro I, known as the Cruel or the Severe. Navarre was ruled by Charles II, known as the Bad; En Pere III, the Ceremonious, governed Aragon, and Pedro I, also known as the Cruel, reigned in Castille. All of these monarchs, if we apply the definition just given, can be classified as Machiavellian princes. I shall, however, concentrate on Pedro I of Castille (1350-1369) and the two individuals who served as his political tutors: his father, Alfonso XI, and the Portuguese, Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque.

Pedro was born on the 30th of August, 1344, the only legitimate offspring of the unhappy union of Alfonso XI and his queen, Maria, daughter of the king of Portugal. At that time, Alfonso had already left his wife for the charms of his mistress, Leonore de Guzman. It is possible that the queen hoped that by producing an heir to the throne, the king would return to her. These hopes were quickly shattered.<sup>1</sup>

There seems, however, to be no question that Alfonso looked upon Pedro as legitimate heir and successor. Though Alfonso was guilty of neglect in regard to his heir, the political acumen of the Castillian king would undoubtedly have influenced young Pedro. Certainly Alfonso XI would have been an excellent tutor in Machiavellian politics.

Alfonso had succeeded to the throne amidst great turbulence in 1312 when he was only one year old. At fourteen, he began to rule in his own name. One of his first political moves was to call his uncle, who at that time was one of his greatest challenges for the throne, to a meeting. Under the pretense of working out an agreement between the two parties involved, the young monarch instead ordered his uncle's arrest and execution. By similar acts, Alfonso intimidated his enemies, restored order in his kingdom and became one of Castille's great monarchs. Alfonso was a willing adherent to the Machiavellian concept that a prince must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for the purpose of keeping his subjects mindful and faithful. Most importantly, he was successful in combining fear with the absence of hatred, a trait admired by Machiavelli. Nor would Machiavelli have been disappointed in the manner in which Alfonso kept faith in matters of politics. For Machiavelli, a ruler ought not to keep faith if it were against his interests or if the commitment was no longer pragmatic. We can observe this by looking at a series of very interesting political negotiations between Alfonso

XI and the court of France and England during the 1340's.

During these years, England and France were making preparations for renewing the Hundred Years' War and both were desirous of obtaining the assistance of the Castillian fleet. Consequently, there was fervent diplomatic activity to obtain a Castillian marriage-military alliance. With the support of the Avignon Papacy<sup>2</sup> the French won the victory. On January 2, 1346, Alfonso signed an agreement<sup>3</sup> in which he promised to aid the French against the English and to marry his son to a French princess. The French, in turn, agreed to pay a dowry of 300,000 florins. Four days later, he concluded a treaty with the English ambassador in which he promised to marry Pedro to Edward III's daughter, Joanna.<sup>4</sup> It appears, then, without question, that Alfonso XI was more than qualified to instruct the young prince in that political philosophy we have come to call Machiavellianism. It seems, however, that it was not Alfonso XI who educated Pedro in the arts of statemanship but rather Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque.

Alburquerque was not Castillian but Portuguese. He was a kinsman of both the king of Portugal and Queen Maria. Early in life he had abandoned his country and entered the service of young Alfonso XI. At the time that Alburquerque linked his future to that of the Castillian king, the nobility had not yet been subdued.<sup>5</sup> By aiding the king, Alburquerque earned the gratitude of the Castillian monarch who was to bestow lavish gifts on him in future years. The education of Pedro was placed in the hands of Juan Alfonso, who was made major domo for the boy. At the death of Alfonso XI, Alburquerque, already in an important position with the young heir, seemed destined to play a prominent role in the new government. Unscrupulous, intelligent, and ambitious, Alburquerque was equipped with all the necessary tools to play the game of Castillian politics. For the next three years, as Chancellor he was the most powerful figure in Castille and at the same time, nurtured Pedro in the arts of Machiavellian government.

Alburquerque's first program was to make the power of the king felt in all parts of the realm. According to Castillian law, a Cortes was to meet at the beginning of each new reign. The three estates in Castillian society were allowed to present their complaints and petitions to the king. Consequently, Alburquerque summoned the Cortes to convene in Valladolid in the summer of 1351. Apparently the selection of that city was intentional. Since it was located in the northern province of Castille, it would be necessary for the king and his party to pass through the territories which had most strongly supported Alburquerque's greatest rival, Juan Nunez

de Lara.<sup>6</sup> The hostility of Juan Nunez to Alburquerque was shared by a considerable number of the Castillian nobility, who resented the power of this foreigner in Pedro's court. Just before his sudden death in Burgos on November 28, 1350 (he was most likely a victim of the Black Plague), Juan Nunez de Lara was preparing to revolt against Pedro and Alburquerque.<sup>7</sup> Thus, the kingdom was temporarily spared civil war, but there remained many who were opposed to Alburquerque. Foremost was Garcilaso de la Vega, adelantado mayor of Castille.

