

**Argumentation and Social Re-Presentation:  
A Study in Coalitional Psychology**

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ta' Malta

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To Marija

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I, Luke Joseph Buhagiar, hereby declare that this thesis was completed for the MPhil/Ph.D. Degree (University of Malta). I also declare that this thesis is my original work, and has not been presented in fulfilment of other course requirements to the University of Malta or any other university. In cases where other scholarly work was consulted, this is clearly indicated in the text.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "Luke Buhagiar", is written above a horizontal line.

## Publications Related to This Work

Parts of **Chapter 2** were published as:

- **Buhagiar, L. J.**, & Sammut, G. (2020a). ‘Social re-presentation for...’: An action-oriented formula for intergroup relations research. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *11*, 352. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00352>

Parts of **Chapter 4** informed the literature review in:

- **Buhagiar, L. J.**, Sammut, G., Avdi, E., Koutri, I., Mylona, A., Pop, A., Rochira, A., Redd, R., & Santarpia, A. (2020). Islam. In T. Mannarini, G. A. Veltri & S. Salvatore (Eds.), *Media and social representations of otherness: Psycho-social-cultural implications* (pp. 61-81). Springer.

**Chapter 5** inspired parts of:

- **Buhagiar, L. J.**, & Sammut, G. (2020b). Attitude Measurement. In G. Ritzer & C. Rojek (Eds.), *The Blackwell encyclopedia of sociology* (2nd ed.). John Wiley & Sons.

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As discussed in the text, the items of the Intergroup Relations Scales, which were developed in Study 2 (**Chapter 7**), were partly informed by input from:

- **Buhagiar, L. J.**, Sammut, G., Rochira, A., & Salvatore, S. (2018). There’s no such thing as a good Arab: Cultural essentialism and its functions concerning the integration of Arabs in Europe. *Culture & Psychology*, *24*(4), 560-576.
- Sammut, G., Jovchelovitch, S., **Buhagiar, L. J.**, Veltri, G. A., Redd, R., & Salvatore, S. (2018). Arabs in Europe: Arguments for and against integration. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, *24*(4), 398–406.

## Abstract

This thesis formulates an action-oriented approach to social re-presentation, whereby re-presentation functions *for* joint projects, and social and alternative re-presentation are systemically related. Furthermore, this thesis posits an intrinsic link between social re-presentation and argumentation, which can be understood in view of a coalitional social ontology. Accordingly, a minimal model of argumentation was devised, to study people's claims for or against a joint project of public interest. Given prior literature showing the depth of anti-Arab views in Malta, these developments were applied to Arab-Maltese relations. In *Study 1*, in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with Arabs ( $N = 15$ ) on their views for/against the integration of Arabs in Malta. Data were analysed using minimal argumentation analysis. Patterns in participants' arguments concerned: the view that integration is difficult but necessary; the view that the Maltese are resistant to integration; and the de-essentialism of both ingroup and outgroup. *Study 2* developed two ecologically valid quantitative scales meant for studying Arab-Maltese relations in Malta. These scales were developed using a novel expert-based rank-order scaling procedure. Arabs' claims (from Study 1) and the Maltese's claims (from Sammut et al., 2018) on integration were thematically categorized to compose scale items, which were subsequently ranked by intercultural relations experts in order of integrationism, and analysed using sensitivity analysis. The two scales were collectively termed the Intergroup Relations Scales: (i) the Re-presentation for Integration Scale (RFI) measured participants' views on integration (social re-presentation); and (ii) the Alternative Re-presentation of Integration Scale (AROI) measured participants' views of the outgroup's views on integration (alternative re-presentation). *Study 3* surveyed Maltese ( $n = 215$ ) and Arab ( $n = 103$ ) views on integration. Data were analysed using multiple regression analyses. Findings showed that alternative re-presentation of the outgroup's project (sub-dimensions of AROI) significantly predicted ingroup social re-presentation for/against integration (RFI). On the basis of these findings, recommendations were made for ameliorating Arab-Maltese relations in Malta. In essence, this thesis demonstrates a systemic link between social and alternative re-presentation, and the relevance of this link—as observed in participants' qualitative arguments and quantitative positionings—for coalitional psychology and intergroup relations research.

*Keywords:* Intergroup Relations, Arab-Maltese Relations, Joint Projects, Social Representation, Alternative Representation, Social Influence, Coalitional Psychology, Spiral of Conflict

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## Abbreviations

EFA = Exploratory Factor Analysis

ERV(s) = Extra-Representational Variable(s)

IR Scales = Intergroup Relations Scales

RFI = Re-presentation for Integration (Scale)

AROI = Alternative Re-presentation of Integration (Scale)

PRO-ALT = Pro-integrationist Alternative Re-presentation [AROI sub-dimension]

ANTI-ALT = Anti-integrationist Alternative Re-presentation [AROI sub-dimension]

LET = Lay Epistemic Theory

NFC = Need for Cognitive Closure

SDO = Social Dominance Orientation

SDO<sub>c</sub> = Social Dominance Orientation (Composite Measure)

SDO-D = SDO-Dominance [SDO sub-dimension]

SDO-E = SDO-Egalitarianism [SDO sub-dimension]

SoC = Sense of Community

SRT = Social Representations Theory

## Chapter 1 – Introduction

Intergroup relations remain highly contested. When groups make contact, they evaluate the outgroup through motivated psychological lenses, and this reflects an underlying socio-psychological repertoire for dealing with potential conflict (Bar-Tal, 2011, p. 11), be it at local or regional levels. Some such intergroup processes are context-specific, appreciable mostly in the specific milieus that provide the soil from which they spring. Others are more universal, held as pertaining to a more or less shared spectrum of human psychological phenomena, inductively observed or deductively inferred across environments known to be inhabited by humankind. This interplay of socio-psychological forces is most evident when intergroup tensions arise, and group projects meet, intersect or outright clash with each other (Bauer, 2015, p. 61).

In studying intergroup relations, what the ingroup thinks is as important to consider as what the ingroup thinks that the outgroup thinks, and vice versa (Elcheroth et al., 2011, p. 755). Accordingly, the concepts of *social representation* (Moscovici, 1961/2008) and *alternative representation* (Gillespie, 2008) are paramount for the study of intergroup relations. Social representations are effectively systems of social influence (Sammut & Howarth, 2014, p. 1800) that function by regulating group interactions, and allow social agents to orient themselves socially and to communicate with members of their collective/s (Moscovici, 1973, p. xiii). Apart from *socially* representing phenomena for specific aims, groups *alternatively* represent their outgroups' views (Gillespie, 2008, 2020), particularly in conflict scenarios, by *revising* them in ways suiting the ingroup.

In turn, among a plethora of mediums of exchange, *argumentation* emerges as key in the formation and perpetuation of such representations. At a minimum, an argument involves

a standpoint, support for that standpoint, and inferential linkages between support and standpoint (Burlinson, 1992, p. 264; Liakopoulos, 2000, p. 153). An argument can refer to the grounding of standpoints or to verbal intercourse over a disagreement (see Johnson & Blair, 1977). The former constitutes “an argument someone *makes* [whilst the latter] an argument someone *has*” (Lewiński & Mohammed, 2016, p. 82; see also O’Keefe, 1977). It is mostly the former sense of argumentation that is of concern to this work. The point is that, if intergroup relations and the coalitional affiliations (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010) accompanying them unfold over a bedding of motivated socio-psychological processes, and if our views of other groups’ views are important and form through the making of arguments, then notions pertaining to intergroup relations, social representation and argumentation deserve joint consideration. This is especially the case when intergroup relations worsen, and the potential for a spiral of conflict (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008) presents itself. Here, coalitions become more inflexible (cf. Leech & Cronk, 2017, p. 97) and groups’ representations of the outgroup ossify (see Moscovici, 1992).

To this end, this thesis pursues a theoretical and methodological framework for studying the above, chiefly by formulating an action-oriented approach to social representation, whereby groups’ joint projects (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999) are foregrounded and seen as guiding representational content to support their ends; and by devising a minimal model of argumentation that is grounded in psychological theory and can be utilised in culturally sensitive research. In turn, these developments are applied to mixed-methods research on Arab-Maltese relations in Malta. The aim is to study the intergroup relations involved, and to provide recommendations for ameliorating such relations. In what follows, *re-presentation* is used to refer to social representation as process, and *representation* refers to social representations as content (see Chryssides et al., 2009).

## **Arab-Maltese Relations: An Introduction**

Malta is a Catholic-majority archipelago, forming part of the European Union as one of its most densely populated member states (Buhagiar et al., 2018). Writing about Malta, Friggieri (2016) notes how “the Semitic character of its language and the Latinity of its culture have both contributed towards the complex formation of a unique country” (p. 201). This eclectic blend formed along Maltese history, which, following a pre-historic period, involved rule by the Phoenicians, the Carthaginians, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Arabs, the Normans, the Aragonese, the Castilians, the Knights of St. John, the French, and finally, the British—before Malta achieved independence in 1964 (Sciriha, 2001; Fiorini & Zammit, 2016) and declared itself a Republic in 1974. The Constitution of Malta, adopted in 1964, states that “The religion of Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion” (Article 2, § 1). The Maltese language, as it is currently known, has its foundation in Arabic (Brincat, 2008), this foundation being laid following the Arab conquest of Malta in the 9<sup>th</sup> century, and subsequently assimilating non-Arabic influences over the years (Friggieri, 1986, p. 207). At present, both Maltese and English are the official languages of Malta (Sciriha, 2001).

The population of Malta stands at around 493,559, of which approximately 18% are foreign nationals (National Statistics Office [NSO], 2019, 2020). It is estimated that Arabs make up approximately 20% of the migrant population, and therefore less than 1% of the total population of Malta (Sammut & Lauri, 2017). In recent history, Arab Muslim communities were established in Malta in the later years of the 1970s and in the 1980s (Camilleri-Cassar, 2011). Moreover, since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and in particular following Malta’s accession to the European Union in 2004, perilous journeys across the Mediterranean Sea saw the arrival of numerous people (both Arab and non-Arab) in search of asylum. From the 2010s onwards, many migrants (particularly Libyans) made their way to Malta from the Arab world (following the Arab Spring), and the war in Syria saw a numerous proportion of Syrian asylum seekers making their way to the islands as well (see Eurostat, 2020).

### *Contested Histories and Collective Memories*

Such migrants land in a geographical location hosting representations of history that are suffused with religio-cultural tensions, which in turn feature in Maltese collective memory. As a case in point, the Arab period in early medieval Malta is somewhat of a “Dark Age” (Barnard, 1975, p. 161), in that sources are mostly lacking (Luttrell, 1987), with Wettinger (1986) referring to this period of Maltese history as “the *pons asinorum* of Maltese historiography” (p. 87). Wettinger continues: “No other period of Maltese history is so fraught with admitted or hidden psychological complexes, with unconscious fears and hates that imaginary skeletons in the national cupboard should become common property to the delight and scorn of all” (1986, p. 87). The lack of sources is compounded by historical controversies concerning the extent of Arabic and Islamic influences on Maltese history (and historiography). A dominant historical narrative among natives is that Malta experienced an uninterrupted Christian tradition, starting with St. Paul’s shipwreck on Malta in 60CE (Mitchell, 2002, p. 8). Against this narrative, Wettinger (1986) provides evidence of the Islamisation of the Maltese during Arab rule. Regardless of issues surrounding historical accuracy, narratives surrounding St. Paul’s shipwreck (60CE), and historical events such as the Great Siege of Malta (1565), remain cemented in Maltese collective memory, as the Arab period remains neglected or its details contested (Chircop, 2014; Mitchell, 2002, p. 30).

Speaking about the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Buhagiar (2007) notes that traditional belief in St. Paul’s shipwreck had already “become the central element of Malta’s Christian and European credentials. Questioning it was both irreverent and unpatriotic, and the island’s geographic location on the fringes of Christian Europe and Muslim North Africa lent the debate a sinister political dimension” (p. 16). This remains so to this day, as both Christian and non-Christian coalitions re-present these events to advance disparate projects. The patterns recounted above reflect similar trends surrounding cultural and historical Christian continuity in collective memories across Europe and the United States (Smeeke & Verkuyten, 2014). Essentially,

“the ideas or ‘facts’ occupying a central organizing role in the official historical narratives are particularly prone to contested interpretations within and across the conflicting sides; thus, they are more vulnerable to distortion in oral historical accounts” (Psaltis, 2016, p. 25).

Evidence of what may be termed syncretism, exists too. Documented cases include reference to folk healing (or other) magical rituals conducted by Christian individuals seeking advice from Muslims in the 16<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> centuries (Cassar, 1993, p. 328; Cassar, 1996, p. 81).

### ***Contemporary Arab-Maltese Relations***

In contemporary times, the number of foreign nationals (including Arabs) migrating to Malta, through regular or irregular channels, has increased substantially (especially over the past two decades); and recent Eurobarometers indicate that immigration issues remain amongst the most pertinent issues for the Maltese (European Commission, 2019, 2020). Among the ethno-cultural groups in Malta, Arabs experience a sizeable share of negative views—by both Maltese natives and also other minority ethno-cultural groups (Sammut & Lauri, 2017). Such negative views often translate into prejudice, including among children (Cefai et al., 2019, pp. 160, 195, 233). Among adults, Arab-Maltese couples similarly face daily obstacles (Cassar, 2005, p. 48).

In a study carried out with Maltese participants, concerning their views on the integration of Arabs, participants’ arguments were largely anti-integrationist, with views appreciative of Arabs being relatively few (Sammut et al., 2018). Local social re-presentation of Arabs tends toward cultural essentialism, whereby Arabs are reduced to ‘Arabic culture’, which is seen by natives as providing exhaustive reasons for Arabs’ psychology and behaviour (Buhagiar et al., 2018).

Anti-Arab prejudice in Malta is in one sense surprising. Consider the following observation by Grima (2014): “On the streets, it is difficult to identify women as Arabs, let alone as Muslims. Language may give them away, but then again, many are able to speak relatively good Maltese” (p. 462). The same applies to many Arab men in Malta. Thus, whilst

the term ‘Arab’ denotes a pan-ethnic category that is culturally and religiously diverse (Naber, 2000), differences between the appearance of Arabs and non-Arab Maltese are not easy to discern. Shryock (2008) notes a “taxonomic uncertainty that suspends Arab Americans between zones of whiteness, Otherness, and color. Intellectually, the categories associated with these zones are almost always vacuous and reductive” (pp. 111-112). This taxonomic ambiguity equally applies to the Arabs living in Malta, and to the Maltese themselves, especially for the outside observer.

Despite these similarities, there are religio-cultural differences between the Maltese and Arabs—and different observers may variably characterise such differences as anything from interesting adornments to outright incompatibilities (Buhagiar et al., 2018). Thus, as seen in other European countries (Helbling, 2012, p. 1), ‘Arabs’ are interchangeable with ‘Muslims’ “in the Maltese psyche, and as well as being an object of contempt, the word ‘Arab’ is often used to homogenise and unify the Muslim community into one single race, irrespective of ethnic and cultural differences” (Chircop, 2014, p. 68). The Arab-Muslim conflation is partly due to the fact that Islam is the dominant religion in the Arab world (Zaharna, 2009, p. 181). However, religio-cultural *prejudices* go beyond this demographic matter. Chircop (2014) notes how such prejudices permeate local educational curricula, whereby “the Arab influence on the development of Maltese identity is often ignored, while the impact of European values and norms is overstated” (Chircop, 2014, p. 71).

Moreover, salient local events provide further context to intercultural relations in Malta, some of them directly relevant to Arab-Maltese relations and others relevant to intercultural relations more broadly. In January 2016, a protest in the form of public prayer was held by sections of the Muslim community for the regularisation/provision of more Islamic prayer spaces (Balzan, 2016). This saw a local far-right political party organise an anti-Islam counter-protest, during which they handed out free pork sandwiches (Diacono, 2016). On a more serious note, in April 2019, an African migrant from the Ivory Coast—

Lassana Cisse Souleymane—was murdered in a racially motivated drive-by shooting, by two off-duty army personnel (Vella, 2019). In October 2019, migrant riots at the Ħal Far open centre saw rooms and several vehicles being set on fire (Sansone, 2019). More recently, in October 2020, the most well-known Imam in Malta argued that religious anti-vilification laws should be re-introduced, and that those who publicly insult the prophet Muhammad play into the hands of extremists (Vella, 2020). This prompted the chairperson of the National Book Council to call for the imam’s deportation, and to post a cartoon mocking Muhammad on his social media profile, causing outrage (Sansone, 2020). Incendiary calls for deportation aside, issues surrounding freedom of speech reveal that prejudice is not the only variable to consider—sometimes, principled objections by majorities toward specific minority practices/demands feature too (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020).

On a more concrete level, many European governments have not managed to integrate Muslims and accommodate religious diversity successfully (Pauly, 2004; Triandafyllidou et al., 2006, p. 3). Moreover, Islamist terrorist attacks, such as the Madrid train bombings (2004), the Charlie Hebdo attacks (2015), the Nice truck attack (2016), and the murder of Samuel Paty (2020), sabotage attempts at building re-presentations of Islam that are more appreciative of the day-to-day lives of Muslims in Europe, the absolute majority of whom are far-removed from these horrible events. Indeed, social re-presentations of Muslims as ‘possible terrorists’ tend to ‘stick’ (Breakwell, 2014, p. 126) in the minds of non-Muslim Europeans, and the Maltese context is no exception to this. In Malta, various studies on anti-Muslim prejudice reveal verbal harassment, workplace discrimination and difficulties particular to Muslim women (Gauci & Pisani, 2013, p., 14, 19; National Commission for the Promotion of Equality [NCPE], 2010, p. 29). Moreover, the hegemonic status of Christianity in Malta is often used to justify the imposition of majority culture on non-Christian minorities (see Darmanin, 2015, p. 37). Over time, pro-active responses by migrant communities



(Muslim and non-Muslim) in Malta, in pursuit of integration, have been observed too (Bugre & Hirsch, 2016).

### **Aims and Overview**

Accordingly, the present work addresses Arab-Maltese relations by relying on social representations theory (SRT), psychological approaches to argumentation, and the literature on coalitional psychology (Clark & Winegard, 2020). These three bodies of literature are interweaved to yield a theoretical footing to the study of Arab-Maltese relations, and a methodology that fulfils the present *research goal*: the ecologically valid study of Arab-Maltese relations. A local migrant integration strategy was recently published in Malta (Ministry for European Affairs and Equality [MEAA], 2017), and notions related to integration have infiltrated local discourse, thus making *integration* a meaningful joint project to study in fulfilling the present task.

In the present work, integration is defined as: the state wherein both dominant and non-dominant groups cultivate their home culture/s—investing in bonding social capital—whilst simultaneously engaging with outgroup cultures, extending their bridging social capital (Berry, 2011; Gittell & Vidal, 1998, p. 15; Sammut, 2011). Whilst the views of non-Arabs on Arabs have been researched, there is a relative scarcity of research on Arabs' views on non-Arabs in Europe (see **Chapter 4**). Thus, the present inquiry focuses on *both* the Maltese's and Arabs' views on integration, *and* on their views on each other's views on integration. The importance of theory effectively situates this work as an “instrumental case study” (Demuth, 2018, p. 80), which:

examines a particular case [Arab-Maltese relations] to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization, or build theory [the action-oriented formulae]. Here, the case itself is secondary to understanding a particular phenomenon [intergroup relations]. The case is carefully chosen in light of existing findings [anti-Arab views in Malta] and theory and with regard to a specific research question [social and alternative re-presentation for/against integration]. It attempts to identify patterns and themes and compare these with other cases. It [sic] that sense, it aims at a limited scope of generalization through checking the transferability [...] of the findings from a single case to other cases. (Demuth, 2018, pp. 78-79)

Importantly, this work also has intrinsic socio-political value, given the recent indications of worsening anti-Arab views in Malta (Sammut & Lauri, 2017, Sammut et al., 2021), which signal the potential for polarisation and a spiral of conflict (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008; Sammut et al., 2018). This warrants a research focus on Arab-Maltese relations. Accordingly, as a researcher, I position myself by adopting what Bauer and Gaskell (2008) call the “melancholic attitude” (p. 344), that is, I value meticulous documentation and observation, without engaging in immediate judgement or intervention. This positioning, together with a sensitivity toward the power differentials involved, allows me to study both groups symmetrically and systemically. The importance of this orientation lies in that, in turn, it allows me to make meaningful recommendations for intergroup reconciliation (see **Socio-Political Commitments**). Much has been said about spirals of conflict *after the fact*. However, little ‘symmetrical’ research has been conducted at their outset, in times of noticeable discrimination. This project seeks to redress this imbalance.

To this end, **Chapter 2** formulates the action-oriented approach to social re-presentation research. Premised on the fundamental idea that thinking is made for action (Fiske, 1992), this approach shifts the focus of SRT away from the *object* being re-presented (‘representations of’), and onto the *joint project/s* (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999) being advanced (re-presentation *for*’) (cf. Franks, 2011, p. 130). This reformulation emphasises the *systemic* interrelations between social and alternative re-presentation, and the *functional* significance of re-presentational activity. It is argued that giving primacy to action opens up a new methodological space in intergroup relations research, and this space is exploited by the development of two action-oriented formulae.

In turn, **Chapter 3** builds upon the action-oriented approach, convergences in the psychological literature on argumentation, the Toulmin model (Toulmin, 1958/2003) and lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski, 1980), to devise the minimal model of argumentation. The minimal model aims at cross-cultural validity by retaining a skeletal form. In the minimal

model of argumentation, interlocutors legitimise their claims on the basis of warrants (reasons) and evidence (examples), and use qualifiers (exceptions, specifications, etc.) to calibrate their claims. The model allows for qualitative data coding, and its claim-oriented nature makes it amenable to research in coalitional contexts.

The psychology behind such contexts and the broader intergroup relations, is reviewed in **Chapter 4**, as is the literature on Arabs and Muslims in Europe and on Arab-Maltese relations. The notion of *silent* coalitions underlies this chapter. Coalitions are ‘silent’ when their shared re-presentational climate advances the same goal/s, in the absence of explicit pursuits and formal organisation. This chapter explores issues relating to polarization and conflict spirals, and describes what is essentially the “coalitional ontology” (Lin et al., 2016, p. 313) upon which argumentation and social re-presentation unfold.

**Chapter 5** then proceeds to detail the overall methodological considerations behind the present work. The substantive theory stance (Greene, 2007, p. 69), upon which this work rests, is explained, as are the epistemological emphases (e.g., a focus on ecological validity) of the present inquiry. The research goals; research objectives; purposes for using mixed-methods; research questions; research design; and sampling considerations, are presented in this chapter. The research design involved qualitative interviews with Arabs (Study 1), the composition of the Intergroup Relations Scales (Study 2), and a survey with the Maltese and Arabs in Malta concerning their views on Arab-Maltese relations (Study 3).

**Chapter 6** therefore presents Study 1, which involved in-depth semi-structured interviews with Arabs in Malta concerning their views for/against integration. Argumentation interviewing (see Sammut et al., 2018) was used, and the data was analysed using minimal argumentation analysis (based on the minimal model of argumentation). Apart from a complex spectrum of arguments on integration, findings revealed three main patterns in Arabs’ viewpoints: the view that integration is difficult but necessary; an awareness of

Maltese resistance to integration; and the de-essentialism of ingroup and outgroup members and their projects.

In turn, **Chapter 7** presents Study 2. This study developed the expert-based rank-order scaling procedure, which was initially inspired by Thurstone scaling (Thurstone, 1928), and majorly adjusted in line with SRT, by building on Jaspars and Fraser's (1984, pp. 110-123) reflections on scaling. Arabs' claims on integration (from Study 1) were thematically categorized with Maltese claims on integration (from Sammut et al., 2018), to compose 12 items. These were ranked by intercultural relations experts in order of integrationism, subjected to exploratory factor analysis and reduced to 10 items. The final outputs consisted of the Intergroup Relations Scales: the Re-Presentation for Integration Scale (RFI) measures participants' views on integration, and the Alternative Re-presentation of Integration Scale (AROI) measures participants' views on the outgroup's views on integration.


**Chapter 8** documents Study 3, which involved the distribution and analysis of a survey with the Maltese and Arabs in Malta (which included the Intergroup Relations Scales among other measures). Multiple regression analysis showed that AROI sub-dimensions and RFI are systemically linked, among both the Maltese and Arabs, thus providing direct evidence for the action-oriented reformulation. The fact that the Intergroup Relations Scales were composed of items based on both Maltese and Arab arguments made them ecologically valid, and enriched the discussion of these results (see **Figure 1** for an overview of the present work, integrating Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3).

Finally, **Chapter 9** provides a general discussion of the overall work presented in this thesis. The main findings and contributions are synthesized, and a joint display of salient findings from Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3 is provided (Fetters et al., 2013). This is followed by a discussion of both the *systemic* (i.e., based on the action-oriented formulae) and the *substantive* (e.g., the struggles of Arab Muslim women, identity negotiations, etc.) facets of Arab-Maltese relations. In turn, the final chapter (**Chapter 10**) concludes this thesis by noting

the overall contributions and limitations of the present work, and recommending avenues for future research. Ultimately, “the human tragedies involved, the often painful process of trying to fit into a new society, the challenges, difficulties, and moral dilemmas that natives face [...] should lead social psychologists to ask themselves what sort of answers” (Verkuyten, 2018, p. 235) they can provide. The final chapter therefore ends with reflections and recommendations for ameliorating Arab-Maltese relations in Malta.

**Figure 1**

*Overview of the Present Work*



*Note.* The present work employs an exploratory sequential design. In Study 1, Arabs' views on integration are studied qualitatively. This enables Study 2, where Arab and Maltese views on integration are scaled, resulting in one scale that measures one's own views on integration and another scale that measures one's views on the outgroup's views on integration. In Study 3, Maltese and Arab views on integration are studied quantitatively, using the scales developed in Study 2 among other measures.

## Chapter 2 – Social Re-presentation For Joint Projects: An Action-Oriented Approach

Since its conception (Moscovici, 1961/2008), social representations theory (SRT) has been fundamentally concerned with the study of dynamic epistemologies (Marková, 2000). Indeed, the theoretical endeavour itself follows from a presupposition of such epistemologies. Various definitions of social representations abound in the literature. A social representation is most commonly defined as a “*system* [emphasis added] of values, ideas and practices with a twofold *function* [emphasis added]” (Moscovici, 1973, p. xiii): (a) creating a structure that enables social agents to orient themselves in their social world and master it; and (b) enabling communication between members of a collective by providing a mutually understood “code for social exchange” (Moscovici, 1973, p. xiii). The dynamics of anchoring (i.e., when foreign social objects are located within the realm of the familiar) and objectification (i.e., the process concretizing objects from abstract notions) influence how social representations emerge and change (Moscovici, 1984), providing a bedrock for common practices and shared knowledge (Howarth, 2006a). More recently, social representations have also been defined as “*systems* [emphasis added] of communication and *social influence* [emphasis added] that constitute the social realities of different groups in society” (Sammut & Howarth, 2014, p. 1799-1800; Duveen, 2008). Regardless of the definition, the *systemic* and *functional* aspects of social representation feature throughout.

A further development within SRT was the notion of alternative representations. An alternative representation is “*the representation of a potentially competing representation from within a social representation*. They are evident whenever we hear the phrases ‘they think’ or ‘they claim’ or ‘they say.’” (Gillespie, 2008, p. 380). Alternative representations are constituents of a social representation that are directed towards other contrasting social

representations, and contribute to intergroup dynamics. They can be managed or countered through semantic barriers—that is, communicative strategies that neutralise or preclude the consideration or adoption of alternative representations to differing degrees (Gillespie, 2008).

Social representations have been researched using various means, ranging from treatments of social representations as explanatory stimuli, to more descriptive approaches seeking to characterise rather than operationalise social representations (Jahoda, 1988; Marková, 2000). Studying social representations as experimental stimuli can come at the cost of neglecting the holomorphic property of social representations, that is, their being all-encompassing and hence part and parcel of—rather than preceding—social action (Wagner, 2015), especially if theory is neglected in the research design. However, even non-mechanistic approaches are still mainly preoccupied with the reproduction and stability of social representations, rather than how these change and function over time—thus, failing to tap their functional aspects comprehensively (Lopes & Gaskell, 2015, p. 42; Sammut et al., 2012; Wagner, 1998). The problem with studying changes in social representations of *objects* over time is that social representations are constitutive of social agents whilst simultaneously being constituted by them (Chryssides et al., 2009), making fruitful analytic demarcations a difficult prospect. Despite the clarifications brought about by constitutivist views, an accumulation of criticisms of SRT (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Verheggen & Baerveldt, 2007) addresses precisely these views.

In this chapter, it is argued that many of these criticisms keep surfacing due to an implicit epistemological commitment to an *object-oriented view* of social representations, giving primacy to descriptions and characterisations of social representations of Object X, by Group Y, in Context Z. Problems emerging from this orientation warrant for their solution a shift in focus towards an *action-oriented view* of social re-presentation. The latter view gives primacy to collective action, and not to social representations as content or to the objects being re-presented. The action-oriented view is essentially a theoretical stance from which to



view past and future research. More strongly, it also provides: (a) an explicit focus on social re-presentation *for* particular joint projects (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008), as opposed to simply *of* particular objects; and (b) more fruitful analytical demarcations, by considering both systemic (re-presentational) and extra-representational variables.

Accordingly, I proceed to present an action-oriented reformulation of social representations research. I first outline some charges levelled at SRT, showing how the highlighted shortcomings are mostly the result of an implicit commitment to object-oriented epistemologies, whether strong or weak. This is followed by (a) conceptual work advancing an action-oriented approach; (b) the presentation of a reformulation premised on this approach; and (c) a discussion of its analytical superiority and methodological implications for intergroup relations research.

### **Recurrent Issues in Social Representations Theory**

A long chain of criticisms of SRT has been launched from within discursive psychology (e.g., Potter & Edwards, 1999; Potter & Litton, 1985; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and social psychology more broadly (Harré, 1984; Jahoda, 1988). Some of the most salient issues concern: (a) the relationship between social representations and social groups; (b) the question of consensus; and (c) the distinction between distributive and collective pluralities (Harré, 1984). These are considered in turn, before presenting the distinctions between the aforementioned orientations.

#### ***Representation-Group Correspondence***

The observation that social representations are either shared across groups or else exclusive to particular groups is non-contentious (Potter & Litton, 1985). Accordingly, defining social groups is one step towards having points of orientation when studying SRT (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990, p. 4). The problem arises when one states that in delineating social groups one simultaneously delineates social representations (Farr, 1998). This leads to a circularity where both are mutually defined, and representations are presupposed to exist in

particular groups before the accrument of empirical evidence (see Fraser, 1994). Tautology is therefore risked whenever representations are explicated in a binary juxtaposition with other concepts (e.g., groups) without the inclusion of at least a third factor (cf. Franks, 2011, p. 6). This is especially problematic given that there is no representation-free ground from which to study social groups (Potter & Edwards, 1999). Moreover, in intergroup relations research, one risks taking one specific group and its representations as exclusive reference points for defining outgroups (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 143).

### *The Question of Consensus*

This is linked to the question of consensus. Fraser (1994) states that if consensus is central for social representations, then the degree to which social representations organise groups becomes an empirical question. Fraser argues that SRT must provide evidence for near-total consensus within groups, and for the view that different groups re-present the same object in different ways, without succumbing to the circularity accompanying mutual definition (Fraser, 1994). However, the centrality of consensus on representational content has been framed as problematic (Rose et al., 1995; Verheggen & Baerveldt, 2007). This is because, ultimately, collectives act in concert even without broad consensus vis-à-vis social objects (e.g., in riots; Litton & Potter, 1985).

In fact, neat re-presentational boundaries across different groups are rare. Rather, plural forms of knowledge generally coexist within the same milieu, in a state of “cognitive polyphasia” (Jovchelovitch & Priego-Hernández, 2015, p. 163). Furthermore, total or near-total consensus would make dialogue unattainable, as dialogue requires both sharedness and difference for it to be required and possible (Gillespie, 2008; Marková, 2000). In solving the problem of consensus, recourse has been made to a higher order of generality, reframing consensus as referring to a common *interobjective* (Sammut et al., 2013, p. 5) representational space—that is, a shared background of assumptions—that allows social communication and interaction (Chryssides et al., 2009; Sammut et al., 2010). Social re-presentation thus features

at once in the taken-for-grantedness of social life, constituting a shared field, while simultaneously enabling disagreement at lower levels of analysis (Rose et al., 1995). This shared background cannot be conceptualised as content-free form, since “content matters” (Bauer, 2015, p. 60) in SRT, even at higher levels of abstraction.

### ***Collective Pluralities and Re-presentational Access***

This raises the question of distributive versus collective pluralities (Harré, 1984; Rätty & Snellman, 1992; see Duveen, 1998). *Distributive* pluralities comprise groups that emerge due to corresponding attributes between their members, whereas *collective* pluralities have features that are not attributable to individual members. Harré gives the example of an army: its *weight* (i.e., of individual soldiers) is a distributive feature, whereas its *organisation* (i.e., as a whole) is a collective one (Harré, 1984). When social representations are held as being distributive, one observes talk of the frequencies of people who hold certain representations and not others. Here, it is the representations themselves which differ across individuals, rather than different positionings (Sammur & Gaskell, 2010) within a shared representation. This view resulted in individualised versions of social re-presentation that do not uphold its fundamentally social nature (Harré, 1984; Sammur & Howarth, 2014, p. 1799).

In contrast, the collective level of analysis enables an understanding of social representations as enablers of collective, or joint, intentionality and action (Franks, 2011, p. 42). Joint intentions require a minimum of two or more people (consider the joint intention to have lunch between friends) (Gilbert, 1989; Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007). Here, the issue is therefore one of *accessibility* (or inaccessibility from without) to social representations and collective intentions, and not one of consensus over representational content. Furthermore, just as total consensus precludes dialogue (Gillespie, 2008; Marková, 2000), total (in)accessibility precludes dynamism across collectives. Therefore, (in)accessibility, like consensus, can never be total, as this would effectively turn social representations into collective representations (Durkheim, 1912/1995), a central concept with which Moscovici

(1961/2008) purposely contrasted social representations. Moreover, at the collective level (Harré, 1984), the important distinction lies between non-dominant/dominant groups, and not minority/majority (Foster, 2003; Moscovici, 1976), since the latter dichotomy privileges distributions.

Here, it is worth noting that there is an asymmetrical relation between these two organisational levels. Whereas distributivity does not imply collectivity, collectivity does imply an underlying distribution to a certain extent. If the number of soldiers in an army (a collective) were to dwindle, at some point its collective organisation might well be effected (the distribution would be too small). This means that considerations of embodiment—and by implication, evolution and cognition—should feature in the study of social re-presentation (Franks, 2011, p. 316), if one is to avoid the charge that social representations incorporate properties of a self-contained “group mind” (Jahoda, 1988, p. 198). Notions of group mind are problematic because they fail to explain individual reflexivity and the varying influences of social representations on individuals (Jahoda, 1988). For example, such views cannot explain when and why re-presentation may make the familiar unfamiliar (Magioglou, 2008; Wagoner, 2008), rather than vice versa.

### **Degrees of Object-Orientation**

The above conceptual problems arise mostly if social representations are conceptualised within an *object-oriented approach* (see Buhagiar & Sammut, 2020a), which studies social representations of Object X, by Group Y, in Context Z. This formula results in ostensibly static entities (Potter & Litton, 1985). The object that is foregrounded is either an objectified and formalised social representation or else a social object held as having stable attributes (see Wagner, 1996), or both. Symptomatic of an object-oriented view of social representations are attempts at fleshing out what the characteristics of social representations of Object X are, treating “the verbal as the *via regia* to the mental and to representations”

(Wagner, 1998, p. 315) in so doing. Such an orientation begs the question as to why a particular social object is re-presented in the way that it is.

Strong object-oriented views clearly give epistemic priority to social representations as determinable objects (Verheggen & Baerveldt, 2007). The quintessential example of a strong object-orientation is that of segmenting and operationalising social representations such that these are construed simply as antecedents of behaviour (see Marková, 2000). This results in an exclusively distributive view of social representations. The point here is not against studying social re-presentation quantitatively, using experimental or survey research. Rather, the point is that when theory or operational efforts target the structure of the representation itself, static depictions result—which leave little room for the influence of joint projects (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008).

Strong variants of object-oriented research include structuralist approaches (Abric, 2001; Moliner & Abric, 2015, p. 83) and installation theory (Lahlou, 2015, p. 194), which will be considered for illustrative purposes. Firstly, structuralism involves attempts at demarcating the distinct central and peripheral features of social representations (Abric, 1993, 2001). For example, Abric's central core theory conceptualises social representations as structures having central features, which are stable and have group consensus, and peripheral features, which are more sensitive to context and allow for heterogeneous opinions (Abric, 1993, 2001; Moliner & Abric, 2015, p. 85). Apart from giving primacy to consensus, this operational focus on representational structure risks conflating social representations with discrete attitudes (see Quenza, 2005). Moreover, salient representational features can only be determined diachronically or retrospectively, due to the myriad developmental trajectories that re-presentation can follow over time (Sammot et al., 2012). Secondly, in installation theory, social representations are defined as logical sets comprised of individual representations distributed in a population (Lahlou, 2015, p. 194). Here, it is not clear what exempts social representations (as instantiated individual representations) from taking on

distributive properties (cf. Lahlou, 2015, p. 194). The theory also assumes that all individual representations are automatically relevant for social re-presentation, thus limiting considerations of joint intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007) and the systemic features of social influence (Sammut & Bauer, 2021, p. 157).

A weaker form of object-orientation rightly sees groups and representations as being somewhat constitutive of each other (see Chryssides et al., 2009), and avoids a synchronic or strictly formalist focus—but still gives primacy to abstract and static entities over dynamic social relations and joint projects (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008). This *a priori* foregrounding of content is problematic because representations are never self-interpreting: “by giving epistemic and ontological priority to social representation as social ‘objects’, [SRT] seems to put the cart before the horse” (Verheggen & Baerveldt, 2007, p. 18).

As an example of a weaker object-oriented view, consider Moscovici’s (1961/2008) influential work, which can be retrospectively fitted in the object-oriented formula as a study on: social representations (SR<sup>n</sup>) of psychoanalysis (Object X), by Catholics/Communists/urban liberals (Group Y), in 20<sup>th</sup> century France (Context Z). This formula does not incorporate a sufficiently detailed understanding concerning *why* psychoanalysis is re-presented differently by these specific groups. For instance, one group (e.g., Catholics) could re-present psychoanalysis as an object that opposes the ingroup’s joint project (e.g., as an unwelcome potential substitute to the sacrament of Confession), and could do so *reactively* in response to another group’s representation. In his seminal study, Moscovici (1961/2008) does posit “representation as instrument for action” (p. 324). He also states that groups often act on the premise that representations of the object correspond to the object itself (Moscovici, 1961/2008, p. 324). Yet, action is not conceptualised systemically in a way that makes it possible to analytically avoid circular group-representation correspondence (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Moreover, it is possible that a distributive streak

pervades Moscovici's work (Harré, 1984; see Moscovici, 1994, where social representations are defined as being “partially distributed” [p. 168]).

At the time of Moscovici's (1961/2008) research, Communists and Catholics clashed for political hegemony, with psychoanalysis featuring strongly in these ideological struggles (Duveen, 2008, p. xv). However, given that Moscovici's hypotheses (e.g., Moscovici, 1961/2008, p. xxxvi) focussed squarely on the themes and phraseology available when speaking about psychoanalysis (i.e., the object), the study did not account for how groups constantly re-imagine the object in line with changing *projects*. Indeed, years later, Moscovici inquired as to the possible reasons behind the ameliorated relations between Communists and psychoanalysis, spurred by academic work bridging these two worlds (Moscovici, 1961/2008, p. 343-345).

### **Conceptual Groundwork for an Action-Oriented Approach**

Having described the object-oriented approach, an action-oriented reformulation is herein proposed, together with its methodological implications. The reformulation does not eliminate a consideration of social representations as content *per se*, but rather gives primacy to *joint projects* (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). Consequently, the “stickiness” (Breakwell, 2014, p. 126) of representational content—that is, its power to attract adherents and resist being easily dismissed—is better explained, with recourse to the link between social re-presentation and action (Bauer, 2015, p. 60).

There are three main ways of conceptualising action within SRT: (a) the constitutive view merges re-presentation and action, seeing them as inseparable (e.g., Wagner, 1996, 2015); (b) the functional view posits that re-presentation actuates courses of action (see Howarth, 2006a, p. 72); and (c) the creative view postulates that re-presentation expands possible behavioural repertoires (Castro & Batel, 2008). These three views are all compatible with the notion of joint projects (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999). Accordingly, this section starts by

clarifying the sense in which representational content is relevant (and its implications), and proceeds to provide exemplars of action-oriented work within SRT.

### ***The Prescriptive Nature of Social Re-presentation***

Representational content is recursively malleable in that it is continuously altered through discursive elaboration. As evidence of this, even contrasting representations can be drawn upon in the service of a common goal (Potter & Litton, 1985). For instance, in Nazi Germany, Jewish migrants were seen as being both ‘capitalists’ and ‘communists’ (Rose et al., 1995); yet, both depictions denounced Jews. Similarly, immigrants can be simultaneously depicted as both lazy/unwilling to contribute to society *and* as stealing the jobs of locals—both depictions can promote unwelcoming dispositions toward immigrants. Social re-presentation also necessarily consists of elaboration at different orders of generality (e.g., concrete-abstract, particular-general, types-subtypes) (Harré, 1998, p. 136). For example, social representations of Arabs within a particular collective imply, by extension, the potential for a re-presentation of Libyans, people from Tripoli, people from Fashlum, and so on. Nevertheless, it is only select representational subtypes that are usually salient for specific collectives (e.g., representations of Libyans, rather than people specifically from Tripoli, circulate in the Maltese public; cf. Chircop, 2014). What is necessary for social action is not an exhaustive elaboration of social representations, but adequate re-presentation on which action can be based and outcomes pursued (see Roqueplo, 1990; as cited in Lahlou, 2015, p. 201).

A key feature implicit in the notion of joint projects (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008), which relates to the above, is the equation of description with direction/prescription. Social representations can be described as having both descriptive and prescriptive (and affective) qualities (Fraser & Gaskell, 1990; Moscovici, 2000, p. 21). An example of this distinction can be given by considering Harré’s (1998, p. 132) schema outlining what social representations *are* and *do*. The schema focuses on how social representations: are partially abstract and



partially pictorial; allow collective sense-making of unfamiliar phenomena through objectification and anchoring; and determine our reality over time (Harré, 1998, p. 132; McKinlay & Potter, 1987). Other authors similarly conceptualised social representations (a) *descriptively* as image/meaning, having both iconic and symbolic aspects (Jahoda, 1988), and (b) *functionally* as having selective, justificatory and anticipatory uses (Doise, 1978, p. 120). Taking these schemata *in toto*, the result is a *conjunctive* view of social re-presentation, which implies an analytic disentanglement between description *and* function/prescription. This view can be fruitfully juxtaposed with the *equative* view (i.e., description = function/prescription) of social re-presentation.

The equative view can be fleshed out with reference to the work of Franks (2011) and Millikan (2004). In discussing cognitive representations, Franks (2011, p. 133), following Millikan (1995, 2004), elaborates the notion of “pushmi-pullyu representations” (Millikan, 1995, p. 186). Pushmi-pullyu representations are *simultaneously* descriptive and prescriptive (Millikan, 1995). These representations work without giving the sense that the prescriptive element is clouding the descriptive element (Franks, 2011, p. 133). Pushmi-pullyu representations feature in human language, for example, in the sentence, “The meeting is adjourned” (Millikan, 1995, p. 186). In this example, a call for action is actuated, and a situation is described, simultaneously. Regardless of milieu, social re-presentation is inherently prescriptive in a similar manner. The pushmi-pullyu quality of re-presentation becomes evident when one considers the range of qualitative methods employed in researching social re-presentation and the results obtained (e.g., interviews, focus groups, etc.; Wagner et al., 1999). Presumably, in these research studies, participants contribute mainly (though perhaps not exclusively) by stating their opinions on the object in question, rather than by continuously prescribing courses of action involving the object in an explicit manner.

**Implications of the Equative View.** The equative view prioritises the systemic and functional aspects of social re-presentation, and as such carries three key implications. Firstly,

(a) it serves a synthetic role (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008), bringing social psychological paradigms closer together, as opposed to having SRT as a separate paradigm (Parker, 1987). The equative view makes SRT more commensurable with discursive psychology (see Batel & Castro, 2018) on the one hand, and evolutionary social cognition on the other. Discursive psychology upholds an action-oriented view of discourse (Heritage, 1984), where discourse has primarily practical consequences and does not merely reflect underlying realities (Wetherell & Potter, 1988, p. 168). Given that social re-presentation is necessarily content-laden (Bauer, 2015), SRT can be used to study the specificities of social contexts, targeting the areas left unaddressed by the use of relatively ‘content-free’ analytical tools in discursive psychology, such as interpretative repertoires (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990, p. 5; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1988, p. 180). Indeed, discourse itself implies social re-presentation since discourse involves *reconstructions* (premised on social representations) and not elaborations “out of the void” (Wagner, 1996, p. 113). In turn, the link with evolutionary social cognition lies in a shared functionalist basis: although reproductive fitness signifies a distinct type of functionalism, it is wholly compatible with psychological approaches that are functionalist by virtue of their focus on goals/motivated processes (Neuberg & Schaller, 2015, p. 9; see **Extra-Representational Research**).

Secondly, (b) the equative view implies that functionality/prescription takes primacy over description. Social thought proceeds by analogy, seeking to confirm conclusions (Carugati, 1990, p. 136). That is, “thinking is for doing” (Fiske, 1992, p. 877) and is only secondarily concerned with deriving semantic facts (see Wagner & Hayes, 2005). This does not mean that social agents act explicitly in order to actualise representations (Wagner, 2015). Rather, social representations are only real insofar as subjects act accordingly (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008), and their reproduction relies on practical imperatives (see Wagner & Hayes, 2005). The prevalence of contradictory representational descriptions pushing for the same cause attests to this. At the same time, some causes *do* benefit from sound portrayals of

semantic truth (i.e., they do gain strength and traction from a correspondence between social re-presentation and actuality). Nonetheless, even if the descriptive elements of re-presentation could be meaningfully *decoupled* (i.e., separated) from the prescriptive/motivational elements (see Franks, 2011, p. 126, p. 177; Fraser & Gaskell, 1990; Harré, 1998, p. 132; Moscovici, 2000, p. 21), this would hardly be relevant for understanding collective action. Whether tacit or made explicit through decoupling, localised shared knowledge remains intimately linked to localised collective practices (Harré, 1984).

Third, (c) joint projects (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008) need not be made fully explicit to come to fruition. In intergroup scenario, the equative view also explains the force of the bilateral accusatory arguments observed when groups alternatively re-present (Gillespie, 2008) the projects of others. These representations inevitably contain various entailments and implications (Moscovici, 1994) concerning the outgroup, and are able to coordinate action toward the outgroup precisely because their prescriptive nature is implicit in their descriptive contents. Moreover, if the action imperatives inherent in social/alternative re-presentation were perpetually obvious, their impetus would decrease, as the co-construction of shared views would be constantly marred by suspicions of deceitful intent.

### ***Action-Oriented Work on Social Re-presentation***

Recourse can now be made to work within SRT which prioritises action, using it as a springboard for the proposed reformulation. Among others, concerns with action are a key component in Wagner's (1996, 1998, 2015) work conceptualising the link between social re-presentation and action, and Bauer and Gaskell's (1999, 2008) work on joint projects, which are considered below.

**Domesticated Worlds.** For Wagner (1996), an understanding of how social re-presentation relates to local worlds presumes the recognition that social re-presentation and action are integrated together beyond contingency (Wagner, 2015, p. 19). "The world beyond any representational system sets limits which must figure in the theory if it is not to take the

airy idealist position of postmodern ‘Beliebigkeit’ [arbitrariness]” (Wagner, 1998, p. 313). Under this view, SRT must leave space for an explanation of “somethings” (Wagner, 1998, p. 307) and “brute facts” (Searle, 1995, p. 2) that exist independently of us. Both notions concern things beyond the domesticated world with which social representations interact (see Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). This stance contrasts with the *a priori* foregrounding of objects or representational content.

Apart from de-emphasising action, another problem of object-oriented views concerns the formulaic “*of*” (Wagner, 1996, p. 96). Social representations are not strictly *of* an object, since social objects do not always have stable attributes that can be talked about (Wagner, 1996). Rather, whether social representations *are* the object or *are of* the object partly depends on context of study, the nature of the representation in question (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999), and the social significance of the “brute facts” (Searle, 1995, p. 2) related to the object. The advantage of retaining the formulaic ‘*of*’, albeit qualifiedly, is therefore its implied realist stance.

**Joint Projects.** Realist roots can also be found in Bauer and Gaskell’s (1999, 2008) “toblerone model” (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008, p. 344) of social representations where the notion of a “joint project” (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999, p. 171) features. The toblerone model describes how subject-subject relations temporally re-present objects in the service of joint projects (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). Projects are the pragmatic contexts within which joint sense-making and action make sense in a collective; they link subjects together on a common trajectory (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999, 2008; Bauer, 2015, p. 52). In the toblerone model, a representation is defined as a “time-gestalt of ‘inter-objectivity’” (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999, p. 171), framing action and serving identity and memory functions within a community (Bauer, 2015, p. 54). In this model, social re-presentation is trebly construed as incorporating representations of the object, project and subjects (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999), which are mutually constitutive. However, the inclusion of multiple factors, and the focus on process and projects, mitigate the

logical quagmires of a binary constitutivism between group and representation. Furthermore, subjects within re-presentation are always a collective in the first-person plural (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008), and not atomised individuals as in Stimulus-Response psychological models (see Harré & Secord, 1972, p. 31; Marková, 2000; Wagner, 1996; see Wagner, 2015). This aligns with the work on joint intentionality explained above (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007). Projects are necessarily *joint*: they do not just involve the mobilisation of individual subjects with separate intentions.

This mobilisation is also teleological, in the substantive sense of ends-in-view (see Dewey, 1925/1988; cf. Bauer, 2013, p. 201) and desired states of affair inherent in there being a “not-yet” (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008, p. 343) and a “future-for-us” (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008, p. 343; see Zittoun & Gillespie, 2018, p. 22, on collectives and future projects). This mobilisation is also *coalitional* (see **Chapter 4**); that is, subjects may feel deeply committed to a project, but may also shift to other projects (Leech & Cronk, 2017, p. 89; Clark & Winegard, 2020). In essence, this means that “social re-presentation binds coalitions for action” (Buhagiar & Sammut, 2020a, p. 10).

There also seem to be negative (i.e., baseline) and positive aspects to joint projects. Negative aspects are present simply by virtue of the nature of social re-presentation, and constitute a bare minimum. These are akin to social construction processes (see Gergen & Davis, 1985), which are for the most part unintended by communities (Wagner, 1996). As an example, consider the interobjective character of joint projects. Negative aspects aid analytical demarcation in that interobjectivity *within* a collective implies some degree of inaccessibility from *without* (by outgroups). Positive aspects of a project are observed when there is explicit and *intended* articulation, and/or group mobilisation, by elites within a collective (e.g., politicians, mass media, etc.) (see Mehan, 1996; Bauer, 2015, p. 60). The joint nature of projects subsumes both negative and positive aspects, and the equative nature of re-presentation holds regardless of intent.

Later developments of the tobleron model included multiple ‘toblerones’ of different sizes—signifying power relations between dominant and non-dominant groups—and placed greater emphasis on the constraints set by a reality outside of re-presentation (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008), further problematising power (Rose et al., 1995) and contextualising intergroup dynamics (see Staerklé et al., 2011). For instance, relatively powerless groups may adjust their projects accordingly to fit those of powerful groups (Foster, 2003, 2011) and gain influence. Re-presentation is here a function of (a) subject-subject relations, (b) the object being re-presented, (c) the joint project, and (d) intergroup dynamics, and must be understood diachronically (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008; Bauer, 2015, p. 52). All this carries key methodological implications which are yet to be fully exploited (Foster, 2011). The following section addresses these implications, by means of an action-oriented reformulation that situates joint projects and alternative re-presentation (Gillespie, 2008) in intergroup scenarios.

### **An Action-Oriented Reformulation**

Fundamentally, an action-oriented view of social re-presentation is predicated on the central distinction between “representation-*for* [and] representation-*of*” (Franks, 2011, p. 130). The former emphasises what the object is being re-presented *for*, whereas the latter concerns simply what is being re-presented (Franks, 2011, p. 130; Millikan, 1989; Millikan, 1995). Franks (2011, p. 130) conceptualises retinal evolution as being directed by what visual representations are ultimately *for*. This is because conceptualising visual representations as being simply *of* the world, leads to questions surrounding the representational accuracy needed for adequate navigation of the world. In contrast, ‘representations-*for*’ foreground issues of functionality/efficacy over accuracy (Franks, 2011, p. 130). This distinction forms the basis of the reformulation that follows.

### *Social Re-presentation For Joint Projects*

Applying the above distinction between representations-of and representations-for (Franks, 2011, p. 130) to *social* re-presentation, the object-oriented formula ('Social representations SR<sup>n</sup> of Object X, by Group Y, in Context Z') can be reformulated as follows:

Social re-presentation SR *for* Project P, of/as Object O, by Group G<sub>1</sub>, in Context C ...  
according to Group G<sub>x...n</sub> (Formula 1)

Formula 1 (a) posits social re-presentation as a systemic process, with collective functions ('Social re-presentation SR'); (b) foregrounds action ('for Project P'); (c) leaves room for both realist and social constructionist conceptualisations ('of/as Object O'); (d) characterises groups as joint and collective subject-subject relations ('Group G<sub>1</sub>'), following Bauer and Gaskell (1999); and (e) incorporates various groups' alternative re-presentation of their outgroups' project, given a specific context ('in Context C ... according to Group G<sub>x...n</sub>'); see below). If Group 'G<sub>x...n</sub>' is G<sub>1</sub>, then *social re-presentation* is studied. *Alternative re-presentation* features whenever 'G<sub>x...n</sub>' is any group other than G<sub>1</sub>.

'For' is the operant word in Formula 1: it indicates an *orientation toward* the Project: one that either *favours* or *opposes* it. It is not meant to exclude re-presentation *opposing* the Project, but only representations that are simply *of* it. As such, strong object-oriented research does not fit within the reformulation. In contrast, research giving primacy to representational content (weak object-orientation) can be reframed by prioritising joint projects during analysis.

This formula enables systemic research on social re-presentation, which can be retrospective or prospective. *Retrospective* study elucidates how the functions of representations change for groups over time (Breakwell, 1993). For example, Sammut et al. (2012) present the views of Maltese immigrants in Britain concerning their country of origin

and host country, and related social representations, making recourse to the notion of collective remembering (Bartlett, 1932) and the historical record (Sammut et al., 2012). Sammut et al. (2012) note the contemporary predominance of assimilationist preferences among Maltese immigrants in Britain, and describe how the joint projects pursued by the Maltese changed over the years depending on the different values prioritised during different epochs, from medieval to post-war eras. Maltese social re-presentation of the past and of the Maltese themselves changed over the years, yet the trajectories taken by re-presentation always served projects that were salient at the time; for example, the self-sustenance of Maltese migrants (Sammut et al., 2012). The historicity intrinsic to social re-presentation (Villas Bôas, 2013) and social psychology more broadly (Gergen, 1973; Billig, 2018; Wagoner & Brescó de Luna, 2018) validates retrospective inquiry.

*Prospectively*, the formula can help devise research questions and inform research methods. SRT has a wide methodological arsenal (see Breakwell & Canter, 1993), which fulfils both analytic and synthetic functions in myriad ways (e.g., interviews, questionnaires, press analysis, etc.; Sotirakopoulou & Breakwell, 1992; see Flick et al., 2015, p. 71, for a review of research methods in SRT). However, methodological pluralism only results in conceptual coherence if managed well (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). By providing a ‘for’ to guide analysis, the proposed formula (along with related considerations) helps clarify recurring methodological issues. Firstly, given the importance of historicity for understanding how representational content is generated and stabilises in particular temporal spans (Billig, 2018; Gergen, 1973; Villas Bôas, 2013), longitudinal research designs can trace joint projects (Bauer, 2015, p. 57). This is not to say that all research must be longitudinal, but rather that a study focusing on a specific time period (T1), should at least leave open the possibility for studying the same phenomenon at a later time period (T2). Secondly, to identify target groups, one can use markers (see Bauer, 2015) such as the exhibition of self-referential identity, groups’ relationships with media systems (e.g., trust vs. mistrust), and group



histories (Bauer, 2015, pp. 57-62). Group identification requires a family resemblance approach (Bauer, 2015, p. 57; see Wittgenstein, 1953), given the fuzzy conceptual nature (see Haack, 1996) of the formula components. For instance, Object O can only be defined with reference to specific subject-subject relations ( $G_x$ ).

These general prospective guidelines can be transmuted into specific procedural propositions for research, as follows. Firstly, qualitative inquiries should allow participants to *advance arguments* for/against the joint project in question, through protocols asking ‘why’ questions (see **Chapter 3**). Subjects’ individual positions toward an issue (elicited during argumentation) shed light on *why* objects are socially re-presented as they are (see Flick et al., 2015, p. 66). This enables elucidation of the link between re-presentation and action (Flick et al., 2015, p. 66). Secondly, the study at T1 can allow the possibility of a study at T2 if its research design (see **Chapter 5**) takes the possibility of T2 into consideration.

Third, groups can be identified by asking research participants: (a) for their views on group geographies/taxonomies in the context around them; (b) how they identify/position themselves within these geographies; and (c) which sources (mass media or other) they consult for information. Doing this tactfully avoids the reification of group categories to some extent; and enables both the discursive problematisation of group categories, and (if need be) an acknowledgement of cultural hybridity (Gillespie et al., 2012). In essence, “social categories are (1) perspectival, (2) historical, (3) disrupted by the movement of people, and (4) re-constitutive of the phenomena they seek to describe” (Gillespie et al., 2012, p. 391). Accordingly, defining target groups in this manner diminishes the risk of delineating groups exclusively on the basis of another group’s (e.g., the researcher’s ingroup) representations of them (see Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 143). This means that the groups being researched need not be on the same analytical level. For example, one could legitimately study the conflict between a national and an ethnic group, based on definitions derived from both groups’ representations of self and other.

### *Alternative Re-presentation For Joint Projects*

Divergence of opinion makes dialogue and argumentation possible and necessary (Marková, 2000), and SRT becomes useful when group trajectories intersect and resist each other, and knowledge encounters unfold (Bauer, 2015, p. 61; Jovchelovitch & Priego-Hernández, 2015, p. 167). Divergent *practices* make social re-presentation evident (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). The action-oriented formula can therefore be expanded to address the question concerning how the study of dominant/non-dominant group relations and SRT can be united (Marková, 2008). Power differentials indicate the existence of different joint projects, each of which is only partly accessible from without.

Alternative representations by outgroups can be engaged with or resisted in various ways—including through argumentative styles that act as semantic barriers/promoters (Jovchelovitch & Priego-Hernández, 2015, p. 173). This is particularly the case when “semantic contact” (Gillespie, 2020, p. 22)—that is, “the meeting of meanings as it occurs moment to moment” (p. 22)—occurs between conflicting groups. Accordingly, the present reformulation enables research of alternative re-presentation across groups longitudinally. Building upon Bauer and Gaskell’s (1999) systemic approach, the action-oriented reformulation studies “how in the object [ $O_x$ ], the project [ $P_x$ ] of the subjects [ $G_x$ ] is represented; or how in the subjects [ $G_x$ ] the object [ $O_x$ ] appears in relation to a project [ $P_x$ ]; or how the project [ $P_x$ ] links the subjects [ $G_x$ ] and the object [ $O_x$ ]” (p. 168):

SR *for*  $P_{x\dots n}$ , as a function of:  $SR_1, AR_1^2, AR_1^n \dots SR_2, AR_2^1, AR_2^n \dots$  and any other  $SR_n$  and  $AR_n \dots$  relevant to Context C (Formula 2)

In Formula 2, ‘SR *for*  $P_{x\dots n}$ ’ is a function of the intersection between a plurality of knowledges (Jovchelovitch & Priego-Hernández, 2015, p. 163), where: (a)  $G_1$ , in advancing its Project, socially re-presents the relevant Object/s ( $SR_1$ ); (b)  $G_1$  alternatively re-presents

G<sub>2</sub>'s Project (AR<sub>1</sub><sup>2</sup>), and other relevant outgroups' Projects (AR<sub>1</sub><sup>n</sup>); (c) G<sub>2</sub>, in advancing its Project, socially re-presents the relevant Object/s (SR<sub>2</sub>); (d) G<sub>2</sub> alternatively re-presents G<sub>1</sub>'s Project (AR<sub>2</sub><sup>1</sup>), and other relevant outgroups' Projects (AR<sub>2</sub><sup>n</sup>); and (e) other groups, in advancing their Project, socially re-present the relevant Object/s (SR<sub>n</sub>), and alternatively re-present outgroups' Projects (AR<sub>n</sub>). In line with the equative view of re-presentation, each SR<sub>x</sub> and AR<sub>x</sub> in Formula 2 subsumes Formula 1. For example, SR<sub>1</sub> subsumes 'SR *for* Project P<sub>1</sub>, of/as Object O, by Group G<sub>1</sub>, in Context C ... according to Group G<sub>1</sub>'; and AR<sub>1</sub><sup>2</sup> subsumes 'SR *for* Project P<sub>2</sub>, of/as Object O, by Group G<sub>2</sub>, in Context C ... according to Group G<sub>1</sub>'; and so on. The "pushmi-pullyu" (Millikan, 1995, p. 186) nature of social re-presentation means that in articulating a collective's social re-presentation of the Object (SR<sub>x</sub>), one inevitably articulates its trajectory toward a Project (P<sub>x</sub>). This conceptual 'overlap' between the Project and the Object/s utilised to advance it is not problematic, as all formula components are fuzzy in nature. The logic behind Formula 2 is that all re-presentations/projects interrelate with other re-presentations/projects and collective futures.

This intergroup dynamic can be approached either (a) from the vantage point of a specific group, for example, G<sub>1</sub> (where 'SR *for* P<sub>x...n</sub>' = 'SR *for* P<sub>1</sub>'), or (b) by focussing on the systemic and interconnected gestalt (where 'SR *for* P<sub>x...n</sub>' is not tied to any specific group), as is done in the present research programme on Arab-Maltese relations. As a methodological corollary of Formula 2, surveys should address both participants' views and also what they think the outgroup thinks: "meta-representational polls should get as much prominence as straight opinion polls" (Elcheroth et al., 2011, p. 755). It also follows that research triangulation should aim at understanding joint projects in their complexity, from the *perspectives* of different collectives (Flick, 1992; Flick et al., 2015, p. 77) and the coalitions (Clark & Winegard, 2020) they host.

### ***Extra-Representational Research***

Having articulated an action-oriented reformulation for SRT research, I now turn to ‘extra-representational’ research, which incorporates non-representational elements in the research design. The problem is double-edged. On the one hand, studying intergroup relations from a purely psychological perspective is insufficient (Doise, 1978, p. 32, 55), and sociological insights are needed (Lopes & Gaskell, 2015, p. 42). On the other hand, the constraints set by actuality on social construction processes, and the characteristics of the distributions underlying collective phenomena need addressing, to abate the charge that social representations are “irreducible explanatory devices” (Jahoda, 1988, p. 197). In other words, although culture and re-presentation are intimately linked (Sperber, 1985), SRT still lacks an explicit grounding in evolutionary theory and embodiment (Franks, 2011, p. 316).

The intersection between the biophysical and the social has featured in work on social ontology spanning recent decades, for example, within the meta-theoretical framework of critical realism (see Bhaskar, 1975/2008; Sayer, 2000). Critical realism addresses this intersection by means of (a) a stratified view of reality where causality is understood in terms of powers and generative mechanisms (see Harré & Moghaddam, 2016), (b) a qualified justification of epistemological relativism, and (c) a recognition of the contingent, dynamic and historical nature of knowledge (de Souza, 2014; Sayer, 2000). This meta-theoretical framework avoids problems associated with linear explanations whereby causal explanations on one level (e.g., the biological) carry on directly to another (e.g., the psychological). Despite the possible benefits of critical realism (Zachariadis et al., 2013), its benefits for the social sciences remain contested (Cruickshank, 2004; Hammersley, 2009; Roberts, 2014). Thus, its application to SRT has been minimal (e.g., de Souza, 2014), and cannot yet replace substantive field-specific theory (Greene, 2007, p. 69) in seeking to bridge different levels of analysis (see **Chapter 5**).

A way forward entails the identification of parameters within both evolutionary social cognition and sociocultural psychology that are commensurable with each other (Franks, 2011). A massively modular view of mind and strong social constructionism *impede* this synthesis; however, a recognition of the relational nature of individual cognitive representations, and soft social constructionism (Thomas & Velthouse, 1990), *facilitate* this synthesis (Franks, 2011, p. 109). Re-presentation is only one aspect of mind (Franks, 2011), and SRT research can incorporate different kinds of extra-representational variables (ERVs). Some ERVs share a similar ‘in-between’ ontological plane (see Harré & Sammut, 2013, p. 15) as social representations; for example, affordance relations (e.g., opportunities that contexts/objects provide for immediate action; Franks, 2011, p. 191, p. 316), consensual practices (e.g., whom to kiss, how and when; Verheggen & Baerveldt, 2007), sense of community (McMillan & Chavis, 1986), mentalities (Sammut, 2019a), and so on. Other ERVs lie at a lower-level ontological plane; for example, social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), which refers to individuals’ orientations toward intergroup relations, and need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), which is a cognitive style relating to epistemic certainty (see **Chapter 4** and **Chapter 8**).

The distributive-collective distinction (Harré, 1984), or the problem of emergence, is encountered at multiple levels of analysis in social psychology (Doise, 1980, 1986), and as such, demands formulations specific to the research question at hand. In bridging social representation and ERVs, surveys or experimental protocols can be used to further an understanding of how lower-level variables (e.g., characterological variables, etc.) relate to varying orientations toward a specific project within a shared re-presentational field.<sup>1</sup> To a certain extent, this manner of proceeding works regardless of researchers’ philosophical understanding of psychological variables (e.g., strictly genetic vs. ecological views of

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<sup>1</sup> This echoes Doise et al.’s (1999) conceptualisation of social representations as organising principles framing individual positions toward an issue.

personality; Buss & Hawley, 2010). Mapping ‘SR for Project P’ onto lower-level variables does not impoverish, but rather aids, the study of social re-presentation as a collective pursuit. This provides the action-oriented approach with a more explicit grounding in evolutionary theory and embodiment (Franks, 2011, p. 316).

## **Conclusion**

This chapter proposed an action-oriented approach to SRT, following a discussion of the differences between an object-oriented and an action-oriented approach (see **Appendix A**). In summary, I made the argument that recurrent issues in SRT (e.g., those pertaining to group-representation correspondence, representational consensus and distributive views) effectively culminate in the *object-oriented approach*, which studies representations primarily in terms of their content. Distinctions were subsequently made between strong and weak object-oriented approaches; the former rely on strict formulations of representations as determinable objects, whilst the latter simply foreground the content of representations over the project they advance. This led to an elaboration of what was termed as the *equative view* of re-presentation, wherein re-presentation was conceptualised as being simultaneously descriptive and prescriptive. This laid the ground for the systemic and functional study of social re-presentation, and meant that joint projects (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999) need not be made fully explicit to be actuated.

After considering action-oriented work in SRT, I presented two action-oriented formulae, drawing inspiration from Franks’s distinction between “representation-*for* [and] representation-*of*” (Franks, 2011, p. 130). Formula 1 tapped ‘Social re-presentation SR for Project P’ and Formula 2 understood ‘SR for P<sub>x...n</sub>’ as a function of the systemic relations between ingroup and outgroup social and alternative re-presentation for/against the project in question. This chapter therefore offered SRT specific methodological procedures in line with the action-oriented formulae, which had previously been lacking (Potter & Edwards, 1999).

The ways in which psychological phenomena other than social representations (ERVs) could be incorporated in work on SRT, was also explored.

Thus, the take-home message is that it is goals that shape group interactions, and that they do so partly through the re-presentation they inspire (Doise, 1986, p. 114). It is therefore action that directly unites psychological phenomena with reality (Wagner, 2015, p. 13); and social influence is systemic (Sammut & Bauer, 2021, p. 157), such that the groups relevant to Context C mutually influence each other's re-presentations. The theoretical propositions made above constitute a move away from viewing the sociocultural as simply relating to shared understandings in a collective, and towards a more explicit focus on the primacy of action (Ratner, 1996). In turn, this gives credence to the argument from sufficient re-presentation (see Roqueplo, 1990): that is, action-related concerns provide the litmus test for discursive elaboration within localised communities. This answers Moscovici's (1994) question, "is there an Occam's razor prohibiting us multiplying the contexts of communication beyond necessity?" (p. 176), in the affirmative: joint projects (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999) guide re-presentation as needed for their advancement.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See Buhagiar and Sammut (2020a) for the relevance of this work for mainstream psychological research.

### **Chapter 3 – The Minimal Model of Argumentation**

The goal-oriented nature of re-presentation can be further appreciated by devising an empirical model of argumentation, inspired by the action-oriented formulae. Argumentation can be defined as the verbal and social act which, through the advancement of propositions, aims at convincing an audience/interlocutor about a particular standpoint (van Eemeren et al., 2002, p. xii). Apart from substantiation (Willard, 1989), argumentation necessarily involves incompatible positions and must be understood in light of its communicative context, as a fundamentally social exchange (Ben-Ze'ev, 1995; Hornikx & Hahn, 2012). Fittingly, Wenzel (1990, p. 9; see Lewiński & Mohammed, 2016) highlights three main ways of understanding argumentation: as rhetoric (i.e., the process of persuasion); as dialectic (i.e., the procedures regulating conflicts between standpoints); and as logic (i.e., the view of arguments as products, and the analysis of their inferential composition). Accordingly, “all arguments can be regarded as rhetorical, dialectical and logical phenomena” (Wenzel, 1990, p. 9).

Contemporary research on argumentation strives at theoretically accommodating these three perspectives on argumentation (Lewiński & Mohammed, 2016), and adds a focus on the empirical literature on persuasion (see Bauer & Glăveanu, 2011, p. 209; van Eemeren, 2015).

Argumentation has been the subject of extensive research within the humanities (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; van Eemeren et al., 2014) and analytic philosophy (Austin, 1962; Toulmin, 1958/2003). However, there is a relative lack of psychological research on the topic (Voss & Van Dyke, 2001). At present, the field is dotted with research areas that overlap only slightly (Hornikx & Hahn, 2012; Oaksford, 2011). These include Billig's work on rhetorical psychology (Billig, 1987), Bayesian models within cognitive psychology (Hahn



& Oaksford, 2007), and evolutionary approaches to argumentation (Mercier & Sperber, 2011).

Despite their value, philosophical explorations of argumentation have traditionally sacrificed an understanding of the intricacies of social life, or else posited logical standards beyond what is normally achievable by interlocutors (Lillo-Unglaube et al., 2014). This normative focus makes the empirical application of most philosophical models of argumentation an impractical one. Although certain models of argumentation (e.g., the Toulmin model; Toulmin, 1958/2003), have been applied in social research (Liakopoulos, 2000, p. 152), these lack parsimony, particularly in terms of data analysis (see **The Toulmin Model**). In addition, studies employing the Toulmin model (e.g., Liakopoulos, 2000) make no claim for a correspondence between argumentation and social cognition. Thus, the pursuit for a parsimonious model should incorporate an understanding of argumentation grounded in psychological theory.

This chapter has two goals. First, it is argued that the inclusion of ‘why’ questions in qualitative research elucidates the link between social re-presentation and action (Flick et al., 2015, p. 66). Secondly, the minimal model of argumentation—grounded in lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski, 1980)—is presented. This model allows argumentation to feature both in the research *method*, and as the research *focus*. To this end, the next section explores a sociocultural view of argumentation, showing it to be commensurable with other psychological approaches, and evaluates the intersections at which argumentation and the action-oriented approach converge. This sets the stage for considering different empirical methods for studying argumentation. Finally, lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski, 1980) is presented, and the minimal model is proposed.

### **Towards a Sociocultural Psychology of Argumentation**

Under a sociocultural conception, argumentation emerges within social contexts (Rosa, 2007, p. 309), and is fundamental to belief formation (Rosa, 2007, p. 312) and social

construction processes (Gergen, 1988, p. 31). Argumentation is therefore resistant to decontextualised formalisations, and is institutionally, socioculturally and historically embedded (Gerritsen, 2001, p. 51; Muller Mirza et al., 2009, p. 67; Sammut & Buhagiar, 2017). The intractability of argument form (Bar-Tal & Kruglanski, 1988, p. 3; Gergen, 1988, p. 37), and cultural differences in argumentative styles, constitute difficulties in constructing an argumentation model that can be empirically applied and also has cross-cultural validity. This calls for an eclectic approach to the endeavour, necessitating a review of cross-cultural differences in argumentation and convergences across psychological approaches.

Reasoning is a universal phenomenon (Mercier & Sperber, 2017, p. 286), displaying cross-cultural similarities (e.g., Miller, 1987). Nonetheless, there are “Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD)” (Henrich et al., 2010, p. 61) peculiarities to argumentation in the West (Mercier & Sperber, 2017, p. 279). Cross-cultural differences in argumentative styles abound (Mercier & Sperber, 2017, p. 277; Norenzayan et al., 2002). Differences concern: a preference for abstract versus concrete reasoning (Luria, 1976, p. 77); the relevance of arguments from authority (Bloch, 1971; Walton, 1997, p. 33); (in)tolerance for apparent logical contradictions (Peng & Nisbett, 1999); whether disputes are engaged in as ends in themselves (Corsaro & Rizzo, 1990); whether main claims are proposed following supportive information or at the outset (Kotani, 1994); and whether argumentation is seen as the way to obtain truth or else as a consequence of the failure to do so (Lloyd, 1990, p. 129).

### ***Convergence across Psychological Approaches***

These examples contextualise the war metaphor of argumentation prevalent in the West—where interlocutors *attack* viewpoints, and *lose* or *win* arguments (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p. 5)—as one metaphor among many. They also aid the search for convergences across psychological approaches to argumentation. Sociocultural elements penetrate both the epistemic and relational features of argumentation, from the provision of justifications to the

use of symbolic tools (Andriessen & Schwarz, 2009, p. 148; Muller Mirza, 2015). In turn, this reflects the need for cross-culturally valid models.

**Symbolic Resources.** Correspondingly, symbolic tools and resources feature in one of the main pillars of sociocultural psychology: the semiotic mediational framework (Valsiner & Rosa, 2007, p. 4), focusing on the creation/employment of meanings. This approach has social representations theory (SRT) is one of “its nearest neighbors” (Valsiner & Rosa, 2007, p. 4). Indeed, “the processes of social representation and semiotic mediation feed into each other, creating potential for change at both personal and societal levels” (Valsiner, 2013, p. 1).

A cultural notion becomes a symbolic resource when (a) it is intentionally used for an aim lying exterior to it, (b) it is used in situations not necessarily calling for its use, and (c) it requires for its use “the creation of a sphere of experience beyond the here and now of the socially shared reality” (Zittoun, 2007, p. 344; Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010a). For example, a song can be enjoyed to bring two people close together (fulfilling points [a] and [b]) within a shared musical field (fulfilling point [c]) (Zittoun, 2007, p. 344). For Zittoun, argumentative styles do not fully qualify as symbolic resources, as they do not meet point (c) (Zittoun, 2007, p. 344). They may instead be considered rhetorical resources (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010a; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006). Nonetheless, symbolic resources (linguistic or otherwise) can still be used *within* argumentative discourse (cf. Muller Mirza, 2015). The *use* of symbolic resources is not automatically goal-oriented, as such resources simply “offer temporary definitions, ‘quasi-aims’, bringing provisional meanings to some actions” (Zittoun et al., 2003, p. 419). However, this *does not preclude* the deliberate use of symbolic resources for particular aims (Zittoun et al., 2003). The semiotic mediational approach is thus compatible with teleological conceptions of argumentation, which emphasise its justificatory nature and interlocutors’ conflicting motivational goals (cf. Jaspars, 1988, p. 352; Stein & Miller, 1993).

