

Ethical Considerations in Selection and Streaming in Education*

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*This is an edited text of a public lecture given by Professor Hirst in the Faculty of Education, University of Malta, May 1988.


Under this rather forbidding title I want to dig below the immediately practical questions to do with selection and streaming in schools and look at certain of the fundamental moral and social value questions that pervade debates on these topics. In doing this I am not seeking to evade the directly practical issues that arise. It is rather that, in an area where much of the empirical evidence on what happens under different practical arrangements is inconclusive and raises such sharp controversy, there is a danger that we lose sight of what is really at stake. The analytical exercise of the kind I shall undertake therefore seeks to bring to the fore just those basic issues of principle on which any organisation of schooling inevitably takes some stand. After all what we really want is a system that as far as possible embodies the principles we really espouse rather than one locked into principles we have inadequately examined. The basic question I am therefore addressing is: what are the principles of selection and streaming we think the educational system should reflect and what can we say about the practical organisation of the system simply on these grounds.

As a first move in this analytical task let me make it plain how I understand the terms "selection" and "streaming" within the context that concerns us. The process of selection I shall take to be the grouping of pupils according to certain particular rules as part of the means to achieving certain educational ends or purposes. Selection within an educational system is thus a deliberate, intentional procedure which is built into the system and it is primarily justified as the means to certain ends. If that is the case, we shall avoid a good deal of confusion in our debates if we keep a firm hold on what the educational purposes are that we wish schools to serve and see the rules of any selection processes in relation to these. If the purposes are clear we can at least seek to assess what selection processes, if any, are consistent with those ends

even if it is difficult to discover empirically the detail of what happens when we put certain processes into practice. Of course this is not to deny that any system of selection will have consequences that were not envisaged. And that being so we must always be prepared to change the system in the light of what actually happens. But it is with the educational purposes of schools that we must surely start if we are to examine issues of selection coherently.

But within any sizeable educational system the process of selection can be carried out at two different levels. First, at the level of the organisation of schools as a whole, there is the selection of pupils for admission to different schools. Here the central question is whether there are to be schools of different types, schools that serve different purposes. Are we in fact to have a selective system at all? If so, what distinct purposes are different schools to serve and what are to be the rules by which pupils are selected for them? It is these issues about schools within the system that are usually referred to as the problem of "selection". But the process of selection also arises within any one school no matter what its basis for admitting pupils is. The issue now is how pupils are to be grouped into classes or other units for actually achieving what the school is after. Are there to be different kinds of classes, e.g. different streams, sets, or mixed ability groups and if so what are to be the rules for putting pupils into them? At this level it is customary to refer to these interlocked questions as the issue of "streaming" though that is a shorthand when streaming is only one system of grouping. In these terms then there are two levels of questions I must address: those to do with "selection" and those to do with "streaming".

But where is one to start on such large scale issues? What I have said already gives us the key I think. It is with the purposes we want schools to serve that we must begin. What is it we want achieved that leads us to advocate grammar or



comprehensive schools, academic sets or mixed ability groups? At first the answer might seem very simple, we just want the best education for every child and all we need to know is how we should organise schools so that they get it. But as soon as we push matters a little further we discover that people are often radically divided as to what in practice that best education should be for any one pupil let alone what it should be for different pupils who vary widely in their abilities and interests. But if any argument for or against "selection" or "streaming" makes sense only in relation to the purposes of schools then we shall not get very far until we begin to sort out what those purposes are to be. What I therefore wish to do is to distinguish the four major purposes that figure in most educational systems and lie behind debates on these issues, then going on to pursue the implications each of these has for "selection" and "streaming". What I shall argue is that in so far as we are committed to education in all these terms we have to recognise that we support moral and social principles that pull us in different directions. There is nothing unique in that dilemma, but it does mean that in seeking to reconcile our educational purposes we are compelled to consider what we judge most important for young people in our society. "Selection" and indeed "streaming" in schools are in the end both "political" issues though at very different levels. What then matters is that those "political" decisions are properly and responsibly taken. What I personally consider should be the outcome for schools in the U.K. context I will I trust make plain. What you, in your context should conclude I am not really in a position to argue. What I hope I shall have done is set out the central ethical considerations that you must face.

