"Joined Up or Messed up?"

An inquiry on whether the Peacebuilding Systems Theory
would have been applicable in the Afghan context between 2002 and 2014

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Declaration of Authenticity

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
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Abstract

Humanitarian aid organisations and the military have shared the battlefield over and over again in situations ranging from open conflict to peacekeeping situations. Despite sharing the same geographical space the relationship between the military and aid agencies could only be defined as dysfunctional especially during complex emergency situations. Following the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq humanitarian-military relations were further strained due to the deployment of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in these two countries – leading to, in the majority of cases, either an arms-length or a co-existential approach towards cooperation between the two 'worlds'. This philosophy has led to an inefficient and possibly ineffective response during these two complex emergencies.

This study assesses whether the implementation of the Peacebuilding Systems Theory (PST) in Afghanistan, during the period in question, would have ameliorated the interaction between the PRTs and the aid organisations within the frame work of civil-military cooperation. From a methodological point of view this study implements the PST to an event that occurred in the past and therefore it asks a 'what would have happened' research question with the aim of assessing the applicability of this theory to the Afghan context – thereby creating a counterfactual argument.

A number of interviews were conducted with military leaders who deployed to Afghanistan as part of PRTs as well as with aid workers who had direct contact with these civil-military elements. Through the analysis of the primary data collected it was shown that only elements of the PST could have been applied to this context. After

the analytical process, a number of recommendations were put forward with the aim of improving cooperation between these two diverse 'worlds' during future complex emergency situations.

Dedicated to
my wife Marica
and
my parents

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to my wife Marica who has always supported me and who without complaint has shouldered the extra work load for the past three years. Your love, support and understanding allowed me to complete this incredible journey.

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Last, but not least, I would like to thank my parents, Joseph and Maria, whose encouragement and support helped me through my life. They shaped the person I am today.

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List of Acronyms

ACBAR   Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief and Development

ADF   Australian Defence Forces

ALNAP   Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in humanitarian action

ANGO   Afghan Non-Governmental Organization

AOR   Area of Responsibility

AP   Associated Press

ARRC   Allied Rapid Reaction Corps

AUMO   Australian Military Officer

BAAG   British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group

CALL   Centre for Army Lessons Learnt

CARL   Combined Arms Research Library

CAS   Complex Adaptive Systems

CCOE   Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence

CERP   Commander's Emergency Response Programme

CIA   Central Intelligence Agency

CIMIC   Civil-Military Cooperation

CMCoord   Civil-Military Coordination

CMO   Civil-Military Operations

CMOC   Civil-Military Operations Centre

CMR   Civil-Military Relations

COIN   Counter-Insurgency Operations

CPCC   Canadian Peacebuilding Coordination Committee

CSRC   Crisis States Research Centre

CST   Complex Systems Theory

CT	Complexity Theory
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DAW	Development Agency Worker
DEMO	German Military Officer
DFID	Department for International Development
DOA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defence
DOS	Department of State
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
ENNA	European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCO	Foreign Commonwealth Office
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GC IV	The fourth Geneva Convention
Gen.	General
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HAOs	Humanitarian Aid Organisations
HAT	Humanitarian Assistance Teams
HAWs	Humanitarian Aid Workers
HPG	Humanitarian Policy Group
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

IGO	Inter-Governmental Organisation
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IT	Interdependence Theory
KFOR	Kosovo Force
LICs	Low Intensity Conflict
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MSF	*Médecins Sans Frontières*
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NLMO	Dutch Military Officer
OCHA	Office for the Coordination and Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
PRTs	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PST	Peacebuilding Systems Theory
QIP	Quick Impact Project
RC	Regional Command
RCT	Relational Coordination Theory
SECSTATE	Secretary of State

SFDFA	Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSTR	Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction
StC	Save the Children
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Programme
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNRIC	United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UREC	University Research Ethics Committee
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USMO	United States Military Officer
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WRDOAW	Wahdat Rehabilitation and Development Organisation for Afghan Women

Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Following a lull in discourse related to humanitarian-military relations, the deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) by the United States and its allies[1] has once more made this issue a topical one – mainly due to the controversy created by the PRTs when they were tasked with the provision of humanitarian aid. This contributed towards the blurring of lines between military operations and humanitarian interventions; resulting in the shrinking of the humanitarian space in which aid organisations had to operate (Ferreiro, 2012). This situation led humanitarian aid organisations to complain on the involvement of the PRTs in humanitarian assistance as they were impinging on their humanitarian principles – humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality – which should guide the provision of relief to those in need.

These different philosophies resulted in the development of two competing and diverging schools of thought in the field of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) – varying from full integration to a co-existential approach towards cooperation between the two 'worlds'.

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[1] As a result of the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

However, research available suggests that in complex emergency situations, such as Afghanistan, there is the need for more cooperation and coordination between aid organisations and the military. This study sets to look into whether cooperation and coordination between these two 'worlds' could have improved through the application of the De Coning Peacebuilding Systems Theory (PST).

1.2 Background and the Nature of the Problem

Following the military intervention in Afghanistan the United States government decided, as part of their comprehensive approach directed towards post-conflict reconstruction, to deploy the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The scope behind these teams was to provide developmental and reconstruction assistance but in view of the fact that they were led by the military a serious debate on civil-military cooperation was triggered especially due to their involvement in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. As a result humanitarian organisations levelled harsh criticism on the concept which in their view was encroaching on their humanitarian space and as a consequence restricting access to those in need. On the other hand the military, and their political masters, were dismissing criticism as just turf wars.

The right of a human being, who is not participating in hostilities, to gain access to humanitarian aid and protection during a conflict situation is sacrosanct. This right is enshrined in a number of international legal instruments[2]; according to Stoffels (2004) it is grounded in two of the major principles upon which the International Humanitarian Law[3] (IHL) is based – a) "the duty to distinguish between the civilian

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[2] Including the 1948 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its 1977 Additional Protocols, and the 1951 Refugee Convention.
[3] Also referred to as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

population and combatants" and b) "the duty to ensure respect, protection and

humane treatment for people not or no longer participating in the hostilities."

(Stoffels,2004:518) On the accessibility of aid, Article 59 of the fourth Geneva

Convention (GC IV), relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, states that:

> [i]f the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately
> supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the
> said population, and shall facilitate them by all means at its disposal. Such
> schemes, which may be undertaken either by States or by impartial
> humanitarian organisations such as the International Committee of the Red
> Cross, shall consist, in particular, for the provision of consignments of
> foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing. (ICRC, 2016)

Therefore, Article 59 of the GC IV affirms the primacy of the humanitarian imperative

whereby nothing should impede the prevention or alleviation of human suffering (The

Sphere Project, 2011) during time of conflict. This is a notion that is drawn from one

of the core principles of humanitarianism – Humanity. Von Pilar contends that since

the contracting parties to IHL are States then the legal onus rests on Governments to

"react to humanitarian needs by enabling, supporting and protecting humanitarian

action – or humanitarian space[4]. It is the NGO's duty to work in that space." (1999:5)

However, since the end of the Cold War the paradigm of conflict has evolved; in fact

during an interview with Pfanner, Rupert Smith[5] stated that there has been a shift

from what he terms as "industrial war" to "war amongst the people" (2006:719). In

fact, Van Crevelt states *"*major conventional wars between major states have been

few and far between, wars against or between organizations other than states have

proliferated and are proliferating." (2002:7) Smith continues by explaining that in the

former, one sought to win by imposing military strength on the opponent with the aim

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[4] Vide Appendix 1 for background information on What is the Humanitarian Space?
[5] General Sir Rupert Smith was an officer in the British Army until his retirement in 2002. Smith enlisted in 1962 and following commission he served in East and South Africa, Arabia, the Caribbean, Europe and Malaysia. As a major general, Smith commanded the British 1st Armoured Division during the Gulf War (1990–1991). In 1995 he was Commander UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, and was responsible for breaking the siege of the city by creating the UN Rapid Reaction Force, and ultimately bringing the war to an end. His final assignment was as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe between 1998 and 2001, covering NATO's Operation Allied Force during the Kosovo war (Directions Magazine, 2016).

of breaking their will to fight so as to impose the political outcome pursued. The new paradigm of conflict, on the other hand, seeks to induce a change in the will and intentions of the opponents and the people amongst whom the military is operating. The essential difference is that "military force is no longer used to decide the political dispute, but rather to create a condition in which a strategic result is achieved." (ibid.) In addition populations have now, in these types of new conflicts, become central to military strategy. These types of new conflicts are referred to as Low Intensity Conflicts (LICs) which involve support to insurgency and counter-insurgency, combatting terrorism, peace keeping operations and peacetime contingency operations[6] (Dixon, 1989).

In the post-Cold War era the nature of conflict has shifted as well; the majority of conflicts now are intrastate conflicts as opposed to interstate[7] ones (Van Creveld, 2002; Sandole, nd). Intrastate[8] conflicts generally involve an armed conflict which is fought between a regular military force of a state against a non-state armed actor– examples of which include the conflicts in Somalia, the Balkan region, Libya and Syria.

This led militaries to shift their strategic focus from the Clausewitzian inspired notion of LICs to the notion of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) (Kinross, 2004). According to the United States (US) military MOOTW[9] "focuses on deterring

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[6] Under Peacetime Contingency Operations the US LICs Doctrine did allow Humanitarian and Civic Assistance but was limited only to a) medical, dental and veterinarian assistance in rural areas; b) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; c) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and d) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. (DOA, 1990) Assistance was to be coordinated by the USAID representative in the country concerned.

[7] Interstate armed conflicts is conflict between two or more governments (UCDP, 2017:np).

[8] According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program an Intrastate conflict is defined as "A conflict between a government and a non-governmental party, with no interference from other countries." (UCDP, 2017:np)

[9] According to the US joint military doctrine on MOOTW, the US military is authorised to execute the following MOOTW operations:

      arms control; combatting terrorism; Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations; enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations; enforcing exclusion zones; ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight; humanitarian assistance; military support to civil authorities; nation assistance/ support to counterinsurgency; noncombatant evacuation operations; peace operations; protection of

war and promoting peace" (DOD, 1995:vii) and it involves operations ranging from combatting terrorism to counter insurgency to peace operations to humanitarian assistance (ibid.). Consequently, military forces are becoming involved in areas which were not purely military in nature; this new doctrine specifically included Humanitarian Assistance Operations as part of the military tool box. This is evident from Figure 1 overleaf which depicts the new spectrum of military operations.

Figure 1: The Spectrum of Military Operations
Source: Hillen (1998)

Challenges which were faced during similar military interventions in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990's contributed towards the creation of military concepts such as the 'Three Block War'. The core idea behind this concept, which was coined by General Charles Krulak[10], is that military forces when employed on operations will have to be prepared to switch from providing humanitarian assistance to conducting

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shipping; recovery operations; show of force operations; strikes and raids; and support to insurgency. (DOD, 1995:ix)

[10] During his 35-year career in the US Marine Corps (USMC), General Charles C Krulak served two tours of duty in Vietnam. He rose through several command and staff positions ultimately being appointed as 31st Commandant of the US Marine Corps and therefore a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 1995 to September 1999 (Bloomberg, 2016).

peacekeeping/stabilization operations to combat operations during the same mission or intervention[11] (Dorn and Varey, 2009).

Referring to the scenario chosen for this research project, the 'Three Block War' concept had an influence on the planning of the counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan (Dorn et al., 2009). Both MOOTW and the "three block war" concept pushed military forces, as well as governments, to start looking at Humanitarian Assistance (HA) as an element that could support their political and military plans. This became more evident in Afghanistan when the US and the NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deployed Provincial Reconstruction Teams[12] with the aim of winning the Hearts and Minds of the local population (NATO, 2007). This meant that, in this Southern Asian country, the military became involved in development and HA (Mc Hugh and Gostelow, 2004; Goodhand, 2015). Here we can refer to Rupert Smith's war amongst the people as ISAF with the deployment of the PRTs tried to create the required conditions in which their strategic aim could be achieved (Smith, 2007).

Barnett (2009) deems that the politicization of aid is one of the major changes and challenges affecting the humanitarian sector today. This can be attested from arguments posed above, humanitarianism has not only been politicized but securitized as well as militarized[13]. The recent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq

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[11] In fact Krulak argues that:

> [i]n one moment in time, our [US] service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart – conducting peacekeeping operations – and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle – all on the same day ... all within three city blocks. It will be what we call "the Three Block War". (Krulak quoted by Dorn, 2007:3)

[12] Provincial Reconstruction Teams were civil-military organisations which were "designed to operate in semi-permissible environments usually following open hostilities." (Combined Arms Research Library, nd:1) Their aim was to "jump start reconstruction in areas where there was little or no presence on the part of the [national] government" (Malkasian and Meyerle, 2009:6). These teams were composed of military and civilian, although between 90 to 95% of their compliment were derived from the military (Jakobsen, 2005). A more comprehensive explanation on PRTs will be provided in the literate review chapter of this dissertation.
[13] this is when governments try to control humanitarian aid to further security and military strategies as opposed to humanitarian goals (Kenyon Lischer, 2007).

have created what Kenyon Lischer describes as "severe tensions between aid groups and Western Governments" (2007:102) since the intervening forces were mixing aid and war (Barnett, 2013). Cornelio Sommaruga[14] on this issue states that it is vital that "[h]umanitarian endeavour and political action must go their separate ways if the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian work are not to be jeopardized" (ICRC, 1999).

In his book *Empire of Humanity: a History of Humanitarianism* Barnett (2013) argues that historically the issue of politicization of aid is not something new as throughout the evolution of humanitarianism politics were inherently linked with aid. Barnett continues to assert that due to politicization, securitization and militarization of assistance, Humanitarian Aid Organisations (HAOs) have experienced a dilution of their humanitarian space – the same space which according to Von Pilar (1995) governments are duty bound to enable, support and protect for humanitarian aid agencies to operate within unhindered. This is mainly being caused by the blurring of lines between what is political and what is humanitarian and which according to Elhawary is "fostering an environment that isn't conducive to upholding the core humanitarian principles" (2008:np).

1.3 Why Afghanistan between 2002 and 2014?

Afghanistan was chosen as a case study as it is a prime example of the fusion of security and humanitarian/development programs. On this issue Goodhand notes that there were "strong vested interests [primarily from Governments] not to view Afghanistan as a 'humanitarian crisis' but as a stabilisation and 'early recovery'"

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[14] Cornelio Sommaruga is a former president of the ICRC.

(2015:125) situation. This line of thought has led to the deployment of PRTs[15] – which at their peak in 2009 amounted to 26 teams in total (Malkasian et al., 2009). This situation brought about a shift in the military/humanitarian doctrines and practices, especially at the operational level where a number of challenges were encountered (Goodhand, 2015).

Afghanistan is also an interesting case as it does not only highlight a doctrinal shift but it also brings out a number of policy and practical issues encountered by a number of HAOs – especially by those which ideologically follow the Minimalist or Dunantist[16] approach to humanitarianism. Goodhand continues to suggest that the "boundaries between civil/humanitarian and military/political has proved to be a contested process" (2015:121) and hence the reason why he entitled an article on this issue as *Boundary Wars*. These 'boundary wars' primarily derive from the diverging visions that humanitarian and military/political have on the scope of HA – an issue that will be discussed in some detail in Chapter two. This situation had ramifications that affected the way that HAOs and the military cooperated on the ground in Afghanistan. In fact Afghanistan can be seen as a turning point in military-humanitarian relations as a result of the shift in military/humanitarian doctrine and practice; especially due to the deployment of the PRTs.

1.4 Civil-Military Cooperation in Afghanistan

Between 2001 and 2014 military/political entities viewed HAOs in Afghanistan as being potential candidates to become 'force multipliers' (Powell, 2001). They were being viewed as a capability which could be employed with a combat force that could

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[15] The first PRT, in Afghanistan, was formed in Gardez in the Paktai province in 2002 by the US (Malkasian et al., 2009). The Italian PRT in Herat was the last one to end operations and was closed down in 2014 (*Ministero della Difesa*, 2014).

[16] Dunantist Humanitarian Aid Organisations are those which "seek to position themselves outside of state interests" (ODI, 2003:2) and recognise the founding principles of the Red Cross.

"significantly increase the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment." (DOD, 2007:GL-11). Thereby wanting to integrate the aid organisations within the military command and control structure. On the other hand some, if not the majority, of the aid organisations which deployed to Afghanistan resisted this call for integration with the military as this impinged on their core beliefs of Humanity, Neutrality, Independence and Impartiality. Consequently, opting to adopt a policy of limited or non-cooperation with PRTs and other military entities operating in Afghanistan. These two stands, that is integration (or full cooperation) and non-cooperation, reflect the two extreme poles of the cooperation continuum (De Coning and Holshek, 2012:29).

However, De Coning (2008) asserts that in complex emergencies there exists a need for cooperation between the various participating entities. These different entities would be implementing independent programmes[17], whilst forming part of a complex system, thus to a certain degree making these programmes interdependent. Bearing this in mind, De Coning introduced an alternative approach within the Civil-Military cooperation (CIMIC) body of theory – the Peacebuilding Systems Theory (PST). This theory aims to achieve a compromise between the CIMIC schools of thought advocated by governments, and the military, and that followed by aid agencies with the aim of improving coherence and coordination without surrendering independence (ibid) and impartiality. It attempts to establish a common ground for cooperation between the political/military and humanitarian spheres during complex emergencies.

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[17] These programmes may vary from security related initiatives, rule of law or humanitarian assistance to mention just a few.

1.5 Aim and Significance of the Study

De Coning (2008) in his article, *Civil-Military cooperation and complex peacebuilding systems*, does not provide any evidence which suggests that the PST has been implemented operationally. Therefore, the aim of this study is to test whether the PST would have been applicable in the Afghan context, between 2002 and 2014, and to provide recommendations on how it could be applied in order to improve cooperation between the military and HAOs in complex emergencies.

Therefore, the following research question was formulated.

> How the applicability of the PST could have affected cooperation and coordination between Humanitarian Aid Organisations and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, at the operational level, in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2014?

Furthermore, this research is intended to close an academic gap by providing a better understanding of how this theory could be applied in real life complex emergencies - in which the military and aid agencies share a common physical space. Consequently, this project is aimed at increasing academic knowledge in the fields of Civil-Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Action. However, it will also provide a number of recommendations which may be applicable to military organizations and HAOs vis-à-vis their interaction during complex emergencies - hence contributing towards augmenting organizational learning.

1.6 Methodology

This research project is aimed at testing whether the PST would have been applicable in the Afghan context during the period when the PRTs were deployed. I will be asking a 'what if' or a 'what would have happened' question and thus the

methodology being used will have to take into consideration "alternatives to reality" (Wenzlhuemer[18], 2009:37). Therefore, the methodology has to hinge on the use of counterfactuality in order to examine and analyse an imagined alternative Afghanistan in which De Coning's PST was applied. Thereby generating a different outcome with the objective of testing this theory and consequently proceed to recommend a way ahead for improving civil-military interaction in crises situation. It should be noted that counterfactuality within academia is a controversial and, at times, a contested matter; these issues will be discussed in length in the methodology chapter.

1.7 Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organised into seven distinct chapters. This first chapter provides a generic introduction to the *problematique* being researched, the aim as well as the methodology that will be used. Chapter two will provide background information that is needed to better understand the geopolitical and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2014. Chapter three will give the reader a focused literature review that will aid in understanding the issues revolving around cooperation, or the lack of, between the military and humanitarian organisations in Afghanistan during the period chosen. In the fourth chapter I will explore the Peacebuilding Systems Theory which will form the basis of my inquiry and the Counterfactual Thought Experiments which will be the foundation behind my methodology. Chapter five will elaborate on the research question and the methodology used for this study. The sixth chapter contains the analysis of the research findings whilst chapter seven will, apart from presenting the findings,

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[18] Quoting Markman, Gavanski, Sherman and Matthew (1993).

proceed to suggest ways of how militaries and humanitarian organisations can

cooperate during complex emergencies.

Chapter 2 – Background

2.1 Introduction

The scope of this chapter is to present a focused background surrounding the *problématique* being studied. It defines the issues associated with the problem to provide the reader with the necessary understanding of the context in which the problem is situated. Over and above the literature review, this chapter will assist in providing an insight to understand the required concepts with the aim of gaining the required knowledge to ask pertinent questions which will ultimately contribute towards an enriched analytical process.

The issue of interaction between humanitarians and the military is one of the most controversial topics within humanitarian action due to issues related to the securitization and militarization of assistance. This is resulting in the blurring of lines between what is humanitarian and what is military; thereby impacting the space in which the former operate during complex emergency situations[19].

At first glance it seems that the Humanitarian world and the Military[20] have divergent views on how they conceive the concept of cooperation (and coordination) in

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[19] According to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) a complex emergency, is defined as

> a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme. (OCHA, 2008:11)

This definition was chosen as it best describes the situation in Afghanistan during the period relevant to this research.

[20] Including their Governments.

complex situations. Therefore, by considering the themes that shall be presented in this part of the dissertation the reader will be able to appreciate the elements which have led to the divergences of opinion between the Humanitarian world and the Military with respect to cooperation and coordination in complex emergencies such as Afghanistan between 2002 and 2014.

2.2 Securitization of Aid

Securitization is a concept which permits an issue to be constructed as a threat (Stone, 2009) and therefore placed on the national security agenda. The main argument of securitization is that security is a speech act (Taureck, 2006); in fact Wæver states "[i]t is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one" (2004:13), and continues by stating that "when the elites [politicians] decide it to be so" (1998:6). Therefore, an issue becomes a security problem when it is politicised and when the audience accepts it. Brown and Grävingholt argue that the term securitization is "a critical term for how fields hitherto unrelated to security concerns" (2016a:2) become as such when a security value is attached to them.

In the post-Cold War era, especially after 9/11, it was argued that "[p]oor countries were not (just) a problem in and of themselves, they were reconceptualised as threats to donor countries and the international system" (Brown, Grävingholt and Raddatz, 2016b:242). This is a justification which a number of Western governments have used with the aim of justifying the nexus between security and aid; leading to aid securitization[21]. Nonetheless, it must be added that the extent to which aid was securitised is not homogeneous and varies according to the policies adopted by single governments (ibid.). The theory of securitisation[22] is criticised as it limits

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[21] This is due to the fact that aid became a tool to support States in dealing with security issues.
[22] The theory of securitization was developed by Barry Buzan and Ollie Wæver.

security to a mere speech act – Leonard (2007) argues that this field of study should not be limited only to discourse analysis but also to policies and practices adopted. Brown et al. argues in favour of this assertion; they suggest that securitization takes different forms such as "changes in discourse, aid flows and institutional structures." (2016a:3) The diagram below lists the different forms of securitization:

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Other Forms of Securitization                                           │
│                                                                           │
│   •  Donors justify aid in terms of National or International security.  │
│   •  Donors provide the assistance to countries or sectors based on      │
│      security imperatives.                                               │
│   •  When security actors deliver significant amounts of aid.            │
│   •  Donor governments create new institutional units within their aid   │
│      agencies.                                                           │
│   •  When they create inter-departmental coordination mechanisms based   │
│      on security related reasons.                                        │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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Figure 2: Securitization Actions
Source: Brown et al. (2016a:3)

Brown et al with the creation of new institutional units refer to the creation of "a Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department within DFID" (2016b:248), the "CIDA Afghanistan country desk to the level of task force" (ibid.) amongst others. PRTs are another form of securitization and as will be explained later in this chapter, they satisfy at least three of the forms of securitisation[23] as listed by Brown et al above.