**An Evolutionary Account.** Also consistent with teleological views of argumentation are evolutionary psychological findings showing that reasoning has a primarily argumentative function, whereby interlocutors search for arguments that bolster a desired conclusion and for conclusions that can be argumentatively supported (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). This explains the confirmation bias, whereby individuals look for and construe available evidence in ways supporting their beliefs (Nickerson, 1998; Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Here, the teleological basis of argumentation is clear: individuals engage in motivated reasoning in preparation for argumentative challenges. This makes reasoning fundamentally directed at persuasion (Mercier & Sperber, 2011), whereby agents assess interlocutors' arguments by remaining epistemically vigilant and checking for coherence (Sperber et al., 2010).

Although it largely excludes socio-political factors and lacks cross-cultural generalisability (Narvaez, 2011), this evolutionary account does converge with sociocultural views: both approaches emphasise argumentative teleology, and the pragmatic and confirmatory nature of argumentation (e.g., by focusing on motivated reasoning, or on the pragmatic use of symbolic resources). This makes argumentation an exercise in persuasion.

**Rhetorical Psychology.** This inherent focus on persuasion brings the above accounts of argumentation closer to rhetorical perspectives (Lillo-Unglaube et al., 2014). According to Billig's rhetorical psychology (Billig, 1985, 1987, 1991), reasoned discourse lies behind individuals' viewpoints (Billig, 1987, p. 74). The articulation of such viewpoints constitutes argument-making: a process involving the negotiation of familiar perspectives, contradictions and alternative opinions. Individual argumentation thus has its counterpart in the public sphere, where arguments and their "chains of reasoning" (Billig, 1987, p. 74) collide. This means that all singular opinions (a) address/partake in aspects of argument already prevalent in the social sphere (Billig, 1987), (b) are adopted amongst a plethora of arguments (and representations) already available in public (Billig, 1987; Sammut, 2015, p. 96), and (c) are synthesised according to individual needs.

Thus “logoi” (Billig, 1987, p. 74)—that is, reasons/principles, and by inference, claims—necessarily have their “anti-logoi” (p. 74) or counter-claims, making all conceivable viewpoints debatable. Particularisation and categorisation can be applied to any topic and pitted against each other, as each viewpoint implies the possibility of its contraries (Billig, 1985). The possibility of rhetorical fluidity makes it more practical to conceptualise differences in thought/argument as differences in content. For example, differences between prejudiced versus tolerant thought can be conceptualised as differences in *content*, rather than *form*, of thought (Billig, 1985). The nature of rhetoric is such that argument form remains intractable.

### **Argumentation and Social Re-presentation**

The necessary pervasion of rhetorical contraries fits in naturally with social re-presentation, both in scenarios replete with cognitive polyphasia (Jovchelovitch & Priego-Hernández, 2015, p. 163), and as a corollary of the rhetorical view of mind (Billig, 1991, p. 71; Gibson, 2015, p. 213). Rhetorical contraries endow re-presentation with perpetual indeterminacies and negotiable tensions. The three genitives involved in social re-presentation (re-presentation of *subjects*, of *object*, and of *project*; Bauer & Gaskell, 1999) are subject to constant re-evaluation. Thus, “deliberative thought is internalized argumentation” (Billig, 1991, p. 72), which can be pursued with joint intentions (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007) to further some joint project (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008) over others (see **Chapter 2**). Accordingly, social re-presentation provides a collective interobjective bedding, which allows for intersubjective discordance (Matusov, 1996) and viewpoint heterogeneity amongst arguing subjects (Rose et al., 1995).

This positions social re-presentation strongly within the realm of social influence (Mugny et al., 2008), where “what we think others are thinking” (Elcheroth et al., 2011, p. 733) matters, particularly in intergroup domains. This framing builds upon Moscovici’s classical definition of social representations (Moscovici, 1973, p. xiii), by specifying how the

functions of social re-presentation (i.e., mastery of the social world, and the enabling of communication) are achieved: through social influence (Sammut & Howarth, 2014, p. 1799). Social influence is most evident when social re-presentations function as rhetorical resources for concrete aims (Callaghan & Augoustinos, 2013), promoting or precluding change (Castro & Batel, 2008). On the collective level, this entails alternative re-presentation and the employment of semantic barriers in anticipation of outgroups' counterarguments (Gillespie, 2008), whereby individuals naïvely unearth implicit assumptions in their interlocutors' arguments for strategic purposes (Jackson, 1992; Uzelgun et al., 2016). On the distributive level, this makes agents with better decentration skills (i.e., the adoption of others' viewpoints; Piaget, 1929/2007, p. 33) better arguers (Muller Mirza et al., 2009, p. 70).

The discourses capable of bestowing legitimation vary across different milieus (Duveen, 2007, p. 548). For example, different social representations of climate change are promoted using different argumentative strategies (Uzelgun et al., 2016), and children socially re-present gender for conflicting ends when arguing (Psaltis & Duveen, 2006). Indeed, argumentation and social re-presentation are intrinsically linked: argumentative preferences are shaped by re-presentational content, and the latter is sculpted argumentatively (Kadianaki & Andreouli, 2017; Uzelgun et al., 2016). Gillespie (2008) notes that social re-presentation has both *instrumental* and *communicative* functions. Argumentation is evident in the communicative function, whenever interlocutors appeal to representational content for communicative ends. However, the communicative function also informs the instrumental function, diluting the analytical validity of having two functions construed separately. For example, an arguer may appeal to representations of a clean environment to justify restricting car usage (communicative function). Consequently, this viewpoint makes agents behave in particular ways, for example, by driving less (instrumental function).

This makes argumentation fundamental in the microgenesis of social re-presentation (see Duveen & Lloyd, 1990, p. 8; Psaltis, 2015, p. 72), and aligns with the equative view of

re-presentation and the action-oriented formulae (see **Chapter 2**). Thus, argumentation, in its sociocultural embeddedness, is simultaneously directed towards *goals*, *others*, and particular *topics* (Muller Mirza, 2015), which can be mapped respectively onto *projects*, *groups* and *objects*. Argumentation is an activity bound by (a) rules, and (b) expectations/appraisals of objects (Muller Mirza et al., 2009, p. 86). These respectively relate to (a) re-presentational milieus and the inferential linkages they support, and (b) social/alternative re-presentation.

### ***Empirical Research on Argumentation within SRT***

Despite the intimate link between social re-presentation and argumentation, there is little empirical research linking the two (Üzelgün, 2015). Some examples include: Castro and Batel's (2008) research on arguments on public participation using narrative interview transcripts; Uzelgun et al.'s (2016) analytical reconstructions of arguments on climate change; and Kadianaki and Andreouli's (2017) thematic analysis of online arguments on citizenship. Another example is Sammut et al.'s (2018) study, detailed below.

The action-oriented formulae (see **Chapter 2**), together with an empirically generative argumentation model, would be useful in advancing this research. In building this model, it will be argued that the view—common within narrative and other approaches (cf. Jovchelovitch & Bauer, 2000, p. 64)—“that the researcher should not ask ‘why’ questions in the main body of the interview [precludes an understanding of] how representations influence our action” (Flick et al., 2015, p. 66). Research on argumentation within SRT tends to suffer from the following: (a) a failure to directly ask participants to justify their viewpoints (e.g., narrative interviews that do not ask for justifications); (b) the employment of *post hoc* interpretative procedures (e.g., during argument reconstruction); and (c) a neglect of argument structure (e.g., during thematic analysis on unobtrusive data). Research linking argumentation with SRT requires “a systematization of the repetitive arguments and discursive strategies people use” (Castro & Batel, 2008, p. 481). Thus, the next sections outline empirical work on argumentation, laying the groundwork for the minimal model.

**Post hoc Argumentation Analysis.** During research, interview transcripts are often submitted to thematic analysis (Bauer, 2000), whereby participants' views are coded to identify salient themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This neglects the specific features characterising participants' arguments, and privileges semantic content over pragmatic communication (Üzelgün, 2015). The analysis of argumentation is therefore a systematic alternative, useful for studying social re-presentation (Üzelgün, 2015). This can involve a reconstruction of participants' arguments by the researcher following the identification of unexpressed premises. The latency of such premises could shed light on social re-presentation (Moscovici, 1994, p. 168; Üzelgün, 2015). For example, Uzelgun et al. (2015, 2016) reconstructed arguments on climate change to understand what arguers achieve through their propositions. This method resulted in coherent argument reconstructions, whose implicit premises were not argued *in vivo* by participants.

The reconstructions pursued in these studies are based on the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 517), which presumes that interlocutors argue to resolve differences in perspective. Interactional oscillations between interlocutors, convincing and rebutting each other by "grounding conclusions in mutually acceptable starting points" (van Eemeren et al., 1997, p. 219), make the theory dialectical. In turn, it is pragmatic because it focuses on argumentation as a "coherent whole of speech acts" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 95). The theory also accounts for strategic manoeuvring during argumentative discourse (van Eemeren, 2010; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002, p. 135). Pragma-dialectical theory outlines an ideal model (Üzelgün, 2015), where argumentative moves are only sound if they follow rules for critical discussion, such as allowing one's interlocutor to advance standpoints and defending one's standpoint when asked to do so (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002, p. 141). During argument reconstruction, unexpressed premises are exposed according to rules regulating the addition of premises, the deletion of irrelevant material, the substitution of vague formulations, and content



permutations. This makes arguments analytically explicit (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 103-112).

Notwithstanding the value of the pragma-dialectical approach, sometimes “discourse or text does not contain any indications that justify the reconstruction” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 112). Furthermore, it heavily contrasts with SRT’s emphasis on local meaning-making (Jovchelovitch, 2007). It is true that some interpretation on researchers’ behalf is inevitable, and that a minimal normative baseline during argumentation is necessary (Habermas, 2005, p. 385; Dahlberg, 2013). Yet, argument reconstruction can give researchers an exceedingly interpretative role, and risks excluding inferential linkages particular to a specified context and inaccessible to the researcher, who necessarily falls back on *a priori* formulations. Apart from pragma-dialectical theory, other models previously employed in argumentation analysis include the Argumentum Model of Topics (Greco, 2016; Greco Morasso, 2012), and the Toulmin model (Toulmin, 1958/2003), the latter of which is explained below.

**Argumentation Features at the Data Collection Stage.** In the above studies employing argument reconstruction (Uzelgun et al., 2015, 2016), argumentation featured during *post hoc* analysis, but the data collection protocol did not always foreground argumentation *per se*. Yet, foregrounding argumentation during data collection could minimise the need for *post hoc* interpretation during analysis (Sammut et al., 2018). Sammut et al.’s (2018) study aimed for this, and investigated Maltese social re-presentation for/against the integration of Arabs in society using semi-structured interviews. By understanding their articulated viewpoints, the researchers understood how interlocutors position themselves relative to others, based on how they socially re-present particular objects argumentatively (Sammut et al., 2018).

Argumentation interviewing and analysis, as conducted by Sammut et al. (2018), showed how similar viewpoints can be justified differently. In turn, the inferential linkages

supporting participants' viewpoints were naturally related to action (Wagner, 2015) and joint projects (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). Discerning different argumentative legitimations of similar viewpoints led to an appreciation of how "arguments in social space are fashioned *across* individuals sharing a similar point of view" (Sammur et al., 2018, p. 399). Sammur et al. (2018) used the Toulmin model of argumentation (Toulmin, 1958/2003) during both data collection and analysis. Fittingly, the next section details this model, and Sammur et al.'s (2018) research strategy. This strategy is critically appraised, paving the way for improving Sammur et al.'s (2018) coding frame in line with insights from lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski, 1980).


***The Toulmin Model.*** The Toulmin model views argumentation as fundamentally concerned with justification, its other functions being "secondary, and parasitic upon this primary justificatory use" (Toulmin, 1958/2003, p. 12). Accordingly, the model prioritises persuasion and informal logic over formal validity, seeing the latter as being neither necessary nor sufficient for argument soundness (Liakopoulos, 2000, pp. 153-155). This makes the model consistent with the psychological literature on argumentation reviewed above. The Toulmin model frames argumentation as a fundamentally social act which is dependent in part on the field (e.g., art, politics, etc.) in which it unfolds (Toulmin et al., 1984; Liakopoulos, 2000, p. 155). Some argumentative features are *field-dependent*: they depend on particular contexts for standards of soundness. Others are *field-invariant*. For Toulmin, field-invariant features constitute the components of argument, which are present in any argument made fully explicit (Ball, 1994; Toulmin, 1958/2003, pp. 14-15).

In the Toulmin model, an argument advances one or more claims, and is schematically composed of different components, defined functionally with respect to the claim(s) being made (see **Figure 2**). These components are: claim, data, warrant, backing, qualifier and rebuttal (Liakopoulos, 2000; Toulmin, 1958/2003). In summary, a *claim* is a conclusion, supported by evidence brought forth to establish it; *data* constitute any facts or evidence

employed to substantiate the claim; *warrants* legitimate the step from data to claim, usually in the form of hypothetical linkages; *backings* comprise underlying premises supporting/giving authority to warrants; *qualifiers* reconfigure the strength of warrants, defining their conditions of legitimacy; and *rebuttals* indicate scenarios where the authority of warrants should be rejected (Toulmin, 1958/2003, pp. 90-105). The Toulmin model can also be adapted to research needs (Liakopoulos, 2000, p. 157; Tans, 2006, p. 219).

**Figure 2**

*The Toulmin Model of Argumentation*



*Note.* A schematic diagram of the Toulmin model, showing the main components of an argument. A ‘Claim’ refers to the take-home message of an argument; ‘Data’ refer to the evidence for such a claim; a ‘Warrant’ gives credence to the bridge between data and claim; a ‘Backing’ is an underlying assumption supporting the warrant; a ‘Qualifier’ calibrates the force of the warrant; and a ‘Rebuttal’ indicates instances when the warrant should be refuted. Adapted from “*The uses of argument*” (Updated ed.) by S. E. Toulmin, 2003, p. 117. Cambridge University Press (Originally published in 1958).

An example of an argument (based on the Toulmin model) is: ‘Maya is a local cat’ (Data); and *since* ‘Any local cat may be taken to have white fur’ (warrant)—*on account of the premise that/given that* ‘All local cats have always had white fur’ (backing)—*then* ‘presumably’ (qualifier), *unless* ‘Maya lost her fur’ (rebuttal), ‘Maya presently has white fur’ (claim) (see Toulmin, 1958/2003, p. 117; **Figure 2; Appendix B**). Beyond schematics, argument types vary considerably based on their use of warrants: (a) substantive arguments

relate to things in the world; (b) authoritative arguments rest on source reliability; and (c) motivational arguments appeal to motives, values or emotions (Brockriede & Ehninger, 1960). These mirror Aristotle's artistic proofs—logos, ethos and pathos—respectively (Bauer & Glăveanu, 2011; Leach, 2000, p. 214). Informal argumentation usually advances substantial arguments, whose soundness is field-dependent (Liakopoulos, 2000, p. 155).

Despite the above, attempts at systematising warrants (Freeman, 2006, p. 87) remain unsuccessful (Kock, 2006). Warrants evade a common yardstick. It is difficult to establish what constitutes an actual warrant (Keith & Beard, 2008), and to distinguish between data and warrant (Hample, 1977), or between backing and warrant (Simosi, 2003). This incommensurability “necessitates the use of rhetoric in practical reasoning” (Kock, 2006, p. 247), making the Toulmin model a rhetorical one. The model is not explicitly dialectical: it does not require appraisals of opposing arguments by active interlocutors (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 47). Nonetheless, argumentative exchange is *not incompatible* with the Toulmin model, and can enrich research using the model.

***Argumentation Interviewing and Analysis.*** The rhetorical character of the Toulmin model can be appreciated in Sammut et al.'s (2018) semi-structured interviews. The interviews commenced with a direct question tapping interviewees' principal claim/s on Arab integration. Subsequent questions asked participants to provide reasons for their claim/s (tapping warrants and backings), examples (tapping data), and exceptions to their claim/s (tapping qualifiers and rebuttals). The interviewer summarised the interviewees' arguments at the end to confirm understanding (Sammut et al., 2018). Argumentation analysis was then composed of three steps: (a) claims were coded separately for each interviewee and grouped across interviewees; (b) claims were categorised thematically, unifying those pointing towards similar lines of argument; and (c) the other five components of the Toulmin model were coded for each claim. The output consisted of different argumentative themes, comprising separate arguments with different valences (i.e., positive, mixed/ambivalent or

negative vis-à-vis integration), which in turn advanced multiple legitimated claims (Sammut et al., 2018). This study was followed by abductive research (Salvatore, 2017) on the same dataset, looking at the dominant argumentative strategy of cultural essentialism (Buhagiar et al., 2018; see **Chapter 4**).

Therefore, argumentation interviewing and analysis (as developed by Sammut et al., 2018) chiefly focus on *semantic content* (i.e., argumentative content and structure). Nonetheless, ecological rationality, heuristics (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) and the *pragmatic context* of argumentation (i.e., argumentative strategies; Muller Mirza, 2015, Üzelgün, 2015) still featured in participants' arguments and in the abductive study (Buhagiar et al., 2018). Moreover, Sammut et al.'s (2018) argumentation analysis studied social representation for/against integration (thematization of claims), whilst pursuing an idiographic study of the sense-making processes particular to individual participants (warrants, qualifiers, etc.). The procedure resulted in different types of qualitative data (e.g., claim, warrant, etc.), as argumentative content was treated differently based on its functional relations to other content (Sammut et al., 2018). Although argumentation interviewing and analysis lessened the requirement for *post hoc* interpretation (Sammut et al., 2018), naturally, they did not eliminate it. Nonetheless, participants' arguments were directly addressed during the interview. Therefore, data collection had an epistemic component (see Brinkmann, 2007a, 2007b), allowing participants' arguments to be coded using the Toulmin model.

This guarded against an imposition of the researcher's meaning structures on the data (see Flick et al., 2015, p. 67), to the extent that this is possible (see Brinkmann, 2007a). There is a necessary co-construction of views between researchers and participants (Brinkmann, 2007b; Brinkmann, 2016; Farr, 1982, p. 151; Rapley, 2001). Accordingly, argumentation interviewing (Sammut et al., 2018) encourages interviewee self-reflexivity (Wengraf, 2001, p. 155). This approximates an interviewing style that is *epistemic* (involving an exchange of arguments between interviewer and interviewee), as opposed to *doxastic* (interviewing that

sticks to probing participants' views) in nature (Brinkmann, 2007b). This notion of interviewing echoes those of Kvale and Brinkmann's (2009) "*inter view*" (p. 2), and Farr's (1982) "inter-views" (p. 152), where interviews constitute a social interchange of views, and involve questions promoting epistemic divergence and clarifications. This gives *more* power to interviewees (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, pp. 158-160), as their claims would feature more clearly during data analysis. Moreover, this practice need not involve self-disclosure by the researcher, and need not be combative or make interviewees uncomfortable. Rather, the epistemically vigilant (Sperber et al., 2010) interviewer can present hypothetical dilemmas, play devil's-advocate (see Billig, 1987; Farr, 1982; Flick et al., 2015, p. 67), and so on, offering participants an epistemic encounter. Interviewers can do so without necessarily presenting the hypothetical arguments made as being their own (see **Chapter 6**).

### **Towards a Parsimonious Coding Frame**

To recap, this chapter has so far dealt with the following. First, (a) convergences between psychological approaches to argumentation were noted, showing a ubiquitous focus on motivated reasoning for/against specific courses of action. Secondly, (b) the inextricable link between argumentation and SRT was explored: social re-presentation requires constant argumentative legitimation. Third, (c) recent literature incorporating argumentation during data analysis or data collection was explored, ending with an example (Sammut et al., 2018) of the empirical use of the Toulmin model (Toulmin, 1958/2003). There remains, however, a missing piece in the puzzle. As seen above, the Toulmin model is amenable to empirical work, given its interactional nature and practicality (Brockriede & Ehninger, 1960; Liakopoulos, 2000, p. 155). However, it can be unwieldy and it is sometimes highly difficult to distinguish between some of the Toulmin components (Hample, 1977; Simosi, 2003). Furthermore, the Toulmin model is not directly supported by socio-cognitive research. The missing piece thus concerns the fact that, in order to build the minimal model of argumentation (which incorporates lessons from the above and is suitable for empirical

research), one requires a clear footing in psychological work on the socio-cognitive processes involved.

To this end, lay epistemic theory (LET) (Kruglanski, 1980; Kruglanski, 2012) is now presented in detail, given (a) its emphasis on the epistemic process underlying the myriad manifestations of psychological content, and (b) its congruity with the sociocultural and rhetorical approaches to argumentation outlined above, particularly vis-à-vis the motivated nature of reasoning (Kruglanski, 1988, p. 136). Kruglanski's LET is essentially a model positing a single process for reasoning (or argument-making) and “freezing” (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983, p. 449) on a claim. An argumentation model can be built on this view of cognitive processing. A strength of LET (and of the proposed model) is that it is amenable to a heuristics approach emphasising cognitive efficiency. Heuristic processes contrast with complex algorithms, and involve judgments based on simpler cues (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).<sup>3</sup> Such processes are not seen as biased/incorrect within LET (Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983). Instead, LET's view of heuristics aligns with the principle of ecological rationality, which highlights the exploitation of “patterns of information in the environment to make accurate inferences in a fast and frugal way” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 88).

Following LET, the unimodel of persuasion (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a)—derived from LET—is presented, as it is instructive in devising the new model. Finally, the minimal model of argumentation, which incorporates principles from sociocultural psychology, rhetorical psychology and LET (whilst still retaining key elements of the Toulmin model), is presented.

### ***Lay Epistemic Theory***

According to LET, individuals (a) reach conclusions, (b) through an inferential process, (c) based on available evidence (Kruglanski, 1980, 1990; Kruglanski & Freund,

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<sup>3</sup> Examples include the representativeness heuristic, whereby objects are grouped according to their similarities to parent categories (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974); and the recognition heuristic, whereby objects we recognise carry more weight during decision-making (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999).

1983). Moreover, “all epistemic activity is in a sense lay” (Kruglanski, 1989, p. 9), and therefore, there is a fundamental process at play in all epistemic activity (Kruglanski, 1989, p. 9). Individuals derive knowledge from evidence through inference rules having an *if-then* format, whereby evidence constitutes the antecedent and the derived conclusion constitutes the consequent (Kruglanski et al., 2010). Accordingly, LET formulates “a unitary theory of process applicable alike to divergent contents of knowledge” (Kruglanski, 1979, p. 1456).

This partition between *epistemic content* and the *epistemic process* lies at the heart of LET (Kruglanski, 1979). Epistemic content refers to propositions an individual might want to validate, whereas the epistemic process refers to the flow of cognitive operations undertaken in pursuit of any given validation (Bar-Tal & Bar-Tal, 1988, p. 98; Kruglanski, 1979, 1980). Among other examples, Kruglanski (1988, p. 109) presents that of the “belief in a just world” (Lerner, 1980, p. 11)<sup>4</sup> to illustrate content-bound epistemic models: although the belief in a just world is widely distributed, it still refers to one specific belief rather than the study of belief/believing more generally. In contrast, process-bound models focus on cognitive processes that are relevant *across* content domains. Here, Kruglanski (1988, p. 111) mentions the literature on salience (Taylor & Fiske, 1975),<sup>5</sup> among other examples. Being a process-focused framework, LET has been used to integrate ostensibly different psychological topics within attribution theory and attitude research (Kruglanski, 1980; Kruglanski, 1990; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983).

The emphasis of LET on extracting fundamental processual principles entails an assimilation of the informational and motivational aspects of epistemic behaviour, seeing them as “functionally complementary and jointly necessary” (Bar-Tal & Kruglanski, 1988, p. 7). This bridges the gap between *cold* and *hot* cognition (Abelson, 1963; Brand, 1985). Under

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<sup>4</sup> The “belief in a just world” (Lerner, 1980, p. 11) refers to the belief that the world is predictable and people get the outcomes they deserve.

<sup>5</sup> Information sources are salient when they stand out relative to others and command our attention. Studies focus on the influence of salience on causal attributions, among other phenomena (Taylor & Fiske, 1975).



this view, “all information-processing is motivated and all motivational influences on the cognitive process operate in informational contexts and are governed by rules of information-processing” (Kruglanski, 1988, p. 136). Within LET, motivational factors do not necessarily lead to faulty conclusions and objective validity criteria are not postulated (Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983). This provides LET with a broader focus. For example, it can explain how individuals sometimes refer to their own behaviour as evidence for a conclusion, or advance propositions selectively (Bar-Tal & Bar-Tal, 1988, p. 99). Motivational factors also explain how beliefs endure in the face of evidence contradicting them (Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983).

According to LET, the epistemic process is triggered by a particular purpose held by the individual (against which epistemic problems are defined), and involves the phases of problem formulation (or cognition generation) and problem resolution (or cognition validation) (Kruglanski, 1980, p. 70; Kruglanski, 1990; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983). The epistemic problem relates to different propositions that could be situationally functional to its resolution. In turn, problem resolution must be “teleologically functional” (Kruglanski, 1980, p. 71), addressing the individual’s purpose. Problem resolution thus involves (a) the deduction of different implications that could distinguish between competing propositions; (b) the gathering of evidence for/against them; and (c) greater subjective confidence in propositions deemed to be most congruent with the evidence (Kruglanski, 1980). If evidence fits the *if-then* premise held by the individual, then a conclusion is inferred (Kruglanski, 1988, p. 129).

Given the potential for inference-making to go on ceaselessly, LET incorporates factors that lead to either the termination (epistemic freezing) or the initiation/resumption (epistemic unfreezing) of an epistemic sequence (Kruglanski, 1988, p. 114; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). The factors governing freezing/unfreezing are subsumed under the broader categories of *cognitive capacity* and *epistemic motivation* (Kruglanski, 1988, pp. 114-116). Two types of cognitive capacity are: (a) construct availability (the extent to which the individual can generate propositions based on prior knowledge); and (b) construct

accessibility (this relates to the situational priming of cognitive content) (Kruglanski, 1988, p. 114; Kruglanski & Klar, 1987). In turn, epistemic motivation factors (e.g., the need for cognitive closure; see **Chapter 4**)<sup>6</sup> impact the subjective confidence held in given conclusions (Kruglanski, 2004; Kruglanski & Klar, 1987; Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987).

### *The Unimodel of Persuasion*

Amongst the integrative pursuits utilising LET, the unimodel of persuasion (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a) is particularly relevant. According to the unimodel, it is not the distinction between central and peripheral cues that is critical to persuasion, but the difficulty, salience and relevance of the material being processed (Bohner & Siebler, 1999; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a; Kruglanski et al., 2010). Dual-process models of persuasion—such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic Systematic Model (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993)—postulate two routes to persuasion. According to dual-process models, the central/systematic route (dealing with arguments, written content, etc.) is qualitatively different, requires more processing power and leads to better persuasion outcomes, than the peripheral/heuristic route (dealing with pictorial cues, contextual information, etc.), overall (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a). The unimodel reconceptualises these two routes as “functionally equivalent” (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a, p. 93) kinds of evidence, both of which can lead to persuasive outcomes (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a). In the language of LET, the central-peripheral distinction is not indicative of different kinds of *processing*, but is simply a corollary of our efforts to distinguish cognitive *contents*.

This sound differentiation between content and process (see Lavine, 1999) has several implications. It acknowledges that *bias* can happen symmetrically across different kinds of content (e.g., due to presentation sequence or the complexity of evidence; Pierro et al., 2005),

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<sup>6</sup> The need for cognitive closure refers to the need to achieve a conclusion, that is, to bring the epistemic sequence to an end (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).

rather than simply through the influence of peripheral/heuristic content on central/systematic content (Kruglanski et al., 2006). It also makes for more flexible models acknowledging the malleability of cognitive processing (Erb et al., 2003; Strack, 1999). Another chief advantage of the unimodel is its parsimony (Kruglanski et al., 2006). *Ceteris paribus*, the emphasis on a unitary cognitive process avoids mereological quagmires associated with dualisms and related epistemological deadlocks (Erb et al., 2003; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a; cf. Reber, 1997).

According to critics of unimodels, neuroscientific evidence supports dual-process models (Evans & Stanovich, 2013a, 2013b). In contrast, Keren (2013) argues that neuroscientific evidence is not yet conclusive, and demonstrates that such evidence can be re-interpreted in ways compatible with the unimodel (see also Kruglanski, 2013). For example, “emotion and cognition are only minimally decomposable in the brain” (Pessoa, 2008, p. 148), but the emotion-cognition dichotomy is reflected in many dual-process distinctions, for example, that between Type 1 (intuitive) and Type 2 (reflective) processing (see Evans & Stanovich, 2013a, 2013b). Moreover, given the proliferation of dichotomous processing routes, it is unclear what defines these routes—for example, whether the crucial distinction lies in unconscious versus conscious processing, or automatic versus effortful processing, and so on (Keren, 2013; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999b). This nominal confusion attests to the inescapability of rhetoric in socio-psychological theorisation itself. The jury is perhaps still out, but in the absence of sufficient evidence that the unimodel sacrifices validity concerns for model simplicity, the significance granted to parsimony within the unimodel is not misplaced (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999b).

### ***Principles from LET and the Study of Argumentation***

The unimodel is practical, can generate novel research hypotheses, and has been applied in different domains (e.g., cancer communication, business decision-making, etc.) (Chen et al., 2009; Kruglanski et al., 2006; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a). Fittingly, its

parent framework (LET) also shares key features with psychological approaches to argumentation, and with the action-oriented view of social re-presentation (see **Chapter 2**). This makes it a particularly suitable avenue to the minimal model.

Firstly, both LET and rhetorical psychology acknowledge the fluidity of cognition: rhetorical psychology emphasises how cognitive contents are necessarily rhetorically negotiated (Billig, 1985); whereas LET highlights the fluidity of cognitive *contents*, which share a single cognitive *process* (Kruglanski, 2012). Secondly, LET's emphasis on "teleological functionality" (Kruglanski, 1980, p. 71) accords with the action-oriented formulae studying social re-presentation *for* joint projects (see **Chapter 2**). The teleological considerations are also shared by evolutionary views of argumentation (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Moreover, LET's integration of motivational and informational cognition (Kruglanski, 1988, p. 136) accords with the equative view of social re-presentation (see **Chapter 2**), merging the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of re-presentation.

Third, the views that motivational factors do not necessarily increase errors of judgement, and that epistemic validity criteria are subjective (Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983), accord with the argument from sufficient re-presentation (see **Chapter 2**). This argument states that it is action-related issues (which are inherently motivational) and related joint projects, which ultimately remove the need for re-presentation to proceed indefinitely. Similarly, given their inferential nature, epistemic sequences can theoretically proceed indefinitely (Bruner, 1973, p. 218), but they are adequately *pruned* in the service of epistemic goals, allowing the cognitive agent to act (Kruglanski, 1988, p. 114).

The fourth point of convergence concerns the flexibility of the unimodel (Erb et al., 2003), which allows for the incorporation of representational content at varying hierarchical levels of elaboration (see Harré, 1998, p. 136). Claims about 'Arabs', 'Libyans', or any other level of generality, can all feature in the unimodel. This flexibility acknowledges the intractability of argument form discussed above, and endows the proposed argumentation

model with great potential for sociocultural research. Similarly, LET's emphasis on subjective logic, and its recognition of the historical variability of cognitive contents (Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983) and the cultural influences on cognition (Bar-Tal & Bar-Tal, 1988, p. 98), make LET congruent with cross-cultural research.

Nonetheless, despite the potential of LET for idiographic research (Kruglanski, 1988, p. 137; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983), there is a lack of qualitative and sociocultural research within the framework. Moreover, inferential linkages/leaps from evidence to conclusion are never made analytically explicit within LET and the unimodel; they are simply "assumed to be mentally represented in the knower's mind" (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a, p. 89), and thus cannot be studied by relying exclusively on the unimodel. Finally, whilst LET and the unimodel have been fruitful in re-interpreting experimental data and generating experimental hypotheses (Kruglanski et al., 2006; Pierro et al., 2005), to the best of my knowledge, no effort has yet been made to construct a coding frame using principles from LET.

### **Building the Minimal Model of Argumentation**

Accordingly, the minimal model of argumentation is now presented, as an improved model of argumentation that can also be used as a qualitative coding frame. The minimal model emerged by filtering the Toulmin model (Toulmin, 1958/2003) through principles derived from LET and psychological research on argumentation. This is because the Toulmin model is tied to specific epistemological commitments that needed addressing for the sake of parsimony. In developing a parsimonious model of argumentation that is congruent with the psychology of epistemic behaviour, it will be argued that: (a) backings are redundant and analytically promote infinite regress; (b) qualifiers and rebuttals can be integrated together; and (c) the minimal model must be epistemologically neutral in certain fundamental respects for application in cross-cultural settings.

### ***Warrants: Avoiding Infinite Regress***

There are three reasons pointing towards the redundancy of backings. Firstly, it is not entirely clear where exactly the difference lies between warrants and backings in certain examples given by Toulmin, for example, when illustrating the difference between analytic and substantial arguments (see Toulmin, 1958/2003, p. 117). Secondly, although “the backing for warrants *can be* [emphasis added] expressed in the form of categorical statements of fact” (Toulmin, 1958/2003, p. 98), they need not be. Moreover, backings “often include some degree of inference” (Simosi, 2003, p. 187), just as warrants do. This makes it even harder to distinguish warrants from backings. Third, the warrant-backing distinction implies that other distinctions are possible, for example, between backings and another conceivable third-order component, and so on. For instance, one could argue for third-order statements (e.g., of a historical nature) that further legitimize backings in a specific field. This could go on *ad infinitum*. However, in the absence of psychological evidence specifying the need for two or more inferential categories when explaining epistemic behaviour, the principle of parsimony can be safely adhered to. A monist view of inference is proposed, subsuming inferential linkages at different orders of specification under one component: the *warrant*.

### ***Qualifiers: Calibrations and Rebuttals***

Qualifiers and rebuttals can be merged for a similar reason. The definition of rebuttals as “conditions of exception” (Toulmin, 1958/2003, p. 93) positions the rebuttal as a special case of the *qualifier*. Rebuttals are simply qualifiers indicated by the use of ‘unless’, giving them a more categorical bent, as opposed to ‘presumably’ and ‘probably’. Toulmin further points out that qualifiers and rebuttals *specify the conditions* indicating the strength or outright rejection of warrants (Toulmin, 1958/2003, pp. 93-94), but do not directly negate a claim. Therefore, qualifiers and rebuttals—henceforth referred to collectively as *qualifiers*—are relevant to inference-making, buttressing claims in two ways: (a) as semantic content expressed in communicative action; and (b) as pragmatic concessions (e.g., “yes, but ...”

[Uzelgun et al., 2015, p. 468] arguments) intended as strategic action (cf. Habermas, 1981/1984) to advance a particular claim.

Concerning qualifiers as semantic content, the fact that scientific evidence indicates “that people *sometimes* [emphasis added] look for reasons to justify an opinion they are eager to uphold” (Mercier & Sperber, 2011, p. 66), does not imply that this is *always* the case. Therefore, the model must allow for the possibility of genuine qualifications of, or changes in, viewpoints—by including qualifiers. The rhetorical nature of argumentation (Billig, 1987; Wenzel, 1990, p. 9) means that qualifiers may well have their own implicit and latent chains of justification. If a change in opinion occurs, qualifiers could thus adopt the role of claims.

Concerning qualifiers as pragmatic concessions, such argumentative strategies could take the form of semantic barriers intended to neutralise alternative representations (Gillespie, 2008). Pragmatic concessions made by interlocutors arguably form the basis of much argumentative activity (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002, p. 133). This gives qualifiers an important role, even though some arguments omit qualifiers altogether. In coalitional scenarios, the extent to which interlocutors avail themselves of qualifiers could indicate their degree of openness to the social/alternative re-presentation of their outgroup(s).

### ***Epistemological Neutrality: Evidence for Claims***

Lastly, the minimal model is epistemologically neutral: its skeletal form is not limited by particular epistemological commitments. Specifically, it remains neutral with regards to the following dichotomies: (a) formality-informality; (b) rationalism-empiricism; and (c) deduction-induction. These three dichotomies are here reconceptualised, in line with LET (Kruglanski, 1980), as referring to particular kinds of argumentative *content* which can feature during the argumentative *process*; just as the unimodel neatly incorporates the routes of dual-process models by retaining the principal commonalities among them (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a).

Concerning the first dichotomy, the minimal model can incorporate elements that are relevant for both lay/informal and formalised thought. The minimal model is chiefly concerned with informal/lay logic. However, fully excluding formal thought from the model risks committing the nonreflexive fallacy (Little, 1972; Johnson, 2011), whereby the proposed model is seen as being incapable of explaining the same formal processes lying behind it. Importantly, the minimal model is not concerned with the adequacy of specific logics/formulas, but with their argumentative and inferential presentation; and the “cogency of argumentation” (van Eemeren et al., 1997, p. 218) is different from its formal validity (Blair & Johnson, 1987). This means that a model focussed on how claims are justified should be applicable across arguments with both informal and formal content.

Concerning the second dichotomy, the Toulmin model has been characterised as being “anti-rationalist” (Kock, 2006, p. 247). This is evidenced by the terminology employed. For example, the term *data* was used to denote evidence relevant to a conclusion. This term has strong empiricist connotations, and is not always reflective of different ways of arguing. Toulmin et al. (1984, p. 26) later adopted the use of *grounds* instead of data. Whilst being characterised as any sort of “factual data” (Toulmin et al., 1984, p. 26), this term includes reference to “previously established claims” (Toulmin et al., 1984, p. 26), and is divested of strictly empiricist undertones. Yet, *grounds* still carries foundationalist connotations, giving the impression that arguments are necessarily built from the ground up. In effect, some arguments may instead heavily depend on the strength of warrants, drawing upon evidence (or data/grounds) only if/when needed for substantiation, on an *ad hoc* basis. Relevantly, LET conceptualises evidence as any information that is subjectively useful for problem resolution (Kruglanski, 1980). Accordingly, the term *evidence* will be adopted for the minimal model, as opposed to data/grounds. This term constitutes the bare minimum. Arguments may or may not be empiricist or foundationalist in orientation. Correspondingly, in the minimal model,



evidence may or may not be appealed to in advancing a claim; sometimes, warrants suffice and are foregrounded, and evidence is used to provide ammunition if/when needed.

Finally, in relation to the third dichotomy, LET's exclusive emphasis on deduction (Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983) relegates inferences of an inductive nature to a secondary role. In the minimal model, the notion of evidence (i.e., any information deemed relevant to the claim) remains neutral with respect to the nature of the warrant being employed: the *if-then* nature of inferential processing (Kruglanski et al., 2010) can vary in its manifestation (e.g., arguments can be deductive, inductive, analogical, etc.).

### ***The Final Model***

Accordingly, the final form of the minimal model consists of *claims*, *warrants*, *evidence* and *qualifiers* (see **Figure 3**). According to the minimal model, making an argument involves the advancement of one or more claims. Claims are supported by warrants, that is, by justifications or "chains of reasoning" (Billig, 1987, p. 44). Such warrants can be absolute or qualified, and link available evidence in support of the main claim/s being advanced. Evidence may or may not be made explicit. In some arguments, warrants are foregrounded, and evidence may not be articulated until a person is pressed by an interlocutor (cf. the retrogressive presentation of argument; van Eemeren et al., 2002, p. 37). Other arguments follow a different sequence and build up to a claim following the explicit presentation of evidence (cf. the progressive presentation of argument; van Eemeren et al., 2002, p. 37).

### **Conclusion**

To recap, this chapter proceeded stepwise towards the minimal model of argumentation. After noting convergences between sociocultural, rhetorical and evolutionary psychological approaches to argumentation, the close relationship between argumentation and SRT was articulated, framing re-presentation as *what one does* during argumentative discourse. This led to an exploration of the literature on argumentation, in terms of both data collection and data analysis. It led, more specifically, to an outline of argumentation

interviewing and argumentation analysis, as utilised by Sammut et al. (2018), who employed the Toulmin model of argumentation (Toulmin, 1958/2003) for empirical ends. It was argued that incorporating concerns with argumentation during data collection minimises problems associated with the *post hoc* interpretation of participants' views. So far as argumentation is concerned, argumentation interviewing constitutes an improvement upon more traditional interviewing methods that avoid 'why' questions (Flick et al., 2015, p. 66), as it asks interviewees to justify their views argumentatively (Sammut et al., 2018). This chapter then presented LET (Kruglanski, 1990) and the unimodel of persuasion (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a). In summary, LET states that individuals reach conclusions through inferential processes based on subjectively relevant evidence, and the unimodel posits a single route to persuasion (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a). These approaches allowed the emerging model of argumentation to be based in socio-cognitive psychological processes.


The minimal model thus drew inspiration from the Toulmin model (Toulmin, 1958/2003), and had its components revised in line with principles from LET and the unimodel. The minimal model is primarily an analytical tool, but it is also psychologically valid, being based on the psychological mechanisms underlying argumentative processes. It also retains a concern with argumentative teleology and the motivated nature of lay argumentation, acknowledges the intractability of argument form, and is cross-culturally sensitive due to its skeletal form. It also emphasises the power of rhetorical contraries, as opposed to over-compartmentalising argument components (see Billig, 1985). This makes it more amenable to qualitative data coding (cf. Sammut et al., 2018).

Acts of social construction imply acts of destruction (Valsiner, 2008, p. 273). Similarly, "methodologies hide as well as reveal" (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010b, p. 69). Yet, it is hoped that the broad scope of the minimal model makes it well placed for studying social re-presentation from an action-oriented perspective, and for shedding light on the processes underlying changes in social representations, that is, on what is lost for new creations.

Similarly, it is hoped that the minimal model enables the study of argumentation in coalitional scenarios (see Amgoud, 2005). The next chapter proceeds to review the literature on intergroup psychology and Arab-Maltese relations, in order to fulfil this task.

**Figure 3**

*The Minimal Model of Argumentation*



*Note.* In the minimal model of argumentation, interlocutors legitimise their claims on the basis of warrants, which make an inferential leap from evidence to claim, or else are articulated on their own. An argument can consist of multiple claims (cf. Toulmin, 1958/2003), each having a structure similar to the one in the diagram. Evidence can be anything from concrete examples to general supportive statements. Evidence may (full line) or may not (dashed line) be made explicit; whatever works for substantiating the claim, over and above specific warrants, is used as needed by interlocutors. Some pieces of evidence can promote multiple warrants. Qualifiers may or may not be present in an argument. Qualifiers calibrate the force of the warrant by articulating exceptions or qualifications to the warrant.

## Chapter 4 – Intergroup Psychology: Studying Arab-Maltese Relations

The above conceptual framework, involving (a) the action-oriented formulae, and (b) the minimal model of argumentation, lends itself to the study of intergroup relations. The study of dominant/non-dominant group relations can be incorporated within SRT (Marková, 2008) by studying how “social re-presentation binds coalitions for action” (Buhagiar & Sammut, 2020a, p. 10). Here, the notion of *coalitions* (Clark & Winegard, 2020) is apt. We “feel strong bonds toward the coalitions to which we belong but [we can] also break those bonds and move on to new coalitions when circumstances change” (Leech & Cronk, 2017, p. 89). Group members can thus affiliate (see Duveen, 2008) based on a common understanding of an intergroup scenario. Moreover, coalitional affiliations often remain *silent*, in that people simply navigate the social world (Moscovici, 1973, p. xiii) and express their beliefs through individual behaviours (e.g., daily discussions on migrant integration). At other times, active formations for/against an issue emerge (e.g., pro- vs. anti-integrationist coalitions).

This chapter reviews literature on intergroup relations, focusing on motivational intergroup factors, coalitional processes, and relevant extra-representational variables (ERVs). This chapter then reviews literature on Arabs and Muslims in Europe, and on acculturation strategies, focusing on Arab-Maltese relations.<sup>7</sup> Research on Arab-Maltese relations is then inputted in the action-oriented formulae, enabling the systemic study of this intergroup dynamic, by asking how both groups socially re-present the project of Arab integration in Malta, and alternatively re-present each other’s projects. This sheds light on coalitions striving *for* and *against* integration. Integration is here defined as the state where both

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<sup>7</sup> *Arab-Maltese relations* here refer to relations between people, not to international relations between Malta and Arab League states.

dominant and non-dominant groups cultivate their home culture/s—investing in bonding social capital—whilst simultaneously engaging with outgroup cultures, extending their bridging social capital (Berry, 2011; Gittell & Vidal, 1998, p. 15; Sammut, 2011).

### **Motivated Reasoning for Ingroup Projects**

Intergroup relations ensue in contexts where people interact based on their group identity (Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010, p. 1024). This field is studied using various psychological approaches, looking at personality, cognition, social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), realistic conflict (Jackson, 1993), the spatio-temporal features of conflict (Dixon et al., 2020), conflict resolution and collective action (Hogg, 2013, p. 533; van Zomeren et al., 2008). In contemporary societies, intergroup encounters often involve intercultural elements, especially in situations involving migrant-native dynamics (see Berry, 2017; Sammut & Gaskell, 2010).

Intergroup conflict may ensue when different projects interact (Foster, 2003), especially when groups view their projects as being conflictual and act accordingly (Bar-Tal, 2011, p. 1). Given that motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Molden & Higgins, 2005, pp. 295-296) underlies human cognition, interlocutors naturally favour arguments that bolster their beliefs (Mercier & Sperber, 2011) and legitimate their ingroup's project/s. Likewise, representations of one's ingroup and outgroup are grounded in a universal foundation of cognitive biases (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011, p. 228), which prop the view that our ingroup is right and the outgroup is wrong (Sammut & Sartawi, 2012; Robinson et al., 1995).

Some such processes are more *general* than others. For instance, when group members engage in the “biased assimilation” (Dandekar et al., 2013, p. 5971) of evidence, they assimilate new information into pre-existing notions, using unclear evidence to support a previously held position (Dandekar et al., 2013). Thus, groups generally accept supportive views but carefully assess/dismiss views opposing their own. Two opposing groups may even respond to the same information by holding increasingly radical and polarized beliefs. In Lord

et al.'s (1979) study, opponents and supporters of capital punishment were exposed to different studies providing arguments against or for capital punishment. Interestingly, participants “did show a willingness to report a shift in their attitudes in the direction of findings that were contrary to their beliefs, at least *until those findings were exposed to methodological scrutiny and possible alternative interpretations* [emphasis added]” (Lord et al., 1979, p. 2108). Such reported viewpoint shifts could have been temporary concessions (Lord et al., 1979), and thus, biased assimilation is not always clearly identifiable. This aligns with the view that joint projects need not be transparent to be actuated (see **Chapter 2**).

Another general bias with far-reaching implications is naïve realism (Ross & Ward, 1996). Naïve realism refers to the views that: one sees matters objectively; people would hold the same view if they were to access and accurately process the same evidence; and others’ contrasting views result from a lack of information or an inability/reluctance to assess it rationally (Ross & Ward, 1996). This bias also features in other *specific* motivated reasoning processes, such as the false consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977), where individuals believe their views are apt and more prevalent than they actually are. Interestingly, false consensus perceptions vis-à-vis ingroup members are *greater* when the perceived social distance from the outgroup is high (Jones, 2004). Similarly, in the hostile media phenomenon, groups in conflict view neutrally presented media coverage as being biased (Vallone et al., 1985). For instance, after viewing the same programs about the 1982 Beirut massacre, both pro-Arab and pro-Israeli participants rated them as favouring the outgroup (Vallone et al., 1985). Once again, *group identification* strongly predicts this phenomenon (Hansen & Kim, 2011, p. 171).

These cognitive and motivational processes align with the motivated view of argumentation (Mercier & Sperber, 2011; see **Chapter 3**), and contribute to ingroup bonding. In essence, various manifestations of information-processing are, at heart, efforts at persuasion (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a), which are observed during both majority and minority influence (Kruglanski & Mackie, 1990; Moscovici & Mugny, 1983). In turn,

communication between groups holding different levels of power is key to the formation and perpetuation of social representations (Staerklé et al., 2011).

### *Coalitions*

This pragmatic view of thought (Fiske, 1992) implies that individuals coalesce into new coalitions based on shared interobjective backgrounds (Sammut et al., 2013, p. 5). This tendency is grounded in evolved dispositions for coalitional behaviour (Leech & Cronk, 2017)—ones based on joint intentions (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007) and theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978),<sup>8</sup> among other processes. Coalitions are universal across cultures, and constitute “a group of individuals that coordinate their actions to achieve common goals and share the resultant benefits” (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010, p. 201). Such groups face two fundamental problems: coordinating members, and dealing with free-riders (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010, p. 201). Key concerns revolve around detecting and dealing with competition, non-reciprocation (see Parker Tapias et al., 2007), (un)trustworthiness (Cottrell et al., 2007; Simpson, 2007), other coalitions (Pietraszewski, 2020), newcomers (Cimino & Delton, 2010), free-riding (Delton et al., 2012; Price et al., 2002), group-size-related cost-benefit trade-offs (Tooby et al., 2006, p. 112), and relationships between members (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010, p. 202).

Coalition coordination revolves around issues relating to “common knowledge” (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010, p. 202; see **Chapter 9**): members need relevant knowledge and need to know, to an extent sufficient for action, that other members are on board (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010, p. 203). In line with the action-oriented approach, “there need be no explicit and deliberative representation of others’ knowledge states at all” (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010, p. 204), but simply a shared interobjectivity and joint project (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008).

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<sup>8</sup> An individual has theory of mind when “the individual imputes mental states to himself [sic] and to others” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978, p. 515).

Coalitions rely on evolved adaptations for detecting coalitional groups (Delton et al., 2013) and engaging with them (Pietraszewski, 2013). Kurzban et al. (2001) experimentally found that racial characteristics only become socially significant when they predict coalitional processes. Thus, “racial categories [...] are constructed and regulated by the alliance system in environments where race predicts social alliances and divisions” (Pietraszewski et al., 2014, p. 1). This also applies to other social features, like dress and dialect (Kurzban et al., 2001, p. 15388).<sup>9</sup> The ability to detect coalitions/alliances allows groups to “collaborate to compete” (Sammut, 2019b, p. 348). Such collaborations deal with anything from gossip (Hess, 2017) to outright warfare (Lopez, 2020). In socio-political contexts, ethno-cultural categories, and ways of arguing about relevant projects (e.g., integration), may constitute salient features relevant for positioning others. For instance, one’s definition of integration could reveal one’s stance. Here, avowals of “support for policies and theories strongly affect one’s social status because such expressions function as a signal of tribal identity, loyalty, and commitment to shared group goals” (Clark & Winegard, 2020, p. 3).

Indeed, arguments over policy provide “many good examples of our flexible coalitional psychology at work” (Leech & Cronk, 2017, p. 97). Coalitional processes can relate to access/adherence to similar interobjective backgrounds: the negative (baseline) aspect of projects (see **Chapter 2**). Here, coalition members act as a *silent coalition*: their discourse, actions and allegiances advance the same goal/s, in the absence of explicit pursuits and formal organisation. Alternatively, more active coalition members can form vanguards, steering coalitions into desired futures—this relates to the positive aspect of projects. Naturally, the larger the coalition, the greater the role of leadership in simplifying cooperation, and the greater its resistance to alternative views (Tooby et al., 2006).

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<sup>9</sup> This does not apply to all social features (see Pietraszewski & Schwartz, 2014a, 2014b).



### *Polarisation and Conflict Spirals*

Accordingly, understanding mutual re-presentations is vital for preventing conflict from escalating due to mutual hostilities. Attributions of bias to adversaries can transform simple disagreement into outright conflict (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008; Ross & Ward, 1996), leading to conflict-escalating strategies. Consequently, conflictual responses lead to further attributions of bias, whereby the disagreeing party is seen as less meriting of cooperation. A spiral of conflict is thus created and sustained (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008). Conflict spirals range from contexts of mass protest (Heirich, 1971) to outright war (Starr, 1978). Here, *ingroup* members who disagree with their ingroup are judged more harshly than disagreeing outgroup members (Sammut et al., 2015; Marques et al., 1988). Thus, at times, “social cognition is biased toward being more divisive and exclusive than open and inclusive” (Sammut et al., 2015, p. 289).

Inflexible viewpoints can promote group polarisation (Moscovici, 1992), whereby groups move toward increasingly extreme views. When this happens, groups police boundaries (Buhagiar & Sammut, 2020a), striving for cohesion around the emerging extreme views, which serve as a potent source of social influence (Moscovici, 1992). Apart from radicalisation, intergroup interaction may also promote perceptual changes such that objects of discussion change in their meaning for group members (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). This carries implications for the group’s goal (Moscovici, 1992).

Yet, the ways in which conflicting groups advance different re-presentations of their own and their outgroups’ *projects* remain under-researched (Buhagiar & Sammut, 2020a). ERVs (see **Chapter 2**) are useful here, because proximal intergroup orientations calibrate coalitional processes (Sinn & Hayes, 2017, 2018). Variables like social dominance orientation play socio-functional roles in individuals’ views toward minorities (Grigoryev et al., 2020). Other variables, like need for cognitive closure, influence the likelihood of viewpoint shifts

(Kruglanski et al., 1993; Kruglanski et al., 2006, p. 95). Such processes modulate how coalitions bind or break (Sinn & Hayes, 2017).

### **Extra-Representational Processes in Intergroup Conflict**

Psychological approaches to intergroup relations (Hogg, 2013, p. 533) have yielded various operationalizations of conflict-related variables. Given their relevance for dominant/non-dominant group relations, this section considers social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), sense of community (McMillan & Chavis, 1986) and mentalities (Sammut, 2019a).

#### ***Social Dominance Orientation***

Social dominance orientation (SDO) is defined as “a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical, that is, ordered along a superior-inferior dimension” (Pratto et al., 1994, p. 742). SDO constitutes a somewhat “universal intergroup orientation” (Hansen & Dovidio, 2016, p. 545), which consistently predicts conflict-related views (Ho et al., 2015). The construct involves two dimensions—SDO-Dominance (SDO-D) and SDO-Egalitarianism (SDO-E)—measured using the SDO<sub>7</sub> scale (Ho et al., 2015). SDO-D denotes a clear preference for high-status groups dominating low-status groups, whereas SDO-E represents a subtler inclination favouring non-egalitarian intergroup relations and hierarchical ideologies (Ho et al., 2012, 2015). Both facets “are theoretically distinct and dissociate in terms of the intergroup outcomes they best predict” (Ho et al., 2015, p. 1003). For instance, SDO-D consistently predicts support for direct behaviours that forcefully maintain hierarchical relations (e.g., aggression toward minorities, zero-sum views of conflict, etc.). In contrast, SDO-E consistently predicts non-violent support for policies/ideologies that maintain power differentials between groups (e.g., by over-emphasising meritocratic ideals; Ho et al., 2015).

In intergroup domains, SDO predicts: affect toward minority members (Bratt et al., 2016); prejudice toward various ethnic groups (Pratto et al., 1994); racism (Van Hiel &

Mervielde, 2005); and schadenfreude and decreased empathy toward outgroup members (Hudson et al., 2019). SDO ratings among students decreased following interventions based on intergroup contact (Dhont et al., 2014). Similarly, students sharing rooms with others of a different ethnicity expressed decreased SDO levels, when compared to participants in a co-ethnic condition (Shook et al., 2016). An ongoing debate concerns whether SDO constitutes a general orientation toward intergroup dominance, or else a specific contextual preference for the ingroup domination of others (Kteily et al., 2012; Lehmler & Schmitt, 2007). The fact that SDO-D *inversely* correlates with ingroup identity among low-status groups, suggests that SDO represents a generalised orientation (Pratto et al., 2006) marked by a preference for hierarchy, regardless of the position occupied by one's ingroup (Ho et al., 2015).

A phenomenon linked to SDO is that of *ideological asymmetry*, whereby people align their identification with groups depending on their social status (Sidanius et al., 1994). For example, dominant ethnic groups tend to identify more strongly with the national group (Sidanius et al., 1997; Sidanius et al., 2019; cf. Staerklé et al., 2010). Different groups also differ in their tactics for social change. For example, Americans higher on SDO were more supportive of violence against Arabs in the Middle East. In contrast, Lebanese participants *lower* in SDO were more supportive of anti-Western violence (Henry et al., 2005). Thus, whether SDO supports violent action depends on local dynamics.

Concerning ethnic minorities, SDO predicted negative attitudes toward immigrants, particularly where there was a high perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalism, in representative samples from four continents (Europe, Oceania, Asia and America) (Araújo et al., 2020). Nonetheless, the percentage of migrants in a country also moderates the effect of SDO (Araújo et al., 2020). SDO negatively predicts willingness to help outgroups (e.g., between Jews and Arabs; Halabi et al., 2008), and to help immigrants when the latter pose symbolic or realistic threats (Costello & Hodson, 2011). In the United States, SDO predicted anti-Arab views (Pratto et al., 1994), and in New Zealand, SDO predicted negative views of

derogated groups, including Arabs (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). SDO also negatively predicts support for national policies favouring migrant minorities in European countries (Küpper et al., 2010; Scott & Safdar, 2017), both generally and in specific domains (e.g., economic discrimination; Grigoryev et al., 2020). Finally, SDO is also linked with different intergroup ideologies and acculturation strategies (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2018; see **Intercultural Strategies**), and “high essentialist beliefs and high SDO could jointly contribute to boundary enhancement for outcomes meant to disadvantage stigmatized groups” (Roberts et al., 2017, p. 1654).

### ***Need for Cognitive Closure***

Whilst SDO denotes an intergroup orientation, need for cognitive closure (NFC) constitutes a cognitive style (Hodson & Esses, 2005). NFC is a motivational variable that influences the termination/freezing of an epistemic sequence (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Kruglanski, 2004, p. 65). It signifies “a desire for definite knowledge on some issue. It represents a dimension of stable individual differences as well as a situationally evocable state” (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996, p. 263). Webster and Kruglanski (1994) devised the NFC scale, which taps different facets of NFC: decisiveness, close-mindedness, a preference for predictability and structure, and discomfort vis-à-vis ambiguity (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Roets and Van Hiel (2011) proposed a brief one-dimensional equivalent of the scale.

NFC contributes to “*group-centrism*—a pattern that includes pressures to opinion uniformity” (Kruglanski et al., 2006, p. 84), an accentuation of intergroup differences (Federico et al., 2013), and a preference for homogeneous groups similar to oneself (Kruglanski et al., 2002). NFC also predicts ingroup favouritism (Shah et al., 1998), ingroup glorification, outgroup derogation (Dechesne et al., 2000), intergroup hostilities (Dugas et al., 2018; Federico et al., 2005), and higher conservatism (Jost et al., 2003; Roets & Van Hiel, 2006). However, NFC is *negatively* related to economic conservatism in Poland (Kossowska & Van Hiel, 2003). Moreover, whereas information emphasising conflict/hostility strengthens

the relationship between NFC and intergroup competitiveness, information emphasising cooperation makes it non-significant (Golec de Zavala et al., 2008). Importantly, in Malta, Sammut et al. (2021) recently found that *both* pro- and anti-multiculturalists can be closed-minded and limit dialogical engagement. Thus, NFC may not lead to a specific position, but rather to *rigid variants of any position*.

Relevant to the present inquiry, Polish conservatives high in NFC exhibited more antipathy toward Muslims and Arabs, but only when they feared a potential terrorist attack (Golec de Zavala et al., 2010). In Belgium, intergroup contact with immigrants from Muslim-majority countries was more strongly related with a reduction in prejudice in participants with *higher* levels of NFC, possibly because intergroup contact decreases uncertainty about intergroup matters (Dhont et al., 2011). In fact, exposing participants to multicultural situations reduces NFC in various contexts (Tadmor et al., 2012). In Italy, immigrants with high NFC experienced greater psychological distress (Kosic, 2002), and differed in their preferred acculturation strategy (Kosic et al., 2004). More specifically, if Croatian and Polish migrants in Italy formed closer relationships with co-ethnic groups upon arrival, the higher their NFC, the stronger their inclination to maintain their home culture. In contrast, if they formed closer ties with Italians, the stronger their inclination to assimilate into the host culture instead (Kosic et al., 2004).

### ***Sense of Community***

Sense of community (SoC) relates to the relationship between individuals and their communities (McMillan & Chavis, 1986; see Sarason, 1974). SoC has four different aspects: membership; influence (mutual usefulness between individual and community); integration or needs fulfilment; and shared emotional connection based on a shared history, collective memory and experiences (McMillan & Chavis, 1986). Research on SoC largely emphasises its positive outcomes (Mannarini et al., 2017), such as its relationship with quality of life (Gattino et al., 2013), life satisfaction (Hombrados-Mendieta et al., 2013) and political

participation (Rochira et al., 2019). However, the “creative tension of the dialectical process” (Townley et al., 2011, p. 70) between SoC and cultural diversity, can cause SoC to conflict with the promotion of diversity. SoC is in fact generally stronger among homogeneous communities (Farrell et al., 2004), and tends to be linked to ideas of group membership and similarity (Townley et al., 2011). If this is the case, then SoC relates to bonding social capital (Sammut, 2011)—for instance, among co-ethnics (see **Intercultural Strategies**).

The relationship between SoC and intergroup relations is mixed. Whilst Castellini et al. (2011) found that ethnic heterogeneity in neighbourhoods is linked with a lower SoC in Milan, they found no evidence for a relationship between SoC and prejudice. Castellini et al. (2011) did find a positive correlation between SoC and a preference for migrant integration overall—but with some caveats. That is, in ethnically heterogeneous districts, SoC predicted a preference for migrant exclusionism; and in ethnically homogeneous districts, SoC predicted both integrationism and segregationism (Castellini et al., 2011). In contrast, Prezza et al. (2008) found no relationships between SoC and ethnic heterogeneity in Italy. Lastly, Mannarini et al. (2017) found that in cases of low perceived ethnic heterogeneity, SoC was negatively associated with subtle and blatant prejudice; whereas in cases of high perceived ethnic heterogeneity, SoC positively predicted covert prejudice.

### ***Mentalities***

The final ERV is that of *mentalities* (Sammut, 2019a), which refer to the various mindsets people adopt in seeking to adapt to dynamic life circumstances. Initially proposed by French historians (Burke, 1986), the concept has been adapted in psychological terms to refer to mindsets that are, in effect, bundles of “*substantive cognition*” (Sammut, 2019a, p. 427). Sammut (2019a) positions mentalities as a functional mechanism between relatively unstable sociocultural phenomena on the one hand, and ostensibly stable personality structures on the other. “Mentalities, therefore, are like gears – a range of five that enable the

particular agent to calibrate their dispositional inclinations to ecological demands” (Sammut, 2019a, p. 428).

The concept of mentalities was built on previous work researching social axioms (Leung & Bond, 2008, 2009) and the symbolic universes (Salvatore et al., 2018) enabling sense-making in European countries (see Sammut, 2019a). Social axioms constitute “general beliefs about the social world” (Leung & Bond, 2009, p. 2), that is, “about people, social groups, social institutions, the physical environment, or the spiritual world as well as about categories of events and phenomena” (Leung & Bond, 2008, p. 198). Leung and Bond (2009, p. 3) describe five social axioms: (a) *social complexity*, that is, a set of beliefs emphasising multiple solutions to problems and human variability; (b) *religiosity*, that is, belief in the existence of the divine and emphasising the benefits of religious practices/institutions; (c) *reward for application*, that is, beliefs holding that planning and hard work yield positive results; (d) *social cynicism*, that is, a negative outlook on humanity, intergroup biases, institutional mistrust and a belief that people bend the rules to achieve their aims; and (e) *fate control*, that is, the belief constellation that life is determined by external conditions, which people have only some influence on (Leung & Bond, 2009, p. 3).

Similarly, symbolic universes constitute “basic, embodied, affect-laden, generalized worldviews” (Salvatore et al., 2018, p. 1), which imbue cultural milieus with meaning. These generalized worldviews work at the level of assumptions, structuring people’s knowledge of the world and its operation. Individuals make sense of, say, intergroup conflict, in different ways, based on the symbolic universe they see the world through (Salvatore et al., 2018; Sammut, 2019a). The five symbolic universes identified during research are: (a) *interpersonal bond*, prioritising emotional and communitarian connections between people, and positive relationships; (b) *ordered universe*, foregrounding absolute values and the need to fix social structures; (c) *caring society*, highlighting society’s support and care for the individual; (d) *niche of belonging*, denoting familism and a zero-sum approach toward societal problems;

and (e) *others' world*, signifying an anomic reaction to a hostile world where might is right (Salvatore et al., 2018, p. 20; see Salvatore, Avdi et al., 2019).

Recently, symbolic universes were found to be relevant in situations where the Other is portrayed as the enemy (Salvatore, Mannarini et al., 2019). Moreover, symbolic universes emphasising local identity, community and belonging, featured highly in regions in the United Kingdom with a higher percentage of 'leave' voters in the Brexit referendum (Veltri et al., 2019). Unlike symbolic universes, measures of mentalities (Sammut, 2019c) were built specifically with the Maltese context in mind (see **Chapter 5** for the measures). Given the influence of work on social axioms (Leung & Bond, 2008, 2009) and symbolic universes (Salvatore et al., 2018), on the notion of mentalities (Sammut, 2019a), mentalities should predict people's understanding of dominant/non-dominant group relations—to which I now turn.

### **Arabs in Europe**

Arabs have been in Europe for a long time (Echebarria-Echabe & Guede, 2007). Yet, globalisation has radically altered migration patterns, and recent turmoil in Arab states fuelled an increase in Arab migration to Europe. Conflations between 'Arabs' and 'Muslims' are common in the literature (Helbling, 2012, pp. 1-5). Nonetheless, the following review specifies the groups being referred to.

Much has been written about the refugee crisis in Europe. Media discourse, populist reactions (and the various strategies associated with it; see Staerklé & Green, 2018), and political concepts relating to both the securitization and the humanization of migrants, have all contributed to rising tensions and political opposition to Arab and Muslim immigrants (Krzyżanowski et al., 2018). Similarly, Podobnik et al. (2017) found that votes for right-wing populist parties correlate with the percentage of immigrants in a given country. Moreover, the overall inflow of immigrants into the European Union, coupled with increasing media coverage of this inflow, contribute to an increasing Euroscepticism (Harteveld et al., 2018).



Host communities fear that immigration will lead to an overall loss of cultural heritage, privilege or resources (De Cristofaro et al., 2019), and Europeans' views of Arabs (both migrants and non-migrants) should be considered against this backdrop.

Negative views of Arabs in Europe have been circulating for a long time (see Darwish, 1974). More recently, Albarello et al. (2019) have reported findings in Italy concerning the “outgroup-to-outgroup generalization” (p. 59) of ‘Islamic terrorists’ into the superordinate category ‘Arabs’. Using linguistic measures, Albarello et al. (2019) found that this generalization is more pronounced under experimental conditions of threat. The fact that the category ‘Islamic terrorists’ was judged by participants as being worse than the category ‘Arabs’, indicates the extent of the prejudice involved toward Arabs (Albarello et al., 2019).

Negative representations of Arabs abound in the literature, beyond experimental studies. McKinney (1997) speaks of “two of the most prevalent social representations of Arabs within France: the proletarian immigrant worker and the oil-rich emir” (McKinney, 1997, p. 59). Shaheen (2003) reviewed almost a thousand movies featuring Arabs, and found overwhelmingly negative representations depicting Arabs as savage and backward extremists who hate members of religions other than Islam. Positive representations of Arabs (e.g., as regular people or as good protagonists) were few and far between, and featured mostly in the eighties and nineties (Shaheen, 2003). Moreover, German students' representations of Arab women were deeply influenced by media portrayals of the Arab Spring, portraying the Arab woman as an activist/rebel on the one hand, and as an oppressed/helpless victim on the other (Mustafa-Awad & Kirner-Ludwig, 2017; Mustafa-Awad et al., 2019). Similarly, Halliday (2010) reported direct anti-Arab prejudice in Britain. Such representations result in “Arabs, Muslims, Islam, and all kinds of religious sects within Islam [being lumped] into one category” (Echebarria-Echabe & Guede, 2007, p. 1087). Such oversimplifications amplify prejudice toward Arabs. For instance, in Sweden, people with Arab Muslim names (e.g., Mohammed) are sometimes less likely to be called for a job interview (Rooth, 2010); and

people are less likely to return lost letters containing money to addressees with an Arab Muslim name (Ahmed, 2010).

### ***Muslims and Islam in Europe***

Scholars have also increasingly focused on representations of Muslims and Islam. Nowadays, Europe is home to many different forms of Islam, which interrelate with their surrounding cultural milieus (Le Vine 2003, p. 100). Three prevalent aspects of representations of Muslims and Islam relate to: (a) perceived incompatibilities between Islamic and European cultures/values; (b) tensions between the recognition of Muslim migrants' struggles, and negative attitudes toward these same migrants; and (c) the ubiquitous conflation between Muslims and terrorists (Buhagiar et al., 2020, p. 62). Across newspaper content spanning six European countries (France, Italy, Greece, the United Kingdom, Romania and Malta), content relating to Islamic violence and the simultaneous recognition of Muslims (e.g., as an oppressed group) remained salient over time, with violence being increasingly emphasised (Buhagiar et al., 2020, p. 75). Bell and Strabac (2021) also reported negative views of Muslims in France, Norway, the Czech Republic and Poland. Whilst Islam and Muslims are generally re-presented negatively (Buhagiar et al., 2020, p. 73), the social object signifying Muslims varies across contexts (e.g., the conflict in Syria signifies Muslims in Greece, the threat of terroristic Islamic converts does so in Romania, etc.) (Buhagiar et al., 2020, pp. 70-71). These findings echo those of an earlier meta-analysis, which found that themes relating to terrorism, war, migration, anti-Muslim views, and Muslim women were particularly salient in global media representations (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017; cf. Bleich et al., 2015). News exposure can also increase anger toward Muslims (Shaver et al., 2017).

In Germany, whereas realistic threat was related to anti-Muslim views, symbolic threat (i.e., perceived threats to one's values) was related to both anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic views (Uenal, 2016). In the Netherlands, representations of Christian cultural continuity were associated with resistance to Muslim immigrants (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014). This

perceived opposition between national customs and Islam was reported in other European countries too (e.g., Hatziprokopiou & Evergeti, 2014). However, historical representations portraying the Netherlands as *tolerant* improved acceptance of Muslims' faith expressions (e.g., celebrations, the hijab, etc.), notably among majority members with strong national identification (Smeekes et al., 2012).

Dislike toward Muslim practices (e.g., Islamic schools) can be based either on prejudice or on principle (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020). Interestingly, those who expressed principled objections to Muslim practices exhibited lower SDO than did the prejudiced group (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020). Beyond principled resistance, discourse emphasising cultural differences is utilised by both the radical right, in promoting ethno-statism, and the radical left, in defending minorities' expressive rights (Garner, 2010, p. 130; Taguieff, 1990, p. 117). This accords with the action-oriented view of social re-presentation, whereby similar re-presentations can advance different ends (see **Chapter 2**).

Perceived cultural/value-based incompatibilities can position Muslims in especially negative territory. In Poland, atheist child-in-laws are sometimes preferred over their Muslim counterparts (Gołębiowska, 2009, p. 376), and intergroup contact did not attenuate anti-Muslim prejudice (Golebiowska, 2018). Moreover, Muslims risk being regarded as outsiders due to multiple factors other than religious ones (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2011, p. 62). In fact, anti-Muslims attitudes in Britain are compounded by negative views of ethnic categories associated with Islam (Bleich & Maxwell, 2012, p. 45). Similarly, Bruneau et al. (2018) found widespread blatant dehumanization of Muslim refugees in four European countries (Spain, Greece, Czech Republic and Hungary). This dehumanization “was uniquely associated with resistance to refugee settlement, support for anti-refugee policies, and a greater tendency to sign petitions opposing aid to refugees” (Bruneau et al., 2018, p. 657); and was significantly stronger in the Eastern European countries (Bruneau et al., 2018).

Social representations of Muslims and Islam in Europe had been negative prior to 9/11 (e.g., Soubiale & Roussiau, 1998). Nonetheless, 9/11 and other terrorist attacks saw a substantial negative shift in representations (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017). Thus, Muslims became increasingly identified with security threats (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010) and terrorism (Cinnirella, 2012, p. 179; Orehek et al., 2010; O'Brien, 2016). Combined with generalised anti-Muslim/anti-Islamic propaganda (e.g., Pop, 2016), such representations have far-reaching implications, as Arabs and Muslims negotiate their daily lives in Europe by responding to this representational climate.

### **Intercultural Strategies**

Various intercultural strategies have also been proposed in studying how dominant and non-dominant groups interact with each other (Berry, 2011). When referring to non-dominant groups' preferences vis-à-vis interactions with dominant groups, "these preferences have become known as *acculturation strategies*. When examined among the dominant group, and when the views held are about how non-dominant groups *should* acculturate, they have been called *acculturation expectations*" (Berry, 2011, p. 2.4).

Berry (2011) conceptualised four different acculturation strategies and four different acculturation expectations, each based on two continua: the degree to which a group seeks to retain its own culture/identity/heritage; and the degree to which a group seeks to form relationships with others exhibiting different cultures/identities/heritage (Berry, 2011, p. 2.5). Among non-dominant groups: (a) *integration* is sought when they strive to retain their home culture whilst seeking relationships with other groups; (b) *assimilation* is pursued when non-dominant groups form relationships with other groups, whilst *not* maintaining their home culture; (c) *separation* occurs when home culture is retained and other groups are not engaged with; and (d) *marginalization* materializes when neither home culture nor outgroup culture are engaged with, regardless of intent (Berry, 2011). These strategies correspond respectively to acculturation expectations by the dominant group: (a) *multiculturalism*, when diversity is a

feature of the whole society (e.g., due to integration efforts); (b) *melting pot*, when assimilation is simultaneously sought by the non-dominant minorities; (c) *segregation*, when separation is imposed by the dominant group over non-dominant ones; and (d) *exclusion*, when marginalization is enforced by the dominant group (Berry, 2011).

*Integration* requires mutual effort/accommodation by non-dominant and dominant groups alike (Berry, 2011). This strategy has been positively linked with migrant adaptation (Berry et al., 2006; Ward, 2008), and offers both groups the chance to simultaneously invest in different forms of social capital, thus potentially leading to more social cohesion (Sammut, 2011). Nonetheless, in some contexts—both European and beyond—increased ethnic diversity correlates with less social cohesion and less community trust, especially in cases of ethnic polarisation (e.g., Koopmans & Veit, 2014; Laurence & Bentley, 2016; Putnam, 2007). This makes integration a difficult prospect to achieve.

The preferred intercultural strategies are also context-dependent and their meaning varies across groups. For example, the Maltese in Britain generally prefer assimilation over integration (Sammut, 2010). Moreover, European citizens generally equate migrant integration with *linguistic* integration, seeing this as highly important (Dražanová et al., 2020, p. 9). Migrants' contribution to the welfare system, and their commitment to the host country's way of life, also rank highly among Europeans' priorities (Dražanová et al., 2020, p. 9).

Overall, ERVs influence acculturation expectations among the dominant group. For people who highly identify with their national group, “hierarchy-enhancing myths” (Hindriks et al., 2014, p. 539), such as a preference for migrant assimilation, mediated the effect of SDO-D on prejudice toward immigrants in the Netherlands. For people with low national identification, “hierarchy-attenuating myths” (Hindriks et al., 2014, p. 539), such as support for multiculturalism, mediated the relationship between SDO-E and prejudice. In contrast, in research with Swiss and American participants, SDO predicted aggression against immigrants

who *do* assimilate (Thomsen et al., 2008). Thomsen et al. (2008) argue that assimilation implies a blurring of boundaries, which high-SDO individuals dislike. Similarly, in France, high-SDO individuals were against “disruption of status boundaries” (Guimond et al., 2010, p. 648). This counters research showing that SDO positively relates with support for assimilation, and negatively relates with multiculturalism (Levin et al., 2012).

Other researchers have gone beyond “the Berry boxes” (Ward, 2008, p. 105) and considered *deprovincialization* (Verkuyten et al., 2010), a form of multiculturalism where one’s ingroup is re-evaluated/put in perspective, and the outgroup is valued more highly than in ‘traditional’ multiculturalism. Another development has been that of *interculturalism* (Verkuyten & Yogeewaran, 2020), which emphasises intergroup dialogue/contact, identity hybridity, and shared belonging (Verkuyten & Yogeewaran, 2020, p. 3), and is “a middle ground position” (Scott & Safdar, 2017, p. 29) striving for both diversity/full participation and national heritage promotion. Moreover, *colorblindness* (Levin et al., 2012) foregrounds people’s status as equal individuals over their cultural group membership (see Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Roebroeck & Guimond, 2018).

