

# EUROPEAN UNITY

*Speech delivered by Professor Dr. Walter Hallstein to the Federal Council of the European Movement on his election to the Presidency of the European Movement, at Villa Lubin, in Rome, on January 20th, 1968.*

I wish to thank you very much for electing me President of the European Movement.

I appreciate the honour you do me and take it as a sign of confidence and of faith in the work which I have done so far, to the best of my ability, for our great and good cause.

I am particularly pleased that this election has taken place in Rome. Rome, the eternal city, is more than any other European city the home of all Europeans. Currents of thought, faith and will have flowed from Rome to leave their mark on what is known as Western culture. The movement for the unification of Europe is also linked forever with the name of Rome; its greatest achievement so far is embodied in the Treaties of Rome. And the honoured name of de Gasperi heads a long list of outstanding men who have contributed decisively to our work. I am glad to see some of them among those who are present here today.

The first duty attaching to my new office is to express the cordial thanks of the European Movement to my predecessor and friend, M. Maurice Faure, for all he has been to this Movement, for everything he has done for it. He devoted all his high gifts to this great task, his keen mind, his ardent will, his inspiring eloquence, his faith in the great cause of Europe. He has secured for himself a worthy position in the ranks of the great bearers of this office and his name will leave an indelible mark on the history of our Movement. We – and particularly I myself – count very much on still enjoying his active and decisive co-operation.

## THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT

The European Movement is a political movement. As such it has, since its foundation, assumed two tasks: the task of taking the initiative and providing drive, and the task of exercising a watching brief. For it aims at nothing less than being – if I may use this bold word – the conscience of the European nation which we expect the next generations to form.

Our Movement seeks to provide drive by moulding and keeping alive the vision of a united Europe while it canvasses, admonishes, urges and animates. It seeks to influence the decisions taken by those bearing political responsibility in our countries – either directly or by creating an irresistible current of opinion among the peoples of Europe.

The Movement seeks to exercise a watching brief in those fields where no democratic, that is no parliamentary, control has yet been organized for Europe, or in addition to such parliamentary control once it has been established. In doing so, its role is that of critic; it follows developments, examining, questioning, correcting and, if necessary, censuring.

But is such a function still appropriate today? This question is put very often, and rightly so.

It is true that a great deal, a very great deal, has been achieved. The economy already shows a high degree of interpenetration. Its growth is satisfactory, and the beneficial effect on business activity has been lasting. And in political terms, the activity of the States in the economic sphere has moved far in the direction of a federal or co-operative form. The Treaties of the Communities are living constitutional documents, the beginnings of a European constitution. The advantage of, indeed the need for, common institutions and a common policy have been shown to be genuine and are undisputed. War within the Community has become impossible. No tactical exercise by a General Staff can weaken this truth.

But more has been achieved than just a situation which brings certain benefits. This situation is not static, it exerts a dynamic force. Nobody wants and nobody is able to give up the togetherness which has become an irreplaceable element of economic and political interest. Our economic interest is carrying us forward. Economic logic is developing its own motive power. The merger of the Executives of the three Communities is removing losses due to friction and increasing the impact of the European campaign.

All this is true. Unfortunately, it is not the full truth. The complete picture also includes the internal and external dangers which threaten the work we have achieved.

The internal dangers, to mention them first, are nationalism, so-called realism and the unfinished, partial nature of our European construction.

Of these, the danger of nationalist infection is the greatest. Like others, Europeans find it difficult to learn the lesson of history. Are two world wars in the twentieth century not sufficient to prove the unsuitability of a European political order which, through the short-lived alliances of sovereign States, through the alternation of hegemony and balance of power, has for centuries exposed Europe to war after war, and which, if renewed, is bound to make Europe the Balkans of the modern world?

If the views of the nationalists are narrow, the realists are stupid. They are cramped by their day-to-day interests, and to deal smartly with these interests is for them the purpose of policy. The realities which they take as their guide are too small, too trivial; the man who takes them as a guide for his actions is in fact giving up the attempt to exercise his will in shaping the course of policy, and he falls an easy prey to any passing political vogue. It would almost

seem as if to him action to change existing realities were not the essence of all true policy. It is because Europe is divided and lacks homogeneity that there is a European Movement.