Spear (2016:18) contends that "United States foreign aid[24] has always been securitized, that is, explicitly used in support of geostrategic goals". In 2001, during the National Foreign Policy Conference for leaders of NGOs, the then US Secretary of State (SECSTATE) Colin Powell (2001) took the US securitization on aid to a new level when he stated:

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[23] These forms are a) donors provide the assistance to countries or sectors based on security imperatives, b) security actors deliver significant amounts of aid, and c) donors create inter-departmental coordination mechanisms based on security related reasons.
[24] US Foreign Aid includes military and economic assistance together with developmental and emergency response aid (USAID, 2017).

I have made it clear to my staff here[25] and to all of our ambassadors around the world that I am serious about making sure we have the best relationship with the NGOs who are such *a force multiplier*[26] for us, such an *important part of our combat team*[27]. (Emphasis added by author).

Colin Powell's affirmation[28], in his capacity as SECSTATE, clearly frames how the US Government was considering NGOs[29]. They were being seen as an important capability which could potentially be used to drive both their foreign and military policies. This speech also demonstrates a shift from politicized/securitized assistance to its militarization confirming Spear's (2016) argument that the first decade of the 21st century saw the militarization of US aid with the aim of serving military objectives especially in Iraq[30] and Afghanistan[31]. Barnett argues that the US-led invasions of these two countries "represented the logical conclusion of decades of transforming humanitarianism from the private into the public" (2013:192). The issue of militarization of aid will be dealt with in a subsequent section within this paper.

The post 9/11 way of thinking behind the utility of aid to support own interests, especially in terms of security, has helped in the "shifting of discourse away from an ethically based, poverty-focused altruistic practice towards a more self-interested national or international rationale" (Brown et al., 2016b:242).

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[25] Referring to the State Department staff.
[26] **Force Multiplier** in the US military is defined as "A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment." (Department of Defence, 2007:GL-11)
[27] **Combat Team** for the US military is "a combined arms team that forms the basic building block of the Army's tactical formations." (Department of Defence, 2016:25)
[28] This statement was made by the US Secretary of State only 19 days after the start of the War in Afghanistan.
[29] The World Bank (1995:13) defines NGOs as "private organisation that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interest of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development." This means humanitarian aid organisations are a subset that falls under the umbrella of Non-Governmental Organisations.
[30] On 20 March 2003 the United States together with their allies invaded Iraq with the aim of substituting the Saddam dictatorial regime with a more pro-West government.
[31] Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks the US and its allies invaded Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 following the Taliban's refusal to extradite Osama bin Laden. NATO became officially involved in Afghanistan as an alliance in August 2003 when it took the helm of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

2.3 Militarizing Aid

Traditionally the role of the military in humanitarian assistance is to provide logistical support (Lanzer, 1995) and the provision of security during peacekeeping operations (Pilkington, 1997) However this all changed when the US, and some of their allies, indicated the importance of aid as a military tool not only through speech acts but also with the implementation of militarization through the deployment of PRTs[32]. This is true for both Afghanistan and Iraq. PRTs combined military, developmental and humanitarian objectives with the aim of achieving political goals, counterterrorism together with promoting social and economic development (US Institute of Peace, 2013); they became the epitome of militarization of assistance. Spear (2016) suggest that this made the Department of Defence (DOD) a major aid donor[33] as well as implementing partner[34]. She continues by suggesting that the US resorted to the militarization policy due to "the chronic bureaucratic weaknesses of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)" (Spear, 2016:18) which rendered this organisation unable to respond to the needs of the US governments' national security strategy post 9/11 effectively and efficiently. Although DOD Directive 3000.05 made extensive references to the role and importance of civilian agencies in Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations it clearly stated that the military would play a key role until civilian organisations could take the lead (DOD, 2005).

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[32] PRTs in Iraq were under US Military Command. In Afghanistan the concept was established by the US but the PRT commands were handed over to NATO even though the majority were led by US military.

[33] Spear (2016), quoting Wilder and Gordon (2009), states that in 2009 the PRT Commander's Emergency Response Programme (CERP) funding was of USD 1.2 billion whilst USAID global education fund reached USD 800million. This shows the importance that the US government was giving to the DOD as a provider of assistance.

[34] A key policy shift occurred in 2005 when the US Government issued the Defence Department Directive 3000.05 – Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. According to Spear (2016) this policy shift made SSTR a core mission of the US military thus placing stability operations at par with combat operations.

From a US[35] military policy standpoint, and to a lesser extent for its allies, humanitarianism became an important aspect of their counterinsurgency strategy aimed at winning the 'hearts and minds' of the local populations and therefore instrumental in furthering their politico-military goals (Barnett, 2013; Brown et al., 2016a). This was so important to the US strategy that the Congress authorised military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to spend funds "for urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction" (DOA, 2014:13-12).

The first PRT was inaugurated by the US in 2002 a year after the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom[36] (GAO, 2008). These entities were "civil-military units" (Perito, 2007:1) that according to the *Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook* PRTs were tasked with a) assisting in the establishment and improvement of local Government, b) increasing stability and security and c) facilitating reconstruction (CALL, 2010). These tasks inevitably led to the engagement of military personnel in assistance and reconstruction which according to Mc Hugh and Gostelow (2004) have closed the gap which differentiated the military from the humanitarian personnel. This became more evident when military personnel engaged in relief operations "armed but not uniformed, and travelled in unmarked vehicles" (Mc Hugh et al, 2004:34). They continue by arguing that this dual role[37] of the military affected how the local population perceived humanitarian aid. Olson's (2006:14) research supports this assertion; according to her findings US military personnel claimed that "they believe Afghans see no separation between the military and foreign NGOs"; whilst NGOs claimed that in some areas the local population's perception was that "PRTs are the good NGOs" (ibid.). Lex Kassenberg reiterates that if aid organisations

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[35] The US point of view as the concept was developed by the US. United States allies became involved in PRTs when the US handed over the command of these civil-military units to ISAF. In addition it should be noted that nations who lead PRTs in Afghanistan have evolved the concept to suit their political requirements; this evolution will be briefly explained later on in this chapter.
[36] The US military name of the invasion of Afghanistan. Also referred to by the acronym OEF.
[37] Shooting with one hand and providing assistance with the other.

were forced to get involved with "Provincial Reconstruction Teams and military entities, our acceptance in the communities will be demolished" (IRIN, 2009); all this contributed to the blurring of lines between military and humanitarian activities.

2.4 Blurring of the Humanitarian Space

Christophe Fournier[38] during a speech delivered as part of NATO's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) 'Unity of Purpose' conference, stated:

> it should be obvious to you in the military that if we[39] are part of your team, if we are on your side, if we are providing you with information, if we are advancing towards the same goals as you then we fall directly into the cross hairs of the other side. It's nothing personal, but we can't afford this sort of unity. (Fournier, 2009:np)

The argument put forward by Colin Powell, NATO's unity of purpose notion together with the implementation of the PRTs continue to blur the lines between what is political, military and humanitarian. Goodhand (2015) argues that the merging of security and humanitarian agendas, during the last decade of the 21st century, is in part due to the decline of interstate conflicts and the rise of asymmetric wars[40]. This shift in the nature of conflict led to the realignment of military doctrines to face these new realities; thus the shift towards Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN) (ibid.).

Goodhand in his article *Boundary Wars* succinctly summarises why HA was an integral part of the COIN doctrine in Afghanistan. He states:

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[38] Dr Christophe Fournier was the president of *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) between 2006 and 2010.
[39] Referring to Humanitarian Aid Organisations.
[40] This refers to what General Rupert Smith refers to as wars amongst the people that are intrastate conflicts and civil wars.

> [t]his doctrine argues for a population-centric approach, or the civilianisation of military operations. Defeating the Taliban required better penetration of society by the state, more effective regulation of disputes and the provision of public goods … These are areas in which NGOs supposedly have a comparative advantage due to their close relationships to local communities, flexibility, speed of implementation… (2015:126).

Due to their experience working in the field with the local communities, aid organisations were being considered by political and military leaders as important assets that could assist their overall objective – the stabilisation and legitimisation of the Afghan state.

These new military concepts have resulted in the shrinking of the humanitarian space[41] in which humanitarian aid actors could operate. This is influencing the core of humanitarianism; aid agencies who subscribe[42] to such initiatives are definitively losing their impartiality, independence and neutrality – the core humanitarian principles[43] which according to Barnett "rendered humanitarians apolitical – one of the keys of their success" (2013:2). The encroachment on humanitarian space by the military, especially in Afghanistan, together with the blurring of the lines between military engagement and humanitarian work has led to independent access by aid agencies being lost (IRIN, 2009). Humanitarian organisations concern on such matters are most often dismissed by their critics as just 'turf wars' (Olsen, 2006). Aid organisations' arguments go further than that; in fact, MSF in 2004 following the death of five of its aid workers, decided to suspend its operations in Afghanistan after 24 years of continuous operations (Sedra, 2005). This decision was taken after "a Taliban spokesperson claimed responsibility for the murders and later stated that

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[41] Vide Appendix 1 for a brief explanation of What is the Humanitarian Space?
[42] For those who do not subscribe there is a risk that they are also perceived as no longer being impartial, independent and neutral.
[43] Vide Appendix 2 for a brief explanation on the Humanitarian Principles.

organisations like MSF work for US interests and are therefore targets for future attacks." (MSF, 2004:np) MSF continued to argue that

> violence directed at humanitarian aid workers in Afghanistan comes amid consistent efforts by the US-led coalition to use humanitarian aid to build support for its military and political aims. The Organisation has also spoken out against the military's attempt to usurp humanitarian aid". (ibid)

In fact a statement by the then Taliban leader in 2003 portrayed all western humanitarian aid organisations as enemies of Islam[44]. Julier (nd), quoting the Associated Press (AP), refers to Mullah Omar[45]'s statement that read as follows

> O Muslims know the enemies of your religion – the Jews and Christians. America, Britain, the United Nations and all Western aid groups are the greatest enemies of Islam and humanity.

This is a clear reference to the curtailing of humanitarian space within which HAOs could operate in Afghanistan as these agencies where being perceived as part of the military/political intervention. This has led to a number of relief organisation to avoid dealing/coordinating with military units in Afghanistan so as not to be associated with them.

2.4.1 Impact on Access

Humanitarian access is also a vague term and thus there exists no one agreed definition of what it is. The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (SFDFA) defines humanitarian access as "access by humanitarian actors to people in need of assistance and protection AND access by those in need to the goods and services essential for their survival and health, in a manner consistent with core humanitarian principles." (2014:11) Therefore access by humanitarians to the needy and by those in need to assistance is crucial for effective humanitarian action – this is in line with

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[44] It must be noted that a number of aid organisations were allowed, albeit some political restrictions, to operate within the Afghan territory during the Taliban regime between 1996 and 2001. This statement is a clear indication of a change in perception by the Taliban towards humanitarian aid organisations following their deposition by the US and their allies.
[45] Mullah Omar was a Mujahideen Commander and the founder of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 1996.

the humanitarian imperative[46]. The Office for the Coordination and Humanitarian

Affairs (OCHA[47]) contends that access is derived from the delicate balance between

adherence to the core principles and the perceptions of the parties to a conflict

stating:

> [i]f one or more parties to a conflict believe, rightly or wrongly, that humanitarian actors are acting in favour of a political or military outcome, or that humanitarian action is not being implemented strictly on the basis of humanitarian needs alone, they will be less willing to allow humanitarian activities. (2010b:np)

This brings us back to the arguments made earlier with respect to securitization and

militarization of aid in the last two decades. OCHA's statement is a clear declaration

that provision of aid aimed at satisfying political and/or military goals as opposed to

humanitarian needs will restrict humanitarian access. Rodwerder agrees and

continues by asserting that the involvement of political and military actors in

assistance operations "can compromise the real or perceived neutrality and

impartiality of humanitarian operations[48]" (2015:4) thus posing additional challenges

for securing access during complex emergencies.

2.5 Provincial Reconstruction Teams

According to a publication by the CARL[49], PRTs are "interim civil-military

organisations designed to operate in semi-permissive environments usually following

open hostilities." (nd:1) ISAF continues to argue that these civil-military entities would

be able to make way into "the most unstable and insecure areas" (2009:8) due to its

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[46] The humanitarian imperative is the right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental right that should be enjoyed by everyone (IFRC, 1995).
[47] OCHA is a United Nations Body formed in 1991 by the General Assembly.
[48] The 2004 Taliban deadly attack on MSF aid workers is an example of the loss of the perceived neutrality, impartiality and independence during a complex emergency.
[49] Combined Arms Research Library.

military component whilst stabilising the area through defense, diplomacy and development[50] (Mashatt and Polk, 2008). Petřík agrees and argues that, in this context, PRTs were "a real-life application of the security-development nexus in the form of hybrid civil-military units deployed in a conflict zone." (2016:163) In theory the PRT concept foresaw that as soon as its Area of Responsibility[51] (AOR) was secure, the military component would be withdrawn, the PRT dissolved and the diplomatic and development components reverting to "more traditional, effective, and efficient means to pursue their aims." (ISAF, 2009:8) Thus leaving a civilian component[52] to continue with the work.

PRTs were a tool which have been conceived to support stabilisation strategies post-conflict in Afghanistan[53] with the aim of "jump starting reconstruction in areas where there was little or no presence on the part of the government" (Malkasian and Meyerle, 2009:6). Malkasian et al. continue to argue that PRTs did not conduct "development for development's sake" (ibid.) but to create a safe and secure environment in which the Afghan government could exert their authority. Thus serving a political aim.

Although PRTs were, amongst other things, tasked with the conduct of reconstruction and development activities, PRTs became also engaged in HA activities (Van Buren, 2011). The UK military stabilisation doctrine clearly states that military forces involved in stabilisation operations will have to be able to transition rapidly from combat to peace keeping to HA (MOD:2010). This statement undoubtedly highlights the military's interest in being engaged in humanitarian assistance in complex

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[50] The three D's - which are the pillars of U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization programs (Mashatt et al., 2008).
[51] Area of Responsibility (AOR) is defined as "the geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has the authority to plan and conduct operations." (DOD, 2016:15) The PRT AORs in Afghanistan can be found in Appendix 3.
[52] However, as will be seen later in this chapter the civilian components of the PRTs were almost negligible.
[53] Together with Iraq.

environments. As a matter of fact ISAF gave the PRT Commander the discretion to decide whether to provide HA (ISAF, 2009:196) in his AOR. Even though the ISAF PRT manual provided a very important caveat which stated that it[54] "must not be used for the purpose of political gain, relationship building, or "winning hearts and minds[55]."" (ISAF, 2009:204) and that it should be distributed on the basis of need and in line with the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality.

However, there is evidence which indicates that when PRTs were actively engaged in the provision of HA, this was not delivered in line with the humanitarian principles[56]. Moreover, it is impossible to define the military forces involved in PRTs as neutral and independent as they[57] were one of the belligerent forces siding the fragile government of Afghanistan. In addition, through their activities, they were also assisting the government to extend its authority to the detriment of the Taliban insurgents. On this issue Greenberg agrees and questions this concept by stating that one cannot be "shooting with one hand, and [then] giving medicine[58] with the other" (2002:79).

2.5.1 Why were Provincial Reconstruction Teams deployed?

Malkasian et al. (2009) and CARL (nd) both agree that PRTs were devised as a mechanism which could operate in unstable areas; they assert that the inability of other actors, apart from the military, to operate in similar unstable situations would lead to an area "getting stuck in instability." (CARL, nd:6). Nevertheless CARL (Ibid.)

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[54] Referring to Humanitarian Aid.
[55] Winning the Hearts and Minds of the population is an important aspect of Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN).
[56] An example being a distribution of aid provided by a PRT in 2006 directed exclusively to members of the Afghan National Army (ISAF, 2009). This aid was not provided according to the principle of humanity as the aid was not delivered to those who needed it most. In addition the principles of impartiality and independence were also not observed.
[57] To include also their governments.
[58] Here one can use the same argument for all types of humanitarian assistance.

remarks that that there were exceptions to this rule as some NGOs do operate in similar situations.

Security was an important immediate objective of the PRTs; although Malkasian et al. in their study suggest that they could not find anything to suggest that PRTs had turned the tide of violence. In fact they state that "[a]ttacks in general have increased in Afghanistan over the past 2 years[59]" (Malkasian et al., 2009:11). However they continued to state that these civil-military organisations "helped prevent a difficult situation from becoming even worse." (Malkasian et al., 2009:15).

2.5.2 Provincial Reconstruction Teams Principles

According to CARL (2012) PRTs were expected to adhere to seven principles[60]. In this research only the principles of Coordination and Integration and Unity of Effort will be discussed; since they are the most relevant to the scope of this study – linking PRTs with HAOs. These two principles are defined as follows:

Coordinate and integrate - "the PRT should coordinate and integrate with goals, plans, strategies, and activities of all stakeholders at all levels of government, civil society, private sector, traditional governance structures, IGOs, and NGOs." (CARL, 2012:9).

Unity of effort – "requires coordination and cooperation among government departments and agencies, with NGOs and IGOs … without unity of effort, the probability of success for any endeavour is diminished and the chance resources are wasted." (CARL, 2012:10). A task under this principle for PRTs was to support civilian efforts including those of NGOs.

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[59] Referring to the period between 2007 and 2009.
[60] According to CARL (2012) the seven PRT guiding principles are a) Focus on stability b) Fill the gaps c) Coordinate and integrate d) Focus on effects, not outputs e) Unity of effort f) Continuity of operations g) Flexibility.

These two principles affirm why Colin Powell in 2001 and NATO's Unity of Purpose conference in 2009 highlighted the importance (for the US and NATO) of having all stakeholders involved in Afghanistan[61] unite their efforts and purposes to achieve a single aim. As already stated, for the majority of HAOs this goes against their principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. Being involved with in a concept or entity which is driven by one of the belligerent forces would automatically mean that the aid agency is taking sides and is no longer autonomous as it is supporting the US/NATOs COIN operations in the country.

2.5.3 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

The first PRT, in Afghanistan, was formed and operated in Gardez in Paktia[62] province in 2002; by 2009 a total of 26 PRTs were present in Afghanistan (Malkasian et al, 2009). Of these 26 PRTs, 12 were led by the US, whilst the remaining 14 were under the lead of other ISAF contributing nations. The Herat[63] PRT, which was led by Italy, was the last to close in 2014 (*Ministero della Difesa[64]*, 2014).

According to the GAO[65] PRTs in Afghanistan evolved from Humanitarian Assistance Teams (HATs) [66], which the US military established in early 2002 following the ousting of the Taliban regime (GAO, 2008). These teams were made up of 10 to 12 US military personnel and were tasked with 'humanitarian needs assessments' and to implement small DOD projects aimed at winning the trust of the local population (ibid.). Therefore PRTs are often seen as expanded HATs to which a force protection element and representatives from US governmental civilian agencies were added.

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[61] And Iraq in the context of the Unity of Purpose conference.
[62] Paktia province is located in the eastern part of Afghanistan and it borders with Pakistan. Vide Appendix 4.
[63] Herat province is located in the western part of Afghanistan and it borders with both Iran and Turkmenistan. Vide Appendix 4.
[64] Ministry of Defence.
[65] US Government Accountability Office.
[66] Also known as Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells.

PRTs were assigned a province as their AOR and were staffed by ISAF coalition partners (ISAF, 2009; Perito, 2007). They fell under the direct command of ISAF although on the ground they were led by different lead nations[67] (Sidell, 2008), which provided funding and priorities (Petřík, 2016). Notwithstanding a centralised command structure, PRTs varied in "size, composition and operational[68] style" (Jakobsen, 2005:11). Staff levels varied from as little as 50 to 300 personnel of which the large majority were military[69] (Jakobsen, 2005). Leadership structures were also different; in fact Petřík asserts that Nordic[70] PRTs had a leadership structure which mirrored that of US PRTs[71], whereby civilians were subordinated to the military[72] (2016). Although Eronen (2008) suggest that their leadership style was collaborative and equally manned thus mimicking the British leadership style as opposed to that of the Americans. PRT performance and leadership styles also varied according to the personality of its Commander and other members of the command team (USAID, 2006).

PRTs in Afghanistan exhibited a wide range of leadership models; military and civilian-led at the extreme ends of the continuum with different shades of joint leadership in between. Figure 3 portrays this continuum whilst table 1 provides examples of the range of leadership styles employed.

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[67] Non-US led PRTs were most often multinational at times combining the contribution of as much as five different nations. Petřík (2016) gives the example of the Uruzgan Tarin Kowt Australian led-PRT which had contributions from the US, Singapore, Slovakia and Afghanistan. The Province of Uruzgan is located in the central part of the country; vide Appendix 4.

[68] In the case of the US, for example, the PRT was equipped for self-defence and could in effect call on coalition air power if and when necessary (Sidell, 2008). However, they did not have the mandate to provide protection to the civilians (ibid.).

[69] Petřík suggests that the balance between military and civilian personnel in the PRTs varied. He states that usually US PRTs in Afghanistan had 2 to 4 civilians in a team made up of 80 to 100 military personnel. In the British PRTs the percentage of civilian stood at 15% whilst the Australian PRTs had over 40% of its manning made up of civilian experts. (2016) This is another indicator that the concept of PRTs was loosely defined and it was in the hands of the lead nation to decide on its composition and leadership (ibid.)

[70] Swedish and Norwegian.

[71] Vide Appendix 5.

[72] The US had one exception to this rule. This was the PRT in Panjshir which unlike all the others was civilian-led (Petřík, 2016). The province of Panjshir is located in the north-eastern part of the country; vide Appendix 4.

The Distribution of Lead Nations on the Military-Civilian Scale

			Sweden	UK	Turkey
USA	Italy	Germany	Norway	Canada	Czech Republic Australia

Military-led ←——————————————————————————→ Civilian-led

Figure 3: Military-Civilian Lead Nation Leadership Continuum
Source: Petřík (2016:167)

Lead Nation	Type of Leadership	Doctrinal Leadership Concept	Effective Leadership Style
Italy	Dual Head Command	Civilian Foreign Affairs representative led the civilian part whilst the military commander led the military part of the PRT.	On the ground the military had effective dominance.
Germany	Dual Head Command	Civilian Foreign Affairs representative led the civilian part whilst the military commander led the military part of the PRT.	For some time the PRT effectively acted as two different teams, although later on it came under military leadership.
Sweden/Norway	Under Military Command	Civilian component of the PRT was under military command.	The military and civilian leaders operated in a collaborative and equal manner.
Canada	Whole-of-Government Leadership	Board of directors representing all ministries involved in the PRT.	N/A
UK	Triumvirate leadership structure	PRT had a military commander, a senior diplomat and a developmental leader.	N/A

Table 1: PRT Leadership Styles
Source: Petřík (2016:166-167)

Another important aspect of the PRTs was the source of funding as it effectively

translated into who controlled the PRT; this was especially true for the US. In fact US

military PRT commanders had sizable amounts of money available to them through CERP with virtually no bureaucratic restrictions. Whilst USAID had a bureaucratic cycle of nine months for the approval of funds for Quick Impact Projects (QIP). This was an obvious constraint to the civilian component of US PRTs (Petřík, 2016).