Finally, recent research has re-ignited a focus on *tolerance*, especially where dominant group members perceive non-dominant group practices as being incompatible with their own (Verkuyten et al., 2019, 2020a). Tolerance can be based on permission, co-existence, respect or even esteem of the Other (Forst, 2003, pp. 73-75; Darmanin, 2015, p. 33). In tolerant contexts, principled objection, and not prejudice, is presumed to lie beneath the dislike of cultural practices (Verkuyten et al., 2020a). Tolerance also has multiple disadvantages, such as feelings of unacceptance among the non-dominant group (Verkuyten et al., 2020b). Nonetheless, Verkuyten et al. (2019) posit tolerance as the “minimal condition for living together despite meaningful differences” (Verkuyten et al., 2019, p. 28).

### *Arabs' Negotiation of Everyday Life in Europe*

Arabs negotiate their identity in European countries, in part, by responding to these intercultural strategies. In a large-scale qualitative inquiry with British Arab activists, Nagel and Staeheli (2008) noted how integration involves identity negotiation vis-à-vis one's membership in society. The participants argued that Arab immigrants should participate in the host society, and opposed the view that integration demands cultural homogeneity or subservience to Britain. They also positioned "their obligations to the host society within a broader set of commitments and geographical affinities that link 'here' [Britain] and 'there' [home country]" (Nagel & Staeheli, 2008, p. 417). A common expression was that of wanting to give something back to British society.

Nagel and Staeheli (2008) further noted a degree of transnationalism in their participants' discourse, whereby they "live their lives simultaneously in multiple locations through social networks that transcend national boundaries" (Nagel & Staeheli, 2008, p. 419). Other participants, however, expressed no such feelings, and saw Britain as their only home. Participants distinguished between assimilation and integration, rejecting the former as imposed conformity. The negative representations of Arabs and the negative consequences of hijab-wearing, meant that integration—though desirable—was a difficult prospect for the participants (Nagel & Staeheli, 2008). Research in other countries also confirmed reports of negative views on hijab-wearing (e.g., in France and Romania; Geisser, 2010; Mohamed-Salih, 2015, p. 91).

In another paper, the same authors analysed how British Arab activists and their communities were impacted by government surveillance measures in response to terrorist crimes (Staeheli & Nagel, 2008). Participants perceived these measures as a threat, and as evidence of anti-Arab encroachment. Securitization affected travel and everyday activities like sending money to relatives, adding feelings of uncertainty. Participants argued that other Arabs also fear losing their citizenship, getting involved in their communities in Britain,

wearing Islamic clothing or identifying as Arab, denial of jobs/housing, and the end of their cultural traditions (Staeheli & Nagel, 2008).

The above research focused on activists, who may not be representative of other Arabs. Yet, Nagel and Staeheli uncovered patterns that also featured widely in other studies looking at Arabs more broadly (Nagel & Staeheli, 2008; Staeheli & Nagel, 2008). In a study on Iraqi refugees<sup>10</sup> in England, Platts-Fowler and Robinson (2015) found variations in participants' experiences of integration, which depended on the resettlement area in which they lived. Refugees' experiences ranged all the way from friendly neighbours, to racial harassment. Shops selling Arabic products were highly valued by some participants, who saw such places as enablers of social interaction. Some participants also reported feeling conspicuous when wearing the hijab. Essentially, "refugee integration is grounded and embodied in space and place" (Platts-Fowler & Robinson, 2015, p. 488).

Kivisto and Vecchia-Mikkola (2013) studied feelings of ambivalence among Iraqi immigrants in Rome and Helsinki. Some participants spoke of resistance back in their home country, and of pleasant childhood memories (Kivisto & Vecchia-Mikkola, 2013). In reacting to this ambivalence, participants adopted one of three strategies: (a) some participants renounced their old country and valued the host country more (*exit* strategy); (b) others emphasized the desire to go back to Iraq one day, seeing their stay in the host country as an interlude (*loyalty* strategy); and (c) others maintained ties with both countries (*a voice* strategy), emphasizing their commitments (e.g., family commitments) in the host country (Kivisto & Vecchia-Mikkola, 2013; see Hirschman, 1970). Thus, migrants' integration depends on "the way they address their ambivalence" (Kivisto & Vecchia-Mikkola, 2013, p. 201).

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<sup>10</sup> Iraq was one of the founding members of the Arab league, has Arabic as one of its main languages, and hosts a large number of Arabs.



Perceptions of negative reactions by natives were also documented in the town of San Marcellino in Southern Italy (Arcidiacono et al., 2012), using semi-structured interviews with both Italian natives and migrants from the Maghreb. The authors report that “the supremacy of male decision power” (Arcidiacono et al., 2012, p. 6) among the migrants’ families influenced their relations with natives, especially for Maghrebian women. There was an asymmetrical power relationship between natives and migrants, sustained partly by the charity provided by natives. Arcidiacono et al. (2012) also describe positive native-migrant relations, ranging from good relations between the Imam, the parish priest and the mayor—to examples from daily life (e.g., enjoying coffee together in a bar). Overall, in San Marcellino, “the Muslim community presents itself as ‘low-key’ [...] as a strategy of integration, a sort of decategorization strategy for the reduction of intergroup bias” (Arcidiacono et al., 2012, p. 7).

Moreover, Mestheneos and Ioannidi (2002) studied the experiences of different refugees (including Arabs) across different EU states. Welfare dependence, institutionalized racism and prejudice by Europeans, culture shock, and refugees’ personalities/abilities all impacted their social integration. Arab refugees reported the importance of learning the host country’s language, and feelings of culture shock. Welfare assistance sometimes resulted in further refugee exclusion due to over-dependence on the system. However, in countries without welfare support, some refugees faced difficulties integrating suitably into the labour market, hunger or rough sleeping. Refugees with better social skills managed to find employment, whereas more reserved individuals (including Arabs) faced anomie and disorientation (Mestheneos & Ioannidi, 2002). In turn, perceptions of discrimination predict different group identifications among migrants. For instance, in the Netherlands, perceived discrimination by the dominant group predicted greater ingroup *ethnic* identification; and perceived acceptance predicted greater *national* identification (among Moroccans, amongst other groups; Cvetkovska et al., 2020). Thus, “minorities may shift alliances between ethnic

and national groups given the project they seek to advance” (Buhagiar & Sammut, 2020a, p. 7).

Colombo et al. (2009) found that second-generation migrants (including Arabs, e.g., Egyptians) in Milan (Italy) pursued various self-identification strategies, including transnational identities (cf. Nagel & Staeheli, 2008), hyphenated identities (e.g., an emphasis on being Italian *and* Egyptian), cosmopolitan identities (e.g., involving de-categorization and multiple identities), identities in crisis, and the formation of ethnic enclaves (Colombo et al., 2009). These identities vary in terms of how conducive they are to good relations with non-Arabs. Yet, to the best of my knowledge, there is little research on Arabs’ views on non-Arabs in Europe (however, see Furia & Lucas, 2008), despite the importance of such views for understanding the *systemic* aspects of Arab/non-Arab relations in Europe. The present inquiry addresses this lacuna.

### ***Muslims’ Negotiation of Everyday Life in Europe***

Whether Muslims retreat, engage with society or essentialize their identity, varies across European contexts (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2011, p. 27). Muslim migrants’ values generally fall midway between home and host country values (Norris & Inglehart, 2012). However, aware of negative media representations (e.g., portraying Muslims as ultra-conservatives or terrorists; Brown et al., 2015), some Muslims opt for *ontological* strategies, sticking to their core principles; whereas others pursue more *pragmatic* strategies, relaxing some Islamic principles to facilitate social life (Sartawi & Sammut, 2012).

In France, Muslim migrants exhibit less assimilation than do their Christian counterparts (Adida et al., 2014). French natives’ discrimination toward Muslims also reinforces perceptions of institutionalized discrimination among Muslims (Adida et al., 2014). In turn, Muslims may radicalize (particularly in cases involving collective humiliation and contempt; see Kruglanski et al., 2014, 2018; Tausch et al., 2011), thus feeding non-Muslims’ negative views, and so on (Dekker & van der Noll, 2012, p. 112)—resulting in a conflict

spiral (Sammut et al., 2018). In Germany, Muslim focus group participants rarely stated that they personally experienced discrimination, but most participants still discussed *collective* discrimination (Holtz et al., 2013). Collective discrimination encouraged some participants to re-affirm an essentialised Muslim identity, creating boundaries with the broader German society. In contrast, others adopted a hyphenated identity through local sports and politics (Holtz et al., 2013). Here, it is worth noting that white (and non-Arab) Muslims in Britain face similar discrimination and negative media representations, which sometimes depict them as “more of a threat than other Muslims [...] a threat from ‘within’” (Amer & Howarth, 2018, p. 624). Thus, white (and non-Arab) Muslims also respond strategically to reactions by both Muslims and non-Muslims alike (Amer, 2020).

O’Brien (2018) notes how ‘Islamophobia’ has its counterpart in ‘Europhobia’, which portrays European democracy as a neo-imperialist hoax, and alternatively re-presents Europeans’ views of women as sexualized rather than liberating. Thus, “reverse othering generates and disseminates a significant counter discourse that moves many Muslims in Europe to resist their subjugation in myriad ways” (O’Brien, 2018, p. 10). Similarly, perceptions of (mostly symbolic) threat promote both anti-Muslim hostility among non-Muslim Norwegians, and anti-Western behavioural intentions among Swedish Muslims (Obaidi et al., 2018). Individuals who respond by becoming radicalized are usually otherized by mainstream Muslims, who see them as ignorant Muslims or not Muslim at all, judging them more harshly than other outgroup members (Sammut & Sartawi, 2012). Such de-essentialisation strategies serve protective functions for the ingroup (Sammut & Sartawi, 2012).

### **Arab-Maltese Relations in Malta**

Many intergroup dynamics observed in Europe also unfold in Malta. There has been little quantitative research on specific minority communities in Malta (Attard et al., 2014, p. 7), and only sporadic research on ethnic minority women, who are more at risk of socio-

economic exclusion (Camilleri-Cassar, 2011, p. 193). Nonetheless, research has been gaining momentum, focusing mostly on immigrants or foreign nationals, both Arab and non-Arab (Cefai et al., 2019; Sammut & Lauri, 2017). Recently, Cefai et al. (2019, p. 17) found evidence of discrimination and prejudice amongst children in educational settings, where racist bullying remains an issue. Discrimination extends to the labour market, where many asylum seekers receive salaries below the minimum wage, and are susceptible to precarious informal work (Attard et al., 2014, p. 17). Overall, the difficulties faced by migrants and asylum seekers lead them to lose trust in the authorities. This, in turn, further disadvantages them in terms of housing and related services, creating a vicious cycle (Fsadni & Pisani, 2012, p. 74). Migrant women face more difficulties in finding employment (Gauci & Pisani, 2013, p. 19), but generally have an easier time finding property to rent than men (Fsadni & Pisani, 2012, p. 76). Moreover, housing discrimination is especially relevant for Arabs in Malta (Cassar, 2005, p. 56; Fsadni & Pisani, 2012, p. 58; Vella Muskat, 2016, p. 17).

The potential for a vicious cycle, or a conflict spiral (Sammut et al., 2015), becomes pertinent when considering that Maltese police generally attribute criminal tendencies and connections to Arabs, especially Libyans (Azzopardi Cauchi, 2004, pp. 203-204). Indeed, Arabs face high levels of prejudice in Malta, even among children, who tend to express more negative views about Arabs and Africans, than about Europeans or members of other socio-ethnic groups (Cefai et al., 2019, p. 233). Specifically, young Maltese students express significantly negative attitudes toward foreign nationals from the Maghreb region (e.g., Libya and Tunisia) and the Middle East (e.g., Lebanon and Syria) (Cefai et al., 2019, p. 195). Arab children have also reported incidents of discrimination by Maltese children (p. 160). Among adults, Maltese-Arab couples face prejudice on a daily basis (Cassar, 2005, p. 48).

The conflation between 'Arab' and 'Muslim' is similarly observed in Malta (Chircop, 2014, p. 68; Gauci & Pisani, 2013, p. 2; National Commission for the Promotion of Equality [NCPE], 2010, p. 29), as is that between 'Muslim' and 'Jihadi' (Darmanin, 2015, pp. 36-7).

Muslims have to negotiate their identities on a daily basis. For instance, individuals who wear the hijab—locally described as “a hybrid and complex embodiment of religion, identity and socio-politics” (Grima, 2014, p. 461)—face difficulty finding work, workplace discrimination and verbal harassment (Gauci & Pisani, 2013, pp. 14-19; NCPE, 2010, p. 29). This prejudice can also be subtle, and reflects Maltese self-identification as European as opposed to Arab (Grima, 2014, pp. 470-472). Native Maltese Muslims are sometimes otherized too (Gauci & Pisani, 2013, p. 14). Similarly, identities are negotiated in educational settings (Chircop, 2014), where guardians of primary school children sometimes justify the imposition of majority culture with reference to Christianity’s hegemonic status in Malta (Darmanin, 2015, p. 37). Darmanin (2015) asks whether the best option is minimal religious toleration, or else institutional pluralism, noting that any changes arising “out of the claims of minority religious Others or from nonbelievers will lead to a ‘backlash’ and to more intolerance in personal attitudes” (Darmanin, 2015, p. 42).

At the same time, local reports of respect by Catholics toward Muslims feature as well (Grima, 2014, pp. 470-472). Indeed, these tensions between negative and positive representations were reflected in a recent media analysis on representations of Muslims and Islam (and Arabs), cited above (Buhagiar et al., 2020). In Malta, such representations simultaneously evoke notions of: (a) *threat* (e.g., terrorism) versus *recognition* (e.g., commerce with the Arab world); (b) *power* (e.g., Arab oil industries) versus *powerlessness* (e.g., refugees); and (c) *situatedness* (e.g., local migrant integration) versus *global issues* (e.g., foreign policy and conflict; Buhagiar et al., 2020, p. 71).

In Malta, a local migrant integration strategy was recently published (Ministry for European Affairs and Equality [MEAA], 2017). Although issues concerning integration are commonly linked with Arabs, Muslims and Africans among the Maltese public (Assimakopoulos & Vella Muskat, 2017, p. 38), there is little research specifically on Arabs’ arguments for/against integration. Indeed, most local research rightly focuses on access to

services, experiences of discrimination, and migrants' rights. Nonetheless, Maltese arguments for/against integration *have* been investigated (Sammut et al., 2018). Accordingly, this research is presented before proceeding to fit local research into the action-oriented formulae.

### ***Maltese Arguments For and Against Integration***

In a study by Sammut and Lauri (2017) based on data gathered in 2010 and 2011, the Maltese expressed warm attitudes (on a 100-point thermometer) toward Western Europeans, somewhat neutral attitudes toward Eastern Europeans and Asians, and clearly cold attitudes toward Arabs. Arabs were the only pan-ethnic group rated well below the mid-point by the Maltese (Sammut & Lauri, 2017, p. 239). Arabs were almost always the worst rated socio-ethnic group, including by the other minorities. However, Arabs' ratings for other socio-ethnic groups were always in positive territory, and were highest for the Maltese. This asymmetry potentially indicates assimilationist preferences among Arabs in Malta. Indeed, in this study, Arabs expressed a strong preference for assimilation. The Maltese, too, expressed high levels of support for assimilation (Sammut & Lauri, 2017, p. 236). These findings inspired further research concerning the Maltese's views on Arab integration.

Between December 2015 and January 2016, Sammut et al. (2018) carried out in-depth argumentation interviews, to understand how the Maltese socially re-present the project of Arab integration. Argumentation analysis involved the coding of claims; a thematic categorization of these claims; and the subsequent coding of other argument components (i.e., warrants, backings, data, qualifiers and rebuttals; see **Chapter 3** and **Chapter 6**). Participants' claims featured cultural, economic, psychological, religious, socio-political and stigma-related argumentative themes, and mostly advanced the anti-integrationist project. Interestingly, no pro-integrationist religious arguments were made, reflecting the absence of symbolic resources for socially re-presenting Islam in appreciative terms (Sammut et al., 2018).

Sammut et al. (2018) present arguments appealing to the socio-political theme in detail. Firstly, (a) socio-political arguments *for* integration advanced the claim that “We never had problems with Arabs, they integrate and we get along” (Sammut et al., 2018, p. 403). Participants highlighted the longstanding Arab-Maltese trade relations, Arab-Maltese similarities, and the benefits of intercultural contact and constructive personal relationships. They qualified their views by stating that Arabs with strong Islamic beliefs integrate less. Secondly, (b) *mixed/ambivalent* arguments advanced the claims that “[1] Migrants can practice their beliefs as long as they don’t bother or influence others [and 2] The more exposed to European culture, the better capable Arabs are of integrating” (Sammut et al., 2018, p. 405). Such arguments were noncommittal; noted the pros and cons of integration; emphasised Arabs’ role in integrating; or argued that some Arabs are more ‘cultured’ than others (Sammut et al., 2018). Thirdly, (c) socio-political arguments *against* integration advanced the claims that “[1] Arabs expect special treatment due to racism [...2] Arabs isolate themselves and do not integrate [...3] Arabs impose their culture on others [and 4] Large proportions of foreigners are a political problem” (Sammut et al., 2018, p. 404). These arguments portrayed ‘Arabic culture’ as regressive and violent; argued for irreconcilable differences between Maltese and Arab cultures; referenced Arabs’ bad reputation; or accused Arabs of destabilizing Europe using terrorism and Islam. Participants qualified their views by positioning Arabs as simply one of many problematic groups in Malta (Sammut et al., 2018).

This paper was followed by an abductive analysis focusing on arguments from cultural essentialism (Buhagiar et al., 2018). Essentialism involves reducing a social group to what is seen as its immutable, stable and natural core (Kadianaki & Andreouli, 2017; Haslam, 1998, p. 291). Essentialist views are articulated argumentatively (Yildiz & Verkuyten, 2012), and feature prominently in intergroup scenarios (e.g., Zeromskyte & Wagner, 2017), where they legitimate intergroup boundaries (Roberts et al., 2017). The Maltese’s essentialist arguments depicted ‘Arabic culture’ as an elemental feature of Arabs, which makes their

integration highly implausible (Buhagiar et al., 2018). The culturally essentialist arguments varied in their differential emphases on reductionism, delineation, determinism and temporality (Buhagiar et al., 2018). *Reductionist* arguments reduced all Arabs to ‘Arabic culture’, conflating ‘Arabic culture’ with ‘Islamic culture’. *Delineatory* arguments demarcated Arabic culture as something apart from Maltese culture, bounded and unchangeable. *Determinist* arguments portrayed Arabs as being psychologically and behaviourally moulded by Arabic culture. Finally, *temporal* arguments referenced the “*inductive potential*” (Wagner et al., 2009, p. 367) of Arabic culture, arguing that Arabs will cause trouble—if not now, then in the future. The only culturally essentialist argument *for* integration portrayed Arabic culture as a passionate culture, similar to that of Mediterraneans (Buhagiar et al., 2018).

Valsiner (2019) reiterates Buhagiar et al.’s (2018) view that these findings show how “social representations of Arabs [in] Malta operate according to the cognitive fast and frugal heuristics, with negative affect assertions speeding up the making of judgments” (Valsiner, 2019, p. 442). Essentialist social re-presentation of outgroups promotes “minimal social discrimination” (Valsiner, 2019, p. 435). This presents a crucial point. If essentialist social re-presentation reflects minimal discrimination, then studying the outgroup’s views can shed light on a potential spiral of conflict at its outset (Sammut et al., 2015).

### ***Coalitions For and Against Integration***

Sammut et al. (2018) studied how Maltese *subjects* re-present Arabs/Arab-Maltese relations (the *object*)<sup>11</sup> in advancing/resisting the *project* of integration (see Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). For example, in arguing *for* integration, the Maltese socially re-presented Arabs as well-integrated (Sammut et al., 2018). However, socially re-presenting Arabs as culturally essentialised promoted *anti*-integrationism. This can be fitted in Formula 1 (see **Chapter 2**):

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<sup>11</sup> The object’s definition is necessarily fuzzy (see **Chapter 2**). I largely use ‘Arab-Maltese relations’ to denote the object, which could well take different forms.



Social re-presentation SR [well-integrated Arabs vs. culturally essentialised Arabs]  
*for/against* Project P [integration], of/as Object O [Arab-Maltese relations], by Group G<sub>1</sub>  
 [Maltese], in Context C [Malta]... according to Group G<sub>1</sub> [Maltese] (Formula 1)

This research effort can be advanced by studying how Arabs (*subjects*) socially re-present the Maltese/Arab-Maltese relations (*object*) in their arguments *for/against* integration (*project*), completing Formula 1 for Arabs. Moreover, Arab-Maltese intergroup dynamics can be understood by studying the Maltese's alternative re-presentation of Arabs' project, and Arabs' alternative re-presentation of the Maltese's project, by asking both groups for their views on the outgroup's views on integration. This fits in Formula 2 (see **Chapter 2**):

SR *for* P<sub>integration</sub>, as a function of: SR<sub>M</sub>, AR<sub>M</sub><sup>A</sup>, AR<sub>M</sub><sup>n</sup> ... SR<sub>A</sub>, AR<sub>A</sub><sup>M</sup>, AR<sub>A</sub><sup>n</sup> ... and any other SR<sub>n</sub> and AR<sub>n</sub> ... relevant to Context C (Formula 2)

Here, the integrationist Project (P<sub>integration</sub>) is conceptualised as a function of the following: (a) the Maltese, in favouring/opposing integration, social re-present Arab-Maltese relations (SR<sub>M</sub>), (b) alternatively re-present Arabs' project (AR<sub>M</sub><sup>A</sup>), and (c) alternatively re-present other outgroups' projects (AR<sub>M</sub><sup>n</sup>); and (d) Arabs, in favouring/opposing integration, socially re-present Arab-Maltese relations (SR<sub>A</sub>), (e) alternatively re-present the Maltese's project (AR<sub>A</sub><sup>M</sup>), and (f) alternatively re-present other outgroups' projects (AR<sub>A</sub><sup>n</sup>). Similarly, (g) other groups, in advancing their Project, socially re-present the relevant Object/s (SR<sub>n</sub>), and (h) alternatively re-present other outgroups' Projects (AR<sub>n</sub>). Points (a) till (f) are the subject of the present inquiry, in Context C (Malta). Social re-presentation *for* integration will feature different semiotic resources than social re-presentation *against* integration (Sammut et al., 2018, p. 405). This sheds light on the various silent coalitions involved.

This warrants a note concerning the nature of coalitions and group boundaries. I do not use ‘Arab’ and ‘Maltese’ to ignore the existence of hybrid identities (e.g., persons of mixed Arab-Maltese descent, etc.). The demarcation of group boundaries into ‘Arab’ and ‘Maltese’ is meant to indicate probable degrees of access to different interobjective backgrounds based on the social groups people frequent. As such, project coalitions for/against integration can also involve multiple/hybrid identities (e.g., Arab, Maltese, Arab-Maltese, etc.). Yet, prior studies showed a convergence of antipathy specifically toward Arabs, legitimating research along socio-ethnic lines. Qualitative research (e.g., Sammut et al., 2018) also showed that the labels ‘Arab’ and ‘Maltese’ make lay sense in Malta. Moreover, Arab nationals may well identify with the label ‘Arab’ on the whole, as did participants in Nagel and Staeheli’s (2008, p. 421) study (see above). By asking participants directly about a specific project (i.e., integration), researchers can target the project directly whilst allowing participants to re-present Arab-Maltese relations in whichever way they deem fit (e.g., by speaking about ‘Arab-Maltese relations’, ‘Arabs’, ‘the Maltese’, etc.). This minimises needless group categorizations during interviews/surveys (Gillespie et al., 2012).

The above considerations accord with research showing that ethnic characteristics only become salient when relevant to contested projects (e.g., integration) (Kurzban et al., 2001). As noted above, group categories should not be needlessly reified, as their definitions depend on perspective, people’s movements, and history, and they also are “re-constitutive of the phenomena they seek to describe” (Gillespie et al., 2012, p. 392). However, at the same time, “it can be useful to distinguish one social group or culture from another” (Gillespie et al., 2012, p. 399), so long as researchers are cognizant of the constructed nature of categories and problematize them when necessary (Gillespie et al., 2012). Research designs should be open to this diversity when possible.

## Conclusion

This chapter reviewed literature on intergroup relations and coalitional psychology. It started by reviewing the literature on intergroup cognition, specifically in terms of the cognitive and motivational biases underlying intergroup relations. This paved the way for an articulation of the notion of *coalitions* in a way that is compatible with evolutionary psychological research, whilst leaving space for the role of social construction and re-presentation. In essence, argumentative processes were understood as re-presenting objects of interest *for* coalitional ends (see **Chapter 2**). This addressed the collective psychological processes involved in coalition formation and advancement: coalitions were conceptualised as advancing different projects, either *silently* (i.e., by virtue of day-to-day relations between subjects) or more *actively* (e.g., through vanguards or political elite).

Having presented this holistic view of coalitional dynamics, this chapter proceeded to consider ERVs deemed as being relevant to intergroup relations. These were SDO (an orientation toward intergroup relations), NFC (a cognitive style or motivational variable), Sense of Community (a psychological variable tapping one's relations with the community) and Mentalities (denoting individual capabilities for situational adaptation). The social psychological literature on Arabs and Muslims in Europe was then reviewed, showing how Arabs and Muslims negotiate intercultural projects in hugely diverse manners across Europe, including in Malta. The fact that, in Malta, both dominant (the Maltese) and non-dominant groups converge in their distaste for Arabs, inspired the present research, making it pertinent. This chapter ended with a reformulation of Arab-Maltese relations in terms of the action-oriented formulae presented in **Chapter 2**. The study by Sammut et al. (2018) completed part of the formulae by addressing Maltese social re-presentation for/against integration (SR<sub>M</sub>). It is the goal of the present work to address the remaining components.

Before proceeding, it is worth noting the take-home messages from Chapters 2-4. These are the following: (a) social re-presentation is systemic and functional, necessarily

cohering around joint projects; (b) argumentation has a strong motivational basis, being *for* or *against* such projects; and (c) in intergroup scenarios, this translates into (silent) coalitional behaviour along project (and/or socio-ethnic or other) lines. Accordingly, the next chapter outlines the methodological considerations behind the present inquiry.

## Chapter 5 – Methodology

Having preliminarily fitted Arab-Maltese relations in the action-oriented formulae, the next step consists of mixed-methods research to obtain a nuanced understanding of Arab-Maltese relations in terms of formulae components. This chapter presents the methodological considerations behind the present inquiry. This research is grounded in the *substantive theory stance*, whereby ontological and epistemological concerns are approached substantively (Greene, 2007, p. 69)—in this case, through action-oriented SRT (see **Chapter 2**). The work of the previous chapters culminates in research decisions based on this stance.

This chapter starts with an outline of the present undertaking, which involves qualitative semi-structured interviews (Study 1), scale development (Study 2), and a quantitative survey (Study 3). This is followed by a section re-visiting the nomothetic-idiographic distinction (Windelband, 1894/1998) in social psychology, toward which a fractal view is adopted (Abbott, 2010, p. 10). The substantive theory stance is then explained, as are the epistemological emphases of the present inquiry. The research goals; research objectives; purposes of using mixed methods; research questions; research design; and sampling considerations, are then presented. All three studies are analysed and presented analytically in their own right in Chapters 6-8. The findings are then brought together systemically in **Chapter 9**, completing the research programme<sup>12</sup> on Arab-Maltese relations in Malta (see **Appendix C** for the overall methodology in tabular form).

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<sup>12</sup> The term ‘research programme’ (Morse et al., 2006) here refers to Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3. Part of Study 2 was also informed by input from Sammut et al.’s (2018; Sammut, 2015-2016) study with Maltese participants.

## Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3: An Outline

In what follows, I provide an overview of Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3, to contextualise the whole Methodology chapter (see **Inquiry Logics: The Present Research**). The main research question driving the present research programme is: *How do the Maltese and Arabs advance pro- or anti-integrationist projects [Project P] by socially re-presenting Arab-Maltese relations [or any other Object O], and alternatively re-presenting each other's projects?* The following studies tap different aspects of this research question.

*Study 1* involves in-depth one-to-one semi-structured interviews with Arabs, complementing those conducted by Sammut et al. (2018) with the Maltese. This study addresses research sub-questions concerning: (a) how Arabs in Malta socially re-present Arab-Maltese relations (when arguing) for/against integration; and (b) how Arabs in Malta alternatively re-present the Maltese's project (when arguing) for/against integration. Purposive snowball sampling is conducted. Open-ended data is collected using argumentation interviewing (Sammut et al., 2018), and analysed using argumentation analysis (Sammut et al., 2018), both adapted in line with the minimal model of argumentation presented in **Chapter 3** (henceforth, the analysis used is termed 'minimal argumentation analysis'). The output consists of (a) argumentative themes; (b) claims categorized by valence (positive, negative or ambivalent/mixed vis-à-vis integration); (c) selected portrayals of arguments (warrants, evidence and qualifiers) supporting the claims; and (d) in-depth discussions of the arguments together with illustrative excerpts. Study 1 is presented in detail in **Chapter 6**.

In *Study 2*, the claims made by Arabs (in Study 1) and the Maltese (Sammut, 2015-2016; Sammut et al., 2018)<sup>13</sup> are thematically categorized to form ecologically valid Intergroup Relations Scales. Following thematic categorization, the scale items are piloted (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 88) with a small number of participants for purposes of

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<sup>13</sup> Sammut (2015-2016) is the dataset behind Sammut et al.'s (2018) study, which informed part of Study 2 with permission. This dataset was collected by Prof Gordon Sammut, and analyzed by both of us (Sammut et al., 2018). The follow-up abductive analysis (Buhagiar et al., 2018) on this dataset was conducted by myself, under Prof Gordon Sammut's guidance.

cognitive interviewing, subjected to expert ranking in order of integrationism, and scaled using sensitivity analysis (Agesti, 2010, p. 10). Validity and reliability tests for the Intergroup Relations Scales are conducted using the data from Study 3. The outputs consist of two 10-item scales—the Re-Presentation for Integration Scale (RFI scale) and the Alternative Re-Presentation of Integration Scale (AROI scale)—where Item 1 is the most pro-integrationist item and Item 5 is the least pro-integrationist item; and Item 6 is the least anti-integrationist item and Item 10 is the most anti-integrationist item. The RFI scale and the AROI scale are collectively labelled as the Intergroup Relations Scales (IR scales). RFI taps Maltese and Arab social re-presentation for integration, by asking participants for their views on each item. AROI (composed of the same items) taps Maltese and Arab alternative re-presentation of their outgroup’s (‘Maltese’ for Arabs, and ‘Arabs’ for the Maltese) project, by asking participants what they think their outgroup thinks about each item. Study 2 thus “connect[s] the initial qualitative phase to the subsequent quantitative strand” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 87). Study 2 is presented in detail in **Chapter 7**.

*Study 3* involves a split-ballot survey distributed among Maltese and Arabs living in Malta. The measures in the questionnaire involve the IR scales, extra-representational variables (SDO, NFC, mentalities and sense of community), and demographic characteristics. Study 3 addresses research sub-questions concerning: (a) the differences between the Maltese’s and Arabs’ social re-presentation for/against integration; (b) how the Maltese and Arabs alternatively re-present each other’s projects; (c) the relationship between alternative re-presentation of the outgroup’s project and the Maltese’s/Arabs’ social re-presentation for/against integration; and (d) the relationship between extra-representational variables (ERVs) and social re-presentation for/against integration. The questionnaire is: piloted with a small number of Maltese participants for purposes of cognitive interviewing; translated from English to Maltese and Arabic, and back-translated; and distributed to Maltese and Arabs in these three languages. Purposive snowball sampling is conducted. The output consists of

bivariate statistics and multiple regression models for both groups. Study 3 is presented in detail in **Chapter 8**.

Importantly, each item in the IR scales is legitimated by arguments (claims, warrants, evidence and qualifiers) made by both groups. The IR scale items composed in Study 2 (a) are merged *claims* of Maltese and Arab participants; and (b) contain succinct formulations of the social and alternative representations available in arguing for/against integration. In turn, in Study 3, these items numerically represent what participants are *for* (social re-presentation) and what they think the outgroup is *for* (alternative re-presentation). The qualitative findings behind the items thus provide insight into the argumentative content and processes inherent in re-presentation (Uzelgun et al., 2016), showing which arguments function to advance which project. In **Chapter 9** (General Discussion), the data obtained from this mixed-methods research are integrated into a joint display (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 228; Fetters et al., 2013). The joint display consists of frequencies for RFI and AROI scale items per group, and selected arguments behind these positionings. The next sections explore the nomothetic-idiographic distinction before presenting mixed-methods research in detail.

### **The Nomothetic-Idiographic Distinction**

The different paradigms behind quantitative and qualitative research in psychology can be traced back to the distinction between nomothetic and idiographic approaches. The former emphasise general ahistorical abstraction, and the latter singular, historical, concrete events (Münsterberg, 1899, p. 5; Windelband, 1894/1998). The nomothetic “seeks laws, the [idiographic seeks] forms. In the one, thought pushes from the identification of the particular to the grasping of general relationships, in the other one remains with the painstaking characterization of the particular” (Windelband, 1894/1998, p. 15). The nomothetic approach relates to universal principles “as opposed to the study of the individual case” (Zedeck, 2014, p. 234). In contrast, the idiographic approach foregrounds the “understanding of an individual



case” (Zedeck, 2014, p. 170), obtaining in-depth understanding as opposed to universality. A discussion of the conflictual understandings of these terms will position the present inquiry.

The ‘generality’ and ‘uniqueness’ of these respective approaches have corresponded to different referents over time (see Schäfer, 1999). For instance, the nomothetic came to be erroneously equated with ‘scientific’, and the idiographic with ‘non-scientific’ pursuits (Lamiell, 1998). This contrasts with Windelband’s (1894/1998) original formulation, but it characterised much of 20<sup>th</sup> century psychology (Lamiell, 1998; Affifi, 2020). Lamiell (1998) clarifies that idiography may, but need not, focus on the singular individual. Rather, idiography concerns “the nature of the sought-after knowledge” (Lamiell, 1998, p. 27): a knowledge of uniqueness. In contrast, nomothetic generality applies abstracted laws to all observed instances/cases (Lamiell, 1998). Nomothesis does not imply (but nor does it exclude) aggregation *per se*—as by its definition, aggregation can tolerate the occasional outlier (Lamiell, 1998; Valsiner, 2016, p. 6). Based on this reading, the present inquiry concerning Arab-Maltese relations, as a whole, is best described as idiographic (but see below), since it ultimately studies a unique situated case (Lamiell, 1998, p. 31).

However, idiographically unique events rely on the nomothetic for intelligibility (see Salvatore & Valsiner, 2009, pp. 10-12). This results in a paradox where to posit uniqueness, one must make recourse to a nomothetic frame of reference (theoretical principles, ontologies, etc.). This dependence attests to a mutual reliance between nomothetic and idiographic research (De Luca Picione, 2015, p. 363). That is, “*uniqueness always entails assimilation to a more general class* that is in its nature fuzzy [...] and is being constructed as the process of encountering similar (never the same!) unique versions of the phenomena unfolds” (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2009, p. 12). Academic literature, prior findings and theoretical work lay the foundations of this “*more general class* [i.e., nomothesis]” (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2009, p. 12). Under this nuanced reading, the idiographic case of Arab-Maltese relations rests on the nomothetic foundation of an action-oriented “coalitional ontology” (Lin et al., 2016, p. 313).

Accordingly, idiography and nomothesis function in a complementary manner, not in opposition (Affifi, 2020; Valsiner, 2016, p. 6). This integral view of nomothesis-idiography (Affifi, 2020) informs research design ontologically, epistemologically and methodologically (del Rio & Molina, 2009, p. 77). It *avoids* two equally incomplete views of psychology as either (a) the constant pursuit for generalizable laws, or else (b) the perpetual revision of social constructs (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). In essence, the integral view invites the use of mixed methods. The dialectical tension between nomothesis and idiography transpires as a core challenge (cf. De Luca Picione, 2015, p. 363).

To this end, the nomothetic-idiographic distinction can be reframed in terms of “fractal distinctions” (Abbott, 2010, p. 10). The nomothetic-idiographic distinction does not find a direct counterpart in other classic distinctions, such as the quantitative-qualitative, etic-emic and positivist-constructionist divides (De Luca Picione, 2015, p. 365). Any psychological object can also be investigated using either approach (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). For instance, “the idiographic approach is defined [...] by the researcher’s theory that models the object of investigation and defines a suitable research method” (De Luca Picione, 2015, p. 365). Abbott (2010) proposes the concept of “fractal distinctions” (p. 10) to describe oppositional structures (qualitative vs. quantitative, etc.) that repeat themselves in a self-similar manner at different analytical levels (Knappertsbusch, 2020; Maxwell, 2015, p. 89). A fractal dynamic is appreciable in the tension between idiography and nomothesis: within the specific, one finds the general, which turns out to be specific at a given level of analysis, and so on.

### ***Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3: Idiographic Arguments, Nomothetic Positioning***

As a whole, this research programme deals with a unique idiographic case: Arab-Maltese relations in Malta. Yet, given the fractal nature (Abbott, 2010, p. 10) of nomothesis-idiography, within the research programme itself, Study 3 is best conceptualised as primarily nomothetic, and Study 1 as primarily idiographic. The IR scales (Study 2) link both studies.

Study 3 fulfils a nomothetic role because of the relative stability (cf. Sammut, 2019a) of the items composing the IR scales, yielding insight into Maltese and Arab positioning on integration. Moreover, Study 3 deals with phenomena that are relatively unchanging within a given time span (Affifi, 2020). Importantly, the present inquiry lays the foundation for possibly studying a potential conflict spiral between time period T1 and eventual time period T2 (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008, p. 182). A longitudinal approach would track temporal variation in responses (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010), tracing joint projects (Bauer, 2015, p. 57). The historicity provided by longitudinal research would yield better nomothetic knowledge. Although the present research is not longitudinal, Study 2 provides the tools necessary for such an undertaking.<sup>14</sup>

In contrast, Study 1 is idiographic because it focuses on specific arguments, highlights detail and change, and presupposes the nomothetic foundation of a “coalitional ontology” (Lin et al., 2016, p. 313) as its ground (Affifi, 2020; Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). Moreover, qualitative research is preoccupied with intercultural understanding and diverse forms of knowledge (Gergen et al., 2015, p. 1), making it particularly suitable for understanding unique cases (arguments in Study 1), and for informing scale development (in Study 2). To recap, the research programme on the idiographic case of Arab-Maltese relations incorporates a fractality (Abbott, 2010, p. 10), which resurfaces within each study (e.g., in Study 1, warrants are highly specific, compared to relatively general claims, etc.).

### **Studying Intergroup Relations using Mixed Methods**

The integral view of nomothesis-idiography (Affifi, 2020) calls for mixed-methods research. Mixed-methods research employs different elements of qualitative and quantitative research to comprehensively understand a specific phenomenon (Zedeck, 2014, p. 218), combining qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection methods, data analytic

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<sup>14</sup> Maltese and Arab arguments on integration may change in future. The IR scales can be used more than once, but careful consideration and openness to future revision are recommended.

methods and inference procedures. Whereas some researchers emphasise mixed *methods* as a research design integrating qualitative and quantitative data, others emphasise the possibility of mixing two paradigmatic standpoints or *methodologies* (Johnson et al., 2007, p. 119). In summary, following Greene (2006, 2008), four key decisions in mixed-methods research relate to the researcher's: (a) *philosophical basis* (this influences the breadth of mixing, e.g., whether to mix methods or methodologies); (b) *socio-political commitments* (i.e., an orientation that prioritizes the research question or else emancipatory/participatory research; Johnson et al., 2007, pp. 118-129); (c) *inquiry logics* (i.e., broader methodological considerations—e.g., research goals, objectives, design, etc.—which in turn determine the reason and location for mixing; Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007); and (d) *guidelines for practice* (i.e., the more concrete practicalities, e.g., research methods, sampling schemes, data analytic specifications, etc.; Greene, 2006, p. 93).

In the present inquiry, (a) the *philosophical basis* involves mixing qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Paradigmatic differences are understood through the substantive lens of SRT, foregrounding the action-oriented approach; and through epistemological emphases on ecological validity, cultural sensitivity, qualitative-quantitative complementarity and dialectical relations, and pragmatism (see **Philosophical Basis**). In turn, (b) *socio-political commitments* mainly orient the present inquiry toward answering the main research question concerning how the Maltese and Arabs advance pro-/anti-integrationism through social/alternative re-presentation (see **Socio-Political Commitments**).

Concerning (c) *inquiry logics* (Greene, 2006, p. 93), mixing mainly occurs when the IR scales are built (Study 2) and applied (Study 3). The “coherence and connection among the constituent parts” (Greene, 2008, p. 9) of the research programme rests precisely on the ecological validity of the IR scales, which are sensible to both the Maltese and Arabs. The research design guiding the present inquiry is the *exploratory sequential design* (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 69), where studies are conducted sequentially. Mixing also occurs in

**Chapter 9** (General Discussion), through the joint display (see **Inquiry Logics: The Present Research**). Concerning (d) *guidelines for practice* (Greene, 2006, p. 93), qualitative interview research is mixed with quantitative survey research. Guidelines for practice, including ethical considerations, are presented in Studies 1, 2, and 3 (see Chapters 6-8), with the exception of sampling schemes (see **Sampling Design and Sampling Schemes**), which are discussed in this chapter given their relation to research legitimation/validity (Onwuegbuzie, 2007, p. 2980). These four key decisions are discussed below.

### **Philosophical Basis**

Guba and Lincoln (1994, pp. 105-109) provide an account of the criticisms of the “‘received view’ of science” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 106), that is, (post-)positivism and quantitative methods. These criticisms concern: the neglect of context/meaning-making; inadequate treatment of the nomothetic-idiographic distinction; resistance to creative understandings; the underdetermination of theory; and disinterest in researcher-subject interactions (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, pp. 106-107). Qualitative research addresses some of these drawbacks, allowing “the researcher to tap into a well of rich information” (King, 2004, p. 191), privileging argumentation, meaning and context (Power et al., 2018). Qualitative research has its own drawbacks too. It is thus more fruitful to emphasise the strengths and limitations of both methods/methodologies.

Criticisms of quantitative methods are countered by their strengths, that is, the benefits of: sound operationalisation; group comparisons; model specification; and hypothesis-testing (Castro et al., 2010). In turn, the in-depth, contextualised accounts provided by qualitative methods, are countered by their general inability to: reach many participants; reliably integrate findings from different studies; study links between cases as systematically as quantitative methods; or yield generalisable results (Castro et al., 2010). Accordingly, “quantitative and qualitative methodologies must interact in a continuous way [...] to answer different and complementary research questions” (Gelo et al., 2008, p. 279).

Thus, mixed-methods researchers oscillate dynamically “between *generalization* and *contextualization*, *explanation* and *understanding*, *deduction* and *induction*, and *hypotheses-testing* and *hypotheses-generating*” (Gelo et al., 2008, p. 280). The systematic integration of qualitative and quantitative methods yields holistic research outcomes (Power et al., 2018). Thus, the purported *ontological* divide between (post-)positivism and non-positivism need not influence mixed-methods research *in practice*, as both qualitative and quantitative approaches study localised manifestations of universal phenomena (Power et al., 2018).

Various degrees of realism and constructivism have been proposed in attempts to bridge positivist quantification and non-positivist qualitative research (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 109). Mixed-methods research emerged from a drive to integrate constructivism and post-positivism, usually favouring a compatibilist view of the qualitative-quantitative split (Bartholomew & Brown, 2012). For instance, historical realism (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 109), critical realism (Zachariadis et al., 2013) and constructivist realism (Cupchik, 2001) generally conceptualise reality as taking shape over time, socio-politically and culturally. These align with the action-oriented view (see **Chapter 2**), which recognizes the dialectical tensions between co-constructions and ERVs (see Wagner, 1998).

The present research engages with these issues through the prism of action-oriented SRT. This is because the sheer multiplicity of realist-constructionist formulations similarly evoke the notion of “fractal distinctions” (Abbott, 2010, p. 10). Adopting a substantive theory stance (Greene, 2007, p. 69) locates social psychological theory (i.e., SRT) as the arena where these debates unfold. Thus, the present inquiry rests on the action-oriented approach to social re-presentation, where the dialectic between the re-presentational (cf. ‘historical’, ‘constructivist’, ‘critical’, etc.) and the extra-presentational (cf. ‘realism’) is dealt with substantively.

In mixed-methods literature, talk of *paradigms* (i.e., actual belief systems about method) has been somewhat eclipsed by talk of epistemological *stances* (standpoints adopted

toward the relations between paradigms) (Morgan, 2007; Shannon-Baker, 2016). The substantive theory stance informs the present inquiry in a principal manner, together with *differential epistemological emphases* (cf. Greene & Caracelli, 1997, p. 9). The latter include a focus on: *cultural sensitivity* and *ecological validity* (Bartholomew & Brown, 2012; Miller, 2004, p. 107); the *complementarity* of mixed methods (Kelle, 2006); the *dialectical* relation between quantitative and qualitative data (Maxwell & Loomis, 2003); and the benefits of *pragmatism* (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). Although the last three of these emphases have been regarded as stances in their own right (Greene, 2007, p. 68), their merits are here subsumed as epistemological emphases within the substantive theory stance. Theory and the research questions are therefore the fulcra on which the present inquiry rests (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).

### ***The Substantive Theory Stance***

The substantive theory stance posits that “what matters most in guiding practical inquiry decisions are the substantive issues [intergroup relations] and conceptual theories [action-oriented SRT] relevant to the study being conducted” (Greene, 2007, p. 69). Most socio-psychological theories, including SRT, are substantive in nature and are always “adapted to social referents” (Cook & Groom, 2004, p. 22), such as social groups. Such “practical theories are works in progress” (Cook & Groom, 2004, p. 27), making substantive theory and methodology mutually dependent (Cook & Groom, 2004, pp. 19-21). The following six points concretize the action-oriented approach into actual methodological decisions.

First, in SRT, methodological strategies revolve around the study of how social representation operates (Wagner et al., 1999). This requires a plurality of research methods—particularly when studying intergroup relations (Bar-Tal, 2011, p. 338)—guided by relevant research questions (Cook & Groom, 2004, p. 39). The use of multiple methods supplants the limitations of individual ones (Denscombe, 2008), especially when studying different cultural

groups (Flick et al., 2015, p. 77), where interview and survey research present specific challenges (Benstead, 2018; Hawamdeh & Raigangar, 2014). The action-oriented view is compatible with many of the methods used in SRT (e.g., interviews, questionnaires, etc.; see Breakwell & Canter, 1993; Sotirakopoulou & Breakwell, 1992).

Secondly, SRT's concern with social groups is here conceptualized within a "coalitional ontology" (Lin et al., 2016, p. 313). Mixed-methods research helps identify target groups without needlessly reifying group identities (Gillespie et al., 2012). Study 1 thus explores group identities and self-identification, determining the meaning of categories like 'Maltese' and 'Arab' to participants. This influences how groups are segmented in Study 3. Group segmentation relies on "historical witness [and requires] sociological imagination to identify that intersection between interesting issues, groups and projects" (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999, p. 176). The intersection between Maltese and Arabs (*vis-à-vis* integrationism) seems particularly salient. Having target groups on different analytical levels (e.g., the national/ethnic category 'Maltese', and the pan-ethnic category 'Arab') is defensible, given participants' self-identifications and social representations in Malta. Moreover, in polemic issues, groups often police group boundaries (Buhagiar & Sammut, 2020a).

Third, the action-oriented approach raises two questions: (a) which project to study; and (b) how to approach it. Concerning point (a), 'integration' has become part of local discourse, and is discussed at the national level in Malta (MEAA, 2017), making it a meaningful project to study. Concerning point (b), polemic representations (Liu, 2004), such as re-presentations for/against integration (Sammut et al., 2018), lend themselves more easily to the action-oriented approach, as participants tend to position themselves more neatly along project lines. Thus, the project of *integration* could be directly studied using survey research. This circumvents issues associated with defining Object O (e.g., 'Arab-Maltese relations', etc.).



Fourth, argumentation occupies a central role in social re-presentation: arguments are *for* a project as opposed to another, re-presenting objects accordingly (see **Chapter 3**). Thus, Study 1 obtains *internally heterogeneous* qualitative data: different argument components (claims, warrants, evidence, and qualifiers) fulfil different roles, reflecting the motivated nature of re-presentation and argumentation (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). In classic thematic analysis, the principles of “*internal homogeneity* and *external heterogeneity*” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 91) guide the delineation of themes. In the present inquiry, these principles help design scale items by thematically categorizing Arab and Maltese claims (Study 2). However, contrary to thematic analysis, the claims themselves are characterised by *internally heterogeneous* justifications. This sheds light on ‘social re-presentation SR for Project P’: (a) claims stand out from other components and directly inform scale items; and (b) internally heterogeneous data (warrants, evidence, and qualifiers supporting the claims) help interpret statistical results following data integration in **Chapter 9** (Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007).

Fifth, according to the action-oriented approach, “the end goal of discourse ultimately lies outside of it: discourse is motivated and framed in line with joint projects” (Buhagiar & Sammut, 2020a, p. 11). This methodology thus ‘reveals’ (see Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010b, p. 69) how claim-oriented arguments teleologically support projects. Analytically settling on specific claims complements Sammut et al.’s (2018) study, enabling the development of the IR scales. Consequently, this methodology perhaps ‘hides’ (see Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010b, p. 69) a more critical/discursive understanding of contemporary socio-political realities. This is addressed by discussing Arabs’ arguments at length in Study 1.

Sixth, the action-oriented view necessitates research on ERVs, which interact with social re-presentation (see **Chapter 2**). Study 3 analyses the ‘constraints’ made on re-presentation by ERVs (e.g., SDO), which variably predict participants’ social/alternative re-presentation for/against integration. Valsiner (1998) notes how “the human personality [cf. ERVs] is socially guided and also guides itself through the construction and use of semiotic

mediating devices [cf. social re-presentation]” (Valsiner, 1998, p. 385). ERVs retain a similar relation to social re-presentation.

**Embedded Epistemological Emphases.** Epistemological and paradigmatic concerns are often “embedded in or intertwined with substantive theories” (Greene, 2007, p. 69). Theory influences methodology and the interpretation of findings (Yanchar & Williams, 2006). Thus, making the *relation* between different methods more explicit aids that same interpretation. Accordingly, I now discuss research *legitimation* (validity and reliability),<sup>15</sup> *ecological validity* and *cultural sensitivity* (Bartholomew & Brown, 2012; Miller, 2004, p. 107). I then discuss the *complementarity* (Kelle, 2006) and *dialectic* (Maxwell & Loomis, 2003) between qualitative and quantitative research, and the merits of a calculated *pragmatism* (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005).

**Legitimation.** SRT favours methodologies where “truth is sought at the cultural level from within local meanings that shape quantitative measurement” (Bartholomew & Brown, 2012, p. 178; Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 43). The present inquiry therefore requires a construct of integration that is “sufficiently culturally inclusive to accommodate diverse outlooks” (Miller, 2004, pp. 106-107). That is, the scales used should be mutually intelligible to both groups (Karasz & Singelis, 2009). This methodological move toward greater validity aids hypothesis-testing and theoretical advancement (Miller, 2004, p. 94). The centrality of the local context (Bartholomew & Brown, 2012) necessitates methodological creativity, whereby traditional quality criteria and innovation work side-by-side.

These considerations relate to research *legitimation*, that is, “the difficulty in obtaining findings and/or making inferences that are credible, trustworthy, dependable, transferable, and/or confirmable” (Onwuegbuzie, 2007, p. 2980). The notion of legitimation—or inference quality criteria (Collins et al., 2007)—relates to the validity and reliability of both quantitative

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<sup>15</sup> Research legitimation is intrinsically linked to the epistemological emphases of the present inquiry, and is therefore discussed here.

and qualitative studies. Before exploring ecological validity, I therefore discuss traditional quality criteria: (a) internal validity, (b) construct validity, (c) generalizability, and (d) reliability (Korstjens & Moser, 2018).

First, (a) internal validity refers to the extent to which the internal structure of a study has no flaws, and its results allow for reasonable cause-and-effect inferences (Zedeck, 2014, p. 179). Relevant to Study 3 (survey research), “cause-and-effect inferences drawn from *nonexperimental* research lack internal validity” (Lavrakas, 2008, p. 347). Nonetheless, in Study 3, quantitative measures are presented to participants in an online survey, thus providing a degree of “mundane realism to the research study by having survey respondents [complete the survey] in a context quite similar to one in which they would [normally discuss its contents]” (Lavrakas, 2008, p. 345), such as the workplace or home. Given that internal validity is rarely used for determining the standard of qualitative research (Korstjens & Moser, 2018), in Study 1, I reflexively aim for research credibility (the qualitative counterpart to internal validity) through “prolonged engagement, persistent observation, triangulation” (Korstjens & Moser, 2018, p. 121) and piloting (see **Chapter 6**).

Secondly, (b) construct validity refers to “the degree to which a test or instrument is capable of measuring a concept, trait, or other theoretical entity” (Zedeck, 2014, p. 60). The results of Study 1 contribute toward greater construct validity, as ultimately, they influence scale development (Study 2). In Study 2, the construct validity of the IR scales is directly assessed using exploratory factor analysis on the data obtained in Study 3. On a related note, the content validity of the IR scales benefits from experts’ feedback on item wording. Construct validity is discussed in detail in **Chapter 7**.

Turning to (c) generalizability, the present inquiry avoids irrelevant convenience samples (e.g., consisting solely of undergraduate students). This aids Study 1 and Study 3’s generalizability/inference transferability to the broader Maltese context (Lavrakas, 2008, p. 346). The notion of inference transferability “subsumes the quantitative external validity

(generalizability) as well as the qualitative transferability” (Gelo et al., 2008, p. 283), allowing a common thread between Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3. In Study 1, theoretically saturating (Teddlie & Yu, 2007) participants’ arguments promotes *theoretical generalization*, that is, the context-bound “generalization of concepts and relations among them” (Demuth, 2018, p. 81), to phenomena within a similar class. Overall, Study 1 prioritizes the co-construction of data between interviewer and interviewee (Brinkmann, 2007b), and Study 3 provides more objective information on the distribution of the various co-constructions scaled in Study 2. The ecologically valid IR scales make Study 3’s results more transferable to the broader socio-cultural context where Arab-Maltese relations unfold (Demuth, 2018).

Finally, concerning (d) reliability, in Study 1, inter-coder reliability is not a priority (Korstjens & Moser, 2018), because argumentation interviewing has an epistemic character (Brinkmann, 2007b). Instead, researcher-subject interactions and co-constructions (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, pp. 106-107) unfold more freely. In Study 1, I reflexively aim for the dependability and confirmability (the qualitative counterparts to reliability) of the results (Korstjens & Moser, 2018), by transparently detailing all the steps taken during the course of research. In contrast, in Study 2 and Study 3, internal consistency (Cronbach, 1951) is assessed for relevant measures, and only measures demonstrating sufficient levels of reliability are used in the analyses.

***Ecological Validity and Cultural Sensitivity.*** Ecological validity is “the degree to which results obtained from research or experiments are representative of conditions in the wider world” (Zedeck, 2014, p. 109). The present inquiry yields findings that are transferable in the ecological sense, that is, by being relevant to the broader context where Arab-Maltese relations unfold (Gelo, et al., 2008; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003, p. 38). The skeletal framework of the minimal model is good for studying arguments among participants who are not “Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD)” (Henrich et al., 2010, p. 1). This takes culture-specific argumentative differences into account (Johnson &

Christensen, 2008, pp. 23-24), remaining sensitive to the sociocultural circumstances guiding our understanding (Cicourel, 1996). Accordingly, the IR scales (Study 2) make the present inquiry ecologically valid by means of the scaling procedure employed.

Overall, I aspire to ecological validity in three senses. Firstly, “ecological validity is a subtype of external validity” (Andrade, 2018, p. 498), because it examines whether results are generalizable to real-world contexts. Secondly, my understanding of ecological validity is informed by action-oriented SRT, and thus inseparable from “contextual sensitivity, creativity, conceptual awareness, coherence, and critical reflection” (Yanchar & Williams, 2006, p. 3). Third, insofar as ecological validity concerns the interaction between artificial research contexts/designs and (measurement of) the phenomenon of interest, then ecological validity is also intimately related to construct validity (particularly in Study 2).

***Pragmatic Avenues to the Research Question.*** Here, a degree of pragmatism is in order. Research on intergroup conflict is well-positioned to prioritise the study of collectives (Bar-Tal, 2011, p. 338). Among the various tools in social psychology, the present research relies on verbal (argumentation) and textual data (questionnaire responses), precisely to study “minimal social discrimination” (Valsiner, 2019, p. 435) and its possible transformation into intergroup conflict. The verbal/textual nature of the research makes it amenable to future longitudinal research of a similar kind, aimed at tracking polarisation. This pragmatic gaze, oriented toward problem resolution (Greene & Hall, 2010, p. 138), makes the present inquiry socio-politically relevant, given the practicality of survey administration.

Pragmatism *per se* is not the underlying theory of truth (Denzin, 2012) guiding the present inquiry. Pragmatism links truth to ‘what works’ (Karasz & Singelis, 2009). However, researchers have to position themselves concerning what constitutes sound research, to be able to judge outcomes for their scholarly contributions. This presupposes an already operant theoretical framework (Yanchar & Williams, 2006), where ‘what works’ is intrinsically tied to one’s definition of good evidence (see Denzin, 2010). In this work, I consider issues

surrounding potential polarisation, even though local “communities of practice” (Denscombe, 2008, p. 271) generally foreground minority discrimination (Fsadni & Pisani, 2012; Vella Muskat, 2016; see **Chapter 4**). Accordingly, in the present inquiry, pragmatism is only relevant insofar as decisions are made to facilitate the fulfilment of research questions, and to address intergroup relations using the action-oriented formulae.

Pragmatism also relates to the *predictive* potential of social re-presentation. Multiple regression analyses can address the relation between social and extra-representational processes in Study 3. There can be challenges in studying social representations as variables (Marková, 2000; see **Chapter 2**). Yet, these challenges are manageable, by specifying parameters of interpretation. For instance, the IR scales are grounded in arguments from the collectives being studied, and these arguments ultimately inform interpretation. What is ‘revealed’ by way of prediction justifies what is ‘hidden’ by way of operationalization (cf. Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010b).

***Qualitative-Quantitative Complementarity and Dialectic.*** Finally, the qualitative (Study 1) and quantitative (Study 3) components can both complement or challenge each other. *Complementarity* (Bartholomew & Brown, 2012) is appreciable in the dependence of Study 3 on Study 1 for substantive item content, and both studies ultimately inform each other (Salomon, 1991). Qualitative studies can augment quantitative studies by supplying thick descriptions (Geertz, 1973), checking inferences, making statistical findings more meaningful (Kelle, 2006), generating new hypotheses and scales (Power et al., 2018), and portraying “the argumentative level of immediate social interaction that is characterized by fragmentation [and] contradiction” (Voelklein & Howarth, 2005, p. 440). In turn, quantitative findings explain the functional significance of qualitative findings, and describe the systemic relations between social re-presentation, alternative re-presentation, and ERVs. Together, these complementary roles amount to a *synthetic* approach (Power et al., 2018): *analytically*, Study 1 and Study 3 yield their own inferences, and *systemically*, they yield meta-inferences (i.e.,

general inferences synthesizing inferences from separate studies) (Rocco et al., 2003, p. 603; Salomon, 1991).

*Dialectical* tensions in the data are also likely, whereby qualitative arguments and regression models point in different directions. Such tensions lead to “enhanced, reframed, or new understandings” (Greene, 2007, p. 69). Addressing tensions requires a continuous back and forth between datasets (Phelan, 1987). This “continuous dialectical tacking between the most local of local detail and the most global of global structure” (Geertz, 1974, p. 43), is explored in **Chapter 9** (General Discussion). As per the fractal view (Abbott, 2010, p. 10), tensions can feature both across and within studies (see Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, p. 99), and can make research “more pragmatically relevant and useful, and more dialectically insightful and generative” (Greene & Caracelli, 1997, p. 13; Johnson & Gray, 2010, p. 88): ‘what works’ in answering research questions can be strengthened by harnessing data tensions (Onwuegbuzie & Combs, 2010, p. 413). Following this overview, I now position myself as a researcher.

### **Socio-Political Commitments**

Most research in Malta has focused on the discrimination experienced by minorities (see **Chapter 4**). The present inquiry focuses categorically on the dominant (Maltese) and non-dominant (Arabs) groups’ views on integration, in order to understand Arab-Maltese relations. The point is not to ignore other discourses (e.g., on assimilation or prejudice-reduction). Rather, given the increasingly negative views of Arabs among the Maltese (Sammut & Lauri, 2017; Sammut et al., 2021), this focus can contribute to efforts at ameliorating intergroup relations. The national focus on integration (MEAA, 2017) makes the topic amenable to scholarly work. I therefore study coalitions for/against integration, by researching the perspectives of the Maltese and Arabs.

To achieve this, I adopt a “melancholic attitude” (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008, p. 344) to the present inquiry, prioritizing detailed observation over immediate valuation or intervention.

The study of conflict resolution/polarisation can be read as promoting the securitization of minorities, which disadvantages the non-dominant group (Staheli & Nagel, 2008). However, this would constitute a misreading of the present work. For instance, Arabs' arguments are presented holistically and in their own right in Study 1. My concern is with systemic intergroup processes, and my recommendations follow from this.

The “melancholic attitude” (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008, p. 344) allows me to remain open to ‘unorthodox’ views in participants’ arguments; and studying both groups’ justifications for their views counters a neoliberal neutrality (see Duroy, 2014) that ignores power differentials between groups. The point is to see where both collectives stand, on aggregate, vis-à-vis integration, and where their arguments converge and diverge. This allows me to propose meaningful recommendations (after completing the research), which rest upon a degree of “‘ideological creativity’ [...] where diverse ideological threads are combined together [...] to produce novel positions and argumentative lines” (Andreouli et al., 2020, p. 312).

Lastly, the focus on ‘Arabs’ in particular stems from the fact that they remain one of the most stigmatised groups in Malta, across socio-ethnic groups (Sammut & Lauri, 2017). This stigma is partly due to media representations of Islam and historical factors (Buhagiar et al., 2020; see **Chapter 1**). The pertinence of the present inquiry lies in that if intergroup relations do worsen, Arabs are likely to suffer as a consequence. Here, readers risk conceiving of ‘Arab’ and ‘Maltese’ as static identities, or of both groups as actively forming coalitions to engage in battle. This would constitute a misunderstanding of joint projects (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). The point is rather to understand both sides of an unequal intergroup relationship which seems to be largely sustained by increasing prejudice amongst the dominant group (Sammut et al., 2021). I defend this approach to group segmentation by confirming the extent of Arabs’ self-identification as ‘Arabs’ in Study 1. As noted in **Chapter 1**, much has been said about conflict spirals after the fact. Instead, this project seeks to study a potential conflict spiral at its outset, in times of visible prejudice/discrimination.



## **Inquiry Logics: The Present Research**

To recap before proceeding further, this chapter has so far provided an outline of Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3, and situated this research programme within a fractal view of the nomothetic-idiographic distinction. This subsequently allowed for better planning in terms of how to study intergroup relations using mixed methods. The philosophical basis of this work was covered, appealing to the substantive theory stance (Greene, 2007, p. 69): that is, viewing the present endeavour through the lens of action-oriented SRT. The epistemological emphases on ecological validity and cultural sensitivity (among other criteria) followed suit from this stance. In turn, my socio-political commitments emphasised the need for conflict attenuation.

To fulfil these commitments, the challenge lies in mixing methods integrally whilst retaining the integrity of the whole research programme (Yin, 2006). Research integration concerns “the extent to which combining qualitative and quantitative approaches can address adequately the [1] research goal, [2] research objective(s), [3] research purpose(s), and [4] research question(s)” (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007, p. 303) at hand. These four components sequentially lead to other decisions concerning (5) research design, (6) sampling design and (7) sampling schemes (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007). These are considered in turn.<sup>16</sup>

### ***Research Goals***

The main *research goal* of the present inquiry is to understand intergroup relations between the Maltese and Arabs in an ecologically valid manner, by studying the joint project (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999) of integration. This overarching goal implies a set of interdependent goals.<sup>17</sup> These are: (a) *understanding a complex phenomenon*, that is, the meaning behind Arab participants’ arguments for/against integration (Study 1), and how both groups re-

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<sup>16</sup> Different authors use similar terms (e.g., research goals, etc.) for different purposes. Unless otherwise specified, I follow Onwuegbuzie and Collins’s (2007) definitions.

<sup>17</sup> The following research goals were adapted from Newman et al. (2003). They are here referred to as research goals, following Onwuegbuzie and Collins (2007).

present integration and the outgroup's project (Study 3); (b) *enabling the measurement of change*, by providing a research method that can be used for longitudinal measurement in future (Study 2); (c) *testing new ideas*, by formulating hypotheses and testing them empirically (Study 3); and (d) *contributing to the knowledge base*, by integrating arguments (Study 1) and statistical information (Study 3)—this being made possible through Study 2 (Newman et al., 2003, pp. 178-179), and achieved using a joint display in **Chapter 9**.

### ***Research Objectives***

Given these goals, this research has the following *research objectives*. Firstly, the research goal of 'understanding a complex phenomenon' corresponds to the research objectives of (a) *exploration* and (b) *description* (Johnson & Christensen, 2008, pp. 23-24), which are linked. Exploration of Arab viewpoints is crucial because little is known about their views. Thus, sound description of interview data (Study 1) constituted an accessible way to understand Arabs' arguments for/against integration. In turn, Study 3 explored and described Arab-Maltese relations quantitatively.

The second research goal—'enabling the measurement of change'—corresponds to the objective of (c) *prediction*, addressed in Study 2 and Study 3. Scale construction (Study 2) makes prediction possible and enables this work to be repeated in future (Johnson & Christensen, 2008, p. 25). Study 3 directly assesses the predictive role of demographics, alternative re-presentation and ERVs, on 'social re-presentation SR for  $P_{\text{integration}}$ '.

The third research goal—'testing new ideas'—leads to the research objective of (d) *explanation*, which is addressed using multiple regression in Study 3 (see **Chapter 8** for details). Finally, the research goal of 'contributing to the knowledge base' relates to both *description* and *explanation*. The joint display *describes* intergroup relations holistically, in line with the integral view of nomothesis-idiography (Affifi, 2020); and (together with the multiple regression findings) it *explains* which arguments are likely to advance specific pro-/anti-integrationist positions in Malta. This explanation involves "the identification of the

meanings that underlie [social behaviour and] the obtaining of *accounts*” (Harré & Secord, 1972, p. 9).

### ***Research Purposes***

These research objectives inform the purposes for mixing methods (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007). Following Greene et al. (1989), one purpose is *complementarity*,<sup>18</sup> which “seeks elaboration, enhancement, illustration, clarification of the results from one method with the results from the other method” (Greene et al., 1989, p. 259). Study 1 and Study 3 complementarily address intergroup relations, by elaborating or even corroborating the results obtained (Rossman & Wilson, 1985), leading to “significance enhancement” (Collins, Onwuegbuzie & Sutton, 2006, p. 83).

The second purpose for mixing is *development* (Greene et al., 1989). This involves the use of “results from one method to help develop or inform the other method” (Greene et al., 1989, p. 259). Study 2 provides a common metric between Study 1 and Study 3. Quantitative self-report measures are criticised because participants’ understanding of survey items is uncertain (Buhagiar & Sammut, 2020b; Schwarz, 2008, p. 42). Ecologically valid scaling and internally heterogeneous argumentation data address this issue by mapping the range of possible reasons behind respondents’ answers to the questionnaire. The IR scales are only meaningful in view of the qualitative findings (see Rosenbaum & Valsiner, 2011, p. 61). This guards against naïve views positing a static “true state” (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010, p. 831) underlying respondents’ replies in Study 3.

The third research purpose is that of *expansion*: the extension of “breadth and range of inquiry by using different methods for different inquiry components” (Greene et al., 1989, p. 259). This relates to (a) research sub-questions, and (b) triangulation. Firstly, (a) research sub-questions, formulated separately per study, expand the research by addressing different aspects. Secondly, (b) triangulation sheds light on joint projects from different *perspectives*

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<sup>18</sup> Here, complementarity refers to a purpose behind mixing methods, rather than an epistemological emphasis.

(Flick, 1992; Flick et al., 2015, p. 77; Flick, 2018, p. 529). Study 1 addresses Arabs' perspectives, which differ from the Maltese's perspectives (Sammut et al., 2018), and also vary among Arab interviewees themselves. Moreover, Study 3 pursues different viewpoints and attributed viewpoints across collectives. I do not triangulate to seek convergence, corroboration or validation of similar *results* across methods (Caracelli & Greene, 1993; Denzin, 1970/2009; Rossman & Wilson, 1985).<sup>19</sup> The triangulation of different *perspectives* is thus always pursued within the same study. This is because, given the differences between qualitative and quantitative methods, one cannot presume that Study 1 and Study 3 will point toward the same results. Whilst similar perspectives may well transpire across these studies, the present inquiry remains open to both a complementarity and a dialectic between Study 1 and Study 3.

### ***Research Questions***

The research questions presented here are either relevant to the whole research programme or to a particular study. The overarching research question is: *How do the Maltese and Arabs advance pro- or anti-integrationist projects [Project P] by socially re-presenting Arab-Maltese relations [or any other Object O], and alternatively re-presenting each other's projects?* This question taps the action-oriented formulae.

Study 1 addresses Formula 1, complementing Sammut et al.'s (2018) study with the Maltese. The research sub-question is: (a) *How do Arabs socially re-present Arab-Maltese relations (when arguing) for/against the integrationist project?* Study 1 addresses:

Social re-presentation SR [X] for Project P [integration], of/as Object O [Arab-Maltese relations, etc.], by Group G<sub>1</sub> [Arabs], in Context C [Malta]... according to Group G<sub>1</sub> [Arabs]

(Formula 1)

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<sup>19</sup> Greene et al. (1989) understand triangulation as requiring "that the different methods assess the same conceptual phenomenon" (Greene et al., 1989, p. 258). However, I here understand triangulation in terms of Flick's (2018, p. 787) emphasis on the pursuit of different perspectives.

Study 1 also partly addresses Formula 2. Here, the research sub-question is: (b) *How do Arabs alternatively re-present the Maltese's project (when arguing) for/against the integrationist project?* In Study 2, no research sub-questions are formulated.

Study 3 addresses Formula 2 directly. Here, the research sub-questions are: (c) *What are the differences between the Maltese's and Arabs' social re-presentation for/against integration?*; (d) *How do the Maltese and Arabs alternatively re-present each other's projects?*; (e) *What is the relationship between alternative re-presentation of the outgroup's project and the Maltese's/Arabs' social re-presentation for/against integration?*; and (f) *What is the relationship between extra-representational variables and social re-presentation for/against integration?* Study 3 addresses:

SR for  $P_{\text{integration}}$ , as a function of:  $SR_M, AR_M^A, AR_M^n \dots SR_A, AR_A^M, AR_A^n \dots$  and any other  $SR_n$  and  $AR_n \dots$  relevant to Context C (Formula 2)

### ***Research Design***

The substantive theory stance is compatible with the sequential design (Onwuegbuzie & Combs, 2010, p. 413). I opted for an *exploratory sequential design* (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, pp. 69-71), involving a qualitative study (Study 1), instrument development based on Study 1 (Study 2), and a quantitative study (Study 3) involving these instruments. This three-phase design is exploratory because Study 1 influences the other phases (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, pp. 69-71).

This design achieves the following. Firstly, the findings of Study 1 can be studied further in a larger sample in Study 3. Secondly, the intermediate step (Study 2) addresses the lacuna of adequate local scales (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 86-87). Third, this design assesses “instrument fidelity” (Collins, Onwuegbuzie & Sutton, 2006, p. 80), by testing the

developed scales for their appropriateness. The exploratory sequential design starts with “constructivist principles during the first phase” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 87), and subsequently ‘shifts’ to accommodate more traditionally post-positivist pursuits in later phases (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 87).

The *separateness* of the phases makes this design strong. Completing and reporting studies in a self-enclosed manner reduces the risk of accumulated errors. Novel ideas that emerge in Study 1 can be explored in Study 3 (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 89). Inaccessible areas of inquiry also become clear during Study 1, and are suspended for future research. Essentially, “strong development designs use dissimilar methods of equal status” (Greene et al., 1989, pp. 267-268).

### ***Sampling Design and Sampling Schemes***

I now consider the (a) *sampling design*, that is, the framework guiding the choice of sampling schemes and sample sizes; and (b) *sampling schemes*, that is, the strategies used for selecting sample units (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007). Sampling is intended to achieve variability in Study 1, and sufficient breadth in Study 3 (within practical limits). The ultimate end is to achieve “interpretive consistency” (Collins, Onwuegbuzie & Jiao, 2006, p. 87) between the sampling design and the inferences/meta-inferences made.

Sampling design relates to: (a) the temporal orientation of the research programme; and (b) the relation between the qualitative and quantitative samples (Collins et al., 2007). In this work, (a) Study 1 and Study 3 are implemented sequentially and the participants of Study 1 are different than those of Study 3. Concerning point (b), the relationship between samples is both parallel and multilevel. It is parallel because the samples of Study 1 and Study 3 are different but from the same population: Arabs living in Malta. It is multilevel (i.e., samples are drawn from a different population in one study than in another; Collins et al., 2007) because Study 3 involves a sample drawn from a population of Maltese living in Malta. However, if one also considers Sammut et al.’s (2018; Sammut, 2015-2016) study—the

results of which informed part of Study 2—then the sampling design would theoretically be characterised as involving two parallel relationships overall: Maltese samples in Sammut et al.’s (2018) study and Study 3, and Arab samples in Study 1 and Study 3.

**Sampling Scheme: Study 1.** The sampling scheme<sup>20</sup> in Study 1 is purposive snowball sampling, guided by the principle of maximum variation (see Teddlie & Yu, 2007), to secure a range of Arab perspectives (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007, p. 285). Arabs of different ages, genders, occupations, religions, nationalities and generations are interviewed. In snowball sampling, interview participants sequentially introduce the researcher to other potentially interested participants, and so on (Teddlie & Yu, 2007). The aim of purposive/non-probability sampling is “to generate a sample that will address research questions” (Teddlie & Yu, 2007, p. 84). Maximum variation is aspired to using multiple snowball streams, by contacting a diverse set of initial ‘seed’ participants (Kirchherr & Charles, 2018). The minimum sample size recommended for interview research is 12 participants (Guest et al., 2006; Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007), and in Study 1, this is exceeded until theoretical saturation is subjectively reached (Teddlie & Yu, 2007). Aiming for maximum variation contributes to research credibility (Collins et al., 2007).

**Sampling Scheme: Study 2.** In Study 2, 15 independent local experts in fields related to intercultural relations rank scale items based on how pro- or anti-integration they are, and subsequently provide feedback on the items. Sampling experts constitutes a form of “sampling special or unique cases” (Teddlie & Yu, 2007, p. 80). More specifically, it involves *critical case sampling*, that is, “choosing settings, groups, and/or individuals based on specific characteristic(s) because their inclusion provides [the] researcher with compelling insight about a phenomenon of interest” (Collins et al., 2007, p. 272). Relying on expert rankings increases the likelihood that the scaling exercise is based on a common metric, and that the

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<sup>20</sup> Sampling schemes fall under “guidelines for practice” (Greene, 2006, p. 93), but are preliminarily presented here because of their integral role in deriving inferences (see Chapters 6-8).

joint project is understood within a limited set of parameters, chiefly because of experts' formal education/training. At the same time, expert background heterogeneity (e.g., philosophy, anthropology, etc.) protects against monolithic interpretations of integration. Non-expert ranking was ruled out to avoid tapping two contrasting alternative representations by pro- and anti-integrationist rankers.