The third internal source of danger is the fact that today Europe's political unity is limited to economic and social policy, while defence policy and foreign policy outside the economic field are still conducted autonomously. This is an unhappy situation.

Added to these there are the dangers from without.

Economically speaking the Community has been a success not only at home, but also in its dealings with the outside world. After the success of the Kennedy Round and the World Monetary Conference at Rio de Janeiro, Europeans could no longer fail to see the advantages to be gained when the Community acts as a unit. But the Community's trading partners throughout the world have also ceased to speak of an 'inward-looking Community'.

From the political angle, however, the picture of the conditions surrounding us is much darker, it is truly disquieting. A look at the relationship between our Europe and the two super-powers of the present world, the United States of America and Soviet Russia, provides evidence enough.

#### EUROPE, AMERICA AND RUSSIA

Until about 1964, the United States of America, which acquired a right to the lasting gratitude of the Europeans through the massive support given from the very outset to Europe's efforts at unification, had in its foreign policy given priority to European affairs. By today, under the influence of the war in Viet-Nam, the atomic stalemate, the anticipated easing of tension and the comparative quiet on the European front, the situation has changed. There is also a growing feeling of disappointment and doubt about the Europeans. Are they at all able to get together, and if so, are they ready for an alliance with the United States? Inevitably there are areas of friction due to the realities of the economic and political situation, and these are a further contributing factor. All this does not mean that America's interest in the unification of Europe has faded. America's attitude is marked by uncertainty rather than negation, so we can describe it as an attitude of 'wait and see'. It is therefore essential that communications should be improved with a view to dealing with the mistaken assessments, the misunderstandings and hasty judgments which are encouraged only too well by occasional strident anti-American pronouncements. We also need a framework into which to fit the relations between America and Europe, a concept such as still existed at the time of President Kennedy.

If then we are inclined to complain, in our relations with the United States, about their taking too small an interest in our affairs, the situation is exactly the opposite with regard to the Soviet Union, since the interest of the Soviet Union is a negative one. Undoubtedly, the Russian population has enjoyed rapid social development as a result of unparalleled efforts in the cultural and educa-

tional fields. But it would be illusory to expect that this could lead to a radical weakening, let alone an abandonment of the socialist basis of Soviet policy. What this policy means for Europe, however, becomes clear if we look at the concrete aims the Soviet Union is pursuing as part of its medium-term programme for Europe. Under this policy, the Russians do not only want to consolidate the *status quo* resulting from the second world war, they also want to put a stop to any military, economic and political integration in Western Europe, which includes in particular the wish to destroy the integration achieved among the Six and thus to place the Soviet Union in a dominant position in Europe, including the Baltic and, as has become increasingly clear in the last few months, the Mediterranean. These are the dangers which must be countered, internally by strengthening the non-communist part of Europe in all fields, and in our external relations through the constant demonstration of our good will and of our good intentions. Integrating Europe means creating a peaceful order, the only one we have established today, internally and externally.

The conclusion from all this is that the reasons which after the second world war led to the policy of European unification and in particular to economic integration have not only not been superseded but have become stronger and more numerous. These reasons were the need for the creation of a vast economic area, the maintenance of peace in Europe, security for Europe and a say in world politics.

But what then are we to do, in concrete terms?

#### THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

We must start from a basic fact. This fact is the existence of the European Communities and the momentum inherent in them. These Communities represent more than a special type of relationship between the member countries, more than just commercial relations, mutual commitments to respect the interests of one's partners and to refrain from action running counter to the common interest, etc. These Communities have rather been a means of transforming Europe for the first time into a unit capable of independent action. This is precisely why we consider them as the beginning of the history of a united Europe and why we treat as past history anything that had motivated and influenced their establishment. The economic and social advantages offered by the Communities are so overwhelming that they overshadow in quite undue measure the importance of the Communities as a beginning of a European order or, in other words, their importance in political terms. True, they are limited to economic and social matters; they are however not intended merely as a means of providing a uniform trading area but of achieving the economic fusion of the six member countries. It is no exaggeration to say that the intention is to establish a new and greater, a European, economy. It is however not economic facts but the unity of the order governing the economy which is the criterion of its unity – and such an econo-

mic order is nothing other than part of a constitution. The unity of the economic order of the Communities can be seen in three basic principles which inspire it: freedom, equality and security.

All this is tantamount to the emergence of something which, though not yet fully a state, has an embryonic and well developed European personality. Its institutions – Parliament, Council of Ministers, Court of Justice, Commission – point to its federal character, though it is only a partial federation. Whatever the temporary difficulties, then, the prime task of any European policy must be to maintain what has been achieved and to develop it further. There is no alternative.

Now, these Communities still have six members only. This is a historical accident which is due to the fact that only these six states were prepared to embark upon the adventure involved in this first attempt at unification. The other states capable of joining, though invited, preferred to wait. The majority of them formed an association of different design, EFTA, which is a free trade area. This dualism has, however, been virtually overcome since the members of EFTA decided to seek the final solution of the problem of European unification in a link with the European Communities. This could be through full membership, or it could be through some other form of organic connection. Since then it has again been evident – and this has always been part of our political design – that Community policy is not just a policy for six states but that it is the campaign of a unit which deems itself to be the vanguard of a greater Europe. Any progress made by the Communities is a gain for the whole of Europe, every setback a loss for the whole continent. The success or failure of the Communities is therefore a matter that concerns the whole of Europe. What this means today is easy to see if we look at the milestone represented by 1 July 1968. It is the most important date since the foundation of the European Communities, the day on which the customs union and the common agricultural market enter into force.

We have always described the campaign for Europe as a succession of three themes: customs union, economic union and what is called political union. These concepts do not stand for stages clearly separated from each other in time, indeed, they overlap.

Customs union, for instance, will not be fully completed when intra-Community customs duties are removed on 1 July.

But despite this, the chief task ahead is the completion of economic union. By this we understand the whole set of measures required if conditions similar to those obtaining on a domestic market are to exist in the Community.

What still has to be achieved is the following:

- (1) The free movement of goods through removal of tax and administrative frontiers;
- (2) Free movement of workers, freedom of establishment and freedom to supply

- services for entrepreneurs;
- (3) Free movement of capital;
  - (4) A common transport policy; here, extraordinary and inexcusable arrears must be made good;
  - (5) Protection of competition from all forms of distortion;
  - (6) Securing the common character of the Community's economic policy, particularly in short-term economic policy, monetary policy and financial policy.

All this sounds very technical, it is very technical. But taken in their entirety these technical details are the essence of what the European citizen is offered in terms of European economic integration, of what he is expected to put up with. And the trouble starts when one gets down to details.

These are the questions we come up against if we try to find out where the shoe pinches, if we ask the European what he thinks of first when he hears the word 'Europe'. If then we want to influence public opinion in Europe, if we ourselves want to be considered as representing public opinion in European matters, we must focus our attention on all these problems.

All this is therefore very important. Yet there are even more important matters, for these problems are, after all, merely that part of the European effort which deals with the past and the present, the part which serves to clear the terrain that has been blocked so far. But more important, far more important, is the road that should be taken on this cleared terrain, the question of where we are going from here. In other words: economic union is no more than the structural framework that makes a European policy possible. But what should be the content of this European policy?

#### A COMPREHENSIVE COMMON POLICY

If we look from this angle at the draft for the material content of a European economic and social policy, we immediately come up against the most formidable problems that face us today; these are not only economic and social, they are also political. We find that here history is putting us to the test. In the last, the tenth, General Report on the Activities of the Community which the Commission of the European Economic Community submitted to the European Parliament as required by the Treaty of Rome, the Commission said: 'The success of the Community will ultimately depend on what use the Community's institutions make of the instruments at their disposal – on the nature of the policy they are able to plan and implement.'