2.6 Humanitarian Aid Agencies in Afghanistan

Aid organisations have a long history operating in Afghanistan. OXFAM (2014) for example has been operating there uninterrupted for over 30 years. Likewise MSF (2016) has operated in Afghanistan since 1980; although they withdrew for a short period between 2004 and 2009[73] following the killing of five of their staff and the receipt of further threats (MSF, 2004). In spite of a history of instability and insecurity HAOs have and are operating in various Afghan provinces (ibid). OXFAM (2014:np) states that it "works with partner organisations in 18 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces", Save the Children[74] (StC) operates in the provinces of Uruzgan (nd), Balkh, Jawzjan, Saripul, Bamyan and Faryab (2013). Whilst MSF is currently operating in Kabul, Kunduz, Khost and Lashkargah in Helmand province (2016). These few examples show that international aid agencies have, and are, operating in a number of Afghan provinces and thus are not concentrated around the capital Kabul[75].

On average, according to Humanitarian Outcomes (2016), between 2006 and 2014 in Afghanistan there were 204 humanitarian aid agencies. Table 2 provides a statistical distribution according to the type of organisation.

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[73] In 2009 they decided to return following "indications that the overall situation for Afghans was getting worse rather than better." (MSF, 2009:np) MSF reopened operations in the capital city Kabul and soon after expanded operations to the southern region of Helmand (MSF, 2009).
[74] This organisation has operated in Afghanistan since 1976 (StC, nd).
[75] Kabul was and is still considered to be one of the safest areas in the country.

	Total No. of Aid Agencies	Total No. of International Aid Agencies	Total No. of National Aid Agencies	Red Cross/Crescent	UN Agencies
Afghanistan	204	111	76	8	9

Table 2: Aid Agencies Deployed in Afghanistan
Source: Humanitarian Outcomes (2016)

This information suggests that around 38 percent of all aid organisations employed in Afghanistan were national aid agencies. This percentage is quite high when compared to Iraq; where only 3 percent of the aid organisations were indigenous. Although the majority of the international HAOs were present in Afghanistan, they however used the services of a number of local relief agencies to implement their projects (InterAction, 2010).

2.6.1 Mix of Aid Workers

Humanitarian Outcomes (2015:np) estimated that, in 2003, globally there were around 450,000 humanitarian aid workers. Unfortunately, no information is available on the average number of aid workers who worked in Afghanistan in the past 15 years. There is also no consolidated information which could be referred to in order to establish and analyse the demography of the aid worker population in this country. MSF (2004) does provide an indication suggesting that before 2 June 2004 it employed 67 international and 658 local aid workers in Afghanistan. This indicates that, for this organisation, the mix between international and national aid workers stood at around one is to ten (1:10).

2.7 Peacebuilding and its relation to Humanitarian Action

According to the UN there is no one agreed definition of what is peacebuilding as there exist various "opinions of what it involves." (2010:5) This assertion is confirmed in a study conducted by Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell, and Sitea (2007) who list 24 different concepts and definitions of what peacebuilding is across various agencies.

The term peacebuilding was coined by Galtung in 1976; he called for the creation of peacebuilding structures "to promote sustainable peace by addressing the "root causes" of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capabilities for peace management and conflict resolution." (cited in UN, 2010:5) Yet, this concept took prominence when Boutros Boutros-Ghali[76] launched his *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992 (Barnett et al., 2007). Boutros-Ghali defined the notion of post-conflict peacebuilding as an action "to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict." (UN, 1992:np) This definition was to a certain extent widened in scope in the *Brahimi Report* which defined this concept as "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide tools for building on those foundations something that is more than absence of war." (UN, 2000:3) According to this report peacebuilding includes, but is not limited to, the activities listed in figure 4.

Activities falling under Peacebuilding

- Reintegrating former combatants into civilian society.
- Strengthen the rule of law.
- Improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses.
- Providing technical assistance for democratic development.
- Promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.

Figure 4: Activities falling under Peacebuilding according to the Brahimi Report
(Source: UN, 2000:3)

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[76] Secretary General of the UN between 1992 and 1996.

According to this list there seems to be no direct link between these elements and humanitarian action. However, the UN, argues that "[t]here is no simple, clear cut definition of peacebuilding that sets it apart from conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-making, humanitarian and developmental assistance." (2010:12) During a conflict situation humanitarian actors would already be present on the ground providing assistance to those in need. They will continue to do so even when the country transitions from conflict to a peacebuilding situation (UN, 2010). This makes HA by default an element of peacebuilding. In fact, according to Llamazares, the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordination Committee (CPCC) lists "[h]umanitarian relief and emergency assistance" in its peacebuilding activities chart (2005:16).

OCHA (2011) in an occasional policy brief also suggests that there exists common ground between peacebuilding and humanitarian action. OCHA suggests that peacebuilding has an explicit political alignment in support of national strategies; whilst humanitarian action follows the core principles and is guided by need (ibid). Although there exists commonalities their different guiding principles creates tension between the two disciplines.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter has shown the complexity of the issue within scope of this study; the complexity that arises from the issues related to cooperation and coordination between the Humanitarians and the Military will be discussed in greater length in the theoretical discussion chapter.

The military/political domain needed aid organisations to join them as the latter were an important piece of the COIN puzzle. Humanitarians were wary of the military as they did not want to lose their neutrality, independence and impartiality; in addition

they argued that with the employment of the PRTs the military was entering into the developmental and humanitarian realm, thus impinging on their humanitarian space. The composition[77] and sources of funding of the PRTs depended on the lead nation. Notwithstanding the fact that the roles of these elements were defined doctrinal concepts, the personality of the PRT commander had an effect on the management and tasks of the PRTs. Whilst US PRTs were heavily dominated by the military other lead nations tried to preserve the "traditional roles for the military and civilian components." (Petřík, 2016:169).

Finally this review looked at the link between humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding. This link is deemed as important since the research being conducted hinges on the De Coning's Peacebuilding Systems Theory. In fact, chapter three will look into some detail in the PST. However, other related theories or notions such as the Relational Coordination Theory and Civil-Military Cooperation will also be explored in order to provide a sound theoretical foundation on which to base this research.

The next Chapter will provide a literature review which should clearly position this study in relation to other academic studies which related to my research area.

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[77] Number of civilians when compared to military.

Chapter 3 – Literature Review

3.1 Introduction

This Literature Review seeks to critically analyse a number of academic studies which were conducted over the recent years and which tackle, in general terms, the issues surrounding Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the relationship between the military and humanitarian aid agencies post-2001 as well as the issue of civil-military cooperation within the context of Afghanistan[78]. This chapter combined with the background provided in chapter 2, will give the reader the necessary breadth and depth required to assimilate a comprehensive knowledge of the issue being discussed. This chapter also show the cross-disciplinary extent of the *problématique* being studied as the literature reviewed emanates from the humanitarian and development fields, conflict resolution as well as defence studies. Notwithstanding the multi-disciplinary dimension of the issue, this chapter shows how this research compliments the body of literature already available.

From the literature review conducted it transpired that none of the studies had a "what would have happened" research question and therefore they studied a particular moment in time. Through this research I will try to establish whether a theory, which has generalised the lessons learnt from the relational problems being

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[78] Between 2002 and 2014.

faced by the military and the humanitarian aid agencies, would have been applicable in the context of Afghanistan.

3.2 The Evolution of Military-Humanitarian Relations Literature

Prior to entering into the merits of the literature review, I would like to first provide a short overview of how the literature on the relationship between the military and humanitarian organisations, during complex emergencies, evolved over the past 25 years.

Jacobs-Garrod (2010) argues that literature related to military-humanitarian relations, in complex situations, came into two distinct waves. In the early 1990's following the interventions in Haiti, Somalia and Balkan region, a number of consequences of poor coordination vis-à-vis response to humanitarian crisis situations were exposed. As a result, the academic world experienced a rise in literature dealing with lessons identified/learnt with regards to humanitarian interventions. However, in the late 1990's interest in this field started to wane; according to Jacobs-Garrod (2010) this was mainly due to two main reasons a) that the international community grew wary of involvement in complex emergencies and b) the political will to intervene subsided.

Following the military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, coordination between military and HAOs during complex situations became once more a topical issue. However, this time the extent to which they[79] "should interact in response to crises was a source of great debate." (Jacobs-Garrod, 2010:75)

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[79] Referring to the aid organisations and the military.

3.3 Availability of Literature

The majority of literature available on this topic looks at the relationship between the HAOs and the military from a single point of view. Thereby viewing the issue from the vantage point of a particular country military force[80] or relief organisation[81]. From the literature review conducted it also transpired that researchers tend to focus on the generic cultural and organisational differences which effect the relations between the two actors. This will ultimately have an effect on the general conduct of the intervention and thus on its effectiveness. This was also noted by Jacobs-Garrod; in fact she states that few authors have examined "the military-NGO relationship in the context of its broader implications for effective interventions." (2010:74) This was, to a certain extent, conducted by Cedric de Coning through his research in the fields of CIMIC, Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding which led to the development of the Peacebuilding Systems Theory (PST). This theory, which will be explained in more detail in chapter 4, aims at improving relations between military and aid organisations in emergency situations.

3.4 A Common Goal, a Different Approach

Davidson, Hayes and Landon argue that once in the field, during complex emergency situations, both the military and their humanitarian counterparts have a common goal that is the "stabilization of the situation and a return to normalcy" (1996:19). They continue to argue that although the end-state may be the same, both communities

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[80] For example Jacobs-Garrod (2010) looks at the issue from the perspective of the US and New Zealand, Khosa (2015) looks at this topic through the lens of the Australian government and its Defence Force whilst Grare (2015) considers this relations from the French point of view.
[81] For example OXFAM International (2007) *OI Policy Compendium Note on the Provision of Aid by Military Forces*, and the Save the Children *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan* (Mc Hugh and Gostelow, 2004).

have a different perspective on how the overall objective should be achieved. Jacobs-Garrod (2010) agrees and suggests that the military tries to achieve this goal through the provision of security whilst humanitarians use aid.

Cole[82] (cite in Robertson and Cole, 2013) argues that through research conducted it is evident that there exist five broad goals for an intervention during a complex emergency situation especially in a post-conflict situation. These five end-states are listed in Figure 5 below.

The Five Broad Goals of Peacebuilding

- <u>Safe and Secure Environment</u>: The ability of the people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence.

- <u>Rule of Law</u>: The ability of the people to have equal access to just laws and a trusted system of justice that holds all persons accountable, protects their human rights, and ensures their safety and security.

- <u>Stable Governance</u>: Ability of the people to share, access, or compete for power through nonviolent processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state.

- <u>Sustainable Economy</u>: The ability of the people to pursue opportunities for livelihoods in a system of economic governance bound by law.

- <u>Social Well-Being</u>: Ability of the people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement.

Figure 5: The Five Broad Goals of Peacebuilding
(Source: Cole as cited by Robertson et al., 2013:11)

Kilcullen[83] offers a framework which suggests that Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations should be based on three pillars – Security, Political and Economic – he continues to argue that this framework can also be applicable to other situations involving "peace operations, stabilization and reconstruction, and complex humanitarian emergencies." (2006:4) Henceforth, in his opinion, this framework is

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[82] Between 2012 and 2015 Ms Beth Cole was the Director of the Office of Civilian Military Cooperation at USAID.
[83] Dr David J. Kilcullen was the Chief Strategist of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the US State Department in 2006.

also applicable to the Afghan context. The figure 3.2 defines in further detail these three pillars.

		Pillars		
		Security	**Political**	**Economic**
Principle Dimensions		Military	Mobilization	Humanitarian Assistance
		Police	Governance Extension	Developmental Assistance
		Human Security	Institutional Capacity	Resource & Infrastructure Management
		Public Safety	Societal Reintegration	Growth Capacity
		Population Security		

Table 3: The Kilcullen 3- Pillars of Counterinsurgency
(Source: Kilcullen, 2006:4)

In her study Jacobs-Garrod (2010) outlines the common goals, vide figure 6, that are pursued by the military and NGOs during complex emergency situations, although she does qualify that these goals are dependent on the context of the emergency and the type of NGO[84].

Common Goals Pursued by the Military and the NGOs

- Ending the Conflict

- Stabilization

- Peace

- Population free from Fear

- Population free from Starvation, War Crimes, and Disease

- Legitimate Government

- Functioning Legal System

- Functioning Educational System

- Self-Controlled and Incorrupt Government

- Turn a Failed State to a Developing State

Figure 6: Common Goals Pursued by the Military and the NGOs during an Intervention
(Source: Jacobs-Garrod, 2010)

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[84] Whether they are Emergency or Alchemical humanitarians. Barnett defines Emergency humanitarianism as that type which "limits itself to saving lives at risk" (2013:22) and the Alchemical type as that humanitarianism that has the "desire to remove the causes of suffering" (ibid.).

Figure 7 hereunder provides a matrix showing the mapping, as adapted by the author, of the Kilcullen three pillars against the Broad and Common Goals identified by Cole and Jacobs-Garrod respectively.

	Pillars		
	Security	Political	Economic
Safe and Secure Environment	▓	▓	
- Ending Conflict			
- Peace			
- Free from Fear			
- Free from War Crimes			
Rule of Law	▓	▓	
- Functioning Legal System			
- Self-Controlled & Incorrupt Government			
- Legitimate Government			
Stable Governance	▓	▓	
- Self-Controlled & Incorrupt Government			
- Legitimate Government			
Sustainable Economy		▓	▓
- Population free from Starvation			
- Developing State			
Social Well-Being		▓	▓
- Population free from Starvation & Disease			
- Functioning Educational System			

Figure 7: Mapping the Kilcullen Pillars with the Broad and Common Goals
(Adapted by the Author; Sources: Cole (as cited in Robertson et al., 2013), Kilcullen (2006) and Jacobs-Garrod (2010))

The figure above clearly indicates that there is intertwining between the themes provided by these three authors; this explains why Kilcullen and Jacobs-Garrod both advocate for inter-agency and comprehensive approaches when intervening during complex emergency situations. In fact, Killcullen states that

> we need to create "unity of effort" at best, and collaboration or deconfliction at least. This depends less on shared command and control hierarchy, and more on a shared diagnosis of the problem, platforms for collaboration, information sharing and deconfliction. (2006:4)

Therefore, in the grand scheme of things there is coherence between the end-state of the humanitarian and military missions - an argument that has created debate

within the military-humanitarian sphere with aid organisations such as MSF vociferously criticising[85] such an approach.

This debate was created even though there seems to be coherence with the end state that both politicians (through military interventions) and HAOs would like to achieve; but there exist no coherence on how this objective is to be achieved. Which in part, according to Teagle (1996), is attributable to cultural and organisational difference between the two. Jacobs-Garrod (2010) agrees but argues that the difference in mandate plays a critical role when assessing the relationship between military and NGOs. Both Teagle and Jacobs-Garrod argue that the primary mandate of the military in complex emergencies is to provide a safe and secure environment in which assistance can be provided. On the other hand that of aid organisations is to distribute assistance based on need and according to the humanitarian principles. Jacobs-Garrod in her paper continues by providing a number of examples to illustrate the divergence in mandate but at the same time where they overlap; essentially the foundations of this debate. Security is not achieved through the deployment of military forces alone; conditions must be created in order to achieve a safe and secure environment. With this in mind a military commander, when intervening, would consider to alleviate the fear and the desperation of the affected population. This is done by ensuring that the populace have "enough to eat, a place to sleep, and hope for a future." (Jacobs-Garrod, 2010:80) In the pursuit of such an objective the military would not always carry out such activities in a neutral and apolitical manner (Teagle, 1996 and Rohwerder, 2015).

HAOs on the other hand intervene to assist a population in need by providing humanitarian assistance in order to alleviate their suffering (Smock, 1996). Their

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[85] This in reference to Christophe Fournier criticism during a speech delivered as part of NATO's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) 'Unity of Purpose' conference as already mentioned in Chapter 2.

priority is to deliver aid whilst security is of a lesser concern to them although they are also cognisant of the fact that civil order contributes to an improved security situation; but Jacobs-Garrod states that they are still adamant that they (humanitarian community) "should be the sole providers of the assistance that contributes to that civil order." (2010:80) Beck (2015) argues that the difference in mandates is a major stumbling block for cooperation between the military and humanitarian organisations.

Although Van Brabant agrees with Beck on the problem that one of the common objections to coordination is the different mandates, he also agrees with the argument that Jacob-Garrod puts forward. In fact he makes a very interesting remark when he states that:

> [a]gencies have to recognise that the underlying humanitarian mandate is the same: save lives, reduce suffering and try and protect or restore livelihoods and local capacities. The work of different agencies is therefore *inherently complementary*. (Van Brabant, 1999:15; emphasis by author)

Thus the military and the humanitarian mandates should complement each other as opposed to substitute each other in order to achieve the ultimate end state; consequently creating an interdependency which is the foundation on which improved relations are to be based (Jacobs-Garrod, 2010).

3.5 Humanitarian-Military Relations in Complex Emergency Situations

Mc Hugh and Gostelow (2004), in a research study commissioned by Save the Children (StC), argue that military and humanitarian relations are effected by their diverging perspective of what is HA – therefore its definition. In addition they continue to argue that this is not a question of interpretation on what actually is HA but "more to the process of delivery and the motivations behind them." (Mc Hugh et al., 2004:1) This is where the humanitarian principles are factored in.

Radice argues that attempts to define HA tends to contain two basic fundamentals a) "they indicate the kind of action at stake, such as the provision of relief in war zones or in the aftermath of natural disasters, or, in a more general sense, the alleviation of extreme suffering" (2010:24) and b) "[t]hey then enunciate the principles that should condition the undertaking of such action." (ibid.) In fact Carbonnier (2015) defines humanitarian aid as

> assistance designed to save lives and maintain and protect human dignity, and alleviate suffering during and in the aftermath of emergencies. To be classified as humanitarian, aid should be consistent with the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. (2015:40)

If one takes for example the US military's definition, which states that humanitarian aid "consists of Department of Defense (DOD) activities conducted outside the US and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation." (DOD, 2014:I-1) It is clear that this definition is similar to that provided by Carbonnier but lacks what Radice terms as the enunciation of the principles which according to Carbonnier's definition is what makes aid humanitarian.

As a result Mc Hugh and Gostelow (2004:42), argue that HAOs may adopt four different policy options when interacting with the military, in this case the PRTs. These options range from a state of co-existence to cooperation and they are:

a. *Principled non engagement* – this option entails no humanitarian-military interaction as such collaboration may impair the independence, neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian organisation.

b. *'Arm's-length' interaction* – this option advocates for the lowest level of interaction which is carried out through a mutually respected body[86]. This

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[86] Such as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). This option would not be valid if the integrity and objectivity of such an organisation is questioned by either side.

interaction is carried out at the operational level when operational needs

dictate so.

c. *Proactive, pragmatic, principled engagement* – as this option suggests

the interaction must be proactive whilst keeping in mind the principles of

humanitarianism. Here aid organisations build on existing liaison

relationships built through the "mutually respected body" to further

facilitate interaction. This type of interaction occurs at the field level

where the aid organisations proactively shape the nature of the

interaction whilst at the same time advocate their principled position of

this relationship.

d. *Active, direct engagement and co-operation* – This is direct engagement

and cooperation at both the operational and field level in the identification

and realisation of humanitarian and reconstruction projects.

RAND (2004) argue that NATO in Afghanistan preferred to adopt an active, direct

engagement and co-operation type of a relationship (option (d)), with the HAOs.

However, studies suggest, that humanitarians generally prefer to adopt either options

(a) or (b) (Mc Hugh et al, 2004; Runge, 2009). In fact RAND suggests that although

ISAF tried to coordinate efforts with aid organisations through weekly meetings the

"overall attendance was generally low and sporadic." (2004:87)

3.6 The Afghan Situation

The involvement of the military in the provision of aid – humanitarian and

developmental – in support of a security mandate is a contentious one and "perhaps

nowhere more so than in Afghanistan." (Jackson and Hayson, 2013:3) This

experience has "irrevocably shaped how aid agencies regard and relate to military

forces during conflict" (ibid.) The situation was further exacerbated by the "considerable degree of confusion both among the humanitarian community and the Afghan population over the various military forces[87] present in Afghanistan" (Morris, nd:13); especially related to their respective mandates vis-à-vis humanitarian support operations. On the question of mandates ISAF needed to interact, cooperate and coordinate with the civil society especially with HAOs. As part of their counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, according to Schirch, ISAF viewed HAOs as "important implementing partners for a "soft power" approach to win over the allegiance of Afghan citizens" (2010:1). This links perfectly to how the US Army defined aid in one of its manuals – a nonlethal weapon utilised to win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents (Haysom and Jackson, 2013:20). However to secure access HAOs needed to remain objective as they did not have the luxury to be perceived as supporting anyone of the belligerent forces.

This led to a situation were in order to secure access to those in need HAOs were required to "manage their coexistence and interactions" (BAAG and ENNA, nd:4) with military stakeholders very carefully. In their report BAAG et al. continue to argue that in Afghanistan NGOs "tended to adopt a highly cautious approach to interaction with military forces for the fear of being perceived as aligned to one side in the conflict" (nd:5). The issue of being perceived as aiding ISAF or the US-led coalition created significant problems to HAOs when interacting with the military especially PRTs (Jackson et al, 2013). This is the reason why, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, HAOs tended to adopt a minimalist approach towards cooperation and therefore their interaction with the PRTs could only be labelled as either principled non-engagement or arms' length type of interaction. This argument is succinctly epitomized in an

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[87] NATO's ISAF and the US-led coalition Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

interview given by an ANGO representative interviewed for the BAAG and ENNA policy brief who stated that "[w]e try to keep PRTs away from our offices and *do not interact* with them because it brings threats from insurgents and suspicion from our target community[88] [sic]." (nd:7 emphasis by author)

As part of the arms' length approach type of interaction between HAOs and ISAF (and the PRTs) the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief and Development (ACBAR) created a high-level NGO-military contact group (Schirch, 2010). This contact group was aimed at keeping the lines of communication between HAOs country directors and ISAF senior leadership open, whilst serving as a forum to resolve operational issues. However, it was disbanded after a change in ACBAR leadership as they deemed that "such close relations with ISAF were no longer desirable." This indicates a shift towards the principle of non-engagement.

"You [HAOs] don't need to love us [PRTs], you just need to work with us." (Haysom et al, 2013:13) this quote was taken from a speech made in 2004 by the Herat PRT Commander during a meeting with NGOs. This quote clearly shows that there was lack of interaction between PRTs and HAOs which was hindering ISAF's efforts to use aid organisations as part of their COIN strategy.