**Sampling Scheme: Study 3.** The sampling scheme employed for Study 3 is snowball sampling, for both the Arab and Maltese samples. Snowball sampling constituted the only practicable sampling scheme for accessing Arab participants. In turn, using snowball sampling with the Maltese as well ensured constancy between sampling methods (see Miller, 2004, p. 104). Weighting the Maltese sample on the basis of national statistical data would have introduced a further source of bias (e.g., widening/narrowing sample differences), as such data is absent for Arabs (Miller, 2004, p. 104). Despite its merits, representative sampling is not always possible in culturally sensitive research (Miller, 2004).

In Study 3, snowball sampling involving multiple streams (accessed by contacting a diverse set of initial 'seed' respondents; Kirchherr & Charles, 2018) ensures a sample that is diverse and large enough to aid "interpretive consistency" (Collins, Onwuegbuzie & Jiao, 2006, p. 87). Study 3 is best classified as "correlational-comparative" (Gelo et al., 2008, p. 271): it is correlational because it concerns the relationships among variables within groups (Arabs and Maltese separately); and it is comparative because it compares two models (one per group) using separate multiple regression analyses (Brewer & Kuhn, 2010, p. 126). Study 3's samples surpass the minimum sample size of 82 participants within a correlational design (Collins et al., 2007). This minimum number is "needed to detect a medium (using Cohen's [1988] criteria), [...] statistically significant relationship [...] with .80 power at the 5% level of significance" (Collins et al., 2007, p. 273).



## Conclusion

This chapter provided the overall methodological decisions informing the present inquiry (see **Appendix C**). These decisions were guided by: (a) a focus on coalitions for/against the integrationist project; (b) the possibility of intergroup polarisation; (c) the urgency of studying “minimal social discrimination” (Valsiner, 2019, p. 435); and (d) the need for ecologically valid measures allowing for future longitudinal research.

To summarise, this chapter started with an outline of the present research programme. Study 1 involves qualitative interviews with Arabs concerning their views on integration; Study 2 develops two IR scales meant for addressing Maltese and Arab re-presentations for or against integration; and Study 3 investigates Maltese and Arab positioning on integration through an online quantitative survey. This chapter situated this research programme within a fractal view (Abbott, 2010, p. 10) of the nomothetic-idiographic distinction. The overall research programme constitutes an idiographically situated case, within which Study 1 occupies a chiefly idiographic role (in that it analyses specific arguments on integration), and Study 3 occupies a chiefly nomothetic one (in that it concerns itself with the relative stability of coalitional positionings on integration). This chapter also articulated the philosophical basis of this work, highlighting the crucial role played by action-oriented SRT in planning the present research. This ensured that the flow from theory to empirical research was as seamless as possible, and was followed by an explanation of the socio-political commitment underlying this work: that of conflict attenuation. In turn, this chapter detailed the inquiry logics behind this work, namely the research goals, research objectives, research purposes (for mixing methods), research questions, research design and sampling considerations.

Importantly, the main research question of the present work is: *How do the Maltese and Arabs advance pro- or anti-integrationist projects [Project P] by socially re-presenting Arab-Maltese relations [or any other Object O], and alternatively re-presenting each other's projects?* This research question is answered in accordance with the research goal, which

concerns the ecologically valid study of Arab-Maltese relations. The four challenges of mixed-methods research are addressed throughout the course of this work: (a) the limits of *representation* are addressed by aiming for constancy between sampling methods; (b) *legitimation* is addressed in detail for all studies; (c) mixed methods are *integrated* all the way from research goals to sampling schemes; and (d) my socio-*political* commitments were described above (see Onwuegbuzie, 2007, pp. 2979-2980). Before proceeding to Study 1, a final note is in order concerning the theoretical thrust and theoretical drive (Morse et al., 2006) of this research. *Theoretical thrust* refers to the overall theoretical direction of a whole research programme, where the overarching research question—relevant to all studies—plays a central role. This chapter relied on an action-oriented theoretical thrust and its transmutation into concrete methodological decisions. *Theoretical drive* refers to the overall direction of an individual study. Specific research questions regulate theoretical drive, and direct core methodological choices (Morse et al., 2006). Thus, whilst the theoretical *thrust* remains fairly constant, the theoretical *drive* of individual studies sometimes ventures into ancillary quests, or slightly detaches from the theoretical thrust of the overall research programme (Morse et al., 2006, p. 281). This is to be expected and is in line with the research purpose of *expansion* (Greene et al., 1989). The specificities of each study are discussed in the following chapters.

## Chapter 6 – Study 1: Arabs’ Arguments on Integration

The study of Arabs’ views documented in this chapter constituted the first phase of the research programme, complementing Sammut et al.’s (2018) study with the Maltese. Study 1 involved one-to-one in-depth semi-structured interviews with Arabs living in Malta concerning their views on integration. This chapter details Study 1 by presenting (a) the *procedure* involved, (b) the *results* obtained, and (c) a *discussion* of these findings based on comparisons with Maltese arguments (Sammut et al., 2018) and academic literature.<sup>21</sup>

### Rationale and Procedure

The present study was undertaken in line with Creswell and Plano Clark’s (2017, pp. 84-93) recommendations for qualitative research within an exploratory sequential design. This section presents an overview of the rationale behind Study 1 and a summary of the steps taken, before describing piloting, the interview protocol, sampling and recruitment, participant characteristics, ethical considerations, research questions and data analysis.

### Rationale

“At the heart of social representations theory is the idea that common sense has a value and a purpose” (Flick et al., 2015, p. 66). Valuing lay knowledge implies that people should be engaged in discussion, making qualitative interviews a natural choice for studying social re-presentation (Flick et al., 2015). Following the methodological considerations and rationale detailed in **Chapter 5**, the interviews in this study asked “‘why’ questions in the main body of the interview” (Flick et al., 2015, p. 66) and involved “playing ‘Devil’s advocate’ by introducing aspects of representations that go against those being evoked and

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<sup>21</sup> The findings and limitations of Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3 are discussed more fully in **Chapter 9** (General Discussion), in view of the literature presented in **Chapter 4**.

discussed” (Flick et al., 2015, p. 67), to stimulate argumentation. Hypothetical dilemmas (Billig, 1987, p. 253) were used too, and interviewees’ views were explored from various angles (Farr, 1982, p. 162). The rationale behind these practices was premised on the view that positions and arguments are sometimes only justified when faced with alternative views (Billig, 1988, p. 99). Such interviewing practices also avoided “replacing [my] own assumptions uncritically with those of [my] informants” (Bauer et al., 2000, p. 15), and vice versa.

Given that I am Maltese, I remained cognizant of the different ways in which interviewees could position me in view of the network of social representations that I am nested in (Flick et al., 2015, p. 68). Moreover, the interview protocol allowed for an epistemic encounter (Brinkmann, 2007b; Brinkmann, 2016), whereby the co-construction of interview data shed light on interviewees’ arguments. Effectively, both the *semantic content* (i.e., argument content and structure), and the *pragmatic context* (i.e., heuristic uses of argument, etc.) of argumentation featured in this study (Üzelgün, 2015). This dual focus followed from the view that “re-presentation is argumentative, that is, while putting forward a certain version of objects or events, people are at the same time undermining plausible alternatives” (Batel, 2012, p. 5).

I also remained sensitive to “the challenges presented by conducting research in different cultures” (Hawamdeh & Raigangar, 2014, p. 27). Open-ended interviews largely rely on a Western viewpoint, and therefore one should adapt interview questions based on interviewee feedback in cross-cultural scenarios (Gustafsson Jertfelt et al., 2016). Specifically vis-à-vis Arabs, Hawamdeh and Raigangar (2014) argue that “challenges concern interviewing style, the relationship between interviewee and interviewer, and acquiring consent for participation” (pp. 27-28). Hawamdeh and Raigangar (2014) recommend a semi-structured interview format over an unstructured one, because Arab customs surrounding narration can be less open to free elaboration. A

semi-structured format is more direct, whilst still allowing space for elaboration.

Interviewees differed in the degree to which their behaviour indicated acculturation, but these recommendations were followed.

### ***Overall Procedure***

Interviews with Arab participants were undertaken between February and May 2019. Fifteen participants of various backgrounds took part. The interviews lasted about an hour on average (range = 20-155 minutes). They took place at locations chosen by the interviewees. Locations were neutral places (Longhurst, 2003, p. 124) such as local cafeterias. Interviews were carried out in Maltese, English or a mix of both. All participants were sufficiently fluent in the language/s used.<sup>22</sup> All interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed to text, and translated to English before analysis. The interview protocol was based on the minimal model of argumentation, and, together with the coding frame, was piloted before the study proper. During the study, Arab participants were recruited using snowball sampling, guided by the principle of maximum variation (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007). Recruitment involved multiple snowballing streams. The option of having an Arab-speaking interpreter present during the interviews was made available. However, the need for an interpreter did not arise. Data was analysed using argumentation analysis (Sammut et al., 2018), adapted in line with the minimal model of argumentation (henceforth, 'minimal argumentation analysis'). All these steps are detailed below.

### ***Piloting***

Before interviewing Arabs, a preliminary interview protocol and coding frame were devised and piloted with 8 Maltese interviewees. The pilot interviews took place between September and November 2018 with 2 females and 6 males (age range = 24-50 years). Pilot interviews increased the study's credibility (Korstjens & Moser, 2018). Their primary purpose was (a) to gauge the suitability of the interview protocol's *main questions* (tapping claims,

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<sup>22</sup> Many Arabs in Malta speak good Maltese (Grima, 2014, p. 462).

warrants, evidence and qualifiers) and *questions tapping the inferential process* (which corresponded to Toulmin's backings; Sammut et al., 2018). Furthermore, (b) *preliminary questions* concerning self-identification and media consumption (Bauer, 2015, pp. 57-62) were tested. Piloting also tested: (c) the relevance of *ancillary questions* (e.g., clarificatory, hypothetical or devil's-advocate questions); (d) whether the final *summary* (*in vivo* member checking) provided to interviewees bore any fruit; (e) a *coding frame* based on the minimal model; and (f) whether *post-interview member checking* (Korstjens & Moser, 2018) was feasible (see **Appendix D** for the pilot interview protocol).

Various lessons were learnt from piloting. Firstly, (a) all four *main questions* (tapping claims, warrants, evidence and qualifiers) worked well. *Questions tapping the inferential process* shed light on how warrants legitimate a claim, but worked better with some participants than others. Accordingly, these questions were only retained in the final **Interview Protocol** as optional probes. Secondly, (b) *preliminary questions* concerning media consumption and self-identification yielded relevant answers. These questions followed Bauer's (2015) recommendations for identifying target groups, and helped build rapport (Leech, 2002). However, a preliminary question asking 'Which groups do you identify in Maltese society?' yielded irrelevant answers or confused interviewees, and was removed. Third, (c) *ancillary questions* (clarificatory, hypothetical or devil's-advocate questions) were useful for epistemic engagement. They clarified understanding, and invited participants to argue their case or defend their position, tapping alternative re-presentations. Accordingly, ancillary questions were used as needed. Fourth, (d) the final *summary* of interviewees' arguments served as *in vivo* member checking, whereby interviewees either affirmed the summary or corrected some parts. Thus, overall, all pilot interview questions were retained in the final protocol with the exception of one preliminary question; and questions tapping inferential processes were retained as optional probes instead (see **Interview Protocol**).

After the pilot interviews, (e) the *coding frame* was tested. The main issues revolved around: (1) the expression of multiple, similar claims; (2) the double-coding of warrants and evidence; and (3) distinguishing between qualifiers and parallel arguments/claims. Firstly, (1) only arguments relating to integration were coded as claims. Reading through the whole transcripts before data analysis helped determine whether different parts of an argument were to be coded as one claim or many, based on whether warrants and evidence were supplied for the potential claim/s. Secondly, (2) the double-coding of warrants and evidence was permitted, but these components were generally distinguished based on whether the text was prescriptive (warrants) or descriptive (evidence). Thirdly, (3) qualifiers were usually shorter and less frequent than claims/parallel arguments. In contrast, fully-fledged claims were repeatedly justified (see **Coding Frame**).

Finally, (f) *post-interview member checking* involved going back to participants and presenting their own arguments to them after analysis. Almost all interviewees stated that the arguments represented their views well and changed nothing (only one participant corrected errors). However, two participants agreed with the arguments presented, but also reconfigured their arguments in ways that clearly went beyond the original interview. Post-interview member checking was thus dropped, avoiding *ad hoc* manipulations of arguments in the absence of an epistemic encounter.

### ***Interview Protocol***

The argumentation interviewing protocol (Sammut et al., 2018) was thus adapted in line with the minimal model of argumentation (see **Chapter 3**). The actual interviews with Arabs commenced with two preliminary questions, followed by a direct question on Arab integration in Malta, tapping participants' *claim/s*. Participants were then asked to provide reasons (*warrants*) for their claims, examples (*evidence*) and exceptions/qualifications (*qualifiers*). Throughout the interview, participants were engaged in debate, thus retaining "the interactional nature of interviews" (Potter & Hepburn, 2005, p. 284). Once participants'

views were sufficiently explored, I provided a summary of their main arguments, and asked them to verify its correctness or amend inaccuracies. Ancillary questions were dispersed throughout the interview if/as needed. The final interview protocol (together with *optional probes*) was semi-structured (therefore, question order shifted according to interview flow), and was composed as follows (see **Appendix D** for the Maltese version):

- (1) *Preliminary question 1 – relationship to media*: What kind of media do you consume?  
(*Probe*: You could refer to any platform you like [e.g., online, printed, etc.])
- (2) *Preliminary question 2 – self-referential identity*: Which group/s do you identify yourself with? (*Probe*: How do you self-identify?)
- (3) **Question tapping Claim**: What is your opinion regarding the integration of Arabs in Malta?
- (4) **Question tapping Warrant**: Why do you think so? (*Probes*: What are the assumptions or general ideas underlying your argument?/You argued that X, and therefore Y. Some people argue that X, but reach other conclusions. Why did you reach conclusion Y?)<sup>23</sup>
- (5) **Question tapping Evidence**: What examples do you have to support your argument?
- (6) **Question tapping Qualifiers**: Are there any exceptions to your views?
- (7) *Ancillary question 1 – clarification*: What do you understand by integration?
- (8) *Ancillary question 2 – clarification*: Does your argument apply to all groups in Malta or specifically to Arabs?
- (9) *Ancillary question 3 – clarification*: Does your argument apply to all Arabs?
- (10) *Ancillary question 4 – hypothetical scenario*: If X were to happen, what would you argue?

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<sup>23</sup> The optional probes in Question 4 had been piloted as *questions tapping the inferential process* (see **Piloting**).



(11) *Ancillary question 5 – playing devil’s advocate*: If someone were to argue X, how would you respond?<sup>24</sup>

(12) **Summary**: Does this summary represent your views well, or is there anything you would like to clarify?

### ***Sampling Scheme and Recruitment***

Arab participants were recruited using purposive snowball sampling involving separate streams: different participants were separately asked to participate in the study, and if they accepted, following the interview, they were asked to refer a maximum of three other participants (if willing) in case they wanted to participate. Thus, separate gatekeepers to the various Arab communities were contacted in their individual capacity, ensuring a diverse set of initial ‘seed’ participants (Kirchherr & Charles, 2018). This sampling scheme was guided by the principle of maximum variation (Teddlie & Yu, 2007). Key contacts came from different backgrounds, and were contacted in a variety of public settings (e.g., public events, outside cafeterias, other informal settings, etc.). Participants either made contact with potential participants themselves, or else provided me with their details with their consent. A few snowball streams involved an initial Maltese gatekeeper. However, once initial contact was made, all Arab participants participated in the study themselves before introducing me to other participants. It proved difficult to recruit female participants. Therefore, extra effort was made to recruit females, aiming for maximum variation. Inclusion criteria stipulated that participants had to be persons (a) originating from Arab League states, or else having one/both parents originating from Arab League states (e.g., second-generation migrants); and (b) currently residing in Malta. Citizenship was not an inclusion criterion.

Recruitment proceeded until theoretical saturation was subjectively reached, that is, until no distinctly new arguments on integration surfaced in participants’ views (van

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<sup>24</sup> Ancillary questions were asked if/as needed.

Rijnsoever, 2017). Given the study's aims, representativeness was not an indispensable criterion (see Salvatore, 2016). The saturation of different argumentative themes and claims occurred by the 14<sup>th</sup> interview. Thus, 15 interviews were carried out for validity purposes.

### ***Participant Characteristics***

Fifteen participants took part in this study: 11 males and 4 females (age range = 21-68 years). Four participants were 21-30 year-old second-generation migrants: two immigrated to Malta when young, and two were of mixed Arab-Maltese origin and born in Malta. Moreover, seven participants were 31-50 years old, and four participants were 51+ years old. All participants identified as Muslim, except for one who provided no details on religious affiliation. Three participants had a Maltese nationality, seven participants had an Arab nationality (e.g., Libyan, Syrian, Tunisian, etc.), and five participants had a mixed Maltese and Arab nationality. Moreover, three participants had a secondary level, four participants had a post-secondary level, and eight participants had a tertiary level of education. All were gainfully employed, except for two participants who were students. Five participants were single, eight participants were married, and two were widowed.

### ***Ethical Considerations***

All recruitment was done on a voluntary and informal basis, and participants were not remunerated for their participation. All interviewees participated in their individual capacity. Ethical clearance was sought by submitting a detailed ethics evaluation form to the Social Wellbeing Faculty Research Ethics Committee, which was approved (see **Appendix D**). The research study was conducted in conformity with the University of Malta's Research Code of Practice and Research Ethics Review Procedures. When snowballing, I ensured that potential participants were made aware that their details were being passed on to me, prior to making contact. Potential participants were approached respectfully and without interfering in their daily activities. Sensitive personal data (including audio recordings) were handled carefully, and processed in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679

(GDPR) (see **Appendix D**). All data was stored confidentially, transcripts were pseudonymised, and participants' anonymity was safeguarded as much as possible when reporting results.

This study involved no potential harms, over and above those experienced in everyday life. Participants were informed about their rights, the purpose of the study, and all other relevant details prior to the interview. An information sheet and consent form (see **Appendix D**) were presented to participants in English or Maltese for their signature prior to the interview (all participants could read in either one or both languages), to obtain informed consent and permission to audio-record the interview. Participants had the opportunity to ask questions about the study before signing. The interview protocol did not involve direct provocation/confrontation. For example, when playing devil's advocate, propositions were presented from a third-person perspective, as if made by an imaginary interlocutor. Finally, during analysis, care was taken not to exclude rare arguments or relegate them to an inferior position, apart from recognising their infrequency (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007).

### ***Research Questions and Expectations***

This study addressed two research sub-questions, each corresponding to an action-oriented formula: (a) *How do Arabs socially re-present Arab-Maltese relations (when arguing) for/against the integrationist project?* (Formula 1); and (b) *How do Arabs alternatively re-present the Maltese's project (when arguing) for/against the integrationist project?* (part of Formula 2). Based on the literature reviewed in **Chapter 4**, it was expected that the Arab participants would: (a) mostly make pro-integrationist arguments; (b) make arguments de-essentializing Arabs and Arab-Maltese relations; (c) advance argumentative themes similar to those advanced by the Maltese (Sammut et al., 2018); (d) make positive religious arguments for integration (contrary to the Maltese; Sammut et al., 2018); (e) call for various forms of action aimed at improving intergroup relations; and (f) meaningfully engage with Maltese alternative representations of Arabs' project, whilst promoting their own.

## *Data Analysis*

Minimal argumentation analysis was conducted using NVIVO 12 (QSR International). The interview texts were transcribed and translated to English. The data was preliminarily explored “with an eye to identifying broad trends” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017, p. 213), by reading through the transcripts, taking notes, and periodically referring to the coding frame and end-of-interview summaries. Translating all transcripts to English ensured symmetry with the analysis completed on Maltese interviews (Sammut et al., 2018).

Analysis involved three stages. First, (1) participants’ *claims* were coded in the raw data, and similar claims across participants were grouped, in preparation for the eventual identification of argumentative themes underlying similar claims. When collating claims across participants, highly similar take-home messages were grouped into one claim, which was worded in ways that did justice to participants’ slight differences in argument. Whenever claims were legitimated by warrants of different strength, broader/polysemic terms were used (e.g., the claim ‘Arabs *have to* be diplomatic/practical to integrate’ was legitimated by some warrants stating that this *should* be the case, and others stating that this *is* the case). Similarly, some claims consisted of atomic propositions, whereas others were compound propositions involving operators like ‘and’ or ‘and/or’. Claims variously referenced ‘Arabs’, ‘Arab Muslims’, ‘Arabs and Muslims’, ‘migrants’, ‘foreigners’, and so on. Whenever the reasons for a claim were essential for the claim to be meaningful, these featured in the claim (instead of just being coded as warrants). For example, the claim ‘Some Arabs integrate more than others—integration depends on individual willingness, background and personal situations’ was worded as such, given the centrality of individual variations to this claim.

Secondly, (2) claims were thematically organised, with the intent of grouping claims tapping the same *argumentative theme*. In turn, all the claims per theme were grouped according to valence (positive, negative or mixed/ambivalent vis-à-vis integration). This stage involved work on the previously elicited claims, ensuring that the arguments advancing such

claims influenced the thematic organisation. Moreover, this stage was guided by the principles of “*internal homogeneity* and *external heterogeneity*” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 91): claims appealing to the same argumentative theme (internal homogeneity) were sufficiently different from other claims (external heterogeneity). The argumentative themes were generally “(i) specific enough to be discrete (nonrepetitive), and (ii) broad enough to encapsulate a set of ideas contained in numerous text segments” (Attride-Stirling, 2001, p. 392). Finally, (3) the third stage coded the various *warrants*, *evidence* and *qualifiers* in the raw data, shedding light on the justifications behind each claim. Thus, such justifications were *internally heterogeneous*, as different argument components fulfilled different roles (see **Chapter 5**).

To recap, data analysis yielded a collection of *claims* (first stage), which were thematically organised per *argumentative theme* (second stage) and structurally backed by *warrants*, *evidence* and *qualifiers* (third stage). The stages were implemented iteratively, referring back to previous stages when needed. The following section details the coding frame used for coding arguments in line with the minimal model.

**Coding Frame.** The coding frame was used in the first and third stage of data analysis. The transcripts were not dissected into text segments (see Attride-Stirling, 2001) during coding, as arguments differed greatly in length. Labels used for claims, warrants, evidence and qualifiers are not direct quotes. However, participants’ wording was retained as much as possible, especially when coding warrants, evidence and qualifiers. This minimised *post hoc* interpretation.

The research question was kept in mind during the coding process, and all transcripts were read in whole prior to coding. Claims were identified first (stage 1), and warrants, evidence and qualifiers were coded in relation to the specific claims they supported (stage 3). Text was only double-coded when necessary (e.g., some evidence was provided in the course

of stating a warrant). Implicit premises were not reconstructed (e.g., Uzelgun et al., 2016), and only arguments that featured were coded. The following sections provide more detail.

**Claims.** Claims were coded in text containing the take-home message of the interviewee. Claims were statements that summarised the interviewee's stance and positioning towards the project of integration. Usually, claims tended to be the stated conclusions and the bottom-line for the interviewee's positioning on the issue. An example of a claim is: "Capital punishment should remain illegal." Clues for coding claims could be found in textual data containing: first-order statements; statements featuring, or alluded to, more than once; and statements featuring in the summary verified by the interviewee.

**Warrants.** Warrants were coded in text containing statements that support or justify—that is, warrant—the claim in question. Warrants were usually not value-neutral facts, but rather interpretative statements linking evidence, observations, or perceived facts as justificatory grounds for supporting the claim. An example of a warrant to the claim on capital punishment is: "[because] Everyone should be given a chance to start afresh." Clues for coding warrants could be found in textual data containing: statements making explicit the link between evidence and claim; 'because' statements; reasons given by the interviewee; matters of common knowledge (interobjective backgrounds) with a discernible value judgement vis-à-vis the claim in question; and abstract principles.

**Evidence.** Evidence was coded in text containing statements constituting empirical evidence, observations, natural occurrences or facts (perceived, actual, concrete, statistical, based on personal experience, etc.). Evidence was coded in statements that could in themselves be value-neutral observations, but which were strategically interpreted by the interviewee to advance warrants supporting a claim, as per the minimal model. An example of evidence for the claim on capital punishment is: "[for example,] Many criminals rehabilitate themselves and start afresh." Clues for coding evidence could be found in textual data containing: a basis from which an argument takes off; examples; observations; matters of

common knowledge (interobjective backgrounds), usually with no discernible value judgement; ‘for example’ statements; statistical data; personal testimony; and other comparable “factual data” (Toulmin et al., 1984, p. 26).

***Qualifiers.*** Qualifiers were coded in text containing statements that calibrate the warrant or claim, and detail their application or suspension in special circumstances. Qualifiers were statements that may have included exceptions or the detailing of conditions where the warrant, or indirectly, the claim, do not apply or have force. An example of a qualifier to the claim/warrant on capital punishment is: “[however,] Murderers should be executed.” Clues for coding qualifiers could be found in textual data containing: statements indicating alternative re-presentation or awareness of outgroup representations (e.g., “there are those who say that...”, “despite X’s claims, it is not true that...”, “many think that ... but...”, etc.); calls to action flowing from a claim; rebuttals to self; ‘in fact’ or ‘however’ statements; and exceptions/qualifications to an argument previously made.

### ***Legitimation***

Issues concerning research legitimation were presented holistically in **Chapter 5**. The emphasis here is on validity/credibility (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017, p. 15), dependability, confirmability, transferability, and interpretive consistency. These criteria enabled better descriptions of participants’ accounts. Firstly, the study’s credibility was enhanced: by piloting the interview protocol and coding frame; by aiming for maximum sampling variation; and through prolonged engagement with participants’ arguments (Korstjens & Moser, 2018). Perspectives were sought from participants with different genders, ages and nationalities, amongst other criteria, ensuring the diversity required for adequate triangulation (Flick, 2018, p. 529). This diversity permitted the cumulative build-up of evidence for the presence of a specific claim or argument. Detailed descriptions of arguments were also provided (see **Results**), even for rarer arguments. These arguments possibly represented perspectives that

ran contrary to the more salient arguments, and contrary to the ‘narrative’ being built when presenting results. This increased the study’s accuracy.

The study’s dependability and confirmability were boosted through *in vivo* member checking (end-of-interview summary), and by transparently detailing all the steps taken (Korstjens & Moser, 2018). This contributed to Study 1’s transferability, which was also aided by the ecological validity (Hosek & Rubinsky, 2020, p. 76) and cross-cultural sensitivity provided by the minimal model. The transferability of the inferences derived from this study (Gelo et al., 2008) allowed for a degree of theoretical generalization (Demuth, 2018), especially since theoretical saturation was subjectively deemed to be reached.

## **Results**

Analysis yielded a total of 35 claims, advanced across a total of 14 positions with discrete valences (positive, negative or mixed/ambivalent), and distributed among 6 argumentative themes. *Positions* signify a collection of claims sharing a specific valence and subsumed under a particular argumentative theme. Some themes were also linked to one another. Importantly, some claims were supported by more arguments than others. During the preliminary questions, three participants stated they mostly watch Maltese media, seven participants stated they watch both Maltese and international media (Arab and non-Arab), two participants stated they only watch international media, and three participants either gave no information or else stated they just watch movies/sports. No clear link was identified between media consumption and participants’ views.

Participants self-identified as Arab, to varying degrees. Some participants professed a hybrid identity (e.g., Maltese and Syrian); others saw themselves as Muslims first, Arabs first (vis-à-vis a specific nationality) or Maltese first; others (especially second-generation migrants) stated that self-identity is extremely difficult to describe; and one participant emphasised the specific ethnic group she belongs to and the fact that she is a woman. Other



responses included: “Maltese Syrian [not] Syrian Maltese” (Nabil, male, 37),<sup>25</sup> emphasising ‘Syrian’ as the main identity; “Maltese Muslim” (Sarah, female, 29); or “Maltese with rights” (Zuhair, male, 60), emphasising full membership in the identity category. Thus, the sample was varied. Participants socially re-presented ‘Arabs’ in different ways, or else substituted the term for other terms (e.g., ‘Muslims’, ‘Arab Muslims’, ‘foreigners’, ‘migrants’, etc.) as the interview progressed.

In summary, interviewees generally argued for some form of integration or mutual engagement. Integration was sometimes socially re-presented as “mutual respect” (Sarah, female, 29) or “belonging” (Tareq, male, 47), either for specificity or out of concern that the term ‘integration’ could be appropriated to preclude Arabs or migrants from living their cultures. Some participants argued that integration is taking place, or that Arab-Maltese relations are improving over time. The active pursuit of integration was generally favoured, with many participants socially re-presenting integration as achievable if only certain setbacks (e.g., racism) are addressed directly. Moreover, some participants emphasised discrimination and the difficulties (either personal or institutional) inherent in bringing about integration, or else argued that integration is happening badly or slowly, if at all. No participants made forthright arguments against integration. However, some arguments were relatively assimilationist, and others made highly negative attributions to the Maltese, verging on anti-integrationist sentiment. Some participants socially re-presented integration as a personal or psychological matter, and others as a societal or institutional matter. Some arguments attributed variability to individuals (e.g., Arab and Maltese individuals), and others attributed generalised traits to the ingroup or outgroup as a whole.

Accordingly, valence did not always clearly indicate that an argument was directly *for* or *against* integration. Rather, valence indicated that an argument could well be used to

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<sup>25</sup> All reported names are pseudonyms. Participant profiles (e.g., after quotes) are presented in the format: [pseudonym, gender, years of age]. Participants’ nationalities were generally omitted to safeguard anonymity.

advance pro-integrationism (positive valence) or anti-integrationism (negative valence). This is because Arabs' arguments were generally pro-integrationist (with some exceptions) and less accusatory/direct than the Maltese's (Sammut et al., 2018). Thus, (a) a *positive* valence was assigned to claims/arguments: stating that integration is taking place; highlighting positive elements in Arab-Maltese relations, Arabs or the Maltese; or arguing that integration is desirable or necessary. Secondly, (b) a *negative* valence was assigned to claims/arguments: making the case that integration is not taking place; pinpointing the difficulties impeding integration or making it harder; or highlighting negative elements in Arab-Maltese relations, Arabs or the Maltese. Thirdly, (c) a *mixed/ambivalent* valence was assigned to claims/arguments: promoting outlooks that were appreciative of both sides of an issue; making cases for how integration should be achieved despite difficulties; or proposing alternatives to integration whilst not dismissing it. This generally aligned with the equative view of social re-presentation (see **Chapter 2**), whereby descriptive arguments implicitly advance silent coalitional orientations.

The findings are presented below. **Table 1** provides a summary of argumentative themes and positions. Participants' arguments are presented using rich descriptions and illustrative excerpts, and schematically. **Figures 4-17** present the different positions per theme, in terms of *claims*, and selected *warrants*, *evidence* and *qualifiers*. In these figures, different arguments (i.e., sets of claims, warrants, evidence and qualifiers that go together) are separated by alternating colours. Although these schematic argument illustrations are necessarily selective, the prevalence of each claim per position is noted below. When reading the argument illustrations, one should start with claims and proceed sequentially with warrants ('because...'), evidence ('for example...') and qualifiers ('however/in fact...').

**Table 1***Argumentative Themes and Positions*

Argumentative Theme	Claims per Position (by Valence)		
	Positive Position	Mixed/Ambivalent Position	Negative Position
<b>Cultural</b>	1	0	2
<b>Economic</b>	2	0	1
<b>Psychological</b>	1	3	1
<b>Religio-Cultural</b>	1	1	4
<b>Socio-Political</b>	4	5	6
<b>Stigma-Related</b>	0	0	3

*Note.* The six argumentative themes, the positions they advanced, and the number of claims per position.

**1.0 Arguments from Culture**

The *cultural* theme comprised arguments revolving around cultural notions, such as mentalities, character, heritage and language. These arguments emphasised intercultural differences or similarities between the Maltese and Arabs. No mixed/ambivalent cultural position was advanced. Arguments from religion were largely omitted from this theme, even when these related to culture directly. Such arguments were mostly reserved for the religio-cultural theme.

**1.1 Positive Cultural Position.** The positive cultural position (see **Figure 4**) advanced the claim: **‘Shared culture, heritage, language and mentality between Arabs and the Maltese ease Arab integration—more so than in other parts of Europe’**. This argument featured as a claim among 4 participants. It highlighted how cultural similarities between both groups, and the fact that many Arabs learn Maltese easily (given the Arabic base of the Maltese language), both facilitate integration. This position advanced pro-integrationist views, chiefly by invoking notions of continuity in Arab-Maltese relations, and by positioning examples of successful integration within this continuity. Participants argued that a shared

appreciation of hospitality, a shared Mediterranean feeling of closeness, and linguistic similarities made Arab integration in Malta more straightforward than in other European countries (e.g., Austria or Germany). Participants argued that Malta is not *that* European and strict, with institutional flexibility in day-to-day affairs contributing to integration. Ali saw a high degree of similarity between *core* Maltese and Arab values (e.g., hospitality) despite a difference in *outward* appearance (e.g., Malta being more Westernised):

“The values of the Maltese, for example, the value of hospitality, hospitality, which is very, very rich in the Arab world [...] The Maltese are similar.”

(Ali, male, 27)

This argument acknowledged differences, only to reiterate the commonalities promoting integration. Arab-Maltese similarities were also argued to make daily activities (e.g., going to work, etc.) easier. Moreover, participants argued that Arab Christians integrate even better, given their religious similarities with the Maltese. Other examples emphasised shared feelings of passionate and fun-loving sociality. Qualifiers usually strengthened this claim, by comparing Malta with Europe. The only qualifying exception was the view that Malta is changing (e.g., more capitalism, more anti-migrant media hostility, etc.).

**Figure 4**

*The Positive Cultural Position*



*Note.* The positive cultural position.

**1.2 Negative Cultural Position.** The negative cultural position (see **Figure 5**)

advanced the claims: 'Maltese and Arab character, culture and mentality are different and contrasting'; and 'Arabs and the Maltese have contrasting views on gender relations'. These arguments featured as claims among 5 and 3 interviewees, respectively. Such claims highlighted differences between Arabs and the Maltese, arguing that some Arabs experience a culture-shock, or else positing these differences as the locus of intervention for better integration.

The claim that '**Maltese and Arab character, culture and mentality are different and contrasting**' was warranted with representations of Arabs as being more tight-knit and family-focused, and as valuing reciprocity more highly than Maltese. The Maltese were represented as being more Westernised, less religious, or very liberal. These arguments re-

presented the Maltese as having different norms, which outsiders are not always privy to. Participants qualified their arguments by clarifying that difference does not imply incompatibility—despite the difficulties in finding middle ground, especially for Arabs who come from more conservative and generally poorer countries. One argument stated that children should be taught that Muslims and Christians can live together, and that Muslim children should learn about Christianity, given the importance of mutual respect. This qualifier re-presented both religions as being “from the same God” (Zuhair, male, 60).

Examples for this claim referenced differences in clothing and marriage customs, culture-shock among Syrians in Malta, cultural differences experienced during intermarriages, and the fact that many Maltese consume alcohol whilst many Arab Muslims do not. Zuhair argued that Maltese people halt relationships once they are no longer useful, in contrast with Arabs’ spirit of reciprocity. This highlighted some Arabs’ lack of representational *access* to the utilitarian ethos guiding daily Maltese relations:

“And as long as he [a Maltese] needs you, you are welcome [...] The moment he doesn’t need you anymore, and you don’t need anything either, you feel that it’s your time to move on [laughs]. Right? So that’s it, the Maltese, [...] there’s a need somewhere.” (Zuhair, male, 60)

The other negative cultural claim stated that ‘**Arabs and the Maltese have contrasting views on gender relations**’. Participants either found Maltese gender relations incomprehensible and too liberal; or else were appreciative of egalitarian gender relations in Malta and critical of Arab views. Nasser argued that whilst many Arab women dress modestly (with modesty being construed as showing only one’s face and hands), Maltese women dress immodestly. In contrast, Yara and Ali argued that older Arabs should become more egalitarian. Participants also recognised that one’s upbringing impacts one’s views on gender

relations. The evidence provided cited: disagreements within Arab families in Malta (egalitarianism vs. conservatism); differences between young Arab women living a domestic life and others attending university/working; anxiety when one's daughter meet males for romantic dates; and (in contrast) expressions of worry that public male-only Arab groups in Malta give the wrong impression. The conservative argument was qualified by statements that the burka nonetheless goes overboard. The argument appreciative of egalitarianism was qualified with the view that conservative views on gender among older Arabs do not imply closed-mindedness. Inter-generational differences featured heavily:


“For example, gender equality [...] I have a bit of problems with my parents, especially my father, who is more immersed [...] in the mentality of, of his time.”

(Yara, female, 21)

In essence, the negative cultural position re-presented integration as a difficult—but generally important—prospect.

**Figure 5**

*The Negative Cultural Position*



*Note.* The negative cultural position.

## 2.0 Arguments from Economics

The *economic* theme comprised arguments revolving around economic relations between Arabs/migrants and the Maltese. Arguments for the economic boost provided by migrants (Arab and non-Arab) in Malta, were counterbalanced by experiences of discrimination and workplace difficulties. Analysis yielded no mixed/ambivalent economic position.

**2.1 Positive Economic Position.** The positive economic position (see **Figure 6**) advanced the claims: 'Foreigners contribute greatly to the country'; and 'The lack of government handouts in Malta pushes Arabs to integrate by forcing them into the labour market'. These arguments featured as claims among 2 participants and 1 participant, respectively.

The claim that '**Foreigners contribute greatly to the country**' highlighted their contributions to Malta's economic growth. The economy's dependence on foreigners was pointed out either for descriptive elaboration, or else to advance the need for better



integration. Participants argued that foreigners do (mostly physical) work that the Maltese do not want to do. Tareq argued that if migrant workers leave, Malta's situation would become precarious. He favoured the government's decision to selectively import migrants for work, whilst being wary of the fact that this decision took place without the public's consent.

Evidence included foreigners' contributions in construction:

“Who built the hospital? [...] The roads? Today, the Maltese don't want to work, eee, physical labour. [...] You see the foreigners who are working.”

(Zuhair, male, 60)

The claim that **‘The lack of government handouts in Malta pushes Arabs to integrate by forcing them into the labour market’** constituted a minority position. Nabil argued that without government handouts, Arabs/migrants are forced to mingle with natives and find work. He cited Germany to support his view that welfare money makes people lazy, but was also conscious of the risks involved in the absence of an economic safety net.

Referring to migrants in Malta, Nabil argued that:


“Yes, here, I see them as having integrated more, more [...] Because you have to work! You have to enter the job market! [...] And you have to meet with people, you have to mingle with people to integrate.”

(Nabil, male, 37)

In essence, both positive economic claims were pro-integrationist, in different manners. The first claim re-presented foreigners as indispensable, and the second argued for an economic solution to integration.

**Figure 6**

*The Positive Economic Position*



*Note.* The positive economic position.

**2.2 Negative Economic Position.** The negative economic position (see **Figure 7**) advanced the claim: **'The Maltese want immigrants here to work for them, but do not want them to be themselves and/or mistreat them at work'**. This argument featured as a claim among 3 participants, and highlighted the double standards experienced by immigrants at the hands of the Maltese. The Maltese were alternatively re-presented as wanting the fruits of migrants' labour whilst disrespecting them with needless orders or discrimination:

“They [Arabs] see Malta as: people still want, they want you here in Malta, and they don't want you to be who you are.” (Shayma, female, 33)

This argument re-presented foreigners as beneficial to Malta in economic terms, and as deserving of better treatment and integration in Maltese society. Foreigners' contributions thus served as a starting point for 'negotiating' a better life and work conditions. Participants argued that foreigners seeking integration are unduly burdened with expectations to become like the Maltese—and to simultaneously accept the latter as they are. Other participants mentioned the sheer effort involved in simply securing one's workplace rights, and the experiences of discrimination suffered by Muslims at work. Participants argued that some employers: threaten Muslims they will fire them if they take leave for Eid; prevent employees from wearing the hijab; employ migrants precariously (e.g., short contracts); or do not even pay their employees. Shayma argued that even veil-wearing Maltese Muslims find it difficult to get jobs due to prejudice; and that some Muslims do not even apply for job interviews due to feelings of helplessness, or else apply and are never contacted. These cases of discrimination were re-presented by Nasser as fuelling further conflict:


“Amongst the Arabs, there's this word going round: 'Where are the human rights?!' [...] They say Europe talks about human rights. 'Aren't I human?!' he'd tell you. 'I worked for 4 days and he didn't pay me, where are the rights, who am I gonna tell?!'”

(Nasser, male, 40)

Participants qualified their arguments by pointing out that nowadays, the Maltese are actively importing workers rather than simply employing asylum-seekers, thus making the double standards more hypocritical. They also emphasised the grave extent of discrimination, and argued that removing the veil can be traumatic for Muslim women. Other qualifiers attested to fairness and good work experiences.

**Figure 7**

*The Negative Economic Position*



*Note.* The negative economic position.

### **3.0 Arguments from Psychology**

The *psychological* theme was particular in that it encompassed claims relating to: individual variability among both groups; the characteristics of both ingroup and outgroup; or the importance of individual effort or circumstances. Some psychological arguments stated that integration depends on individuals. Others stated that individuals are embedded in systemic processes wherein they position themselves.

**3.1 Positive Psychological Position.** The positive psychological position (see **Figure 8**) advanced the claim: **'The Maltese are good, friendly, kind-hearted and welcome foreigners'**. This argument featured as a claim among 3 participants. Participants argued that the Maltese (both people and government) welcome migrants in a small country, and have always done so. Others made characterological arguments, attributing kind-heartedness and

charity to the Maltese, or re-presenting the Maltese as people who give you a chance.

Speaking about a hypothetical Arab who comes to Malta, Nasser stated that:


“He’ll do well. Do you know why? Because he’ll find that the people are good  
[...] The Maltese [...] at first, they’ll treat you well [...] they’ll say, ‘let’s see,  
this person [...] let’s see what he’s worth. Maybe he’s blessed!’”

(Nasser, male, 40)

Participants cited Maltese generosity and hospitality, and re-presented the Maltese as being nicer than other Europeans (e.g., Germans who look down on Arabs). Day-to-day examples were also mentioned, such as Maltese people saying ‘good morning’; offering coffee and cigarettes at work; and sharing a good time with you. Some qualifiers strengthened this claim by arguing that the Maltese are kind to everyone (Arabs, Chinese, Bulgarians, etc.). Another qualifier protested against double standards (e.g., unfair treatment of Arabs) and the tensions created by intergroup differences vis-à-vis gender and religion. Other qualifiers appealed to consensus (e.g., the view that one’s friends share similar beliefs), or to personal experience.

**Figure 8**

*The Positive Psychological Position*



*Note.* The positive psychological position.

**3.2 Mixed/Ambivalent Psychological Position.** The mixed/ambivalent psychological position (see **Figure 9**) advanced the claims: 'Some Arabs integrate more than others—integration depends on individual willingness, background and personal situations'; 'The Maltese are friendly with Arabs they get to know personally, even though they often say bad things about us'; and 'There are different Arab and Maltese people—both can be good or bad'. These arguments featured as claims among 11, 4, and 5 participants, respectively. This position identified different paths to integration.

The claim that '**Some Arabs integrate more than others—integration depends on individual willingness, background and personal situations**', was the most common claim. It noted the different reasons for why Arabs integrate in Malta or do not. At times, participants argued about whether individual Arabs 'integrate' or not, re-presenting integration as a unilateral process. Other arguments were more systemic, re-presenting

integration as a societal phenomenon that individuals navigate. Warrants relied heavily on concrete examples, and can be grouped into three. Firstly, arguments from willingness/individual characteristics stated that more flexible Arabs (in terms of cultural and religious customs), or Arabs with friendlier personalities, integrate better. Secondly, arguments focusing on individual backgrounds stated that people from more Westernised Arab regions (e.g., Damascus) integrate better than those from relatively conservative regions (e.g., rural Syria). Participants also argued that Arabs from war-torn areas face more difficulties adjusting. Third, other arguments highlighted the influence of personal situations/circumstances, such as the locality one ends up residing in, or whether one's work colleagues are respectful.

Overall, participants claimed that Arabs integrate more when they: are more open/less conservative than others; adapt their views and customs to the local context; do not practise their religion too strictly (e.g., they do shake hands with unrelated members of the opposite sex); originate from more Westernised countries (e.g., Jordan); actively seek integration (e.g., by contributing locally), or at least integrate passively (e.g., following local laws/customs); strike a balance between their home culture and the host culture, or else become fully Westernised; are Christian; mix with locals; are not pressured by fellow migrants to retain their home culture; are lucky in terms of opportunities; marry a Maltese native; have not undergone the trauma of war; befriend Maltese Christians; come to Malta at a young age or are born and raised here; spend more time in Malta; look more Mediterranean; come from a country from which there are few people in Malta, and are forced to mix with natives; do not share a common cause with other co-nationals (e.g., home country issues); are more educated or love to learn; are more psychologically adjusted; are approachable; learn and speak Maltese; work with locals; are respected by natives (e.g., colleagues); or end up in welcoming and favourable situations in Malta (e.g., location, company, etc.).

In Yousef's view, despite the challenges faced by Arabs:

“There are Arabs who have integrated, and they integrated well, because they had that flexibility [...] Because the individual, as well, what’s his nature? There are people who are always, for example, fearful, they remain cautious. There are people, they’re friendly—as you say in Maltese—*friendly* [‘*dħulin*’] [laughs]”

(Yousef, male, 68)

Yousef continued to re-present integration as an individual process:

“[Integration is] not the attitude of a movement, it’s an individual attitude [...] it depends on your character, your mood, how open you are, how courageous you are.”

(Yousef, male, 68)

Participants qualified their views by stating that many Arabs *do* integrate, to different degrees, despite challenges. Whilst being conscious of restrictions demanded by Islam (e.g., against alcohol consumption, or concerning hand-shaking, etc.), some participants argued one can still practise Islam and integrate, and that the key thing is flexibility. For instance, Ali argued that whenever Arab shop-owners do not sell alcohol, they could lose customers, because people would simply shop elsewhere to buy everything at once. Other participants claimed that they still go to Church on special occasions, and that one can attend weddings but refrain from dancing and drinking alcohol—thus striking a balance. Other qualifiers held that: gender does not influence whether someone integrates; despite Arabs’ best efforts to integrate, their accent when speaking Maltese may lead to prejudice; challenges are inevitable (e.g., integration between children); societal change may require that one adapts their views (e.g., in difficult situations, the wife has to work too out of necessity, etc.); and the media and government policies influence integration.



The claim that **‘The Maltese are friendly with Arabs they get to know personally, even though they often say bad things about us’** argued that, despite negative chatter, once an Arab becomes “a nice person” or “one of ours/us” [‘minn tagħna’ in Maltese] for the Maltese, they navigate social relations with locals better. Participants showed awareness that, although the Maltese talk negatively about Arabs, good relations can still ensue between Maltese and Arab acquaintances. Inversely, this claim also expressed interviewees’ awareness that despite seemingly good relations, natives still talk negatively about Arabs behind their back. Thus, participants either re-presented the exceptions we make for individuals we know as a natural part of being human, or else as implicit racism and forced toleration of minorities.

Some participants argued that the Maltese initially find it weird to relate to an Arab, but over time it becomes normal. Others argued that once a person gets to know you, they bracket their views of Islam:

“[In general, the Maltese are] against Muslims, but then Mohammed who lives next to me, who’s a neighbour: he treats me well, I treat him well. It does not mean that I love him, but I tolerate him [laughs]” (Sarah, female, 29)

Zuhair argued that integration ultimately revolves around individual encounters, and that this somewhat explains the idiosyncratic exceptionalism of the Maltese:

“Integration is revolved around personal things. Many times, they give an opinion about the Arab, ‘But you’re different,’ right? Because they’d know you [...] ‘But you’re not like them!’ How am I not like them? [laughs]”

(Zuhair, male, 60)

This perceived exceptionalism shed light on other aspects of Arab-Maltese relations. Sarah noted that her own good friends could be racist toward other Arabs, and that the Maltese are especially friendly if she avoids talking about Islam and adopts an accommodating demeanour. Some participants still felt Maltese, regardless of the course taken by interpersonal relationships. Others qualified their views with reference to the small number of people who are outright racist and would completely avoid relating with Arabs.


The claim that **‘There are different Arab and Maltese people—both can be good or bad’** constituted the quintessential argument from individual variability. This argument de-essentialised ingroup and outgroup members, attributing good and bad characteristics to both. Participants argued that one cannot lump all Arabs into one category, given the great variety of Arab groups, dialects and nationalities (e.g., Gulf countries vs. North African countries). Alternatively, this claim appealed to an abstract variability, such as the view that all individuals are different. Participants noted that Arabs can behave problematically, especially when high expectations of Europe make them feel entitled. They also argued against generalisations of the Maltese simply because a few are discriminatory; and that both the Maltese and Arabs can be prejudiced against the other. Qualifiers stated that the Maltese are still more likely to be prejudicial vis-à-vis religious differences, when compared to Arab Muslims in Malta. The issue of vacuous chatter (‘paroli’ in Maltese) also featured, whereby some members of both groups were re-presented as people who bark but do not bite:

“There are Maltese people who say a lot of things and who speak a lot, they bark but they don’t bite [...] Even Arabs, there are many who speak nonsense. They bark but they don’t bite, right? So, when it comes to chatter, there’s a lot of it.”

(Nabil, male, 37)

In all, the mixed/ambivalent psychological position spoke to the complexity of integration. This was mainly reflected in interpersonal Arab-Maltese dynamics.

**Figure 9**  
*The Mixed/Ambivalent Psychological Position*



*Note.* The mixed/ambivalent psychological position.

**3.3 Negative Psychological Position.** The negative psychological position (see **Figure 10**) advanced the claim: **‘(According to some Arabs) The Maltese are greedy and/or backward’**. This argument featured as a claim among 2 participants. The indirect version of this argument noted that some Arabs have negative views of the Maltese. The direct version attributed negative characteristics to the Maltese. Aya argued that some Arabs look down on the Maltese, and that this condescending attitude may potentially be present prior to their arrival. Specifically, she argued that some rich, upper-class Arabs view the Maltese as being crude or backward—a view that becomes ingrained when they undergo negative experiences in Malta. Aya also argued that the poor treatment of Arabs/foreigners by some institutions—particularly those related to identification/residence papers—can lead minorities to dislike the Maltese. In contrast, Abdul directly argued that the Maltese are very insular and lack a good education; that becoming wealthy following a history of poverty made the Maltese feel unduly superior; and that the Maltese lack an identity and are money-obsessed:


“The Maltese, when they have a piece of work with someone who’s Arab—OK? —the problem is when it comes to money. Money comes first. Don’t mention anything else. For money, he’d sell his wife and his daughter and everything! Many Maltese, for them, they don’t care about anything else.” (Abdul, male, 68)

The direct version of this claim was legitimated with reference to: bad experiences with the Maltese; bad national infrastructure and modus operandi in day-to-day affairs; and a perceived lack of self-knowledge among the Maltese. Qualifiers extolled the virtues of the ingroup in comparison with the Maltese; dismissed Malta’s status as European, and Maltese self-attributions of charity, as irrelevant (Abdul, male, 68); argued that the Maltese themselves admit they are greedy; or pointed out rare exceptional Maltese people (e.g., well-

travelled or articulate Maltese, etc.). The negative psychological position re-presented the Maltese as a hindrance to integration. Its direct version constituted the most anti-integrationist position in the dataset.

**Figure 10**

*The Negative Psychological Position*



*Note.* The negative psychological position.

#### **4.0 Arguments from Religion**

The *religio-cultural* theme revolved around religion—on its own, or in relation to culture. Religio-cultural arguments either concerned Christian-Muslim relations in Malta, or else Islam directly. Some arguments were critical of the ingroup and of Islamic religious conservatism. Others disapproved of the religious ethnocentrism of the Maltese; and others recognised the mutual fears of the Maltese majority and the Arab Muslim minority.

**4.1 Positive Religio-Cultural Position.** The positive religio-cultural position (see **Figure 11**) advanced the claim: '**There are good relations/no issues between Christians and Muslims in Malta**'. This argument featured as a claim among 2 participants. Some


participants argued that in Malta, they have not undergone negative experiences because of their Muslim identity. For example, they argued that no one insults you for being Muslim, and noted the lack of trouble between Christians and Muslims locally. Other arguments stated that: Islam teaches mutual help and reciprocity; interfaith coexistence is natural; and good relations depend on people's actions (e.g., respectful behaviour begets respectful behaviour).

“Here, Christians and Muslims, no one says anything. Not even Christians. [...] No one insults you with your religion or tells you a bad word [...] neither from one side nor from the other.” (Farid, male, 49)

Qualifiers clarified that: there are good and bad people in every group; perceptions of good relations are shared by Christians too; and the few natives who are against Islam/Muslims bother even the moderate Maltese (e.g., during protests). Asked about the view that Arabs impose their religion, Farid argued from religious certainty, stating that preaching about Islam is not imposition but simply involves stating the truth. Farid also used this argument from religious certainty to justify the provision of mosques, or land for building mosques, by government to Muslims. Other qualifiers stated that radical Islamists are not reflective of Muslims, and are harmful to Muslims themselves (e.g., bad image, terrorist attacks on Muslims in Muslim-majority countries, etc.).

**Figure 11**

*The Positive Religio-Cultural Position*



*Note.* The positive religio-cultural position.

**4.2 Mixed/Ambivalent Religio-Cultural Position.** The mixed/ambivalent religio-cultural position (see **Figure 12**) advanced the claim: **'Arabs have to be diplomatic/practical to integrate'**. This argument featured as a claim among 3 participants. Some participants advanced this view affirmatively, favouring diplomacy and social acumen in navigating daily life as Arab Muslims in Malta, and re-presenting this as a means of retaining good relations. Others re-presented daily diplomacy/practicality as a necessary evil, seeing the need to keep a low profile as indicative of underlying prejudice by natives. This claim was religio-cultural because it mostly referenced Islam.

Arguments ranged from the perceived need to assert oneself more forcefully (e.g., through one's demeanour or dress at the workplace), so that people respect you more (in Aya's view, especially if wearing the hijab); all the way to avoiding confrontation by not discussing sensitive topics like religion. Participants substantiated this claim by arguing that:



people should not hold too strongly to their religious identity; diplomatic speech goes a long way; and different Maltese people react differently to Arabs (e.g., according to Nabil, Southerners are more direct), and one should adapt accordingly. Other arguments noted that although the Maltese teach Christian swear words to foreigners to mock them, Arabs should not repeat them, and that it is one's duty to respect others' religions and to look less Muslim to blend in. Highlighting her sense of duty, and referring to a protest for the provision/regularisation of more Islamic prayer spaces (see Balzan, 2016), Aya argued that:

“I feel that I have an obligation to respect other people's religions. I feel I have an obligation to attend mass, when it's something that is culturally appropriate [...] to celebrate Christmas [...] to celebrate Easter with others. I feel I have an obligation to be less evidently Muslim, you know, in order to not scare off people. [...] Like, I was really against it when they were, they were praying in the street. [...] I completely understand the cause. But then again, uhhh, I don't, I don't believe it should be the way. You have your freedom, but you really need to understand that it's such a critical time.” (Aya, female, 25)


Another argument favoured the use of (dark) humour in diffusing insults and discriminatory remarks:

“For example, during the time of ISIS, when they were cutting off heads and such, [people would say] ‘Beware, damn it, because this guy will cut off our heads or something!’ And I go along with them, ‘Damn it, don't you, don't you say another word cos I'll cut off your ...!’ Right? So, he presents this view to you, ey. So, he wants you to—right? He might be saying it as a joke, but in reality—he'd be afraid! [laughs]” (Nabil, male, 37)

Some qualifiers also fleshed out this claim substantially. Sarah argued that just because she does not experience discrimination, this does not mean that discrimination does not exist—it simply means she learned to avoid it. She argued that older Arabs feel like guests in Malta and are likely to dismiss instances of discrimination, but younger ones (especially Maltese Arabs) are more likely to be bothered by, and address, discrimination. Other qualifiers posited that: ideally there should be no need for daily diplomacy; being female complicates matters; and some Arabs (e.g., plasterers) afford to be less diplomatic than others (e.g., salespersons), by retorting when insulted. Some participants also argued that they still feel Maltese and care about improving Malta. This claim uncovered the various layers of complexity (males vs. females; young vs. old; blue- vs. white-collar workers) which contribute toward different and conflicting social re-presentations for integration.

**Figure 12**

*The Mixed/Ambivalent Religio-Cultural Position*



*Note.* The mixed/ambivalent religio-cultural position.

**4.3 Negative Religio-Cultural Position.** The negative religio-cultural position (see **Figure 13**) advanced the following claims: ‘Arabic Islamic culture can hinder integration’; ‘Religion makes Arabs stick out among foreigners’; ‘The Maltese majority fears cultural take-over by the Arab Muslim minority, and the Arab Muslim minority fears losing its culture and religion’; and ‘The Maltese view of belonging is based on ethnicity, religion and family—foreigners will always be outsiders in Malta’. These arguments featured as claims among 2, 2, 2 and 5 participants, respectively. This position criticised both ingroup and outgroup, and recognised mutual fears. Experiences of, and arguments from, discrimination based on religious customs also featured. Participants were once again oriented toward better relations between Arab Muslims and Maltese Christians.

The claim that ‘**Arabic Islamic culture can hinder integration**’ attributed the lack of successful integration to Islam’s conservative elements and surrounding religio-cultural practices. Participants argued that certain aspects of Islam, especially when interpreted inflexibly, are not conducive to integration. Reasons and examples included the views that: Arab Christians integrate better; Islam is intolerant toward other religions; and Islam has an excessive focus on some aspects of daily life (e.g., prohibition of alcohol or pork, as per Emad’s view). Arabic Islamic culture was also argued to hinder integration either because certain practices (e.g., gender segregation, the burka, etc.) frighten or bother the Maltese, or else because of its teachings/practices:

“Islam allows you to marry a Christian, and she can keep her faith. It allows you. But it does not allow the other way round! Look at, look at how racist [sic] the religion is. It allows you to marry a Christian, she can keep hers, but with the kids there are no ifs and buts. They follow father. [...] For a Muslim woman to marry a Christian, it’s impossible! Islam does not allow it. Isn’t this discrimination?”

(Emad, male, 52)

Emad clarified that he was not arguing for assimilation, seeing it as another problem in its own right. He also argued that political correctness around Islam is useless because reality is what it is. Other qualifiers to this claim stated that: some Arabs are less rigid, or integrate more, than others; Arab males integrate much better when they marry a Maltese wife, because family is important in Malta and this ensures they follow local social customs; and the Maltese also play a role in integration, with the racist minority being particularly problematic.

The claim that **‘Religion makes Arabs stick out among foreigners’** argued that Arabs’ fondness of Islam can possibly lead to issues with locals. This claim was not critical of Islam per se. Rather, warrants mentioned: different conceptions of God (e.g., the issue of the Trinity); the restrictions demanded by Islam (e.g., alcohol prohibition, etc.); misconceptions amongst the Maltese, who were argued to unfairly attribute rigidity to Muslims/Islam; and the role of upbringing in shaping one’s view of life. Examples cited: an incident when journalists intrusively filmed Muslims during private prayer; and the Maltese’s lack of understanding vis-à-vis Ramadan and other matters:

“We don’t celebrate Christmas and Easter, and so on. But the Maltese have the idea, I don’t know where they got it from, that we, I mean, we don’t celebrate, so therefore we don’t say ‘Merry Christmas’ for example. This is not true.”

(Zuhair, male, 60)

Qualifiers argued that: the local situation is better than in European countries like France, where women are told not to veil; only a few Maltese bother Arabs for following Ramadan; despite differences, Muslim-Christian intermarriages do take place locally; and, notably, that religious differences need not be a hindrance to integration. Zuhair argued that just as locals are divided over religion (e.g., Catholics vs. Jehova’s Witnesses) and politics

(e.g., Labourites vs. Nationalists), so too, Christianity and Islam simply constitute another difference. He therefore emphasised the need for listening and mutual learning. To recap, this claim alternatively re-presented the Maltese as ill-informed, and socially re-presented Arabs as particular among foreigners. This advanced the view that integration is desirable but requires diligence.

The claim that **‘The Maltese majority fears cultural take-over by the Arab Muslim minority, and the Arab Muslim minority fears losing its culture and religion’** acknowledged mutual fears. Arguments ranged from attributions of ignorance to both groups, to acknowledgements of each group’s deeply entrenched representations of the other. Participants argued that cultural differences between Muslims and Christians lie behind this mutual fear; and that when people build walls (due to ignorance or unnecessary caution), they fear each other and resist integration instead of recognising mutual similarities. Similarities were re-presented as something that can be ‘uncovered’ through education.

This fear was re-presented differently per group. Participants argued that the Maltese majority fear losing their culture, faith and way of life (e.g., due to an influx of foreigners with different religions and languages); and the Arab minority fear losing their cultural and religious identity, particularly if their children lose the Islamic faith (e.g., if they start believing in the Trinity, eating pork, drinking wine, etc.).

Issue surrounding collective memory (this specific term was used by Yousef) surfaced as well. The argument was that the Maltese have negative historical representations of Islam and the Turks (conflated with Arabs), and Arabs have negative historical representations of Christendom and the Knights in Malta. Other warrants attributed an us-against-the-world mentality to Arab Muslims who fear other groups will destroy their culture; and perceived a fear among Maltese Christians of eventual minority governance:

“You’d have that fear, amongst the minority, that when it mixes it will lose its identity. [...] It’s fearful, of losing its faith, of losing its culture, of losing its way of life [...] The majority also has its fear! That ‘those, they will control us, they will change our culture.’ [...] And similarly, ‘those are only a few at present, but tomorrow they’ll grow, and they’ll get into parliament [...] and they’ll govern us according to their way of life’” (Yousef, male, 68)

Participants argued that the importance of culture for human beings lies behind mutual fears. They argued that change takes time, particularly when collective memories are involved. Others argued that such intercultural dynamics are unfolding more broadly in Europe as well. A notable qualifier took the form of a call to action: for intergroup dialogue as a necessary way forward.

Finally, the claim, **‘The Maltese view of belonging is based on ethnicity, religion and family—foreigners will always be outsiders in Malta’** elaborated on the different manners in which the Maltese view of kinship excludes Arabs/foreigners, limiting their integration. The basic argument was that social and identity markers can increase or decrease one’s status in Malta. Participants argued that persons who are not ethnically Maltese and Catholic, do not speak Maltese or else have a noticeable accent, are not educated, do not consume alcohol, are Muslim/Arab, or have an Arab name, are considered to be ‘less than’ other people:

“Many times I sound as a Maltese, let’s say, ‘ideal’ Maltese, but then once I say my name or I say that I am Muslim, I make, I am already seen as, judged a bit as a somewhat lower category, than a Christian Maltese [...] if I criticise something and they come and tell me ‘go back to your country’, that’s already enough to

show you, that so, OK, am I integrated or not? [...] Am I Maltese or not? At which point am I and am I not?" (Sarah, female, 29)

Participants argued that the Maltese tie ethnic origin to personal identity, racialize Muslims (as Arabs), and resist the idea of a Maltese Muslim/Arab. Conversely, people who fulfil the above-mentioned criteria in the 'right' manner are respected more. Compared to the claim that 'Arabs have to be diplomatic/practical to integrate', this claim emphasised Maltese ethnocentrism more categorically. Other arguments highlighted the Maltese's strong familism, which determines access to social circles. It was argued that the Maltese do not care that foreigners remain at the social periphery, as long as they consume, work and obey the law. The Maltese's lack of enthusiasm for integration was also alternatively re-presented as making it easier for migrants to live a quiet life. At the same time, participants noted that once foreigners get to know a native well, the latter introduces them to their clique. This argument alternatively re-presented the Maltese as anti-integrationist:

"I don't think the Maltese people want to integrate, you know? [...] Because Maltese culture [...] is based on families, of 'who you know', you know? 'Because you're the cousin of this person', you know what I mean? And then you're like, 'oh, because she's the girlfriend of whoever.' And then you're like, OK, then you're part of a social circle." (Aya, female, 25)


Participants cited evidence of: people (including Arabs born in Malta and Maltese Muslims) being told to go back to their country; locals' resistance toward building a new mosque in Malta; and general feelings of unacceptance. Moreover, the fact that the Constitution of Malta (1964, Article 2, § 1) states that Roman Catholicism is the religion of Malta, was cited as evidence for this claim, as this constitutional article

was perceived as defining who is Maltese and who is not. Qualifiers argued that even Maltese non-Christians suffer from this exclusionary stance; and that they themselves (i.e., the participants) sometimes racialize other Muslims. Participants also alternatively re-presented Islam as one local religion among many, arguing that Islam is no longer a foreign religion in Malta, and that more work is needed to build the identity of the 'Maltese Muslim', equal to that of the 'Maltese Christian'.

The negative religio-cultural position was therefore highly varied, tapping intergroup attributions and criticisms. The social/alternative re-presentations of ingroup, outgroup and intergroup relations, were still largely for better integration.



**Figure 13**  
*The Negative Religio-Cultural Position*



Note. The negative religio-cultural position.

## 5.0 Arguments from Socio-Politics

The *socio-political* theme dealt with integration as a political or sociological process, generally referenced integration more explicitly than other themes, and had a relatively balanced assortment of positive, mixed/ambivalent and negative claims. Arguments revolved around whether integration is happening or not; whether integration requires input by both groups; what threatens integration; and solutions for improving Arab-Maltese relations.

**5.1 Positive Socio-Political Position.** The positive socio-political position (see **Figure 14**) advanced the claims: ‘Arabs integrate in society—there are good relations between the Maltese and Arabs in Malta’; ‘Integration/mutual belonging is our only option—we should all contribute to this challenging goal while keeping our cultures and religions’; ‘The integration of Arabs and other foreigners in Malta is improving over time and generations’; and ‘There are many good examples of integration—they are just not mentioned very often’. These arguments featured as claims among 5, 7, 4 and 3 participants, respectively.

Advancing the claim that ‘**Arabs integrate in society—there are good relations between the Maltese and Arabs in Malta**’, participants argued that Arabs have been in Malta for a long time. The similarities between Arabs and the Maltese, their mutual respect, the ease with which one can get along with the Maltese, and the Maltese’s welcoming/helpful attitude toward migrants, were also mentioned. Participants also argued that over time they became, and started feeling, Maltese—both *personally* and *collectively*:

“For us, this is our country, this is like, it’s like our country [...] we have two mothers: Syria—and Syria is like dead—and we have another mother: that’s Malta. [...] It’s she who hugs us, it’s she who welcomed us here.”

(Jamal, male, 41)

Inter-ethnic friendships, good relations at work, Arab contributions to local communities (e.g., helping the vulnerable), and Maltese-Arab intermarriages, were mentioned as evidence of successful integration. Some examples were passive: Jamal argued that one can live a comfortable life in Malta without anyone bossing you around. Others were more active: Wasif argued that the Maltese speak highly of their Arab work colleagues, and Zuhair argued that he and his wife never felt like foreigners in Malta. The main qualifiers revolved around documentation delays (e.g., identity cards), the perception that integration can still improve more, and the media's deleterious role in hindering integration.

The claim that **'Integration/mutual belonging is our only option—we should all contribute to this challenging goal while keeping our cultures and religions'** highlighted the responsibility of both groups to contribute. This claim incorporated myriad views of what integration actually is. Participants variously re-presented integration as: mutual belonging; a necessary challenge and a duty; mutual respect (as opposed to tolerance); a balance between identity and adaptation; unity and peace; and daily relations between individuals. Participants were in almost unanimous agreement that successful integration requires both groups' input. Emad emphasised its indispensability and urgency:

“No, the only alternative is that we have to live together. We have to live together, cooperate with each other, we don't have any other choice. Except that we discuss, and we see what, what we agree on and we cultivate that which we agree upon, and where we don't agree we avoid, or at least we don't provoke each other.” (Emad, male, 52)

This highly warranted claim was justified on the basis that the Maltese and Arabs have a duty to learn about each other, and to bridge the gap between one another. Participants argued for the necessity of dialogue, peaceful co-existence, the cultivation of our

commonalities, mutual respect and the possibility for both groups to keep their own culture/religion whilst adopting new cultural elements if desired. Examples of integration referenced day-to-day activities, such as visiting one another when sick, giving condolences, and celebrating together; and also the rights of different minority groups (e.g., Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus, Buddhists, etc.) to practice their beliefs/identity (e.g., clothing). Participants argued that the Maltese should relax their stereotypes about Arabs (e.g., as unhygienic, violent, opportunistic, etc.), and Arabs should relax their relatively conservative ways (e.g., cultural customs that stand out in Malta). Shayma even stated that she intervenes when discriminatory episodes take place (e.g., foreigners harassed for their accent). Participants also argued that, whilst being the only way forward, integration is a huge challenge requiring a lot of courage; and that it is difficult—but necessary—for all to take an active role in promoting integration. The need for more dialogue once again featured as a qualifier, as did the recognition that other European countries already went through similar processes.

The claim that **‘The integration of Arabs and other foreigners in Malta is improving over time and generations’** involved a positive appraisal of the situation. Examples of relations between younger natives and migrants were mentioned. This argument advanced the view that some form of inter-generational integration is taking place, and looked more favourably upon the younger generations vis-à-vis integration:

“These young ones I mean, like, 20s, 25, it’s like they mingled more with, with, with maybe those who are their age, they saw more Arab kids at school, eee, they made friends at university. Yes, it’s more easy for them to integrate, in the future it will be better. But these who, for example, I don’t know, over 30s, no [...] they’re still, they’re still with the view that their dads gave them, their mom gave them, and school and home.”

(Nabil, male, 37)

This claim argued that younger people mingle together at school/work and form friendships in life in general. It also argued that, over time, Arabs will learn and adapt more to the local culture, and the Maltese will become more tolerant and less racist (e.g., due to more mixing, more foreigners in Malta, etc.). Participants also argued for the inevitability of some form of integration, given the increasing levels of globalisation. Examples referenced: the increasing number of intermarriages; integration between children at schools and university; the argument that Islam will adapt and relax over time just as Christianity did; and the higher incidence of discrimination among older Maltese people. Qualifiers noted the differential rates of integration among Arabs, and argued that ideally integration should still take place at a faster rate.

Finally, the claim that **‘There are many good examples of integration—they are just not mentioned very often’** mentioned numerous examples of integration, and of meaningful Arab-Maltese/Muslim-Christian relations. As evidence, participants cited the Archbishop’s position in favour of the teaching of Islam and prayer rooms in schools; the fact that many migrants work, pay taxes, invest, build a life in Malta, and/or become citizens; and examples of private and government entities allowing Muslim workers to wear the hijab or providing a prayer room. Participants emphasised that, whilst some examples do come out in public (e.g., the Archbishop’s statements), many do not. This is because there are no available fora for publicising day-to-day success stories. Recounting a story involving help by a Catholic priest, Tareq argued that one cannot simply contact the media when good things happen, but should simply be satisfied when people witness them:


“I thanked him for what he did with us as a Muslim family that’s part of the village, and all. But these are examples that don’t really come out, they’re not mentioned that much. You cannot even get them out. Because how can you, what

are you going to do? [...] the fact that it had an impact on the people of the village is enough.” (Tareq, male, 47)

Other arguments stated that good examples must be sought amidst the negativity that surrounds us (e.g., in the media), as only a few people speak out about good examples. Nonetheless, participants argued that, importantly, successful integration stories make people feel welcomed. Integration was re-presented as a ‘hidden’ project that unfolds ‘quietly’ in everyday life, serving to reposition the value of media stories in view of the many day-to-day success stories.

In all, the positive socio-political position thus argued that integration is taking place (presently, or over time), emphasised its necessity, and highlighted its hidden local presence.

**Figure 14**  
*The Positive Socio-Political Position*



Note. The positive socio-political position.

**5.2 Mixed/Ambivalent Socio-Political Position.** The mixed/ambivalent socio-political position (see **Figure 15**) advanced the claims: ‘Arabs should not be forced to integrate—other strategies can work too’; ‘By granting Arabs their rights and requests, Arabs feel respected and tensions decrease’; ‘Integration depends mostly on migrants’; ‘Integration is a continuous and fluid process—it is hard to say whether it is taking place or not’; and ‘More education and efforts are needed by the government/institutions for better integration’. These arguments featured as claims among 2, 5, 2, 2 and 8 participants, respectively.

The claim that ‘**Arabs should not be forced to integrate—other strategies can work too**’ advanced non-integrationist solutions, such as a melting pot of cultures; the assimilation of all groups (Arabs, native Maltese, etc.) into a new, redefined, Maltese identity (mostly by Aya, female, 25); or a multiculturalism that allows people to choose their self-identifications whilst co-existing with others. Some participants even advanced the possibility of parallel systems (e.g., parallel marriage systems), or questioned whether integration is necessary at all provided that people live and let live. Such arguments, however, were usually qualified with the proviso that actual integration—“in the proper term of what integration should mean” (Sarah, female, 29)—is nonetheless more ideal. Other qualifiers argued that some basic commonalities (e.g., language) should still be shared across people, and that even other solutions have downfalls. For instance, Sarah argued that multiculturalism can inadvertently separate people on the basis of identity. Participants also acknowledged the future inevitability of Arab Muslims adapting to local customs (e.g., the presence of alcohol), and of cultures merging together.

In essence, participants’ main worry was that the term ‘integration’ is often co-opted by people wanting minorities to conform/assimilate to hegemonic norms. In contrast, ‘proper integration’ was defined as (a) a balance between adaptation and group identity retention across all groups, or as (b) both group identity retention and mutual respect. Participants also argued that integration (especially if improperly construed) should not be forced on Arabs



who would rather avoid activities conflicting with their beliefs (e.g., involving the presence of alcohol). They argued that, sometimes, people who simply do not drink are seen by others as not integrating. Referring to Arabs who only have other Arabs as friends, Sarah argued:

“Now, do they need to integrate here in Malta? And what, what needs to happen so that—? I don’t know, is there a need to meet, even, to necessarily have Maltese friends, at the end of it all? If they live their lives comfortably, if they’re not affecting anyone, I mean, I don’t see why they should [...] They work with Libyans, they meet with Libyans at night, but ultimately, they’re buying from Mal-, I mean, from a Maltese shop. [...] There are transactions with the Maltese [...] They’re not, they’re not completely cut off for themselves.”

(Sarah, female, 29)

The claim that **‘By granting Arabs their rights and requests, Arabs feel respected and tensions decrease’** was highly political, featuring frequent arguments for minority religious rights/requests. This claim called for concrete action benefitting the Muslim community in Malta. It argued that the provision of what were alternatively re-presented as either *rights* or *requests*, would positively strengthen intergroup relations in Malta. Participants made their case by arguing that conflict will remain as long as things are done half-measure and people are not granted their demands. They argued that perceived discrimination (*vis-à-vis* rights, laws, etc.) makes people feel attacked, unequal, and incapable of being themselves; and that in contrast, when governments address people’s needs, they feel respected and reciprocate their contribution to society.

This claim focused mostly on religious rights/requests. It mainly concerned the possibility of carrying out halal slaughter, the building of a new mosque and/or an increase in the number of regularised prayer spaces, the teaching of Islam and/or Arabic in schools, and

the recognition of Eid as a feast by the authorities. The argument largely rested on appeals to religious freedom. However, some participants based their arguments on secular laws (e.g., the desired ability to buy land and build any structure, including a mosque). The number of Arabs, Muslims and other minorities was re-presented as increasing, promoting arguments for: the need for a better legal infrastructure ensuring minority religious rights/requests; or the possibility of appeasing minorities by fulfilling their demands. In Yousef's view:

“Society, in general, it has to, for integration to happen, and for it to be strengthened if it exists, it has to show respect towards the minority. Because they're a national minority, a religious minority, foreigners in general. You have to show respect. You have to show that they are welcome [...] if the government serves the needs of min-, they feel that they are welcome, they are at home [...] and, they have a sense of belonging, more: ‘This is my country, because I enjoy everything, everything I desire, it's basically secured.’” (Yousef, male, 68)

Qualifiers stated that even non-practising Muslims would feel respected if such demands were fulfilled, as they would be able to pass on the religion to their children—just as non-practising Christians send their children to Catechism lessons. Nasser positioned me as a majority member, and claimed that I only avoid fighting with my government because it gives me what is mine. Participants mostly agreed that the case for minority rights applies to all religions, not just Islam. Nonetheless, they disagreed whether such demands should be met through government concessions (e.g., the provision of a new mosque) or through regular democratic political channels. Tareq also acknowledged the risk that minorities can become a “political football” (Tareq, male, 47) between political parties competing on trivialities.