At this point, however, we are face to face with nothing less than the second industrial revolution. The field where the struggle is occurring over the broad lines of how we should deal with the problems involved is that of medium-term economic policy. For this policy we have already created the necessary institutions and procedures. The broad lines of common policy, once elaborated and adopted, must be translated into concrete measures in the individual sectors of

social policy, industrial policy, agricultural policy, commercial policy.

A high degree of creative imagination and of detachment is needed, that is, the ability and readiness to abandon old habits of thought. The Community must not just pursue a common policy, it must endeavour to pursue the best economic policy that is humanly possible. If it succeeds in this effort, it has won. For there is no safer guarantee for our success than the quality of our work.

The Treaty of Rome bids us seek the continuous improvement of the living and working conditions of the peoples of the Member States. To do this we must harmonize the policy of the Community and the policies of the individual Member States, we must reconcile the requirements of growth with those of stability, and we must compete successfully both with the technologically more advanced countries and with countries where wage levels are lower than in Europe.

In social policy, where there have already been impressive results, the employment problem and living and working conditions call for our special attention.

In our common economic policy the most important element will always be industrial policy, since the Community's economy is largely industrial. This industrial policy must contribute to the improvement of overall productivity, to a higher degree of employment and to the competitiveness of enterprises. For achieving this end, a European energy policy and regional policy are indispensable.

The common agricultural policy will for us always be the shining proof of what can be achieved by a common policy.

Now that a common organization of the markets for agricultural products has been established, there remains the task of managing the markets concerned and of modernizing the structure of European agriculture.

The common commercial policy deserves our special attention. Economically it is of outstanding importance, for the Community is the greatest trading power of the world.

Our commercial policy is already a common policy as far as customs duties and trade in agricultural products are concerned. In the remaining fields, acceptance of a common policy has not progressed as it should, despite the unrelenting efforts made by the Commission. The main reason for this is, of course, the close connection of commercial policy with general foreign policy. As long as the latter has not become a Community policy, there will be a tendency to maintain national control over some elements of commercial policy. But the Treaty calls for a common commercial policy with no provisos.

Without such a common commercial policy intra-Community trade, too, will not be entirely similar to trade on a domestic market. For as long as the import rules of the various member countries differ, checks and, in certain cases, action to exclude goods from free circulation will extend not only to products against the importation of which the countries want to protect themselves (as for instance cameras, sewing machines) but to all like products, including those

of Community origin, for member countries will want to make sure that these products are not imported from non-member countries.

And how are we to arrive at a common foreign policy – as, after all, is our wish when we declare that our aim is a political community – if the immediate, pragmatic approach through foreign trade policy is blocked? It is precisely here that a start should be made by laying a basis of solidarity and then gradually building it up. Vigorous efforts should therefore be made to secure progress with the common commercial policy.

There is little or no excuse for the fact that we do not have a gripping, long-term concept for a European development policy. The Community will not be living up to its world-wide responsibilities in development policy as long as it does not make an original contribution, commensurate with its economic importance, to solving the problem of relations between the industrialized countries in the northern hemisphere and the developing countries in the southern hemisphere of our planet. Not only have the Member States so far refused to grant the Commission the means with which to tackle this problem, most of them are not yet seriously prepared to accept discussion of this challenge to Europe as a matter that is in any way of concern to the Community as a whole. But how then is the 'third world' to gain confidence in us and in the continuity of our action? It is in this context, too, that we must view the questions with which we shall have to deal during the forthcoming negotiations on the extension of the Yaoundé Convention.

Lastly, the Community has established international relations which take the form of links of various types; further arrangements are still the subject of negotiations.