3.7 A Call for Increased Communication, Cooperation and Collaboration

The majority of studies on the research topic chosen for this paper call for improved communication, cooperation and collaboration between the military and HAOs. Beck argues that in humanitarian operations communication is an essential element for the effective and efficient conduct of operations; he also deems that its importance increases exponentially as the "scope and scale of the humanitarian response

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[88] In 2007, for example, the community elders in Faryab told a Danish NGO that their community could no longer ensure their security because the Norwegian PRT has visited one of their projects (BAAG et al., nd:7)

continues to expand." (2015:49) He continues to state that the "[m]ilitary and civilian humanitarian organizations *must* communicate and cooperate to avoid conducting parallel operations and duplicating efforts in order to reach and help as many people as possible." (ibid., emphasis by author) Heaslip agrees and argues that the communication between the two 'worlds' should be transparent so as to "provide answers as opposed to obscuring questions due to institutional resistance" (2012:21), thus avoiding misperceptions and mistrust. In addition RAND (2004), following a study conducted during the early stages of the Afghanistan intervention, recommends the establishment of a standing communications and information-management strategy to include the required infrastructure for the coordination of information flow between the military and NGOs. However, although Runge (2009), agrees with improved communication, he argues that at the strategic level communication should be intensified[89] whilst in the field communications between the two should be coordinated by a UN agency and meeting should always occur on neutral ground[90]. Here Runge is arguing for a *proactive, pragmatic, principled engagement* at the strategic level whilst an *arm's-length' interaction* approach in the field.

Jacob-Garrod (2010) in her study suggests that the effectiveness of any response to an emergency situation is always impacted by the quality and the extent of the relationship between the military and aid organisations. In fact she argues that international interventions have been characterised by "largely uncoordinated, uncommunicative, and uncooperative military-NGO relationship." (Jacob-Garrod, 2010:360) This has led and leads to wastage of resources and duplication of effort (Heaslip, 2012). Jacob-Garrod and Heaslip continue to argue that in order to avoid

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[89] This interaction is held outside the area of the intervention.
[90] Neither at the NGO nor in military premises.

such wastage it is very important that the military and aid organisations cooperate throughout the relief operation lifecycle, most importantly during the planning and execution phases. Beck (2015) is in agreement in fact he also suggests that such cooperation should be conducted through Civil-Military Operations Centres (CMOC). However, even though available literature shows the importance of communications, cooperation and possibly collaboration, aid organisations are not comfortable with such comments especially when the military is involved in ongoing conflict and military operations. In fact Christian Aid's International Director Roger Riddle complained, in writing, with the British Foreign Secretary in 2002 regarding the PRTs by stating that "[d]irect contact and collaboration with military forces jeopardizes existing long standing relationships with local communities and Christian Aid's neutrality" (Christian Aid, 2004:46). This clearly indicates that for certain aid organisations it is more important to maintain the relationship with those in need than garnering and enhancing a relationship with the military. This even though they might a) be operating in the same geographical space and b) contributing towards wastage of resources through the duplication of effort.

3.8 Conclusion

An assessment of the literature available on the civil-military relations has shown that it evolved around periods of complex emergencies such as the early 1990's – Haiti, Somalia and the Balkan region – and the early 21st century due to the military interventions that occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq. This literature review also indicates that in most case studies tend to look at this relationship through a narrow perspective whilst focusing on the cultural and organisational differences which certainly do effect how these two 'worlds' relate with each other. These relations will influence the effective conduct of interventions.

This chapter has also shown that during interventions in complex emergency situations, humanitarian aid organisations and the military aspire to achieve a common goal – the stabilization of the situation and the return of normalcy. However, due to their different mandates they approach the problem from different angles whereby the military use security whilst aid organisations look at the provision of assistance to achieve the goal. This divergence in how to approach the end-state seems to be the foundation of the whole debate surrounding civil (humanitarian)-military relations.

The options that are available for interaction between the two were also briefly considered in this chapter as the literature review conduct, in the majority of cases, called for an increase in communication, cooperation and collaboration between the military and humanitarian aid organisations. However, most aid organisations argue to the contrary as they are not comfortable with increasing cooperation and collaboration with the military, even if it leads to inefficiencies during interventions, as they are afraid that such a relationship would jeopardise their humanitarian principles. The issue of Civil-Military Cooperation and the debate surrounding it will be analysed in more depth from a theoretical point of view in chapter 4.

Reverting to the research question and therefore whether the PST would have been applicable to Afghanistan; this literature review has shown that over the past two decades there has always been a call for improved interaction being cooperation, coordination or collaboration. It has also emerged that the majority of studies look at the issue of military-humanitarian relations from a single point of view[91]. However, in this study I chose a different point of view and thereby looking at the problem through the PST and using a counterfactual argument in order to study whether the

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[91] Either from the point of view of a particular military force or HAO.

application of such a theory would have improved the interaction between the two and as a result the effectiveness of the interaction.

The next chapter will look into some detail in the theory behind the De Coning's Peacebuilding Systems Theory, which is the theory on which this study hinges. Moreover, other related theories or notions such as the Relational Coordination Theory will also be explored in order to provide a sound theoretical foundation on which to base this research.

Chapter 4 – Theoretical Discussion

4.1 Introduction

This theoretical chapter will explore the De Coning's Peacebuilding Systems Theory (PST) which is the theory upon which the research question of this study hinges. This theory shall be looked into through the Relational Coordination Theory (RCT) and the Complexity Theory (CT). Through the RCT the importance of coordination of interdependent activities in systems, such as the Humanitarian System, will be explored. On the other hand CT will be introduced with the aim of understanding why the Humanitarian System can be defined as a complex system which is able to evolve, adapt and learn from its environment. This chapter will also proceed to analyse how the notions of the PST emerged from the RCT and CT.

The notion of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) will also be explored in this chapter, even though it does not strictly fall into the PST theoretical discussion dimension. It is required to understand the reasoning behind De Coning's PST.

4.2 Relational Coordination Theory

Malone and Crowston broadly define coordination as "the act of working together harmoniously." (1990:np) They continue by suggesting that the use of the word harmoniously implies that the activities conducted are interdependent.

Havens, Vasey, Gittell and Lin (2010)[92] indicate that coordination was traditionally viewed as an information-processing problem and thus this notion depended on the level and quality of information sharing[93] between the different elements. They continue to argue that in a complex environment, which is characterised by uncertainty and interdependent activities, cooperation should no longer be approached from an information-processing perspective but from a "relational" (Havens et al., 2010:927) one. Havens et al. targeted hospitals and health management as complex environments in their study, as their research analysed the "relational coordination between nurses and other providers and the impact of relational coordination on patient care quality." (2010:926) Notwithstanding, by inference, this argument can also be applied to this research project as emergencies, especially post-conflict ones, are also considered complex environments.

Gittell (2011) suggests that Follett[94] was the first academic to realise the importance of relations in coordination and thus proposed the first concepts behind the Relational Coordination Theory. She argued in favour of coordination being a process of incessant interrelating between "the parts and the whole." (Gittell, 2011:401) In fact Follett states that:

> [i]t is impossible … to work most effectively at coordination until you have made up your mind where you stand philosophically in regard to the relation of parts to wholes. … the most profound truth that philosophy has ever given us concerns not only the relation of parts, but the relation of parts to the whole, not to a stationary whole, but to a whole a-making. (1949:91)

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[92] Referring to Galbraith (1977).
[93] The qualities of information sharing are accuracy, frequency and timeliness.
[94] Referring to Mary Parker Follett who as an American social worker, philosopher and pioneer in the fields of organisational behaviour and theory.

Crowston and Kammerer (1998), Faraj and Sproull (2000), and Bechky (2006)[95], agree and have argued in favour of the importance of relationships in coordinating activities. They base their arguments on the merit that coordination is the management of task interdependence and thus fundamentally a relational process.

In fact Gittell defines relational coordination as a "mutually reinforcing process of communicating and relating for the purpose of task integration." (2002:301) Communication and relationships are therefore two important attributes of coordination which if present would lead to the achievement of a common or overarching objective. In this argument the RCT is uniquely positioned "as it conceptualise[s] the relational dynamics involved in coordination." (Havens et al., 2010:927)

The RCT proposes three specific relationship elements – shared goals, shared knowledge and mutual respect – and four communication dimensions – frequent, timely, accurate and problem-solving – in order to have effective coordination (Gittell, 2011). Consequently, coordination that occurs through frequent and effective communication, supported by the relational elements, should enable organisations to achieve their desired outcomes in an effective manner. The relationship between the two dimensions is represented in Figure 8.

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[95] These authors come from different background including Information Technology, Organisational Behaviour as well as Social Sciences. This shows the horizontal applicability of the coordination theory across academic disciplines.

Figure 8: Relational and Communication Dimensions of the RCT
Adapted by the author from Gittell (2011).

Table 4 succinctly highlights the reasons why relational coordination, through RCT, is

seen as a mutually reinforcing process of communication and relationships.

Relational Dimensions		The relation between Relational and Communication Dimensions
Shared Goals	These are goals that transcend the participants' individual goals.	This will lead to an increase in motivation to engage in **frequent** and **timely** communications. Furthermore the probability of resorting to **problem-solving** communications as opposed to blaming tactics is definitively higher.
Shared Knowledge	Enables participants to see how their individual goals interrelate with the whole process.	Allows participants to communicate with greater **accuracy** since they are aware of each other's objectives; they would also be aware of how their goals are related to the other individual objectives.
Mutual Respect	Enables participants to overcome the status barrier that prevent them from seeing and taking into account the work of others.	Increases the possibility that participants are more receptive to communications irrespective of their status, thereby increasing the **quality of communications**.

Table 4: The mutually reinforcing process advocated by RCT
(Source: Gittell, 2011 adapted by the author)

The relationship that this theory advocates is consistent with Follett's (1949) relational approach and therefore it is a "task-based relationship" (Gittell, 2011:402) as opposed to a personal relationship. However, since this process is not a mechanistic one, but a human process, personal relations or preferences may, at times, have an effect on the overall relation/communications nexus.

4.2.1 Post-Bureaucratic Organisations

Heckscher (1994) in his post-bureaucratic organisation research argues in favour of network-type organisations[96] as opposed to traditionalistic bureaucratic organisations; thereby supporting the replacement of hierarchical organisations with network centric structures. Powell (2012) refers to these types of organisations[97] as relational forms of organisation as they harness coordination and communication between the different parts as opposed to stove piping. In fact Ouchi (2012) suggests that a basic requirement for networks to function effectively is to harness a culture that enables high quality communication.

As opposed to other organisational theories the RCT does not call for the replacement[98] of structures but for the redesign of weak relational processes across functional boundaries (Gittell, Seider, and Wimbush, 2010). These realignments are aimed of strengthening and reinforcing weak processes to enhance performance.

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[96] According to Sopińska a network organisation is "a voluntary association of independent organisations cooperating with each other, which, by common use of their complimentary resources, reach specific objectives, thereby increasing the effectiveness of their activities." (2013:87)

[97] Powell (2012) is referring to network centric organisations.

[98] It is important to note that military entities are hierarchical by nature and thus culturally they find it difficult to accept an argument which suggests that they should move away from such a structure.

Thereby this theory supports the Theory of Performance[99] by creating the ideal conditions in which the level of performance of a unit, organisation and/or of a network is improved (Elger, nd) through effective coordination.

<u>4.2.2 The Relational Coordination Theory and Humanitarian Action</u>

ALNAP defines the Humanitarian Systems as a "network of interconnected institutional and operational entities through which humanitarian assistance is provided" (2015a:18). Notwithstanding the fact that the RCT is a theory which has roots in Organisational Behaviour and bearing in mind that the Humanitarian System is a network in itself, then the RCT's principles are applicable to it[100].

Moreover, ALNAP compares the Humanitarian System[101] to an "organic construct like a constellation: a complex whole formed of interacting core[102] and related[103] actors" (2015b:np), which is there to support an affected community by providing humanitarian aid. If ALNAP's definition is deconstructed and analysed, it is evident that the humanitarian system a) is made up of number of entities which have different functions within the system; b) harnesses interaction between the entities[104]; c) allows for interdependent tasks; and d) has an overarching goal that transcends the individual objectives of the actors.

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[99] According to Elger (nd), the Theory of Performance
> develops and relates six foundational concepts (italicized) to form a framework that can be used to explain performance as well as performance improvements. To *perform* is to produce valued results. A *performer* can be an individual or a group of people engaging in a collaborative effort. Developing performance is a journey, and *level of performance* describes location in the journey. Current level of performance depends holistically on 6 components: context, level of knowledge, levels of skills, level of identity, personal factors, and fixed factors. Three axioms are proposed for effective performance improvements. These involve a *performer's mindset, immersion* in an enriching environment, and engagement in *reflective practice*.

[100] Referring to the Humanitarian System.
[101] Vide Figure 9 for a graphical representation of the Humanitarian System.
[102] ALNAP defines core actors as those organisations "which aid provision is their primary mandate." (2015a:20)
[103] Related actors are defined as those "[g]roups that play a critical role in humanitarian response but humanitarian action is not their core function." (ibid.)
[104] Although at different levels of intensity.

Figure 9: The Humanitarian System
Source: ALNAP (2015a:20)

These deductions suggest that for this network of actors to operate effectively and efficiently there must be some level of coordination. In theory, the Humanitarian System cannot afford to adopt a stove pipe approach during a crises situation as instead of delivering "assistance in a cohesive and effective manner to save lives and alleviate suffering" (Humanitarian Coalition, 2016:np) they would be providing an inferior service to the effected population.

For these reasons, in an ideal world, one would anticipate that the RCT should be the fulcrum on which the humanitarian system operates. Therefore, going back to the

issue being researched, it should be expected that, during complex emergencies, military organisations and humanitarian agencies would adopt a relational approach to facilitate coordination on the ground. The question of whether military and aid organisations cooperate and coordinate activities will be discussed through the notion of Civil-Military Cooperation or as aid agencies prefer to refer to it as Civil Military Relations (CMR).

4.3 Civil-Military Cooperation

Knight (2008) argues that in view of the post-cold war asymmetric conflicts and the resulting complex emergencies, cooperation between military and civilian entities has become a requirement. He continues by suggesting that this cooperation should be done through CIMIC. Military and humanitarian actors working in the same environment is not a new concept; however such a relationship was always based on the distinction (between military and non-military) made under the International Humanitarian Law (Bessler and Saki, 2006). A distinction that is vital in preserving Humanitarian Space in which humanitarians could operate safely whilst basing their actions on the humanitarian principles (ibid.). However arguments posed earlier in this chapter show that this is changing as interaction between the two, in complex emergencies, is spread over a wider spectrum thereby eroding this traditional separation. This makes CIMIC a contentious topic.

Pugh (2001) maintains that in complex emergencies the relations between the military and civilian worlds can take the following three dimensions:

The Civil-Military Cooperation Dimensions

CIMIC can take the following forms of relationships:

a. Between external military forces and internal civilian authorities/society.
b. Between internal regular/irregular forces and external civilian agencies.
c. Between external military and civilian components of an intervention.

Figure 10: The Civil-Military Cooperation Dimensions
Source: Pugh (2001:1)

Of interest to this research is the relationship between the military and the civilian (exclusively humanitarian agencies). This relationship is quite a complicated one. Complications arise from the fact that humanitarian[105] and military entities have "distinctive practices and standpoints" (Pugh, 2001:2) with regards to this controversial topic. He continues by suggesting that a major obstacle for coordination in complex emergencies is that both spheres are fragmented. Divisions that arise from a variety of reasons as listed in figure 11 below.

Humanitarian Aid Organisations	*The Military*
a. Sheer number of actors.	a. Varied military traditions.
b. Fragmentation of actors.	b. Different national and military cultures.
c. Fragmentation of activities.	c. Different objectives.
d. Variations in perceptions.	

Figure 11: Obstacles to Coordination and Integration between Humanitarian and Military Organisations
Source: Pugh (2001:2)

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[105] This includes the UN agencies, ICRC, international and indigenous humanitarian aid organisations.

These divisions are also visible in the terminology used to label this concept in fact ICRC[106] terms it as Civil Military Relations (Rana, 2008); whilst the UN terms it either Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) or UN-CIMIC.

The following are the CIMIC working definitions of NATO, EU, US, UN[107] and CMR for ICRC.

NATO's CIMIC Definition

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil populations, including national and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.

EU's CIMIC Definition

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil role-players (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.

US Military Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Definition

The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives.

UN CIMIC or Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) Definition

The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals.

ICRC CMR Definition

Interactions between military and non-military organisations and actors, generally in the context of a peace operation, or more rarely in a combat operation or during occupation; operational coordination and interaction between military, local authorities, population, non-governmental humanitarian, developmental and civil society organisations and wider society.

Figure 12: CIMIC, CMCoord & CMR Definitions
Sources: NATO (2002:np); Council of the EU (2009:8); DOD (2013:ix); UN (2003:21); Frerks (2016:32)

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[106] Since CIMIC is effectively a military term having a different label for this concept also helps in keeping the distinction mentioned by Bessler et al (2006).
[107] The UN uses both UN-CIMIC and UN-CMCoord to refer to this concept (De Coning at al, 2012).

NATO, the EU and the US view the concept of CIMIC as a way to establish cooperation between a military force and external civilian entities, including humanitarian organisations. It is viewed as a tool in the Commander's tool box that enhances Command and Control and supports the overall operation (De Coning et al., 2012). This requires the setting up of mission specific CIMIC mechanisms to develop, enhance and manage relationships. On the other hand De Coning et al. argues that the motivation behind UN-CIMIC is to "maximise coordination among its own multidimensional components and to establish cooperation between the UN peace operation and the actors" (2012:28) in the area. This difference is derived from two fundamental differences a) UN operations are normally consent based[108] and b) the military are deployed as part of an integrated mission under overall civilian direction (De Coning, 2005). The ICRC's view is completely different; Studer (2001) suggests that the ICRC's view can only be described as isolationist. This is because they strictly observe the humanitarian principles and the code of conduct (ibid.).

Through civil-military cooperation, at various levels, the military in Afghanistan tried to implement an integrated approach[109] towards rebuilding this country following the 2001 invasion. Julier (nd) argues that a number of aid organisations agreed to operate under the umbrella of the integrated approach, whilst others did not. In his view those who did subscribe to the integrated approach lost their credibility as well as access to those who they were supposedly assisting. Thus, statements such as those made by the Taliban in 2003 and 2004 support and justify the ICRC's arguments in favour of neutral and independent humanitarian action (ibid), free from any political interference.

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[108] There is the consent of both parties to a conflict and operations are usually initiated following the signature of a cease-fire or peace agreement.
[109] The implementation of an integrated approach through CIMIC can be drawn from the assertions made by the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and NATO's concept of Unity of Purpose. Sometimes this approach is also referred to as the whole-of-government approach or the comprehensive approach.

On the ground the divisions with respect to CIMIC between humanitarians and the military, boils down to the level of engagement between the two. The latter advocates for greater coordination (or possibly integration); whilst humanitarians[110] commit to co-existence and distinction[111] (Rana, 2008). The discrepancy between their lines of thought is so great that Rana states that it is possible that "neither side of the debate will allow itself to be persuaded to adopt the principles of the "adversary", each must understand and respect the notion of complementarity and distinction." (2008:239)

4.3.1 Coordination vs. Cooperation

Smith, Carroll and Ashford suggest that cooperation is a "process by which individuals, groups, and organisations come together, interact, and form psychological relationships for mutual gain or benefit." (1995:10). This definition suggest that cooperation is a voluntary arrangement which is mutually beneficial to the parties involved; whilst coordination, as already explained earlier, entails the "managing of dependencies between activities"[112] (Malone and Crowston, 1994:90). This may involve the synchronisation and integration of activities and command and control structures with the aim of employing resources efficiently to achieve common objectives. It is evident that the meaning of cooperate suggests that it should be under taken on voluntary basis whilst that of coordinate alludes to a controlled structure. This makes coordination and cooperation two distinct elements which delineate the type and extent of relationships between two or more parties.

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[110] Dunantists.
[111] This issue will be discussed in greater depth in chapter three.
[112] Malone and Crowston continue by stating that "if there is no interdependence, there is nothing to coordinate." (1994:90)

4.3.2 The United Nations

Notwithstanding the definitions provided, according to the UN the humanitarian community, during crises situations, adopts a coordination strategy which ranges "from close cooperation to sheer co-existence." (nd:98) Along this continuum, cooperation is viewed as "the strongest relationship that can exist" (De Coning et al., 2012:28) whilst co-existence is the "minimum form" (De Coning et al., 2012:29) Therefore for the UN and the humanitarian community coordination is the range scale which denotes the intensity of cooperation between the different entities involved in complex emergencies.

Figure 13: The Humanitarian Community Coordination Strategy
Sources: UN (nd:98) and De Coning et al. (2012:29)

4.3.3 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

Unlike the UN, NATO in its CIMIC policy makes a clear distinction between cooperation and coordination. The Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence[113] (2016) *CIMIC Handbook* mentions that coordination has two functions that of 1) coordination between military structures on activities related to the operation and 2) the synchronisation of military efforts with those of civilian actors[114] with the aim of avoiding duplication and waste of valuable resources. The *CIMIC Handbook* clearly indicates that NATO CIMIC should deal with cooperation <u>with</u> civilian entities and should not get involved in the coordination of "the activities of civil actors." (CCOE, 2016b:I-1-3). NATO also understands that their mandate and principles may have an effect on the extent that these civilian organisations interact with the military - the manual makes it crystal clear that this fact has to be accepted and respected.

As per their definition NATO views cooperation "as interaction" (CCOE, 2016b:I-1-4); this interaction can range from integration to co-existence , although they admit that the former is only "achievable in rare cases." (ibid.)

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[113] The Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE) is a NATO accredited Centre of Excellence responsible for contacts between all representatives of the civilian population and military forces. It serves as a bridge between the military and civilian worlds by a) connecting people, b) share collective knowledge and c) gain unity of purpose (CCOE:2016a).

[114] To include development and humanitarian organisations.

Figure 14: NATO's Cooperation Continuum
Sources: CCOE (2016b)

4.3.4 International Committee of the Red Cross

Within the humanitarian sphere the ICRC has a unique role to play as it "is a private humanitarian organisation which has a status of its own[115]" (Rehse, 2004:40) - it is the exclusive guardian of IHL. In view of this special role the ICRC is accustomed to work and interact with the military and other armed groups.

The ICRC outright opposes any involvement of the military in the humanitarian sector (ICRC, 2000). However due to its role, during a post-conflict situation, it "does not exclude any cooperation" (Rehse, 2004:49) with the military. In his paper, Rehse, noted that

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[115] In fact the ICRC mission statement states that the ICRC:

> is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the Movement in situations of conflict. It also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. (ICRC,2008)

> the ICRC has developed a two-pronged approach for managing its relations with the military. It seeks constant and close dialogue with political and military decision-makers and relevant actors in a theatre of operations and concurrently maintains a clear separation of ICRC activities in the field from the armed forces. (2004:51)

ICRC favours to term its relation with the military as being complementary as opposed to a situation of cooperation (ICRC, 2000).

4.3.5 The Schools of Thought Governing CIMIC

Rehse (2004) states that there is no universally accepted and coherent definition of CIMIC to which the community[116] can refer. In fact, even within the military dimension there exist divergences on what this term really means.

The three military definitions presented in figure 12 do, however, have one common denominator – it serves the military commander in the execution of his or her military mission to achieve the military objective. This argument can be linked with ARRC's concept of 'Unity of Purpose[117]' - whereby every entity, being military or civilian, deployed during a complex emergency, notwithstanding its organisational aim, serves a higher common objective. This shows that the concept behind unity of purpose is in line with the core notion of the RCT where a relationship between the different external actors is needed with the aim of achieving an overarching purpose effectively and efficiently.