The first of the four purposes schools serve is, I suggest, the mastery of those areas of knowledge, understanding and skill that every person needs for basic competence and viability as an individual in their society. What I mean here is an education to which everyone in a society has a right simply as a human being in that society irrespective of race, religion, sex, social background or ability. It is the kind of education we recognise most readily at the primary stage where we consider everyone needs to read and write, to use numbers, to understand the world and the society about them. The idea that because some pupils find certain of these kinds of learning difficult or not interesting they should be selected to go to a school which attends to them selectively or to other things instead, would seem to most of us bizarre. These matters are so important and so fundamental in everyone's life if it is to be a truly human life, that difficulty with these areas of learning demands that we provide special "remedial" help, extra teaching and attention. We do all we can so that no one misses out, if at all

possible, in reaching that minimum level we consider everyone really must have. Here is a form of basic personal education that is for all, equally, where what we are after is set by the demands made on everyone by life in the society, not by the differences of any kind there might be between people or their roles. Not that all pupils will in fact attain even the minimum standards we think necessary for all and manifestly some pupils will rampage with great speed through all those things we would consider basic. But what matters in this form of education is that we do all we can to make sure everyone attains certain common ends. Education of this kind most of us would consider crucial for all as basic to development as a person as well as being necessary for purely practical reasons. In a democracy it must surely also be valued as a fundamental form of the educational opportunity to which all should equally have access as a basic right. What is to be noted however is that what exactly such a basic personal education should contain is not easily decided. In terms of elementary skills it is arguable that we are moving into a period when certain computer skills will be as necessary as writing skills. It seems to me too that a basic understanding of the workings of one's society in terms of its financial, legal and political practices and its health and social services, is no longer an optional matter. Indeed, I would suggest that in western societies a great deal of education at the secondary stage ought now to be devoted to basic personal education that is necessary for all. Just what we consider to be the content and standards of the basic personal education we want attained by all is a very telling judgment for it marks out just what kind of life we think all, without exception, should have access to.

But there is more to basic education than this. In addition to much necessary knowledge and skill, life in any society demands that we learn to establish certain kinds of relationships with other people for without these much of what life is about is closed to us. Most of the things that we value in life of their very nature go on within complex personal and social relationships that are part of a vast network. It is in the family, in friendships, in associations for music making or playing games, in churches, businesses and hospitals that human life is lived. Learning to cooperate with others in enterprises of great variety and to establish certain kinds of relationship is thus a basic part of education to which all have a right simply as human beings in that society. In a liberal democratic society this includes learning to live together as equals, to treat people fairly, to respect the interests and freedom of others, to work together for the good of others, to accept responsibilities and share in benefits irrespective of sex, colour, creed, ability or social class. It includes too,

learning to take part in the political life of the society as a citizen with both a right to the benefits there are for all and responsibility to contribute to the good of the community.

It seems to me therefore important that alongside the first form of education I outlined, that of basic personal education, we should distinguish a second form whose purpose is basic social education. Like the first we can recognise this kind of education for all at the primary school stage when learning to cooperate with other children no matter who, to share facilities and opportunities fairly with them and to consider their interests as well as one's own is built into the programme of activities. But it is now strongly argued, and I think rightly, that wide ranging personal and social education of many kinds is a necessity for all at the secondary stage for the good of pupils individually and for the good of society as a whole. No longer can we consider moral and political concerns as matters outside the educational sphere of responsible schooling if only because we demand significant choice in these areas by all members of our society irrespective to their background.

The third educational purpose I want to distinguish is of a sharply different character. Beyond pupils' basic development personally and socially, we see schools as providing opportunities for the fullest possible fulfilment of each individual's own distinctive abilities and talents. We recognise that, whatever the reason, people differ in their potentialities, some being better at languages, mathematics, music or games than others. People are unique, they do not start alike and we do not wish to make them alike. Rather we consider it important that they be able to pursue the development of their gifts and abilities and thereby find personal achievement and satisfaction. But the development of personal abilities is important not only for the good of the individual concerned. It is also of great importance for the community as a whole. The calibre of life we can all have depends very much on the use the society makes of the abilities and talents people have to contribute for the good of all. We need those who can contribute to technological and industrial development, to commercial enterprise and to medical and social services. Any society must therefore have a vested interest in developing pupils' abilities of great variety, for we need for the greater good of the community gardeners and plumbers, teachers and secretaries, scientists and surgeons. The development of pupils' particular abilities is therefore for both individual and social good. Not that all particular uses of abilities are good or desirable, some can be individually or socially destructive. But we manifestly want schools to provide a wide range of opportunities for abilities to be developed in those ways that in themselves enhance the quality of life of the individual and

contribute to the wider good of the community. It is of the nature of this form of education that, being geared to individual abilities, it will lead to differences of achievement in any one area and will concentrate on different abilities for different pupils. Indeed, its stress is on human difference and diversity, unlike the forms of basic education I outlined which are concerned with human similarities and likenesses. But for all their differences in a democratic society all pupils will have an equal right to opportunities for the development of their abilities within a framework designed to provide for both individual fulfilment and social good. Freedom to be different is the equal right of all and schools must do justice to both freedom and equality if they are to be truly democratic.