#### GEOGRAPHIC EXTENSION AND DYNAMIC GROWTH

With this part of its activities the Community enters fields which are part of the border area between economic integration and general political integration. Through the renewed applications for membership or association by Great Britain, Scandinavian countries and Ireland, these fields have acquired high topical importance. Where the applications for membership are concerned, we even move beyond the formal limits of the Community provisions, for the Treaty of Rome treats only part of the procedure of admitting new members as a Community matter and part as a matter for the Member States as individual, sovereign units. It is of course this that gives the veto, derived from the principle of unanimity, its special force.

It is not my intention to deal in detail with the subject of the crisis that has resulted from the French veto on negotiations concerning the British application for membership, with the consequences of this situation and conclusions to be drawn from it. But I do want to make one statement on the subject, and I lay the greatest emphasis on this point; it follows logically from everything I have said



so far, as a dictate of reason. However great the disappointment and irritation may be, whatever the concern about the loss which the cause of European unity is suffering as a result of what has happened – in no circumstances whatsoever is it justifiable that the five governments, or any of them individually, should react to what has happened by contemplating measures which involve a risk of losing what has been achieved. What we have created on the road to the unification of Europe is a tremendous asset – from the business angle as well as from that of economic and general policy – of which nothing must on any account be sacrificed. Its value, though difficult to assess, lies not just in what it is but quite as much – indeed even more – in what it holds in store. For it holds out more than just a hope. It contains all those conditions which man can create in his endeavour to achieve the ultimate objective of full European federation. This does not mean that such an objective will be attained automatically. For it is not given to man to create conditions which automatically lead to the desired result. But what we can do has been done: we have created an organism which, by virtue of its design and of the questions and challenges it constantly produces, confronts those who bear responsibilities in Europe with a continuous series of situations and options to which, if they are guided by reason, they can only respond by further unification of Europe.

The existence of what are thus dynamic Communities is one of the realities on which we must base our work. But what we do must also rest on a second, no less compelling foundation. This is confidence in our success. I say confidence – not possibility, not speculation, not assumption, not expectation or hope. And the experience gained with our Communities has proved another thing: Europeans, when offered the chance of integration, do not let it slip past. And it was one meagre positive point in the critical situation of 19 December last year that not even French diplomacy toyed with destruction of the Community.

In our time it is the historic destiny of the continent to integrate; the strength of Europe is equal to the task, and we shall not fail. And the force of the facts, of the interests and the logic inherent in the process of fusion will carry us irresistibly forward.

We propose to accept this destiny. We wish to assist in its fulfilment not by providing a detailed action programme, a perfect and therefore theoretical design of a European Utopia, but rather by drawing up the outlines, the framework of a plan for the period 1968 to 1980. This is not unduly bold. In 1955 at Messina and in the two following years in Val Duchesse, on the outskirts of Brussels, we were not daunted by the task of devising a plan for the period up to 1970 and even beyond. We wish to act, as a free political movement, at the side of those who bear the formal responsibility. For we are not a gathering of notables – the honoured names of the founders of Europe with which our movement is adorned are no excuse for sclerosis – we are a militant group. We want to activate our movement. We want to rejuvenate it – physically too, by bringing in younger

men. We need the younger generation. But the younger generation needs us as well; we want to fill their minds and their hearts with something constructive, something grand.

Our grand concept is that of the European political community. It is the organic completion of what we have started and what we have despite all obstacles carried forward to its present state. This is why we must take to heart the lessons to be drawn from what has been done.

The experience gained since the end of the war shows that it is only by means of common institutions that progress towards European unification can be made and maintained. These are institutions which are able and willing, independently of the individual Member States, to formulate the political interests and political aims of Europe and can uphold them in a continuous dialogue with governments. Thus they contribute to a steady increase in the degree of agreement between the Member States in political thinking and action. They help create a situation where the feeling of European solidarity and the realization that ours is a European cause end by being generally accepted in all governments and all the way down the civil services. To achieve this by diplomatic conferences or other conventional methods of bilateral diplomacy is just not possible. The process of unification is, of course, particularly difficult when it impinges on the delicate, central spheres of sovereignty, of foreign policy other than economic, and of defence policy. This only increases the need for institutional experience gained in economic integration to be applied in these fields also.