In fact Fournier noted that when there are encounters between MSF and NATO the latter organisation's representative would, at times, comment that "at least we share

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[116] Referring to the civilian, humanitarian and military spheres.
[117] Major E.R. Price in his monograph explains the meaning of Unity of Purpose when entities "seek at least to agree on the ends, even when they cannot agree on the ways and means for achieving those ends." (2003:16)

a common goal." (2009:np) He does not agree with this line of thought; in fact in the same speech he adds

> I am nervous about the "unity of purpose" you[118] consider so crucial to the achievement of your objectives. This is a "unity of purpose" MSF believes is harmful to this trust[119]. (ibid.)

Therefore, in the real world there exist humanitarian organisations such as MSF who due to their organisational philosophy do not subscribe with the notions of the RCT.

The UN CIMIC philosophy promotes dialogue and interaction between humanitarian actors, the military and other armed groups with the aim of protecting and promoting the humanitarian principles, de-conflicting resources and operations and, if required, endeavour to achieve a common goal (UN:nda). ICRC leaves room for cooperation with the military and other armed groups. However, this interaction is not done to the detriment of their principles (Rehse, 2004).

These diverse viewpoints coupled with the differences in how the concepts of coordination and cooperation are understood have created a number of issues related to cooperation between those involved in the realm of security and those in development and/or humanitarian assistance. As a result of these divergences, two distinct schools of thought governing CIMIC (De Coning, 2008) were created. The first school of thought "advocates that coordination can be achieved by introducing more order into the system" (De Coning, 2008:57). Donini terms this type of relationship as "coordination by command" (2002:14); he defines it as "coordination in which strong leadership is accompanied by some sort of authority" (ibid.) using either the carrot or the stick. De Coning continues by suggesting that this school of

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[118] Referring to NATO and the military.
[119] Fournier was referring to the trust that MSF, and any other Humanitarian Aid Organisation, gains from the different stakeholders in a crisis situation – being the local population, the government, the military, armed groups etc. This trust is only gained and maintained when aid organisations abide with the core principles of humanitarianism.

thought favours centralization of coordination under either one agency / entity or an integrated "mission coordination process" (2008:57). This school of thought positions itself on the integration side of NATO's cooperation scale; it is mainly favoured by the political and military communities. This is evident from Colin Powell's 'force multiplier' affirmation in his capacity as SECSTATE. ARRC's trail of thought, on unity of purpose, clearly frames how politicians and military strategists were looking at integrating HAOs into their military operational framework to assist them in achieving their overarching objective/s.

The second school of thought rests on the other side of the coordination continuum. According to De Coning (2008), it rejects any type of centralised coordination or integration; he refers to this school of thought as the "minimalist approach" favouring coordination. He continues by suggesting that this equates to what Donini terms as the "coordination by consensus" (2002:14) category. He defines this category as

> coordination in which leadership is essentially a function of the capacity to orchestrate a coherent response and to mobilize the key actors around common objectives and priorities. Consensus in this instance is normally achieved without any direct assertion of authority by the coordinator (ibid.).

As a parenthesis it should be noted that in the humanitarian sphere there exists a system which more or less fits into this category of coordination – the Cluster Approach. This system entails the grouping of humanitarian organisations into clusters according to the sector in which they operate – for example Health, Food Security and Shelter to mention just a few. Furthermore an organisation is designated as the cluster coordinator (Humanitarian Response, nd). Involvement in the cluster is on voluntary basis (Global Shelter Cluster, 2016). Vide Appendix 7 for the Cluster Approach.

De Coning continues by suggesting that this minimalist approach is subscribed by those entities which "reject any notion of centralized coordination or integration and some are even opposed to recognising coordination as a distinct element of action" (2008:58). Here De Coning is referring to those humanitarian aid agencies that accentuate the importance of independence, as a core principle of humanitarianism, and oppose any political and security initiative that as a result can compromise both their independence and that of humanitarian action.

Donini proposes a third broad classification of coordination namely "coordination by default" which he defines as "coordination that, in the absence of a formal coordination entity, involves only the most rudimentary exchange of information and division of labor amongst them." (2002:14). He suggests that even in the absence of a designated coordinator probably there will be at least "sharing of information and attempt to avoid duplication". (2002:15) From the literature review conducted, it is evident, that HAOs that subscribe to the minimalist approach place themselves along a spectrum that ranges from coordination by consensus to that by default. De Coning in his 2008 article does not mention this third type of classification although he takes it into consideration in his second school of thought when he suggests that some are even opposed to the idea that coordination is a distinct element of action. He continues by stating "[t]hey emphasize the importance of independence in humanitarian action and oppose any initiatives that may result in this independence being compromised by integrating humanitarian action into political and security agendas" (2008:58).

Political and Security[120] communities support the first CIMIC school of thought as it favours integration and control. Moreover, it is evident that humanitarian agencies

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[120] Including the Military.

favour the second school of thought as it acknowledges the core principles of humanitarianism (De Coning, 2008; Powell, 2001; Fournier, 2009). This is yet another indication that shows the divergence of how political/military actors and humanitarian organisations perceive the role of coordination during complex emergencies. This divergence has led to De Coning proposing a third approach to coordination which in his own words "aims to synthesize the two schools of thought" (2008:58) that have dominated the CIMIC discourse for the past 30 years. He termed this third alternative as the Peacebuilding Systems Theory (PST).

4.4 Peacebuilding Systems Theory

This theory recognises the fact that during complex emergencies there exist a need for improved coordination and coherence; therefore it suggests a way of how to improve coordination between entities, in particular military and humanitarian, without compromising the independence of "individual programmes and agencies" (De Coning, 2008:58). The PST, although being a compromise between the two schools of thought, seems to be, at least in theory, a win/win situation for both the political/military spheres as well as for the HAOs. This theory suggests that during complex emergencies, due to the large number of different but interdependent programmes, a complex system is created. In fact De Coning states that this complex system is developed when the

> collective and cumulative efforts [of the programmes being implemented] start to have an effect on the conflict system they intend to transform that none of the programmes could have achieved on their own. (2008:58)

Theoretically, the PST combines together the Interdependence Theory (IT) and the Complex Systems Theory (CST).

De Coning (2016a) indicates that in the case of the PST the theoretical context used is the Complexity Theory (CT) which is also known as the Complex [Adaptive] Systems Theory. This CT is, according to Schneider and Somers, "a broad-based movement that contains new tenets" (2006:353) on how systems work. Although the ideas put forward by this movement have deep historical roots, they have mostly gained ground in the 1980's with the foundation of the Santa Fe Institute (Pascale, 1999) through the conceptualization of a "common theoretical framework for complexity." (Dodder and Dare, 2000[121]). The next part of this chapter will delve deeper in the CT with the aim of understanding the theoretical background of PST.

4.4.1 Complexity Theory

CT is a broad and multi-disciplinary area of study with participants emanating from various fields including "physics, biology, economics, archaeology, computer studies" (Dodder et al., 2000:np) amongst others. It seeks to study systems which are non-linear, thereby complex in nature, and therefore those systems which adapt and change. According to Loode complex systems are "phenomena which arise both in the natural, as well as the social worlds." (2011:70) He continues by providing a number of examples of complex systems occurring in nature, these include ant colonies, the human brain and the global climate system. On the other hand Loode asserts that complex social systems include markets and families (2011). Although these systems are diverse, in both their nature and composition, they still have one thing in common "they cannot be understood and manipulated by reducing them to their individual components." (Loode, 2011:70) This means that if one agent is eliminated from the system it will adapt and change in order to continue functioning. On the other hand in complicated systems all components are largely independent

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[121] Quoting Waldrop 1992.

and therefore if one element is eliminated the system will either fail or operate with reduced efficiency. (Hendrick, 2009)

4.4.2 The Characteristics of a Complex System and its Relation to Peacebuilding

Hendrick argues that one critique of Complexity Theory is that there is no consensus between academics on what are the central concepts of complex systems; in fact she continues to state that this situation causes "further confusion in literature and practice." (2009:18)   Hendrick's assertion is supported by a literature review conducted by McDaniel, Lanham and Anderson (2009) whereby they also suggest that there is no consensus on the real characteristics which define Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). Nevertheless, from their study they extrapolate a list of five characteristics that capture the core concept behind CAS "(a) diverse agents that learn, (b) nonlinear interdependencies, (c) self-organization, (d) emergence, and (e) co-evolution." (McDaniel et al., 2009:193) In fact De Coning argues that CAS are systems that are able to:

> adapt, and that demonstrates emergent properties, including self-organising behaviours. It comes about, and is maintained, as a result of dynamic and non-linear interactions of its elements, based on information available to them locally, and as a result of their interaction with their environment as well as from modulated feedback they receive from other elements in the system. (De Coning, 2016b:20)

Although De Coning's (2016b) definition encompasses all the five characteristics listed by McDaniel et al. (2009) he also argues on the importance of whole-of-systems approach including it as a characteristic of complex systems.

What follows is a succinct explanation of the generic characteristics which constitute a CAS:

a. <u>Diverse agents that learn</u> – the CAS by definition is a system that is made up of a number of diverse and autonomous elements or agents which is capable

of adapting to changes. Complex systems are able to adapt as the agents are able to learn from experience.

b. <u>Nonlinear interdependencies</u> – Mathematical linearity, according to Smith (2011), is made up of a) homogeneity – a change in input is proportional to a change in output and b) additivity – the outputs corresponding to the sum of two inputs are equal to the sum of the outputs arising from the individual inputs (Jervis, 1997). These two principles of linearity are broken in CAS as by nature they are non-linear systems. De Coning (2016b) argues that nonlinearity is made up of three characteristics the first one being that the outputs generated are not proportionate to their input. Therefore, the issue of indirect or unintended consequences of actions taken. The second characteristic is that complex systems do not follow a predetermined cause-and-effect path. A third aspect is that it cannot be "reduced to something simpler, like a set of laws or rules that can help us to predict the behaviour of the system." (De Coning, 2016b:23) These three characteristics suggest that complex non-linear systems are governed by unpredictability and randomness. However academics, such as De Coning (2016b) and Hendrick (2009), argue that complex systems use feedback mechanisms to regulate themselves within certain boundaries and consequently limiting their actions together with unpredictability and randomness.

c. <u>Self-organization</u> – Self-organisation within a complex system suggests that elements within the system are able to interact between themselves without any controlling element (Hendrick, 2009). De Coning (2016b) agrees; in fact he states that this concept "refers to the ability of a complex system to organise, regulate, and maintain itself without needing an external or internal managing or controlling agent." (2016b:24) Emergence, which will be

explained in more detail hereunder, is an important aspect in the self-organising process as it explains how the elements in the system are not merely interacting with each other in order to maintain themselves but these interactions could generate "a new collective effect (or effects) that would not have occurred if the different agents acted on their own." (De Coning, 2016b:26)

d. <u>Emergence</u> – Holman defines emergence as "higher-order complexity arising out of chaos in which novel, coherent structures coalesce through interactions among the diverse entities of a system." (2016:np) This means that emergence occurs when the interactions between the elements forming up the system are disrupted, causing the system to differentiate and ultimately merge into something new. Thus emergence, together with self-organisation (Mitleton-Kelly, 2005), in a complex system is the process by which such systems are able to adapt to change.

e. <u>Co-evolution</u> – Co-evolution occurs since elements in a system are able to change based on their interactions with other elements and their environment. Additionally, patterns of behaviour of the individual elements can also change with time (Chan, 2001).

f. <u>Whole-of-Systems approach</u> - De Coning (2016b) argues that "[t]he concept of complexity is embedded in a whole-of-systems approach. Whereby the system can be defined as "a collection of interacting elements[122] that together produce, by virtue of their interactions, some form of system-wide behaviour." (De Coning, 2016b:20-21). Loode (2011) continues by arguing that CT challenges the notion that if one comprehends the behaviour of each agent in the system then one can understand how the whole system functions. This

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[122] Holland refers to these elements as agents that "interact and adapt or learn." (2005:1)

encompasses the importance of the whole-of-systems approach when dealing with complex systems.

De Coning (2016b) argues that the three most important characteristics of CAS are non-linearity, self-organisation and whole-of-systems approach. Although it should be noted that that on the issue of the whole-of-systems approach Loode, quoting Burns (2007), suggests that practitioners should acknowledge the fact "that a 'whole system' perspective is unachievable." (2011:80)

Loode suggests that CT or CAS have just recently found their way into the field of peacebuilding and therefore "its application in this field is still in its infancy." (2011:69). He continues by suggesting, while quoting Lederach, that complexity within peacebuilding programmes derives from the "multiple actors pursuing a multiplicity of actions and initiatives at numerous levels of social relationships in an interdependent setting at the same time. (Ibid.) Thereby complexity is derived from "multiplicity, interdependence and simultaneity." (Ibid.)

The Humanitarian System can be labelled as a Complex Adaptive System[123]. Apart from being identified as a complex system by ALNAP, it is my opinion that it satisfies the generic characteristics of CAS. Over the years the humanitarian system has been able to learn, adapt and evolve; this is evident through Barnett's (2013) description of how humanitarian action has evolved through the three ages of humanitarianism. In the age of Imperial Humanitarianism[124] charitable institutions, such as the missionaries, had the monopoly of humanitarian action with no interference from governments who took a *laissez-faire* attitude towards the provision of assistance.

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[123] It should be noted that the agents that make up the humanitarian system are in themselves complex adaptive systems which are made up of a number of elements. For example agent labelled as International NGOs in the humanitarian systems is made up of a collection of individual international humanitarian aid organisations which have different mandates and subscribe to different humanitarian ideologies – minimalists or dunantists.
[124] This age spans between 1800 and 1945.

Significant evolution to the humanitarian system occurred during the age of Neo-Humanitarianism[125] with the shift from missionary type humanitarianism to the creation of secular HAOs. This era also saw the creation of intergovernmental organisations and an increased interest from governments to control humanitarian action. In the age of Liberal Humanitarianism[126] the military started making its capabilities available to assist during emergency situations and at times they also tried to position themselves in the core of the system (Barnett, 2013).

4.5 The Applicability of the Peacebuilding Systems Theory

When applied to a complex emergency the Humanitarian System consists of a number of agents which are engaged in a large number of independent programmes. According to De Coning the binding assumption is "that collectively and cumulatively they promote, support and sustain the objectives of the system." (2008:59) This assumption draws on elements of the Relational Coordination Theory. In fact De Coning argues that the role of the Interdependence Theory, which is one of the pillars of the PST, is to provide "motivation for coordination in complex peacebuilding systems." (2008:58-59) The PST also draws on the Complexity Theory (De Coning, 2008). He suggests that although complex systems will self-organise, he contends that various factors can impact this process and thus "hinder or help the self-organization" (2008:60) of the system. So the role of the PST in this process is to "encourage, support and facilitate" (ibid.) the self-organisation of the Humanitarian System.

The PST also "supports and enhances synchronisation at the level of the individual programme as well as at the systematic level." (Ibid.) This is done by

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[125] The age of Neo-Humanitarianism spans between 1945 and 1989.
[126] This is the current age.

a) developing a clear, coherent and inclusive strategic vision together with an evaluation and feedback mechanism for the system.

b) developing mechanisms to facilitate coordination at the operational level - this includes also civil-military cooperation.

c) developing processes so that each individual programme is able to coordinate with others in the system making them less dependent on the needs of the implementing and funding institutions.

At this stage it is pertinent to point out that Donini (2002) argues that complexity contradicts centralised command and that the latter hinders the self-organisational traits of the system. In fact Cilliers (2002) argues that it is impossible that one single agent in a complex system has sufficient knowledge of the system to establish control over it. Instead, complex systems rely on the process of self-organisation for order; which surfaces "out of the cumulative decisions of each individual programme that make up the system." (De Coning, 2008:61)

Cognisant of the fact that in the Humanitarian System there exist a number of agents which have different mandates together with divergent views on the scope and use of humanitarian assistance, De Coning with the PST is trying to assist this complex system to self-organise. This is being done by

a) making all agents in the system realise that the Humanitarian System is a complex system which allows for interdependent tasks and thus the requirement to coordinate at various levels and with the different agents.

b) letting the system self-organise due to the requirement to coordinate whilst at the same time trying to harmonise it by keeping each agent within their boundaries and thus keeping order in the system.

In practical terms De Coning (2008) argues for the separation between the management and coordination functions. He contends that decision-making occurs within the managerial function whilst exchange of information would occur within the coordination domain. In his view by separating these two functions coordination would no longer serve as a threat to the independence of a programme or the impartiality of an entity.

The introduction of the PRTs in Afghanistan, the US and NATO, sent shockwaves throughout the humanitarian world as they tried to shift the 'Military Force' element of the Humanitarian System to penetrate its core. In the meantime with these PRTs the political elite tried to establish the military as the 'controlling' agent within the system. This destabilised the system; in fact the majority of HAOs argued that this continued to blur and shrink their humanitarian space. As already mentioned in the Background chapter, the deployment of the PRTs in Afghanistan, especially their involvement in humanitarian assistance, has led Afghans to confuse the actions undertaken by the military and the humanitarian organisations. Olson (2006) suggests that Afghans saw no distinction between the military and the humanitarians; some humanitarian aid agencies also claimed that the Afghan population perceived the PRTs as "being the good NGOs" (Olson, 2006:14). The process of politicisation and militarisation of aid that occurred in Afghanistan has effected humanitarianism at its core as humanitarian organisations started to lose their apolitical status since their independence, impartiality and neutrality were negatively affected. The deadly attack on MSF aid workers in 2004 and the Taliban's perception that this organisation was working for US interests is a prime example of the problems created with the involvement of the military in HA in complex situations. The confrontation between the two elements (although located at different levels) of the humanitarian system has led to lack of cooperation between the two. This is why this study will look at

whether the application of the PST in the Afghan context would have impacted cooperation between the PRTs/military and the HAOs.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the De Coning PST is underpinned by two different theories – the RCT and the CT. Through RCT the importance of coordination between different entities that are engaged in interdependent tasks was highlighted. In fact according to theory it would be expected that elements forming part of the Humanitarian System would, by inference, interact and coordinate during complex emergencies. However, reporting available suggest that in reality this is far from the truth.

The CT is used to show that the Humanitarian System is a complex system which is made up of different interacting elements which form a complex whole. De Coning uses this theory[127] to explain how the system is able "to adapt, adjust, correlate and synchronise" (2008:59).

Furthermore, the two CIMIC schools of thought were explored in order to present the diverging views that military and humanitarian organisations have on cooperating with each other in complex emergency situations. This is from where the De Coning PST emerged - to serve as a compromise theory in between the two schools of thought. The ultimate objective of this theory is to overcome cooperation issues between military and humanitarian agencies to better their working relationship for the benefit of communities in need.

This chapter has shown that the primary aim of the PST is to improve coordination and coherence between different actors during a complex situation without impacting

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[127] Which in his article refers to as Complex Systems Theory (CST).

the independence of their work and their impartiality. This is done through the separation of the managerial or decision-making function from that of coordination. This separation should support the self-organisation process of the Humanitarian System as it aids in the synchronisation at the individual program level as well as at the systems level.

The next chapter will discuss the research methodology that has been used for this study whilst also presenting the methods used for the collection of primary data. In addition, in view of the fact, that the research question is drafted as a counterfactual the chapter will also present the reasoning behind counterfactual argumentation.

Chapter 5 – Methodology

5.1 Introduction

The aim of the study, as outlined in chapter one, is to test whether the Peacebuilding Systems Theory would have been applicable in the context of Afghanistan during the period in which PRT were employed[128]. This chapter will illustrate the methodological framework that was applied in analysing the research problem. It will also provide the reasoning behind the research philosophy chosen as well as the methods used in collecting the required data. Since the research question is a counterfactual it was felt appropriate to provide the reader with a focused theoretical background on this concept to better understand the creation of the 'alternative world'. Additionally, this chapter shall present the reader with a comprehensive understanding of how the research question will ultimately be approached.

5.2 Research Philosophy

To answer the research question posed it was decided to opt for a qualitative methodology as opposed to a quantitative one. This approach provides for a more flexible and fluid way of understanding (Mason, 2006) whether the PST, in the Afghan context, would have ameliorated the interaction between humanitarian actors and the PRTs.

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[128] Between 2002 and 2014.

Moreover, this methodology presents the opportunity to approach the study from a learning perspective as opposed to a scientific testing perspective (Agar, 1986) – a scientific approach would have limited the potential of this research. Antonesa, Fallon, Ryan, A.B., Ryan, A., and Walsh argue that in doing so the researcher will be able to "learn *with* them, rather than conducting research *on* them[129]" (2006:18 emphasis in original). In addition, Creswell (2007) suggests that qualitative research does not underestimate the complexity and individuality of human experiences; they tend to enable researchers to learn from and about the perspectives of the participants[130] on the topic being studied. This is impossible through quantitative research methods. Thereby seeking to produce new insights (as well as knowledge) on issues that are either complex or poorly understood (Rubin & Babbie, 2005) as these methods generally aid in the development of a relationship between the researcher and the research participants and thus elicit narratives through open and direct contact (DiCiccio-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006).

5.3 Research Question

In order to test the applicability of the De Coning Peacebuilding Systems Theory (PST) within the Afghan context during the employment of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams between 2002 and 2014, the following research question was formulated.

> How the applicability of the PST could have affected cooperation and coordination between Humanitarian Aid Organisations and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, at the operational level, in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2014?

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[129] Referring to the participants of this study. In fact I will also opt not to refer to them as test subjects or subjects as this tends to give the perception of a scientific experiment.
[130] Here I am referring to the participants of the research project.

The research question presented is drafted in a 'what if' or a 'what would have happened' context and therefore the methodology that must be used during this research must take into consideration "alternatives to reality" (Wenzlhuemer[131], 2009:37).

5.4 Methods

In view of the fact that the research question asks a 'what if' question my methodological strategy must hinge on the use of counterfactuality to analyse an imagined alternative Afghanistan[132] in which De Coning's PST was applied. This would lead to a different outcome from reality with the objective of testing the applicability of the theory and consequently proceed to recommend a way ahead for improving civil-military interaction in crises situation.

Therefore, with respect to the data collection method, I shall be using a two-layered approach; the first part will be a desk research whereby I analyse available literature – related to the interaction (or lack of) between the PRTs and aid organisations in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2014 With the aim of establishing the real world[133] pertaining to the scenario chosen. Subsequently a counterfactual argument will be developed, establishing the "alternative world" (Lebow, 2010:29) thus generating "what might (or should) have happened" (Catellani, 2011:81) by applying the PST to *'a'*, the antecedent. Prior to entering into the merits of the second layer of the methodological approach I will go into the theoretical aspects of counterfactual thought experiments to give the reader an understanding of this concept prior to formulating the 'alternative world'.

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[131] Quoting Markman, Gavanski, Sherman and Matthew (1993).
[132] Within the time constraint mentioned earlier, that is between 2002 and 2014.
[133] The real world refers to what has really happened.