Garcilaso was a powerful man who had found favor with Alfonso XI, and had been major domo to the children of Leonor de Guzman. He was a man proud of his feudal power and totally lacking in humility. Pedro soon found it easy to apply several Machiavelian principles in his dealings with Garcilaso. For example, Machiavelli writes:

I say that every prince must desire to be considered merciful and not cruel ... A prince ... must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for the purpose of keeping his subjects united and faithful.

And men have less scruple in offending one who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared; for love is held by a chain of obligation ...; but fear is maintained by a dread of punishment which never fails.

Garcilaso was in Burgos with a large number of armed men as the king approached that city in May of 1351. I believe at this time Alburquerque was seeking a victim in order to display his power and that of his royal protege. Garcilaso was an appropriate choice. To destroy a man of such power would surely intimidate the rest of the Castillian nobility. Garcilaso played right into the hands of his enemies. Learning of the king's approach, he and his followers met the king at a place called Celada. Almost immediately, the hostility existing between Garcilaso and Alburquerque surfaced. Though unsupported by historical documentation, one historian suggests<sup>8</sup> that the entire episode was planned by Alburquerque so that he might have the opportunity to destroy his rivals. Only Pedro's intervention prevented bloodshed. The following day, a similar episode broke out and again the king prevented an armed conflict.<sup>9</sup>

On the day following Pedro's arrival in Burgos, Garcilaso was summoned to appear before the king. Immediately upon entering the king's presence his companions were seized and, upon Pedro's orders, Don Garci was murdered. The king then ordered that the body be thrown into the main square of the city, where a bullfight

was to be held that day.<sup>10</sup> Other executions soon followed, plunging Burgos into a state of terror in which no one dared raise his voice against the king or his chancellor. Alburquerque then directed Pedro toward the liquidation of the remainder of the family of Juan Nunez de Lara and of his main supporters. In the following weeks this purge was carried out. The great land holdings which once belonged to the Lara family were confiscated and put under the direct control of the crown. Alburquerque had taught Pedro the value of fear and cruelty in the administration of his domain. This lesson Pedro never forgot.

From Burgos, Pedro proceeded to Valladolid for the meeting of the Cortes. The Cortes was convoked during the first days of July, 1351 and lasted until March of 1352. Pedro, who had shown such ferocity in dealing with his enemies in Burgos, now revealed another side of his personality, one of generosity in dealing with the petitions and complaints brought before him.<sup>11</sup> We can see an obvious attempt to establish the concept of a monarch who must be feared but not necessarily hated; one who would deal out death and destruction to those who would oppose him but could also display compassion and generosity to those who petitioned. It was under the strong hand of Alburquerque, then, that Pedro was introduced to the arts of statesmanship. But unfortunately for the Portuguese minister, he was to become one of his protegee's first victims.

Alburquerque fell out of favor with his young master early in 1353 as the result of a marriage which he contracted between the crowns of Castille and France.<sup>12</sup> (Neither of the treaties signed by Alfonso XI in 1346 had been implemented.) The Castillian king was reluctant to abandon his beautiful and intelligent mistress, Maria de Padilla, in favor of the French marriage, despite the numerous advantages which it offered.<sup>13</sup> The pressure which Alburquerque applied to Pedro to consummate this alliance was the main reason that the Castillian king decided to dispose of his Portuguese minister.

Without any hesitation, Pedro was prepared to abandon the man who had served him so well. Unaware of his imminent downfall, the minister continued to advise the king in matters of state. Upon the urging of Alburquerque, the marriage of Pedro and Blanche of Bourbon took place on June 3, 1353. Three days after his marriage, Pedro left Valladolid to be reunited with Maria de Padilla in Toledo.