In different societies and at different times, however, the value placed on particular abilities will vary and the opportunities provided overall for developing them will therefore be different. Though many people may be capable of being dentists, and indeed may wish to train in dentistry, the need for dentists may in fact at any one time be strictly limited so that only a small number of people could find personal satisfaction in that particular contribution to society's good. No real good will, then, can be served by offering an excess of places for training in dentistry. Open opportunity and competition in terms of ability for the appropriate number of places is clearly the most rational approach. The provision of opportunities for training in different areas clearly serves to channel human abilities so that they can find fulfilment in valued ways.

But societies have other ways of steering the development of abilities, in particular by giving rewards of money, status or power to those with skills and qualities that are prized. This being so, in educating for the development of personal abilities, schools come to serve other, very different, purposes. The development of high ability, as say a mathematician or lawyer, can come to be valued not for the personal fulfilment that ability can bring in itself nor for the good it can bring to the community, but because it is the means to the individual achieving valued extrinsic rewards in terms of money for cars, houses and travel or influence in political or social circles. Schools then serve a fourth purpose, access to rewards. Of course schools may well serve the development of abilities for their intrinsic value to pupils and society and at the same time incidentally serve this fourth purpose by putting many of their pupils into the way of high rewards. But if what matters is the development of abilities for personal and social good, many abilities that have low extrinsic rewards may well be seen as being of high importance. If on the other hand the rewards are

what matters, then education in this fourth sense can seek to develop abilities that may bring little or no significant fulfilment to the pupil and indeed might belong to a category that does little or no social good. Developing abilities can thus take on two different purposes which may in fact conflict for any individual. What is in a pupils' personal interests may produce little by way of rewards or rewards may come from pursuits that give little personal satisfaction. That particular kinds of abilities are tied to high rewards means that whether we like it or not certain educational decisions are tightly linked to external social consequences of very considerable significance for pupils. Their future standard of living is likely to be determined to a large degree by the abilities they do or do not develop at school. That being so, if we subscribe to liberal democratic principles we shall want an educational system which takes seriously equality of opportunity for pupils to seek those rewards.

I have distinguished four purposes which education serves because in pursuing each of these the issues of "selection" and "streaming" take on a different significance and only if we keep all four purposes in mind can we begin to adequately determine what we should do. The first of the purposes, that of basic personal education, is concerned with a common set of achievements for all. It is not about differences between pupils except in so far as some have difficulty in mastering the basic knowledge and skills that all require as common goods to which all have equal right. Schools therefore must attend to pupils' disadvantages and seek to overcome these whatever their cause. But if the concern is with all attaining common basic levels in the same areas of education, there can be no different purpose for different schools or even for different classes other than those arising from learning difficulties. A selective system of schools, except for extreme handicap, would seem to lack any rationale in terms of this first purpose. And selective classes within a school could have nothing to do with pursuing different goals or different standards. The best means for reaching common goals could be the only basis for selection.

The second purpose, that of basic social education, introduces another consideration. For if such education is concerned precisely with learning to live and cooperate with others, respecting them equally irrespective of their ability, race, religion, sex or social class, then any principle of selection is likely to strike at the very roots of that purpose. A school system which is selective on any grounds is thereby deficient in its provision of schools that are a fully adequate context for basic social education. The sharp institutionalisation of differences involved necessarily raises problems

for education in the fundamental principles of a democratic society, something schools in a democracy must surely seek hard to preserve. Selection into classes on any particular basis similarly gives prominence to the distinction being made and it is once more hard to see how that can be justified unless it is necessary for overcoming learning difficulties. Basic social education like basic personal education is concerned with differences only as a hard practical necessity when empirical evidence justifies this. The evidence that it is necessary for education of these kinds is far from easy to find.