5.4.1 Counterfactual Thought Experiments

I will briefly explore the principle of causation as this principle and counterfactuals are intrinsically connected. Hume defines a cause as "an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second." (Hume cited in Hausman, 1998:111) Therefore "if the first object had not been, the second had never existed." (ibid.) Lewis (2001), in his theory, continues by suggesting that if '*a*' and '*b*' are distinct events that occur, then '*b*' depends on '*a*' if and only if, '*a*' were not to occur, then '*b*' would not occur either[134]. This theory constantly tries to "make the world appear ordered and predictable[135]" (Lebow, 2015:407) thereby favouring linearity. He continues to argue that the notion of cause in social sciences is a human invention which assist in organising

> information in terms of cause and effect to impose order on our world and make it more predictable. Our naïve understanding builds on the concepts of succession and continuity, and the assumption that some necessary connection exists between them [cause and effect]. (Lebow, 2015:409)

Counterfactual cases are scenarios which could have occurred and thus unlike Humes theory of causation takes into consideration a number of distinct and independent variables that assume different values. Thus the conditional clause is not applicable. Counterfactuals are conditionals which are contrary to facts and thus counterfactual thinking allows the possibility to imagine a different outcome when the antecedent occurs differently from the factual world.

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[134] A *modus ponens* situation – if 'a' then 'b'.
[135] This is very common in economic theory especially in the laws of micro economics where one would only examine the relationship between two variables whilst assuming that all other factors remain equal (a *ceteris paribus* situation). Examples include the laws of demand and supply.

"The ability to imagine alternative scenarios is a ubiquitous, if not essential, part of human mental life." (Lebow[136], 2010:29) He continues by arguing that counterfactuals[137] are:

> routinely used by ordinary people and policy makers[138] to work their way through problems, reach decisions, cope with anxiety, and make normative judgments. They are readily inspired by disconfirmed expectations and failed actions and regrets they evoke. (ibid.)

Counterfactuals, or the creation of imagined alternative worlds, enable people to run experiments with the aim of generating a different outcome. Thereby making [c]ounterfactuals a powerful and inevitable research tool (Lebow, 2010). It is this argumentation that led me to look at this research through a non-linear perspective and thus applying a counterfactual approach. Notwithstanding, Lebow also suggests that these types of experiments are essential in theory formulation; although I will use the 'what if' research question not to formulate new theory but to test the applicability of an existing one[139] at a specific place and time.

However not everyone agrees with the appropriateness of the use of counterfactuals as a research tool. In fact, Weber (1949)[140] warns that "[t]he attempt to construct in a positive way what 'would' have happened can, if it is made, lead to monstrous results." Moreover, counterfactual arguments are rejected by some as being "forceful suppositions, mere conjecture, and frivolous figments" (Tetlock and Belkin, 1996:38). Similar arguments only lead to the worthless dismissal of counterfactuals although it should be noted that one should not make the mistake to "assume confidently that we know exactly what would have happened if we had gone down another path"

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[136] Paraphrasing Hofstadter (1979 and 1985).
[137] There exists a number of different definitions of what counterfactuals are. These include "imagination of alternatives to reality" (Wenzlhuemer, 2009, 37); "[a] counterfactual is a subjective conditional that presupposes the falsity of its antecedent" (Weinryb, 2009:109); or "counterfactual history describes reflections on likely events in the past which didn't take place" (Demandt, 2002:190 quoted by Berger Waldenegg, 2011:136). What these definitions have in common is that a counterfactual provide an alternative to what has really happened.
[138] Catellani (2011) article refers for example to the use of counterfactuals by politicians during interviews.
[139] Referring to the Peacebuilding Systems Theory.
[140] As quoted in Albrecht and Danneberg (2011, 12).

(ibid.). Notwithstanding this criticism Albrecht et al. suggest that recently

counterfactual thinking has received, increased positive attention and in a way that is

less critical than Weber's view on the subject. They continue to suggest this positive

inclination towards counterfactual arguments has created an increase in the number

of studies using this methodology in various fields of study. This increase shows a

growth in acceptability of counterfactual imagination as a research tool.

5.4.2 The Functions of Counterfactuals

Albrecht et al. argue that counterfactuals serve a multitude of purposes and

according to the context, their function may be "critical, affirmative, explanatory,

heuristic, illustrative, or pedagogical." (2011:16) Consequently, they are a tool which

"can be used to solve problems, analyse notions, and facilitate conclusions." (ibid.)

5.4.3 The Criteria of Counterfactuals

Counterfactuals are governed by a set of normative criteria which, according to

Tetlock et al., "appear to command substantial cross-disciplinary support." (1996:17)

These criteria assist in countering critics who view counterfactual arguments as

suppositions, conjectures and frivolous figments of imagination. Furthermore, they

assist the researcher to develop a sound counterfactual image which does not lead

to, what Weber (1949)[141] terms as, a monstrous result. Figure 15 lists and briefly

explains these criterion.

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[141] As quoted by Albrecht et al (2011).

Criteria for Counterfactuals

1. <u>Clarity</u> – this is mainly with respect to the specification of the antecedent and the consequent of the imagination.

2. <u>Logical Consistency or Cotenability</u> – this refers to the assumptions that connect the antecedent and the consequent.

3. <u>Historical Consistency</u> – this means that there is a minimal deviation of the shared knowledge claims (minimal-rewrite rule).

4. <u>Theoretical Consistency</u> – this means primarily that the knowledge necessary for the implications of the counterfactual imagination ought to be consistent with generally accepted theoretical knowledge claims.

5. <u>Statistical Consistency -</u> this means primarily that the knowledge necessary for the implications of the counterfactual imagination ought to be consistent with well-established statistical generalizations.

6. <u>Projectability</u> – this means that the applied rules of inference are not contingent, arbitrary generalisations, but essentially law-like operations that can support projections to the past as well as to the future.

Figure 15: The Six Criteria of Counterfactuals
Source: Tetlock et al. (1996); Albrecht at al. (2011:18)

In this research the criteria put forward by Tetlock et al. will be adopted as they seem to be the most widely used set of standards[142]. These same criteria were taken into consideration when developing the 'alternative world' which shall form the basis of this research.

5.4.4 The Use of Counterfactuals

Although counterfactuals, as a methodology, is considered to be a "hot topic" (Cartwright, nd:1), from a literature review conducted it is evident that this methodology is in use in various social science disciplines such as history[143], economics[144], literature[145] as well as political science[146]. What follows are a few examples of how the counterfactual thought experiments were applied as a methodology across a number of academic disciplines.

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[142] They are used by Albrecht at al. (2011) and Catellani (2011).
[143] Levy S.J. (2015) or Berger Waldenegge G.C. (2011).
[144] Cartwright N. (nd).
[145] Klauk T. (2011) or Dobrn D (2011).
[146] Lebow R.N. (2015) or Catellani P. (2011).

History is seen as the memory of past experiences; in fact, Tucker states that historians should "study what actually happened, not what could have, may have, or would have happened." (2009:103) However, Berger Waldenegge argues that even though there exist scepticism in this field on the use of counterfactuals historians such as Demandt[147] have "insistently defended the legitimacy of such reasoning" (2011:132). Recalling Weinryb definition of a counterfactual in historiography this methodology "presupposes the falsity of the antecedent" (2009:109) and therefore the historian would reflect on alternatives to historical realities. Therefore, one would, for example, find essays examining the plausibility of:

a.   the antecedent "if Britain had confronted Hitler" (Khong, 1996:96), early on during the Sudetenland issue, and two possible causes "Hitler would have backed down" (ibid.) and "World War II might have been avoided." (ibid.)

b.   whether the counterfactual suggesting that if "Kennedy displayed greater resolve prior to the crisis [Cuba missile crisis], Khrushchev would not have sent the missiles to Cuba." (Lebow and Stein, 1996:124)

These historical 'rewrites' provide historians as well as political analysts with an opportunity to explore 'new worlds' with the aim of weighing the significance of the decisions taken, through these hypothetical scenarios, "just as we commonly evaluate other choices" (Shook, 2014:nd)[148].

The counterfactual methodology is also used in evaluations. This includes the comparison of what actually happened with what would have happened in the case of non-intervention or if the intervention was done differently (Luque-Fernandez, 2014). This allows different scenarios to be studied with the aim of evaluating the

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[147] Alexander Demandt – is a German historian and a professor of ancient history at the Free University of Berlin.
[148] Quoting Evans R.J. (2014).

success of the intervention and to identify and learn lessons from that particular intervention. It also allows for contingency planning (Rescher, 2009)

In International Relations counterfactual scenarios, as part of theory building, can confirm the applicability of a linear model or reveal its shortcomings in a particular situation. In fact, Lebow suggests that they "assist those committed to theory building … to understand the conditions under which generalizations are likely to hold and some of the reasons and dynamics by which those conditions change." (2010:5)

The second part of the methodological approach will test the feasibility of the alternative world created. I chose interviews as my prime source of evidence. The reason being that this source is targeted - it focuses directly on the topic, and provides the perceived causal inferences and explanations (Yin, 2009). The interviews were semi-structured as:

a. they are more suited for the exploration of perceptions, experiences and opinions of the respondents as they are free-flowing and therefore are ideal for complex and sensitive issues; and

b. the varied professional mix of the sample chosen excludes the possibility of the use of a standardised interview.

Therefore, using this technique, in the interviews, the subjects were not asked a tight set of questions but also a number of questions that originated from their own responses. This method allows me to understand "the interviewee from the interviewee's own perspective" (Antonesa et al., 2006:70). The semi-structured interviews were administered on a one-to-one basis using skype. The interviews were recorded, whenever permission by the participants was granted and later transcribed; there length was of approximately 45 minutes.

5.5 Recruitment and Sampling

I started off by selecting the PRTs, and therefore the military organization which led that particular PRT, and then the humanitarian aid agencies which operated in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2014. PRTs in Afghanistan were diverse in composition, leadership and strategic vision (depending on the lead nation). In order to take into consideration these complexities I chose four different PRTs. Moreover, to be able to draw up well-founded conclusions two different HAOs which operated in the same regions of the PRTs were selected; however it should be noted that not all accepted the invitation to participate. In fact only individuals from four different organisations were interviewed.

Once contact was established with each and every organization[149] then it will be left in the hands of the individual organizations to choose the most appropriate participant/s to be involved in this research. The data collection was done through the administration of semi-structured interviews to professionals who are:

a. military personnel who have at least served within a PRT in Afghanistan for a minimum of 6 months in a leadership position.

b. humanitarian aid workers who have worked alongside the PRTs in Afghanistan for at least 6 months.

All participants to this study were a) professionals coming either from the humanitarian field or from the military, and b) over the age of 18. Thus none of the participants fall into a vulnerable category.

A total of eleven subjects were interviewed, six were military personnel who had leadership positions in PRT missions and the remaining four were from HAOs and one from a developmental organisation. All five operated in Afghanistan during the

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[149] Sample copies of the emails sent to the military and the humanitarian aid organisations are attached to Appendix 8.

period in question. Figure 16 provides the list of research participants with all participants except for one requested to remain anonymous.

List of Research Participants

1.　Two military officers from a US PRT referred to as USMO1 and USMO2.

2.　Two military officers from an Australian PRT referred to as AUMO1 and AUMO2.

3.　A Dutch military officer who will be referred to as NLMO.

4.　A German military officer who shall be referred to as DEMO.

5.　Mr B Kitchen from the International Rescue Corps.

6.　An StC and OXFAM aid worker who will be referred to as HAW1 and HAW2 respectively.

7.　One participant who deployed as part of an ICRC mission who will be referred to as HAW3.

8.　A participant from a Development Agency who shall be referred to as DAW.

Figure 16: List of Research Participants

5.6 Ethical Considerations

Even though my research did not involve participants falling under a vulnerable category as is the praxis at the University of Malta when conducting research involving human beings, Ethics Board approval was sought[150]. A number of guiding principles were developed during the ethics approval process including a procedure for informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity as well as voluntary participation; these procedures are developed in greater depth in Appendices 9 through to 11.

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[150] Provisional approval was granted in November 2016 which was later confirmed on 23 February 2017.

5.7 Possible Bias

Career wise I am a Lieutenant Colonel in the Armed Forces of Malta. Throughout my 22-year career I had the opportunity to study abroad in countries such as Italy, the US, Sweden and Ireland. Moreover, I deployed three times on overseas operations[151]. These experiences made me aware of the contested space between the military and humanitarian aid organisations during complex emergency situations. In addition they made me feel and value the hardship that people endure during conflict[152]. Thus my career and my experiences may be viewed as potential research bias which might the results of this study. Whilst I am aware of that this potential bias may influence the way I look at the topic, I am cognisant of the fact that I need to retain a reflective and objective attitude throughout the study.

5.8 Conclusion

The way that the Research Question was constructed warranted the use of Counterfactual Thought Experiments as the methodology best suited to investigate the research area under study. There is disagreement within the academic world on the utility of counterfactuals. There are those who argue that that counterfactuals are just conjectures and sources of speculation; others argue that there is a space for this concept in the academic world, as this chapter accentuates.

This methodology was adopted as the research is examining a scenario that 'might have happened'. In addition this chapter also explored the theory behind

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[151] I deployed on EUNAVFOR ATALANTA at the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) located in Northwood in London and this operation dealt with escorting World Food Programme (WFP) shipments to Somalia as well as acted as an anti-piracy mission in the Horn of Africa. The second operation that I deployed on was EUFOR Libya were I was deployed at the OHQ in Rome. The mission dealt with the Libyan uprising in 2011 and supported, planning wise, UN OCHA's efforts in Libya.

[152] This is one of the main reasons that I decided to read for a Masters in Art in Humanitarian Action.

counterfactuals; to keep with a post-positive philosophy the research focuses on the applicability of the Peacebuilding Systems Theory in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2014 – thereby assessing whether the general notions of the theory apply to that scenario.

The recruitment, sampling methodology and the data collection method was then discussed together with the possible biases that might effect this study. Chapter 6 will present and discuss the findings.

Chapter 6 – Empirical Findings and Analysis

6.1 Introduction

This chapter will present and analyse the findings of the desk research as well as the primary data that was collected through the semi-structured interviews. An alternative 'world' that was created through a counterfactual argument will be presented with the intention of testing its feasibility and thus assessing whether the PST would have been applicable to Afghanistan during the period in question. However, prior to entering the merits of the findings and their analysis it is pertinent to provide a succinct socio-economic[153] assessment of Afghanistan.

6.1.1 Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a land locked country[154] in the South Asia region bordering with Iran to the west and Pakistan to the east whilst to its north it borders with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Although area wise it is a large country, it is relevant to point out that it has no natural permanent water reservoirs (CIA, 2016). On the human development scale, UNDP (2015) defines Afghanistan as a country with low level development and ranks it 171th in the Human Development Index[155] with a score of 0.465[156].

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[153] Appendix 12 provides more socio-economic facts on Afghanistan.
[154] Vide Appendix 4.
[155] In the 2014 report Afghanistan was ranked at the 169th place on the Human Development Index with a score of 0.468 (UNDP, 2014).
[156] Out of 1.

Afghanistan has a very rich history[157] although tainted with a very turbulent past as can be confirmed through Thier's (2009) quote hereunder:

> Afghanistan has experienced a relentless welter of swift and jarring changes in its recent history. Since the 1970s, following a fifty-year period of relatively peaceful and gradual development, Afghanistan was whipsawed through Cold War great-power competition, accompanied by a Soviet invasion, Communism, and jihadism; fratricidal civil war perpetrated by ethnic militias acting as regional proxies; the rise of Talibanism and bin Laden's global jihadism; and pacification and democratization under U.S.-led military intervention (2009:2).

Following the US-led military intervention and on the request of the Afghan authorities and as mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), ISAF deployed in August 2003 with the aim of enabling "the Afghan authorities as well as UN personnel to operate in a secure environment" (NATO, 2015). ISAF remained in Afghanistan for 12 years; Handing over of security to Afghan forces commenced in 2011, with Afghan authorities assuming full responsibility for security during the last quarter of 2014, when ISAF declared its mission complete (ibid.).

Since the Russian invasion in 1979 humanitarian aid organisations (HAOs) have been operating in this country, providing assistance both to those in need within Afghanistan and to Afghans displaced to camps in neighbouring countries such as Pakistan. Even during the Taliban regime[158], despite political restrictions, HAOs continued to operate and they became instrumental during the four-year drought that hit this country between 2008 and 2011 (WRDOAW, 2014).

In 2001, following the US military intervention, HAOs in Afghanistan increased as the political restrictions imposed by the Taliban regime were removed. However, they were now being faced with new challenges including the mass return of Afghan refugees together with the securitization and militarization of Humanitarian

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[157] A timeline of Afghanistan's recent history is attached in Appendix 13.
[158] Between 1996 and 2001.

Assistance (HA) (ibid.). It is pertinent to point out that during four decades of conflict the insecurity that ensued led to large scale displacement of Afghans both within the country and to neighbouring countries (ECHO, 2016).

6.2 The Alternative World

The analysis of the literature carried out provides the following synopsis of the situation[159] which existed in Afghanistan during the period in which the US and its allies deployed the PRTs.

<div style="border:1px solid black; padding:10px;">

<u>The Factual World</u>

With the aim of improving the legitimacy of the Afghan central government the US and their allies created the PRTs. These entities were tasked with securing and assisting in the development of the province they were assigned to. In the process they also provided humanitarian assistance with the aim of winning the hearts and minds of the local population and collecting information on the insurgents. The involvement of the PRTs in the provision of relief led to humanitarian aid organisations being perceived as supporting the agenda of the military forces and thus were no longer seen as neutral, independent and impartial.

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Figure 17: The Factual World

The counterfactual argument that will be proposed for this study will slightly alter the antecedent and therefore, in this case, the roles of the PRTs in Afghanistan. At this point I would like to recall that De Coning (2008) suggested that the scope of the PST was to improve cooperation without compromising independence and impartiality of either the HAOs and/or of their projects. Referring to the definition of 'Independence[160]', the alternative world will consider a scenario whereby the provision of HA by PRTs is eliminated from the equation[161]. By doing so the political and military motive behind the delivery of relief will be removed. This in theory

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[159] The chain of reasoning for the historical world that existed can be found in Appendix 14.
[160] Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented (OCHA, 2010).
[161] A bone of contention between the military and humanitarian agencies.

should (a) remove the perception that the PRTs were HAOs; (b) reduce the blurring of the lines; (c) decrease the encroachment by the military onto the humanitarian space: (d) improve the neutrality and impartiality aspect of HA delivered and (e) remove the perception that HAOs were supporting the political agenda of the US and its allies[162].

<div style="border:1px solid black; padding:10px;">

<u>The Alternative World</u>

With the aim of improving the legitimacy of the Afghan central government the US and their allies created the PRTs. These entities were tasked with securing and assisting in the development of the province they were assigned. In order to maintain the neutrality, independence and impartiality of humanitarian action, the PRTs were not given the mandate to carry out any tasks related to the provision of HA. Thereby the Afghan citizen is dependent on the military for the provision of security; whilst they are dependent on the humanitarian aid organisations for the provision of relief distributed according to the principles of humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality. Thus, by inference, the activities of PRTs and HAOs become interdependent. This situation mandates coordination and cooperation.

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Figure 18: The Alternative World

6.3 Complementarity

The slight alteration made to the antecedent entails complementarity between the tasks performed by the military and the HAO; and not substitutability. Thus in a similar scenario the PRTs would be responsible to support the region assigned with the provision of development assistance injected through the donor governments together with the provision of security through the support of ISAF. This would then leave the required space for the HAO's to provide HA according to the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.

Even though ISAF through Policy Note 3 specifically noted that HA is not to be used for political gain, relationship building or 'winning the hearts and minds' and should

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[162] Including the central Afghan government.

uphold the humanitarian principles, military officers interviewed still argued that its

provision was an essential part of their mission. A Dutch military officer who served in

Tarin Kowt[163] emphasised the fact that CIMIC projects including the provision of HA

were important, especially in the initial phase of the PRT mission, as it allowed the

military to conduct operations in a relative safe environment (NLMO, 2017a). Military

officers interviewed had more or less the same view on the importance of the

provision of HA[164], as part of a whole of government approach, especially during the

initial phase of the PRT mission or in areas which were not being serviced by HAOs

due to insecurity. However, one interviewee[165] suggested that the main effort of the

Tarin Kowt[166] PRT was the provision of development and reconstruction assistance.

He added that in some instances HA was provided to the local population in the form

of either food staples, blankets and school supplies or toys (AUMO1, 2017b). The

reason behind these drops was to attenuate daily hardships of the Afghans; he also

argued that to his knowledge there were no ulterior motives for this assistance

although he did acknowledge that by inference having a content population reduces

the possibility of instability (Ibid.). It is pertinent to point out that the Australian

developmental policy entailed that PRTs are civilian-led as opposed to being military-

led.

Humanitarian Aid Workers (HAWs) interviewed were not in agreement with the

arguments posed by the military; their view point was very much consistent with

arguments posed in literature on the subject. In fact, Kitchen[167] (2017) stated that

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[163] The Netherlands were the lead nation of the Tarin Kwot PRT between 2006 and 2010.
[164] Including food staples and medical assistance.
[165] An Australian Defence Forces retired officer who deployed after 2010.
[166] Tarin Kwot is located in the Uruzgan Province. The PRT was under combined Australian-US civil-military leadership between 2010 and 2013.
[167] Mr Bob Kitchen is the Director of the Emergency Response and Preparedness Unit of the International Rescue Committee (IRC). He has vast experience in humanitarian assistance particularly in the field with IRC; his last field deployment was as country director in Afghanistan.

"the military had different agendas than the NGOs" whilst asserting the importance of complementarity of tasks/mandates. In addition, he stated

> we do not do a good job in counter insurgency operations, in providing support to provincial district governors' offices, we do not do a good job in building roads or building big concrete facilities; the military does a crap job at humanitarian programmes. So we do have different lanes and different agendas which need to be well coordinated and well informed of who is doing what…

When asked specifically on whether PRTs would have achieved their mission if the concept of complementarity of tasks/mandates was applied to Afghanistan. The majority of the military interviewees indicated that the PRTs would have been able to achieve their mission, which according to ISAF was to

> assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts. (ISAF, 2:2009)

An Australian officer stated that "yes we would have achieved our mission if aid organisations would have provided assistance to the population in an effective manner. This would have enabled us to focus on our primary task – security. The complementarity of tasks involved a higher degree of cooperation which unfortunately aid organisations were not prepared to accept." (AUMO2, 2017j) The Dutch officer interview argues that "most probably if they [HAOs] were present and able to provide aid we would have been able to achieve our mission without resorting to handing aid ourselves." (NLMO, 2017a)

Nevertheless, they emphasised that complimentarity could only be achieved through the presence of HAOs. However a US officer interviewed was hesitant of the effectiveness of HAO operations in areas which he defined as insecure especially in the provinces bordering Pakistan (USMO1, 2017c). In fact he stated "I am not convinced as NGOs, in Afghanistan, have shown that they were unable to effectively

provide assistance in provinces which were deemed to be hostile and insecure."
(ibid.) On the other hand, an HAW interviewed argued that the heavy reliance on the
military made PRTs weak. In fact, Kitchen (2017) states that the PRT concept was
"more successful in Iraq than it was in Afghanistan" he continues to suggest that this
was attributable to the composition and leadership of the PRT. In Iraq the
management of the PRT was shared on equal basis by the military, State
Department and Agriculture Department; whereas in Afghanistan, due to insecurity,
in the majority of cases the military took control of the PRTs. This led to the military
getting more involved in civil matters including the forging of relationships with
community elders and governmental representatives in the province assigned. An
interviewee who deployed in Afghanistan as part of an ICRC mission contended that
the concept of complementarity or the division of tasks between HAOs and the
military is beneficial for safeguarding the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian
action. However, he could not envisage how interaction between HAOs and PRTs
led by governments engaged in open hostilities with the Taliban could ever be
achieved (HAW3, 2017d) bearing in mind that PRTs were in principle non-neutral
and biased.