When the requisite organization is established, its competences and methods must be governed by three principles:

(1) Its decision-taking process must in no circumstances be allowed to replace the procedures used by the Communities that are already operating in the economic and social fields, with a view, perhaps, to forcing these Communities into a position of dependency. It should rather develop on lines parallel to those of the European Economic Community and should make up the leeway in integration that exists in the spheres concerned.

In due course – let us say around 1980 – the merger proper, that is the merger of all economic, military and political Communities, can take place, and this would mean establishing the federation of Europe. We may leave it to the future (and the specialists in constitutional and international law) whether this is to be brought about by a treaty between the Member States or by a constituent act of a European constituent assembly.

(2) The procedures adopted in the new fields must from the outset comprise a consultation mechanism which is not limited in its scope and which in urgent situations is capable of functioning sufficiently fast to deprive the partners which are less enthusiastic supporters of integration (and experience has shown that these are the bigger ones) of the usual pretext that the urgency of the matter made it impossible to consult the Community in time.

(3) The procedure must aim at permanent evolution and revision of the constitution in favour of a steadily rising degree of integration; in fact, it must make such a development ineluctable.

All this, too, is the lesson to be drawn from experience.

There will, however, be organic progress towards full federation only if the example of the constantly advancing European Communities, of their constitutions and of the driving force supplied by their very existence exerts its full influence in the seventies and presses the governments forward in the right direction. It is therefore of outstanding importance that the constitutions of the existing Communities should be strictly observed, carefully cultivated and consciously developed.

#### PRESENT SORRY PLIGHT

From this angle, the Community is in a sorry plight. Our immediate task must therefore be to stop or reverse a tendency which is today more or less evident in the capitals of all member countries: the tendency to water down the existing institutions, to weaken them and to submit them again to the play of diplomacy.

Here I am referring not only to the main lines of policy which are determined by the political moves of the Member States. Equally great importance may increasingly attach to the less spectacular but, by their sum and their continuity, powerful procedures established and partial actions taken by the bureaucracies of the individual Member States. The committee bureaucracy of the Council of Ministers, which is often marked by wild proliferation but which is hardly discernible for, let alone controllable by, the national parliaments, can, if not checked by tight political leadership, nibble like so many ants at the institutional order established by the Treaties, to the point of destroying it. If we are not careful, the combined bureaucracies will soon have restored a situation where they can indulge in the vice of traditional conference diplomacy which settles for agreement at the lowest common denominator. How often has it happened that in their external relations the Communities have, to their shame, been almost incapable of action!

To this very day the Ministers of Finance still meet outside the Council of Ministers. Until today there has hardly ever been, in the Council of Ministers, a debate on the budget which went into the substance of the problems. So-called experts may try to impair, if not destroy, the autonomy of the Commission in matters of organization. And how many Treaty rules on the distribution of competence are today interpreted in a way which has little in common with the objectives of the Treaty?

From the role of the existing Communities, which is that of a driving force, it must further be concluded that these Communities must do everything in their power to keep to those political aims already outlined in, or to be derived from, their Treaties which refer to economic policy. This means:

- (i) Strengthening the powers of the European Parliament in legislative and budget matters.
- (ii) Direct elections to the European Parliament.
- (iii) Bringing the Parliament some little way into the task of choosing the members of the European Executive.
- (iv) Being prepared to bring political matters before the Court of Justice.
- (v) The Commission of the European Economic Community must – if possible even more than today – be treated and respected as a political institution. The first step would be for all governments to appoint to it only leading politicians and no experts, however high their qualifications may be. From today onward the governments must be urged to include in the appointments they will be making in 1970 and 1971 only personalities who have held government office in their own countries or at least are regarded by their political parties as qualifying for a ministerial post.
- (vi) The Council of Ministers must not be deterred by any gentleman's agreement from applying the rule of the majority vote. Its bureaucracy could well do with a slimming cure.