But if there is little place, if any, for selection in either form of basic education, education for the fulfilment of personal abilities has very different implications. In pursuing this third purpose schools are seeking to provide for each pupil opportunity to develop their own distinctive abilities at an appropriate level. The development of individual differences is of the essence of the business. What is wanted is the opportunity for pupils to go in different directions be they academic, technical, artistic or athletic and at their own pace. For this purpose it would seem that schools providing different opportunities are what we need and within them groupings of pupils based on ability in different areas that will allow the gifted to forge ahead at their own rate. This sounds like a "selective" and "streamed" arrangement. But though something of that sort is certainly indicated we must be careful about the details. To begin with, though we may want a differentiated system, that is not to say it must be a selective system. Choice of school by pupils rather than their allocation to schools might be more appropriate. Who does the selecting, the pupil or the school, makes a lot of difference. However, if there are to be only limited opportunities for developing certain abilities there might well need to be selection for access to particular areas of education. Even if that is so, however, do we really want separate institutions serving say academic and technical abilities? Is it not the case that any one pupil may wish to develop a combination of academic and technical abilities and that we might wish to encourage such combinations? Indeed, if personal fulfilment is a major purpose, to prevent combinations of abilities across the whole range is a serious disadvantage in any system. What is more, if the distinctive abilities of each pupil are to be valued as equally important for them personally and as a contribution to society's good, the isolation of pupils into, say, academic and trades schools will do little to forward any real appreciation of the value of different abilities for society as a whole. It is also the case that in the early stages of education even for this third purpose the differences between individuals are not likely to be so great that

separate institutions are needed for meeting pupils' needs. Within any one school of reasonable size it is going to be possible to cope with very wide ranging abilities for pupils from say 11 to 16 by using setting and streaming. Clearly what can be done in any institution depends on its overall size and the age range for which it caters. The third purpose of education thus demands that schooling be progressively differentiated in ability terms, but that does not necessarily point to a selective system. It certainly points to ability grouping wherever that is necessary for high achievement, though setting for specific areas rather than streaming would be the ideal.

The fourth purpose of education, that for personal rewards, is clearly like the third purpose, linked to differentiation within the educational system. If a high premium is put on developing the rewarded abilities, if only because the rewards of those who get to the top are so manifest, there will inevitably become great competitive pressure for the training of those abilities. In so far as such training is limited, that competition will be accentuated. It is the significance of extrinsic rewards and the competitive nature of access to them that produces popular demand for selective schools and patterns of setting and streaming. In most modern societies the rewards attached to specific 'jobs means that at school level the development of academic abilities is the key and it is therefore not surprising that a selective system dominated by academic pursuits has emerged. Clearly in these contexts that serves well the pursuit of rewards and, provided the competition is run on the grounds of ability only so as not to infringe our commitments to equality of opportunity, where can be the objection? In so far as schools serve this fourth purpose only, there is, I suggest, no answer to that question.

But in so far as schools serve all the four purposes I have outlined, conflicts emerge that we must take seriously. Even where the pursuit of personal abilities is concerned there is a genuine tension between the third and fourth purposes I have distinguished. As I indicated earlier, concern for rewards and the competition that that involves can deflect education away from the importance of developing pupils' abilities for their personal significance in themselves and their value in society irrespective of the rewards. Being a first rate plumber can for some be personally more fulfilling than being a lawyer even if the rewards are much lower. What is more both jobs are vital in our society. If my third educational purpose is to be reconciled with the fourth, the institutionalisation of competitive academic selection will need to be moderated by explicit concern for other values. If not we will build into the very structure of our

institutions a distorted concern for abilities which fails to develop them as providing personal fulfilment and as important contributions to society. That would be a great disservice to our pupils individually and be a negative force in our society.

There is, however, a yet greater tension between the demands of the two forms of basic education outlined and the two forms of education directed to each individual's personal abilities. Basic personal and social education are in aim essentially non-differentiating, whereas concern for the individual's personal abilities must be differentiating. If therefore we wish to do justice to both of these major concerns we must somehow organise our educational system to combine elements of differentiation, including selection, with elements of non-differentiation. As in all moral and social problems where there are conflicting aims we must seek a way ahead that provides an acceptable compromise within our context. How are we to find that?