The claim that **‘Integration depends mostly on migrants’** stood out from the rest in that it placed the responsibility of integration categorically on migrants. Some participants

making other claims had alternatively re-presented this view of integration as favouring assimilation. However, the two participants making this claim argued *both* for the dependence of integration on migrants, *and* for integration as opposed to assimilation. For instance, in rejecting assimilation, Nabil argued that migrants can still practise their culture privately within the confines of their home—an argument regarded as assimilationist by other participants. This re-presentational complexity attests to the polysemic nature of integration. The main argument here was that the Maltese had already played their part by welcoming migrants, and thus, the latter should reciprocate. For instance, Emad evidenced this claim by arguing that locals appreciate it when he attends a Christian funeral to show respect.

Moreover, this claim advanced the notion that Arabs should not pressure government institutions for “extraordinary laws” (Emad, male, 52), such as having Eid as a public holiday or Islam taught in schools. What other participants re-presented as rights, was here re-presented as extraordinary demands. The latter re-presentation promoted migrants’ responsibility to adjust to local cultural conditions, as part of reciprocating the host’s welcome—as opposed to imposing their ways. Participants argued that holding on to certain practices (e.g., the hijab) will naturally make one conspicuous, thus hindering that person’s integration in society. Nabil also argued that integration ultimately benefits minorities more than it does the majority, and therefore it is in the minorities’ interest to adapt. In a tougher formulation of his argument, he argued that if someone does not like Malta, they can leave. Approaching the more assimilationist corollaries of this claim, Nabil said:

*Nabil:* You can never pretend that the country integrates with you. It’s you who has to integrate with the country! If you came to my country—I’m Syrian, I live here in Malta—I integrated with the Maltese, *I* am living with the Maltese; it’s not the Maltese who came to my country and are living with me. [...] *I*, it has to be *me* who has to be able to integrate with them, not them integrating with me.

*Interviewer:* So, the Maltese, do you think they should or should not make an effort to integrate?

*Nabil:* What effort do you want the Maltese to make?! What, what do you want them to do?! (Nabil, male, 37)

Here, *integrating* was re-presented as something someone does, as opposed to a bilateral socio-political process. Qualifiers to this claim stated that it only holds so long as the Maltese do not push migrants away with racist/discriminatory behaviour. Other qualifiers argued that migrant political activity, through regular political channels, is still welcome (e.g., for specific laws for minorities). Nabil also argued that the Maltese are too worrisome, and fear job take-over, rent price increases, and so on; and thus, it is difficult to change their viewpoints about integration.

The claim, **‘Integration is a continuous and fluid process—it is hard to say whether it is taking place or not’** either advanced arguments from ignorance; or else highlighted the fluidity of integration, problematising the term and arguing for its indeterminacy and temporality. Interestingly, only second-generation migrants advanced this claim. Yara emphasised integration’s indeterminacy, and Ali its temporality:

“Well, integration is not something, it’s not something fixed, sort of, where if I’m doing X it means that I’m integrating. Well, this, I don’t know, it depends on me, I, and on who I’m integrating with [...] I don’t have an opinion where I say, if this happens, then it means that I’m integrating, and if this happens, then I’m not.” (Yara, female, 21)

“Erm, even the way [my dad] goes about things, how he used to do things with me, and how he now does things with my siblings. He’s more lenient, because

always, because integration is a continuous process. So, you can never say, ‘I arrived’. Because a new concept comes in, and if, how much are you going to adapt to it?” (Ali, male, 27)

Participants argued that: integration is not something that is discussed within their inner circles; there are both good and bad examples of integration, depending on where one looks; integration is a learning process involving constant adaptability; integration is not a question of fulfilling criteria, but one of relations between people; and that, being appreciative of both Maltese and Arab viewpoints, it is hard to say whether integration is taking place. As evidence, participants cited the relative leniency and adaptability of Arab parents over time (e.g., vis-à-vis women in the workplace); uncertainty vis-à-vis whether the Maltese want to integrate (e.g., bad comments on social media); and also good examples like multi-faith gatherings and people of different faiths breaking the Ramadan fast together. Qualifiers represented integration as an interesting topic. Participants admitted that one rarely hears about integration, and that generally the negative aspects tend to stand out. Integration was here defined in terms of mutual tolerance and acceptance.

Finally, the claim that **‘More education and efforts are needed by the government/institutions for better integration’** favoured the active pursuit of integration, on a structural level, involving the input of government and other powerful entities:

“We [should] start from young kids, so we make laws concerning the young, and we teach our kids a bit, about integration between us and, between Christians, eee, Hindu, anything, that it’s at your own leisure, you practise your culture and religion, and I practise my culture and religion, and we unite at the same time, we understand each other.” (Shayma, female, 33)


Participants argued for addressing the misconceptions that people of different ethno-religious backgrounds may have about each other, with the end goal of changing zero-sum views of ‘us-and-them’ into ‘us’. Participants emphasised the education of both natives and migrants—especially, second- and third-generation migrants, given the difficulty of integrating first-generation migrants (especially if traumatised). The view that if governments serve people’s needs, then people feel they belong and contribute back, here featured as a warrant.

Participants stressed the importance of all institutions/stakeholders (the government, the media, educational institutions, etc.) in educating people. Government policies were seen as instrumental for furthering integration. For example, documentation delays for migrants, and the constant need for documentation renewal, were argued to demotivate migrants, who end up perceiving the Maltese negatively. The government’s role in securing Muslims’ minority rights/requests (e.g., concerning halal slaughter or Islamic lessons in schools) was reiterated. Participants argued that just as LGBT individuals have been granted their rights, so too should religious minorities be granted theirs. The need for providing more courses for both foreigners and the Maltese (to learn about each other), featured as well. Tareq argued that ethics lessons, whilst helpful, are not enough. Yousef argued that anti-integrationist public opinion should not hold the government from furthering integration, because ultimately, although it takes time, integration is the way forward. A similar qualifier attributed good will to government, but noted that little is happening on the ground.

The mixed/ambivalent socio-political position made various calls for action, either because the situation is bad or because it needs improvement. This position advanced a multiplicity of re-presentational content: it explored alternatives to integration, construed the provision of minority rights/requests as a conflict attenuation strategy, called for active integration efforts, shifted the responsibility on migrants, or re-presented integration as fluid.

**Figure 15**

*The Mixed/Ambivalent Socio-Political Position*



Note. The mixed/ambivalent socio-political position.

**5.3 Negative Socio-Political Position.** The negative socio-political position (see **Figure 16**) advanced the claims: ‘Institutionalised discrimination/difficulties hinder integration’; ‘Integration is happening slowly/badly, if at all’; ‘Many Arabs are publicly disengaged and stick to their own communities’; ‘Racists and the far-right are wrong, problematic and should not be tolerated’; ‘Sometimes, immigrants do things their own way’; and ‘The Maltese are racist, fear Islam, discriminate and/or resist the integration of Arabs, Muslims and other foreigners’. These arguments featured as claims among 7, 7, 3, 6, 3 and 5 participants, respectively.

The arguments behind the claim that ‘**Institutionalised discrimination/difficulties hinder integration**’, ranged from institutional impediments to integration (e.g., dead slow bureaucracies), to cases of institutionalised discrimination. Participants argued that when institutions push people away, people automatically anchor themselves in other identities:

“You feel like, as much as you want to integrate, and as much as you feel Maltese, you get to a point where the institutions themselves are pushing you out, you know? It’s like, ‘you’re not one of us!’, like, ‘wake up!’ And then the moment you, you’re repelled from—you know—you’re, you latch on, kind of, to something else. And then that is, and then you feel somewhere else, where you have a sense of belonging. [...] and then that’s one of the reasons I wanted to go back at some point. Because it’s just like [...] I am not wanted, you know, here.”

(Aya, female, 25)

Participants recounted incidents of discrimination, such as Europeans being allowed to skip Arabs in queues; foreigners receiving a worse court sentence than the Maltese; perceptions of false police accusations; and people receiving their residence card so late it would have already expired. Some participants expressed a generalised wariness that the



institutions or the locals are out to defraud or financially exploit unsuspecting foreigners. Other participants argued that the law itself is discriminatory, because—largely due to historical reasons—it does not give the same consideration to non-Christian religions (e.g., when applying to erect places of worship; the privileging of Roman Catholicism in the Constitution of Malta, etc.). At times, it was also the very *perception* (correct or otherwise) of discrimination that was argued by participants as disheartening migrants. One mentioned example concerned migrants' perception of job rejections as discrimination, when in fact they would have not satisfied EU or local criteria.

This claim (concerning institutionalised discrimination/difficulties) therefore ranged from arguments relating to bureaucratic difficulties/inefficiency to arguments describing outright racism and discrimination. Concerning the former, participants argued that documentation issues precluded people from work and education, making them feel wholly excluded. Qualifiers pointed out that not everyone encounters discrimination, but that ultimately, everyone is aware of it. Participants also argued: that their claim applies to all foreigners; that cases of institutionalised discrimination are starting to be reported by the media; and that the degree of racism in Malta is huge and makes people feel jaded.

The claim that **'Integration is happening slowly/badly, if at all'** advanced three main arguments: that integration is not happening at all; that it is taking place too slowly; or that it is not being implemented properly. The issue of people's chatter resurfaced. Participants argued that the Maltese should accept Arabs/Muslims, not scare them away; and that Arabs should mix more with the natives instead of sticking to their own. The issue of bad implementation, and arguments on the malleable nature of integration, featured repeatedly:

“How it's being addressed, how it's being marketed and how it's being implemented [...] That's the problem with integration. That, from what we're seeing, certain people, how they're seeing it: 'they came here, they have to be

like us.’ Listen, but I have my identity, how can I remove certain things that are, for me, sacred? Religious? Sentimental? How are you gonna take them away from me? [...] ‘If you came to Malta, you have to be like the Maltese’: hold on a second, not even the present-day Maltese are like the Maltese that I knew when I arrived in Malta!” (Tareq, male, 47)

Participants referenced the paradox inherent in expecting heavily underpaid migrant workers to want to integrate in society. As evidence of slow/unideal integration, participants argued that many migrant workers only know work-related Maltese words, and that the Maltese rarely mix with migrants (e.g., low attendance for intercultural nights). Participants clarified that the issue of slow integration concerns all minorities, not just Arabs. Here, the psychological argument reducing integration to individual relations featured as a qualifier, as did the many exceptions indicating successful integration (e.g., at work, etc.). Participants disagreed as to whether matters have improved or worsened over time. Those who noted incremental improvements in integration were more optimistic.

The claim that ‘**Many Arabs are publicly disengaged and stick to their own communities**’ argued that they do so because they have the mentality that one day, they will return to their home country. In contrast, other participants claimed that people are naturally deeply connected to their roots, and that migrants (especially first- and second-generation) can only find like-minded individuals among people who underwent similar experiences:

“The migrants that we have now, and the Arabs that we have now, many of them are first-generation or second-generation migrants. This means that they’re *deeply* connected with their heritage. So, they’re deeply connected with Libya, et cetera, and they’re deeply connected with what’s happening back home. So, they have, they are living certain experiences, traumatising experiences, that they can

no longer, they cannot share with the other Maltese around them, right? And they feel isolated. [...] They find consolation with other people from their exact culture, you know, kind of.” (Aya, female, 25)

Examples cited Arabs who live a different life at home than they do in public, for instance, by retaining their customs (e.g., home country food, interior design, norms, etc.). Others argued that local Arabs should be more publicly engaged and involve themselves in politics, at least in local councils, instead of expecting the government to design tailor-made laws for them. At a minimum, participants stressed the need for Arabs to learn Maltese or English. At the same time, a notable qualifier was that many are now taking integration courses, because they have recognised the unfeasibility of remaining cut off from society.

The claim that **‘Racists and the far-right are wrong, problematic and should not be tolerated’** localised the threat of discrimination and national security threats on specific minority groups, such as local far-right parties or criminals. Participants stressed the need to tackle these ideas in their inception, to avoid chaos and intergroup retaliation; and argued that the authorities should unequivocally condemn violent hate crimes, to preserve national security. Referring to the racially motivated drive-by shooting of Lassane Cisse Souleymane by off-duty army personnel in April 2019 (Vella, 2019)—which occurred about three weeks after the Christchurch mosque shootings in New Zealand—Tareq emphatically argued:

“One of the largest problems at the moment, as I’m seeing things, in society, is that you have far-right ideology, it’s increasing. [...] Not only in Malta, even in Europe or in the whole world [...] The incident that happened three days ago in Birżebbuġa, that’s really worrying me. [...] In Malta, we’re small. In other countries, you have large areas, you can do many things. In Malta [...] we can’t have these kinds of things. And there, if there isn’t, sort of, eee, harsh actions

about these from the authorities, towards those who do such things, if there won't be sentences that are merciless, then we'll open a door that we shouldn't open. And no one will know, never, what its consequences are. [...] It's dangerous because if I'm going along and I see something that it might scare me, I might react aggressively. What will happen? Will we end up, sort of, with suspicious people reacting in a bad way?" (Tareq, male, 47)

Participants also argued that people with far-right beliefs scare the public by saying that Sharia law will take over Malta; and were wary both of extreme comments made against foreigners online, and of the far-right political parties gaining prominence locally. Far-rightists were alternatively re-presented as alarmists who fan the flames of prejudice and who make arguments from irreconcilable differences to further political ends. A notable qualifier was that racists who speak in more intellectual terms, are more influential and worrying than uneducated racists. Participants disagreed as to whether racism is increasing or decreasing, but noted that migration is a natural process, and alternatively re-presented far-right views by arguing that there is no active plan to fill Malta with foreigners.

The claim that **'Sometimes, immigrants do things their own way'** was based on a few examples meant to show how some immigrants do not help themselves despite needing help, or else are hard-headed vis-à-vis the law (e.g., during construction work). Whilst arguing that this is human nature and that such arguments apply to all groups, participants expressed their disappointment:

"There are many people who are hard-headed. If the law is telling you [...] you have to use scaffolding and protection and these things, you have to, you have to obey! [...] when you're supposed to be bound by safety equipment, health and safety, you should do those things. So, all right, but after you die, or after these

things happen to you, it will be too late! Because no one will, sorry, no one, in that case, will give, give you your rights.” (Shayma, female, 33)

Apart from attributing nonchalance or hard-headedness, participants argued that sometimes, immigrants do not seek help (e.g., in domestic violence cases), simply because they fear the system or believe no one will help them. Participants also mentioned inter-minority fights that made the news, attributing these incidents to “a tribe mentality” (Tareq, male, 47) that must be understood in order to attenuate conflict. Qualifiers acknowledged that only few foreigners do things their own way, and that when such incidents occur, they bother both the Maltese and other immigrants, particularly those who identify as Maltese.

Finally, the claim that **‘The Maltese are racist, fear Islam, discriminate and/or resist the integration of Arabs, Muslims and other foreigners’** mentioned a collection of incidents of discrimination, and involved attributions of racism and anti-integrationism to the Maltese as a *people* (thus complementing the claim concerning *institutional* discrimination). Participants disagreed about who (e.g., which demographic profile) specifically resists integration, but agreed that anti-integrationist forces are at play among natives. Fear, a lack of intercultural communication, a generalised mistrust of the Other, negative media influences, and the hyper-accelerated pace of social change in Malta, were all cited as reasons. Some participants went so far as to argue that the Maltese, as a whole, are deeply racist. The discriminatory incidents mentioned involved people being harassed for wearing the hijab, generalisations about foreigners, daily chatter, and racist comments (e.g., “go back to your country” or “you came to my country, so do as I say”). One participant also cited public resistance to Muslim minority rights, such as the possibility for Muslim schoolchildren to have a small break for Dhuhr, the noon prayer. Another participant referred to people who write comments on social media to cause a stir and reframe sensational issues (e.g., a local debate on whether to remove crucifixes from public health centres) in a racist manner, by


wrongly attributing these issues to Arabs and Muslims. Sarah mentioned the disapproval of Arab-Maltese dating relationships:

“Once I had a [Maltese] boyfriend who had to leave me, for example, because his dad told him ‘No’ because I was Ar-, Muslim Arab. I was going out with one and he told him, ‘you cannot go out with her.’” (Sarah, female, 29)

Sarah clarified that, whilst this incident was clearly racist, other incidents may indicate a genuine worry, among religious Christian parents, concerning inter-religious dating and God’s judgement of the couple in question. Other qualifiers stated that some people stop being racist once they have genuine encounters with Arabs; that Malta is extremely racist (thus strengthening the claim); and that anti-integrationism is more a question of daily chatter rather than outright conflict.

In summary, the negative socio-political position laid bare the complexity involved, at local, institutional and societal levels.

**Figure 16**  
*The Negative Socio-Political Position*



## 6.0 Arguments from Stigma

The *stigma-related* theme highlighted different causes of stigma. Arguments from stigma naturally pinpointed setbacks to integration, and the only position was a negative one. These arguments dealt with generalisations, attributed false beliefs to the Maltese, and were highly critical of biased media reporting. In all, the negative stigma-related position tapped different facets of how Arabs are portrayed, and invoked media representations of Arabs, historical representations of Arab-Maltese relations, and social and alternative representations of both groups. This showed Arabs' awareness of stigma.

**6.1 Negative Stigma-Related Position.** The negative stigma-related position (see **Figure 17**) advanced the claims: 'Arabs who commit crimes give all Arabs a bad name—we are all the same to the Maltese'; 'The Maltese have a very negative image of Arabs and Muslims—this is perpetuated generationally'; and 'The media puts Arabs and Islam in a bad light, hindering integration'. These arguments featured as claims among 4, 3 and 9 participants, respectively. Arguments from stigma generally mentioned the devastating effects of the media, specifically through biased anti-Arab/anti-Muslim reports. Other forms of systemic bias were mentioned, such as the generational transmission of prejudice, and aspects of Maltese collective memory that are not conducive to integration.

The claim, '**Arabs who commit crimes give all Arabs a bad name—we are all the same to the Maltese**' argued that, fundamentally, all Muslim Arabs reflect Islam in their actions, especially in countries where they are in the minority. Participants argued that a few bad apples ruin the group's reputation. Examples included extremists across the globe (e.g., the Islamic State), and also Arabs who committed crimes locally (especially high-profile crimes), both at present and in the past (e.g., a murder spree committed by a Tunisian in 1988; see Calleja, 2006). In essence, the Maltese were alternatively re-presented as viewing all Arabs as Libyans, and as incapable of distinguishing between these categories. Participants clarified that they would feel equally frustrated if foreigners were to commit crimes in their



home countries, and that Arabs who commit crimes ultimately hurt them more than they hurt the Maltese:

“When Arabs commit wrongdoings they hurt me, before hurting the Maltese.

Because, because he’s dirtying our name, so, all of us. They don’t know that, for example, this one’s Libyan or this one’s Syrian or this one’s Moroccan or this one’s Arab. No. They tell you ‘Arab,’ they call us all Arabs, I mean. One commits a wrongdoing, and all are blamed.” (Jamal, male, 41)

The second claim—**‘The Maltese have a very negative image of Arabs and Muslims—this is perpetuated generationally’**—made arguments from collective memory. Participants argued that the presentation/teaching of Maltese history in the educational system, does not help integration. This is because history lessons concerning conflict between the Ottoman empire and the Knights of Malta, tend to conflate Arabs with Turks, thus depicting Arabs (and Muslims) as the Maltese’s principal enemy. Participants argued that although Malta had been ruled or attacked by other powers (e.g., the British, French, Italians, etc.), nowadays the Maltese do not re-present these countries antagonistically. This claim also advanced alternative re-presentations of the Great Siege of Malta. Ali re-presented the Knights in negative terms, before discussing a local legend involving a Turkish villain:

“Now, the Turks are not Arabs—go tell them that!—but this element of Dragut against the Knights, that is ingrained in children. In schools we start off, about 1565, on the Siege, and how much oil we [the Maltese] threw at them—which isn’t true. And they don’t explain the context of the Great Siege, that the Knights had attacked an island that was of the Turks some time before and these sort of retaliated. Erm, this starts in children, do you see what I mean? Even the story of

the Għarusa tal-Mosta, where Hasan runs after her, the Għar ta' Hasan. These are all subliminal messages that don't do any good, ey. How will you, ee, you're promoting something and then you are teaching another?" (Ali, male, 27)

Thus, anti-Arab stigma was argued to be perpetuated generationally, in schools, and through collective memory. In contrast to the negative religio-cultural position, however, this claim did not acknowledge the negative collective memories of both groups. Rather, this claim re-presented Maltese history to advance an argument from stigma, that is, to make the case that integration is hindered by systemic elements in the Maltese socio-cultural milieu. As other sources of stigma, participants referenced Maltese social representations of Arab males as ruthless pragmatists who simply marry local women for citizenship, and of Arabs as intrinsically violent and unhygienic. Qualifiers stated that whilst ethics lessons in school help ameliorate children's views of intercultural relations, they are not enough. Despite the negative effects of stigma, some participants clarified that the negative image of Arabs is more of a sociocultural issue rather than a question of racism.

Finally, the claim that **'The media puts Arabs and Islam in a bad light, hindering integration'** was a highly warranted claim arguing for the deleterious effects of the media. Whilst recognising that the media is naturally motivated by ratings and profit, participants argued that, all too often, it ends up creating stories and sowing chaos in order to sell—resulting in falsehoods or sensationalised portrayals of Arabs and Muslims. For example, participants mentioned media exaggerations vis-à-vis the number of Muslims praying at a given time, and attributed bad intentions to reporters' biased exaggerations. The media's skewed emphasis on negative news was a source of immense frustration:

“The media, the media, I wish the media would be real media. That gives us, eee, the truth. That doesn’t give us what others tell her to give us, those who skip parts and portray things as they wish. We need a real media that tells the truth.”


(Farid, male, 49)

As evidence, participants cited headlines that specify a perpetrator’s nationality when the criminal in question is Arab, and the irresponsible conflation between Islam, terrorism and violence. They argued that people’s stereotypical views of Muslims as Islamic State savages, are principally due to irresponsible media reporting. Other examples referenced coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a way deemed to be against Palestine; unfair interviewing of Arab and Muslim individuals; polarisation between local political media stations (as indicative of how the media works); media representations of apartment-renting by foreigners as an ‘invasion’; and media representations of Arabs/Muslims as the culprits behind the push to remove crucifixes from public buildings.

Qualifiers acknowledged the media’s devastating effects on *all* foreigners, not just Arabs; and argued that despite slight improvements, and despite there being responsible journalists, media portrayals of Arabs and Islam remain a key source of stigma. Moreover, participants highlighted the media’s untapped potential in educating people about integration. Whilst acknowledging that, from a marketing perspective, it serves to sell, participants agreed that the media is not investing in a strong society. Some even stated that, by now, they are used to media representations, and they do not bother them as much as they used to.

**Figure 17**

*The Negative Stigma-Related Position*



*Note.* The negative stigma-related position.

## Discussion

Study 1 involved in-depth semi-structured interviews with Arabs in Malta concerning their views on integration. Having presented the results in detail, this section discusses the main findings of this study. Following a summary of results, I revisit them in view of the action-oriented formulae, research questions and expectations.

### ***Key Finding: Integration as Difficult but Necessary***

Arabs' arguments overwhelmingly favoured some form of integration—construed as mutual belonging, mutual respect, or migrant adaptation to local customs—and made their case using arguments from culture, economics, psychology, religion, socio-politics or stigma. Some arguments were *positive*: they argued that integration is taking place or is the only way forward, or attributed positive qualities to the ingroup or outgroup. Other arguments were *negative*: they argued that integration is not taking place or is being hindered, or attributed negative qualities to the ingroup or outgroup. And other arguments were *mixed/ambivalent*: these acknowledged both sides of a debate, highlighted the integrationist way forward despite difficulties, or proposed alternatives to integration. The cultural and economic themes lacked mixed/ambivalent positions, and the stigma-related theme only advanced a negative position.

The most common claims were: 'Institutionalised discrimination/difficulties hinder integration' (7 participants); 'Integration is happening slowly/badly, if at all' (7 participants); 'Integration/mutual belonging is our only option [...]' (7 participants); 'More education and efforts are needed [...]' (8 participants); 'The media puts Arabs and Islam in a bad light [...]' (9 participants); and 'Some Arabs integrate more than others [...]' (11 participants). The claims that 'Arabs integrate in society [...]' and that 'The Maltese are racist, fear Islam, discriminate and/or resist the integration of Arabs [...]' were made less frequently (by 5 participants each), but were backed by a high number of warrants and evidence.

It is worth noting that the patterns in these claims are reflective of patterns in the other claims. These patterns chiefly concern: (a) the social re-presentation of *integration as difficult*

*but necessary*, inviting calls for action (e.g., against institutional discrimination, for more flexibility among Arabs, etc.); (b) the alternative re-presentation of the *Maltese as resistant to integration*; and (c) the *de-essentialism* of the ingroup (Arabs and/or Muslims), the outgroup (Maltese) or Arab-Maltese relations (e.g., emphases on Arab diversity, etc.).

**The Action-Oriented Formulae and Research Questions.** These patterns fit neatly into the action-oriented formulae, addressing the research questions asked above. The first research sub-question (‘How do Arabs socially re-present Arab-Maltese relations [when arguing] for/against the integrationist project?’) can be answered as follows:

Social re-presentation SR [Integration as difficult but necessary/De-essentialised Arab] *for* Project P [Integration], of/as Object O [Arab-Maltese relations/Arabs], by Group G<sub>1</sub> [Arabs], in Context C [Malta]... according to Group G<sub>1</sub> [Arabs] (Formula 1)

That is, Arabs argued *for* integration, by socially re-presenting Arabs in a de-essentialised manner, and Arab-Maltese relations as benefitting from integration.

The second research sub-question (‘How do Arabs alternatively re-present the Maltese’s project [when arguing] for/against the integrationist project?’) was linked to Formula 2, which can be partially completed:

SR *for* P<sub>integration</sub>, as a function of:

SR<sub>M</sub> [Culturally essentialised Arabs], AR<sub>M</sub><sup>A</sup> [?], AR<sub>M</sub><sup>n</sup> [?] ...

SR<sub>A</sub> [Integration as difficult but necessary/De-essentialised Arab], AR<sub>A</sub><sup>M</sup> [Maltese as resistant to integration], AR<sub>A</sub><sup>n</sup> [?]...

and any other SR<sub>n</sub> and AR<sub>n</sub>... relevant to Context C [Malta] (Formula 2)

That is, the social re-presentation for integration is a product of the systemic relations between (a) the Maltese's social re-presentation of Arabs as culturally essentialised (SR<sub>M</sub>; finding from Buhagiar et al., 2018); (b) Arabs' social re-presentation (SR<sub>A</sub>) of themselves as de-essentialised, and of integration as difficult but necessary; and (c) Arabs' alternative re-presentation (AR<sub>A</sub><sup>M</sup>) of the Maltese as being resistant to integration.

**Research Expectations and Outcomes.** The expected outcomes for Study 1 were all fulfilled (see **Research Questions and Expectations**). Firstly, (a) Arabs did overall favour integration. Secondly, (b) many arguments de-essentialised Arabs, the Maltese and Arab-Maltese relations. De-essentialism featured in the following psychological claims: 'Some Arabs integrate more than others [...]'; 'There are different Arab and Maltese people [...]'; and 'The Maltese are friendly with Arabs they get to know personally [...]'. The integrationist project was also de-essentialised in the socio-political claims: 'Integration is a continuous and fluid process [...]'; and 'There are many good examples of integration [...]'. Moreover, all stigma-related claims opposed essentialism: 'Arabs who commit crimes give all Arabs a bad name [...]'; 'The Maltese have a very negative image of Arabs and Muslims [...]'; and 'The media puts Arabs and Islam in a bad light [...]'.  
Thirdly, (c) Arabs' argumentative themes were similar to those of the Maltese

(Sammut et al., 2018). This was possibly because both groups reside in the same society, and because the integrationist project lends itself to the argumentative themes explored above. The only difference between groups was that the religious theme, among Arabs, was termed 'religio-cultural'. However, the Maltese had also used cultural and religious terms interchangeably (Buhagiar et al., 2018).

Fourth, (d) Arabs did make positive religious arguments, in contrast with the Maltese, who had not (Sammut et al., 2018). Religion is a bone of contention between many Maltese and Arabs, and Arabs' self-distancing from issues relating to public crucifixes evinces the ideological nature of symbols (Psaltis et al., 2014). Given Arabs' more pro-integrationist

stance, re-presentations of Christian-Muslim relations in (at least minimally) positive terms constituted another semiotic resource for integrationism among Arabs. This was not the case for the Maltese (Sammut et al., 2018). However, Arabs' positive religio-cultural claim was only mildly positive, and largely argued that there were 'no issues' between Christians and Muslims. On a similar note, whilst the Maltese made positive stigma-related arguments ('Fear of Arabs is unjustified, prevalent and causes problems'; see **Chapter 7**; Sammut, 2015-2016), Arabs did not have the semiotic resources for re-presenting views of the Maltese outgroup as unjustified, presumably because Arabs are the non-dominant group. At most, Arabs de-essentialised the Maltese, or acknowledged their views.

Fifth, (e) Arabs made frequent calls for action. These featured either as *claims* or as *qualifiers*. Examples included *socio-political* arguments for integration as the only option, for Muslim minority rights/requests, for education, for integration programmes, for faster integration, for other intercultural strategies (e.g., a melting pot, multiculturalism, etc.), against the far-right, or against discrimination; and *stigma-related* arguments highlighting the media's potential to advance integration instead of hindering it.

Finally, (f) Arabs engaged with Maltese alternative representations of their project, by employing semantic barriers (Gillespie, 2008) or promoting their own alternative re-presentation. For example, some participants posited a "rigid opposition" (Gillespie, 2008, p. 385) between 'proper integration' involving mutual respect, and 'bad integration' approximating migrant assimilation. Participants arguing that integration depends on migrants did not make this rigid opposition. In turn, the rigid opposition between 'local religions' and 'Islam as a foreign religion', was actively rebutted by claiming Islam as one local religion among others. Moreover, participants alternatively re-presented the Maltese as wanting both migrants' labour *and* their conformity, thus semantically "undermining the motive" (Gillespie, 2008, p. 387) of the Maltese calling for cultural homogeneity. Similarly, participants attributed to the Maltese, the views that Islam is rigid and that all Arabs are



Libyans. These views were attributed only to be subsequently “bracketed” (Gillespie, 2008, p. 381) as misconceptions. In turn, “the semantic mechanism of separation” (Gillespie, 2008, p. 386) was observed in Arabs’ distinctions between ‘actual racism’ and ‘normal processes’: for example, ‘actual racism’ versus ‘the Maltese being friendly only to Arabs they know’. Furthermore, arguments against the far-right invoked semantic barriers relating to “prohibited thoughts” (Gillespie, 2008, p. 385), which dismissed far-right views as dangerous and unworthy of interaction. Finally, alternative re-presentations of history (e.g., the Great Siege) pragmatically targeted Maltese collective memory to push for educational changes; and the alternative re-presentation of specific demands (e.g., halal slaughter, Islamic lessons in schools, etc.) as minority rights, pushed for political change (see also Gillespie, 2020).

### ***Silent Coalitions in Arab-Maltese Relations***

The re-presentational complexity discussed above is compounded by the presence of arguments *against* integration among participants. However, such claims were too few and insufficiently backed, to merit fitting in the action-oriented formulae. Whilst the seeds of an *assimilationist coalition* (e.g., ‘Arab Islamic culture can hinder integration’), and an *anti-integrationist coalition* (e.g., ‘[...] The Maltese are greedy and/or backward’), were discernible, these paled in comparison with the *pro-integrationist coalition*.

This contrasted with the Maltese’s views (Buhagiar et al., 2018; Sammut et al., 2018). Moreover, among the Maltese, arguments were clearly *for* (positive valence), *against* (negative valence), or mixed/ambivalent toward integration (Sammut et al., 2018). However, among Arabs, argument valence was not immediately indicative of coalitional affiliation (see **Results**). In essence, symbolic resources (Zittoun, 2007, p. 344) overlapped between pro- and anti-integrationist claims. For instance, talk of contrasting views on gender relations (negative cultural claim), advanced both pro- and anti-integrationism. Accordingly, silent coalitions for and against integration were not always as clearly distinguishable among Arabs as they were among the Maltese (Sammut et al., 2018).

Interestingly, the Maltese and Arabs similarly lacked the symbolic resources for making arguments from biology (e.g., genes, IQ, etc.) to attack the outgroup (see Buhagiar et al., 2018). Both groups also mentioned trade relations, or highlighted the absence of problems with the outgroup, when making the case *for* integration. Claims surrounding intergroup similarities and experiences of positive contact (e.g., personal relationships, friendships, etc.) were also advanced by both groups, as were qualifiers noting the difficulty of relating with people who practise Islam too strictly (Sammut et al., 2018). When making mixed/ambivalent arguments, both groups referenced Arabs' option to practise their home culture in private and to adopt local customs in public, and the differential rates of integration among individual Arabs. However, the Maltese referred to the 'cultured' Arab as preferable, arguing for the Europeanisation of this minority (Sammut et al., 2018).

Where groups mostly differed was in the negative arguments. The Maltese opposed integration by arguing that Arabs isolate themselves, are notorious, are irreconcilably different, resist integration, seek to destabilise Europe, impose their culture, demand special treatment, and are a demographic and political problem (Sammut et al., 2018). Moreover, the Maltese culturally essentialised Arabs, arguing that they are reducible to and determined by their 'Arabic culture', which is different than Maltese culture and problematic (Buhagiar et al., 2018). Thus, a clearly anti-integrationist silent coalition is present among the Maltese. In contrast, whilst some Arabs were wary of the imposing aspects of Islam, they never directly opposed integration. Only one claim attacked the Maltese directly ('[...] The Maltese are greedy and/or backward'), apart from the claims attributing racism. Aware of the social representations about them, Arabs focussed on de-essentialising their ingroup instead. This creative reconfiguration allows Arabs to reframe identity in positive terms, instead of passively accepting derogation by the outgroup or de-identifying as Arab altogether (see Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

**Re-presentational Complexity.** Despite Arabs' pro-integrationism, their negative arguments/claims were abundant and varied. This can be explained by appealing to the *negativity bias* (Rozin & Royzman, 2001), and the *hostile media phenomenon* (Vallone et al., 1985). The negativity bias refers to “a general bias [...] to give greater weight to negative entities (e.g., events, objects, personal traits)” (Rozin & Royzman, 2001, p. 296). Individuals therefore attend to, and utilise, negative information more than positive information (Vaish et al., 2008), with negative impressions being more unyielding in the face of contrary evidence (Baumeister et al., 2001; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). This bias can manifest through “greater negative differentiation” (Rozin & Royzman, 2001, p. 299), whereby negative information is understood in a more detailed manner, using complex cognitive representations (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). This explains the ubiquity of negative claims: attention to the difficulties in actuating integration allowed participants to express such difficulties, and related solutions, in greater detail. In turn, the hostile media phenomenon (Vallone et al., 1985; see **Chapter 4**)—together with actual negative media representations and experiences of discrimination (Buhagiar et al., 2020)—also explains participants' focus on negative representations.

All participants identified as Arab in different ways and to different degrees. Perhaps, this pan-ethnic category was argumentatively salient for participants precisely because it is relevant to the contested project in question (see Kurzban et al., 2001). Therefore, the methodological segmentation of groups into ‘Arabs’ and ‘Maltese’ was sensible, and did not constitute needless reification (Gillespie et al., 2012). “Despite all the academic debate about ‘communities’, and despite the considerable heterogeneity of Arabs [...] this was a label they used to describe themselves [...] and so must be recognized” (Staeheli & Nagel, 2008, p. 786). Participants' arguments were sometimes influenced by what Nagel and Staeheli (2008) call a “a pan-Arab consciousness” (p. 421).

There were no clear differences between arguments made by different Arab sub-groups that can be stated with confidence. The only exception was the claim: ‘Integration is a

continuous and fluid process [...]’. This claim was exclusively advanced by second-generation Arab/Arab-Maltese participants. Arguably, this critical problematisation of integration reflects “the microgenesis of opinion creation” (Valsiner, 2019, p. 442) across generations, and may be a precursor to future re-presentations of integration. This re-presentation may equally reflect the identity strategies adopted by second-generation migrants, such as transnational identities, hyphenated identities, or identities in crisis (Colombo et al., 2009; see **Chapter 9**).

My presence as a Maltese researcher also influenced participants’ arguments in productive ways. For instance, Nasser qualified his argument for minority rights by claiming that the only reason I do not fight for my rights is because they are safeguarded. Similarly, participants explained certain events only briefly, before resuming their arguments. Positioning me as a majority member who is ‘in the know’ concerning Maltese views, allowed them to do so. For instance, Nabil only briefly mentioned the fact that Maltese people teach foreigners swear words for kicks, before making his point. This presumption of a shared interobjective understanding, thus gave participants a space to make their case. In all, different positionings resulted in highly complex re-presentations and amplified the argumentative scope of the interview.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, Study 1 researched the views of Arabs in Malta concerning the integration of Arabs. The rationale behind this study highlighted the importance of asking ‘why’ questions (Flick et al., 2015, p. 66) during the course of the interview, and the importance of understanding Arabs’ views on integration. Fifteen Arabs were recruited using snowball sampling, and asked for their views on integration (claims), the reasons behind their views (warrants), any examples they could bring to substantiate their views (evidence) and any exceptions they could think of to their own views (qualifiers). The findings were fitted in the action-oriented formulae, portraying the substantive content of Arabs’ social re-

presentation for/against integration (SRA) and Arabs' alternative re-presentation of the Maltese's project (ARA<sup>M</sup>). Three main patterns ran through participants' arguments. These pointed toward (a) a predominant view, among Arabs, of *integration as difficult but necessary*. Participants also (b) *de-essentialised* themselves and their relations with natives, and (c) alternatively re-presented the Maltese as being *resistant to integration*. Moreover, the notions used by Arabs to advance or resist integration appealed to cultural, economic, religio-cultural, psychological, socio-political and stigma-related argumentative themes, mirroring those of the Maltese. These findings were discussed above, converging around the notions of silent coalitions and re-presentational complexity.

In all, whilst silent coalitions advancing assimilationism and anti-integrationism were perceptible, the bulk of Arabs' semiotic resources for re-presenting Arab-Maltese relations revolved around pro-integrationism (contrary to the Maltese; Buhagiar et al., 2018). Therefore, if a spiral of conflict were to materialise along religio-cultural or socio-political lines (see Adida et al., 2014; Dekker & van der Noll, 2012, p., 112; Kennedy & Pronin, 2008), the integrationist project would likely constitute the locus of action. Accordingly, the next study details the development of two Intergroup Relations scales, which were subsequently utilised in a survey seeking to study Arab-Maltese relations quantitatively.

## Chapter 7 – Study 2: The Intergroup Relations Scales

Following Study 1, I now describe the composition of two Intergroup Relations scales. Study 2 composed one scale for studying *Re-presentation for Integration*, and another for studying *Alternative Re-presentation of Integration*. The scales are collectively labelled as the Intergroup Relations (IR) scales. The items constituting both IR scales are identical. However, the Re-presentation for Integration Scale asks participants directly for their views, whereas the Alternative Re-presentation of Integration Scale asks participants for their views on the outgroup's views. As stated in **Chapter 2**, 'for' is an operant word in the former scale: it indicates an *orientation toward* the Project, either *favouring* or *opposing* it. It is not meant to exclude re-presentation *opposing* the Project, but only representations that are simply *of* it.

Study 2 first involved a thematic categorization of Arab (from Study 1) and Maltese (from Sammut et al., 2018; Sammut, 2015-2016) claims on integration, yielding 12 items. These items were ranked by experts in order of integrationism, and scaled using sensitivity analysis (Agresti, 2010, p. 10). The IR scales were tested for validity and reliability. The final scales consisted of 10 items each (2 items were dropped for validity reasons), concerning Arab-Maltese relations in Malta, with Item 1 being the most pro-integrationist and Item 10 the most anti-integrationist. Each item is backed by arguments (claims, warrants, evidence, and qualifiers) made by both groups. Therefore, the scales could be meaningfully distributed among both Maltese and Arabs. This chapter presents (a) the *rationale and procedure* involved in Study 2; (b) the *results*, that is, the IR scales and their properties; and (c) a *discussion* on the scaling procedure and the scales.

## **Rationale and Procedure**

In **Chapter 4**, integration was defined as: the state wherein both dominant and non-dominant group/s cultivate their home culture/s—investing in bonding social capital—and simultaneously engage with outgroup cultures, extending their bridging social capital (see Berry, 2011; Gittell & Vidal, 1998, p. 15). This definition, together with DeVellis's (2017), and Creswell and Plano Clark's (2017, pp. 192-195) recommendations for developing quantitative scales, guided the present study. This section starts by discussing Study 2's rationale and a summary of the steps taken, before proceeding to item generation and the scaling procedure employed.

### ***Rationale***

The principal aim of Study 2 was to build ecologically valid scales for studying views on Arab-Maltese relations. The rationale behind Study 2 prioritised the need for scales that are sensible to both the Maltese and Arabs in Malta, instead of privileging some views over others (Kidder & Fine, 1987). Three important choices lie behind the scaling procedure: (a) the intended scope behind the IR scales; (b) an appropriate method of scaling in line with social representations theory (SRT); and (c) the adaptation of the scaling procedure to build scales meant for studying two separate populations. Before treating these issues, I justify the need for scale development, in light of available literature.

Essentially, “conventional instrument development or validation techniques may not be adequate to determine whether an instrument is appropriate for use with populations who differ from those with whom the instrument was originally developed” (Willgerodt, 2003, p. 798). Research is culturally sensitive when it employs instruments appropriate for the contexts/populations in question (Vogt et al., 2004). Here, issues of reliability, validity, and relevance feature as main preoccupations (Willgerodt, 2003). Many mixed-methods approaches to scale development start by conducting focus groups (Willgerodt, 2003; Nassar-McMillan & Borders, 2002) or interviews (Heydari et al., 2016; Walsh et al., 2018). In Study

2, the scales were built using interview data because: (a) this enabled the comparison of interview data involving both Maltese and Arabs, retaining a level of symmetry; (b) given the topic's socio-political nature, one-to-one interviews facilitated participants' expression of their personal views; and (c) one-to-one interviews ensured that the integrationist project remained the principal focus of discussion.

Prior to scale development, the available scales for studying integration-related topics were reviewed (DeVellis, 2017; Lee et al., 2015). These targeted topics such as acculturation strategies (Berry, 2011; Kosic, 2002); natives' ethnocentrism or prejudice (Neuliep & McCroskey, 1997); multicultural ideology (Berry, 2006; Berry, 2017; Dandy & Pe-Pua, 2010); multiculturalism (Berry & Kalin, 1995); attitudes toward different ethnocultural groups (Dandy & Pe-Pua, 2010); views on refugee minors (Angelidou et al., 2019); tolerance (Berry & Kalin, 1995); acculturation preferences (Berry, 2017); anti-Arab prejudice (Echebarria-Echabe & Guede, 2007); and Islamophobia (Lee et al., 2009). No scale was encountered which *simultaneously* addressed the views of the dominant and non-dominant group, whilst featuring substantive content on the integrationist project. Most importantly, the specificity of Arab-Maltese relations, and the surrounding Maltese context, necessitated the construction of ecologically valid scales.

Indeed, the scope of Study 2 revolved around the scales' ecological validity. Thus, scale development drew on insights from qualitative research: the claims made by Maltese (Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (Study 1) participants were thematically categorised to formulate meaningful scale items. The arguments lending support to the content of scale items, reflect the repertoire of arguments available in the Maltese public sphere. This minimised the risk of building items that draw upon symbolic resources (Zittoun, 2007, p. 344) that are not meaningful for both group/s being studied, that are skewed toward one group's alternative re-presentation, or that lead participants to attribute bias to the scales. The scales, therefore, do not simply rely on the researcher's subjective appraisal. They rely on (a)



participants' understanding of scale items; (b) expert ranking; and (when applied) on (c) participants' self-positioning in line with a subset of the repertoire of arguments available in the public sphere. When individuals express viewpoints, they position themselves relative to other public positions (Billig, 1988, 1989). These social positions are justified whenever individuals *account* for their views (e.g., Harré & Secord, 1972, p. 9). In the present research, the scale items represent avowals of justifiable social positions which individuals adopt amongst a multitude of other social positions, which are also argumentatively defensible in the social context where they occur.

**Thurstone Scaling and SRT.** In the history of psychology, scales were generally developed for studying attitudes; for example, Thurstone scaling (Thurstone, 1928), Likert scaling (Likert, 1932) and Guttman scaling (Guttman, 1944). However, some authors have also asked whether such scaling procedures can be meaningfully adapted for studying social representations (e.g., Jaspars & Fraser, 1984, pp. 110-123). I focus on Thurstone scaling (Thurstone, 1928), which was developed to assess a person's precise attitudinal position toward an object, relative to different attitudinal statements on a continuum. Thurstone scaling served as an initial baseline for building a scaling procedure to study *Social Re-presentation for Project P*.

In summary, Thurstone scaling involves the generation of an extensive list of items, which are worded "such that acceptance or rejection of the statement does indicate something regarding the reader's attitude about the issue" (Thurstone, 1928, p. 544). Judges are then asked to distribute the statements in piles ranging from strongly pro- to strongly anti- views (only the piles at the ends and in the middle are labelled). Thus, each statement ends up in the middle (neutral) pile, or else in one of the various pro- or anti- piles. Importantly, the distribution of statements must not be based on judges' personal opinions toward the object in question, but rather on what the statements seem to signify (Thurstone, 1928). The scale value of each statement—that value "below which just one half of the readers [i.e., judges] place it"

(Thurstone, 1928, p. 546)—is calculated using graphic (Thurstone, 1928, 1929) or formulaic means (Edwards, 1957, p. 86). Ambiguous and irrelevant items are then excluded procedurally, retaining only those items that allow scale values to be evenly spaced. The scale is then employed by having actual participants indicate categorical agreement/disagreement with each item (Thurstone, 1928). In the end, this process yields results relating to individual participants' mean attitude; the range of views they agree/disagree with; frequency distributions of attitudes; and the variety of attitudinal positions for a particular group, as indicated by a frequency distribution and its dispersion (Thurstone, 1928).

Thurstone scaling has been applied in various domains, including affective behaviour (Murray, 1971), education (Blunt, 1983), feminism (Fassinger, 1994), and policing (Guffey et al., 2007). Since its conception, various variants have been developed: the *method of paired comparisons* involves comparative judgements of statement pairs (Thurstone, 1927; Edwards, 1957, p. 19); the *method of equal-appearing intervals* (Thurstone & Chave, 1929) is similar to the Thurstone scaling procedure described above and is based on the assumption “that the intervals between successive cards would represent *equal-appearing intervals*” (Edwards, 1957, p. 85); and the *method of successive intervals* does not assume equal-appearing intervals but relies on normality assumptions when calculating interval widths (Edwards, 1952; Edwards, 1957, p. 120). Other scaling procedures combine Thurstone scaling with other forms, such as the method of summated ratings (Fassinger, 1994; see Likert, 1932).

However, the method of paired comparisons is too laborious (it requires the comparison of all possible item dyads; Edwards, 1957, p. 83) and assumes that scale values are normally distributed in the population (Adams & Messick, 1958). The method of equal-appearing intervals “does not require the judges to discriminate between statements placed within the same category” (Edwards, 1957, pp. 120-121), and problematically assumes that the spaces between items are psychologically equivalent for all judges (Edwards, 1957, p. 120). In turn, the method of successive intervals relies on the normality assumption too

(Adams & Messick, 1958). Whilst various solutions to these problems have been proposed over the years (see Guilford, 1938; Gulliksen, 1954; Mosier, 1940; Saffir, 1937; Sjöberg, 1964), the assumptions of normality and of equal intervals remain highly contested (Adams & Messick, 1958; Gaskell, 1996). That is, any set of items *ranked by position*, when left unconfined, *will* tend to assume a normal distribution (e.g., based on mean rankings) (cf. Attneave, 1949)—especially when the items reflect a breadth of possible views. However, this does not imply that the psychological *scale values* of items, or the rankings for *each individual item*, or the *views circulating in a population*, will necessarily be normally distributed (cf. Thurstone, 1928).

The relationship between SRT and scaling procedures (Gaskell, 1996) is relevant for Study 2. Likert and Thurstone scaling have often been compared in terms of laboriousness, and whether judges are necessary (Edwards & Kenney, 1946; Likert et al., 1934). Moreover, the various forms of Thurstone scaling are complementary in terms of advantages and disadvantages (see Edwards & Gonzalez, 1993), the choice of procedure being a “matter of practical convenience rather than of relative validity” (Saffir, 1937, p. 179). Farr (1994) argues that Thurstone “trawled the mass media of communication of his day in search of good opinion items [and that] sampling the media as well as people’s opinions is comparable to the methods used” (Farr, 1994, p. 2) in SRT. Accordingly, Farr states that SRT “should now consider the possibility of working with Thurstone scales since there is a compatibility here between theory and method” (Farr, 1994, p. 2). Similarly, the relative tolerance of Thurstone scaling for double-barrelled or intermediate items (Drasgow et al., 2010) aligns with SRT. Likert scaling generally omits such items because they do not distinguish between ‘true’ attitudinal positions, and may yield low item-total correlations (Drasgow et al., 2010). However, such items are “necessary for accurately measuring the attitudes of people with intermediate standings” (Drasgow et al., 2010, p. 466) in Thurstone scales. Double-barrelled or intermediate items are particularly useful when items are sourced from arguments made by

two separate groups, as they allow the incorporation of multiple representational contents that are meaningful for all. Therefore, compound items were allowed in the IR scales.

Nonetheless, traditional scaling techniques have rarely been used in SRT (Quenza, 2005), chiefly because the techniques focus on attitudes (Doise et al., 1993, p. 5). Accordingly, to use elements of Thurstone scaling in action-oriented SRT research, adjustments are needed (a) based on the topic at hand (Thurstone, 1928), and (b) in line with the theoretical framework.

**Scaling Intergroup Relations: An Expert-Based Rank-Order Procedure.** I now present an expert-based rank-order procedure for scaling views on intergroup relations. The above-mentioned adjustments concern: (a) the use of *expert judges* (not lay), ensuring that defined interobjective (expert) understandings of ‘integration’ influence item ranking; (b) the ranking procedure, which involves simply placing items in *rank order*, given the problems with equal-interval scaling and psychological scale values; (c) the scaling procedure, which employs *sensitivity analysis* (Agresti, 2010, p. 10), and not calculations based on the Gaussian distribution; and (d) the eventual scoring of scale items by participants on a *7-point Likert scale* (see **Chapter 8**). To make my case, I appeal to Jaspars and Fraser’s (1984, pp. 110-123), and Gaskell’s (1996), discussions on SRT and Thurstone scaling.

In contrast to attitudes, social representations are social because they “deal with social reality mainly in the social structural and cultural sense” (Jaspars & Fraser, 1984, p. 105). Despite their social essence, attitudes are usually studied as individual orientations, with traditional scaling procedures often assuming “that subjects do not differ in their cognitive representation of the attitude statements, but only in their evaluation of the statements” (Jaspars & Fraser, 1984, p. 111). Therefore, “a Thurstone scale only exists if there is sufficient agreement among the judges to produce a scale. Respondents are supposed to have a similar representation of the attitude statements and should produce similar reactions” (Jaspars & Fraser, 1984, p. 111) to adjacent items.

The assumptions surrounding *both* a shared social representation of scale items *and* differing individual tendencies, are implicit in traditional scaling methods (Jaspars & Fraser, 1984, p. 112). Having an ecologically valid scaling procedure does not ‘solve’ this issue, but can directly target the scaling of different social representations *for/against* the project in question. By having expert (instead of lay) judges rank items in an ordinal manner, the risk of having judges give undue weight to explicitly pro- or anti- views is reduced. Moreover, a heterogeneous sample of expert judges is needed to at least ensure that the social representation of integration guiding the ranking procedure is not systematically biased toward one field (e.g., law or anthropology). A compromise between ‘the expert representation’ of integration and ‘heterogeneous views’ within such a re-presentation (Gaskell, 1996) is therefore needed.

One aspect of Thurstone scaling that is compatible with SRT concerns its potential for comparing groups and studying cultural (dis)similarities (Gaskell, 1996). However, “there is still the problem of establishing *scale values* [emphasis added] for items” (Gaskell, 1996, p. 24). As seen above, scale value calculations generally “make the assumption that the judgments for each stimulus are normally distributed on the unknown psychological continuum” (Edwards, 1952, p. 118). Talk of an “unknown psychological continuum” (Edwards, 1952, p. 118) assumes an infinite set of potentially scalable items in a hypothetical universe of items, and ignores the relative social meaning that items have with regards to each other. Yet, views *for/against* integration are justified argumentatively, and also have within themselves implicit potential justifications that may counter future opposition (Billig, 1988). It therefore follows that the meaningful set of items is significantly smaller than the ‘universe’ of all possible items. For example, the meaningful set of items included mention of lynching decades ago (e.g., Ford, 1940), whereas the most anti-integrationist item in the IR scales cannot do so, because the lynching of minorities is fortunately not a salient aspect of local discourse and did not feature in the interview data.

In the present inquiry, *claims* indicate the spectrum of meaningful item content, representing participants' social re-presentation for/against integration. What matters here is that all items are more/less integrationist than the adjacent one, and not whether they are equally spaced or whether all possible item configurations are devised. Ultimately, the task of calculating psychological scale item values is not a meaningful one (Stevens, 1951, pp. 27-28). Subjecting the thematically generated scale items to simple ordinal ranking and sensitivity analysis (Agresti, 2010, p. 10) is therefore more advantageous. Moreover, sticking to a small number of non-redundant items that can be ranked as a whole, makes the ranking exercise meaningful.

Finally, the social representations underlying respondents' scores (in Study 3) reflect the respondents' different collectives and interobjective backgrounds (Jaspars & Fraser, 1984, p. 120). Here, scoring the IR scales (in Study 3) using 7-point Likert scales plays a key role. Scores reflect respondents' social re-presentation *for/against* the integrationist project, rather than simply attitudes *toward* an object. Thus, "it should not come as a surprise that such differences may be even more marked [among] groups belonging to *different cultures*" (Jaspars & Fraser, 1984, p. 121). Essentially, the IR scales shed light on the re-presentations implicit in participants' responses (Jaspars & Fraser, 1984, p. 122) and the arguments advancing them. Scale items here represent varying imperatives for action (ranging from 1 to 7), especially in the Re-presentation for Integration scale.

To recap, the above rationale culminated in an expert-based rank-order procedure for scaling items for intergroup relations research. This procedure avoids the pitfalls associated with classical Thurstone scaling; and most importantly, it aligns with the action-oriented approach to social re-presentation. The next section puts this procedure into practice.

### ***Overall Procedure***

The processes of item generation, expert ranking and item scaling, were undertaken between July and September 2019, with the expert ranking proceeding from August 2019

onward. A thematic categorization procedure generated 12 items. These were subjected to cognitive interviewing with 5 participants, who discussed item comprehensibility and content, and offered alternative phrasing (see **Piloting: Cognitive Interviewing**). Experts of various backgrounds were recruited using critical case sampling (Collins et al., 2007), and the number of experts whose rankings were scaled totalled 15. The ranking of items in order of integrationism lasted an average of 7 minutes. The expert judges were contacted by email and provided with the options of either conducting the ranking procedure online, or else meeting in person and completing the exercise using the same online link (see **Appendix E**). Experts who were met in person—together with some others who provided online correspondence—were asked for their feedback on item content and the items' suitability for studying views on integration, *following* the ranking procedure. The ranking procedure was implemented using Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT) and completed in English.

The items were scaled in Microsoft Excel, using sensitivity analysis, as proposed by Agresti (2010, p. 10) for ordinal data. The means of scale items were calculated on raw data and transformed data (e.g., log transformations), and compared. Details concerning these steps are presented below. In all, in Study 2: (a) a literature review was conducted, confirming that no similar scales exist (see **Rationale**); (b) a plan was devised based on theory and research needs; (c) an item pool was generated; (d) items were subjected to cognitive interviewing and (e) expert ranking; and (f) items were scaled using sensitivity analysis. Finally, (g) exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and reliability analysis were conducted on both IR scales using data from Study 3 (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017; DeVellis, 2017, pp. 103-140; Lee et al., 2015).

### ***Ethical Considerations***

No ethical issues arose during item composition and scaling. This study was conducted in conformity with the University of Malta's Research Code of Practice and Research Ethics Review Procedures. The ranking procedure was included in an ethics self-

assessment form filed with the Social Wellbeing Faculty Research Ethics Committee (SWB FREC) for Study 3, prior to obtaining the expert rankings (see **Chapter 8**; see **Appendix F**). All recruitment was done on a voluntary and informal basis, all participants were informed of the purpose of the research, and participants were not remunerated in any way. All participants were contacted in their individual capacity. No sensitive personal data were collected during the course of Study 2. All data were stored confidentially, and care was taken not to disclose participants' identity in any way. There were no potential harms associated with the study, over and above those experienced in everyday life.

### ***Item Generation***

The scale items were generated through a thematic categorization of Maltese (Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (Study 1) arguments on integration. Thematic categorization involved six main steps. Firstly, (a) the divergences and convergences between Maltese and Arab claims were noted. Secondly, (b) claims that converged on the same issue were grouped. Claims converged when they similarly affirmed a position/issue, when they tapped the same position regardless of valence, and/or when they justified a specific position (in the format: 'Item *because* Claim'). Thirdly, (c) items were generated and subjected to permutations such that they clearly indicated pro- or anti-integrationism, and to different degrees (e.g., by using words/phrases like 'definitely' or 'can be'). Fourth, (d) the warrants, evidence and qualifiers behind the claims were double-checked to confirm that the claims indeed related to the generated item in question. Fifth, (e) the resultant list of items was shortened to 12 items, 6 of which were pro-integration and 6 anti-integration. Sixth, (f) the items were subjected to cognitive interviewing and their wording was improved (see **Output**).

The goal of item generation (DeVellis, 2017, p. 106) was to capture various scalable viewpoints surrounding integration, all the way from the most pro-integrationist to the most anti-integrationist views. Items were either clearly for/against integration, or constituted loaded statements of perceived fact. If statements could possibly indicate pro-integrationism



in one group and anti-integrationism in another, or else could be equally endorsed by both pro- and anti-integrationists, they were rephrased. As long as items referenced varying degrees of integrationism, confounds were allowed, in line with Thurstone’s (1967, p. 16) recommendation against unfruitfully sticking to exact anthropological classifications. For instance, some scale items related to Islam rather than to Arabs specifically. Similarly, compound items were allowed (see e.g., Edwards, 1941; Fassinger, 1994; Thurstone & Chave, 1929). At times, compound phrasing ensured that items made sense similarly for both communities. Moreover, compound phrasing sometimes made items stronger (e.g., for someone to be highly pro-integration, they must endorse Item 1; see **Table 2**).

The language used was derived from Maltese and Arab arguments on integration. For example, consider **Figures 18-19**:

**Figure 18**

*Arab Argument for Integration*



*Note.* An Arab claim (Study 1), with selected warrants, evidence and qualifiers.

**Figure 19**

*Maltese Argument for Integration*



*Note.* A Maltese claim (Sammut et al., 2018), with selected warrants, evidence and qualifiers.

The *claims* in **Figure 18** and **Figure 19** are similar, despite being justified using different arguments. Based on the convergence between the above claims, the following item was formulated: ‘The similarities between Arab and Maltese culture, heritage, language and mentality can help us get along’ (Item D; see **Table 2**).

Incidentally, Attride-Stirling (2001) compares Toulmin’s (1958/2003) *claims* to *global themes*, and *warrants* to *organizing themes*. Whereas thematic categorization (see Attride-Stirling, 2001) was generally guided by the principles of “*internal homogeneity* and *external heterogeneity*” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 91), item generation was content-driven. Thus, items such as Item D (pro-integration) and Item G (anti-integration)—‘The religious and cultural differences between Arabs and the Maltese can be problematic when it comes to living together’—both featured in the final scale. These items similarly tapped notions of cultural similarities/differences, but were based on different claims and made the scales more balanced. Some claims were relevant for more than one item. However, only those claims directly legitimating the item were considered for this exercise.

Items were worded such that the scale remained ‘symmetrical’. This involved the use of words/phrases of varying degrees of strength, and permutations making items stronger or weaker (Wang, 1932). For instance, although neither the Maltese nor Arabs argued directly for racism, some claims negatively typified an entire ethnic group. The following item therefore counterbalanced the most pro-integrationist item, using notions present in the interview datasets: ‘Racism between the Maltese and Arabs makes sense—we simply should not mix’ (Item L). Permutations made the ranking exercise more intuitive for expert rankers, and the scale more meaningful. Item phrasings not backed by qualitative data, or making unbalanced accusations against one group, were avoided. This is because “*the scale must transcend the group[s] measured*” (Thurstone, 1928, p. 547). For instance, the item ‘At the end of the day, the Arabs or the Maltese will want to impose their way of life on the other’ (Item J), was worded as such. Claims involving zero-sum alternative representations attributing malicious intent to the outgroup, featured in a generalised and symmetrical manner in the items.

Mixed/ambivalent claims that were too neutral (e.g., ‘Integration is a continuous and fluid process—it is hard to say whether it is taking place or not’) usually did not inform scale items. Similarly, claims that simply described a process (e.g., ‘The lack of government handouts in Malta pushes Arabs to integrate by forcing them into the labour market’) could not inform scale items, as one could endorse this statement regardless of their position on integration (Edwards & Kenney, 1946; Wang, 1932). Exceptionally long items (DeVellis, 2017, p. 110) were avoided, as were multiple negatives and “*ambiguous pronoun references*” (DeVellis, 2017, p. 112). All six pro-integrationist items were worded in positively pro-integrationist terms, and all six anti-integrationist items were worded in positively anti-integrationist terms (cf. DeVellis, 2017, p. 112). This made the ranking exercise possible.

No neutral items were generated, as there was no clear way of knowing whether the scale midpoint signified disinterest, indifference, ambivalence or neutrality toward integration

amongst respondents (Edwards, 1946; Fassinger, 1994). Omitting neutral items made the scales more gradual, and minimised the risk of artificially making overall anti-integrationist respondents seem more pro-integrationist, or vice versa, due to their endorsement of neutral items.

The number of items was limited to 12 prior to expert ranking (see **Results**). This number was manageable in terms of cognitive complexity, thus making the ranking procedure meaningful. Moreover, extending the number of items could only be done through additional permutations, thus, the new items would not have differed in terms of both content *and* level of pro-/anti-integrationism, but mostly artificially in terms of the latter criterion. Similarly, including items that were simply sub-sets of other items (e.g., items on gender relations, which would have been sub-sets of items tapping religio-cultural notions) would have weakened the scales' gradualism.

Furthermore, following the ranking procedure, no items were deleted due to large standard deviations or interquartile ranges in mean ranking. Items were only deleted when EFA revealed them to be critically inadequate. This is because concerns with ecological validity meant that it was important to retain the mutually relative meaning of items as much as possible (see Billig, 1988; see **Rationale**). Additionally, the requirement of scale symmetry imposed limitations on item removal.

**Piloting: Cognitive Interviewing.** Before expert ranking, the items were subjected to cognitive interviewing (Power et al., 2018) with 5 voluntary participants to check participants' understanding of items, item vocabulary and response options (DeVellis, 2017, p. 221). This enhanced the validity of the IR scales (Karasz & Singelis, 2009). (Arab participants were only recruited for the survey proper in Study 3, given the relative difficulty in recruiting them.)

During this exercise, item content and comprehensibility, and the perceived strength of items (i.e., how pro-/anti-integrationist they seemed to be) were discussed, and some items

were re-worded following this exercise. In particular, words/phrases indicating strength (e.g., ‘definitely’, ‘can be’, etc.) were adjusted based on participants’ feedback. Item H was rephrased to ‘Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural practices *private* [instead of *personal*] in order to get along with the locals’, for better comprehensibility. Compound items were found to be comprehensible and non-problematic. Following DeVellis’s (2017, pp. 221-222) recommendations, the final decision on item wording was taken by the researcher. Cognitive interviewing was only conducted once prior to the scaling exercise. Moreover, no alterations were made to the items following expert ranking and feedback (see **Scaling Method**).

### ***Sampling Scheme and Recruitment***

Recruitment involved critical case sampling, whereby independent experts were chosen precisely because of the information they could provide (Collins et al., 2007). This scheme constituted a form of “sampling special or unique cases” (Teddlie & Yu, 2007). These experts approached intercultural relations from a variety of fields. *Expert* rankings ensured that the scaling procedure was grounded in a shared expert view of integration. The formal educational training of experts narrowed the parameters within which the project of integration could be understood by them. At the same time, the variety of fields minimised the risk of having some specialised view of integration take precedence over others. The final number of expert rankers was restricted in size, mainly because of the number of available experts locally. Recruitment of expert rankers proceeded (a) until the minimum number of 15 expert rankers (see Rosander, 1936) was reached, and (b) until the mean positions of the items took on a normal distribution (cf. Attneave, 1949).

In all, 22 experts were contacted, and 16 of them took part in this study, but one expert was excluded from the scaling procedure for ranking one pro-integrationist item among the 7<sup>th</sup>-12<sup>th</sup> positions, and one anti-integrationist item among the 1<sup>st</sup>-6<sup>th</sup> positions (see **Scaling Method**). The expert in question was removed because the six pro-integrationist and the six

anti-integrationist items were decided upon on an *a priori* basis to make the scaling exercise more intuitive. In all, the number of experts whose rankings were scaled thus totalled 15. Of these 15 experts, 7 were met in person, completed the ranking exercise using the online link and provided feedback on scale items; 1 expert completed the ranking exercise using the online link and also provided feedback through online means; and 7 experts simply completed the ranking exercise online without providing feedback.

**Participant Characteristics.** The 15 experts included 2 experts in anthropology, 1 in law, 2 in philosophy, 4 in intercultural counselling, 1 in education, 1 in international relations, 2 in psychology, 1 in international migration, and 1 in youth and community studies. Experts had a postgraduate level of education, with most having doctorates in their fields. All experts were familiar with the Maltese context.

### ***Scaling Method***

The scaling method was inspired by Thurstone scaling (Thurstone, 1928), and adjusted in line with SRT (Gaskell, 1996; Jaspars & Fraser, 1984, pp. 110-123). This method involved (a) a ranking procedure, and (b) sensitivity analysis (Agresti, 2010, p. 10).

**Ranking Procedure.** The experts ranked the items in order of integrationism after being instructed that “the following scale involves a series of items concerning the integration of Arabs in Malta, with 6 statements being pro-integration, and 6 statements being anti-integration, to various degrees” (see **Appendix E**). They shifted the items into one specific position, among 12 positions which could only be occupied by one item. Rankers placed the item judged to be the most pro-integrationist in the 1<sup>st</sup> position, the item judged to be the least pro-integrationist in the 6<sup>th</sup> position, the item judged to be the least anti-integrationist (from the anti-integrationist items) in the 7<sup>th</sup> position, and the item judged to be the most anti-integrationist in the 12<sup>th</sup> position.

Of the 15 experts, 8 provided feedback concerning the items, *following* the ranking procedure. I asked for feedback concerning: (a) the relevance of each item for measuring

views on integration; (b) the conciseness and clarity of scale items; and (c) potentially excluded item content (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017, pp. 192-195; DeVellis, 2017, p. 128). All experts found the scale items to be well-devised and recommended no alterations.

**Sensitivity Analysis.** The ordinal data was subjected to sensitivity analysis (Agresti, 2010, p. 10). Agresti (2010) notes that a disadvantage of using the median with ordinal categorical responses concerns “its discontinuous nature: Changing a tiny bit of probability can have the effect of moving the median from one category to the next” (Agresti, 2010, p. 10). Moreover, two items could have “the same median even when an underlying latent variable has distribution shifted upward for one [item] relative to the other” (Agresti, 2010, p. 10). Accordingly, Agresti (2010, p. 10) makes the case for treating ordinal data on an interval scale, using measures like the mean. Agresti recommends sensitivity analysis, where a few scores (mostly non-linear transformations of the rank orders) are selected, and the researcher determines whether the item positions depend on this selection or not (Agresti, 2010, p. 10). If item positions are the same across the absolute majority of the calculations, then the outcome would be reliable. Accordingly, the ranking of each item (see **Table 2**) was calculated based on the median, and five mean-based measures: (a) a linear measure; (b) two sequence-based non-linear measures; (c) a log-based non-linear measure; and (d) a non-linear measure based on the mean average cumulative proportion. These measures were calculated, per item, on the 15 positions assigned to each item (by the 15 experts). All mean-based measures produced the same output in terms of item positions. Using the median, items in the middle occupied the same ranks. Given the coarseness of the median (Agresti, 2010, p. 10), the output was deemed stable on the basis of the mean-based measures (see **Table 3**).

Although items had varying standard deviations and interquartile ranges (see **Appendix E**), no items were removed from the final list of items prior to EFA. Whilst high levels of dispersion may indicate item irrelevance/ambiguity (Thurstone, 1928), scale items were only excluded when they exhibited poor factor loadings (such items also exhibited

relatively high levels of dispersion). This safeguarded against the exclusion of important semiotic content, and retained the relative meaning of each item vis-à-vis the others as much as possible (see **Rationale**; cf. Billig, 1988). Contrary to Thurstone's (1928) assumptions, the supposed ambiguity of scale items with high dispersion could have been instead a natural consequence of expert heterogeneity.

## **Results**

The scaling procedure resulted in a set of 12 ranked items, which ultimately resulted in two 10-item IR scales. This section details (a) the scale outputs, (b) scale legitimation (ecological validity, content validity, etc.), and (c) validity and reliability tests. EFA (Costello & Osborne, 2005) was conducted, and Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach, 1951) values were calculated, on the survey data obtained in Study 3.

### ***Output***

The IR scales initially consisted of 12 items concerning Arab-Maltese relations in Malta, with Item A being the most pro-integrationist item (1<sup>st</sup> position), Item F the least pro-integrationist (6<sup>th</sup> position), Item G the least anti-integrationist (7<sup>th</sup> position) and Item L the most anti-integrationist (12<sup>th</sup> position). The final IR scales consisted of 10 items. **Table 2** and **Table 3** present the items and the results of the sensitivity analysis (Agresti, 2010, p. 10). **Figures 20-31** present schematic illustrations of the claims backing the items (see **Chapter 9**, for schematic portrayals of selected warrants, evidence and qualifiers behind these claims).

The *Re-presentation for Integration Scale* (RFI scale) asks participants the following question for each item: 'To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?'. The *Alternative Re-presentation of Integration Scale* (AROI scale) asks the Maltese the following question for each item, 'To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?'; and asks Arabs the following question for each item, 'To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?'. Only one scaling procedure was conducted, and two scales were obtained from this. Both scales are



collectively referred to as the IR scales. In what follows, item letters refer to the items prior to EFA (i.e., prior to the removal of Item E and Item H); and item numbers refer to the items featuring in the final IR scales.

**Table 2**

*The Initial Items of the Intergroup Relations Scales*

Rank	Scale Item	Weight	
		RFI	AROI
Item 1 (Item A)	The Maltese and Arabs can definitely get along whilst fully keeping their cultural and religious differences—living together is highly beneficial.	5	5
Item 2 (Item B)	It would be better for society if the Maltese and Arabs engage with each other (e.g., at work, at school, etc.) instead of isolating themselves.	4	4
Item 3 (Item C)	Having Christian and Muslim places of worship side by side makes for a strong and diverse society, both here in Malta and elsewhere.	3	3
Item 4 (Item D)	The similarities between Arab and Maltese culture, heritage, language and mentality can help us get along.	2	2
Excluded (Item E)	As a minimum, there should be no discrimination between the Maltese and Arabs.	/	/
Item 5 (Item F)	As with other cultures, cultural contact between Arabs and the Maltese can be good in some specific respects (e.g., new food, music, etc.).	1	1
Item 6 (Item G)	The religious and cultural differences between Arabs and the Maltese can be problematic when it comes to living together.	1 <sup>a</sup>	1
Excluded (Item H)	Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural practices private in order to get along with the locals.	/	/
Item 7 (Item I)	Arabic Islamic culture and Maltese Christian culture are too contrasting for us to get along well.	2	2
Item 8 (Item J)	At the end of the day, the Arabs or the Maltese will want to impose their way of life on the other.	3	3
Item 9 (Item K)	It would definitely be better if the Maltese and Arabs avoid dealing with each other altogether.	4	4
Item 10 (Item L)	Racism between the Maltese and Arabs makes sense - we simply should not mix.	5	5

*Note.* These 12 items were subjected to the expert-based rank-order scaling procedure. Item letters (in parentheses) indicate the items' rank (Item A = most pro-integrationist; Item L = most anti-integrationist). Pro-integrationist items = Items A-F. Anti-integrationist items = Items G-L. Item numbers indicate item labels and ranks following EFA, after which Item E and Item H were excluded from the scales. Weights were assigned to items after EFA, for both scales.

<sup>a</sup> Items 6-10 of the RFI scale, and of the composite AROI scale, should be reverse-scored before weighting (see **Scoring the Intergroup Relations Scales**).

**Table 3***Results of the Sensitivity Analysis*

Scale Item	Measures					Median
	Mean-based measures					
	Linear <sup>a</sup>	Non-linear	Non-linear	Non-linear	Non-linear	
	A <sup>b</sup>	B <sup>c</sup>	(log) <sup>d</sup>	(ACP) <sup>e</sup>		
<b>Item A</b>	5.27	13.13	21.00	1.05	0.94	1
<b>Item B</b>	4.47	9.53	14.60	1.02	0.87	2
<b>Item C</b>	3.60	6.47	9.33	0.99	0.80	3
<b>Item D</b>	3.20	5.53	7.87	0.96	0.77	4
<b>Item E</b>	2.40	3.93	5.47	0.92	0.70	5
<b>Item F</b>	2.07	2.40	2.73	0.90	0.67	5
<b>Item G</b>	-1.67	-1.80	-1.93	0.72	0.44	8
<b>Item H</b>	-1.87	-2.33	-2.80	0.70	0.43	8
<b>Item I</b>	-3.20	-4.93	-6.67	0.57	0.32	9
<b>Item J</b>	-3.67	-6.53	-9.40	0.49	0.28	10
<b>Item K</b>	-4.67	-9.73	-14.80	0.36	0.19	11
<b>Item L</b>	-5.93	-16.07	-25.40	0.02	0.09	12

*Note.* The position of the 12 items, using mean-based measures and the median. The *median* reflects the median of the 15 positions assigned to each item (by 15 experts); the lower the position (e.g., position 1), the more integrationist the item. For the *mean-based* measures, per item, each position assigned to the item by the experts was weighted accordingly by the following scores (Notes <sup>a</sup> – <sup>d</sup>), and weighted positions were then added and divided by 15 (the total number of experts), resulting in the scores shown in the table; the higher the score, the more integrationist the item.

<sup>a</sup> The Linear measure was based on the following scores (1<sup>st</sup> position till 12<sup>th</sup> position, respectively): 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, -1, -2, -3, -4, -5 and -6.

<sup>b</sup> The Non-linear A measure was based on the following scores (1<sup>st</sup> position till 12<sup>th</sup> position, respectively): 16, 11, 7, 4, 2, 1, -1, -2, -4, -7, -11 and -16.

<sup>c</sup> The Non-linear B measure was based on the following scores (1<sup>st</sup> position till 12<sup>th</sup> position, respectively): 26, 17, 10, 5, 2, 1, -1, -2, -5, -10, -17 and -26.

<sup>d</sup> The Non-linear (log) measure was based on log transformations of the following scores (1<sup>st</sup> position till 12<sup>th</sup> position, respectively): 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1.

<sup>e</sup> The Non-linear (ACP) measure was calculated by averaging the average cumulative proportions (ACP) of each ordinal position per scale item (see Agresti, 2010, p. 10).

**Figure 20**


*Item A*



*Note.* Item A (Item 1), and the Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) claims informing it.

**Figure 21**


*Item B*



*Note.* Item B (Item 2), and the Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) claims informing it.

**Figure 22**


*Item C*



*Note.* Item C (Item 3), and the Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) claims informing it.