With a large following, Alburquerque pursued the young king, hoping to bring him back to Valladolid and his bride. On the Sunday following Pedro's wedding, Juan Alfonso reached the village

of Albornoz, a short distance from Toledo.<sup>14</sup> There, he was visited by Pedro's emissary, Don Samuel Levi, who was the king's treasurer and a partisan of the Padilla family. Levi brought instructions from Pedro that he wished to consult with his minister and that the king did not understand why Juan Alfonso would bring such a powerful host with him. He ordered Albuquerque to dismiss them and come to Toledo alone. Pedro sent assurance that he had nothing to fear for his personal safety. Albuquerque, however, remembered only too well the lesson he had taught Pedro in the case of Garcilaso and had no intention of placing himself at the mercy of the young king. Fearing for his safety, he abandoned the project and fled to his homeland.<sup>15</sup>

Following Albuquerque's departure, Pedro purged his government of all those placed in power by Juan Alfonso,<sup>16</sup> destroying those who resisted. Thus Pedro began to govern in his own name, employing the methods he had been so ably taught by Albuquerque.

In the years immediately following Albuquerque's discharge, Pedro was forced to rely upon the political acumen he had acquired. In 1354 a rebellion broke out, led by Enrique of Trastamara, the bastard half-brother of the king, and supported by Albuquerque who had returned from exile to play a leading role. After a desperate struggle, Pedro was finally able to crush the last remnants of this rebellion in the early months of 1356. It appeared, then, that tranquility would once more be restored to the Castillian kingdom.

But the peace was only temporary for by the end of 1356, Castille was to be involved in one of the most prolonged and bloody wars in her history. The war with Aragón broke out late in 1356 and did not end until the death of Pedro in 1369.

The war continued intermittently until 1361, generally favoring Castille. In the early months of that year, Pedro, intended to deal a final blow to his enemy. Realizing the precarious nature of his position, the Aragonese king entered into negotiations with Granada, hoping to create a diversion and gain time for his kingdom to recover from numerous defeats suffered at the hands of the Castillian forces. The conditions for Aragonese intervention in Granada were well timed. In May of 1361, a coup d'etat had taken place in Granada which resulted in the seizure of the throne by the vizar Abu-Said. In doing so, he had driven Mohammed, an ally and vassal of Pedro, from the throne. Abu-Said realized that the Castillian king would support Mohammed and he eagerly entered into an alliance with the king of Aragon. Pedro was already deep in Aragonese territory when he received news of these events.<sup>17</sup> This

danger forced Pedro to give up his invasion when it appeared that victory in Aragon was at hand. Within a few days a peace agreement between Castille and Aragon had been reached.<sup>18</sup> When Abu-Said learned of this settlement between Aragon and Castille, he wrote to Pedro protesting his peaceful intentions and offered to continue paying tribute to the Castillian king as his predecessor had done.<sup>19</sup> Pedro, however, had already determined to destroy the usurper. An interesting stipulation of the Aragonese-Castillian treaty of 1361 had required Aragon to assist Pedro in his war against the Moors. Pere III was reluctant to aid his bitter rival, so he procrastinated as long as there was the slightest chance that Granada might be successful. En Pere wrote Pedro on September 8<sup>20</sup> and again on October 25<sup>21</sup> offering excuses to the Castillian king. He first pleaded illness which prevented him from taking part in these matters; his second reason was the threat that the Free Companies were to his kingdom. Apparently the Castillian king accepted these excuses, for in a letter of his own, dated from Seville on September 24, 1361, he offered with equal hypocrisy his condolences to the Aragonese king for having to face such a menace and apologized that he was unable to aid him because of the war with Granada.<sup>22</sup> When it appeared inevitable early in 1362 that the usurper was about to be destroyed. En Pere quickly dispatched a detachment of Aragonese troops to fulfill his obligation to Pedro I. He displayed no scruples about deserting an ally that he had used so successfully months earlier.

The war with Granada ended with the death of Abu-Said in April of 1362. Pedro was now free once more to turn his attention to Aragon. The following passage from *The Prince* shows how clearly Pedro practiced the Machiavellian Creed,

How laudable it is for a prince to keep good faith and live with integrity, and not with astuteness, every one knows. Still the experience of our times shows those princes to have done great things who have had little regard for good faith, and have been able by astuteness to confuse men's brains, and who have ultimately overcome those who have made loyalty their foundation. . . . Therefore, a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing it would be against his interest, and when the reasons which made him bind himself no longer exist. If men were all good, this precept would not be a good one; but as they are bad, and would not observe their faith with you, so you are not bound to keep faith with them.