In the United Kingdom we had for many years a supposedly tripartite system of secondary education which at 11+ selected pupils into secondary grammar, secondary technical and secondary modern schools in a roughly descending order of intellectual ability as assessed by combining I.Q. tests with tests in mathematics and English. Primary schools, for pupils from 5 to 11+, were local comprehensive schools taking pupils of all abilities, though their later years were streamed, or more rarely were setted separately for mathematics and English. This system, though officially presented as concerned with the third of my four educational purposes, was in practice seen by many people as dominated by the fourth purpose, the provision for a selected minority of an education that could bring greater extrinsic rewards. It was in fact objected to by many because the selection procedures were inaccurate, though it was the best that could be devised. It was considered too rigid, too decisive in its consequences, too self-fulfilling in depressing the development of the less able and so on. But in terms of my earlier analysis it had more fundamental weaknesses if schools ought to take seriously all four educational purposes I have outlined. First it took a minimalist view of the basic personal education needed by all pupils. It saw this as the concern of the very early years of primary education only, after that the promotion of individual personal abilities for fulfilment and reward became the point. But in fact the modern world has long demanded basic knowledge, understanding and skills of a considerable range and sophistication. The basic general education about the world we live in that all people need

nowadays is simply not provided by schooling dominated by academic pursuits from an early stage. My own view is that we can no longer really justify any pupils abandoning basic education even for part of the curriculum before, say, 14. It takes until then for most pupils to begin to master the kind of knowledge of our contemporary physical and social context required for living in it intelligently and competently. At present most of us, dependent on our own initiatives and the media, never even attain that by middle age. But our traditional "selective" and "streamed" system equally took a minimalist view of the basic social education that all pupils need. In particular it prepared pupils hardly at all for the choices and responsibilities they faced. In any complex liberal democracy these choices and responsibilities are now very considerable. Increases in personal freedom have in most societies come with the disappearance of many of the forces that previously held society together. Increasingly democratic societies now depend on the direct voluntary adherence of all their members of certain crucial fundamental principles. The significance of schools as institutions where these principles of equality, freedom and respect for others are both truly expressed and adequately taught is now overwhelming. It seems to me that basic social education until 14 is required. In the light of these comments on both forms of basic education and what they entail, I can see no real justification for any form of selective schools in U.K. until about 14. Inside schools, for pupils up to about 14 the separation of pupils into special groups for certain remedial purposes can clearly be justified but otherwise all groupings, I suggest, should be expressly comprehensive or, where appropriate, simply on the basis of pupil choice.

But if the traditional U.K. selective system minimalised basic personal and social education, it also served to narrow education for personal fulfilment quite unacceptably. By institutional groupings into three kinds of schools it prevented the development of combinations of abilities that we now regard as not only natural but personally desirable and socially important. Early selection and streaming prevented many from the later pursuit of abilities by restricting far too soon and far too narrowly the choices open to pupils. The status of the academic education provided in grammar schools, because of its leading to external rewards, only served to accentuate the pursuit of a narrow range of abilities particularly by the academically able. But it led too to a valuing of abilities primarily for the extrinsic rewards they bring rather than for their personal and social significance. A selective system within a capitalist economy cannot but accentuate extrinsic rather than intrinsic educational values with the personal and social

consequences so narrow a view entails. The more we let selection rip the greater is the pressure on individuals to pursue what is rewarded rather than what will bring personal satisfaction or social good. The greater too is the tendency to undervalue the contribution of non-academic abilities in society with the undemocratic sentiments that that entails.

In keeping with these comments on the significance of the former selective system in U.K. for the development of personal abilities, I would defend most firmly the U.K.'s almost universal move to a comprehensive school system for pupils from 5 up to at least 16. Within that, the fulfilment of personal abilities requires as flexible arrangements as possible for personal choice amongst groups appropriate to one's individual capacities. Exercising this function in most areas at any advanced stage will require setting by ability. But the institutional framework for those groups should be as wide ranging as makes practical sense and in the U.K. I consider secondary schools should therefore be comprehensive. Ideally I think the U.K. should push ahead with comprehensive institutions for all up to 18. After that some differentiation into academic, technical and other institutions geared to different kinds of specialist abilities seems to me inevitable. Within our primary and secondary comprehensive schools I would want a system of class groupings that is as mixed as possible in ability and all other respects up to about 14, as the sole emphasis of education to that age I take to be basic education. Remedial education would be available as also might be special interest groups which pupils would choose. From 14, however, though some basic education should I think continue until 16 in mixed ability groups, education for personal abilities could be phased in during the period 14 to 16. For this purpose part of the time-table, say half, might be directly devoted to developing individual abilities in core areas such as languages, mathematics and science. Here pupils could be grouped according to ability as is appropriate. Streaming I see as an adequate but not very desirable crude approximation to setting. Even in these setted groups, however, I would want to work up to 16 to concentrate on general educational purposes rather than those of narrow academic specialisation. Only from 16 at the earliest would I wish education to be given over entirely to a concern for personal abilities with pupils setted on appropriate academic or other ability grounds.