6.4 Coordination, Cooperation or Coexistence

An important aspect of the alternative world is the requirement of coordination and
cooperation. This element of interaction has already been identified in both the
background and theoretical discussion chapters of this study. A number of studies
cited in the literature review called for the improvement of interaction between the
humanitarian and military spheres when employed during complex emergencies such
as Afghanistan. Recalling the CIMIC schools of thought, the military favoured an
interaction which was based on active, direct engagement and a cooperation type of

a relationship. A number of US political and military leaders asking even for integration through a call for unity of purpose or unity of effort. On the other hand most HAOs argued in favour of a minimalist type of interaction and thus looking at keeping an arm's-length from the military.

From the interviews, it transpired that the military, in the case of Afghanistan, advocated for a whole of government or comprehensive approach towards peacebuilding in this country. Therefore, they argued that HAOs should have collaborated more with the PRTs in order to pursue the common goal of stabilising Afghanistan. In fact, a US military officer argued that the concept of PRTs was introduced in Afghanistan to support (a) the development of the Afghan government entities, (b) support the reconstruction of infrastructure and (c) bring security in the province which they were deployed (USMO2, 2017e). He continues to argue that if HAOs, at the tactical and operational levels, cooperated and collaborated more with the PRTs the security and humanitarian situation in this country would have improved at a faster rate (ibid). The German and Australian officers interviewed also shared a very similar view however they argued that better cooperation and collaboration would have facilitated synchronisation of operations in the field and thus reducing duplication of effort and wastage in terms of resources (AUMO1, 2017b; DEMO, 2017f). These arguments are in line with the principles of the Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) theory – whole-of-system approach, co-evolution, and self-organising - which is one of the theories on which De Coning built his Peacebuilding Systems Theory (PST). Notwithstanding that this argument is in line with the CAS it diverges from the Humanitarian System as proposed by ALNAP as it identifies the military as a core element as opposed to a peripheral one. The Dutch officer interviewed complained that when he was deployed in Afghanistan as part of the Tarin Kwot PRT, there was also lack of cooperation even within the PRT itself with the

relationship between the military leadership and the development representative being shaky at best (NLMO, 2017a). This he argues had an effect on the relationship that the PRT had with a number of Aid/Development Organisations as well as with the local population (ibid.). This lack of cooperation within the Dutch PRT may have been personality driven although this could not be verified through other sources. Van Buren (2011) provides a similar example in his book which dealt with the conduct of a particular PRT in Iraq. He suggested that if the Foreign Service Officer[168] was not in good terms with the military leadership[169] then he or she would "fail epically." (2011:122).

On this issue of interaction with the PRTs Kitchen (2017) indicates that IRC employed a two tier relationship – at the operational level in Kabul, they invested quite a lot of time in coordinating with the ISAF Deputy Commander. In fact, he stated that himself together with four other NGO country directors had a monthly meeting with ISAF with the aim of discussing HA needs around the country, how military operations were effecting HAOs security and exchanged views on the HAO-PRT issues. However, he noted that there were never instances where ISAF and this small community of country directors took part in joint decision making processes. On the other hand, in the field[170] IRC applied a coexistence strategy. Kitchen states that their[171] "staff were not allowed to go to PRT sites or associate or be seen to associate themselves in the public with them." (Kitchen, 2017). This was mainly for two reasons a) to safeguard their neutrality and independence b) due to the insecurity that interacting with the PRTs posed on their field staff[172]. Therefore IRC

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[168] The author mentioned the role of the Foreign Service Officer as he occupied this position whilst serving in a PRT in Iraq.
[169] Van Buren also suggest that the Colonel (PRT military commander) in the PRT was the "top dog" (2011:122) and he compared this role as "a mythical god, with the final word on everything". (ibid.)
[170] In the military this level is often referred to as the tactical level.
[171] IRC's.
[172] All field staff that IRC employed were Afghani.

had a kind of a coordination relationship[173] at the strategic/operational level whilst at the field level they preferred to coexist with the military and the PRTs.

With respect to HA, ICRC adopted a similar stance to that embraced by IRC. In fact, the interviewee argued that his organisation adopted a principled non engagement policy with both ISAF and the PRTs when it came to the delivery of assistance (HAW3, 2017d). This to protect the fundamental principles of the organisation and thus securing access to all parts of the country. However, the interviewee argued that the ICRC did in fact interact with the military forces[174] on the ground as the organisation is also mandated by the international community, through the International Humanitarian Law, to monitor hostilities as well as preventing violations to the 1949 Geneva Convention and its associated protocols (Ibid.). Therefore it is clear that ICRC, in the field, adopted a two-pronged approach whereby they advocated a non-engagement policy with military actors when it came to the delivery of aid whilst actively pursuing a proactive, pragmatic and principled engagement when it came to providing protection to the victims of conflict under IHL. This is similar to what Runge (2009) was arguing for[175] but the interviews with IRC and ICRC suggest that, in the field, they preferred to adopt a coexistence stance as opposed to an arm's length interaction.

From the discussion with a Save the Children (StC) aid worker the four options that were available to HAOs as engagement models with the PRTs were once more extrapolated[176]. She noted that from her experience in the field StC tried to engage with PRTs indirectly through UNAMA and thus adopted an arm's-length approach;

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[173] Which was limited only to exchange of information and advocacy.
[174] Referring to ISAF, Afghan National Army and Non State Armed Actors.
[175] A proactive, pragmatic and principled engagement at the strategic level and keeping and arm's length at the field level.
[176] These four models were listed in a report commissioned by StC in 2004 and authored by Mc Hugh and Gostelow. The option mentioned by the StC aid worker have already been mentioned and explained in chapter three of this dissertation.

however she also noted that in some areas such as Uruzgan province, interaction was stepped up a notch as this HAO[177] was entrusted to administer projects funded by donor governments such as Australia[178] with the aim of securing financial support for certain humanitarian projects (HAW1, 2017g). Even though the Australian Defence Force (ADF) were openly involved in military activities in Afghanistan.

An interviewee from a donor development agency which deployed to Afghanistan as part of the Lashkar Gah PRT[179] commented that a major issue in leading that PRT was the management of the different agendas that the organisations, forming part of it, brought to the table together with the diverging national and organisational cultures (DAW, 2017h). This comment was made as the Lashkar Gah PRT was a multifaceted and multinational PRT which was, according to UK development doctrine, civilian-led[180]. The interviewee suggested that communication was the key for cooperation and coordination between the various entities (Ibid). Therefore it seems that the Lashkar Gah PRT[181] did not face any internal conflicts between the civilian and the military members of this organisation[182]. It is interesting to note that during the interview the interviewee constantly kept on mentioning the good relationship that the PRT had with the contractors[183]; this is so as the PRTs were one of the avenues through which donor[184] money was being used to assist the province, in this case Helmand, to develop and reconstruct. Furthermore it is pertinent to point out that there was hardly any mention of HAOs and/or NGOs – possibly indicating that the interaction between this PRT and HAOs was scarce.

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[177] StC Australia.
[178] This can be confirmed through an article written by McGeough (2013).
[179] This PRT was opened in 2004 by the US in Lashkar Gah and was taken over by the UK, as the lead nation, together with Denmark and Estonia (Dahl Thruelsen, 2008). It also incorporated three different governmental development agencies – DFID, USAID and Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA).
[180] The PRT commander was a civil servant coming from the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO).
[181] At least during the period when the interviewee was deployed.
[182] Unlike to what occurred in the Tarin Kwot PRT during the Dutch tenure.
[183] These are typically for-profit local and foreign contractors (and their sub-contractors) receiving and implementing tax payer funded overseas assistance.
[184] Governments.

When one takes into consideration the outcome of the interviews with respect to the Humanitarian System it becomes evident that:

a. the military, with the introduction of the PRTs, whether knowingly or not was trying to move into the inner core of the system notwithstanding the fact that to alleviate the suffering of the affected community was not its primary mandate. The provision of assistance was being used to achieve their primary aim - security.

b. the HAOs were resisting this move by either adopting a co-existence or keeping an arms-length stance in order not to lose access to their target - the effected community.

The interviews also suggest that at the strategic/operational level there existed a level of cooperation between the two but it was conducted in a manner[185] that very little space was provided for the latter to infiltrate from the outer to the inner circle of the Humanitarian System.

HAOs also argue that although complementarity will require additional cooperation, in case of the alternative world presented, they would still either adopt an arms-length or co-existence approach at the field level. This in view of the fact that the PRTs would still be led by governments who are assisting the Afghan government to extend its authority and are engaged in kinetic activities against the Taliban. This makes the PRTs non-neutral and biased actors. Although the PST encourages and supports synchronisation of interdependent tasks through cooperation in the alternative world, the PST would be difficult to implement as it does not eliminate impartiality from the equation.

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[185] By the HAOs.

6.5 Removal of the Management Function from Coordination

Another issue which was discussed was whether the separation of the management function, including decision making, from the coordination process would have improved the interaction between the PRTs and the HAOs in Afghanistan. A matter that became apparent from the interviews was that there is no common understanding across the board on the differences between cooperation and coordination. In fact, these two words were continually being used interchangeably. The interviews have shown that at the field level, in reality, there existed no or very limited cooperation between the PRTs and HAOs.

In this hypothetical alternative world both sides argued that the decision-making process could not have been eliminated from the coordination process. They[186] agreed that coordination entails a level of planning and thus an element of decision making; in fact, Malone et al. argues that coordination requires the "*managing* of dependencies between activities." (1994:90, emphasis by author) Consequently, if the way ahead for the interaction between HAOs and the military will require the complementarity of tasks/responsibilities then one would expect that a number of interdependencies will be created, thereby a higher level of coordination is required. The management of interdependencies requires a level of joint planning, decision-making and information sharing.

6.6 Could the Alternative World be successful in the case of Afghanistan?

This issue has already been tackled in part in the complementarity section of this chapter. The majority of military officers interviewed agreed with the concept of the division of tasks due to the different mandates that the military and HAOs have in the

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[186] Interviewees emanating from both HAOs and PRTs.

field. However, they were adamant that for the alternative world to succeed, and therefore eliminating completely the military humanitarian aid distribution from the equation, HAOs would have to be present to take over this role from an early stage as for the military the provision of aid is one of the very important building blocks on which stability in the province rests. Aid workers were in agreement that the way ahead with respect to deployments in complex emergency situations, that require the provision of HA, is in fact complementarity. However, they argued that in their opinion a situation where a) ISAF was involved in kinetic activities against one of the 'warring parties' and thus supporting the government and b) where they predominantly controlled the relationships with the community elders, the scenario would result as non-conducive for the enhanced cooperation or possibly coordination with the PRTs (Kitchen, 2017; HAW3, 2017d; and HAW1, 2107g). This due to the fact that the military force that is deployed was not impartial and neutral; thus interaction with the military would make them seem to be impartial and non-neutral as well. This would lead to the HAOs loosing access to those in need especially in those areas that were not under effective control of the Afghan central government. Kitchen (2017) argues that the internal security situation in Afghanistan led to communities being "forced to choose on a day to day basis who they were aligned with and to survive they were often aligned with whoever was standing right in front of them". This quote highlights the importance of the humanitarian principles application in the case of Afghanistan.

All aid workers interviewed expressed the opinion that in Afghanistan the internal security and political situation did not make it possible to adopt the alternative world presented. In fact on this argument Kitchen[187] (2017) provides a comparison on what he considers to be the reason which distinguishes the difference in interaction between the military and the HAOs in the context of Kosovo and East Timor versus

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[187] Kitchen (2017) deployed with IRC in Kosovo as well as in East Timor.

that in Iraq and Afghanistan. He states that in Kosovo HAOs were very willing to interact, cooperate and coordinate with NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR[188]) and states "I remember loading tents and humanitarian supplies in the back of tanks and then accompanying those tanks up into the mountains to provide HA with KFOR." (Kitchen 2017) He suggests that in East Timor he regularly travelled with Australian and New Zealand military convoys with the aim of distributing aid. Kitchen continues to argue that all this changed in Iraq and Afghanistan as in these two countries the military (and their political masters) were more interested in the political and the security environment and less "about the intentions and goodness [of the military] and programmes that tried to support and empower" (ibid.).

The comparison made by Kitchen with respect to the interaction between HAOs and the military in complex emergency situations in different geographical contexts[189] also indicates that the geopolitical situation[190] is an underlying aspect which needs to be factored in when dealing with humanitarian-military relations. It is apparent that it has a vote in the level and type of interaction between the two actors.

6.7 Key Findings

This research set to analyse whether the Peacebuilding Systems Theory (PST), as coined by De Coning, was applicable in Afghanistan during the period in which the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were active, that is between 2002 and

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[188] KFOR is a NATO led peacekeeping force which was mandated through UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Its main task was to create a safe and secure environment with amongst others being tasked to support the international humanitarian effort.

[189] Kitchen (2017) makes reference to four geographical locations – Kosovo, East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately this argument which was posed by Kitchen could not be explored with the other HAO interviewees as they did not have the vast field experience that he has.

[190] Kitchen (2017) argues that in Kosovo KFOR was associated with a victorious returning Albanian government which had virtually no opposition. In Afghanistan it was different as there was a vibrant and increasingly capable opposition and armed militant groups which forced communities to choose almost on a daily basis with whom to align themselves (government/ISAF or the Taliban). He also suggest that at times Afghans had to choose with whom to align on a daily basis; to survive they most often sided with those who were just in front of them at that moment in time.

2014. This was carried out through a counterfactual argument and therefore from the point of view of an alternative world which was a result of a minor change in the antecedent of the factual world. The alternative world required the employment of the PRTs were still employed in Afghanistan by the donor governments, many of which, if not all, formed part of ISAF but the distribution of HA would not be effectively allowed. This alternative world was based on the idea of the removal of the PRTs involvement in HA resulting in the removal of the misconceptions that the Afghans (including the Taliban) had with respect on the work being carried out the HAOs. It would have also improved the impartiality and neutrality aspects of the assistance being provided. This alternative would require that the military and the HAOs tasks/mandates are to complement each other - the HAOs providing HA whilst the PRTs and ISAF providing assistance in the form of reconstruction aid and security.

This research has shown that for the PRTs the provision of HA[191] was an important enabler, especially in the initial stages of their mission, which assisted them in developing a safe and secure environment. This notwithstanding the fact that ISAF prohibited the PRTs to use HA to achieve either political or civic support. HAOs on the other hand argued in favour of complementarity of tasks and mandates; thereby being more in line with the alternative world as presented during this study. On the issue of complementarity it was noted that this would have been a viable concept for the Afghan complex emergency situation. Although there existed some hesitation on both sides, the military alluded to the effectiveness of their HA operations in high risk areas whilst some HAOs referred to the issues of interaction with the PRTs. This was a concern as PRT lead governments were also, through ISAF, engaged in open

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[191] Even though its provision was not part of their primary mission.

hostilities with the Taliban. The concept of complementarity opens another issue - the level of interaction between PRTs (and the military) and the HAOs.

In a complex emergency situation where the concept of complementarity is the case, the importance of interaction between the PRTs and HAOs was highlighted when Kitchen noted that the two spheres "have … different agendas which need to be *well coordinated and well informed of who is doing what.*" (2017, emphasis by author) This study has shown that Kitchen's statement above is true and therefore more cooperation is needed in order to reduce wastage. In reality, this research also suggests that HAOs preferred to either co-exist or keep and arms-length from the PRTs in the field whilst interacting at a higher level of intensity at the operational/strategic levels. It also became evident that HAOs, whilst understanding the need for complementarity and therefore a higher degree of interaction in the alternative world (even though the provision of HA was no longer a PRT task) they were still not comfortable to increase the intensity of interaction with PRTs. As they would still be considered as a non-neutral and biased element which could compromise the neutrality, impartiality and independence of the HAOs and of the assistance they provide.

The interdependencies created by the concept of complementarity involves an element of management. In the PST De Coning removes the decision-making function out of coordination process this with the aim not jeopardising independence and impartiality. This research has also shown that in the alternative world provided the interdependencies created through complementarity requires an element of coordination and therefore a level of planning and decision making.

Another important element that emerged is the effect that security and political environment of the country in which the HAOs and the military (including PRTs) are operating has a bearing on the level of interaction between the two. The geopolitical

situation is an underlying factor which influences the amount and type of interaction that occurs during complex emergency situation within the humanitarian-military relations sphere.

Chapter seven consolidates this research by drawing up the resultant conclusions and recommendations.

Chapter 7 – Conclusion and Recommendations

7.1 Introduction

This final chapter links the aim of the research with the findings to draw up conclusions and put forward recommendations to both the military and the Humanitarian Aid Organisations (HAOs). Prior to entering into the merits of whether the aim of this research was achieved or not, I will once again highlight the objectives of this study, namely:

a. To assess whether the De Coning's Peacebuilding Systems Theory (PST) was applicable in the Afghan context during the deployment of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) between 2002 and 2014.

b. To provide recommendations on how cooperation between the military and the HAOs could improve in analogous situations.

c. To close an academic gap, in the fields of Civil-Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Action, by providing a better understanding of how the PST can be applied in real life during complex emergency situations.

The literature review, in the majority of cases, has indicated that there is a need for increased communication, cooperation and collaboration between the military and the HAOs. This even though the latter would argue against as they are not comfortable with jeopardising their principles and putting at risk the accessibility to aid for those in need.

In theory, the PST[192] seems to be the panacea for the contested debate related to the level and type of interaction that the military and HAOs should share during complex emergency situations.

By making use of a counterfactual argument and through semi-structured interviews, this study showed that in Afghanistan, between 2002 and 2014, only elements of the PST could have been applied.

7.2 Is the Alternative World Feasible?

The alternative world presented entailed the exclusion of the provision of Humanitarian Aid (HA) from the PRTs mandate to enable the HAOs to provide assistance according to the principles of humanitarian action. Military personnel interviewed agreed that the provision of aid was an important enabler for the PRTs during the initial phases of their deployment. They continued to argue that it is highly probable that the PRTs would still have achieved their mission even though they were not allowed to provide aid – however, with the caveat that HAOs had to be present from the initial stages to provide the required HA. A stance which the HAOs were also in agreement with.

This entails the implementation of the principle of complementarity which requires keeping the mandates of the military and the HAOs distinct from each other. Therefore, it is recommended that in complex emergency situations the PRTs together with their supporting military contingents, should focus on the provision of a safe and secure environment including development and reconstruction activities; whilst simultaneously the HAOs should provide the required assistance to those in

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[192] One of the main aims of the PST is to increase coordination between the military and the HAOs; whilst keeping the entities involved and their projects independent and impartial.

need. The military should only get involved in the provision of HA, if requested to do so or as a last resort measure.

7.3 A Requirement for Increased Cooperation?

In most cases complementarity creates interdependencies. This requires a greater level of cooperation for these interdependencies to be properly managed. The importance of increased cooperation and interaction has already been highlighted in the literature review through academic studies. This research has shown that in Afghanistan, HAOs, with the aim of defending the humanitarian imperative and their principles, resorted to adopting a minimalist stance towards cooperating with the PRTs.

To improve cooperation and interaction between the two 'worlds', and thereby managing better the interdependencies created, it is recommended that:

a. In the field, HAOs should only exchange information with the PRTs/military during UN coordinated meetings[193]. They should refrain from exchanging information in either military or HAO premises. This will ensure that the belligerent forces and the locals do not perceive the HAOs as forming part of the military deployment.

b. At the strategic level, interaction and cooperation should be intensified for two main reasons a) to coordinate and de-conflict operations at the field level and b) to achieve a better shared understanding of the organisational cultures, the missions and operations as well as the guiding principles.

c. Ideally in similar complex emergency situations a neutral and impartial military force such a UN Force should be deployed as opposed to NATO ones. This

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[193] This recommendation would be applicable if the UN acts and is perceived by all stakeholders as neutral.

course of action should significantly improve the interactions between the military (which would be under UN control[194]) and the HAOs.

d. Military schools should, as part of their academic programme, include short courses on the basic principles of humanitarian action and how to deal with HAOs in complex emergency situations. Ideally these courses should have the input of humanitarian practitioners.

e. Military forces should reserve a number of slots on Staff College courses[195] to humanitarian aid workers who are in, or are aspiring to occupy, leadership positions. This will enable the sharing of ideas between future leaders.

f. Military forces should encourage their personnel to attend courses related to humanitarian action especially at the tertiary level.

Over and above, military commanders deployed in countries facing complex emergency situations must be made aware that HAOs will refrain from cooperating and/or exchanging information with them if they perceive or deem the military force as biased and non-neutral.

Another aspect that was explored during this study was the possibility of removing the element of decision-making from coordination. This concept is one of the tenants of the PST. Interviews conducted have indicated that it is not possible to eliminate decision-making from the equation as they were all in agreement that coordination requires an element of decision-making. Bearing in mind this outcome and considering that the way ahead during complex emergency situations is the complementarity of tasks/mandates, it is recommended that:

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[194] It should be noted that UN forces are bound with three basic principles a) consent of both parties, b) impartiality and c) non-use of force except in self-defence and that of the mandate (UN, nd).
[195] Staff college courses educate and develop military leaders at all levels. Staff courses, in a number of countries, have already been opened to representatives a non-military government agencies.

a. Coordination (including the required decision-making) is carried out at the strategic level away from the field. This type of coordination should be kept at the lowest level possible whereby each side share information on their planned operations with the aim not to carry out joint operations but purely to de-conflict issues.

b. Even though a level of coordination and decision-making occurs at the strategic level, in the field both the military and the HAOs should keep their distances to execute their tasks in an independent manner.

From personal experience, as a military officer, in similar situations the military is most often reluctant to discuss current and future operations due to issues of confidentiality. This hurdle may only be overcome through mutual understanding and trust. Therefore, the recommendation made earlier with regards to cross-training of HAO leadership staff within military staff colleges will ensure that a network between the two worlds is built which could facilitate communications and trust.

7.4 Was PST applicable to Afghanistan?

Notwithstanding the fact that a number of the principles of the PST including complementarity, interdependence of projects and programmes, the motivation to interact and to adapt were applicable to the Afghan context, this study has indicated that, apart from the elimination of the decision making from coordination, there exists two underlying issues that make the PST not wholly applicable. These being:

a. The PRTs were under the operational command of ISAF and were being led by countries who were supporting the Afghan government and engaged militarily against one of the warring parties (the Taliban). This made the PRTs non-neutral and biased.

b. The internal security and political situation in Afghanistan.

These issues once more suggest the importance of having a neutral military force deployed on the ground. This will significantly facilitate a) the interaction between the military force and HAOs, and b) the overall accessibility to aid for those in need.