**Figure 23**


*Item D*



*Note.* Item D (Item 4), and the Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) claims informing it.

**Figure 24**


*Item E*



*Note.* Item E (excluded following EFA), and the Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) claims informing it.

**Figure 25**


*Item F*



*Note.* Item F (Item 5), and the Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) claims informing it.

**Figure 26**


*Item G*



*Note.* Item G (Item 6), and the Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) claims informing it.

**Figure 27**


*Item H*



*Note.* Item H (excluded following EFA), and the Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) claims informing it.

**Figure 28**


*Item I*



*Note.* Item I (Item 7), and the Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) claims informing it.

**Figure 29**


*Item J*



*Note.* Item J (Item 8), and the Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) claims informing it.

**Figure 30**

*Item K*



*Note.* Item K (Item 9), and the Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) claims informing it.

**Figure 31**

*Item L*



*Note.* Item L (Item 10), and the Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) claims informing it.



As per **Table 3**, the median did not differentiate between Item E and Item F, and between Item G and Item H. Mean-based measures did so slightly. Moreover, the average item positions (using both mean-based measures and the median; see **Table 3**) were approximately normally distributed, with the lowest Shapiro-Wilk test statistic being for the non-linear (log) measure,  $W(12) = 0.89, p = 0.12$ , and the highest being for the non-linear B measure,  $W(12) = 0.99, p = 1.00$ . The Shapiro-Wilk test of normality was chosen as it is one of the most powerful tests of its kind (Razali & Wah, 2011).

### ***Legitimation: Validity and Reliability***

Prior to examining the scales' validity and reliability, the dataset (obtained in Study 3) was explored for item means and standard deviations (see **Chapter 8**). The anti-integrationist items were reverse-scored prior to validity and reliability tests (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017, p. 194; DeVellis, 2017, pp. 131-135). I here present details on the validity and reliability of the IR scales.

**Ecological Validity.** The principal type of validity driving scale composition was ecological validity, as explained in detail above and in **Chapter 5**. A qualitative basis informs the scales. Moreover, the ranking procedure contributed to Study 2's ecological validity, as all experts were familiar with the local scenario. Clarifying "the original theoretical concepts" (Cicourel, 2007, p. 740) behind one's study is important for ecological validity. The action-oriented approach to social re-presentation (see **Chapter 2**), the minimal model of argumentation (see **Chapter 3**), and the theoretical concept of integration (see **Chapter 4**) informing the IR scales, were all presented in detail. In turn, ecological validity is linked to other forms of validity, such as content validity and construct validity (Cicourel, 2007).

**Content Validity.** Content validity "is established by showing that the test items are a sample of a universe in which the investigator is interested" (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955, p. 282). This form of validity concerns scale items' sampling adequacy: "the extent to which a specific set of items reflects a content domain" (DeVellis, 2017, p. 86). Moreover, "content

validity is intimately linked to the definition of the construct being examined” (DeVellis, 2017, p. 87). Content validity can either be conceptualized as a subcomponent of construct validity or as the criterion upon which to judge other validity forms (Vogt et al., 2004), as it sets the parameters within which to understand the validity of the construct under study.

In Study 2, these parameters were set through qualitative work, cognitive interviewing, the expert rankers’ feedback, and theory (see Koller et al., 2017). Moreover, item content was derived from actual arguments circulating in public (see Groarke & Hogan, 2018; Walsh et al., 2018; Vogt et al., 2004). All these factors boosted the scales’ content validity. All the experts who provided feedback found the items to be well-devised, and recommended no changes (see **Ranking Procedure**). Importantly, no expert ranker pointed out content that was *missing* in the items, meaning that the qualitative work behind the scales sufficiently mapped the spectrum of arguments surrounding integration in the present zeitgeist. The IR scales reflected this.

**Construct Validity.** “*Construct validation* is involved whenever a test is to be interpreted as a measure of some attribute or quality which is not ‘operationally defined.’ The problem faced by the investigator is, ‘What constructs account for variance in test performance?’” (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955, p. 282). Construct validity should be studied “whenever no criterion or universe of content is accepted as entirely adequate to define the quality to be measured” (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955, p. 282). Thus, the development of theory and the construction/amelioration of indicators constitute essential aspects of construct validation (Vogt et al., 2004). Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) “is typically used for the investigation of construct validity in cases where the relationships amongst variables are unknown or ambiguous” (Atkinson et al., 2011, p. 2). EFA is particularly useful when led by conceptual considerations (Wilson et al., 2017), and has four main functions: (a) to explore the number of latent variables underlying an item set; (b) to explain variation among items in terms of a smaller number of factors that account for that variation; (c) to define the

substantive meaning/content of such factors; and (d) to identify item performance and eliminate those performing poorly (DeVellis, 2017, pp. 143-144).

EFA was performed on the dataset obtained in Study 3, to explore the dimensionality of the IR scales. EFA was preferred over confirmatory factor analysis because the scaling procedure was novel (see Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). Worthington and Whittaker (2006) argue that “exploratory methods (i.e., principal-axis and maximum-likelihood factor analysis) are able to recover the correct factor model satisfactorily a majority of the time” (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006, p. 815). Therefore, EFA served as an intermediate stage between my initial choice of items and expert rankings on the one hand, and the multiple regression analyses of participants’ views on the other.

There is a longstanding debate about the suitability of principal axis factoring versus principal-components extraction (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006) in factor analysis. The purpose of principal-components extraction is largely to minimise the number of items whilst retaining much of the original variance. In contrast, the purpose of principal axis factoring “is to understand the latent factors or constructs that account for the shared variance among items” (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006, p. 818). This makes EFA, using principal axis factoring, better suited for scale development (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006; Byrne, 2005). EFA, using principal axis factoring, suited the IR scales, as the aim was *both* to exclude exceptionally problematic items (data reduction), *and* to identify underlying factors (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Henson & Roberts, 2006; Ullman & Bentler, 2013, p. 677). Furthermore, principal axis factoring was used instead of maximum likelihood extraction, as the data violated the assumption of multivariate normality (Costello & Osborne, 2005).

Raw item scores ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) were used for EFA, with Items G-L (anti-integrationist items) being reverse-scored. The EFA being reported was performed on non-weighted items for both IR scales (following Groarke & Hogan, 2018); that is, the items were not weighted in order of integrationism (see **Table 2**)

prior to EFA.<sup>26</sup> EFA was performed on complete scale responses ( $n = 322$ ). This included both Maltese ( $n = 217$ ) and Arab ( $n = 105$ ) participants (see **Chapter 8**). The analysis was conducted across both groups because the arguments behind the items pertained to both groups (see Wilson et al., 2017, for factor analysis with mixed samples). Participants of mixed Arab-Maltese origin ( $n = 18$ ) were excluded as there were only two such interviewees in Study 1. With a subject-to-item ratio of 26.83:1 (18.08:1 for the Maltese, and 8.75:1 for Arabs), the sample size was good for performing EFA (Costello & Osborne, 2005; DeVellis, 2017, p. 190). Decisions on the number of factors to retain, were based on parallel analysis (Horn, 1965)—using O’Connor’s (2000) syntax for SPSS—and scree plot examination (Cattell, 1966), keeping in mind considerations of ecological validity.<sup>27</sup> This combination minimised the risk of over-factoring (Anagnostopoulos & Griva, 2012), as relying solely on eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (the Kaiser criterion; Kaiser, 1960) is contraindicated (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Analysis was conducted using SPSS V27.

***EFA: Re-presentation for Integration Scale.*** EFA with principal axis factoring was conducted on the initial 12-item RFI scale. As the factors underlying the items were expected to correlate, oblique rotation was employed, using Direct Oblimin (delta set at zero). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy ( $KMO = .920$ ) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity ( $\chi^2_{(66)} = 1528.308, p < 0.001$ ) indicated that the matrix was factorable. Measures of sampling adequacy (MSA) values (diagonal elements on the anti-image correlation matrix [see Kaiser & Rice, 1974]) ranged between 0.898 and 0.947, with the exception of Item H (0.785). The Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960) and a visual examination of the scree plot recommended the retention of 2 factors. However, parallel analysis (O’Connor, 2000; DeVellis, 2017, p. 157), based on percentile eigenvalues, recommended the retention of 1

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<sup>26</sup> EFA was performed using both non-weighted and (linear) weighted scores, yielding the same results vis-à-vis variance explained and factor loadings (see **Scoring the Intergroup Relations Scales**).

<sup>27</sup> For syntax, visit: <https://people.ok.ubc.ca/briocconn/nfactors/rawpar.sps>

factor (see **Appendix E**). The retention of 1 factor was also in line with *a priori* considerations relating to scale unidimensionality. EFA was therefore fixed to extract 1 factor.

The determinant of the *R*-matrix (determinant = .008) surpassed Field's (2009, p. 648) minimum criterion of 0.00001, indicating that any multicollinearity present in the data was not severe. Extracted communalities ranged between 0.328 and 0.632, with the exception of Item H (0.051) and Item J (0.249). Given that the sample size exceeded 300, the low communalities were not of great concern and did not inform item deletions (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). The inter-item correlation matrix (see **Table 4**) was scanned for any items with no correlations greater than 0.3, as these could be problematic; and for items with correlations greater than 0.9, which could indicate multicollinearity (Field, 2009, p. 657). Only Item H had no correlations greater than 0.3. No correlation was greater than 0.9.

**Table 4**

*Inter-Item Correlations for the 12 Items of the Initial Re-Presentation for Integration Scale*

Item	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
A	1											
B	.526***	1										
C	.495***	.362***	1									
D	.515***	.527***	.482***	1								
E	.433***	.423***	.320***	.361***	1							
F	.487***	.514***	.498***	.538***	.438***	1						
G	.426***	.320***	.338***	.391***	.334***	.338***	1					
H	.073	.061	.164**	.144**	.161**	.048	.139**	1				
I	.447***	.353***	.410***	.417***	.309***	.359***	.434***	.210***	1			
J	.315***	.245***	.278***	.376***	.278***	.266***	.454***	.240***	.383***	1		
K	.555***	.541***	.438***	.482***	.510***	.462***	.421***	.183***	.483***	.347***	1	
L	.541***	.555***	.441***	.514***	.506***	.466***	.411***	.253***	.501***	.404***	.732***	1

*Note.* The correlation matrix for the 12 items of the initial RFI scale. All items inter-correlate, except for Item H, which does not correlate with Items A, B and F. \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Applying principal axis factoring to the 12-item dataset, 1 factor was extracted (eigenvalue = 5.419), accounting for 40.65% of the variance. All items, except Item H, had

factor loadings greater than 0.4, exceeding Tabachnick and Fidell's (2001, p. 194) cut-off point of 0.32. The minimum loading over 0.32 was 0.499 (Item J). Item H (factor loading = 0.227) was removed as per standard procedure (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). To retain scale symmetry, Item E (5<sup>th</sup> position)—being the pro-integrationist counterpart to Item H (8<sup>th</sup> position)—was removed as well. Item E (factor loading = 0.595) incidentally had the lowest factor loading amongst the pro-integrationist items. EFA was then performed iteratively (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Schönrock-Adema et al., 2009; Worthington & Whittaker, 2006)—variants included an analysis with all the 12 items, or else with 10 items (excluding Item E and Item H), among others. EFA for the latter variant is reported below.

EFA with principal axis factoring was conducted on Items A, B, C, D, F, G, I, J, K and L. Henceforth, these are referred to respectively as Items 1<sup>A</sup>, 2<sup>B</sup>, 3<sup>C</sup>, 4<sup>D</sup>, 5<sup>F</sup>, 6<sup>G</sup>, 7<sup>I</sup>, 8<sup>J</sup>, 9<sup>K</sup> and 10<sup>L</sup>, without the superscripts. KMO (= .914) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity ( $\chi^2_{(45)} = 1352.101, p < 0.001$ ) indicated that the matrix was factorable. MSA values (in the anti-image correlation matrix) ranged between 0.883 and 0.945. Extracted communalities ranged between 0.245 and 0.613. The Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960), parallel analysis (O'Connor, 2000) and the scree plot recommended the retention of 1 factor (see **Appendix E**). EFA was therefore fixed to extract 1 factor.

The determinant of the *R*-matrix (determinant = .014) was adequate (Field, 2009, p. 648). The absolute majority of correlations exceeded 0.3, and no item correlations were greater than 0.9 (see **Table 4** for inter-item correlations between Items A, B, C, D, F, G, I, J, K and L). Principal axis factoring (10-item dataset) extracted 1 factor (eigenvalue = 5.002), accounting for 44.74% of the variance. All items had factor loadings greater than 0.4 (see **Table 5**).

**Table 5***Factor Loadings for the 10-item Re-Presentation for Integration Scale (One-Factor Solution)*

<b>Item</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<b>Letter</b>	A	B	C	D	F	G	I	J	K	L
<b>Factor 1</b>	.730	.670	.622	.712	.659	.574	.625	.495	.766	.783

*Note.* The factor loadings for Items 1-10 of the final RFI scale. Letters correspond to the items in the initial 12-item scale.

Ultimately, this 10-item one-factor solution was deemed as the best solution, in terms of comprehensiveness and parsimony. The 10-item RFI scale achieved a balance between item removal and scale integrity (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Interestingly, Item E's position ( $SD = 1.64$ ;  $IQR = 2.5$ ) had resulted with the highest standard deviation and interquartile range among all the items, during the ranking procedure. Similarly, the dispersion of Item H's position ( $SD = 1.06$ ;  $IQR = 1.0$ ) was among the highest across the anti-integrationist items (see **Appendix E**). Item E and Item H had mean rankings very close to those of Item F and Item G, respectively, and their median rank was the same (Item E and Item F: Median rank = 5; Item G and Item H: Median rank = 8; see **Table 3**). This provided further evidence that Item E and Item H were occupying a relatively unimportant role in overall scale functioning. Both of these excluded items also had among the lower inter-item correlations (see **Table 4**). Given its linearity, the 10-item RFI scale was not majorly affected by item removal: instead of ranging from Item 1 (highly pro-integrationist) to Item 12 (highly anti-integrationist), the final RFI scale ranged from Item 1 (highly pro-integrationist) to Item 10 (highly anti-integrationist).

**EFA: Alternative Re-presentation of Integration Scale.** EFA with principal axis factoring was conducted on the initial 12-item AROI scale. As the factors underlying the items were expected to correlate, oblique rotation was employed, using Direct Oblimin (delta set at zero). KMO (= .836) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity ( $\chi^2_{(66)} = 852.621, p < 0.001$ ) indicated that the matrix was factorable. MSA values (in the anti-image correlation matrix)

ranged between 0.745 and 0.888, with the exception of Item H (0.683). The Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960) and scree plot examination recommended the retention of 3 factors. However, parallel analysis (O'Connor, 2000), based on percentile eigenvalues, recommended the retention of 2 factors (see **Appendix E**). The retention of 2 factors was thus opted for. The factors represented the pro-integrationist (Items A-F) and anti-integrationist (Items G-L) blocks. The unidimensionality of the RFI scale did not imply that the AROI scale must be unidimensional as well. In the RFI scale, social re-presentation for/against integration taps the same project. However, alternative re-presentation of the outgroup's project (the AROI scale) may vary more widely, and pro-integrationist alternative representations do not automatically exclude anti-integrationist alternative representations. EFA was therefore fixed to extract 2 factors. The determinant of the *R*-matrix (determinant = .067) was adequate (Field, 2009, p. 648). Extracted communalities ranged between 0.211 and 0.507, with the exception of Item H (0.65) and Item J (0.165). Correlations for Item G, Item H and Item J were relatively poor (generally less than 0.3). No correlation was greater than 0.9 (see **Table 6**).

**Table 6**

*Inter-Item Correlations for the 12 Items of the Initial Alternative Re-Presentation of Integration Scale*

Item	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
A	1											
B	.469***	1										
C	.471***	.430***	1									
D	.502***	.421***	.426***	1								
E	.277***	.317***	.325***	.209***	1							
F	.402***	.354***	.345***	.345***	.302***	1						
G	.123*	.106*	.204***	.167**	.020	.084	1					
H	.035	.160**	.040	.057	.139**	.058	.073	1				
I	.243***	.268***	.230***	.273***	.126*	.064	.385***	.126*	1			
J	.211***	.196***	.166**	.134**	.010	.107*	.196***	-.006	.332***	1		
K	.240***	.235***	.259***	.281***	.204***	.277***	.200***	.199***	.307***	.252***	1	
L	.328***	.366***	.330***	.300***	.306***	.159**	.296***	.315***	.364***	.210***	.420***	1

*Note.* The correlation matrix for the 12 items of the initial AROI scale. \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$



Principal axis factoring (12-item dataset) extracted 2 factors (Factor 1 eigenvalue = 3.799; Factor 2 eigenvalue = 1.460), accounting for 33.25% of the variance. All items had factor loadings greater than 0.4, except for Item H and Item J. Item J (factor loading = 0.394) still exceeded Tabachnick and Fidell's (2001, p. 194) cut-off point of 0.32. However, Item H (factor loading = 0.244) was removed (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). To retain scale symmetry, Item E—being the pro-integrationist counterpart to Item 8—was removed as well. Item E (factor loading = 0.461) also had the lowest factor loading amongst the pro-integrationist items (Factor 1). EFA was then performed iteratively (Costello & Osborne, 2005)—variants included an analysis with all the 12 items, or else with 10 items (excluding Item E and Item H), among others. EFA for the latter variant is reported below.

EFA with principal axis factoring was conducted on Items A, B, C, D, F, G, I, J, K and L. Henceforth, these are referred to respectively as Items 1<sup>A</sup>, 2<sup>B</sup>, 3<sup>C</sup>, 4<sup>D</sup>, 5<sup>F</sup>, 6<sup>G</sup>, 7<sup>I</sup>, 8<sup>J</sup>, 9<sup>K</sup> and 10<sup>L</sup>, without the superscripts. KMO (= .838) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity ( $\chi^2_{(45)} = 731.010, p < 0.001$ ) indicated that the matrix was factorable. MSA values (in the anti-image correlation matrix) ranged between 0.762 and 0.888. Extracted communalities ranged between 0.183 and 0.536. The Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960), parallel analysis (O'Connor, 2000) and the scree plot recommended the retention of 2 factors (see **Appendix E**). This convergence further supported the initial decision to retain 2 factors.

EFA was therefore fixed to extract 2 factors. The determinant of the *R*-matrix (determinant = .100) was adequate (Field, 2009, p. 648). All correlations exceeded 0.3 for Factor 1, whereas exactly half of all correlations exceeded 0.3 for Factor 2. No correlation was greater than 0.9 (see **Table 6** for inter-item correlations between Items A, B, C, D and F [Factor 1], and Items G, I, J, K and L [Factor 2]). Principal axis factoring (10-item dataset) extracted 2 factors (Factor 1 eigenvalue = 3.569; Factor 2 eigenvalue = 1.380), accounting for 37.29% of the variance. Given the use of oblique rotation, the pattern matrix was interpreted (see **Appendix E**). All items had factor loadings greater than 0.4, except Item 9 (factor

loading = 0.392), which still exceeded Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2001, p. 194) cut-off point (see **Table 7**). No cross-loadings exceeded 0.32 (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). The factors were inter-correlated (factor correlation = 0.487), supporting the use of Direct Oblimin rotation (delta set at zero). This oblique rotation generally yields better factor solutions than Promax rotation (Dien, 2010).

**Table 7**

*Factor Loadings for the 10-item Alternative Re-Presentation of Integration Scale (Two-Factor Solution)*

<b>Item</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<b>Letter</b>	A	B	C	D	F	G	I	J	K	L
<b>Factor 1</b>	.731	.608	.594	.613	.609	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Factor 2</b>	-	-	-	-	-	.541	.735	.407	.392	.484

*Note.* The factor loadings (pattern matrix; see **Appendix E**) for Items 1-10 of the final AROI scale. Letters correspond to the items in the initial 12-item scale. Factor 1 underlies the pro-integrationist items, and Factor 2 underlies the anti-integrationist items.

Ultimately, this 10-item two-factor solution was deemed as the best solution, in terms of comprehensiveness and parsimony. The 10-item AROI scale achieved a balance between item removal and scale integrity (Costello & Osborne, 2005). The relatively high dispersions of the positions of Items E and H in the ranking procedure (see **Appendix E**), and their mean and median rankings (which were close to, or the same, as those of Item F and Item G; see **Table 3**), provided further evidence that these items were occupying a relatively unimportant role in overall scale functioning. Given its linearity, the 10-item AROI scale was not majorly affected by item removal. The 2 factors were interpreted as follows. Factor 1 (Items 1-5) attributed pro-integrationism to the outgroup, and was labelled *Pro-integrationist Alternative Re-presentation* (PRO-ALT). Factor 2 (Items 6-10) attributed anti-integrationism to the outgroup, and was labelled *Anti-integrationist Alternative Re-presentation* (ANTI-ALT).

**Internal Reliability.** A scale is reliable when it functions predictably and consistently, its scores reflecting the measured variable (DeVellis, 2017, p. 49). Internal consistency is a specific form of reliability relating to the homogeneity of items, which should be greatly inter-correlated (DeVellis, 2017, pp. 51-52). Cronbach's (1951) coefficient alpha ( $\alpha$ ) was used to measure the internal consistency of the IR scales, for both groups. The cut-off points were determined based on Nunnally (1978) and DeVellis (2017):  $\alpha = 0.65-0.70$  was deemed minimally acceptable,  $\alpha = 0.70-0.80$  was deemed acceptable, and  $\alpha = 0.80+$  was deemed very good.

The RFI scale demonstrated very good internal reliability for the Maltese sample ( $\alpha = .879$ ), and minimally acceptable reliability for the Arab sample ( $\alpha = .697$ ). The composite AROI scale demonstrated good reliability (Maltese:  $\alpha = .777$ ; Arabs:  $\alpha = .828$ ). The PRO-ALT sub-dimension of the AROI scale demonstrated good reliability (Maltese:  $\alpha = .782$ ; Arabs:  $\alpha = .773$ ), and ANTI-ALT demonstrated minimally acceptable reliability for the Maltese sample ( $\alpha = .659$ ) and acceptable reliability for the Arab sample ( $\alpha = .733$ ).

### ***Scoring the Intergroup Relations Scales***

The scale items were linearly weighted following EFA (see **Table 2**). All weights were positive, and only functioned after reverse-scoring Items 6-10 of the RFI scale and of the composite AROI scale. No reverse-scoring was necessary for computing PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT. Since no scale values (Thurstone, 1928) were formally calculated, only the items' ordinal position informed their weight. The weights are normally distributed, mirroring the distributions of the mean-based measures behind the item rankings (see **Table 3**).

Participants' composite score on the RFI scale is computed by reverse-scoring Items 6-10, multiplying the score on each item by its weight (see **Table 2**), summing up all weighted item scores, and dividing the total by 30. This results in an RFI value ranging from 1 (highly anti-integrationist) to 7 (highly pro-integrationist). The composite AROI score is computed in the same manner. In turn, participants' scores on PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT are

computed by multiplying their score on each item by its weight (see **Table 2**), summing up all weighted item scores, and dividing the total by 15 (separately per subscale). The results are a PRO-ALT value ranging from 1 (weak pro-integrationist alternative re-presentation) to 7 (strong pro-integrationist alternative re-presentation); and an ANTI-ALT value ranging from 1 (weak anti-integrationist alternative re-presentation) to 7 (strong anti-integrationist alternative re-presentation).

## **Discussion**

Study 2 resulted in two ecologically valid scales for studying Arab-Maltese relations in Malta. Study 2 bridged the co-constructionism of Study 1 and the post-positivist pursuit of Study 3. Participants' claims (Study 1) informed scale development (Study 2), which in turn enabled survey research (Study 3). The IR scales' basis in qualitative work meant that when participants completed the scales by rating items on a 7-point scale (in Study 3), the reasoning behind the scale items was not foreign to the participants, regardless of their scores. This section discusses the features of the IR scales and their contribution to intergroup relations research, and revisits the scales in view of the action-oriented formulae.

### ***Observations on the Intergroup Relations Scales***

Four observations are worth noting. Firstly, the Maltese arguments behind the scales were coded using a Toulmin-based protocol (i.e., including backings and rebuttals; Sammut et al., 2018), whereas the Arab arguments (Study 1) were coded using the minimal model (i.e., excluding backings and rebuttals). Given the subsumption of backings under warrants, and rebuttals under qualifiers (see **Chapter 3**), this slight discrepancy did not affect scale development. Whenever Maltese arguments are presented in this thesis, rebuttals and backings are simply presented respectively as qualifiers and warrants. What mattered was the set of warrants, evidence and qualifiers supporting the claims. For example, based on different warrants, evidence and qualifiers, the Maltese claim, 'Islam is not an issue' had a

mixed/ambivalent valence (Sammut, 2015-2016), but the Arab claim, ‘There are good relations/no issues between Christians and Muslims [...]’ had a positive valence.

Secondly, the items were constructed with a view to conducting survey research asking participants for their views on the items (RFI); and for their views on the outgroup’s views on the items (AROI). In his research, Edwards (1941) argued that “while subjects tend to reject the label ‘fascism,’ they may accept fascist principles provided they are not labeled as such” (Edwards, 1941, p. 575). Similarly, given labels’ effects on scale performance (Edwards, 1941), the word ‘integration’ was substituted with phrases like ‘living together’ in the items. The IR scales deal primarily with Arab-Maltese relations, and the integrationist project is important simply because it allows for the study of Arab-Maltese relations in an action-oriented manner (see **Chapter 2**).

Thirdly, the pro-integrationist items (Items 1-5:  $SD = 1.25$ ;  $IQR = 1.70$ ) had a higher *average* standard deviation and interquartile range, than the anti-integrationist items (Items 6-10:  $SD = 0.74$ ;  $IQR = 0.70$ ) in terms of item positions (see **Appendix E**). This is possibly because of the negativity bias (Rozin & Royzman, 2001): the ordinal positions of anti-integrationist items were more clear-cut (Baumeister et al., 2001; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). Differences in item dispersion reflect “greater negative differentiation” (Rozin & Royzman, 2001, p. 299): the rankers were better capable of cognitively engaging with anti-integrationist (negative) information (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). The higher dispersion of pro-integrationist items also reflects their greater tendency to shift in meaning, and their potential for representing different stances over time.

Fourth, the IR scales facilitate the longitudinal study of intergroup relations in Malta (see **Chapter 5**; Johnson & Christensen, 2008, p. 25; Bauer, 2015, p. 57). The present research programme provides a cross-sectional understanding of Arab-Maltese relations in 2019-2020. Yet, if applied longitudinally, the IR scales can gauge the dominant representation of Arab-Maltese relations in Malta. For example, if over time, Maltese or Arab

group leaders over-emphasise the possibility of cultural/ideological impositions (Item 8), then it could be argued that such leaders would be contributing to aggravated intergroup relations. Conversely, an emphasis on similarities (Item 4) over time would possibly ameliorate intergroup relations, and so on.

***Action-Oriented Research: Studying Silent Coalitions***

The action-oriented approach relies on these formulae (see **Chapter 2**):

Social re-presentation SR *for* Project P, of/as Object O, by Group G<sub>1</sub>, in Context C ...  
according to Group G<sub>x...n</sub> (Formula 1)

SR for P<sub>integration</sub>, as a function of: SR<sub>M</sub>, AR<sub>M</sub><sup>A</sup>, AR<sub>M</sub><sup>n</sup> ... SR<sub>A</sub>, AR<sub>A</sub><sup>M</sup>, AR<sub>A</sub><sup>n</sup> ... and any other  
SR<sub>n</sub> and AR<sub>n</sub> ... relevant to Context C (Formula 2)

The IR scales are mostly relevant for Formula 2 (RFI is also relevant for Formula 1 if G<sub>x...n</sub> = G<sub>1</sub>, and AROI is also relevant for Formula 1 if G<sub>x...n</sub> = G<sub>2</sub>). RFI sheds light on ‘SR for P<sub>integration</sub>, as a function of SR<sub>M</sub>’ (Maltese social re-presentation for/against integration), and ‘SR for P<sub>integration</sub>, as a function of SR<sub>A</sub>’ (Arab social re-presentation for/against integration). In turn, AROI provides information on AR<sub>M</sub><sup>A</sup> (Maltese alternative re-presentation of Arabs’ project) and AR<sub>A</sub><sup>M</sup> (Arab alternative re-presentation of the Maltese’s project). The IR scales thus enable the *systemic* study of Arab-Maltese relations. Moreover, the scales’ gradualism enables the *functional* study of Arab-Maltese relations: higher RFI signifies a tendency *favouring* the integrationist project, and lower RFI signifies a tendency *opposing* the project. Similarly, PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT can predict RFI (see Study 3).

A further point relates to silent coalitions and scale dimensionality. Thurstone scaling takes scales to be unidimensional (Gaskell, 1996; Thurstone, 1967, p. 19), and where applicable, “a single dimension may be an ecologically valid description of some social

objects” (Gaskell, 1996, p. 24). Unidimensionality was not necessary for the AROI scale to have ecological validity, as alternative re-presentation need not fall on one continuum. In contrast, the RFI scale’s unidimensionality makes it ecologically valid, as it reflects the directions that coalitional action can take: *favouring* or *opposing* integration. Given the theory and scaling procedure behind the scales, the IR scales have a largely heuristic value. That is, RFI concerns the degree to which one is *for* or *against* integration; and AROI concerns the degree to which one sees the outgroup as being *for*, *against* or *mixed/ambivalent* toward integration (similar scores on PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT indicate the latter). Importantly, this sheds light on how silent coalitions navigate Arab-Maltese relations in Malta.

**Further Methodological Considerations.** In the present inquiry, the validation context and the application context (see **Chapter 8**) of the scales were the same. However, the IR scales were validated using the data gathered in Study 3, due to practical limitations (see **Chapter 5**). The use of randomly split sub-samples (Brown et al., 1990; DeVellis, 2017, p. 140)—one for validation and one for multiple regression analysis—was contraindicated, as truly random samples would still share similar characteristics. Thus, future validation using other Arab and Maltese samples in Malta is recommended (see **Chapter 10**).

Apart from construct validity, ecological validity was a principal concern in Study 2. Culture-specific scale development increased the scales’ relevance for both groups (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017, p. 84). However, ecological validity can only be approximated, and my *forma mentis* is ultimately attuned to that of the Maltese. This may account for the minimally acceptable levels of internal reliability obtained for RFI among Arabs. Importantly, the overall acceptable/good levels of internal reliability, and the fact that no scale resulted with unacceptable reliability values, contributed to the statistical power of the analyses in Study 3 (see **Chapter 8**; DeVellis, 2017, p. 81).

Concerning the two factors comprising AROI, it is worth noting that these are probably not method factors or “nonsubstantive factor[s]” (Murray et al., 2015, p. 121;

Maydeu-Olivares & Coffman, 2006), which surface due to item wording. Murray et al. (2015) note that “it is not uncommon for all the positively worded items to load on one factor and all the negatively worded items to load on another” (Murray et al., 2015, p. 121). However, PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT items were different content-wise (with some exceptions, e.g., Item 4 and Item 6), and were based on varying sets of arguments. Moreover, all 10 items were positively *for* or positively *against* integration. The only consequence of item wording may have been the generally lower factor loadings for ANTI-ALT when compared to PRO-ALT. Future work on the scales can shed light on this (see **Chapter 10**).

Finally, the percentage of explained variance was adequate for both RFI (44.74%) and AROI (37.29%). In the social sciences, an accounted variance of 50-60% or even lower is generally acceptable (Pett et al., 2003, p. 118). It is common for the explained variance of one-factor solutions to range between 20-50% (cf. Huang & Dong, 2012; Faraci et al., 2013; Kalpakjian et al., 2009), and that of two-factor solutions to range between 30-50% (cf. Manganelli Rattazzi et al., 2007; Ng, 2013). Moreover, the action-oriented approach (see **Chapter 2**), the minimal model of argumentation (see **Chapter 3**) and the qualitative basis informing the IR scales, constitute other non-statistical reasons for scale employment.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, Study 2 involved the composition of two IR scales, meant for studying Arab-Maltese relations. The rationale behind the scales, and their principal advantage, is their ecological validity: each item was based on a thematic categorisation involving Maltese and Arab arguments on integration, and this enabled the study of Arab-Maltese relations in a contextually sensitive manner. To recap, this chapter reviewed the literature on Thurstone scaling, highlighting the difficulties involved when assumptions are made concerning normality, psychological continua and equal intervals between scale items. This led to an exploration of Jaspars and Fraser’s (1984) and Gaskell’s (1996) thought on the relation between Thurstone scaling and SRT. Both Thurstone scaling and SRT occupy themselves



with public opinion, and the pursuit of scalability was found to be compatible with both. Accordingly, the expert-based rank-order scaling procedure was devised. Twelve items were generated by thematically categorising Maltese and Arab claims on integration. These were ranked by expert judges in order of integrationism, and scaled using sensitivity analysis (looking at the convergence between mean-based measures of rank-order scores). Finally, the validity and reliability of the scales were explored using data from Study 3. The IR scales both exhibited sound validity and reliability characteristics, and following EFA, the end product consisted of a 10-item RFI scale and a 10-item AROI scale.

Given the grounding of the IR scales in qualitative work, the justifications behind each item, and the potential reasons as to why respondents would rate an item in a certain way, are mapped in the repertoire of claims and related arguments made by both groups. The scales are apt for studying intergroup relations in an action-oriented manner, because each item is weighted, indicating different levels of strength in terms of expressed (RFI) or attributed (AROI) pro-/anti-integrationism. In Study 2, ecological validity was given primacy because “evaluations of social objects cannot be understood without the wider context of controversy in which they are embedded” (Buhagiar & Sammut, 2020b, para. 7). The next study applies the IR scales in the Maltese context of controversy surrounding intergroup relations.

### **Chapter 8 – Study 3: Maltese and Arab Social Re-Presentation for Integration**

Study 3 constituted the third phase of the present research programme. This study involved a split-ballot survey with Maltese and Arabs living in Malta, which shed light on Arab-Maltese relations. This study follows Study 1 and Study 2. To recap, Study 1 found that Arab participants generally favoured integration and made their case using arguments from culture, economics, psychology, religion, socio-politics and stigma. Study 2 developed the intergroup relations scales (the IR scales): that is, the Re-Presentation for Integration (RFI) scale and the Alternative Re-Presentation of Integration (AROI) scale. These scales were informed by Arab (Study 1) and Maltese (Sammut, 2015-2016) arguments on integration.

In Study 3, the IR scales were administered as part of a questionnaire, together with measures tapping mentalities (Sammut, 2019a), social dominance orientation (SDO) (Ho et al., 2015), need for cognitive closure (NFC) (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), and sense of community (SoC) (McMillan & Chavis, 1986). The sample consisted of (a) Maltese participants (of non-Arab origin); (b) Arab participants; and (c) participants of mixed Arab-Maltese origin. Each group was asked for (a) their own views on integration (RFI); and (b) their views concerning the outgroup's views on integration (AROI). The outgroup in question constituted of the 'Maltese' for Arab participants, 'Arabs' for Maltese participants, and both groups separately for participants of mixed Arab-Maltese origin. Survey data was analysed using bivariate statistics and multiple regression analyses. This chapter presents (a) the *rationale and procedure*; (b) the *results*; and (c) a *discussion* of the findings of Study 3.

## **Rationale and Procedure**

Study 3 completed the exploratory sequential design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017, pp. 84-93). This section starts with a brief overview of the rationale behind Study 3 and a summary of the steps taken, before delving into methodological details and data analysis.

### ***Rationale***

The conceptual work undertaken in **Chapter 2** and **Chapter 3**, and the findings detailed in Study 1 and Study 2, made Study 3 possible. In turn, Study 3 addresses the main research goal of the present inquiry: the ecologically valid study of Arab-Maltese relations, with a focus on the relevant joint project (integration). More specifically, Study 3 researches social re-presentation for/against integration among the Maltese and Arabs, and their alternative re-presentation of each other's project. This completes Formula 2 (see **Chapter 2**).

**Studying Arab-Maltese Relations Quantitatively.** Accordingly, the present study investigated re-presentation in a *systemic* and *functional* manner, in line with the action-oriented formulae. The *systemic* element featured in that both social (RFI) and alternative re-presentation (AROI) were studied, and amongst both groups. AROI was studied in terms of its sub-dimensions: *Pro-integrationist Alternative Re-presentation* (PRO-ALT: Items 1-5), and *Anti-integrationist Alternative Re-presentation* (ANTI-ALT: Items 6-10). In turn, the *functional* ('for') element featured in that 'Social re-presentation SR for project P<sub>integration</sub>' (RFI) was central, both in terms of research design and as a criterion variable. Importantly, the IR scales were backed by Maltese and Arab arguments on integration, following the minimal model of argumentation (see **Chapter 3**). More broadly, the integrationist project was contextualised in view of a potential conflict spiral (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008) and the extra-representational variables (ERVs) relevant to Arab-Maltese relations (see **Chapter 4**). Following the literature review (see **Chapter 4**), Study 3 included SDO (Ho et al., 2015), NFC (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), mentalities (Sammut, 2019a), and SoC (McMillan & Chavis, 1986), as ERVs. Study 3 had a correlational-comparative design (Gelo et al., 2008): it

concerned *correlations* between variables, and *compared* two models (Maltese model and Arab model) using separate multiple regression analyses (Brewer & Kuhn, 2010, p. 126).

Survey research is largely correlational. It is only “the soundness of the underlying theory and research design” (Weston & Gore, 2006, p. 723) that allows for causal inferences. According to the “structural-systemic view” (Toomela, 2014, p. 272) of causality, a “phenomenon is understood, i.e., explained causally, when, first, its constituent parts or elements are identified. Second, specific relationships between these parts are described and, third, qualities of the whole that emerge during the synthesis of parts are discovered” (Toomela, 2014, p. 272). This conception of causality accords with the systemic nature of the action-oriented approach. In Study 3, (a) the *constituent elements* are social re-presentation, alternative re-presentation and joint projects; (b) the *relationships* between these elements are elucidated by the functions served by re-presentation for project P; and (c) the *synthesis* of these elements sheds light on intergroup relations.

**Multiple Regression.** Multiple regression analyses (Cohen et al., 2003; Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003) are well-established modeling techniques that “simultaneously examine the association between multiple predictor variables ( $X_1$ ,  $X_2$ ,  $X_3$ , etc.) and a single criterion variable ( $Y$ )” (Hoyt et al., 2008, p. 321). Multiple regression has been used extensively for studying both intergroup relations (Lu et al., 2020; Tausch et al., 2010) and social re-presentation (Bartels & Onwezen, 2014; Cvetkovich & Winter, 2003). Multiple regression is used for prediction, or for explanation, which by its nature also “subsumes prediction” (Keith, 2019, p. 197). The purpose of multiple regression in Study 3 was explanatory because the results informed “recommendations for intervention or change” (Keith, 2019, p. 197; see **Chapter 9**). Given that the action-oriented approach foregrounds project P, RFI was placed as the criterion variable, with PRO-ALT, ANTI-ALT and ERVs as predictors.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> One could argue that since alternative re-presentation is mostly meaningful in view of a group’s social re-presentation for Project P (see **Chapter 2**), then alternative re-presentation should be the criterion variable. Yet, this would make the predictive role of ERVs unclear, and ultimately the present inquiry aims at predicting RFI to

Multiple regression involves three steps (Nusair & Hua, 2010; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004): (a) model specification (positing a regression model); (b) model identification, that is, “deciding whether a set of unique parameter estimates can be estimated” (Nusair & Hua, 2010, p. 315); and (c) model estimation. The output describes the proportion of variance in the criterion variable explained by the predictors, and the effect of each predictor on the criterion variable (Nusair & Hua, 2010). Interactions between variables—that is, “instances when the effect of one variable depends on the value of another” (Keith, 2019, p. 132)—can also be studied. Thus, variable X may moderate the effect of variable Z, such that the effect of Z on criterion variable Y differs for different levels of X (Hoyt et al., 2008).

### ***Overall Procedure***

Survey composition and distribution were undertaken between 2019 and 2020. The survey was composed (using Qualtrics [Qualtrics, Provo, UT]) in English, translated from English to Maltese, and back-translated to English. The survey was then translated to Arabic by a native-speaker, and this translation was back-translated and improved by another native-speaking translator, between October and November 2019. The translators worked in close consultation with me, to ensure item contents retained their meaning (see Miller, 2004, p. 106). Data collection lasted from November 2019 to January 2020. Eligible participants were Maltese and Arab adults (18+ years) living in Malta.

The survey sections involved: (a) an introductory page, where the language was chosen; (b) a page explaining the study and obtaining participant consent; (c) a page collecting data on age and self-identification (Maltese, Arab or Arab-Maltese); (d) a page presenting the IR scales; (e) a page presenting measures of ERVs; (f) a page collecting demographic data; and (g) a concluding page thanking participants (see **Appendix F**). The English and Maltese versions of the survey were subjected to cognitive interviewing prior to

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make meaningful recommendations for ameliorating intergroup relations. Moreover, it is social re-presentation for Project P whose variance is explained with reference to *both* alternative re-presentation and ERVs. Thus, PRO-ALT, ANTI-ALT and ERVs (predictors) were expected to predict RFI (criterion).

distribution. The survey—which was completed in English, Maltese or Arabic—took around 10 minutes to complete. Participants were recruited using snowball sampling. The final output consisted of bivariate statistics, and multiple regression analyses comparing two models. Details are presented below.

### ***Survey Composition: Measures***

The survey was titled ‘Arabs and the Maltese: What are your views?’. Block 1 of the questionnaire targeted eligibility (age) and self-identity, Block 2 presented the IR scales, Block 3 presented ERVs, and Block 4 asked for demographic characteristics. All items within each measure were randomised. The measures are explained below (see **Appendix F**).

**Age (Eligibility) and Self-Identification.** Block 1 tapped *Age* and *Self-identification*. Only adult respondents (18+ years) could proceed to the next block. The *Self-identification* question asked respondents to self-categorise as: (a) ‘Maltese (of non-Arab origin)’; (b) ‘Arab origin (with or without Maltese nationality/citizenship)’; or (c) ‘Mixed Arab and Maltese origin (with or without Maltese nationality/citizenship)’. Henceforth, these categories are respectively referred to as ‘Maltese’, ‘Arab’ and ‘Arab-Maltese’.

**The Intergroup Relations Scales.** Block 2 tapped RFI and AROI. All respondents were presented with the same RFI scale. Participants who self-identified as Maltese were presented with the AROI scale asking them for their views on Arabs’ views on each item. Participants who self-identified as Arab were presented with the AROI scale asking them for their views on the Maltese’s views on each item. Participants who self-identified as Arab-Maltese were presented with both versions of the AROI scale.

***Re-Presentation for Integration.*** The 10-item RFI scale tapped participants’ social re-presentation for/against integration (see **Chapter 7**). Items were measured on a 7-point scale (1 = ‘Strongly disagree’, 7 = ‘Strongly agree’; sample item: ‘The similarities between Arab and Maltese culture, heritage, language and mentality can help us get along’), and ranged from the most pro-integrationist (Item 1) to the most anti-integrationist (Item 10). Participants

indicated *the extent of their agreement* with each item. The RFI scale demonstrated sufficient reliability (Maltese:  $\alpha = .879$ ; Arabs:  $\alpha = .697$ ).

***Alternative Re-Presentation of Integration.*** The 10-item AROI scale tapped participants' alternative re-presentation of the outgroup's views on integration (see **Chapter 7**). The items were measured on a 7-point scale (1 = 'Strongly disagree', 7 = 'Strongly agree'), were the same as those of the RFI scale, and ranged from the most pro-integrationist (Item 1) to the most anti-integrationist (Item 10). Participants indicated *the extent to which they think that the outgroup* ('Arabs' for the Maltese, 'Maltese' for Arabs, and both for the Arab-Maltese) agreed with each item. The AROI scale has two sub-dimensions: *Pro-integrationist Alternative Re-presentation* (PRO-ALT: Items 1-5) and *Anti-integrationist Alternative Re-presentation* (ANTI-ALT: Items 6-10). The composite AROI scale (Maltese:  $\alpha = .777$ ; Arabs:  $\alpha = .828$ ), PRO-ALT (Maltese:  $\alpha = .782$ ; Arabs:  $\alpha = .773$ ), and ANTI-ALT (Maltese:  $\alpha = .659$ ; Arabs:  $\alpha = .733$ ) all demonstrated sufficient reliability (see **Chapter 7**).

***Extra-Representational Variables.*** Block 3 tapped ERVs; that is, non-representational variables that may still shed light on social re-presentation. These variables were selected based on the literature review presented in **Chapter 4**.

***Mentalities.*** Mentalities refer to the various mindsets people may hold when adapting to life situations (Sammut, 2019a, p. 428). Five vignettes (Sammut, 2019c) were presented, asking participants to indicate their agreement on a 5-point scale (1 = 'Strongly disagree', 5 = 'Strongly agree'). The vignettes tapped the *Civic*, *Pragmatic*, *Localised*, *Reward* and *Survivor* mentalities (Sammut, 2019c). The *Civic* mentality represents the drive to improve institutions and address social issues (item: 'The future depends on us and the choices we make. We need to work to fix institutions, laws and policies so that they can cater better to the needs of the people and society.'). The *Pragmatic* mentality champions adaptability and a lax attitude toward rules (item: 'To succeed, we need to adjust to our life situations. Sometimes we have to close an eye to the rules to help our loved ones.'). The *Localised* mentality prizes local

bonds and social identity (item: ‘In life, we need to help one another and improve our communities. We need to follow local rules and customs so that there can be order in Maltese society’). The *Reward* mentality emphasises meritocracy, hard work and success (item: ‘In life, we get what we deserve. One needs to make the best of what life offers and if one works hard enough, one will ultimately succeed’). The *Survivor* mentality is distrustful and fatalistic (item: ‘People are what they are and one has little control over what will turn out in the end. One needs to live day by day and let tomorrow take care of itself’). Participants also indicated which of these statements comes closest to their views (Sammut, 2019a, 2019c).

***Social Dominance Orientation.*** SDO is a generalised “orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical, that is, ordered along a superior-inferior dimension” (Pratto et al., 1994, p. 742). SDO involves two sub-dimensions: *SDO-Dominance* (SDO-D) and *SDO-Egalitarianism* (SDO-E) (Ho et al., 2012). The 16-item SDO<sub>7</sub> scale (Ho et al., 2015) was administered on a 6-point scale (1 = ‘Strongly disagree’, 6 = ‘Strongly agree’). SDO-D denotes a clear preference for group domination by high status groups over low status groups, and SDO-E represents a subtler inclination favouring non-egalitarian intergroup relations and hierarchical ideologies (Ho et al., 2015). Eight of the SDO<sub>7</sub> scale items tapped SDO-D (sample item: ‘Some groups of people must be kept in their place.’), and another eight tapped SDO-E (sample item: ‘We should not push for group equality.’) (Ho et al., 2015). The overall SDO composite (SDO<sub>C</sub>) scale (Maltese:  $\alpha = 0.841$ ; Arabs:  $\alpha = 0.726$ ) and the SDO-E sub-dimension (Maltese:  $\alpha = .805$ ; Arabs:  $\alpha = .672$ ) demonstrated sufficient reliability. The SDO-D sub-dimension demonstrated sufficient reliability for the Maltese: ( $\alpha = 0.671$ ) but poor reliability for Arabs ( $\alpha = .496$ ). SDO has exhibited low reliability ( $\alpha s = 0.3-0.4$ ) in non-Western countries (e.g., Lebanon, Turkey, etc.; Pratto et al., 2013). Subsequent analyses thus employed SDO-D and SDO-E for the Maltese, and SDO<sub>C</sub> for Arabs (this differential use is



legitimate; Ho et al., 2015), as unreliable covariates inflate error rates (Cohen et al., 2003, p. 351).

***Need for Cognitive Closure.*** NFC is a cognitive style/motivational variable. High NFC results in a greater tendency to stop an epistemic sequence and make decisions (Kruglanski, 1988, p. 114). It signifies “a desire for definite knowledge on some issue” (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996, p. 263). The 15-item NFC scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) was administered on a 6-point scale (1 = ‘Strongly disagree’, 6 = ‘Strongly agree’). Its contents (sample item: ‘I don’t like situations that are uncertain’) tapped notions linked to order/predictability, decisiveness, closed-mindedness and ambiguity (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). The scale exhibited sufficient reliability (Maltese:  $\alpha = 0.847$ ; Arabs:  $\alpha = 0.778$ ).

***Sense of Community.*** SoC taps the relationship between individuals and their communities, and feelings of belonging (McMillan & Chavis, 1986). Participants indicated their agreement with a single item designed for this study (‘I feel I belong in my neighbourhood’), using a 100-point slider (0 = ‘Strongly disagree’, 100 = ‘Strongly agree’).

***Social Desirability.*** Three items tapping social desirability (adapted from Berry, 2017, p. 406) were dispersed throughout the NFC scale. These items (sample item: ‘When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening’) were included to identify problematic cases, and were scored on a 6-point scale (1 = ‘Strongly disagree’, 6 = ‘Strongly agree’).

***Demographic Measures.*** Block 4 tapped the following demographic characteristics: Gender; Relationship Status; Education; Occupation; Religion; Religious identification (item: ‘To what extent do you identify with your religion on a scale from 1 to 10?’; 1 = ‘I do not identify at all’, 10 = ‘I identify completely’); Nationality; Locality (item: ‘Town/Village where you live’); and Length of stay (‘How long have you been living in Malta?’). Only cases of respondents who had been living in Malta for 6 months or more were analysed.

### *Piloting*

The questionnaire (in Maltese and English) was piloted with 6 Maltese participants for purposes of cognitive interviewing. These respondents provided their views on item comprehensibility and clarity, enhancing survey validity (Power et al., 2018). The survey in Arabic was not piloted, given the relative difficulty in recruiting Arab participants. No alterations were made following the piloting sessions. Importantly, the AROI scales (which were relatively complex to understand) were understood without any difficulty, and respondents reported no confusing vocabulary (DeVellis, 2017, p. 221).

### *Sampling Scheme and Recruitment*

Both Maltese and Arab participants were recruited using snowball sampling (see **Chapter 5**). A variety of potential ‘seed’ respondents were given the link to the online survey in a variety of public settings (e.g., outside cafeterias, other informal settings, etc.), to minimise sampling bias. They were asked to complete the survey in their own time, if willing, and to send the link to other potential participants. Snowball sampling was used because: (a) snowballing was the only practical means of reaching Arab participants; (b) the use of snowballing for *both* Maltese and Arab participants ensured the sampling method was the same for both groups (see Miller, 2004, p. 104); and (c) snowball sampling involving multiple ‘seed’ respondents ensured a sample that was diverse and large enough for interpretive consistency (Collins, Onwuegbuzie & Jiao, 2006). Using snowballing, the minimum sample size of 82 participants for correlational research (Collins et al., 2007) was surpassed, for both groups.

### *Ethical Considerations*

An ethics self-assessment form was filed with the Social Wellbeing Faculty Research Ethics Committee, and the research study was conducted in conformity with the University of Malta’s Research Code of Practice and Research Ethics Review Procedures (see **Appendix F**). All participants were recruited on a voluntary basis and in their individual capacity, and

were not remunerated for their participation. Participant responses were non-identifiable, thus, no issues concerning sensitive personal data arose. All data was stored securely. There were no potential harms associated with the study, over and above those experienced in everyday life. Participants were asked about issues (intergroup relations/integration) that are topical and ubiquitous in local public discourse.

### ***Legitimation: Validity and Reliability***

The validity and reliability of Study 3 and of the IR scales were detailed in **Chapter 5** and **Chapter 7**. *Ecological validity* guided the present inquiry: the IR scales (the principal measures) are based on qualitative arguments by both Maltese and Arabs, are culturally sensitive, and their contents are transferable to the present sociocultural zeitgeist in Malta. The ecological validity of the IR scales made the findings of Study 3 more *transferable* (Demuth, 2018) to the broader context where Arab-Maltese relations unfold. The fact that participants eventually completed the online questionnaire in contexts (e.g., at home, at work, etc.) where they generally discuss integration (Lavrakas, 2008, p. 345), enhanced the *internal validity* of Study 3 (Zedeck, 2014, p. 179). Moreover, the *construct validity* of the IR scales was explored in Study 2 using exploratory factor analysis (EFA) (see **Chapter 7**), and the *internal reliability* of all questionnaire measures was presented above (see **Survey Composition: Measures**). Cognitive interviewing enhanced the credibility of Study 3, and the translations and back-translations of the survey enhanced its dependability/confirmability (Korstjens & Moser, 2018).

### ***Participant Characteristics***

Of the total number of participants ( $N = 336$ ), 64% were Maltese ( $n = 215$ ), 31% were Arab ( $n = 103$ ), and 5% were Arab-Maltese ( $n = 18$ ).<sup>29</sup> Given their small sample size, Arab-

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<sup>29</sup> These numbers were achieved after removing 6 invalid responses (3 Maltese and 3 Arab cases with obvious response sets) and 1 case of an Arab participant whose *Length of Stay* in Malta was less than 6 months. No case was removed due to high social desirability scores. Moreover, the descriptive statistics presented here are for the sample excluding outliers (see **Data Preparation**). See **Appendix F** for the sample including outliers.

Maltese participants were excluded from analysis. All participants completed Block 1 (age and self-identification) and Block 2 (the IR scales) in full. In all, 83% of Maltese participants ( $n = 179$ ) and 82% of Arab participants ( $n = 84$ ) completed Block 3 (ERVs). Of these, most also completed Block 4 (demographics).

**Maltese Sample.** In the Maltese sample, the mean age of respondents was 39.81 years ( $SD = 14.12$ ; range = 18-89 years). Furthermore, 46.9%<sup>30</sup> of participants were Male ( $n = 83$ ) and 53.1% were Female ( $n = 94$ ). Most participants were either Not Married (43.5%;  $n = 77$ ) or Married (53.7%;  $n = 95$ ), with a minority being a Widow(er) (1.1%;  $n = 2$ ) or having Separated/Divorced/Annulled Marriage (1.7%;  $n = 3$ ). Some participants had a Secondary education (21.6%,  $n = 38$ ), others had a Post-Secondary education (24.4%,  $n = 43$ ), and most had a Tertiary education (54.0%,  $n = 95$ ). Most participants were Workers (87.0%;  $n = 154$ ), whilst others were Students (2.8%;  $n = 5$ ), Homemakers (4.5%;  $n = 8$ ), Pensioners/Retired (5.1%;  $n = 9$ ) or Unemployed (0.6%;  $n = 1$ ). Most identified as Christian (81.9%;  $n = 145$ ), one identified as Muslim (0.6%;  $n = 1$ ), and others identified as having No Religion (15.3%;  $n = 27$ ) or as Other (2.3%;  $n = 4$ ). Participants (excluding those with No Religion) expressed a mean Religious Identification (1 = 'I do not identify at all'; 10 = 'I identify completely') of 6.77 ( $SD = 2.36$ ). Participants reported being of Maltese nationality ( $n = 175$ ; 100%).

Participants' Localities were categorised based on the National Statistics Office's classification (National Statistics Office [NSO], 2020). Participants lived in the North (25.6%;  $n = 44$ ), West (23.8%;  $n = 41$ ), Northern Harbour (25.6%;  $n = 44$ ), Southern Harbour (11.6%;  $n = 20$ ), or South East (8.1%;  $n = 14$ ) of Malta, or in Gozo or Comino (5.2%;  $n = 9$ ). All participants had been living in Malta for 5 Years or More (98.8%;  $n = 168$ ), with the exception of two who had been living in Malta Between 2 Years and 4 Years (1.2%;  $n = 2$ ).

**Arab Sample.** In the Arab sample, the mean age of respondents was 29.88 years ( $SD = 10.39$ ; range = 18-55 years). Furthermore, 44.0% of participants were Male ( $n = 37$ ), and

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<sup>30</sup> Valid percentages are reported (excluding missing values).

56.0% were Female ( $n = 47$ ). Most participants were either Not Married (53.6%;  $n = 45$ ) or Married (42.9%;  $n = 36$ ), with a minority having Separated/Divorced/Annulled Marriage (3.6%;  $n = 3$ ). Some participants had a Primary education (1.3%,  $n = 1$ ), others had a Secondary education (7.7%,  $n = 6$ ), others had a Post-Secondary education (20.5%,  $n = 16$ ), and most had a Tertiary education (70.5%,  $n = 55$ ). Most participants were Workers (52.4%;  $n = 44$ ), whilst others were Students (40.5%;  $n = 34$ ), Homemakers (4.8%;  $n = 4$ ) or Unemployed (2.4%;  $n = 2$ ). Most identified as Muslim (95.2%;  $n = 80$ ), two identified as Christian (2.4%;  $n = 2$ ), and two identified as having No Religion (2.4%;  $n = 2$ ). Participants (excluding those with No Religion) expressed a mean Religious Identification of 8.00 ( $SD = 2.21$ ). Participants reported various nationalities, with the absolute majority (90.4%;  $n = 75$ ) being from 12 different Arab League States. Participants lived in the North (9.8%;  $n = 8$ ), West (7.3%;  $n = 6$ ), Northern Harbour (68.3%;  $n = 56$ ), Southern Harbour (8.5%;  $n = 7$ ) or South East (6.1%;  $n = 5$ ) of Malta. Most participants had been living in Malta for 5 Years or More (72.6%;  $n = 61$ ), with a few who had been living in Malta Between 1 Year and 2 Years (10.7%;  $n = 9$ ) or Between 2 Years and 4 Years (16.7%;  $n = 14$ ).

### ***Research Questions and Hypotheses***

The present study was guided by four research sub-questions (see **Chapter 5**). Hypotheses were postulated for each research sub-question. The null hypotheses of no relationship were tested, applying a significance level of 0.05.

**Question 1: Re-Presentation for Integration.** The first research sub-question asked: (1) ‘What are the differences between the Maltese’s and Arabs’ social re-presentation for/against integration?’ Based on the findings of Study 1 and Sammut et al. (2018; Sammut, 2015-2016), it was hypothesised that Arabs are more integrationist than the Maltese:

$H_{1A}$ : Arabs demonstrate a significantly higher RFI score than the Maltese.

Given the arguments obtained in Study 1, and the scaling procedure undertaken in Study 2, the RFI scale items are meaningful in and of themselves. Thus, it was hypothesised that Arabs are more integrationist than the Maltese vis-à-vis various aspects of integration:

*H<sub>1B</sub>*: Arabs score significantly higher than the Maltese on Items 1-5 (pro-integrationism), and significantly lower than the Maltese on Items 6-10 (anti-integrationism), of the RFI scale.

**Question 2: Alternative Re-Presentation of the Outgroup's Project.** The second research sub-question asked: (2) 'How do the Maltese and Arabs alternatively re-present each other's projects?' In line with the action-oriented approach, the outgroup's project can be alternatively re-presented in pro-integrationist terms, to advance Project P, or in anti-integrationist terms to oppose it. It was hypothesised that the Maltese alternatively re-present Arabs' project as being less integrationist than Arabs alternatively re-present the Maltese's project to be:

*H<sub>2A</sub>*: The Maltese demonstrate a significantly lower AROI score than Arabs.

*H<sub>2B</sub>*: By extension, the Maltese demonstrate a significantly lower PRO-ALT score than Arabs.

*H<sub>2C</sub>*: By extension, the Maltese demonstrate a significantly higher ANTI-ALT score than Arabs.

In Sammut and Lauri's (2017; see **Chapter 4**) local research, Arabs rated the Maltese highly (as a socio-ethnic group) and exhibited assimilationist tendencies. This implies that Arabs generally view the Maltese favourably. The items of the RFI and the AROI scale are the same, and thus both scales can be compared. If re-presentation shapes a group's views of the

outgroup beyond actual encounters, then Arabs should alternatively re-present the Maltese's project (Arab AROI) as being more integrationist than the Maltese's social re-presentation for integration (Maltese RFI):

*H<sub>2D</sub>*: Arabs' AROI score is significantly higher than the Maltese's RFI score.

In contrast, the Maltese had given low ratings to Arabs (Sammut & Lauri, 2017). Moreover, since the Maltese culturally essentialise Arabs (Buhagiar et al., 2018), then the Maltese should alternatively re-present Arabs' project (Maltese AROI) as being less integrationist than Arabs' social re-presentation for integration (Arab RFI):

*H<sub>2E</sub>*: The Maltese's AROI score is significantly lower than Arabs' RFI score.

**Question 3: Relations between Alternative and Social Re-Presentation.** The third research sub-question asked: (3) 'What is the relationship between alternative re-presentation of the outgroup's project and the Maltese's/Arabs' social re-presentation for/against integration?' Given the systemic underpinnings of the action-oriented approach, alternative re-presentation of the outgroup's project is related to the ingroup's social re-presentation for Project P. The *direction* taken by alternative re-presentation was expected to be isomorphic to that taken by social re-presentation. The more pro-integrationist the ingroup's alternative re-presentation of the outgroup's project (higher PRO-ALT), the more integrationist the ingroup's social re-presentation for integration was expected to be. In contrast, the more anti-integrationist the ingroup's alternative re-presentation of the outgroup's project (higher ANTI-ALT), the less integrationist the ingroup's social re-presentation for integration was expected to be:

*H*<sub>3A</sub>: Among the Maltese, PRO-ALT positively predicts RFI.

*H*<sub>3B</sub>: Among the Maltese, ANTI-ALT negatively predicts RFI.

*H*<sub>3C</sub>: Among Arabs, PRO-ALT positively predicts RFI.

*H*<sub>3D</sub>: Among Arabs, ANTI-ALT negatively predicts RFI.

**Question 4: Extra-Representational Variables and Social Re-Presentation.** The fourth research sub-question asked: (4) ‘What is the relationship between extra-representational variables and social re-presentation for/against integration?’ Both main effects and interaction effects were hypothesised.

*Main Effects.* Concerning SDO, “conflicts marked by a high degree of oppression or extreme attitudes can now focus on the SDO-D measure, whereas researchers focused on social policies related to resource redistribution or relatively subtle legitimizing ideologies may focus on SDO-E” (Ho et al., 2015, p. 1023). The definition of integration guiding the present inquiry (see **Chapter 1** and **Chapter 4**), and integration as a policy, relate mostly to differences in outlook in terms of intergroup engagement, not outright conflict or violence. Accordingly, SDO-E was expected to promote lower integrationism among the Maltese. Given that SDO likely represents a general preference for intergroup hierarchies/dominance, as opposed to a preference for ingroup domination (Ho et al., 2015), SDO<sub>C</sub> was expected to promote lower integrationism among Arabs, despite their non-dominant status:

*H*<sub>4.1A</sub>: Among the Maltese, SDO-E (but not SDO-D) negatively predicts RFI.

*H*<sub>4.1B</sub>: Among Arabs, SDO<sub>C</sub> negatively predicts RFI.

Turning to NFC, this variable has been linked to intergroup hostilities (Dugas et al., 2018) and outgroup derogation (Shah et al., 1998). Nonetheless, the relationship between NFC and intergroup relations remains complex and fluid (e.g., Dhont et al., 2011; Kosic et al.,



2004). Given recent local data linking closed-mindedness with *both* highly pro- and highly anti-multiculturalist views (Sammut et al., 2021), no linear main effect was hypothesised for NFC (only interaction effects were hypothesised; see **Interaction Effects**).

Similarly, the literature presents conflicting results on the relationship between SoC, prejudice and integrationism (e.g., Castellini et al., 2011; Mannarini et al., 2017; see **Chapter 4**). No hypotheses were advanced for SoC among Arabs, as the item ‘I feel I belong in my neighbourhood’ could equally apply to Arabs living in homogeneous migrant neighbourhoods and to Arabs living in mixed neighbourhoods. In contrast, given its relationship to group membership and group similarity (Townley et al., 2011), higher SoC was taken to be indicative of greater neighbourhood ethnic homogeneity (e.g., Farrell et al., 2004) among the Maltese, given the relative anti-integrationism expected among this group. Thus, SoC should promote lower integrationism among the Maltese:

*H<sub>4.1C</sub>*: Among the Maltese, SoC negatively predicts RFI.

Finally, all five mentalities (Sammut, 2019c) were included in the survey, as their meaning is mutually relative. These were the Reward, Localised, Survivor, Civic and Pragmatic mentality. Hypotheses for main effects were only advanced for the Reward, Localised and Survivor mentalities. The Civic mentality represents the drive to fix institutions, laws and policies. This could relate to any institution/law/policy, and therefore, no hypotheses were advanced. Similarly, the Pragmatic mentality signifies adaptability and cultural preferences vis-à-vis rules, which do not have any direct relation to integrationism. Since hyper-meritocratic and achievement-based ideals can maintain inequality (Ho et al., 2015), the Reward mentality (henceforth, ‘Reward’) was expected to promote lower integrationism among the dominant group. The Localised mentality (henceforth, ‘Localism’) prizes local customs and bonds, social identity and order, and was expected to promote lower

integrationism among the Maltese (where localism may express itself as parochialism), but higher integrationism amongst Arabs seeking to fit into Maltese society. The anomic Survivor mentality (henceforth, ‘Survivalism’) was expected to promote lower integrationism among all (see **Mentalities**):

*H<sub>4.1D</sub>*: Among the Maltese, Reward negatively predicts RFI.

*H<sub>4.1E</sub>*: Among the Maltese, Localism negatively predicts RFI.

*H<sub>4.1F</sub>*: Among the Maltese, Survivalism negatively predicts RFI.

*H<sub>4.1G</sub>*: Among Arabs, Localism positively predicts RFI.

*H<sub>4.1H</sub>*: Among Arabs, Survivalism negatively predicts RFI.

***Interaction Effects.*** The action-oriented approach postulates that social/alternative re-presentation and ERVs interact: the latter calibrate the relationship between alternative re-presentation and ‘social re-presentation for Project P’ (see **Chapter 2**). Thus, interaction effects were hypothesised for relevant ERVs.

Locally, closed-mindedness featured in both highly pro- and highly anti-multiculturalist views (Sammut et al., 2021), and therefore no main effects were hypothesised for NFC (see **Main Effects**). Nonetheless, NFC can play a moderating role in intergroup scenarios (e.g., Dechesne et al., 2000; Dhont et al., 2011), and NFC often (although inconsistently) favours ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation (e.g., Shah et al., 1998)—even though the relationship between NFC and intergroup preferences remains highly contextual (e.g., Dhont et al., 2011; Kosic et al., 2004). Accordingly, it was hypothesised that at higher levels of NFC, the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI is stronger:

*H<sub>4.2A</sub>*: Among the Maltese, NFC moderates the effect of ANTI-ALT on RFI.

*H<sub>4.2B</sub>*: Among Arabs, NFC moderates the effect of ANTI-ALT on RFI.

Moreover, as noted above, mentalities enable agents to shift their dispositions based on their social environment (Sammut, 2019a, p. 428). Thus, interaction effects were hypothesised for Reward among the Maltese (given this mentality's emphasis on meritocracy and on 'getting what one deserves') and for Survivalism among both groups (given this mentality's heavily anomic character). No interaction effects were hypothesised for Localism, as this mentality's orientation was not as strong and directed as that of Reward and Survivalism. The interaction effects in question concerned the specific AROI sub-dimension that was hypothesised to similarly predict RFI (i.e., ANTI-ALT), given the role of mentalities in *amplifying* people's inclinations (Sammut, 2019a):

*H<sub>4.2C</sub>*: Among the Maltese, Reward moderates the effect of ANTI-ALT on RFI;

*H<sub>4.2D</sub>*: Among the Maltese, Survivalism moderates the effect of ANTI-ALT on RFI;

*H<sub>4.2E</sub>*: Among Arabs, Survivalism moderates the effect of ANTI-ALT on RFI.

### ***Data Analysis***

Data analysis involved two main models: one for the Maltese (henceforth, 'Maltese model'), and one for Arabs (henceforth, 'Arab model'). The use of separate regression models is common in intergroup relations research (e.g., Gaunt, 2011), especially when models are expected to differ across groups. A preliminary exploration of the data indicated clear differences between Maltese and Arab views on integration. Therefore, model segmentation along socio-ethnic lines made sense, as opposed to splitting models in terms of overall pro- versus overall anti-integrationist participants (in which case most of the former would have been Arabs and most of the latter Maltese). Moreover, the Maltese sample was considerably larger than the Arab sample. Thus, including both groups in one model would have drastically reduced statistical power (Frazier et al., 2004; Stone-Romero et al., 1994). All analyses were

conducted using SPSS V27. Tests for interaction effects were carried out using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013, p. 98). Robust estimators for multiple regression were used—specifically, the heteroscedasticity-consistent HC3 estimator (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993), enabled by PROCESS (Hayes, 2013, p. 98) and the RLM macro for SPSS (Darlington & Hayes, 2017, p. 187). Koenker tests (Koenker, 1981) for heteroscedasticity were carried out using the HeteroskedasticityV3 macro for SPSS (Daryanto, 2020).

First, the distributions of RFI and AROI among both groups were examined and graphed, and the differences between groups were analysed. Secondly, correlations between relevant predictors and RFI were studied separately for both groups. Thirdly, preliminary tests for interaction effects were conducted for both samples.<sup>31</sup> Fourth, power analyses were conducted, and model assumptions were checked. Fifth, the final models were tested.

**Data Preparation.** Before data analysis, outliers were excluded if they fulfilled three criteria: if they exceeded cut-off points for (a) Cook's distance (using the formula:  $4/[n-k-1]$ , where  $n$  = sample size and  $k$  = number of predictors; Sorokina et al., 2013) and (b) standardized residuals (greater than |3|); and (c) if their exclusion changed the significance of parameter estimates (see Aguinis et al., 2013). These outlier-detection tests were carried out on the final models. In each group, two cases satisfied these three criteria and were considered influential outliers. All statistics presented below were conducted on samples *excluding outliers*, unless otherwise specified. Following Aguinis et al. (2013), when outliers changed the significance of parameter estimates, the same test is also presented for samples including outliers.

## Results

This section presents (a) Maltese-Arab comparisons; (b) inter-item correlations; (c) preliminary tests for interaction effects; (d) power analysis and assumption tests for the final

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<sup>31</sup> Interaction effects are presented before the assumption tests and power analyses, since only significant interactions were included in the final models.

models; and (e) outputs for the final models. Where relevant, I note whether the results supported or opposed the hypotheses.

### *Maltese-Arab Comparisons*

The Maltese and Arab groups differed in terms of RFI and AROI. Regarding AROI, the groups differed both on the composite AROI measure, and on the PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT sub-dimensions (see **Table 8**, **Table 9** and **Figure 32**).<sup>32</sup>

**RFI.** Overall, Arabs ( $M = 5.91$ ;  $SD = 0.73$ ) had significantly higher RFI (more integrationist views) than the Maltese ( $M = 4.50$ ;  $SD = 1.34$ ),  $t(310.82) = -12.11$ ,  $p < .001$ , Hedges'  $g = 1.19$ , supporting  $H_{1A}$ . Arabs also expressed significantly more integrationist views than the Maltese on all individual items of the RFI scale ( $ps < .001$ ), that is, Arabs scored higher on Items 1-5 (pro-integrationist items), and lower on Items 6-10 (anti-integrationist items), supporting  $H_{1B}$ .

**AROI.** There was no significant difference between the Maltese's (Maltese AROI:  $M = 4.51$ ;  $SD = 1.03$ ) alternative re-presentation of Arabs' project, and Arabs' (Arab AROI:  $M = 4.27$ ;  $SD = 1.18$ ) alternative re-presentation of the Maltese's project,  $t(316) = 1.86$ ,  $p = .064$ ,  $g = 0.22$ , providing no evidence for  $H_{2A}$ . (Including outliers: contrary to  $H_{2A}$ , the Maltese [Maltese AROI:  $M = 4.53$ ;  $SD = 1.04$ ] alternatively re-presented Arabs' project as being more integrationist, than Arabs [Arab AROI:  $M = 4.26$ ;  $SD = 1.17$ ] alternatively re-presented the Maltese's project to be,  $t(320) = 2.10$ ,  $p < .05$ ,  $g = 0.25$ .)

More specifically, contrary to  $H_{2B}$ , the Maltese ( $M = 4.55$ ;  $SD = 1.30$ ) had higher PRO-ALT scores than Arabs ( $M = 4.14$ ;  $SD = 1.32$ ),  $t(316) = 2.58$ ,  $p < .05$ ,  $g = 0.31$ . There was no significant difference between the Maltese ( $M = 3.52$ ;  $SD = 1.18$ ) and Arabs ( $M =$

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<sup>32</sup> No hypotheses posited relationships between (a) Maltese RFI and Maltese AROI, and (b) Arab RFI and Arab AROI. Nonetheless, paired-samples  $t$ -tests were conducted, comparing mean RFI and mean AROI within each group (for whole scales, and per item). These are presented in the joint display in **Chapter 9** (General Discussion) and in **Appendix F**.

3.60;  $SD = 1.29$ ) on ANTI-ALT scores,  $t(316) = -0.55$ ,  $p = .584$ ,  $g = 0.07$ , providing no support for  $H_{2C}$ .

**Re-Presentational Access.** Maltese RFI and Arab AROI were statistically compared to test  $H_{2D}$ . The difference between Maltese re-presentation for integration (Maltese RFI:  $M = 4.50$ ;  $SD = 1.34$ ) and Arab alternative re-presentation of the Maltese project (Arab AROI:  $M = 4.27$ ;  $SD = 1.18$ ) was not statistically significant,  $t(316) = 1.51$ ,  $p = .131$ ,  $g = 0.18$ , providing no support for  $H_{2D}$ .

Arab RFI and Maltese AROI were statistically compared to test  $H_{2E}$ . Maltese alternative re-presentation of the Arab project (Maltese AROI:  $M = 4.51$ ;  $SD = 1.03$ ) was less integrationist than Arabs' social re-presentation for integration (Arab RFI:  $M = 5.91$ ;  $SD = 0.73$ ),  $t(271.79) = -13.92$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $g = 1.48$ , supporting  $H_{2E}$ .

**Table 8**

*Maltese and Arab RFI and AROI*


Scale per group	RFI		AROI		PRO-ALT		ANTI-ALT	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Maltese	4.50***	1.34	4.51	1.03	4.55*	1.30	3.52	1.18
Arab	5.91***	0.73	4.27	1.18	4.14*	1.32	3.60	1.29

*Note.* Mean scores (*M*) and standard deviations (*SD*) for RFI and AROI (including PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT sub-dimensions), for Maltese and Arab samples excluding outliers. Scales were scored on a 7-point scale (1 = 'Strongly disagree'; 7 = 'Strongly agree'). Both groups differed significantly vis-à-vis (a) RFI, and (b) PRO-ALT. \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

**Table 9***Maltese and Arab RFI and AROI: Individual Items*

Items	RFI				AROI			
	Maltese		Arabs		Maltese		Arabs	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Item 1	4.73 <sup>***</sup>	1.79	6.17 <sup>***</sup>	1.34	4.53	1.70	4.42	1.76
Item 2	5.27 <sup>***</sup>	1.71	6.30 <sup>***</sup>	1.30	4.80 <sup>***</sup>	1.66	4.02 <sup>***</sup>	1.73
Item 3	4.38 <sup>***</sup>	1.92	5.77 <sup>***</sup>	1.69	4.27 <sup>**</sup>	1.87	3.61 <sup>**</sup>	1.78
Item 4	4.27 <sup>***</sup>	1.83	5.52 <sup>***</sup>	1.44	4.31	1.63	4.23	1.64
Item 5	4.97 <sup>***</sup>	1.70	5.80 <sup>***</sup>	1.35	4.92	1.51	4.70	1.53
Item 6	5.13 <sup>***</sup>	1.74	3.10 <sup>***</sup>	1.83	4.43	1.75	4.10	1.80
Item 7	4.22 <sup>***</sup>	2.01	2.80 <sup>***</sup>	1.78	4.20	1.84	3.97	1.81
Item 8	4.73 <sup>***</sup>	1.82	3.16 <sup>***</sup>	1.87	4.51 <sup>**</sup>	1.78	3.86 <sup>**</sup>	1.85
Item 9	3.26 <sup>***</sup>	2.02	1.62 <sup>***</sup>	1.37	3.01	1.73	3.13	1.72
Item 10	3.08 <sup>***</sup>	2.00	1.64 <sup>***</sup>	1.10	2.89 <sup>***</sup>	1.67	3.58 <sup>***</sup>	1.80

*Note.* Mean scores (*M*) and standard deviations (*SD*) for each item of the IR scales, for Maltese and Arab samples excluding outliers. Item 1 = most pro-integrationist item. Item 10 = most anti-integrationist item. Items were scored on a 7-point scale (1 = ‘Strongly disagree’; 7 = ‘Strongly agree’). Both groups differed significantly (a) on each item of the RFI scale, and (b) some items of the AROI scale. \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

**Figure 32***Maltese and Arab RFI and AROI Distributions*

*Note.* Maltese and Arab scores on each item of the IR scales. Item 10 = most anti-integrationist. Item 1 = most pro-integrationist. 1 = ‘Strongly disagree’; 7 = ‘Strongly agree’.