The war against Granada had attracted most of the great nobles

of Castille to Andalusia. With the end of the war, the time had come for Pedro to disband his army. Before he did so, Pedro took the opportunity to call a Cortes in Seville, in the spring of 1362. The king took advantage of the Cortes to inform his vassals that they would soon be called upon to defend the frontier of Castille. The existing truce between France and England left numerous mercenaries unemployed. For months they had ravaged the French kingdom and were now directing their attention to the Iberian Peninsula. Already in the fall of 1361, they had attacked the frontier of Aragon.<sup>23</sup> Because of these activities, En Pere had excused himself from aiding Pedro in October of 1361. Pedro impressed upon the Cortes that Castille would be the next target of these mercenaries and it would be necessary to employ considerable forces along the frontiers to prevent such an invasion. Possibly few of Pedro's nobles suspected the true reason for the concentration of an army in the northeast of Castille. The intent of Pedro, of course, was to take the Aragonese kingdom by surprise and resume the war which he had been forced to terminate because of the threat of Granada.

These matters accomplished, Pedro left Seville with a considerable following. Early in May, Pedro entered into negotiations with Charles of Navarre for an offensive and defensive alliance. The Navarran king showed considerable interest in establishing an alliance with Castille. His relationship with France was bad, and of all the Iberian kingdoms, his was most susceptible to invasion by the Great Companies. In a matter of days the agreement had been worked out. The two kings made an alliance of friendship, promising to aid each other in all their wars and to mutually deliver all immigrant exiles.<sup>24</sup> This treaty was ratified by Charles of Navarre on May 22 at Soria and by Pedro at Saragossa on June 2.<sup>25</sup>

On the surface, the treaty appeared to hold many advantages for Navarre, a small state surrounded by many enemies. It had now acquired the protection of their powerful neighbour to the south. It was not long, however, before Charles realized that the alliance he had just concluded had been bought at a high price. Only days later, Pedro informed Charles that he was prepared to renew the war with Aragon, and by the terms of the treaty just concluded, he expected Navarran troops to fight along side his own in the campaign which would begin in a few days.<sup>26</sup> Charles the Bad had fallen into Pedro's trap. As reluctant as he was to enter into the war with Aragon, he had no choice. He officially declared war on Aragon toward the middle of June and sent his troops to the aid of



the Castellians.<sup>27</sup> Pedro did not trouble himself with such formalities. Almost immediately following his meeting with the king of Navarre, he invaded western Aragon. Pere III had been taken totally by surprise. At that time he was on the other side of his kingdom at Paprina with all of his available forces.

The situation of the Aragonese king was critical. This renewal of the war by Pedro earned for him the denunciation of the pope, Urban VI, and was proclaimed by En Pere to be an act of unparalleled treachery. The real cause of this indignation on the part of En Pere and his supporters was that their own aggressive plan against Castille had been thwarted. Pere III had been endeavoring to enlist the Companies to invade Castille and overthrow his hated rival. As the danger to his kingdom increased, the Aragonese king intensified these negotiations.<sup>28</sup> In the meantime, the Castilian-Aragonese war was continued with disastrous results for Aragon.

In an attempt to break the spirit of the Aragonese, Pedro was waging the war with an exceptional degree of terrorism.<sup>29</sup> He had given orders that no Aragonese prisoner was to be taken alive. At this crucial moment Charles V of France came to the aid of Aragon. The French king had been a supporter of Enrique of Trastamara for many years. He now saw how he could solve two problems with the same action. Since signing the treaty of Brittany in 1360 which had temporarily ended the war between France and England, the French kingdom had been ravaged by the unemployed Companies. Thus, in the case of Charles V, two policies of paramount importance coincided: the attainment of a successful solution to the Iberian problem, and the elimination of the Free Companies from his kingdom. Both of these goals could be accomplished through implementing the same program, sending the Companies to Castille to help overthrow Pedro and to establish the Trastamaran usurper.

Charles V's enthusiasm of ridding France of these mercenaries was shared by Pope Urban VI. It was agreed that Charles V, the Papacy and En Pere would each pay one third of the cost to subsidize the expedition.<sup>30</sup> In January of 1366, under the command of Bertrand du Guesclin, the Companies began their invasion of Castille. Pedro, still trusting in his alliance with Charles of Navarre, had taken no precautions to guard the Navarran frontier. He was totally unaware of an alliance recently concluded between Charles, Enrique of Trastamara and En Pere.<sup>31</sup> Pedro assumed the Companies would attack from western Aragon and thus took the necessary precaution to strengthen his fortresses along the Aragonese frontier, but imprudently trusted the Navarran alliance. When the Companies made a sudden dash through Navarre and descended upon

northern Castille, Pedro was outflanked. The mercenaries, disregarding conventional methods of siege warfare, moved quickly on the Castillian capital of Burgos. Faced by widespread desertion to the usurper, Pedro fled his kingdom to take refuge with his English allies in Gascony.