Such a system may or may not be what is required in the Maltese context. That is for others to judge. But forcing the issues to a practical level for the U.K. context will have served I hope to highlight the major decisions of principle which any contemporary educational system including your

own must face. Using the framework of the four educational purposes I have outlined, I suggest the following questions need to be addressed:

(a) How extensive do we consider basic personal and social education should be for all, for during the years we wish to pursue that as the dominant purpose I suggest we must be committed to a fundamentally non-selective and non-streamed school system?

(b) How important do we consider the development of abilities for the sake of personal fulfilment and social good, for that requires classes differentiated according to different abilities and standards for those? In particular from what age should classes devoted to this purpose be introduced into schools?

(c) How important are freedom of choice and equality of status in the development of abilities, for these suggest a non-differentiated school system with differentiated rather than selective classes within each school?

(d) What restrictions are to be placed on the development of certain valued abilities because of the costs involved and the social significance of those abilities, for to the extent we introduce restrictions equally of opportunity means that selection becomes necessary? In general, restrictions must surely be undesirable as being contrary to human freedom but they are necessary in all societies for the greater social good and longer term interests of individuals. Selection into classes within a comprehensive school system can probably provide an adequate degree of selection in most economically advanced societies. Only if a very high level of selection is judged necessary or desirable would a selective school system seem justifiable.

(e) How important do we consider it that schools educate pupils to compete for the restricted pool of extrinsic rewards, for to the extent we value this we will directly advocate an appropriate and efficient selective school system and sets or streaming

within those schools? If rewards are not freely available, freedom and equality in pursuit of these become restricted to the opportunity to compete against others on what are considered equal terms.

Over all, it seems to me that in a democratic society committed to freedom and equality of educational opportunity the extent and nature of selection in a school system reflects two major concerns. First, the society's restrictions for whatever reasons, good or bad, on the development of certain abilities and, secondly, how far education for extrinsic rewards is allowed to dominate other educational purposes. It is to me unremarkable that the USA has the most non-selective educational system in the world. First, the society, as the most open democracy there is, strongly committed to freedom and equality, sets a high premium on basic personal and social education for all. Secondly, as a rich society it has little or no need to restrict opportunities for the development of personal abilities. Thirdly, rewards in American society are more widely distributed than in many others and are less directly related to a restricted form of education. In the U.K. we have until recently been moving more in the American direction. Unfortunately, to my mind, a spell of economic difficulty and a shift in public values has resurrected an unnecessary concern for individual extrinsic rewards and competition within the educational system. But I do not wish to give the impression that a school system can successfully operate without coherent alignment with the economy of the society it serves. If that society is a liberal democracy, however, it must wish its schools to balance those concerns with its commitment to the fundamental values of democracy. Every such society must therefore I suggest consciously form its own resolution of the demands made by the four educational purposes I have outlined. And it must do that in a thoroughly democratic fashion.

Notes

1. In this paper I have indicated that I consider that a school system ought not to be selective on religious or social (including financial) grounds. I take that position as basic to the role of the school in an open democracy. This is not to say that in my view schools have no role in relation to religious education or that they may not charge fees (e.g. say, in some way related to parental income). If religious or financial selection is advocated this must rest on other educational or social purposes which may well conflict with the four purposes that I have outlined, particularly that of basic social education for all. This is not the place for arguing against such other purposes in an open democracy. In the last analysis, however, whether any such principles are to be accepted and what weight they are to be given are again matters for proper democratic decision in a society. But it that is accepted it

must be recognised that the concerns of democracy rather than those of any particular group within it, be that the church or the affluent, are being given the ultimate right to decide on matters for society as a whole. In fact that is precisely how I think such matters should be settled.

2. Further reading:

Cohen, B.: *Education and the Individual* (Allen and Unwin) 1981. Ch. 2.

Guttmann, A.: *Democratic Education* (Princeton Univ. Press) 1986.

Norman, R.: *Free and Equal* (Oxford Univ. Press) 1987. Ch. 5.

Walzer, M.: *Spheres of Justice* (Martin Robertson, Oxford) 1983. Ch. 8.