### *Inter-Item Correlations*

Inter-item correlations (see **Table 10** and **Table 11**), and relationships between demographic variables and RFI (see **Appendix F**) were also analysed per group. For the Maltese, Education and Religion were the only demographic variables to predict RFI significantly (see **Appendix F**). However, these categorical variables were omitted from subsequent analyses because samples across the levels of both categorical variables were greatly unequal, thus heavily reducing statistical power (Frazier et al., 2004; Stone-Romero et al., 1994). For Arabs, no demographic variable predicted RFI. The relationship between Mentalities (self-categorisation measure) and RFI was also tested for both groups (see **Appendix F**). However, only the continuous measures of Mentalities were entered into the final models, because: (a) there were uneven samples per level of the Mentalities self-categorisation measure; (b) the samples for some levels of this measure were too low; and (c) continuous measures are more easily interpreted in regression models.

**Table 10**

#### *Inter-Item Correlations for the Maltese Sample*

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. RFI	4.50	1.34	-	.53***	-.46***	-.21**	-.17*	-.43***	-.48***	-.27***
2. PRO-ALT	4.55	1.30		-	-.39***	-.05	.01	-.16*	-.27***	-.08
3. ANTI-ALT	3.52	1.18			-	.12	-.01	.35***	.28***	.24**
4. Pragmatism	3.53	1.19				-	.12	.21**	.13	.20**
5. Reward	4.04	1.06					-	.15*	.08	.34***
6. SDO-D	2.70	0.90						-	.65***	.28***
7. SDO-E	2.53	1.01							-	.18*
8. NFC	4.08	0.86								-

*Note.* Correlation matrix: Maltese sample excluding outliers. Only variables that significantly correlated with RFI are presented. Items were scored as follows: RFI, PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT = 7-point scale; Pragmatism and Reward = 5-point scale; and SDO-D, SDO-E and NFC = 6-point scale.

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$



**Table 11***Inter-Item Correlations for the Arab Sample*

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. RFI	5.91	0.73	-	.41***	-.20*	.25*	-.22*	-.29**
2. PRO-ALT	4.14	1.32		-	-.64***	.01	-.08	.02
3. ANTI-ALT	3.60	1.29			-	.01	.17	-.12
4. Localism	4.31	0.90				-	.10	-.06
5. Survivalism	2.86	1.42					-	.16
6. SDO <sub>C</sub>	2.29	0.69						-

*Note.* Correlation matrix: Arab sample excluding outliers. Only variables that significantly correlated with RFI are presented. Items were scored as follows: RFI, PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT = 7-point scale; Localism and Survivalism = 5-point scale; and SDO<sub>C</sub> = 6-point scale. The correlation between Localism and RFI was not statistically significant in the Arab sample including outliers (see **Appendix F**). \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

***Preliminary Interaction Tests***

Preliminary interaction tests (Jaccard & Turrissi, 2003) were conducted using the HC3 (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993) heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator (Hayes & Cai, 2007). Prior to analysis, variables were mean-centred (Hoyt et al., 2008; Aiken & West, 1991) to reduce collinearity for predictors with product terms and to facilitate output interpretation. Effect sizes for moderator effects are not usually larger than  $f^2 = .075$ , and cap at about  $f^2 = .15$ ; moreover,  $f^2 = .02$  is a good benchmark for small effects (Hoyt et al., 2008). Using G\*Power V3.1 (Faul et al., 2009), it was determined that for moderator analyses with four predictors (e.g., ANTI-ALT, NFC, ANTI-ALT×NFC interaction term, and PRO-ALT as covariate), for a statistical power of 0.8 (see Cohen, 1988), among the Maltese ( $n = 179$ ), an effect size of  $f^2 = .069$  was required for detection; and among Arabs ( $n = 84$ ), an effect size of  $f^2 = .151$  was required for detection. Therefore, moderator effects were, generally, detected more reliably in the Maltese sample than in the Arab sample. Significant interaction effects were not probed at this preliminary stage (see **Appendix F** for further preliminary tests).

**Maltese Sample.** In the Maltese sample, the moderator effect of NFC on ANTI-ALT in predicting RFI (with PRO-ALT included as covariate),  $B$  (95% CI) = .05 (-.13, .22),  $SE$  (HC3) = .09,  $t(174) = 0.53$ ,  $p = .60$ , was non-significant, providing no support for  $H_{4.2A}$ . However, the moderator effect of Reward on ANTI-ALT in predicting RFI (with PRO-ALT as covariate) was statistically significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = .12 (.02, .21),  $SE$  (HC3) = .05,  $t(174) = 2.37$ ,  $p < .05$ , provisionally supporting  $H_{4.2C}$ . Finally, the moderator effect of Survivalism on ANTI-ALT in predicting RFI (with PRO-ALT as covariate) was non-significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = .07, (-.01, .15),  $SE$  (HC3) = .04,  $t(174) = 1.67$ ,  $p = .10$ , providing no support for  $H_{4.2D}$ . (However, the interaction between Survivalism and ANTI-ALT [with PRO-ALT as covariate] was significant when outliers were included,  $B$  [95% CI] = .14 [.02, .25],  $SE$  [HC3] = .06,  $t[176] = 2.32$ ,  $p < .05$ ; see **Appendix F**.)

**Arab Sample.** In the Arab sample, the moderator effect of NFC on ANTI-ALT in predicting RFI (with PRO-ALT as covariate),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.01 (-.21, .19),  $SE$  (HC3) = .10,  $t(79) = -0.09$ ,  $p = .93$ , was non-significant, providing no support for  $H_{4.2B}$ . The moderator effect of Survivalism on ANTI-ALT in predicting RFI (with PRO-ALT as covariate) was also non-significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = .02 (-.07, .11),  $SE$  (HC3) = .04,  $t(79) = .42$ ,  $p = .68$ , providing no support for  $H_{4.2E}$ .

### ***Final Models***

The main predictors in the final models were chosen on *both* theoretical (principally) and statistical grounds. Exclusive reliance on preliminary correlations in selecting predictor variables would have accentuated the deleterious effects of “small sample sizes, low statistical power, variable and measurement redundancy, specification error, and measurement error” (Jaccard et al., 2006, p. 465). Reliance on theory minimised risks associated with “atheoretical partialling” (Jaccard et al., 2006, p. 459). “Including [theoretically irrelevant] covariates can lead the researcher to underestimate the relevance of a predictor because the essence of the predictor is partialled out” (Jaccard et al., 2006, p. 464), reducing statistical power, degrees of

freedom and the explained variance in the criterion variable (Bernierth & Aguinis, 2016). Model parsimony was therefore favoured over adjustment for covariates other than those that were theoretically relevant (see Jaccard et al., 2006; see **A Note on Covariates**). Similarly, the final models only included interaction terms that were both theoretically relevant and preliminarily significant in some way, since each added interaction term reduces power (Jaccard et al., 2006). Significant moderator effects were probed and graphed, portraying the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI at three levels ( $M - 1SD$ ;  $M$ ; and  $M + 1SD$ ) of the moderator (Hoyt et al., 2008). Multiple regression was conducted using the Enter method on SPSS V27.

The Maltese model ( $n = 179$ ) included PRO-ALT, ANTI-ALT, SDO-D, SDO-E, Reward, Survivalism, ANTI-ALT×Reward and ANTI-ALT×Survivalism, as predictors of RFI. Main effects were entered into the model in Step 1, and interaction terms in Step 2 (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003, p. 60). Reward correlated weakly with RFI ( $r < 0.3$ ; see **Table 10**) and Survivalism did not correlate with RFI, but both mentalities were included to test for moderation effects. Pragmatism and NFC were omitted due to weak correlations with RFI ( $r < 0.3$ ; see **Table 10**), and because no hypotheses backed their inclusion as main effects. In turn, the Arab model ( $n = 84$ ) included PRO-ALT, ANTI-ALT, Survivalism, Localism and SDOc, as predictors (in one step) of RFI. Among Arabs, most predictors correlated weakly with RFI, and therefore variables were not excluded on this basis (see **Table 11**).

**A Note on Covariates.** Before continuing, it is worth pointing out why demographic covariates were not included in the final models. Among the Maltese, Education and Religion predicted RFI, and among Arabs, no demographic variable predicted RFI. Sample sizes across levels for Religion were too dissimilar and could not be meaningfully re-categorized. Moreover, the inclusion of Education as covariate was only possible following an artificial re-categorization into Non-tertiary (Secondary and Post-secondary) and Tertiary (Tertiary) levels. Nonetheless, Education was not included in the final models because: (a) Education

was only predictive of RFI among the Maltese, and including Education solely in the Maltese model would have further reduced model comparability (see Miller, 2004); (b) given the relatively low sample sizes and the use of non-probability sampling, statistical generalization would still not have been possible (see **Chapter 10**); (c) there were probable issues with multicollinearity between Education and some predictor variables (see **Appendix F**); (d) including further covariates risked overfitting the models; and (e) including Education as covariate would have further reduced sample sizes (to  $n = 176$  [Maltese model] and  $n = 78$  [Arab model]). Points (c), (d) and (e) would have impacted statistical power, compromising interaction tests in particular. Although the exclusion of control variables can inflate parameter estimates, in some instances, their inclusion (e.g., when covariates and predictors are related) can yield a wrong conclusion positing no relation between predictor and outcome (Bernerth & Aguinis, 2016, p. 231; Meehl, 1971). Accordingly, analysis and interpretation relied on the main models presented in this chapter (see **Appendix F** for models with Education included as covariate).

**Assumption Testing and Power Analysis.** The assumptions underlying multiple regression were checked, and power analyses were conducted, minimising risks of Type I and Type II errors (Osborne & Waters, 2002). Missing data was not imputed, and listwise deletion was used, as missing values for ERVs occurred exclusively for a subset of participants (Cohen et al., 2003, p. 433) who stopped after Block 2. The outcome variable was RFI (interval scale), and all predictors were continuous. Independence of observations (Keith, 2019, p. 201) was observed, with Durbin-Watson tests (Durbin & Watson, 1950) being satisfactory (Maltese model: Durbin-Watson = 1.71; Arab model: Durbin-Watson = 1.90; Field, 2009, p. 221). Histograms and normal P-P plots indicated sufficient normality for residuals (see **Appendix F**). Multiple regression is robust to violations of normality of residuals, and no transformations were pursued (Osborne & Waters, 2002; Schmidt & Finan, 2018; Field, 2009, pp. 248-250). All scales used had adequate reliabilities (see **Survey**

**Composition: Measures**), reducing the risks of Type I and Type II errors (Osborne & Waters, 2002). No predictor inter-correlations exceeded  $r = .7$  (see **Table 10** and **Table 11**), and variance inflation factor (VIF) and Tolerance values indicated no multicollinearity (Keith, 2019, pp. 213-215).

Visual examination of partial plots for each predictor with RFI, and of plots for studentized residuals (\*SRESID) against standardized predicted values (\*ZPRED), indicated sufficient linearity and homoscedasticity (Keith, 2019, p. 201) in both datasets (see **Appendix F**). Whilst the Koenker test was non-significant for the Arab model (excluding outliers,  $LM = 8.09, p = .15$ ; including outliers,  $LM = 8.69, p = .12$ ), it indicated potential heteroscedasticity in the Maltese model, which lessened significantly after excluding outliers (excluding outliers,  $LM = 15.27, p = .054$ ; including outliers,  $LM = 32.49, p < .001$ ).

Using G\*Power V3.1 (Faul et al., 2009), it was determined that for the Maltese model (Step 1: 6 predictors), for a statistical power of 0.8 and  $n = 179$ , an effect size of  $f^2 = .079$  was required for detection. For the Maltese model (Step 2: 8 predictors), for a statistical power of 0.8 and  $n = 179$ , an effect size of  $f^2 = .088$  was required for detection. For the same sample size and power requirements, an effect size of  $f^2 = .055$  was required to detect whether the change in  $R^2$  between Step 1 and Step 2 was significant. For the Arab model (5 predictors), for a statistical power of 0.8 and  $n = 84$ , an effect size of  $f^2 = .164$  was required for detection.

**Sensitivity Analysis: Comparing Estimators.** Following Aguinis et al. (2013) and Classen et al. (2020), analyses were repeated using (a) the HC3 estimator (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993), excluding outliers (Model A); (b) the non-robust estimator, excluding outliers (Model B); (c) the HC3 estimator, including outliers (Model C); and (d) the non-robust estimator, including outliers (Model D). Models A and B were the *main analyses*, and Models C and D were supplementary. Such comparative analyses follow recent guidelines (Field & Wilcox, 2017), and were necessary because the outliers were so deleterious that they even influenced results obtained using the HC3 estimator.

Specifically, the results below follow Field and Wilcox's (2017) recommendation for a "sensitivity analysis for all frequentist analyses" (p. 37), whereby following comparisons between robust and non-robust estimators, models based on robust estimators were prioritised if results diverged. Likewise, following Judd et al. (2017, pp. 320-327), results excluding outliers (Model A and Model B) were given more weight, to avoid depending on an extremely small number of influential outliers (see **Data Preparation**). Thus, the most reliable analysis was that of Model A (where the HC3 estimator determined the beta coefficients and significance of parameter estimates, on the samples *excluding* outliers). Presentation and discussion of the results relied on Model A (i.e., Model A<sub>M</sub> for the Maltese, and Model A<sub>A</sub> for Arabs; see **Table 14** and **Table 16**), unless otherwise specified (see **Discussion**). Nonetheless, all four models were reported (see **Tables 12-16** for Model A and Model B; and **Appendix F [Tables F41.4-41.8]** for Model C and Model D), following Aguinis et al.'s (2013) recommendations for dealing with outliers transparently.<sup>33</sup>

**Maltese Model.** Hierarchical multiple regression tested the hypotheses, principally that PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT predict RFI over and above ERVs. In Step 1, main effects were analysed. Predictors accounted for 49.3% of the variance ( $R^2 = .493$ ; Adjusted  $R^2 = .476$ ) in RFI. In Model A<sub>M</sub>, PRO-ALT ( $\beta = .39$ ) positively predicted RFI,  $t(172) = 5.74$ ,  $p < .001$ , and ANTI-ALT ( $\beta = -.21$ ) negatively predicted RFI,  $t(172) = -3.48$ ,  $p < .001$ , supporting  $H_{3A}$  and  $H_{3B}$ . Whilst SDO-D ( $\beta = -.13$ ) did not significantly predict RFI,  $t(172) = -1.79$ ,  $p = .075$ , SDO-E ( $\beta = -.22$ ) negatively predicted RFI,  $t(172) = -2.75$ ,  $p < .01$ , supporting  $H_{4.1A}$ . Reward ( $\beta = -.13$ ) negatively predicted RFI,  $t(172) = -2.46$ ,  $p < .05$ , supporting  $H_{4.1D}$ . Survivalism ( $\beta = -.0005$ ) did not significantly predict RFI,  $t(172) = -0.01$ ,  $p = .993$ , providing no support for  $H_{4.1F}$  (see **Tables 12-14**).<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Models A, B, C and D are denoted by the subscript <sub>M</sub> (i.e., Models A<sub>M</sub>, B<sub>M</sub>, C<sub>M</sub> and D<sub>M</sub>) for the Maltese, and by the subscript <sub>A</sub> (i.e., Models A<sub>A</sub>, B<sub>A</sub>, C<sub>A</sub> and D<sub>A</sub>) for Arabs.

<sup>34</sup> Shifting Survivalism (which was only included to test for ANTI-ALT×Survivalism) to Step 2 did not change the significance of parameter estimates.

In Step 2, the interaction terms ANTI-ALT×Reward and ANTI-ALT×Survivalism were added to the analysis, contributing further to the model ( $R^2 = .511$ ; Adjusted  $R^2 = .488$ ;  $\Delta R^2 = .018$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Simple slope analyses indicated that the moderator effect of Reward on ANTI-ALT was significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = .13 (.04, .23),  $SE$  (HC3) = .05,  $t(170) = 2.69$ ,  $p < .01$ , supporting  $H_{4.2C}$ . This interaction was further probed. Specifically, for low Reward ( $M - 1SD$ ), the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.43 (-.59, -.26),  $SE$  (HC3) = .08,  $t(170) = -5.08$ ,  $p < .001$ , was stronger than that for average Reward ( $M$ ),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.29 (-.42, -.15),  $SE$  (HC3) = .07,  $t(170) = -4.29$ ,  $p < .001$ , but significant for both. For high Reward ( $M + 1SD$ ), the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI was non-significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.16 (-.321, .005),  $SE$  (HC3) = .08,  $t(170) = -1.92$ ,  $p = .057$ . In summary, at low Reward, the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI is stronger but always more integrationist than at average Reward, supporting  $H_{4.2C}$  (see **Figure 33**). The Johnson-Neyman technique (see Potthoff, 1964) indicated that at about Reward = 4.975 (i.e., 0.93 above the mean), ANTI-ALT and RFI are significantly related,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.16 (-.32, .00),  $SE$  (HC3) = .08,  $t(170) = -1.97$ ,  $p = .05$ . As Reward decreases, the negative relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI becomes stronger, peaking at the lowest score for Reward (Reward = 1),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.69 (-1.02, -.37),  $SE$  (HC3) = .16,  $t(170) = -4.22$ ,  $p < .001$ . Simple slope analyses indicated that the moderator effect of Survivalism on ANTI-ALT was non-significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = .06 (-.02, .14),  $SE$  (HC3) = .04,  $t(170) = 1.54$ ,  $p = .12$ , providing no support for  $H_{4.2D}$ . (This interaction effect was only significant when outliers were included [see **Appendix F [Text F41.10]** for tests probing this disordinal interaction].)

Comparisons between Model  $A_M$  and Model  $B_M$  (see **Tables 12-14**) for the Maltese sample are available below (see **Appendix F [Tables F41.4-F41.6]** for comparisons between Model  $C_M$  and Model  $D_M$ ). Excluding outliers (Model  $A_M$  and Model  $B_M$ ), the significance of parameter estimates was consistent across both *estimators* and regression *steps*. Including outliers (Model  $C_M$  and Model  $D_M$ ), some discrepancies resulted. Sensitivity analysis (Field &

Wilcox, 2017) therefore further confirmed the relative stability and robustness of the models excluding outliers (Model A<sub>M</sub> and Model B<sub>M</sub>).



**Table 12***Maltese Model, Excluding Outliers (Main Analysis): Model Summary*

Model	Model summary				ANOVA					
	<i>R</i>	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	Adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>RMSE</i>		<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Step 1	.702	.493	.476	.942	Regression	148.42	6	24.736	27.897	.000
					Residual	152.51	172	.887		
					Total	300.93	178			
Step 2	.715	.511	.488	.930	Regression	153.77	8	19.221	22.204	.000
					Residual	147.16	170	.866		
					Total	300.93	178			

*Note.* Maltese model (Step 1 and Step 2), excluding outliers. Summary: coefficient of determination (*R*; *R*<sup>2</sup>; Adjusted *R*<sup>2</sup>), and root mean square error (*RMSE*). ANOVA statistics: sum of squares (*SS*), degrees of freedom (*df*), mean square (*MS*), *F*-statistic (*F*), and *p*-value (*p*).

**Table 13***Maltese Model, Excluding Outliers (Main Analysis): Change in R<sup>2</sup>*

Model	Change Statistics				
	$\Delta R^2$	<i>F</i> Change	df1	df2	<i>P</i>
Step 1	.493	27.897	6	172	.000
Step 2	.018	3.092	2	170	.048

*Note.* Maltese model, excluding outliers: Change in *R*<sup>2</sup> between Step 1 (main effects) and Step 2 (interaction effects).  $\Delta R^2$  = change in *R*<sup>2</sup>. *F* change = change in the *F*-statistic. df1, df2 = degrees of freedom. *p* = *p*-value.

**Table 14**


*Maltese Model, Excluding Outliers (Main Analysis: Model A<sub>M</sub> and Model B<sub>M</sub>): Hierarchical Multiple Regression Summary for Variables Predicting RFI*

Model (with predictors)	$\beta$	HC3 Estimator (Model A <sub>M</sub> )						Non-robust Estimator (Model B <sub>M</sub> )					
		<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Step 1													
Intercept		4.45	.07	4.31	4.59	62.13	.000	4.45	.07	4.31	4.59	63.17	.000
PRO-ALT	.39	.40	.07	.26	.54	5.74	.000	.40	.06	.28	.53	6.47	.000
ANTI-ALT	-.21	-.25	.07	-.39	-.11	-3.48	.0006	-.25	.07	-.39	-.11	-3.44	.001
SDO-D	-.13	-.18	.10	-.39	.02	-1.79	.075	-.18	.11	-.40	.03	-1.71	.090
SDO-E	-.22	-.29	.11	-.50	-.08	-2.75	.007	-.29	.09	-.48	-.10	-3.07	.003
Reward	-.13	-.16	.07	-.30	-.03	-2.46	.015	-.16	.07	-.30	-.03	-2.43	.016
Survivalism	-.0005	-.0005	.05	-.11	.11	-0.01	.993	-.0005	.05	-.10	.10	-0.009	.992
Step 2													
Intercept		4.44	.07	4.30	4.58	61.86	.000	4.44	.07	4.31	4.58	63.56	.000
PRO-ALT	.36	.38	.07	.24	.52	5.28	.000	.38	.06	.25	.50	6.05	.000
ANTI-ALT	-.24	-.29	.07	-.42	-.15	-4.29	.000	-.29	.07	-.43	-.14	-3.92	.000
SDO-D	-.13	-.19	.10	-.38	.01	-1.86	.064	-.19	.11	-.40	.03	-1.74	.084
SDO-E	-.23	-.29	.11	-.51	-.08	-2.76	.006	-.29	.09	-.48	-.11	-3.16	.002
Reward	-.15	-.19	.07	-.32	-.06	-2.88	.004	-.19	.07	-.32	-.05	-2.78	.006
Survivalism	.004	.004	.05	-.10	.11	0.08	.938	.004	.05	-.10	.10	0.08	.936
ANTI-ALT×Reward	.11	.13	.05	.04	.23	2.69	.008	.13	.07	.002	.27	2.01	.046
ANTI-ALT×Survivalism	.07	.06	.04	-.02	.14	1.54	.124	.06	.04	-.03	.15	1.35	.180

*Note.* Maltese model, excluding outliers (Step 1: main effects; Step 2: interaction effects): hierarchical multiple regression. The table presents the standardised beta coefficients ( $\beta$ ) for each predictor; and the unstandardised beta coefficient (*B*), lower [CI (LL)] and upper limits [CI (UL)] for 95% Confidence Intervals, *t*-statistics (*t*), and *p*-values (*p*), for Model A<sub>M</sub> (HC3 estimator) and Model B<sub>M</sub> (non-robust estimator), for all predictors in the Maltese model. Variables were mean-centred to facilitate interpretation of interaction terms.

**Figure 33**

*Maltese Model: Reward Moderating the Relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI*



*Note.* The relationship between ANTI-ALT and (mean) RFI for each level of Reward in the Maltese sample (Model A<sub>M</sub>). Slopes for Low and Average Reward are significant ( $p < .001$ ).

**Arab Model.** Multiple regression tested the hypotheses, principally that PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT predict RFI over and above ERVs. Predictors accounted for 30.5% of the variance ( $R^2 = .305$ ; Adjusted  $R^2 = .260$ ) in RFI. In Model A<sub>A</sub>, PRO-ALT ( $\beta = .40$ ) positively predicted RFI,  $t(80) = 3.14$ ,  $p < .01$ , supporting  $H_{3C}$ . However, ANTI-ALT ( $\beta = .08$ ) did not significantly predict RFI,  $t(80) = 0.58$ ,  $p = .56$ , providing no support for  $H_{3D}$ . SDO<sub>C</sub> ( $\beta = -.24$ ) negatively predicted RFI,  $t(80) = -2.45$ ,  $p < .05$ , supporting  $H_{4.1B}$ . Localism ( $\beta = .25$ ) positively predicted RFI,  $t(80) = 2.36$ ,  $p < .05$ , supporting  $H_{4.1G}$ . Survivalism ( $\beta = -.19$ ) did not significantly predict RFI,  $t(80) = -1.85$ ,  $p = .069$ , providing no support for  $H_{4.1H}$ . (Survivalism only significantly predicted RFI when outliers were included; see **Appendix F [Table F41.8].**)

Comparisons between Model A<sub>A</sub> and Model B<sub>A</sub> (see **Tables 15-16**) for the Arab sample are available below (see **Appendix F [Tables F41.7-F41.8]** for comparisons between Model C<sub>A</sub> and Model D<sub>A</sub>). Excluding outliers (Model A<sub>A</sub> and Model B<sub>A</sub>), the significance of parameter estimates was consistent across estimators. Including outliers (Model C<sub>A</sub> and Model D<sub>A</sub>), the significance of parameter estimates was also consistent across estimators, but these supplementary models yielded a positive finding for Survivalism too. Based on the reasoning above (see **Sensitivity Analysis: Comparing Estimators**; Field & Wilcox, 2017), the models excluding outliers (Model A<sub>A</sub> and Model B<sub>A</sub>) are given more weight.

**Table 15***Arab Model, Excluding Outliers (Main Analysis): Model Summary*

Model	Model summary				ANOVA						
	<i>R</i>	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	Adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>RMSE</i>		<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	
Arab	.552	.305	.260	.518	Regression	9.177	5	1.835	6.844	.000	
					Residual	20.917	78	.268			
					Total	30.094	83				

*Note.* Arab model, excluding outliers. Summary: coefficient of determination (*R*; *R*<sup>2</sup>; Adjusted *R*<sup>2</sup>), and root mean square error (*RMSE*). ANOVA statistics: sum of squares (*SS*), degrees of freedom (*df*), mean square (*MS*), *F*-statistic (*F*), and *p*-value (*p*).

**Table 16***Arab Model, Excluding Outliers (Main Analysis: Model A<sub>A</sub> and Model B<sub>A</sub>): Multiple Regression Summary for Variables Predicting RFI*

Variable	HC3 Estimator (Model A <sub>A</sub> )							Non-robust Estimator (Model B <sub>A</sub> )					
	<i>β</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Intercept		5.09	.54	4.01	6.17	9.36	.000	5.09	.54	4.01	6.17	9.39	.000
PRO-ALT	.40	.18	.06	.07	.30	3.14	.002	.18	.06	.07	.30	3.28	.002
ANTI-ALT	.08	.04	.06	-.09	.16	0.58	.562	.04	.06	-.08	.15	0.63	.527
SDO <sub>C</sub>	-.24	-.21	.09	-.38	-.04	-2.45	.017	-.21	.09	-.38	-.04	-2.49	.015
Localism	.25	.17	.07	.03	.31	2.36	.021	.17	.06	.04	.29	2.62	.011
Survivalism	-.19	-.08	.04	-.17	.006	-1.85	.069	-.08	.04	-.16	.001	-1.96	.054

*Note.* Arab model, excluding outliers: multiple regression summary. The table presents the standardised beta coefficient (*β*) for each predictor; and the unstandardised beta coefficient (*B*), lower [CI (LL)] and upper limits [CI (UL)] for 95% Confidence Intervals, *t*-statistics (*t*), and *p*-values (*p*) for Model A<sub>A</sub> (HC3 estimator) and Model B<sub>A</sub> (non-robust estimator), for all predictors in the Arab model.

## Discussion

Study 3 involved a split-ballot survey meant to shed light on Arab-Maltese relations. The main measures were RFI, PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT (sub-dimensions of AROI), SDOc (and its sub-dimensions: SDO-D and SDO-E), NFC, Mentalities, and SoC. The present inquiry was grounded in the action-oriented approach to social re-presentation (see **Chapter 2**). The IR scales were actualised through qualitative research (Study 1; see **Chapter 6**) based on the minimal model of argumentation (see **Chapter 3**), and a subsequent scaling procedure (Study 2; see **Chapter 7**). Having presented the analytical outputs, this section discusses the main findings of Study 3. After presenting a summary of results, I revisit them in view of the action-oriented formulae, research questions and hypotheses. Discussion of the results relies on Model A<sub>M</sub> and Model A<sub>A</sub> (main analyses: HC3 estimator, excluding outliers), unless otherwise specified.

### *Summary of the Main Findings*

The main finding was that *alternative re-presentation of the outgroup's project* is systemically linked to *social re-presentation for/against integration*, for both groups. Among the Maltese, the more pro-integrationist their alternative re-presentation of Arabs' project (Maltese PRO-ALT), the more integrationist was the Maltese's social re-presentation for integration (Maltese RFI). In contrast, the more anti-integrationist their alternative re-presentation of Arabs' project (Maltese ANTI-ALT), the less integrationist was the Maltese's social re-presentation for integration (Maltese RFI). Among Arabs, the more pro-integrationist their alternative re-presentation of the Maltese's project (Arab PRO-ALT), the more integrationist was Arabs' social re-presentation for integration (Arab RFI). There was no relationship between Arab ANTI-ALT and Arab RFI.

Moreover, among the Maltese (apart from PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT), SDO-E and Reward, too, predicted RFI (both negatively). Reward moderated the effect of ANTI-ALT on RFI: the negative relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI was stronger for Low Reward

than for Average Reward, but significant for both, and always more integrationist for Low Reward. Among Arabs (apart from PRO-ALT), SDO<sub>c</sub> negatively predicted RFI and Localism positively predicted RFI.

Overall, in the Maltese model, predictors accounted for more variance in RFI (Step 1:  $R^2 = .493$ ; Step 2:  $R^2 = .511$ ), than in the Arab model ( $R^2 = .305$ ). Sample characteristics might have influenced the relatively smaller  $R^2$  in the Arab model, and more research is needed to identify meaningful predictors of RFI among Arabs. Nonetheless, considering the small sample size, and that Arabs are an under-researched immigrant group locally, the variance explained ( $R^2 = .305$ ) is satisfactory. Moreover, research sub-questions were answered for both groups.

### ***Research Sub-Question 1: Arab-Maltese Comparisons***

The first research sub-question asked: (1) ‘What are the differences between the Maltese’s and Arabs’ social re-presentation for/against integration?’ Both groups were integrationist overall (mean RFI > 4, for both groups). Nonetheless, Arabs (Arab RFI:  $M = 5.91$ ;  $SD = 0.73$ ) emerged as being more integrationist than the Maltese (Maltese RFI:  $M = 4.50$ ;  $SD = 1.34$ ), both overall (supporting  $H_{1A}$ ), and in terms of specific RFI scale items (supporting  $H_{1B}$ ). This complements Study 1, by highlighting all the different symbolic resources (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010b) that Arabs may draw upon to advance integrationism to a higher degree than the Maltese, and vice versa. For example, Arabs are more likely to promote the idea that similarities can help both groups get along (Item 4), whereas the Maltese are more likely to highlight problematic differences (Item 6), and so forth.

### ***Research Sub-Question 2: Alternative Re-Presentation and Re-Presentational Access***

The second research sub-question asked: (2) ‘How do the Maltese and Arabs alternatively re-present each other’s projects?’ There was no significant difference between the Maltese’s (Maltese AROI:  $M = 4.51$ ;  $SD = 1.03$ ) alternative re-presentation of Arabs’ project, and Arabs’ (Arab AROI:  $M = 4.27$ ;  $SD = 1.18$ ) alternative re-presentation of the

Maltese's project (no support for  $H_{2A}$ ). (Including outliers: the Maltese alternatively re-presented Arabs' project as being more integrationist, than Arabs alternatively re-presented the Maltese's project to be [opposing  $H_{2A}$ ].) Specifically, the Maltese expressed higher PRO-ALT (Maltese PRO-ALT:  $M = 4.55$ ;  $SD = 1.30$ ) than Arabs (Arab PRO-ALT:  $M = 4.14$ ;  $SD = 1.32$ ) did (opposing  $H_{2B}$ ); but ANTI-ALT (Maltese ANTI-ALT:  $M = 3.52$ ,  $SD = 1.18$ ; Arab ANTI-ALT:  $M = 3.60$ ,  $SD = 1.29$ ) did not differ significantly across groups (no support for  $H_{2C}$ ). Despite similar AROI across groups, and higher Maltese PRO-ALT, the Maltese had *lower* RFI than Arabs. This finding re-iterates the importance of considering both groups' social/alternative re-presentation *systemically*, and in terms of how they *function intra-collectively*. That is, Arabs are *for* integration (higher RFI) more than the Maltese are, but the intra-group dynamics of alternative re-presentation are only sensible in view of the direction taken by that same group's project.

Moreover, as per **Table 9**, the Maltese attributed higher scores to Arabs than Arabs attributed to the Maltese, on the following AROI scale items: Item 2 (emphasising mutual engagement), Item 3 (emphasising the strengths of religious co-existence) and Item 8 (stating that one group will take over). In contrast, Arabs attributed higher scores to the Maltese on Item 10 (the view that racism makes sense) than the Maltese attributed to Arabs (see **Chapter 7**). The groups did not differ on AROI items toward the middle of the scale. These findings further contextualised and specified the content of Arab-Maltese alternative re-presentation.

Interestingly, Arabs' AROI did not significantly differ from the Maltese's RFI (no support for  $H_{2D}$ ). Thus, Arabs possibly have accurate *re-presentational access* to Maltese views, by virtue of having to work and co-exist with their Maltese counterparts in daily life. However, the Maltese's AROI differed significantly from Arabs' RFI (supporting  $H_{2E}$ ). Being less inclined toward integrationism than their Arab counterparts, the Maltese alternatively re-present Arabs' project as being less integrationist than it actually is for Arabs. Less necessary contact by the Maltese with Arabs partially explains this finding. That is, Maltese re-



presentation of Arabs may rely more on intra-collective aspirations than actual encounters. This results in a lack of re-presentational access to Arab views. A complementary explanation concerns negative representations of Arabs and Muslims in the media (Buhagiar et al., 2020; Shaheen, 2003), which naturally influence groups' alternative re-presentation of Arabs' project.

***Research Sub-Question 3: Alternative Re-Presentation for/against Project P***

The third research sub-question asked: (3) 'What is the relationship between alternative re-presentation of the outgroup's project and the Maltese's/Arabs' social re-presentation for/against integration?' This was the main research sub-question in Study 3. Maltese PRO-ALT positively predicted Maltese RFI (supporting  $H_{3A}$ ) and Maltese ANTI-ALT negatively predicted Maltese RFI (supporting  $H_{3B}$ ). Moreover, Arab PRO-ALT positively predicted Arab RFI (supporting  $H_{3C}$ ), but Arab ANTI-ALT did not predict Arab RFI (no support for  $H_{3D}$ ).

These findings strongly support the action-oriented approach, which postulates  $SR_{for}$   $P_{integration}$ , as a function of: (a) how the Maltese ( $SR_M$ ) and Arabs ( $SR_A$ ), in advancing their Project, socially re-present the relevant Object/s (i.e., Arab-Maltese relations); (b) how the Maltese ( $AR_M^A$ ) and Arabs ( $AR_A^M$ ) alternatively re-present each other's projects; and (c) how the Maltese ( $AR_M^n$ ) and Arabs ( $AR_A^n$ ) alternatively re-present the projects of other relevant groups. Formula 2 incorporates research sub-questions 1, 2 and 3 of Study 3 (see **Chapter 5**). Based on the above findings, it can be completed as follows:

SR for  $P_{\text{integration}}$ , as a function of:

- (a)  $SR_M$  = overall less integrationist than  $SR_A$  (Maltese RFI < Arab RFI)
- (b)  $AR_M^A$  = the more pro-integrationist  $AR_M^A$  is (Maltese: higher PRO-ALT), the more integrationist  $SR_M$  is (Maltese: higher RFI); and the more anti-integrationist  $AR_M^A$  is (Maltese: higher ANTI-ALT), the less integrationist  $SR_M$  is (Maltese: lower RFI)
- (c)  $AR_M^n$  = for future research...
- (d)  $SR_A$  = overall more integrationist than  $SR_M$  (Arab RFI > Maltese RFI)
- (e)  $AR_A^M$  = the more pro-integrationist  $AR_A^M$  is (Arabs: higher PRO-ALT), the more integrationist  $SR_A$  is (Arabs: higher RFI); however, the anti-integrationist aspect of  $AR_A^M$  (Arab ANTI-ALT) is not significantly related with  $SR_A$  (Arab RFI)
- (f)  $AR_A^n$  = for future research...
- (g) ...and any other  $SR_n$  and  $AR_n$  [for future research]
- (h) ...relevant to Context C [Malta] (Formula 2)

The above links all systemic components and supports the *equative* view of social representation, whereby function = description (see **Chapter 2**). In Study 3, alternative representation (AROI, and its sub-dimensions: PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT) was meaningfully analytically distinguished from ‘SR for  $P_{\text{integration}}$ ’ (RFI), shedding light on how the *systemic* relationship between social and alternative re-presentation *functions*. Systemic relations between social and alternative re-presentation have been both acknowledged and discussed (e.g., Gillespie, 2008; Wagoner, 2015, p. 153). The present inquiry adds the Project squarely in this relationship.

The formula also shows how alternative re-presentation does not always relate to the project uniformly. Among the Maltese, both PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT predicted RFI, but among Arabs only PRO-ALT did so. There are six possible and complementary explanations for this. Firstly, (a) alternative re-presentation may function differently in different groups,

based on different interobjective (Sammut et al., 2013) understandings, norms and histories. Secondly, (b) the dominant group possibly dichotomises the outgroup's project (pro- vs. anti-integrationist) to a greater degree than does the non-dominant group. This follows from the Maltese's culturally essentialised views of Arabs (Buhagiar et al., 2018): to the extent that Arabs are essentialised, the Maltese would be relatively *anti-integrationist* as opposed to *pro-integrationist*. In contrast, Arabs could be more attuned to the differential expressions of the Maltese project, which they encounter as they seek to acculturate.

Similarly, (c) Arabs' actual encounters with the Maltese on a daily basis (e.g., at work, school, etc.) possibly result in Arabs having more *re-presentational access* to the Maltese's *actual* views on integration, regardless of their own position (see **Research Sub-Question 2**). Accordingly, ANTI-ALT may be shared across both relatively pro- and relatively anti-integrationist Arabs. Tied to this, (d) ANTI-ALT could be more divorced from a group's actual social re-presentation for/against integration (RFI), than PRO-ALT. That is, the negativity bias (Rozin & Royzman, 2001) might mean that collectives are more nuanced in their appraisal of the *anti-integrationist* aspects of the outgroup's project, *regardless* of their own views. This could well be the case with Arabs, where ANTI-ALT did not predict RFI. Among the Maltese, ANTI-ALT predicted RFI in all models, except for supplementary Model C<sub>M</sub>—an unlikely scenario (see **Appendix F [Table F41.6]**). Nonetheless, if Model C<sub>M</sub> does hold ground in future research, this reasoning could well apply to the Maltese as well.

Fifth, (e) it could be that, at least among the non-dominant group, PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT function *asymmetrically*, such that it is precisely PRO-ALT which systemically inclines the ingroup to be more integrationist (higher RFI). ANTI-ALT may constitute a relatively natural baseline, simply by virtue of the outgroup being precisely *an outgroup*. If this is the case, the outgroup's *unwillingness* to engage with the ingroup in coalitional scenarios is more representationally salient for the ingroup, than its willingness to engage (cf. Kurzban et al., 2001). In contrast, PRO-ALT, built over time, may make the ingroup more

integrationist (higher RFI). Sixth, (f) the psychological complexity underpinning alternative re-presentation probably differs from that enabling social re-presentation. The relationship between PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT is synergistic: collectives can attribute *both* simultaneously. This reinforces the findings of the EFA in **Chapter 7**, showing that PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT are substantively different factors (Murray et al., 2015, p. 121). It makes as much sense to speak of AROI as it does to speak of its pro-integrationist (PRO-ALT) and its anti-integrationist aspects (ANTI-ALT).

Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the standardised beta coefficients were generally larger for PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT (especially PRO-ALT) than for ERVs, in both groups (see **Table 14** and **Table 16**). Thus, variables relating to social construction were more strongly linked to RFI than those relating to individual cognition. This supports the action-oriented view, which foregrounds collectives and social construction whilst retaining a key role for ERVs. The facts that (a) ANTI-ALT was not predictive of RFI among Arabs but PRO-ALT was (implying that re-presentation is not always explanatorily exhaustive), and that (b) ERVs significantly predicted RFI in both groups, may suggest that it is a *soft* social constructionism (Thomas & Velthouse, 1990) that is at play here. In other words, “brute facts” (Searle, 1995, p. 2) or “somethings” (Wagner, 1998, p. 307) play a key role too.

#### ***Research Sub-question 4: Extra-representational Variables***

The fourth research sub-question asked: (4) ‘What is the relationship between extra-representational variables and social re-presentation for/against integration?’ Among the Maltese, SDO-E (but not SDO-D) and Reward were negatively related to RFI. Moreover, Reward moderated the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI: at Low Reward, the negative relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI was stronger, but always more integrationist than at Average Reward. Among Arabs, SDO<sub>C</sub> was negatively related to RFI and Localism was positively related to RFI. Sensitivity analysis resulted in the following minority results: for the Maltese, SDO-D was significant in Model D<sub>M</sub> (Step 1) and ANTI-

ALT×Survivalism was significant in Models C<sub>M</sub> and D<sub>M</sub>; and for Arabs, Survivalism was significant in Models C<sub>A</sub> and D<sub>A</sub> (see **Appendix F [Tables F41.6 & F41.8]**). The following discussion rests on Model A<sub>M</sub> and Model A<sub>A</sub> (main analyses), but alternative explanations are provided for these minority results too (see Aguinis et al., 2013).

Among the Maltese, the significant relationship between SDO-E and RFI (supporting *H*<sub>4.1A</sub>) was expected. Whereas SDO-D relates to zero-sum competitive views of intergroup conflict, SDO-E concerns the subtle maintenance of hierarchical relationships (Ho et al., 2015), as with anti-integrationism. In fact, SDO-D did not significantly predict RFI. Although unlikely, the minority result for SDO-D in supplementary Model D<sub>M</sub> might indicate an emerging form of more aggressive anti-integrationism. In turn, among Arabs, SDO<sub>C</sub> negatively predicted RFI (supporting *H*<sub>4.1B</sub>), supporting Ho et al.'s (2015) view that SDO indicates a preference for intergroup dominance, rather than *ingroup* dominance. Arabs with higher SDO<sub>C</sub> resist integration either because they seek to assimilate and shed their Arab identity, or because they resist the blurring of boundaries between them and the dominant group (a finding previously observed for dominant groups; Thomsen et al., 2008).

SoC, Localism and Survivalism were not significantly related to RFI among the Maltese (no support for *H*<sub>4.1C</sub>, *H*<sub>4.1E</sub> and *H*<sub>4.1F</sub>). The negative finding for SoC is not surprising, as belonging in one's neighbourhood need not predict integrationism. However, the notion of mentalities (Sammut, 2019a) is partly based on that of symbolic universes (Salvatore et al., 2018; see **Chapter 4**), and symbolic universes emphasising identity (cf. Localism) and anomie (cf. Survivalism) generally relate to a demonisation of the other (Salvatore, Mannarini et al., 2019; Veltri et al., 2019). Accordingly, the negative findings concerning Survivalism and Localism should be the subject of future research. In contrast, the negative relationship between Reward and RFI among the Maltese was statistically significant (supporting *H*<sub>4.1D</sub>). Reward has elements of the "belief in a just world" (Lerner, 1980, p. 11), that is, the belief that people get what they deserve. Moreover, this mentality promotes meritocratic thought,

which often relates to inegalitarian policy preferences (Ho et al., 2015), thus explaining this finding.

Among Arabs, Localism did positively relate with RFI (supporting  $H_{4.1G}$ ). This is in line with Sammut and Lauri's (2017) findings indicating an assimilationist preference among Arabs. Possibly, integrationism (RFI) and assimilationism (cf. Localism, with its emphasis on following local customs) are not always easily distinguishable locally, resulting in this relationship. Alternatively, Localism among Arabs may just be the right mindset to engage with the outgroup's culture, promoting integration. As with their Maltese counterparts, among Arabs, Survivalism did not significantly predict RFI (no support for  $H_{4.1H}$ ). Survivalism was a significant negative predictor only in the supplementary models for Arabs (Models C<sub>A</sub> and D<sub>A</sub>). Although unlikely, this relationship could imply that Arabs exhibiting high Survivalism are the persons being systematically excluded in society, or else the ones unable to tap social and other forms of capital, thus seeing little scope in engaging with the outgroup.

Turning to interactions, NFC did not moderate the effects of ANTI-ALT, in either group (no support for  $H_{4.2A}$  and  $H_{4.2B}$ ). Various studies (Dechesne et al., 2000; Dhont et al., 2011) support the moderating role of NFC in intergroup scenarios. The idea is that if people higher on NFC *freeze* on their viewpoints to a greater extent (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), then the greater conviction that the outgroup is anti-integrationist (ANTI-ALT) should amplify the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI. However, these negative findings suggest that higher NFC might well freeze one's views on issues in a myriad ways, regardless of systemic links between variables (e.g., there was also no significant interaction between NFC and PRO-ALT; see **Appendix F**).

Interestingly, the interaction between Reward and ANTI-ALT was statistically significant among the Maltese (supporting  $H_{4.2C}$ ). The more meritocratic one's mentality (higher Reward), and the higher one's ANTI-ALT, the less integrationist one is (lower RFI). Adaptive behaviours adjust to the situation in question and its ecological requirements

(Sammut, 2019a). In this case, at lesser levels of certainty that effort begets reward (Low Reward), ANTI-ALT was still linked to RFI but this relationship was always more integrationist than for other levels of Reward. Moderator hypotheses for Survivalism were non-significant for both groups (no support for  $H_{4.2D}$  and  $H_{4.2E}$ ). The moderator effect of Survivalism on ANTI-ALT among the Maltese was only significant for supplementary Models  $C_M$  and  $D_M$ . This interaction was disordinal and its substantive interpretation was unclear (see **Appendix F [Text F41.10]**). Finally, whilst no interaction hypotheses were advanced for SDO, it is worth noting that SDO did not moderate the effects of ANTI-ALT or PRO-ALT on RFI (see **Appendix F**).

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion, Study 3 investigated Maltese and Arab views on integration and on each other's projects, in terms of quantitative positionings. More specifically, the *systemic* nature of Arab-Maltese relations was studied by focusing on both RFI and AROI, among both groups. In turn, the *functional* element of Arab-Maltese relations was studied by retaining the centrality of the project (of integration) during analysis. In fact, RFI (which denoted 'SR for P') was studied as the criterion variable.

To recap, a survey was distributed, using snowball sampling, between November 2019 and January 2020 with Arab and Maltese persons living in Malta. The survey was made available in English, Maltese and Arabic, thus reaching a wider pool of participants. The survey measured age; self-identification (as Maltese, Arab or Arab-Maltese); RFI and AROI; Mentalities; SDO; NFC; Sense of Community; and demographic characteristics (see **Appendix F**). The findings showed that alternative re-presentation of the outgroup's project predicts one's own social re-presentation for/against integration, *among both the Maltese and Arabs*. There were different processes involved in re-presentation (for instance, ANTI-ALT did not predict RFI among Arabs), and extra-representational variables played a different role across the groups involved.

In essence, Study 3 completed the exploratory sequential design of the present research programme. The findings were meaningful both intra-collectively and inter-collectively. *Intra-collectively*, PRO-ALT, ANTI-ALT and the ERVs shed light on how the systemic relations underpinning the project function for each group (see **Chapter 2** and **Chapter 9**). *Inter-collectively*, comparisons were instructive. Arabs (RFI:  $M = 5.91$ ;  $SD = 0.73$ ) were clearly for integration, with low deviations from the mean. The Maltese (RFI:  $M = 4.50$ ;  $SD = 1.34$ ) were only slightly for integration, with higher deviations from the mean. The intergroup differences in standard deviations could signify different *coalitions* within each group. Among the Maltese (given the higher *SD*), multiple coalitions may advance integrationism, its opposite, or other projects which partially share aspects of integrationism. Among Arabs (given the lower *SD*), as far as integrationism is concerned, Study 3 may indicate less coalitional *variety*. These issues are further discussed in the next chapter, in view of the action-oriented formulae (see **Chapter 2**), the minimal model of argumentation (see **Chapter 3**), the literature on Arab-Maltese relations (see **Chapter 4**), and the underlying methodology (see **Chapter 5**), bringing Studies 1, 2 and 3 together.



## Chapter 9 – General Discussion

This thesis studied Arab-Maltese relations, within the framework of action-oriented social representations theory (SRT). Focusing on a specific joint project (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999) shed light on intergroup relations. Indeed, Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3 were linked. Study 1 (see **Chapter 6**) yielded arguments that informed the intergroup relations scales (IR scales), which were developed in Study 2 (see **Chapter 7**). In turn, the IR scales were the main measure in Study 3 (see **Chapter 8**), where the action-oriented approach (see **Chapter 2**), and the predictive influence of extra-representational variables (ERVs) on social re-presentation, were directly tested. The action-oriented formulae were thus completed.

These formulae schematised the action-oriented approach, according to which social re-presentation serves to sustain and promote a group's joint project. Joint projects (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999) are argumentatively sustained by ingroup members who, in tapping shared interobjective backdrops (Sammut et al., 2013, p. 5), advance claims for/against a project of public interest (see **Chapter 3**). The present inquiry showed how social re-presentation and argumentation are intrinsically linked and mutually generative (Kadianaki & Andreouli, 2017; Uzelgun et al., 2016): re-presentation is what one *does* during argumentative intercourse. In turn, social re-presentation, argumentation patterns and common projects coalesce individuals into coalitions (see **Chapter 4**), whereby groups of people “coordinate their actions to achieve common goals” (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010, p. 201).

In addressing intergroup dynamics, humans exhibit “a flexible coalitional psychology” (Leech & Cronk, 2017, p. 90), forming and breaking alliances as needed. When this flexibility erodes, group boundaries ossify and polarisation results. In this thesis, an overall methodology was devised (see **Chapter 5**) to study people's arguments and positions on

Arab-Maltese relations. This methodology thus applied principles from coalitional psychology to the collective level, effectively situating the theoretical work on action-oriented SRT and the minimal model of argumentation within a coalitional scenario.

Following an overview of the findings and contributions of Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3, this chapter presents a synthesis, which culminates in the completed action-oriented formulae and a joint display integrating the results of the three studies. This is followed by a discussion of the systemic processes involved in Arab-Maltese relations (based largely on Study 3). This is presented first because it discusses the silent coalitional alignments informing Arab-Maltese relations. An in-depth exploration of various substantive facets of Arab-Maltese relations (based largely on Study 1) is then pursued, complementing the discussions pursued in separate chapters above. This chapter ends with a final account weaving argumentation, re-presentation and coalitional psychology.

### **Study 1: Findings and Contributions**

To recap, in *Study 1*, Arab participants were interviewed concerning their views on integration. Participants' arguments generally favoured integration, which they re-presented in different ways (e.g., as mutual belonging). Patterns in participants' claims highlighted: (a) the view that integration is difficult but necessary; (b) an alternative re-presentation of the Maltese as resistant to integration; and (c) an all-round de-essentialism of both ingroup and outgroup. Participants' arguments showed the presence of various silent coalitions, with a few being *assimilationist* and accentuating migrants' responsibility to integrate, and others being *anti-integrationist* and negatively typifying the Maltese. However, the *pro-integrationist* silent coalition was the most prominent.

More specifically, participants made arguments from culture, economics, psychology, religion, socio-politics or stigma. In summary, arguments from *culture* emphasised how Arab-Maltese similarities help integration, or how Arab-Maltese differences hinder integration. Arguments from *economics* praised foreigners' contributions to Malta's economy, argued

against government handouts, or highlighted immigrants' workplace mistreatment. Some arguments from *psychology* re-presented the Maltese as good and friendly, or as greedy and backward. For the most part, however, psychological arguments were mixed/ambivalent, emphasising Arabs' different rates of integration, the Maltese's favourable exceptionalism toward Arabs they know personally, or the perceived variation among individual Maltese and Arabs (de-essentialism).

Positive arguments from *religion* stated that there are good relations/no tensions between Christians and Muslims in Malta, and mixed/ambivalent arguments highlighted Arabs' need to be diplomatic/practical. However, most religious arguments were negative, and explored how Arabic Islamic culture hinders integration, how religion makes Arabs stick out, both groups' fears of take-over by the other, or Maltese ethnocentrism and familism. In contrast, arguments from *socio-politics* were highly versatile. Positive socio-political arguments contended that Arabs integrate in society, that integration is the only way, that integration is improving, or that good examples of integration abound. Mixed/ambivalent arguments contended that other intercultural strategies can work too, that granting Arabs their rights/requests facilitates integration, that more education is needed, that integration depends mostly on migrants, or that integration is a fluid process. Negative arguments asserted that institutionalised discrimination hinders integration, that integration is happening slowly/badly, that Arabs are too publicly disengaged, that some immigrants are stubborn, that the far-right and racism are problematic, or that the Maltese hold racist anti-Arab views. Finally, arguments from *stigma* claimed that criminal Arabs tarnish Arabs' reputation, that the Maltese have a negative image of Arabs, or that the media stigmatizes Arabs and Muslims.

Study 1 mapped Arabs' arguments in terms of *claims*, *warrants*, *evidence*, and *qualifiers*, thus implementing the minimal model of argumentation and showing its empirical feasibility, whilst retaining the possibility of comparisons with Sammut et al.'s (2018) study with the Maltese. Claims had prescriptive elements, which surfaced in warrants, evidence and

qualifiers, and shed light on various silent coalitions. Moreover, the subsequent *ranking* of scale items in Study 2, further shed light on the potential for such claims to promote pro-versus anti-integrationist coalitions.

Study 1 also contributed to the literature by inviting Arabs to make their case argumentatively, partly fulfilling the socio-political commitments of the present inquiry (see **Chapter 5**). Participants' views directly influenced the IR scales, ensuring a *bottom-up* approach to intergroup relations research, and limiting the extent to which scholars' *a priori* views were privileged over those of the groups under study. Given their minority status and experiences of prejudice (Cefai et al., 2019), the risks of social desirability in participants' accounts or a reticence to discuss certain topics, were real and understandable (Staeheli & Nagel, 2008). Nonetheless, hypothetical questions, devil's-advocate questions, and invitations for argumentation, ensured that participants expressed an elaborate spectrum of views. Moreover, apparent contradictions (see Staeheli & Nagel, 2008) in participants' accounts were not left untapped, chiefly because the interview protocol specifically aimed at unpacking people's arguments. This made the study more valid, helping to achieve "a systematization of the repetitive arguments" (Castro & Batel, 2008, p. 481) used to promote or resist integration.

### **Study 2: Findings and Contributions**

In *Study 2*, the IR scales were composed and found to have sound validity and reliability characteristics. The Re-presentation for Integration (RFI) scale measured participants' views for/against integration, and the Alternative Re-presentation of Integration (AROI) scale measured participants' views of the outgroup's views for/against integration. These two 10-item scales were all backed by arguments made by Arab (Study 1) and Maltese (Sammut, 2015-2016) participants. Scale development on the basis of functionally differentiated qualitative data (such that claims, warrants, evidence and qualifiers fulfilled different roles) contributed to the literature on the exploratory sequential design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 69). Importantly, both scales resulted with the same items, enabling the

symmetrical study of social and alternative re-presentation. Exploratory factor analyses (EFA) showed RFI to be unidimensional, and AROI to be bidimensional. This contribution demonstrated that the attribution of views (alternative re-presentation) functions in a psychologically different manner.

Apart from the IR scales, Study 2 developed a novel expert-based rank-order scaling procedure, fulfilling aspirations initially discussed by Jaspars and Fraser (1984, pp. 110-123), and Gaskell (1996), concerning appropriate scaling procedures for SRT. This procedure circumvented problems impacting most forms of Thurstone scaling (e.g., equal interval scaling). Key features of the procedure concerned (a) the use of *expert judges* (not lay), ensuring that well-defined understandings of ‘integration’ influenced item ranking; (b) the positioning of items by *rank order*; and (c) *sensitivity analysis* (Agresti, 2010, p. 10), ensuring that the items’ final positions were corroborated by various measures. Study 2 served as a ‘bridge’ between co-constructed data obtained in Study 1 and quantitative data obtained in Study 3, allowing the fulfilment of the main research goal: the ecologically valid study of Arab-Maltese relations (see **Chapter 5**).

### **Study 3: Findings and Contributions**

*Study 3* involved a split-ballot survey among Maltese and Arab participants, obtaining both groups’ views on Arab-Maltese relations. This obtained more objective information concerning the distributions of the arguments scaled in Study 2. Arabs emerged as more integrationist than the Maltese. More importantly, one or both sub-dimensions of AROI predicted RFI in both groups. Among the Maltese, *pro-integrationist alternative re-presentation* (PRO-ALT) of Arabs’ project positively predicted RFI, and *anti-integrationist alternative re-presentation* (ANTI-ALT) negatively predicted RFI. Among Arabs, only PRO-ALT predicted RFI, and did so positively.

The findings of Study 3 largely complemented those of Study 1: the relative lack of coalitional variety seen among Arabs in Study 1 (participants were predominantly pro-

integrationist), was reflected in Arabs' low standard deviation in RFI ( $M = 5.91$ ;  $SD = 0.73$ ; see **Chapter 8**). Similarly, the Maltese's higher standard deviation in RFI ( $M = 4.50$ ;  $SD = 1.34$ ) reflected a relative ambivalence which had been observed in qualitative research (Sammut et al., 2018). That is, despite the predominance of anti-integrationist arguments essentialising Arabs (Buhagiar et al., 2018), some Maltese had also valued diversity and trade relations with Arabs, among other factors (Sammut et al., 2018). More directly, Study 3 also complemented previous research with the Maltese, in that this group emerged as less integrationist than Arabs, both overall and in terms of specific RFI scale items.

Following Elcheroth et al.'s (2011) emphasis on meta-representational surveys, Study 3 gave equal consideration to both social and alternative re-presentation. Furthermore, the whole research programme relied on substantive theory (Greene, 2007, p. 69; see **Chapter 5**). Had Study 3 ignored the substantive notions of action-oriented SRT, the Project (integration) could have been side-lined. For instance, adopting either a realist or even a constructionist social ontology (Guba & Lincoln, 1994), might still have directly problematized the Object itself. This is because ontological considerations can be mute vis-à-vis substantive methodological decisions. Thus, Study 3 studied the integrationist project as a proxy for Arab-Maltese relations, shedding light on coalitional alignments and their links to alternative re-presentation.

The workings of ERVs were also examined. Among the Maltese, SDO-Egalitarianism (SDO-E) and the Reward mentality negatively predicted RFI; and the Reward mentality moderated the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI. Among Arabs, SDOc (composite SDO measure) negatively predicted RFI, and Localism positively predicted RFI. As per the action-oriented approach (see **Chapter 2**), the socio-ontological status of ERVs was ultimately of secondary importance apropos of clarifying the link between ERVs and social re-presentation. For example, whether it be construed as a dispositional or a situational

orientation, SDO, as a generalized “intergroup orientation” (Hansen & Dovidio, 2016, p. 545), still predicted RFI.

### **Joint Display: Formulae and Illustrations**

The dynamics discussed above can be mapped onto the action-oriented formulae (see **Chapter 2**) in terms of coalitional alignments (Study 3) and the substantive content underlying them (Study 1). **Figure 34** presents this synthesis, nesting Formula 1 (substantive content) beneath Formula 2 (coalitional alignments). By necessity, this figure is largely illustrative, and only presents highly salient arguments per group. In turn, **Figures 35-44** illustrate the groups’ arguments and positionings more comprehensively. The figures illustrate, *per item*, the relationships between: (a) Maltese and Arab RFI item scores; (b) Maltese and Arab AROI item scores; (c) Maltese RFI and Maltese AROI item scores; (d) Arab RFI and Arab AROI item scores; (e) Maltese RFI and Arab AROI item scores; and (f) Arab RFI and Maltese AROI item scores. Moreover, **Figures 35-44** portray (g) a selection of both groups’ arguments behind the IR scale items (see **Appendix G** for the items excluded from the IR scales). The results for mean comparisons *across* and *within* groups were obtained using independent-samples *t*-tests and paired-samples *t*-tests respectively (see **Chapter 8**; see **Appendix F**). This joint display is presented here because it incorporates elements from both Study 1 and Study 3, informing the discussion that ensues.

**Figure 34**

*An Action-Oriented Formulation of Arab-Maltese Relations*

**SR for  $P_{\text{integration}}$ , as a function of:**

(a)  $SR_M$  = overall less integrationist than  $SR_A$  (Maltese RFI < Arab RFI)

- Social re-presentation SR [Culturally essentialised Arabs] *against* Project P [Integration] ... by Group  $G_1$  [Maltese] ... according to Group  $G_1$  [Maltese]

(b)  $AR_M^A$  = the more pro-integrationist  $AR_M^A$  is (Maltese: higher PRO-ALT), the more integrationist  $SR_M$  is (Maltese: higher RFI); and the more anti-integrationist  $AR_M^A$  is (Maltese: higher ANTI-ALT), the less integrationist  $SR_M$  is (Maltese: lower RFI)

- Social re-presentation SR [Arabs' openness to integration/Arabs integrating well (PRO-ALT) vs. Arabs' resistance to integration/Arabs sticking to their own (ANTI-ALT)] *for/against* Project P [Integration] ... by Group  $G_2$  [Arabs] ... according to Group  $G_1$  [Maltese]

(c)  $SR_A$  = overall more integrationist than  $SR_M$  (Arab RFI > Maltese RFI)

- Social re-presentation SR [Integration as difficult but necessary/De-essentialised Arabs] *for* Project P [Integration] ... by Group  $G_2$  [Arabs] ... according to Group  $G_2$  [Arabs]


(d)  $AR_A^M$  = the more pro-integrationist  $AR_A^M$  is (Arabs: higher PRO-ALT), the more integrationist  $SR_A$  is (Arabs: higher RFI); however, the anti-integrationist aspect of  $AR_A^M$  (Arab ANTI-ALT) is not significantly related with  $SR_A$  (Arab RFI)

- Social re-presentation SR [Maltese's openness to integration/Maltese relating well with Arabs (PRO-ALT) vs. Maltese's resistance to integration/Maltese's discrimination (ANTI-ALT)] *for/against* Project P [Integration] ... by Group  $G_1$  [Maltese] ... according to Group  $G_2$  [Arabs]

*Note.* A synthesis of the action-oriented formulae (Formula 2 in blue; Formula 1 in brown), based on qualitative research with the Maltese (Buhagiar et al., 2018; Sammut et al., 2018) and Arabs (Study 1), and quantitative research with both groups (Study 3). Formula 1 features *salient* re-presentations per group.  $SR_M$  = how the Maltese, in advancing their project, socially re-present Arab-Maltese relations;  $SR_A$  = how Arabs, in advancing their project, socially re-present Arab-Maltese relations;  $AR_M^A$  = how the Maltese alternatively re-present Arabs' project;  $AR_A^M$  = how Arabs alternatively re-present the Maltese's project. Part of Formula 1 in point (d) is greyed out because ANTI-ALT did not significantly predict RFI among Arabs.




**Figure 35**  
Item 1: Synthesis




Note. Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) arguments behind Item 1 (IR scales); and the values of, and relationships between, all score combinations for Item 1 among both groups. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

**Figure 36**  
Item 2: Synthesis




Note. Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) arguments behind Item 2 (IR scales); and the values of, and relationships between, all score combinations for Item 2 among both groups. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

**Figure 37**  
Item 3: Synthesis




Note. Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) arguments behind Item 3 (IR scales); and the values of, and relationships between, all score combinations for Item 3 among both groups. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

**Figure 38**  
*Item 4: Synthesis*




Note. Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) arguments behind Item 4 (IR scales); and the values of, and relationships between, all score combinations for Item 4 among both groups. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

**Figure 39**  
Item 5: Synthesis




Note. Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) arguments behind Item 5 (IR scales); and the values of, and relationships between, all score combinations for Item 5 among both groups. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

**Figure 40**  
Item 6: Synthesis




Note. Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) arguments behind Item 6 (IR scales); and the values of, and relationships between, all score combinations for Item 6 among both groups. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

**Figure 41**  
Item 7: Synthesis



Note. Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) arguments behind Item 7 (IR scales); and the values of, and relationships between, all score combinations for Item 7 among both groups.  $*p < .05$ ;  $**p < .01$ ;  $***p < .001$


**Figure 42**  
Item 8: Synthesis



Note. Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) arguments behind Item 8 (IR scales); and the values of, and relationships between, all score combinations for Item 8 among both groups. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$




**Figure 43**  
Item 9: Synthesis



Note. Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) arguments behind Item 9 (IR scales); and the values of, and relationships between, all score combinations for Item 9 among both groups. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

**Figure 44**  
*Item 10: Synthesis*



*Note.* Maltese (from Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab (from Study 1) arguments behind Item 10 (IR scales); and the values of, and relationships between, all score combinations for Item 10 among both groups. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

## Systemic Processes in Arab-Maltese Relations

In the syntheses presented above, qualitative and quantitative findings demonstrated various intergroup convergences and divergences. Firstly, (a) Arab RFI scores were always significantly more integrationist ( $p < .001$ ) than Maltese RFI scores per item. Thus, Arabs' symbolic resources (Zittoun, 2007, p. 344) for articulating integrationist views actually yielded more integrationist positions among this group. This represents a clear orientation *for* integration among Arabs. In contrast, despite their broader semiotic repertoire for articulating **Item 5** (which represented minimal integration based on specific benefits),<sup>35</sup> the Maltese were still *less* integrationist than Arabs here. Moreover, groups' arguments differed greatly at times. For example, the Maltese's arguments behind **Item 7** (concerning contrasts between Arabic Islamic culture and Maltese Christian culture) were largely *accusatory*, whereas Arabs' arguments were either *accusatory* or *self-critical*. Where the Maltese saw Arab separationism, Arabs saw Maltese familism; and Arabs' self-criticism referenced the conservative elements of Arabic Islamic culture. Overall, the Maltese's relative anti-integrationism and accusatory arguments, squarely aligned with the cultural essentialism they attribute to Arabs (Buhagiar et al., 2018), reflecting a lack of *dialogicality* (i.e., a lack of openness to engage with other views) in the Maltese's social re-presentation (Sammut & Gaskell, 2010).

Secondly, (b) the differences between Maltese RFI and Maltese AROI scores per item (and per overall scales; see **Appendix F**) were never significant, except for **Item 2** and **Item 6**. This could reflect naïve realism (Ross & Ward, 1996) and a false consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977). The presumption that one's re-presentations are natural and shared even by the outgroup, attests to the power of the dominant group in setting norms and narratives. Overall, (1) the Maltese's perceived naturalness of their views, and (2) their accusatory attributions to Arabs, complement previous findings concerning cultural essentialism (Buhagiar et al., 2018).

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<sup>35</sup> Item numbers in bold refer to the respective joint display (e.g., **Item 1** refers to **Figure 35**).

If essentialism attributes “inhering, fixed, and identity-determining essences” (Haslam, 1998, p. 291), then dominant group members could be attributing *self*-essentialism to the non-dominant group, such that they re-present Arabs as similarly viewing themselves as separationist, backward, imposing, fundamentalist, and notorious (**Items 1-10**; Buhagiar et al., 2018).

In contrast, (c) Arab RFI scores were always *more* integrationist than Arab AROI scores per item (and per overall scales; see **Appendix F**), possibly reflecting Arabs’ *re-presentational access* to Maltese views. In fact, Arabs’ accusations were qualitatively different than the Maltese’s accusations. With the exception of accusations of greed and backwardness (**Item 10**), Arabs largely attacked Maltese familism and ethnocentrism, Maltese fears of Arab domination, and discrimination and workplace mistreatment by the Maltese. Thus, Arabs largely expressed awareness of the Maltese’s resistance to integration. On a similar note, (d) Arab RFI scores, per item, were always more integrationist than Maltese AROI scores. However, (e) the relationships between Arab AROI scores and Maltese RFI scores *per item* were not uniform. This reflects dialectical tensions and distinct nuances in participants’ views: although Arab AROI and Maltese RFI *overall* scale scores were *not* significantly different (which further indicated Arabs’ *re-presentational access* to Maltese views; see **Chapter 8**), the situation was more complex vis-à-vis individual items and the arguments behind them. Finally, (f) despite there being no clear patterns between Maltese AROI and Arab AROI scores, Arab RFI scores were always significantly more integrationist than *all* other views (Maltese RFI, Maltese AROI and Arab AROI) per item. This provided further evidence for Arabs’ pro-integrationist silent coalition (see Study 1; **Items 1-10**).

### **Notable Patterns in Arab-Maltese Relations**

I now contextualize the findings of the present inquiry in view of the broader literature (see **Chapter 4**), noting key patterns surrounding anti-Arab views, anti-Muslim views, the struggles of Arab Muslim women and intercultural strategies. The focus on substantive

patterns avoids treating mixed-methods research as a “quick fix” (Giddings, 2006, p. 195), and avoids ‘neutralising’ rarer perspectives, resisting “the seeming drive to grasp a ‘whole’ picture, with little critical reflection” (Freshwater, 2007, p. 140). This discussion recognises “the concept of the whole [as] always being partial in itself” (Freshwater, 2007, p. 140), and paves the way for recommendations for ameliorating intergroup relations (presented in **Chapter 10**).

### *Anti-Arab Sentiment and Identity Conflations*

In Study 1, participants at times argued that perceptions of good Christian-Muslim relations are even shared by Christians (**Item 3**), whilst rebutting the view that Arabs are terrorist savages (**Position 4.2**).<sup>36</sup> This argument indicated awareness of dominant group members’ “outgroup-to-group generalization” (Albareello et al., 2019, p. 59), conflating Arabs with Islamic terrorists and similarly negative outgroups. Shaheen (2003) had similarly uncovered negative movie representations portraying Arabs as backward savages. However, in Study 1, participants did not reference *movie* representations of Arabs (possibly, due to changing representations over time). Rather, participants largely mentioned negative newspaper and social media representations of Arabs. Their arguments corroborated studies on anti-Arab prejudice in mainstream media (Brown et al., 2015). Participants also expressed frustration with Maltese folklore (e.g., local legends depicting Turks negatively) which perpetuated popular stereotypes and, by extension, impacted local Arabs too (**Argument 6.0**).

Whilst the Arab-Turk and Arab-terrorist conflations (Cinnirella, 2012, p. 179; Darmanin, 2015, p. 36-37) were unanimously rejected by participants, the link between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslims’ (Helbling, 2012, pp. 1-5; Chircop, 2014, p. 68) was negotiated in various manners. In Study 1, some participants referenced ‘Arabs’, ‘Muslims’, or ‘Arab Muslims’; other participants positioned Islam as an intrinsic part of being Arab; and others

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<sup>36</sup> Argument and Position numbers in bold refer to arguments/positions presented in **Chapter 6** (e.g., **Argument 1.0** = Arguments from Culture, **Position 1.1** = Positive Cultural Position, etc.).

promoted the re-presentation of the ‘Maltese Muslim’ whilst arguing explicitly against the racialization of Muslims. In Study 3, notions relating to Muslim places of worship (**Item 3**) and Arabic Islamic culture (**Item 7**) thus yielded meaningful results in the study of *Arab* integration.

More concretely, Arab Muslims’ oft-reported difficulties when applying for job interviews (e.g., Rooth, 2010) featured in Study 1 too (**Position 2.2**). In Malta, such difficulties featured in arguments accusing the dominant group of requesting identity homogeneity (**Item 8**). This demonstrates how identity over-simplifications can synergistically amplify anti-Arab prejudice (Bleich & Maxwell, 2012, p. 45). As per Azzopardi Cauchi’s (2004, pp. 203-204) findings, anti-Arab prejudice possibly extends to local police officers—this potentially explains one participant’s protest (in Study 1) against alleged false police accusations against Arabs (**Position 5.3**). Likewise, claims ascribing discrimination to Maltese *institutions* (**Position 5.3**) complement Cefai et al.’s (2019) documentation of *interpersonal* discrimination amongst children in Maltese educational settings. In view of Cefai et al.’s (2019) findings, participants’ hopes, in Study 1, that integration will improve inter-generationally (**Position 5.1**), may be misplaced unless efforts at ameliorating intergroup relations are actively pursued.

**Re-presentation of Arab Migrants.** In Study 1, participants generally referenced first-generation working-class Arab migrants, with some exceptions (e.g., Aya [female, 25] mentioned rich Arabs too; **Position 3.3**; cf. McKinney, 1997).<sup>37</sup> Re-presentations of young Arab students were also appreciable—particularly with second-generation Arab and Arab-Maltese persons. In fact, educational settings were mentioned as one context where intercultural mixing is, or could, take place (**Position 5.1**). Interestingly, in Study 2 and Study 3, only Item H referenced ‘migrants’ directly, and this item was excluded from the IR scales due to poor factor loadings. This possibly indicates that in Malta, the categories ‘Arabs’ and

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<sup>37</sup> Participant characteristics are presented in the format: [Pseudonym (gender, years of age)].

‘migrants’ are somewhat re-presentationally distinct, unless one clearly references ‘Arab migrants’. Nonetheless, media discourse and reactionary populism (Krzyżanowski et al., 2018) consistently contribute to anti-Arab and anti-refugee politics in Europe. Similarly, notions relating to far-right parties, and fears of intercultural mixing or cultural/political take-over, all featured in participants’ arguments (**Items 1-10**), reflecting continued strains in migrant-native relations within the European Union.

Interestingly, although welfare cuts can be an anti-migrant talking point, one economic claim argued against government handouts for Arab and other migrants (**Position 2.1**). This finding aligns with action-oriented SRT, positing that similar re-presentational content can be used to advance different projects. It also reflects Mestheneos and Ioannidi’s (2002) finding that welfare dependence can hinder successful migrant integration in Europe. However, Mestheneos and Ioannidi (2002) also point out that migrants risk hunger and homelessness in the absence of a solid welfare structure. This is peripherally linked to local findings concerning migrants’ mistrust in Maltese institutions, which can trigger a vicious circle that materially disadvantages the migrants themselves (see Fsadni & Pisani, 2012, p. 74). Similarly, in Study 1, the argument that immigrants sometimes do things their own way, emphasised that this ends up being to their own detriment, even if they do so out of helplessness (**Position 5.3**). These arguments did not feature in the IR scales (Study 2 and Study 3), as their specificity would have impacted the scales’ gradualism.

### ***Re-presentation of Muslims and Islam***

Other scholarly research has focused specifically on Muslim migrants (see **Chapter 4**). For instance, Bruneau et al. (2018) documented the dehumanization of Muslim refugees in Europe. In Study 1, participants observed that even *Maltese* Muslims (non-refugees) are sometimes told to ‘go back to their country’ (cf. Amer, 2020; **Position 4.3**; **Position 5.3**). Moreover, participants showed awareness (a) that the social object re-presenting Islam in Malta is ‘Libyans’ (**Position 6.1**); (b) that Arabs and Muslims are equated with security

threats (**Position 5.3; Position 6.1**); and (c) that re-presentations positing an incompatibility between Islamic values/cultures and European ones are hegemonic (**Position 1.2**). These findings corroborate previous research (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017; Buhagiar et al., 2020, p. 70; Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010; Pop, 2016; Soubiale & Roussiau, 1998).

In Study 1, participants *negotiated* these representations through the use of humour, and by arguing that Muslims suffer more from terrorism than Christians do, especially in Muslim-majority countries (**Position 4.1**). For instance, Nabil (male, 37) actively uses dark humour to diffuse tensions between him and prejudiced natives (**Position 4.2**). Other participants also partly *acknowledged* these re-presentations, for instance, by conceding that finding middle ground between cultures is difficult (**Position 1.2; Item 6**), particularly because identity markers (e.g., linguistic accents, etc.) can devalue one's social position (**Position 4.3**). This aligns with research in Poland showing Muslims to occupy low levels of the social hierarchy in the eyes of majority members (Gołębiowska, 2009). Moreover, in Study 3, participants also *resisted* such representations: Arabs' re-presentation (Arab RFI) for mutual religious co-existence (**Item 3**), and against the view that Christian-Muslim contrasts are insuperable (**Item 7**), were more integrationist than the stance attributed to them by the Maltese (Maltese AROI).