In 1362, Pedro had concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Edward III. He now sought to invoke that treaty. The bargaining between him and the Black Prince (who represented Edward III in the negotiations) continued through 1366. Finally, after assuming full financial responsibility for the invasion and granting extensive territories to both the Black Prince and Charles of Navarre (who had once again changed sides), the expedition to restore Pedro began in the early months of 1367.<sup>32</sup>

Charles of Navarre, having secretly abandoned his alliance with Enrique of Trastamara, allowed the English army to descend upon northern Castille and take Enrique by surprise, as the Companies had done to Pedro in 1366. The campaign which ended in triumph for the Black Prince at Najera in 1367 proved to be a Pyrrhic victory. Pedro and the Prince were totally incompatible allies because of their differing political mentality. The Black Prince, imbued with western chivalry, found the Machiavellian Castillian unpalatable. An ill-advised clause in the treaty of Liboume had provided that all prisoners taken during the campaign be turned over to the Black Prince.<sup>33</sup> The battle of Najera had offered Pedro I the opportunity to rid Castille, once and for all, of those who opposed him. The inability, then, of the Black Prince to grasp the political realities of Castillian politics made the entire campaign of 1367 useless.

The day after the battle, Pedro's greatest rivals, who had been determined to resist his authority, were paraded before him.<sup>34</sup> When Pedro demanded that these knights be turned over to him, the Prince replied in a pretentious manner that English knights worked for honor and that there was not one among them who would give up his prisoner if he supposed he was being brought to be killed.<sup>35</sup> What the Prince was proposing must have appeared as sheer madness to Pedro. In a matter of months, most of the prisoners had been ransomed and were again in rebellion against Pedro, working for the establishment of the Trastamaran dynasty. Though we must applaud the nobility of the Prince's sentiments, Machiavelli would clearly have supported Pedro.

He should not shrink from encountering some blame on account of vices that are important to the support of his states; for,

everything well considered, there are some things, having the appearance of virtues, that would prove the ruin of a prince should he put them in practice, and others upon which, though they are seemingly bad and vicious, his actual welfare and security depend.

The elimination of Pedro's rivals at Najera, if not humane, would have been the most pragmatic action, for it would have terminated the civil war and restored order to Castille.

Pedro was correct when he acknowledged that his kingdom was now in a worse state than before.<sup>36</sup> Soon his enemies would again be at large to attack him. In the meantime, he had incurred an enormous debt.<sup>37</sup>

By the end of 1367, the Black Prince had returned to Gascony, and Enrique of Trastamara endeavored once more to overthrow Pedro. The struggle between Enrique and Pedro dragged on until March of 1369 and ended with the murder of Pedro at Montiel on the fourteenth of March. Ingloriously, the career of Pedro I of Castille had come to an end. For nineteen years he had practiced Machiavellian statescraft in an effort to bring a strong, centralized monarchy to his kingdom. This was the same motivation that prompted Machiavelli to write *The Prince*, to end the chaos in the Italian Peninsula by establishing a strong government capable of asserting itself in the face of the prevalent anarchy. It is ironic that Machiavelli found it necessary to praise another Spanish monarch, Ferdinand II. This man was able to accomplish what Pedro had failed to do more than a hundred years earlier by employing the same tactics encouraged by Machiavelli. Any analysis of the fourteenth-century political practices of the Iberian Peninsula reveals that the concept of Machiavellian government, so closely identified with sixteenth-century Italy, were indeed prevalent in the Iberian Peninsula more than one hundred years before Machiavelli.

#### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Juan Catalina Garcia, *Castille y Leon durante los reinados de Pedro I, Enrique II, Juan I y Enrique III*, 2 Vols. (Madrid: El Progreso Editorial, 1891), Vol. I, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Vatican Reg., 138, N. Mxxxviii, Mxxxix, piece just., no. 7 and MXL, piece just., no. 9.

<sup>3</sup> French National Archives, J 602, no. 41.