7.5 Further Research

During the collection and analysis phases of this research a number of issues have been raised which merit further research. Although this dissertation discussed CIMIC and the relationship between HAOs and the PRTs, it was primarily focused on Afghanistan. Therefore, a similar study could be embarked upon, that is using a counterfactual argument and the PST but concentrating on the Iraqi scenario. This with the aim of comparing results and understanding the issue of HAO-PRT relations from a more comprehensive perspective.

A cross case desk analysis of different complex emergencies throughout the years could be carried out with the aim of eliciting the issues that inhibited interaction between HAOs and the military over the years in different scenarios. This with the aim of identifying their evolution and pinpointing the overarching issues. Further research may also include the identification of external underlying factors which influence military-humanitarian relations in complex emergency situations.

The first decade of the 21st century also saw the advent of another stakeholder in complex emergencies that of the private military contractors[196]. This issue was not discussed in this research as it was out of scope but it would be interesting to study their impact on humanitarian-military relations bearing in mind that they are contracted by government and the military to conduct combat and security related activities.

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[196] A private company which provides armed combat and security services in hostile environments.

7.6 Conclusion

I started this journey almost one year ago – a year during which I conducted significant research on the civil-military cooperation focusing on the highly controversial topic of the deployment of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and their interaction with Humanitarian Aid Organisation. All this with emphasis on the Afghan context. The journey was not easy one as I chose to approach this subject through a counterfactual argument through which I induced a small change in the factual world to develop an alternative world. The Peacebuilding System Theory was applied to the alternative world with the aim of assessing whether this theory was applicable to the Afghan context between 2002 and 2014. The research has shown that with the alternative world proposed, only elements of the PST would have been applicable in this context. Both the military and aid organisations indicated that the alternative world proposed (PRTs deployed but the provision of humanitarian assistance not being part of their tasks) would have been realistic in Afghanistan.

This chapter brought together the findings of this study with the intention to put forward recommendations which could improve future humanitarian-military relations and interaction during complex emergency situations. This to the ultimate benefit of those in need. Themes for future studies in this research area were also proposed.

List of Interviews

AUMO1 (2017b), Australian Defence Forces Officer deployed with the Tarin Kwot PRT in 2010, interview, 05 March 2017, via Skype.

AUMO2 (2017j), Australian Defence Forces Officer deployed with the Tarin Kwot PRT in 2010, interview,19 April 2017, via Skype.

DAW (2017h), development aid worker deployed in the Helmand PRT in 2009, interview, 07 February 2017, via Skype.

DEMO (2017f), German Army Officer who deployed in Faizabad between 2007 and 2008, interview, 22 March 2017, via Skype.

HAW1 (2017g), Save the Children aid worker who deployed in Afghanistan in 2005, interview, 28 February 2017, via Skype.

HAW2 (2017i), OXFAM aid worker who worked in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2013, interview, 31 January 2017, via Skype.

HAW3 (2017d), ICRC aid worker who worked in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2007, interview, 31 January 2017, via Skype.

Kitchen, B. (2017), IRC Country Director for Afghanistan between 2009 and 2011, interview, 18 January 2017, via Skype.

NLMO (2017a), Dutch Army Officer who deployed in Tarin Kwot in 2006, interview, 04 April 2017, via Skype.

USMO1 (2017c), US Navy Officer who deployed with the Ghazni PRT in 2010, interview, 09 March 2017, via email.

USMO2 (2017e), US Army Officer who deployed with the Gardez PRT in 2004, interview, 09 March 2017, via email.

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Appendix 1 – What is Humanitarian Space?

Although the concept of Humanitarian Space has been in use for almost 25 years the definition of the term remains elusive not only in the academic arena but also amongst humanitarians. Collinson and Elhawary (2012) in a Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) report list at least seven different definitions of what humanitarian space is. This term, as already mentioned in the introduction, was coined by Rony Brauman who referred to the importance of the *espace humanitaire* in which humanitarians are "free to evaluate needs, free to monitor delivery and use of assistance, free to have dialogue with the people" (Collinson et al. 2012:1[197]). Central to the concept of humanitarian space is the ability of humanitarians to operate freely in adherence to core humanitarian principles (Spearin, 2001; Collinson et al., 2012). Brauman himself stresses this point when he states that the actors "must be independent of political or economic or ideological agendas." (cited in Von Pilar, 1999:3) A working definition which encompasses the essence of Brauman's notion of humanitarian space is that used by the Office for the Coordination and Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) which states that it is "an operational environment that allows humanitarian actors to provide assistance and services according to humanitarian principles and in line with international humanitarian law." (2014:np)

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[197] Quoting Tennant et al., 2010 and Hubert et al., 2010.

Appendix 2 – The Humanitarian Principles

The principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence –referred to collectively as the humanitarian principles – are derived from the ICRC core principles which for years have guided the work of this organisation and its national affiliate Red Cross/Crescent societies (Vincent, 2015). These principles are crucial for the establishment and maintenance of access, by humanitarian aid agencies, to the effected population both during natural disasters and complex emergencies (OCHA, 2010); hence they are central to a number of humanitarian organisations. Their importance has been recognised to the extent that the UN has enshrined them in two General Assembly Resolutions – Humanity, Neutrality and Independence in 1991[198] whilst Independence was added in 2004[199] (OCHA, 2012). In view of their significance the General Assembly frequently affirms their importance in United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.

Vincent emphasises that these principles "not only define the purpose and the raison d'être of the humanitarian endeavour (humanity and impartiality)" (2015:9) but also specifies the characteristics of the actor providing aid (neutral and independent). In this research the definitions proposed by UN OCHA will be used, figure 19 illustrates these definitions.

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[198] Resolution 46/182 which was adopted during the 78th Plenary Meeting on 19 December 1991.
[199] Resolution 58/114 which was adopted during the 58th session of the General Assembly on 5 February 2004.

The UN OCHA definitions of the Humanitarian Principles

Humanity – Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.

Neutrality - Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

Impartiality - Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions.

Independence - Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

Figure 19: The UN OCHA definitions of the Humanitarian Principles
Source: OCHA (2012:np)

OCHA (2010) argues that adherence to these principles together with the perceptions of the parties to a conflict (OCHA, 2010) secures humanitarian access. This argument has created a division amongst humanitarian practitioners in fact it has created two different approaches to humanitarianism – Dunantists[200] and Wilsonian. Dunantist organisations "seek to insulate themselves from politics" (Goodhand, 2015:123) and thus adhering strictly with the principles. Goodhand continues by suggesting that they draw "strong 'Maginot lines' between aid and politics." (2015:124). Conversely, Wilsonian[201] organisations are less "reticent to align themselves behind the foreign policies of their governments and funders." (Goodhand, 2015:123)

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[200] Dunantist organisations are also referred to as Minimalists.
[201] Wilsonian organisations are also referred to as Maximalists; they advocate for an expansive role of humanitarian organisations "involving the simultaneous pursuit of relief, development, human rights/justice and peacebuilding/stabilisation." (Goodhand, 2015:124)

Appendix 3 – ISAF Regional Commands and Provincial Reconstruction Teams Locations

Figure 20: ISAF RC and PRT locations
*Source: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (2016:np)*

Appendix 4 – Political Map of Afghanistan

This political map of Afghanistan shows the international agreed borders, the provincial boundaries together with the capital cities and the location of Kabul (the national capital city).

Figure 21: Political Map of Afghanistan
Source: Nations Online Project (nd)

Appendix 5 – US PRT Organisational Structure

According to Government Accountability Office (GAO) US PRTs organisational structure is as flows:

Figure 22: US PRT Organisation Structure
Source: GAO (2008:7)

Although the PRTs were meant to be joint civil-military as can be seen from the diagram above the organisation is heavy on the military side in fact according to a USAID official, quoted by GAO, "the three civilian officials in the leadership team constitute the only US civilians at most PRTs." (2008:7) Moreover in the same GAO report, military and civilian officials, suggested that the PRT Commander was the

"first among equals" (ibid.) as he was the overall authority on security matters. This comment suggests that effectively PRTs in Afghanistan were led by the military.

Appendix 6 – Fragile States Index: Fragility in the World 2015 (Heat Map)


Figure 23: Fragile State Index
Source: Fund for Peace (2016b:np)

# Appendix 7 – The Cluster Approach

Figure 24: The Cluster Approach
Source: Humanitarian Response (nd)

Appendix 8 – Sample Recruitment Emails

<u>Sample Recruitment Email sent to the Humanitarian Aid Organisations</u>

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is Christopher Xuereb and I am currently reading for a Masters in Art in Humanitarian Action (MA HA) at the University of Malta; as part of my third year of studies I will have to produce a research paper in the form of a dissertation. The working title of my project is **"Joined up or Messed up?" An inquiry on whether Peacebuilding Systems Theory would have been applicable in the Afghan Context between 2002 and 2014.** This study is being supervised by Dr Anna Khakee, the Head of International Relations Department at the University of Malta.

This project looks at the issue of interaction, or lack of, between military entities and humanitarian aid organisations deployed in the field during complex crises situations. It takes into consideration Afghanistan as a case study in particular the period between 2002 and 2014; the period in which Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were deployed in that country.

Interaction between military units and humanitarian aid NGOs, during complex crises situations, has always been controversial. In fact, in Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) or as aid agencies prefer to label it, Civil Military Relations (CMR), there exists two schools of thought:

a. The first one favouring the centralization of coordination under either one agency/entity or in an integrated mission coordination process.
b. The other favours a 'Minimalist Approach' towards cooperation and coordination and therefore rejecting the first school of thought.

Dr Cedric de Coning in his article *Civil-Military coordination and complex peacebuilding systems* proposes a third alternative which may be seen as a compromise between these two divergent schools of thought. This alternative approach is the Peacebuilding Systems Theory (PST).

De Coning does not provide any evidence which indicates that the PST has been implemented operationally. Therefore in this dissertation I would like to investigate, through the lens of civil-military cooperation, whether the implementation of this theory would have impacted cooperation between the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and humanitarian aid agencies.

<u>Participation</u>

I would like to kindly ask the [the name of the organisation] to participate in this study. I have chosen your organisation due to its operational experience in humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2014. This experience has, most probably, led to [the name of the organisation] coming into contact with Provincial Reconstruction Team as you were operating in the same spatial environment. If participation is accepted it would be greatly appreciated if you could provide me with the contact details (preferably email) of three to four members of the [the name of the organisation] who operated in Afghanistan during the period in question, for a minimum of 6 months in a leadership position.

The nominated participants will be requested to participate in a face-to-face / online (through skype) semi-structured interview which will not take more than 60 minutes. Interviews will remain anonymous whilst the data collected will be kept confidential. During the interview participants may choose not to answer any of the questions posed and they have the right to withdraw their participation at any time.

I will be more than happy to share the outcome of this dissertation upon request.

If you have any questions do not hesitate to contact me back on email:
christopher.a.xuereb.00@um.edu.mt

Thanks and Regards,

Christopher Xuereb
MA Humanitarian Action Candidate
University of Malta

University of Malta
L-Università ta' Malta

"Joined up or Messed up?" An inquiry on whether Peacebuilding Systems Theory would have been applicable in the Afghan Context between 2002 and 2014

Sample Recruitment Email sent to the Military

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is Christopher Xuereb and I am currently reading for a Masters in Art in Humanitarian Action (MA HA) at the University of Malta; as part of my third year of studies I will have to produce a research paper in the form of a dissertation. The working title of my research is **"Joined up or Messed up?" An inquiry on whether Peacebuilding Systems Theory would have been applicable in the Afghan Context between 2002 and 2014.** This study will be supervised by Dr Anna Khakee, the Head of International Relations Department at the University of Malta.

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However De Coning does not provide any evidence which indicates that the PST has been implemented operationally. Therefore in this dissertation I would like to investigate, through the lens of civil-military cooperation, whether the implementation of this theory would have impacted cooperation between the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and humanitarian aid agencies.

Participation

I would like to kindly ask the [the name of the organisation] to participate in this study. I have chosen your organisation due to your experience as a lead nation of one of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams that operated in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2014. If participation is accepted it would be greatly appreciated if you could provide me with the contact details (preferably email) of three to four members of the [the name of the organisation] who have served with a PRT in Afghanistan, for a minimum period of 6 months, in a leadership position.

The nominated participants will be requested to participate in a face-to-face / online (through skype) semi-structured interview which will not take more than 60 minutes. Interviews will remain anonymous whilst the data collected will be kept confidential. During the interview participants may choose not to answer any of the questions posed and they have the right to withdraw their participation at any time.

I will be more than happy to share the outcome of this dissertation upon request.

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Appendix 9 – Ethical Considerations – Informed Consent

The participants were provided with a Participant Information Sheet, a copy of which is included in this appendix, and which gave them a short insight of the academic background of the topic chosen whilst highlighting the aim and objectives of the research. They were also given the opportunity to verbally discuss the project with the researcher prior to the conduct of the interviews.

Although the participants were recruited through their own organisations they were still requested to provide their informed consent to participate in this study. An individual Consent Form (copy attached) was forwarded to the participants via email; when in agreement, they were requested to endorse and forward the consent form prior to the interview taking place.

In the consent form participants were made aware of their right to terminate the interview and/or withdraw their participation in the research at any time during the data collection period. Furthermore, prior to the commencement of the interview, they were once more reminded of this right.

It should be noted that this study did not involve vulnerable participants such as minors, mentally infirm or others categories of vulnerable people.

"Joined up or Messed up?" An inquiry on whether Peacebuilding Systems Theory would have been applicable in the Afghan Context between 2002 and 2014

Participant Information Sheet

<u>Background Information</u>

My name is Christopher Xuereb and I am currently reading for a Masters in Art in Humanitarian Action (MA HA) at the University of Malta; as part of my third year of studies I will have to produce a research paper in the form of a dissertation.

This project looks at the issue of interaction, or lack of, between military entities and humanitarian aid organisations deployed in the field during complex crises situations. It takes into consideration Afghanistan as a case study in particular the period between 2002 and 2014; the period in which Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were deployed in that country.

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<u>Participation</u>

You are kindly being asked to participate in a face-to-face / online (through skype) semi-structured interview which will not take more than 60 minutes. Although your contact information have been provided by your organisation it should be noted that participation is voluntary. Interviews will remain anonymous whilst the data collected will be kept confidential. During the interview you may choose not to answer any of the questions posed and you have the right to withdraw your participation from the study at any time.

If you agree to participate in this study it would be greatly appreciated if you could fill in and sign the consent form attached and send me a scanned copy.

The interview will be arranged for a date and time of your convenience prior to end of [month] 2017.

Data protection

The researcher through the University of Malta is bound to the following Terms and Conditions in terms of the Data Protection Act (Chapter 440 of the Laws of Malta). A copy of the terms and conditions shall be forwarded upon request.

If you have any questions do not hesitate to contact me back on email:
christopher.a.xuereb.00@um.edu.mt

Thank you for your interest in reading the information provided. Hope to hear from you soon.

Regards,

Christopher Xuereb
MA Humanitarian Action Candidate
University of Malta

Consent Form

Information about the research has been provided in the Participant's Information Sheet.

This research is funded by the researcher. The interview will require a maximum of 1 hour of your time.

The following questions aim to ensure that you are aware of my role as interviewer, and how the information you share with me during the interview will be used in the research project.

Kindly tick the boxes besides the statements you agree with, and then proceed to sign and date the bottom of the page, scan and send to the Interviewer. In case of clarifications needed in relation to the purpose of the research or the consent form you are kindly advised to get in touch with the Interviewer at: **christopher.a.xuereb.00@um.edu.mt**

☐   I understand that I am being interviewed as part of the '"Joined up or Messed up?" An inquiry on whether Peacebuilding Systems Theory would have been applicable in the Afghan Context between 2002 and 2014' research project at the University of Malta.

☐   I have read and understood the purpose of this research and I was given the possibility to ask questions to the Interviewer pertaining to the research prior to the interview.

☐   I understand that my participation in this research is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw my consent for involvement at any time.

☐   I am not willing for this interview to be audio recorded and transcribed for use as part of the research project.

☐   I am willing for anonymised extracts from this interview to be used as part of the research.

Interviewee: _____   Signature: _____   Date: _____

Interviewer: **Christopher Xuereb** _____   Signature: _____   Date: _____

Contact Address: **Christopher Xuereb; 7, Luigi Ellul Street, Attard ATD 3022, Malta**

If you have any questions about the study, queries or concerns, please get in touch with Christopher Xuereb at: christopher.a.xuereb.00@um.edu.mt

Research Supervisor's Name: **Dr Anna Khakee**
Department of International Relations,
Faculty of Arts, University of Malta,
Msida MSD 2080, Malta
Email Address: anna.khakee@um.edu.mt

Appendix 10 – Ethical Considerations – Confidentiality and Anonymity

In order to ensure confidentiality and anonymity of the participants in this research have been allocated pseudonyms; this will be used in any discussion of interview data. Furthermore, any information which may reveal the identity of the participant will be excluded from any public discussion. If participants provide their consent for the interview to be recorded then it should be noted that it may be impossible to anonymise personal information on the sound files. Furthermore a number of data security procedures were put in place to safeguard confidentiality and anonymity.

The following data security procedures were put in place to secure the data collected and thus safeguarding the confidentiality and anonymity of the participants of this study. This procedure was approved by the University (of Malta) Research Ethics Committee (UREC).

a. <u>Paper-based transcripts of interviews (if required)</u>: in order to ensure the highest level of data protection, physical movement of the paper-based transcripts will be limited to an absolute minimum. The transcripts will be stored in a lockable filing cabinet at the researcher's house. Transcripts will be anonymised.

b. <u>Sounds files</u>: sounds files' physical movement will be equally restricted to an absolute minimum. Storage of tapes/discs will take place in the filing cabinet as outlined above.

c. <u>Electronic sound files</u>: will be stored in the researcher's personal computer which is password protected and encrypted. Please note that it may not be possible to anonymise personal information on the sound files.

d. <u>Home computer</u>: copies of the processed electronic files – with personal information deleted or disguised – will be kept on the researcher's personal computer at home. The computer being used for the processing of the data is for the sole use of the researcher, is password protected at login and encrypted at individual file level.

e. <u>External backups</u>: data will be electronically backed on an external hard drive and DVDs. All this media will be kept secure at the researcher's house in a lockable filing cabinet.

f. <u>Data retention period</u>: data will be destroyed 2 years after the conclusion of the project.

Appendix 11 – Ethical Considerations – Voluntary Participation

Participation in this study was voluntary. Even though it was decided that the participants would be recruited through the organisation that they represent, being military or humanitarian, participants were given the choice to accept or decline participation. Moreover, through the consent process they were also given the right to withdraw their participation in the research at any time in the data collection process.

Appendix 12 – Geographic and Socio-Economic Facts about Afghanistan

Location:
Southern Asia (north and west of Pakistan, east of Iran)

Geographic coordinates:
33 N, 65 E

Capital:
Kabul

Provinces:
34 in total.

Area:
647,000Km^2 (land mass), 0 Km^2 water

Irrigated Land:
32,080 Km^2 (4.9% of land mass)

Bordering countries:
China 45.6 miles, Iran 561.6 miles, Pakistan 1,458 miles, Tajikistan 723.6 miles, Turkmenistan 446.4 miles, Uzbekistan 82.2 miles

Ethnolinguistic Groups in Afghanistan

Iranian
- Baloch
- Aimak
- Hazara
- Pashtun *Durrani, Ghilzai*
- Qizilbash
- Tajik

Turkic
- Kirghiz
- Turkmen
- Uzbek

Other
- Brahui
- Nuristani
- Sparsely populated or uninhabited

Scale 1:8,340,000
Lambert Conformal Conic Projection,
standard parallels 12°N and 38°N

Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.

802551 (R00434) 6-97

Climate:
Arid to semiarid; cold winters and hot summers

Terrain:
Mostly rugged mountains; plains in north and southwest

Natural resources:
Natural gas, petroleum, coal, copper, chromite, tale, barites, sulphur, lead, zinc, iron ore, salt, precious and semiprecious stones.

Population:
31,822,848 (2014 est)

Religion:
Islam

Ethnically:
Multi ethnic society (Indo-European descent)

Median Age:
18yrs

Population growth:
3%

Labour force:
Agriculture 80 percent, industry 10 percent, services 10 percent (2004 est)

Currency:
Afghani

Source: Mills (2007)

Appendix 13 – Afghanistan Recent History - Timeline

Timeline content:

- 1838 – 42: 1st Anglo–Afghan War
- 1878 – 80: 2nd Anglo – Afghan War
- 1919: Independence from
- 1979: Soviet Invasion — Mujahedeen opposition / AQ formed
- 1989: Soviet Military Withdrawe
- 1996: Taliban seize control of Kabul / Hard line interpretation of Islam
- 1999: UN Embargo & Sanctions to force AFG to hand over Osama bin Laden
- 7 Aug 1999
- 12 Oct 2000
- 11 Sep 2001

Lower timeline:

- Oct 2001: US – Led Invasion of AFG / Hamid Karzai Sworn In (President)
- Jan 2002: ISAF deploys in AFG (NATO-led Security Mission)
- NATO Deployment in AFG
- 2002 - GTMO
- 2003 – Abu Ghraib
- 2012 – Burning of the Holy Koran
- Handover of Security to AFG Military
- 2014: End of Combat Operations in AFG

Appendix 14 – The Historical World

In 2002, following the US invasion of Afghanistan, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams were created to assist the fragile Afghan government to improve its legitimacy and governance in all the provinces. Consequently, PRTs were tasked with improving security in the provinces that they were responsible for whilst assisting the local government with development through aid provided by various donor governments. Afghanistan was still a fragile country with ISAF being engaged in counterinsurgency operations around the country. Thus PRTs were also tasked with the provision of Humanitarian Assistance with the aim of a) winning the hearts and minds of the local population and b) collecting information and intelligence on their enemy that is the Taliban insurgents. This meant that the Humanitarian Aid that the PRTs were providing did not following the core principles of Humanitarian Action as it was politicised, securitised as well as militarised – as it was being used the achieve political, security and military aims.

Humanitarian Aid Organisations had a long history of operating in Afghanistan as this country has history of political instability and insecurity which have generated hardships for its population. Humanitarian Assistance provided by such organisations is generally provided according to need and thus in line with the principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Independence and Impartiality. Consequently their mission is Afghanistan was to alleviate the suffering of the local population, notwithstanding if they were pro- or anti- Government. Their agenda was not politically motivated.

Humanitarian Aid Agencies contend that the provision of aid by the military, through the PRTs, has led to a) the blurring of the lines of what is military and what is humanitarian and b) the encroachment on the Humanitarian Space. The issue of the blurring of the lines could be seen from the perceptions of the local population that at times they referred to the PRTs as the good NGOs and thus they could not see the difference between the two dimensions[202]. In addition the Taliban also perceived aid organisations as operating in support of the US agenda in the country. These issues led to aid organisations, or at least some of them, being perceived, by the Taliban, as being non-neutral, non-independent and their actions being judged as not impartial.

In order to counter these issues a sizable number of Humanitarian Aid Organisations continued distancing themselves from the military; this led to lack of coordination and cooperation.

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[202] Military and Humanitarian Relief Organisations.