The more integration spreads to defence and diplomacy, the more urgent will be the problem of geographical extension. During the seventies efforts should therefore be made to settle, for all states of the free part of Europe which are willing, the place they will occupy in the Community or in an organic arrangement with it, or which it is proposed to offer them.

As regards eastern Europe, I think that this is not the moment for formulating far-reaching plans or even for indulging in speculation. Extensive contacts with the countries and the people on the other side of the iron curtain, which can, more than anything else, give those people a feeling of all-European solidarity, should be our first aim. For the rest, our house will be all the more attractive, the better we build it ourselves. The closer we unite, the easier will political talks be one day. Let us therefore prepare ourselves for an all-European meeting in the eighties and let us be grateful for every day by which the time separating us from it can be shortened.

From the very beginning of our work on the unification of Europe we have assumed that security and defence policy cannot be excluded from this process. The solution may lie in a European defence community built up within the framework of a NATO which has developed in a bi-polar direction. Here too, as everywhere in our work for the European cause, we will not only have to think in terms of all-embracing solutions but in terms of a pragmatic, step-by-step approach. This may include:

- (i) A strategic planning community (European general staff) for conventional and nuclear weapons and for every geographical region where Europe has military interests.
- (ii) A European armaments community and a system – at long last an effective

one – for the standardization of weapons.

(iii) The beginnings of a nuclear defence system, able to organize defence against threats which might come from a nuclear China or any country which might be prepared to accept weapons from China.

The completion of such a comprehensive defence community with weapons of all types at its disposal is, of course, not conceivable without a full federal constitution which gives the institutions of the European federation sufficient powers in the field of European security policy and in defence matters as elsewhere.

But today all European states should already consider it a European duty to do nothing that may impede or delay this development. To my mind, this means that even now we are bound to oppose the non-proliferation Treaty in its present form. Its section on control arrangements destroys the achievements of Euratom. And an even more serious defect is the lack of any clause which upholds the nuclear defence interests of Europe. Not even for its own defence would Europe be entitled to have nuclear explosives at its disposal! It may sound harsh, but it must be said: in its power pattern this Treaty is objectively the continuation of the policy of Yalta, that is, of the shameful division of Europe into spheres of interest. This is not changed by the purely verbal and therefore completely insufficient consolation which the Treaty offers by its reference to disarmament.

#### TIME FOR ACTION

Let me sum up:

Our success is a question of will. Nothing less, for there is no automatic progress. Nothing more, for there are no objectively insurmountable obstacles. This will, however, is no abstract, disembodied attitude of mind – it is quite simply the determination to give the European component absolute priority in everyday decisions, in the innumerable separate acts by which integration advances. True, this was easier when the states of Europe themselves appeared to be threatened in their existence, as was for instance the case during the double crisis of Suez and Budapest in 1956, when the final negotiations on the European Economic Community were begun. But we must also be capable of the greater act of will which consists in the unrelenting exercise, over a period of ten or more years, of the political virtues of tenacity, obstinate consistency, and patience. The success of the European effort depends on our strength of character.

If in the last twenty years all endeavours other than those made in the fields of economic policy and social policy have failed – the efforts made by the Council of Europe in 1949 to 1951, the European Defence Community, the deliberations on what is called political union – this was not due to external forces. It was due to a lack of determination. The peoples of Europe have suffered their politicians to promise unification in non-committal addresses delivered on fes-

tive occasions and to forget their promises in their day-to-day policies. The peoples of Europe have tolerated a Europe of ulterior motives. Up to now governments have been able to jeopardize the success of European integration in order to maintain real or imaginary positions of power, or to bolster their claims to hegemony or other fictive values drawn from the political armoury of yesteryear. Anybody who is not convinced of this should just take a look at the current Franco-British duel over a position of hegemony. What happens to Europe in all this?

We have no time to lose. The only road to success – that of convincing others and of implementing integration step by step, in an immensely laborious process – is in itself long and time-consuming enough. And meanwhile the world does not stand still. The super-powers will grow faster than we do, if we do not act quickly.

Let us therefore do our duty, day by day and hour by hour!

WALTER HALLSTEIN