<sup>4</sup> Thomas Rymer, ed., *Foedere, conventiones, litterae et acta publica*, (London: 1825), Vol. III (i), p. 22.

<sup>5</sup> This was during the crucial years, 1336-38, when Alfonso was concurrently at war with the king of Portugal and many of his nobles, including Juan Manuel and Juan Nunez de Lara. This conflict must have posed serious problems for Alburquerque, who was a nephew of the king of Portugal. It appears that Juan Alfonso solved his dilemma by aiding Alfonso XI in his conflict against the Castillian nobility, but abstained from taking part in military action against his native kingdom. For a more detailed discussion see E.R. Amaya, *Don Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque*, pp. 28-34.

<sup>6</sup> Juan Nunez, who had revolted against Alfonso XI in 1336, had been forgiven by Alfonso and had remained loyal until the king's death in 1350. At that time, Alburquerque and Juan Nunez had entered into a shaky alliance which quickly dissolved when Pedro I became seriously ill during the early months of his reign. When it appeared that Pedro's death was imminent, two parties emerged. One headed by Alburquerque supported Fernando of Aragon (a nephew of Alfonso XI), another claimed the crown for Juan Nunez de Lara, since he was a descendent of the house of Cerda. The unexpected recovery of Pedro I ended the need for this political division, but the brief conflict ended the hope of cooperation between Don Juan Alfonso and Juan Nunez. Soon after the king's recovery, Don Juan Nunez withdrew from the court at Sevilla to his lands in Castilla where he died suddenly months later.

<sup>7</sup> Pero Lopez de Ayala, *Cronica del rey Don Pedro*, ed. E. Languano y Amirola, Vol. I, (Madrid: Real Academia Espanola, 1779), p. 15.

<sup>8</sup> Proposer Merimee, *Historie de Don Pedro Ier, Roi de Castille*, (9th ed.; Paris: Charpentier, Libraire-Editeur, 1865), p. 38.

<sup>9</sup> Ayala, p. 37.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

<sup>11</sup> Unpublished documents, Archivo Nacional, Madrid: co.934, n.16, co.383, no.15, co.371, n.18, co.357, n.2.

<sup>12</sup> Unpublished Documents, French National Archives, J603, N.51 and N.53.

<sup>13</sup> The relationship of Pedro I and Maria de Padilla is far too complex to enter into a lengthy discussion of in a paper of this size, but several points must be brought out to put the event into its proper perspective. The traditional story of the relationship, drawn from the *Chronical of Ayala*, is that Padilla was brought up in the household of Alburquerque and was introduced to the king in 1352. Alburquerque's intention was to divert the king's interest from government through the charms of Padilla, a creature Juan Alfonso presumed he could control. This interpretation is opposed with some merit by E.R. Amaya. Nevertheless, Pedro did meet Maria in 1352 and she soon became the king's favorite. By the following year, her relatives were cooperating with the bastard sons of Alfonso XI to depose the Portuguese minister so they could enjoy more authority in

the government. It appears that these interests coincided with those of the young king who was now eighteen and desirous of escaping the authority of Alburquerque. The French marriage proved to be an event around which these events evolved.

<sup>14</sup> Ayala, p. 97.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 101.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 114.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 348.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 350.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 324.

<sup>20</sup> Diplomatic Documents, General Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1391, p. 74.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 1394, p. 75.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Don Jose Yanguas y Miranda, *Diccionario de Antiquidades de Navarra*, (Madrid: 1840-43), Vol. III, p. 99.

<sup>25</sup> Burtalis, *Archives de la Chambre de Comptes de Navarre*, p. 86.

<sup>26</sup> Ayala, pp. 353 ff.

<sup>27</sup> Geronimo Zurita, *Anales de la Corona de Aragon*, (Zaragoza: 1610), Vol. II, p. 259.

<sup>28</sup> French National Archives, Paris, J 603, N. 58.

<sup>29</sup> Zurita, *Anals*, Vol. II, p. 317.

<sup>30</sup> Vatican Archives, Reg. 247, folio 55.

<sup>31</sup> Archives of Chamber of Counts of Navarre, Caja 41, N. 47.

<sup>32</sup> Rymer, *Foedere*, Vol. III (ii), pp. 800-602.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Ayala, p. 471.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 472.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 473-474.

<sup>37</sup> Rymer, Vol. III (ii), p. 825, and Public Records Office: Exchequer (Diplomatic Documents), No. 1225.