Indeed, the fundamental issue in Arab-Maltese relations seems to revolve around *interreligious* differences and preferred manners of relating with religious Others (**Argument 4.0**). Study 1 saw frequent demands for minority rights and protestations against Maltese *religious* ethnocentrism. Importantly, collective memory and intergroup conflict are often linked (Psaltis, 2016), and both the Maltese (Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arabs (Study 1) appealed to historical re-presentations of (cultural) religiosity, and to binary re-presentations of *Christianity-versus-Islam*. Arguments appealing to collective memory (e.g., concerning Christendom or Islam; **Position 4.3; Item 8**) find similar counterparts in Europe. For instance, in the Netherlands, historical re-presentations of Christian cultural continuity promoted



resistance to Muslim immigrants (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014). Similarly, in Malta, the hegemonic status of cultural Christianity is often used to justify impositions of the majority culture (Darmanin, 2015, p. 37). In contrast, however, re-presentations of Dutch history emphasising tolerance promoted acceptance of Muslims' expressions of faith (Smeekes et al., 2012). Likewise, re-presentations of Arab-Maltese similarities promoted integrationism (**Item 4**) in Study 1. Thus, the malleability of historical representations makes them uniquely amenable to intergroup contestation (Psaltis, 2016).

The main finding of Study 3—that alternative re-presentation predicts social re-presentation for/against project P—complements this literature, explaining why the provision of Muslim minority rights can lead to an intolerant backlash by the dominant group (Darmanin, 2015, p. 42). Such reactions would potentially fuel bolder demands by Muslims who essentialize their identity in response (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2011, p. 27), and so on, resulting in a spiral of conflict. However, re-presentational work on the 'Maltese Muslim' identity (**Position 4.3**), and similar re-presentations, may counter this reactionary identity re-affirmation, as could an increased visibility of good Catholic-Muslim relations (**Position 5.1**). In Study 1, the local Archbishop's stance toward Muslims was praised, and participants cited examples of employers providing prayer rooms for Muslims, or mentioned good acts by a Catholic priest. These examples echoed previous research, both in Malta (Grima, 2014) and Italy (Arcidiacono et al., 2012). However, Study 1 participants also noted the general invisibility of such examples (**Position 5.1**).

**The Struggles of Arab Muslim Women.** Representations of Arab women fluctuate between portrayals of activist rebels or helpless victims (Mustafa-Awad & Kirner-Ludwig, 2017; Mustafa-Awad et al., 2019). In Study 1, one participant emphasized her identity as a woman, and argued that if she wears the hijab, she has to assert herself through her choice of dress (**Position 4.2**), reflecting the care with which Arab Muslim women have to navigate the social sphere. Mentions of workplace discrimination and verbal harassment due to the hijab,

and of the difficulties faced by Muslim women in finding employment (**Position 2.2**), echoed Gauci and Pisani's (2013, p. 19) similar findings with migrant women locally (see also NCPE, 2010, p. 29). Participants clarified that such difficulties are equally faced by non-Arab Maltese Muslims. This reflects Amer and Howarth's (2018) point that Muslims pertaining to the dominant group are often seen as a "threat from 'within'" (p. 624), and Nagel and Staeheli's (2008) observation that the hijab can make natives question one's national loyalty. These patterns reflect broader European trends (e.g., in France and Romania; Geisser, 2010; Mohamed-Salih, 2015).

In Study 1, participants' views on women were far from homogeneous. Nasser (male, 40) favoured more conservative gender relations, and what he perceived as modest female clothing (**Position 1.2; Item 6**). Such arguments alternatively re-presented the Maltese view of women as sexualizing (instead of liberating), echoing O'Brien's (2018) observation of Islamic counter-representations of the European project. In contrast, Yara (female, 21) and Ali (male, 27) favoured a more egalitarian view (**Position 1.2**); and Emad (male, 52) dismissed Islam's view of women as backward and restrictive, and opposed "the supremacy of male decision power" (Arcidiacono et al., 2012, p. 6) he observes among Arab Muslims (**Position 6.1**). Camilleri-Cassar (2011, p., 193) reported that ethnic minority women in Malta risk socio-economic exclusion. Similarly, Yara (female, 21) was disappointed at the reality of her female Arab peer staying at home doing domestic chores (**Position 1.2**), and favoured the integration of Arab Muslim women through work and tertiary education.

Whilst all participants in Study 1 affirmed people's liberty to wear the hijab in Malta, and most defended this practice, some participants expressed their preference against wearing the hijab, so that female Arab Muslims blend in (**Position 5.2**). This echoes Iraqis' views concerning feelings of conspicuousness when wearing the hijab in Britain (Platts-Fowler & Robinson, 2015), and similar findings locally (Grima, 2014). Overall, Study 1 participants discussed the hijab in terms of its social consequences, its importance for Muslim women, and

the diplomacy/practicality involved in deciding whether to wear it—but no principled objection was raised against the hijab. In contrast, disapproval of other religio-cultural practices *was* at times expressed as a matter of principle. For instance, Emad (male, 52) disagreed with Islamic prohibitions on intermarriages between Christian men and Muslim women (**Position 4.3**). The present work thus complements Adelman and Verkuyten's (2020) findings concerning such "principled objections" (p. 1) among *non-Muslim majority members* in the Netherlands, by reporting such objections among *Muslim minority members* in Malta.

### ***Intercultural Strategies***

Study 1 and Study 3 both found evidence for Arabs' view that *integration*, though desirable, is a difficult prospect. This mirrors the views of Arabs in Britain (Nagel & Staeheli, 2008). The intercultural strategies discussed by Study 1 participants included integration, multiculturalism, assimilation, melting-pot models, and parallel systems (separation). Participants' favourable construals of integration largely aligned with Berry's (2011) formulation, whereby integration allows migrants to *retain* home cultures whilst *accessing* host cultures. In fact, in Study 3, Arabs' integrationist disposition was expressed strongly (Arab RFI:  $M = 5.91$ ;  $SD = 0.73$ ) (**Items 1-10**). Integration has been argued to be one of the best intercultural strategies for migrant adaptation (Berry et al., 2006; see Ward, 2008). Similarly, Study 1 participants generally re-presented integration as the best outcome, or indeed as the only solution. In contrast, Maltese arguments for integration were softer (e.g., claims that Arabs are OK or pleasant to deal with; **Item 1**; Sammut et al., 2018).

In Study 1, issues surrounding access to social capital featured prominently in claims highlighting the Maltese's exceptionalism with Arabs they know personally. The idea of becoming "one of ours/us" ('minn tagħna' in Maltese), and subsequently managing to access social goods (**Position 3.2**), was the quintessential argument for the importance of social capital. Similarly, arguments stressing the need for Arabs' diplomacy/practicality (**Position 4.2**), or the difficulty in accessing tight Maltese social circles (**Position 4.3**), highlighted the

challenges inherent in accessing such capital. Indeed, the procurement of social capital despite daily obstacles, is emblematic of the potential arduousness of integration. On their part, the Maltese's resistance to integration generally rests on *perceptions* of cultural contrasts, problems with cultural contact and large migrant numbers; and *accusations* of Arab backwardness, separationism, cultural imposition, deceit, religious extremism and notoriety (Buhagiar et al., 2018; Sammut et al., 2018; Sammut, 2015-2016; **Items 6-10**).

Other forms of integration constitute economic or linguistic integration. Arguments praising foreigners' contribution to the country, and against government handouts, favoured *economic* integration (**Position 2.1**). Dražanová et al. (2020, p. 9) found that European citizens prioritize migrants' tax contributions, and their adaptation to local customs. However, in Study 1, Arabs also accused the Maltese of economic greed (**Position 3.3**), and of wanting migrants to work for them whilst hindering their self-expression (**Position 2.2**). The latter argument possibly relates to labour market discrimination, experienced by underpaid migrants (Attard et al., 2014, p. 17). Concerning *linguistic* integration (see Dražanová et al., 2020, p. 9), Study 1 participants argued that migrants should learn Maltese, especially when they spend a long time on the islands. Acknowledging the Maltese's concern of Arabs' separationism, participants qualified their arguments by stating that, nowadays, many migrants are taking integration courses (**Item 2**).

Other intercultural strategies explored by Study 1 participants included multiculturalism, assimilation, deprovincialization, interculturalism and tolerance. Contrary to Berry's (2011) formulation, Sarah (female, 29) differentiated between integration and *multiculturalism* (**Position 5.2**), criticizing the latter's potential to confine people in rigid identities. This reflected tensions between reified (academic) and consensual (lay) representations (Howarth, 2006b). Sarah's critique somewhat aligns with research showing how sometimes ethnic diversity can correlate with less social cohesion and community trust, especially in polarised environments (Koopmans & Veit, 2014; Laurence & Bentley, 2016).

In fact, Sarah favoured instead a multiculturalism where individuals can creatively reconfigure their identity expressions—something that becomes possible when group boundaries are not policed (Buhagiar & Sammut, 2020a).

Turning to *assimilation*, participants generally clarified that they were against this intercultural strategy in principle, similar to Arabs in Britain (Nagel & Staeheli, 2008). This contrasted with Sammut and Lauri's (2017, p. 236) findings concerning a high quantitative preference for assimilation among Arabs locally. This discrepancy could reflect either a change in views over time, or else a dialectical tension between quantitative and qualitative research (Maxwell & Loomis, 2003). Claims surrounding Arabic Islamic conservatism and the need for daily diplomacy/practicality in relating with locals (**Position 4.2; Position 4.3; Item 7**) could, *prima facie*, be construed as assimilationist. However, such *post hoc* interpretations of the data conflict with participants' construal of assimilation. For instance, Aya (female, 25) favoured a form of assimilation/melting-pot whereby *both* the dominant and non-dominant groups merge into a *new*, redefined, Maltese identity. Interestingly, Item H (see **Appendix G**)—which was excluded from the IR scales following EFA—was the most assimilationist item. This possibly reflects the psychological separation between integration and assimilation, among both groups. Nonetheless, the Maltese's desire for Arabs' conformity (**Items 6-10**) does reflect a preference for Arabs' assimilation. These dialectical tensions support the action-oriented view of social re-presentation, by showing how the dominant group can systemically influence the re-presentation of a contested project, by appealing to notions generally associated with other projects altogether in resisting it (see **Chapter 2**).

Study 1 also featured elements of *deprovincialization* (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005; Verkuyten et al., 2010), which involves a re-evaluation of what it means to be Maltese, together with a higher valuation of minorities (not unlike Aya's view of 'good assimilation'). Calls were made for building and making visible the Maltese Muslim identity, thus effectively redefining the Maltese person as potentially non-Christian. Such identity work promotes the

microgenesis of new social representations over generations (cf. Psaltis, 2015, p. 72). Such representations could also emerge through second-generation migrants' problematisation of integration as amorphous (**Position 5.2**). Likewise, arguments for intercultural and interfaith dialogue and engagement (**Position 4.1; Position 5.1; Item 1; Item 2**) essentially called for *interculturalism* (Scott & Safdar, 2017), emphasising the need for inter-relationality and intergroup contact, and welcoming identity hybridization and shared commonalities (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2020), together with a sense of 'mutual belonging'. By simultaneously prioritizing a shared identity (e.g., national identity), interculturalism guards against the pitfalls and group segregations that preoccupied Sarah (female, 29) vis-à-vis multiculturalism (see Scott & Safdar, 2017).

The strategy of *colorblindness* (Levin et al., 2012) was not discernible in Study 1, and *tolerance* (Verkuyten et al., 2019, 2020a) was variously negotiated. Participants arguing against tolerance saw it as a bad form of integration and preferred 'mutual respect'. Likewise, the Maltese's selective tolerance for Arab acquaintances was re-presented as implicit racism. In contrast, others framed tolerance positively when highlighting integration's fluid nature, or its improvement over time and generations (**Position 5.1; Position 5.2**). Participants' appraisals of tolerance relied on permission, mutual co-existence, or mutual respect or esteem (see Darmanin, 2015; Forst, 2003, pp. 73-75), with these being difficult to disentangle in participants' arguments. Thus, on the one hand, tolerance can make Arab minorities feel unaccepted (see Verkuyten et al., 2019). On the other hand, arguments stating that Arabs can live on their own without mixing with natives too much, inadvertently supported tolerance as the "minimal condition for living together despite meaningful differences" (Verkuyten et al., 2019, p. 28). Arguments entertaining parallel systems (e.g., parallel marriage systems) as a possibility arguably depended on a similar premise (**Position 5.2**).

Another premise which arguably underlies talk of parallel systems is that some cultural discordances are hardly surmountable, or else that cultural differences need not be

homogenised. This reflects the dual appeal of talk of cultural differences (Garner, 2010, p. 130; Taguieff, 1990), which can comprise conflicting interobjective backgrounds pertaining to different political factions—in line with the action-oriented approach. For example, as noted in **Chapter 4**, far-rightists can appeal to cultural differences to push for ethno-statism (Garner, 2010, p. 130; Taguieff, 1990). Instead, Study 1 participants referenced cultural differences to push for what were varyingly re-presented as minority *rights* or *requests*.

### ***Identity Negotiations***

In managing different societal factions, Arabs in Malta negotiate their identity on a daily basis, as do other minority groups. Such identity negotiations were often palpable in Study 1 participants' claim-making on politics. In Nagel and Staeheli's (2008) study, Arabs argued that the Arab community should be more politically active in the broader community. Similarly, Study 1 witnessed (a) claims criticising the public disengagement of Arabs, and (b) claims favouring the provision of minority rights/requests for conflict attenuation purposes (**Position 5.2; Position 5.3**). Concerning the former, both groups converged in their perception of Arabs' relative disengagement (**Item 2**). Concerning the latter, the Maltese's claim that "Arabs expect special treatment due to racism" (Sammut et al., 2018, p. 404)—despite not informing scale items directly—presents a direct challenge to Arabs' calls for change. Similar to Nagel & Staeheli's (2008) study, Study 1 participants also favoured Arabs' contributions to Maltese society, for various reasons: (a) to *reciprocate* the welcome received as migrants; (b) as a *natural* consequence of one's rights being safeguarded; or (c) as a *matter of fact* (e.g., Arabs helping elderly Maltese neighbours, etc.) (**Position 5.1; Position 5.2**).

Participants adapted their identity in different *manners*, which in turn influenced their social participation. For instance, Arabs' public disengagement could be a "de-categorization strategy for reducing intergroup bias" (Arcidiacono et al., 2012, p. 7) and a way to keep a low profile (e.g., by not wearing the hijab, not praying in public, etc.), hence being 'diplomatic' (**Position 4.2**). Therefore, *de-categorisation* potentially allows Arabs in Malta to tap social

capital (Gittell & Vidal, 1998, p. 15) they would not otherwise be able to capitalise on, notably when their identity morphs according to the situation (see Colombo et al., 2009). Sometimes, tension arise. For instance, Aya (female, 25) was caught between a *loyalty strategy* (seeing her stay in Malta as temporary) and a *voice strategy* (maintaining ties both with Malta and her home country, and emphasizing her social commitments). Jamal (male, 41) gravitated more toward an *exit strategy*, embracing Malta fully following his escape from a war-torn country (see Hirschman, 1970). Kivisto and Vecchia-Mikkola (2013) similarly report how such strategies influence Iraqi immigrants' integration in Rome and Helsinki.

Participants' identity negotiations also took place in different *contexts*. Arguing that 'Some Arabs integrate more than others [...]' (**Position 3.2**), participants noted that the location where Arab migrants settle upon arrival influences their integration process, corroborating Platts-Fowler and Robinson's (2015) observation that Iraqi refugees' place of residence in England directly influences the experiences they go through (e.g., friendly neighbours vs. racial harassment). Accordingly, "integration is grounded and embodied in space and place" (Platts-Fowler & Robinson, 2015, p. 488). This evinces Ali's (male, 27) and Yara's (female, 21) emphases on constant adaptation, given integration's indeterminateness (**Position 5.2**). Context influences whether one experiences good Catholic-Muslim relations (**Position 4.1**; cf. Grima, 2014) or conflict with natives (**Position 3.3**), and whether one retains hope in institutional efforts toward integration (**Position 5.2**) or else perceives/experiences institutional discrimination (**Position 5.3**). Similarly, context can influence whether Arabs marry a native—which according to some participants, is a great aid to integration (**Position 3.2**), despite the difficulties faced by Arab-Maltese couples locally (Cassar, 2005, p. 48).

Individual *disposition* also plays a role, as per Yousef's (male, 68) observation that friendlier individuals integrate better than overcautious ones (**Position 3.2**). This accords with Mestheneos and Ioannidi's (2002) finding that personality, social skills (e.g., when finding



employment), and support from neighbours can facilitate integration in Europe, whilst perceptions/experiences of institutionalised racism hinder it. In like manner, feelings of culture-shock (**Position 1.2**) can impede individuals from psychological adaptation (Winkelman, 1994).

In essence, perceptions/experiences of institutional discrimination bring together: (a) the potentiality of a conflict spiral between Maltese Christians and Arab Muslims, both of whom may radicalise in response to the other (Dekker & van der Noll, 2012, p. 112; Kruglanski et al., 2014, 2018); (b) changes in minority members' preferred intercultural strategies (Holtz et al., 2013); and (c) minority members' daily identity negotiations (Cvetkovska et al., 2020). These links between interpersonal and collective processes, are appreciable in that whilst some participants mentioned experiences of direct discrimination and others did not, almost all discussed discrimination (even collective) of some sort, echoing similar dynamics observed by Holtz et al. (2013) among Muslims in Germany. Likewise, stigma-related claims (**Position 6.1**) showed that Arab Muslims are aware of negative media representations about them (Brown et al., 2015).

In combatting anti-Muslim views, some Muslims negotiate their identity and political alignments by portraying European democracy as a hypocritical and neo-imperialist project (O'Brien, 2018). In Study 1, for instance, Nasser (male, 40) argued that Europe selectively grants human rights to majority members (**Position 2.2**). This "significant counter discourse [...] moves many Muslims in Europe to resist their subjugation in myriad ways" (O'Brien, 2018, p. 10), and relates to Sartawi and Sammut's (2012) differentiation between the ontological (living authentically Islam's core principles) and pragmatic (following Islam flexibly) strategies that Muslims in Europe choose among. In Study 1, ontological strategies featured in arguments from religious certainty (e.g., by Farid [male, 49]; **Position 4.1**), positing Islam as absolutely true and non-negotiable. Arguably, there is also an ontological strategic element (Sartawi & Sammut, 2012) in hijab-wearing and abstinence from alcohol

among Arab Muslims in Malta. In contrast, religio-cultural arguments for diplomacy/practicality (**Position 4.2**) were more pragmatic (Sartawi & Sammut, 2012). Similarly, Ali (male, 27) argued for a flexible Islam that adjusts to local customs, and Emad (male, 52) criticized rigid Islams, arguing against legalistic prohibitions (e.g., on alcohol or pork consumption).

This continuum—from outright demands for Islam (cf. ontological strategy), to Islamic flexibility, to outright criticism of Islam (cf. pragmatic strategy)—reflects the malleable terrain of Arab Muslim identification in Malta. As examples of these three positions, consider Farid’s (male, 49) argument for the provision of a mosque, or land for building one, by government (**Position 4.1**); Ali’s (male, 27) argument that Arab shop-owners should concede to selling alcohol (**Position 3.2**); and Emad’s (male, 52) overall case against Arabic Islamic culture (**Position 4.3**). This tension between ontological and pragmatic strategies (Sartawi & Sammut, 2012) informed the IR scales too. Consider, for example, **Item 2** (*disengagement vs. co-existence*), **Item 3** (*calls for rights/requests vs. non-problematic Christian-Muslim relations*), **Item 6** (*traditional gender roles vs. gender egalitarianism*), and **Item 7** (*criticism of Islam among both groups*). Despite Maltese attributions to the contrary, in Study 3, Arabs were less likely to view Arab-Maltese religio-cultural differences as problematic (**Item 6**). This could reflect either their awareness of *intra*-group diversity or else their gradual adoption of local views over time.

Perhaps opposing ontological strategies (Sartawi & Sammut, 2012), arguments from de-essentialism (of both ingroup and outgroup) were highly warranted in Study 1. De-essentialism featured notably in psychological arguments (**Argument 3.0**), but not exclusively (e.g., **Argument 5.0**; **Argument 6.0**). This contrasted with Holtz et al.’s (2013) findings with Muslims in Germany, who essentialised their identity in response to perceived collective discrimination, and differentiated themselves from German society. Instead, Study 1 participants differentiated themselves from Islamic terrorists (**Position 4.1**; **Position 4.2**), to

whom they ascribed ignorance, malign intentions and inauthenticity. De-essentialism and subsequent differentiation from terrorists serve protective identity functions (Sammut & Sartawi, 2012), allowing Arab Muslims to reclaim a more positive identity rooted in daily reality.

Moreover, Arabs' de-essentialism counters the cultural essentialism levelled at Arabs by the Maltese. The Maltese had argued that Arabs are (a) *reducible* to their culture, (b) *determined* by it, (c) *delineated* by it (and intrinsically different from the Maltese), and (d) *temporally* influenced by it (Buhagiar et al., 2018). These views were respectively countered by Arabs' arguments concerning: (a) the ubiquity of individual *variability* (**Argument 3.0**); (b) Arabs' cultural *adaptability* (**Position 5.1**; **Position 5.2**); (c) Maltese Muslim *identities* (**Position 4.3**), together with *good examples* of Arab-Maltese relations (**Position 5.1**); and (d) the necessity, or even *improvement*, of integration over time and generations (**Argument 5.0**). Concerning the delineatory form of cultural essentialism (Buhagiar et al., 2018), Grima (2014) reports how Maltese self-identification as European and 'not Arab', may underlie anti-Muslim views. Revealingly, Abdul's (male, 68) argument that the Maltese are Arab and 'not European' informed the most anti-integrationist item (**Item 10**). This shows how identity contestations can co-opt an outgroup's identity, and how the dominant group's identity can be a re-presentational locus for coalitional ends.

### **Weaving Argumentation, Re-Presentation and Coalitional Psychology**

The above discussions elucidate the intersections between the main concepts used in this work. In essence, the action-oriented approach (see **Chapter 2**) advanced three basic tenets: (a) re-presentation is guided by, and *functions for*, the actuation of joint projects (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999); (b) social and alternative re-presentation interrelate *systemically*, especially in intergroup scenarios; and (c) methodological concerns with action shed light on how social influence sustains silent coalitions tending toward a specific project. Evidence for this framework was provided inductively and abductively (Salvatore, 2017). *Inductively*, the

statistical relationship between AROI sub-dimensions and RFI provided direct evidence for the action-oriented view. *Abductively*, the above discussions noted how intergroup sentiments, migrants, Muslims and Islam, religio-cultural similarities and differences, gender, intercultural strategies (particularly integration), and identity connotations and negotiations, can be re-presented for coalitional ends.

The action-oriented reformulation also inspired the minimal model of argumentation (see **Chapter 3**), on which minimal argumentation analysis (Study 1) was based. Motivated argumentation (Mercier & Sperber, 2011) buttresses specific *claims*, supporting one project *over* another. This shifted the focus, within intergroup relations research, toward *silent coalitions* (see **Chapter 4**): subjects advance coalitional aims, through the re-presentational climate they perpetuate in their everyday argumentation. Interestingly, in discussing the requirements for coalition coordination, Tooby and Cosmides (2010) prefer the term “mental coordination” (p. 203) over “common knowledge” (p. 202), as the latter ostensibly “requires infinite cognitive resources” (p. 203) and could rest on a “flawed assumption of economic rather than ecological rationality” (p. 203). This work provides an answer to this dilemma: social re-presentation provides the *substantive* aspect to ‘mental coordination’. Re-presentational common knowledge is already charged, directed, often presumed among coalition members and necessarily incomplete, and is only cognitively salient insofar as it enables actionable pursuits. This view grounds re-presentation and argumentation in a “coalitional ontology” (Lin et al., 2016, p. 313), furthering the study of dominant/non-dominant group relations within SRT (see Marková, 2008). More concretely, intergroup relations constitute the broader domain within which coalitions interact through re-presentation and argumentation.

It follows that the socio-ontological gap between argumentation and re-presentation cannot be too wide. Both upward (to the collective level) and downward reductionism (to the distributive level) (Valsiner & Rosa, 2007, p. 3) theoretically underdetermine the complexity

involved. For instance, argumentation is more directly influenced by distributive properties (i.e., the characteristics of interlocutors) than social re-presentation. However, it would be mistaken to presuppose that the two processes lie on different ontological planes.

Argumentation is effectively the attempt to persuade interlocutors of re-presentations that are held as legitimate by the speaker's silent coalition. Accordingly, the action-oriented formulae raise pertinent questions on intergroup consilience. Consider perspective-taking or role-reversal in conflict scenarios: these may not be sufficient for peace-making (see Doise, 1986, p. 92), if perspectives are intimately linked to re-presentational access and projects. Similarly, given the narrowness of the representation-argumentation gap, localised events can precipitate unforeseen re-presentational change, and vice versa. This carries implications for policy (see **Chapter 10**).

## **Conclusion**

This chapter commenced by discussing the findings of the present inquiry. Study 1 fruitfully applied the minimal model of argumentation, yielding substantive findings on Arabs' views on integration. Study 2, in turn, developed a scaling procedure that benefits the study of contextualised intergroup scenarios. Study 3 empirically demonstrated an inextricable link between social and alternative re-presentation. This chapter then proceeded to illustrate the results obtained by integrating Formula 1 and Formula 2; and by integrating the qualitative and quantitative findings in a joint display showing the arguments behind each position on integration, together with the average scores of the Maltese and Arabs. More substantively, the issues relevant to Arab-Maltese relations were discussed in view of the literature. Anti-Arab sentiment in Malta; identity conflation between 'Arabs', 'Muslims' and derogatory terms; re-presentations of Arab migrants, Muslims and specifically Arab Muslim women; and intercultural strategies, were all explored above in view of the findings. Clearly, the intercultural and interreligious dynamics visible in other European contexts play out in the Maltese microcosm too. Participants' articulations of 'good integration' versus 'bad

integration', and other appraisals of available strategies, were instructive. That is, the reception of such strategies is dependent on the context in which they are promoted.

Overall, the foregoing discussion culminated in an interweaving of argumentative, representational and coalitional processes, as fundamentally inseparable. Notably, there was also a high degree of complementarity between Study 1 and Study 3, together with some instances of qualitative-quantitative tensions encouraging further deliberation. This leads to the concluding chapter of this thesis, where the overall contributions, limitations and directions for future research are explored, together with recommendations for ameliorating Arab-Maltese relations.

## Chapter 10 – Conclusion

This thesis researched Arab-Maltese relations, within the framework of action-oriented social representations theory (SRT). A cohesive thread flowed through Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3, with recurring patterns culminating in a joint display. The main research goal concerned the ecologically valid study of Arab-Maltese relations in Malta. This goal was fulfilled. The contributions made were stimulated by a “sociological imagination” (Flick et al., 2015, p. 71) that was at once theoretically generative *and* grounded in data. In turn, the data converged around the main research question concerning how the Maltese and Arabs advance different projects in the process of re-presenting relevant objects and each other’s projects. This question was answered by demonstrating a link between AROI sub-dimensions and RFI. This chapter concludes the thesis by presenting the overall contributions of this work, its limitations, and directions for future research. I also reflect on recommendations for ameliorating intergroup relations, fulfilling socio-political commitments made in **Chapter 5**.

### **The Main Contributions of This Work**

This work made theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions. *Theoretically*, the action-oriented approach to social re-presentation was developed, together with two action-oriented formulae that make for research designs that align with the theory. In summary, the action-oriented approach posits joint projects (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008) as a central feature of social re-presentation, by moving away from an automatic focus on the content of representations (‘social representations of X’), and towards a focus on the project that re-presentations advance (‘social re-presentation for P’). This theoretical work was also important for developing the minimal model of argumentation, which is claim-oriented and suitable for culturally sensitive research.

*Methodologically*, the main contribution concerned the expert-based rank-order scaling procedure, which enabled a way of bridging the views of two different groups on a project of mutual concern, yielding scale outputs. This procedure results in scale items that are ordered in terms of their relation to the project in question. It also provides researchers with an understanding of the possible reasons behind participants' scale scores, based on the qualitative work grounding the procedure. The scales that result from this procedure are ecologically valid.

*Empirically*, the main contributions concerned a demonstrable link between alternative and social re-presentation (Study 3), together with substantive insights into Arab-Maltese relations (Study 1). More specifically, Arabs emerged as more integrationist than the Maltese, and the findings shed light on the workings of re-presentation as a psychological process. This empirical work allows for tangible recommendations for ameliorating Arab-Maltese relations, precisely by making the case for reframing the project of integration in line with arguments available in the public sphere, in ways that make for intergroup reconciliation. These recommendations are explored below, following an overview of the limitations of this work and directions for future research.

### **Study 1: Limitations**

The main limitation of Study 1 related to social desirability (Grimm, 2010): some participants may have provided socially acceptable arguments, instead of honest views. Despite migrants' potential wariness of majority group members (Willgerodt, 2003), most contacts were willing to participate in the study. Thus, snowball sampling may have introduced a further selection bias. Moreover, all participants recruited for Study 1 spoke either Maltese or English. Therefore, some Arab demographic profiles were inevitably omitted. Similarly, only four female participants were recruited, principally due to cultural norms surrounding gender relations among some Arab Muslims. Nonetheless, extra effort was made to recruit females and diversify the sample. The impact of these limitations was reduced



as follows. The argumentation-based interview protocol potentially unpacked socially desirable responses; and sampling based on the principle of maximum variation ensured that different participant profiles were studied. Study 1 was conducted from *within* the Maltese cultural milieu, because I was born and bred in Malta. However, my understanding of Arabs' views was necessarily from *outside* Arabs' cultural milieus (cf. emic-etic distinction; Berry, 1969; Helfrich, 1999). This could have led to some relevant areas of exploration remaining ignored. Care was nonetheless taken to note re-presentational content *omitted* by participants (Gervais et al., 1999). For instance, cultural arguments were plenty, but no arguments from biological incompatibility (between Maltese and Arabs) were made (cf. Buhagiar et al., 2018).

Despite efforts to make the parameters (sampling, analysis, etc.) of Study 1 comparable with those of Sammut et al.'s (2018) study with the Maltese, some questions (e.g., those concerning backings) did differ between both studies. Meaningful comparisons were still possible, as usually questions differed in terms of levels of analysis—more so than substantive content. The complexity involved in different *progressive* and *retrogressive* presentations of argument (a natural feature of argumentation; van Eemeren et al., 2002, p. 37) meant that arguments could only be systematized to a certain point. Thus, the arguments presented were necessarily selected from a broader set of arguments. Nonetheless, effort was made to be as comprehensive as possible.

## **Study 2: Limitations**

There was an absence of Arab (non-Maltese) experts in the scaling procedure in Study 2, chiefly because of the relatively small pool of experts available locally for consultation. Moreover, given their work in intercultural contexts and relatively high degree of intergroup contact, the experts were possibly more integrationist than laypersons. This may have slightly skewed the ranking procedure (see Edwards, 1946). Furthermore, the subjective element in claim categorizations and item composition was inevitable, but these processes were revisited iteratively, thus reducing the impact of this limitation. Some decisions were also made for

pragmatic reasons. For example, Item 5 largely left unspecified the ‘specific respects’ in which cultural contact can be beneficial, for fear that mention of economic benefits (which feature in the claims behind Item 5) could invite artificially high responses.

Unfortunately, the IR scales could not be validated on a separate sample of Maltese and Arab participants, other than the one obtained in Study 3, chiefly due to difficulties with recruiting Arab participants (cf. Vella Muskat, 2016, p. 6). Notions relating to non-discrimination (Item E) and assimilation (Item H) were excluded from the IR scales. Item H was removed because of low factor loadings, and Item E (which also had relatively low factor loadings) because it was the pro-integrationist counterpart of Item H. Thus, the arguments informing these items were not represented in Study 3, despite their presence in the public sphere. The balance between argument representation, and scale performance and symmetry, legitimated this. Indeed, ecological validity could only be approximated (Cicourel, 2007)—precisely because, based on prior literature (e.g., Cefai et al., 2019; Sammut et al., 2018), both groups were expected to re-present projects differently. This partly explains the minimally acceptable Cronbach’s alpha values among Arabs ( $\alpha = .697$ ) for RFI (this is extremely close to 0.7 and not too worrying), and among the Maltese ( $\alpha = .659$ ) for ANTI-ALT. However, the internal reliability of the IR scales was generally good for both groups.

Finally, the one factor (eigenvalue = 5.002) extracted from the 10-item RFI scale accounted for 44.74% of the variance, and the two factors (Factor 1 eigenvalue = 3.569; Factor 2 eigenvalue = 1.380) extracted from the 10-item AROI scale accounted for 37.29% of the variance. In **Chapter 7**, I noted that these percentages are not uncommon in the social sciences (see Huang & Dong, 2012; Faraci et al., 2013; Kalpakjian et al., 2009; Manganelli Rattazzi et al., 2007; Ng, 2013). Nonetheless, the percentage of variance explained should ideally be 50%-60% or more (see Pett et al., 2003, p. 118). Potential reasons for the percentages obtained include: (a) the use of a novel scaling procedure (whose benefits outweighed this limitation); (b) the divide between expert rankers (in Study 2) and lay people

(participants in Study 3); (c) the possibility that integrationism is only one project (thus, a subset of the total variance) among interconnected intercultural projects which are sustained/opposed by similar arguments; and (d) the use of a small initial item pool. Nonetheless, the theoretical basis behind the IR scales was well-developed, and qualitative data legitimated the items used, increasing validity.

### **Study 3: Limitations**

The main limitation of Study 3 concerned the use of non-probability sampling, due to difficulties with recruiting Arab participants. Great effort was invested in securing large enough sample sizes. Yet, the lack of representativeness remained an issue, and social desirability may have resulted in more integrationist responses (especially among Arabs, given their minority status). Moreover, textual data is only one source of insight (Wagner, 1998). Although it was methodologically sound to focus on argumentative *claims* when studying intergroup relations (see **Chapter 5**), claims in themselves are somewhat unstable, not least because of ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988) inhering within them. Thus, actual human behaviour is the ultimate litmus test (Buhagiar & Sammut, 2020a) of the action-oriented approach: this calls for the use of behavioural measures. On another note, the relatively large number of hypotheses may have increased risks of a Type 1 error. Nonetheless, these hypotheses were split across two groups, minimising this risk. Low statistical power for detecting interaction effects is also an issue with multiple regression techniques (Cohen et al., 2003, p. 301). Moreover, notwithstanding the meaningful reliance on Model  $A_M$  and Model  $A_A$  (using the HC3 estimator on datasets excluding outliers), another limitation concerned the absence of demographic controls. Study 3 thus played a largely exploratory/illustrative role.

Other features of Study 3 were limitations in one sense and contributions in another. These concerned: (a) the study of collective phenomena and action by focusing on aggregates using survey research, and (b) the use of multiple regression instead of structural equation

modeling (SEM) (MacCallum & Austin, 2000). Concerning point (a), it could be argued that aggregates shed more light on *distributive* processes, rather than *collective* action potentials (cf. Harré, 1984). However, the leash between method ('distributive' methods) and theory ('collective' re-presentation) is not fully restrictive. Indeed, this research design allowed the mapping of both groups' arguments/positionings on various aspects of integration, leading to direct recommendations for ameliorating intergroup relations (discussed below). Despite potential issues with studying social re-presentation as discrete variables (e.g., using the IR scales), the research design was theory-driven, thus mitigating the potential research costs incurred.

Concerning point (b), although SEM is highly useful for psychological research, it could not be adequately performed, as SEM requires larger samples (MacCallum & Austin, 2000). Multiple regression was chosen (a) due to considerations of statistical power (see Jaccard et al., 2006), and (b) because the IR scales had weighted scores, which could only be meaningfully captured using composite scores (which multiple regression can incorporate). Moreover, EFA (in Study 2) was only sensible in the absence of confirmatory techniques. Given the novelty of the scaling procedure, it was also somewhat premature to employ SEM. Multiple regression has its own advantages (e.g., information on prediction informs policy; Jaccard et al., 2006; Jeon, 2015) and disadvantages (e.g., measurement error not accounted for; Jeon, 2015; Nusair & Hua, 2010). Equally, SEM has its own advantages (e.g., measurement error accounted for; MacCallum & Austin, 2000) and disadvantages (e.g., it can reject correctly specified models in samples exhibiting multivariate non-normality; Finney & DiStefano, 2006, p. 274; Nunkoo & Ramkissoon, 2011). All things considered, multiple regression was opted for and robust estimators (Hayes & Cai, 2007) were used to mitigate its drawbacks.

## Directions for Future Research

Accordingly, future research can employ SEM within action-oriented SRT, as it yields better insights on causality. More epistemological work may be needed prior to the wider application of SEM within SRT (see Flick et al., 2015, p. 76). Nonetheless, SEM could study the influence of ERVs whilst accounting for measurement error. Future research could also identify meaningful control variables (e.g., salient demographic characteristics) relevant to *both* Maltese and Arabs (Miller, 2004, p. 104), and replicate this work with larger and more representative samples for statistical generalisation, or at least with samples containing roughly equal sample sizes per level of the covariates which are adjusted for. Moreover, action-oriented social re-presentation can be studied using behavioural measures, spatial analysis (Formosa, 2007; Formosa et al., 2011), or even observational and ethnographic methods (Sussman, 2016; Marcén et al., 2013). This is because naturalistic data can elucidate action/non-verbal behaviour (Potter & Shaw, 2018), complementing the present endeavour with meticulous descriptions of human behaviour. Similarly, experimental methods could artificially ‘introduce’ re-presentational content to participants and measure its effects on silent coalitional alignments (see Valsiner, 2019).

Future theoretical work on the action-oriented approach should incorporate the role of ideology (see Jaspars & Fraser, 1984), giving the theory a more diachronic basis. Within contemporary arguments on integration, there are potential future accounts and rhetorical contraries (Billig, 1988). Thus, future research could explore the psychological effects of ideology on idiographic human arguments and behaviour, in tandem with longitudinal research applying the IR scales (this would shed more light on polarisation and potential conflict spirals). Projects other than integration could also be studied. The present endeavour focussed mostly on Maltese Christians and Arab Muslims, given participants’ demographic profiles. Thus, the views of persons of Arab-Maltese origin require further study, as do those of female Arabs, since they face their own distinct challenges (see **Chapter 9**). Other groups

of interest are non-Christian Maltese and non-Muslim Arabs (including converts to Christianity or Islam), given the religio-cultural nature of the intergroup tensions involved. Future research by Arab *interviewers* could also yield different perspectives on Arabs' and the Maltese's views (cf. Berry, 1969; Helfrich, 1999).

Moreover, when applying the expert-based rank-order scaling procedure, future research can experiment with using a larger pool of initial items: it remains an open question whether the benefits of greater item choice outweigh the limitations of a less intuitive ranking procedure. The IR scales would also benefit from confirmatory factor analysis (Brown & Moore, 2012; Ullman & Bentler, 2013, p. 677), and from validation in samples with exclusively Maltese (non-Arab) participants, and other samples with exclusively Arab participants in Malta (apart from samples including both Arab and Maltese participants). Future research on intergroup relations in other contexts could also source arguments from the groups in question (relevant to the conflict/context in question), and subsequently build ecologically valid scales using the expert-based rank-order scaling procedure.

Finally, the choice of ERVs was based on the literature reviewed in **Chapter 4**. SDO is an intergroup orientation (Hansen & Dovidio, 2016, p. 545), NFC is a cognitive style (Hodson & Esses, 2005), mentalities constitute socially adaptive mechanisms (Sammut, 2019a), and sense of community relates to the psychological relationship between individual and community (McMillan & Chavis, 1986). These ERVs complemented each other highly. Future research could include right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) (Altemeyer, 1988). RWA does not always consistently predict anti-outgroup views (see Henry et al., 2005; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007), and some RWA scales (Zakrisson, 2005) address topics relating to sexuality and religious expression in ways which may be considered authoritarian among some groups but normative among others. Nonetheless, RWA could be relevant to the study of Arab-Maltese relations. Given its relation to SDO (e.g., Thomsen et al., 2008), studying RWA in this context would make for a more integrated approach. Similarly, studying processes

relating to intergroup contact (Pettigrew et al., 2011) and intergroup threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), would provide a more complete picture of Arab-Maltese relations. Clues for this can be taken from the fact that the IR scales incorporate notions relevant to both symbolic and realistic threat. The potential benefits of intergroup contact in the Arab-Maltese context could be clarified by further empirical work in this domain.

### **Recommendations Based on the Present Work**

As noted in **Chapter 5**, whilst most local research focuses on minority discrimination (a very sound focus indeed), the present inquiry adopted a “melancholic attitude” (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008, p. 344) and studied Arab-Maltese relations ‘symmetrically’. Given the worsening anti-Arab and anti-Muslim views among the Maltese (Buhagiar et al., 2018; Buhagiar et al., 2020; Cefai et al., 2019; Sammut et al., 2018; Sammut & Lauri, 2017; Sammut et al., 2021), this work was meant to inform manners for ameliorating intergroup relations. I aim for an “ideological creativity” (Andreouli et al., 2020, p. 312) which fulfils normative aspirations in view of the findings of the present inquiry. The following recommendations also rest on Jaspars and Fraser’s (1984) observation that, if the processes underpinning a person’s views on social issues tap social re-presentations (not simply attitudes), such “that his [sic] representation reflects in the first place the culture of which he [sic] is a part, then it becomes clear why such changes [in viewpoint] are much harder to accomplish than mere changes in evaluative responses” (Jaspars & Fraser, 1984, p. 120). Indeed, attempts at changing attitudes can be highly ineffective “if differences in social representation are not taken into account” (Jaspars & Fraser, 1984, p. 120), especially among groups with different cultural backgrounds (p. 121).

Accordingly, three main recommendations follow from this work. First, (1) *group leaders can promote intergroup peace*. Group leaders who are highly esteemed in different Maltese Christian and Arab Muslim groups (e.g., bishops, imams, secular stakeholders, etc.) can promote viewpoints favouring good Arab-Maltese relations in a gradual manner (see

Lauri, 2015, p. 397). Gradualism is important, given an already polarised intercultural scenario (Sammut et al., 2021; European Commission, 2019, 2020). The RFI scale sheds light on what different arguments can *achieve* in the public sphere (see **Chapter 9** [joint display]), and thus holds the key to gradual attempts at social influence (e.g., presenting content informing Items 5, 4, 3, 2, and eventually Item 1). By presenting the viewpoints inhering in these arguments, group leaders can shape discourse incrementally, promoting sound intergroup relations. Religious leaders play an important role here, given the religio-cultural nature of Maltese-Arab tensions.

Such efforts at social influence may or may not be intended specifically at bringing about integration. The present work mostly used the integrationist project as a proxy for studying intergroup relations. Whilst integration is generally suitable for migrant adaptation (Berry et al., 2006; see Ward, 2008) and affords social capital to various social groups (Sammut, 2011), the focus here is more precisely on conflict prevention and the amelioration of intergroup relations. If hyper-globalisation (Rodrik, 2011) and global trade accelerate cultural homogenization, it remains an open question whether efforts at integration will tend toward the ‘good integration’ models or the ‘bad integration’ models eloquently described by participants in Study 1, especially if socio-economic inequality underlies any ostensible cultural similarities. Thus, integration can well be an interim goal, the ultimate one being intergroup peace grounded in socio-economic justice.

All strategies have strengths and drawbacks. The first strategy has the benefit of including group leaders, but risks the possibility of reactance and counter-persuasion (Quick et al., 2013) if not implemented well. Backlash could beguile any communicative effort, particularly when such communication is meant to promote rapprochement between religious Others (Darmanin, 2015, p. 42)—therefore, coordination among different group leaders would be required for this strategy to be effective. Should intergroup relations deteriorate, Arabs and other minorities will suffer as a consequence. Accordingly, a second strategy



concerns (2) *intergroup re-presentational alignment*. The IR scales can be used to reduce polarisation by incrementally aligning both groups' re-presentations. Instead of shifting public opinion toward Item 1 (pro-integrationism), group leaders can aim for viewpoint convergence, for instance, by moving both groups' views toward content pertaining to items in the middle of the IR scales (e.g., Item 5, on the benefits of cultural contact)—always by gradually presenting (e.g., in speeches) content pertaining to adjacent items (as per the previous strategy). The issue here concerns the ethical asymmetry between pro- and anti-integrationist items. Equating items calling for intercultural/interreligious co-existence (e.g., Item 1; Item 3) with items calling for intergroup domination or racism (e.g., Item 8; Item 10), or placing these on an equal footing, constitutes a false equivalence. These are clearly different trajectories, and the same holds for items toward the middle of the scales, even if to a lesser degree. Nonetheless, this strategy holds promise in cases where intergroup conflict reaches boiling point.

A brief detour on structural dynamics is here warranted. Collective memories, collective histories, differential rates of socio-economic access, and legal frameworks can conspire to create unequal social structures. As a relatively minor example, consider the allegiance to Roman Catholicism in the Maltese constitution, which attests to natives' "attachment to Catholicism as an ethno-religious identity" (Darmanin, 2015, p. 42). Such structural phenomena constitute the social ontology upon which communication efforts at aligning intergroup re-presentations would unfold. Accordingly, critiques of structural inequality, and of the drawbacks associated with the accelerated economic change hitting the Maltese islands, are indispensable for a complete appraisal of the situation. Essentially, the social ontology within which minority (or other) social influence is expected to produce representational change (see Jaspars & Fraser, 1984), is bound to limit this same influence.

This leads to the third and final recommendation: (3) *increasing positive media representations of Arabs/Muslims*. This strategy reduces the difficulties associated with

reactance to direct public statements, has more empirical backing at present (because alternative re-presentation predicted social re-presentation in Study 3), is simpler to implement, and obtains a wider reach. The present findings suggest that “minimal social discrimination” (Valsiner, 2019, p. 435) and its evolution into polarisation can be attenuated by means of re-presentations portraying the outgroup as integrationist. Media representations portraying, for example, Arabs in integrationist settings (e.g., Maltese and Arabs interacting in normal life circumstances), gradually and in line with the pro-integrationist items of the AROI scale (from Item 5 to Item 1 [PRO-ALT sub-dimension]), can promote peaceful intergroup relations among both groups, particularly among the Maltese. This strategy can achieve both a shift in viewpoint (cf. Strategy 1) *and* intergroup re-presentational alignment (cf. Strategy 2). Moreover, efforts against polarization and radicalization (Strategy 2), do not negate the scholarly effort toward intercultural integration (Strategy 1)—these can be complementary.

More comprehensive media reporting can make the re-presentational sphere a level playing field, with balanced reporting serving to influence groups’ alternative re-presentation of each other. In contemporary (post-)industrial societies, propaganda is not simply “the deliberate attempt by organized agencies to produce shifts in opinion and sentiment” (Asch, 1952, p. 617). Rather, it is a ubiquitous sociological phenomenon, incrementally perfected by means of technique and accumulating knowledge on humankind (Ellul, 1973, p. 4). This means that positive media re-presentations require a solid basis in reality to bring about lasting change, as they would be portrayed in a climate which could *already* be largely invested in propagandizing intergroup division. Thus, the point is not to fabricate positive re-presentations, but to transparently showcase what is already there. This is not unlike the recent impetus toward a historiography that *acknowledges* or *uncovers* minority voices, precipitated by worldwide protests and movements calling for interethnic justice worldwide.

Moreover, more appreciative media portrayals of Arabs and Muslims in movies, dramas and similar fora (see Shaheen, 2003), can also contribute to better intergroup relations.

Finally, mixed-methods research often advances implicit political presumptions under the guise of qualitative-quantitative research efforts aimed at producing “the ‘best of both worlds’” (Giddings, 2006, p. 195), thus inadvertently serving the very same technocratic and economic *modi operandi* afforded by dominant groups (Howe, 2004; Freshwater, 2007). The approach presented above considered both re-presentational processes *and* the conditions perpetuating power differentials and socio-economic inequality. In the absence of further empirical work, and though choosing between the aforementioned strategies requires attention to contextual variations, the above arguments make Strategy 3 a particularly compelling strategy.

### **Concluding Statement**

This thesis asked whether alternative re-presentation is systemically linked to social re-presentation. The findings replied in the affirmative. Study 1 yielded a vast array of arguments on integration, made by Arabs in Malta. Study 2 composed ecologically valid scales for studying Arab-Maltese relations. In turn, Study 3 brought the research programme to a close, by testing relevant hypotheses and exploring related areas of inquiry, such as the extra-representational basis of Arab-Maltese relations in Malta. This work formulated the action-oriented approach to social re-presentation, generated and implemented the minimal model of argumentation in social research, and yielded theoretical insights into the workings of argumentation and social re-presentation within coalitional scenarios. The take-home messages are that: re-presentation operates systemically and functionally; argumentation is inseparable from re-presentation, favouring or opposing joint projects; the re-presentations propagating silent coalitional behaviour are generated and employed argumentatively; and, more substantively, what the Maltese think that Arabs think, and vice versa, matters greatly for peaceful intergroup relations.

Socio-psychological research should “propose some answers to the following research questions: What tensions structure the data? What is opposed? What is similar? What goes together? How does the context structure the data?” (Flick et al., 2015, p. 76). The *tensions* explored in Study 1 and Study 3 shed light on how pro- and anti-integrationist silent coalitions *oppose* each other, and on the *similar* re-presentational content shared among members of the same coalition. This lent support to the theoretical backbone of this work, showing how re-presentation and argumentation inevitably *go together*. The *context* provided by extra-representational variables imbued the present work with a broader focus, and literature on the intergroup climate in contemporary Malta was consulted to ensure that the recommendations made take into account intergroup power differentials. Across all three studies, the demonstration of Arabs’ pro-integrationism could be considered a contribution in its own right, as it directly contributes to local debates surrounding minority acculturation strategies (Berry, 2011).

Recommendations were made, among others, arguing for media representations that are more appreciative of Arab communities in Malta. Such media representations should be informed by the IR scales, portraying notions relating to the benefits of cultural contact (Item 5), Arab-Maltese similarities (Item 4), the co-existence of religious Others (Item 3), mutual engagement (Item 2), and the benefits of getting along whilst keeping one’s own culture and religion (Item 1). The aim, here, would be to re-present Arab-Maltese relations more faithfully and holistically, instead of selectively foregrounding negative incidents. Portrayals of Arabs in television and online series, dramas, and so on, could follow a similar route.

Liu et al. (1999) keenly observe that: “History is the story of the making of an ingroup” (p. 1023). As ingroups and outgroups morph, adapt, and pursue new projects, it is hoped that these recommendations aid in the facilitation of intergroup conciliation. Valsiner (2019) notes how “social representations of Arabs [in] Malta operate according to the cognitive fast and frugal heuristics, with negative affect assertions speeding up the making of

judgments” (p. 442). This “minimal social discrimination” (Valsiner, 2019, p. 435) has its counterpart in a minimal social acceptance that is at least conducive to new group formations that are *for* projects which make possible a decent life for all within a shared geographical space.

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## Appendix A

### The Object-Oriented Approach versus The Action-Oriented Approach

**Table A1**

*Comparisons between the Object-Oriented Approach and the Action-Oriented Approach*

Feature	Empirical orientation	
	Object-oriented	Action-oriented
<b>Object</b>	Representations of objects prioritized in research	Representations of objects not prioritized in research
<b>Project</b>	Projects not analyzed, or analyzed <i>post hoc</i>	Projects given primacy in the research design
<b>Action</b>	Action does not feature, or features <i>post hoc</i>	Concerns with action shape the research design
<b>Analytical frame</b>	No analytical third factor: ‘group-representation’ dyad	Analytical third factor: ‘group-representation-project’ triad
<b>Pluralities</b>	Susceptible to distributive view; collective pluralities only feature incidentally	Less susceptible to distributive view; collective pluralities feature prominently
<b>Social influence</b>	Not necessarily systemic	Systemic: groups relevant to Context C influence each other
<b>Stickiness</b>	What makes representations stick is not always clear	Stickiness explained with reference to projects
<b>Social representations</b>	Substantive descriptions are foregrounded (‘of’)	Functionalist descriptions are foregrounded (‘for’)
<b>Alternative representations</b>	May or may not feature	Feature and are central, given the systemic nature of social/alternative re-representation
<b>Intergroup relations</b>	Intergroup relations may or may not feature; group representations possibly compared	Intergroup relations are essential; Main focus is on the interaction between group projects
<b>Extra-representational variables</b>	May or may not feature	Feature, at least conceptually


*Note.* This table highlights the main differences between the object-oriented approach and the action-oriented approach to social representations research. Adapted from “‘Social Re-presentation for...’: An Action-Oriented Formula for Intergroup Relations Research” by L. J. Buhagiar, & G. Sammut, 2020a. *Frontiers in Psychology. Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology*. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00352.

## Appendix B

### The Toulmin Model of Argumentation: An Example

**Figure B1**

*An Example of an Argument Schematised Using the Toulmin Model*



*Note.* An example showing the interplay of the various components of an argument, according to the Toulmin model. The claim 'Maya presently has white fur', is evidenced by the datum 'Maya is a local cat'. The warrant '[Since] Any local cat may be taken to have white fur' supports the link between datum and claim. In turn, the warrant makes sense on account of the backing '[On account of the fact that] All local cats have always had white fur'. The modal 'presumably' indicates the qualifier to the warrant, in this example. Finally, the claim holds '[Unless] Maya lost her fur' (the rebuttal). Adapted, using a different example, from *"The uses of argument"* (Updated ed.) by S. E. Toulmin, 2003, p. 117. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (Originally published in 1958).



**Appendix C**  
**Overall Methodology**

**Table C1**

*Overall Methodological Considerations*

<b>Philosophical basis</b>	
Stance	(a) Integral view of nomothesis-idiography (Affifi, 2019; Salvatore & Valsiner, 2009, 2010)  (b) Substantive theory stance: action-oriented approach, grounded in a “coalitional ontology” (Lin et al., 2016, p. 313; Greene, 2007, p. 69; see <b>Chapter 2</b> )  (c) Fractality features at all levels of analysis (Abbott, 2010, p. 10)
Embedded	(a) Ecological validity and cultural sensitivity (Bartholomew & Brown, 2012; Morris et al., 1999)
epistemological	(b) Pragmatism (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005)
emphases	(c) Qualitative-quantitative complementarity (Kelle, 2006)  (d) Qualitative-quantitative dialectic (Maxwell & Loomis, 2003)
<b>Inquiry logics</b>	
Research goals	(a) Understanding a complex phenomenon  (b) Enabling the measurement of change

	(c) Testing new ideas
	(d) Contributing to the knowledge base (Collins et al., 2007)
Research objectives	(a) Exploration <sup>a</sup>
	(b) Description <sup>a,d</sup>
	(c) Prediction <sup>b</sup>
	(d) Explanation <sup>c,d</sup> (Johnson & Christensen, 2008)
Research purposes	(a) Complementarity
	(b) Development
	(c) Expansion (Greene et al., 1989, p. 259)
Main research question	How do the Maltese and Arabs advance pro- or anti-integrationist projects [Project P] by socially re-presenting Arab-Maltese relations [or any other Object O], and alternatively re-presenting each other's projects?
Research sub-questions	(a) Study 1: (1) How do Arabs socially re-present Arab-Maltese relations (when arguing) for/against the integrationist project?
	(b) Study 1: (2) How do Arabs alternatively re-present the Maltese's project (when arguing) for/against the integrationist project?

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	(c) Study 3: (1) What are the differences between the Maltese's and Arabs' social re-presentation for/against integration?
	(d) Study 3: (2) How do the Maltese and Arabs alternatively re-present each other's projects?
	(e) Study 3: (3) What is the relationship between alternative re-presentation of the outgroup's project and the Maltese's/Arabs' social re-presentation for/against integration?
	(f) Study 3: (4) What is the relationship between extra-representational variables and social re-presentation for/against integration?

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Research design	Exploratory sequential design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 69)
Sampling design	(a) Parallel: Arab sample in Study 1 and in Study 3  (b) Multilevel: Maltese sample in Study 3 (in parallel with the Maltese sample in Sammut et al. [2018])

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**Guidelines for practice**

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**Study 1**

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Research method	Qualitative: open-ended one-to-one semi-structured interviews
Legitimation	(a) Credibility: enhanced through piloting, “prolonged engagement, persistent observation, [and] triangulation” (Korstjens & Moser, 2018, p. 121)  (b) Dependability/confirmability: all steps detailed transparently (Korstjens & Moser, 2018)

Sampling scheme	Purposive snowball sampling aiming for maximum variation (Teddle & Yu, 2007)
Data gathering tool	Argumentation interviewing: based on the minimal model (Sammur et al., 2018; see <b>Chapter 3</b> )
Data analysis	Minimal argumentation analysis: based on the minimal model (Sammur et al., 2018)
Analytical output	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Argumentative themes</li> <li>(b) Claims, categorised by valence (positive, negative and ambivalent/mixed vis-à-vis integration)</li> <li>(c) Selected portrayal of arguments (warrants, evidence and qualifiers) supporting the claims</li> <li>(d) In-depth discussions of arguments together with illustrative excerpts</li> </ul>
Inferences	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Transferability: facilitated by ecological validity</li> <li>(b) Transferability: based on theoretical generalisation (Demuth, 2018, p. 78; Gelo et al., 2008)</li> <li>(c) Interpretive consistency: theoretical saturation yields robust inferences</li> </ul>
<b>Study 2</b>	
Item generation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Thematic categorisation of Maltese and Arab claims on integration</li> <li>(b) Items worded procedurally</li> <li>(c) Feedback by experts on item contents</li> </ul>
Validity and reliability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Ecological validity: items based on qualitative findings (principal source of validity)</li> <li>(b) Content validity: expert feedback on item contents</li> </ul>

	(c) Construct validity: exploratory factor analysis
	(d) Internal reliability: Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach, 1951)
Sampling scheme	Critical case sampling (Collins et al., 2007, p. 272)
Scaling method	(a) Expert-based rank-order scaling procedure in line with SRT (Jaspars & Fraser, 1984, pp. 110-123) (b) Sensitivity analysis (Agresti, 2010, p. 10)
Output	(a) Re-Presentation for Integration scale; and Alternative Re-Presentation of Integration scale (b) Each item is presented together with the arguments (Arab and Maltese) justifying it
<b>Study 3</b>	
Research method	Quantitative split-ballot national survey: "correlational-comparative" (Gelo et al., 2008, p. 271)
Validity and reliability	(a) Ecological validity: items based on qualitative findings (principal source of validity) (b) Internal validity: questionnaire presented to participants in contexts (e.g., at home, at work, etc.) where they generally discuss integration (Lavrakas, 2008, p. 345) (c) Construct validity: of the Intergroup Relations scales, using exploratory factor analysis in Study 2 (d) Credibility: enhanced through piloting/cognitive interviewing for the whole questionnaire (e) Internal reliability: of all measures, using Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach, 1951)

	(f) Dependability/confirmability: translations from English to Maltese, and from English/Maltese to Arabic, followed by back-translations; all steps detailed transparently (Korstjens & Moser, 2018)
Sampling scheme	Snowball sampling due to practical constraints (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007, p. 285; Teddlie & Yu, 2007)
Data gathering tool	Online questionnaire (closed-ended responses)
Data analysis	(a) Descriptive statistics (b) Bivariate statistics (c) Preliminary tests for interaction effects (d) Multiple regression analyses
Analytical output	(a) Results of hypothesis-testing: inferential statistics (b) Multiple regression models ('Maltese model' and 'Arab model')
Inferences	(a) Transferability: facilitated by ecological validity (b) Interpretive consistency: samples sufficiently large and diverse for meaningful statistical tests, despite sampling constraints (Collins et al., 2006, 2007; Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007)
<b>Socio-political commitments</b>	(a) Issue relevant to local context: local literature, integration strategy, etc. (MEAA, 2017; Sammut et al., 2018) (b) Research is pertinent: views on Arabs have worsened locally (Sammut et al., 2018; Sammut et al., 2021) (c) Intergroup relations studied symmetrically: "melancholic attitude" (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008, p. 344)

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- (d) Research provides a way to longitudinally study the potential development of intergroup polarisation from “minimal social discrimination” (Valsiner, 2019, p. 435)
  - (e) Meaningful recommendations are made for ameliorating intergroup relations (see **Chapter 10**)
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**Final integration (systemic outputs)**

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Formulae	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Formula 1: Social re-presentation <math>SR [X]</math> for Project P [integration], of/as Object O [Arab-Maltese relations, etc.], by Group <math>G_1</math> [Arabs], in Context C [Malta] ... according to Group <math>G_1</math> [Arabs]</li> <li>(b) Formula 2: <math>SR</math> for <math>P_{integration}</math>, as a function of: <math>SR_M, AR_M^A, AR_M^n \dots SR_A, AR_A^M, AR_A^n \dots</math> and any other <math>SR_n</math> and <math>AR_n \dots</math> relevant to Context C</li> </ul>
Joint display	<p>Frequencies of pro- and anti-integrationist views (Study 3), presented together with the arguments (Study 1) behind these positionings, for both the Arabs and Maltese (Creswell &amp; Plano Clark, 2011, p. 228; Fetters et al., 2013; Greene, 2008; Newman et al., 2003, p. 178-179; see <b>Chapter 9</b>)</p>
Meta-inferences	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Enabled because the IR scales act as a common metric between Study 1 and Study 3</li> <li>(b) Interpretive consistency: improved because sample sizes exceed recommendations for both Study 1 and Study 3 (Collins et al., 2006; Collins et al., 2007; Onwuegbuzie &amp; Collins, 2007)</li> </ul>

*Note.* This table comprehensively portrays the epistemological stance, key decisions, steps and expected final outputs pertaining to the present inquiry. The superscripts associated with each research objective indicate which research goal/s it addresses (e.g., the research objective of Exploration relates to the research goal of ‘Understanding a complex phenomenon’).

**Appendix D**  
**Study 1: Supplementary Material**

**Figure D1**

*Final Interview Protocol in Maltese*

- (1) *Preliminary question 1 – relationship to media: X'tip ta' midja tikkonsma? (Probe: Tista' tirreferi għal kwalunkwe pjattaforma li trid [eż., onlajn, stampata, eċċ.])*
- (2) *Preliminary question 2 – self-referential identity: Liema grupp/i tidentifika magħhom? (Probe: Kif tidentifika lilek innifsek?)*
- (3) **Question tapping Claim:** X'inhom l-opinjoni tiegħek dwar l-integrazzjoni tal-Għarab f'Malta?
- (4) **Question tapping Warrant:** Ghaliex taħseb hekk? (*Probes: X'inhuma l-assunzjonijiet jew l-ideat ġenerali taħt l-argument tiegħek?/Inti argumentajt li X, u allura Y. Xi wħud jargumentaw li X, imma jilħqu konklużjonijiet oħra. Ghaliex wasalt għall-konklużjoni Y?*)
- (5) **Question tapping Evidence:** X'eżempji għandek biex issostni l-argument tiegħek?
- (6) **Question tapping Qualifiers:** Hemm xi eċċezzjonijiet għall-fehmiet tiegħek?
- (7) *Ancillary question 1 – clarification: X'tifhem b'integrazzjoni?*
- (8) *Ancillary question 2 – clarification: L-argument tiegħek japplika għall-gruppi kollha f'Malta jew speċifikament għall-Għarab?*
- (9) *Ancillary question 3 – clarification: L-argument tiegħek japplika għall-Għarab kollha?*
- (10) *Ancillary question 4 – hypothetical scenario: Kieku kellu jigr li X, x'targumenta?*
- (11) *Ancillary question 5 – playing devil's advocate: Kieku xi hadd kellu jargumenta li X, kif tirrispondi?*
- (12) **Summary:** Dan is-sommarju jirrappreżenta l-opinjoni tiegħek sewwa, jew hemm xi haġa li tixtieq tiċċara?

*Note.* This figure presents the Maltese version of the final interview protocol used in Study 1 (see **Chapter 6**).



## Figure D2

### *Pilot Interview Protocol*

- (1) *Preliminary question 1*: What kind of media do you consume?
- (2) *Preliminary question 2*: Which groups do you identify in Maltese society?
- (3) *Preliminary question 3*: Which group/s do you identify yourself with?
- (4) **Question tapping Claim**: What is your opinion regarding the integration of Arabs in Malta?
- (5) **Question tapping Warrant**: Why do you think so?
- (6) *Question tapping inferential process 1*: What are the assumptions or general ideas underlying your argument?
- (7) *Question tapping inferential process 2*: You argued that X, and therefore Y. Some people argue that X, but reach other conclusions. Why did you reach conclusion Y?
- (8) **Question tapping Evidence**: What examples do you have to support your argument?
- (9) **Question tapping Qualifiers**: Are there any exceptions to your views?
- (10) *Ancillary question 1 – clarification*: What do you understand by integration?
- (11) *Ancillary question 2 – clarification*: Does your argument apply to all groups in Malta or specifically to Arabs?
- (12) *Ancillary question 3 – clarification*: Does your argument apply to all Arabs?
- (13) *Ancillary question 4 – hypothetical scenario*: If X were to happen, what would you argue?
- (14) *Ancillary question 5 – playing devil’s advocate*: If someone were to argue X, how would you respond?
- (15) **Summary**: Does this summary represent your views well, or is there anything you would like to clarify?

*Note.* This figure presents the interview protocol used during pilot interviews in Study 1 (see **Chapter 6**).

## Figure D3

### *Acceptance of Ethics Proposal for Study 1*

3/23/2021 University of Malta Mail - Research Ethics Proposal - Accepted

 L-Università ta' Malta Luke Buhagiar <luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt>

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**Research Ethics Proposal - Accepted**

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**SWB FREC** <research-ethics.fsw@um.edu.mt> 12 December 2017 at 15:26  
To: Luke Buhagiar <luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt>  
Cc: Gordon Sammut <gordon.sammut@um.edu.mt>

Reference Number: SWB 235/2017

Dear Mr Luke Joseph Buhagiar,

I am pleased to inform you that your ethics proposal with regards to your research entitled *The Psychology of Argumentation: A case study in coalitional psychology* has been accepted. Hence, you may now **start your research**.

You are kindly requested to pick up your documents from our office between 08:00-12:15 and 13:30-16:45.

Thanks and regards,  
Charmaine

Faculty Research Ethics Committee (FREC)  
Faculty for Social Wellbeing  
Room 113  
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University of Malta  
Msida MSD 2080

Ms Charmaine Agius  
Tel: (+356) 2340 2237



Ms Marica Galea  
Tel: (+356) 2340 3956

**Students' hours:**  
Monday-Friday  
08:00-12:15 and 13:30-16:45 (1 October-15 June)  
07:30-13:00 (16 June-30 September)

*Note.* This figure presents the acceptance of the ethics proposal for Study 1.

## Figure D4

### Information Sheet and Consent Form for Study 1 (in English and Maltese)

<p><b>Information sheet for interview participants</b></p> <p><b>Title:</b> The Presence of Arabs in Europe</p> <p><b>Purpose of research:</b> The purpose of this PhD research is to understand the arguments of Arab and Maltese participants concerning the presence of Arabs in Europe. This study will take place in the form of a one-to-one interview where participants will provide their opinions concerning this topic. This research aims to contribute towards better policy making when it comes to different groups of people living in the same country.</p> <p><b>Procedures involved:</b> After reading the information sheet and listening to an explanation about the research, if you do agree to participate in an interview, you will be asked to sign a consent form detailing your rights as participant and to fill in participant characteristics. The interview will then commence and is expected to take between 30 and 90 minutes.</p> <p><b>Participant rights, risks and benefits:</b> Participation in this study is totally voluntary. Participant rights are further detailed in the consent form. No harm is expected to be caused by participating in this research. Participants will not be remunerated in any way for participating in this research.</p> <p><b>Contact for further information:</b> luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt / [redacted]</p> <p style="text-align: right;"> Luke Joseph Buhagiar University of Malta</p>
<p><b>Folja ta' informazzjoni għall-partecipanti fl-intervisti</b></p> <p><b>Titlu:</b> Il-Prezenza tal-Gharab fl-Ewropa</p> <p><b>L-Għan tar-riċerka:</b> L-iskop ta' din ir-riċerka tal-PhD huwa li nifhem l-argumenti tal-partecipanti Gharab u Maltin dwar il-prezenza tal-Gharab fl-Ewropa. Ir-riċerka parzjalment tinvolti intervisti <i>one-to-one</i> fejn il-partecipanti jipprovdu l-opinjoni tagħhom dwar dan is-suggett. Din ir-riċerka għandha l-għan li tikkontribwixxi lejn tfassil ta' <i>policy</i> ahjar fir-rigward ta' gruppi differenti ta' nies li jgħixu fl-istess pajjiż.</p> <p><b>Proċeduri involuti:</b> Wara li taqra l-folja ta' informazzjoni u tisma' spjegazzjoni dwar ir-riċerka, jekk taqbel li tippartecipa f'intervista, se tintalab tiffirma formola ta' kunsens li fiha hemm dettalji dwar id-drittijiet tiegħek bħala partecipant u se tintalab timla l-karatteristiċi tal-partecipant. L-intervista mbagħad tibda u hija mistennija li tiegħu bejn 30 u 90 minuta.</p> <p><b>Drittijiet, riskij u benefiċċji tal-partecipant:</b> Il-partecipazzjoni f'dan l-istudju hija totalment volontarja. Id-drittijiet tal-partecipanti huma ddettaljata aktar fil-formola tal-kunsens. L-ebda ħsara mhi mistennija li tiġi kkawżata mill-partecipazzjoni. Il-partecipanti ma jgħallux għall-partecipazzjoni f'din ir-riċerka.</p> <p><b>Ikkuntattja għal iktar informazzjoni:</b> luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt / [redacted]</p> <p style="text-align: right;"> Luke Joseph Buhagiar Universita' ta' Malta</p>

### Consent form for interview participants

Please fill this form after reading the information sheet and listening to an explanation about the research.

Thank you for considering to take part in this research. The person organising the research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any questions arising from the explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to participate.

- I understand that data will be audio recorded for transcription purposes and that the data will be destroyed after analysis. I understand that any data I disclose during the study will be treated as strictly confidential and will be processed solely and exclusively for the purposes of this study.
- I understand that participation is totally voluntary. I also understand that if I decide at any time during or after the research that I no longer wish to participate in this project, I can notify the researcher and be withdrawn from the study immediately, without prejudice and without the need to provide any reason. Furthermore, I have the right to ask that any data supplied up to that point be destroyed.
- I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this study. I understand that information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled according to the provisions of the Data Protection Act. I thus have the right to access, rectify and erase data about myself.

#### Participant's Statement

I, \_\_\_\_\_, agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have read the notes written above, and understand what the research study involves.

Participant's signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

(Optional) If you would like to receive a summary of the results when the research project is completed, please leave your contact details (email address or mobile number) \_\_\_\_\_

#### Researcher's Statement

I, Luke Joseph Buhagiar, confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks of the proposed research to the volunteer.

Student's signature *Luke Joseph Buhagiar* Date \_\_\_\_\_

Supervisor's signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

### Formola ta' kunsens għall-partecipanti fl-intervisti

Jekk jogħġbok imla dil-formola wara li taqra l-folja ta' informazzjoni u tisma' spjegazzjoni dwar ir-riċerka.

Grazzi talli qed tikkonsidra li tiegħi sehem f'din ir-riċerka. Il-persuna li qed torganizza r-riċerka għandha obbligu li tispjegalek il-proġett qabel ma inti taqbel li tiegħi sehem. Jekk għandek xi mistoqsijiet li johorġu mill-isjegazzjoni diġà mogħtija lilek, staqsi lir-riċerkatur qabel ma tiddeciedi jekk tippartecipax jew le.

- Nifhem li d-data se tkun irrekordjata (*audio recorded*) għal skopijiet ta' traskrizzjoni u li d-data se tingered wara l-analiżi. Nifhem li kull data żvelata matul l-istudju se tiġi trattata bħala strettament kunfidenzjali u se tiġi pprocessata biss u esklussivament għall-finijiet ta' dan l-istudju.
- Nifhem li l-partecipazzjoni tiegħi hija totalment volontarja. Nifhem ukoll li jekk niddeciedi f'xi ħin matul jew wara r-riċerka li m'għadnix nixtieq nippartecipa f'dan il-proġett, nista' ninnotifika lir-riċerkatur u niġi irirat mill-istudju minnufih, mingħajr preġudizzju u mingħajr il-ħtieġa li nipprovdni xi spjegazzjoni. Barra minn hekk, għandi d-dritt li nitlob li kull data provduta sa dak il-punt tiġi meqruda.
- Jiena nagħti l-kunsens għall-ipprocessar tal-informazzjoni personali għal dal-istudju. Nifhem li l-informazzjoni se tiġi trattata bħala strettament kunfidenzjali u skont id-dispożizzjonijiet tal-Att dwar il-Protezzjoni tad-Data. B'hekk, għandi dritt għall-aċċess, ir-rettifika u l-qirda tad-data dwari.

#### Stqarrija tal-partecipant:

Jien, \_\_\_\_\_, naqbel li l-proġett ta' riċerka msemmi hawn fuq ġie spjegat lili għas-sodisfazzjon tiegħi u naqbel li niegħu sehem fl-istudju. Grajt in-noti miktuba hawn fuq, u nifhem dak li jinvolvi l-istudju ta' riċerka.

Firma tal-partecipant \_\_\_\_\_ Data \_\_\_\_\_

(Optional) Jekk tixtieq tircievi sommarju tar-rizultati meta tiffesta r-riċerka, jekk jogħġbok halli d-dettalji ta' kuntatt (l-indirizz tal-email jew in-numru tal-mowbajl) \_\_\_\_\_

#### Stqarrija tar-riċerkatur:

Jien, Luke Joseph Buhaqiar, nikkonferma li spjegajt bir-reqqa n-natura, it-talbiet u kwalunkwe riskji prevedibbli tar-riċerka proposta lill-voluntier.

Firma tal-istudent Luke Joseph Buhaqiar Data \_\_\_\_\_

Firma tas-supervizur \_\_\_\_\_ Data \_\_\_\_\_

Note. These figures present the information sheet and consent form used in Study 1 (in English and Maltese).

**Appendix E**  
**Study 2: Supplementary Material**

**Figure E1**

*Ranking Procedure*

**Q1. The following scale involves a series of items concerning the integration of Arabs in Malta, with 6 statements being pro-integration, and 6 statements being anti-integration, to various degrees. Please rank the following statements in the following order:**

**1st item: most pro-integration item**  
:  
:  
:  
**12th item: most anti-integration item**  
-----

---

Arabic Islamic culture and Maltese Christian culture are too contrasting for us to get along well.

---

At the end of the day, the Arabs or the Maltese will want to impose their way of life on the other.

---

The Maltese and Arabs can definitely get along whilst fully keeping their cultural and religious differences – living together is highly beneficial.

---

Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural practices private in order to get along with the locals.

---

As with other cultures, cultural contact between Arabs and the Maltese can be good in some specific respects (e.g., new food, music, etc.).

---

Racism between the Maltese and Arabs makes sense - we simply should not mix.

---

As a minimum, there should be no discrimination between the Maltese and Arabs.

---

The religious and cultural differences between Arabs and the Maltese can be problematic when it comes to living together.

---

It would be better for society if the Maltese and Arabs engage with each other (e.g., at work, at school, etc.) instead of isolating themselves.

---

The similarities between Arab and Maltese culture, heritage, language and mentality can help us get along.

---

It would definitely be better if the Maltese and Arabs avoid dealing with each other altogether.

---

Having Christian and Muslim places of worship side by side makes for a strong and diverse society, both here in Malta and elsewhere.

---

*Note.* This figure presents the ranking exercise completed by the expert rankers in Study 2.

**Table E2**

*Standard Deviation and Interquartile Range of Item Rankings*

Item	1 (A)	2 (B)	3 (C)	4 (D)	X (E)	5 (F)	6 (G)	X (H)	7 (I)	8 (J)	9 (K)	10 (L)
<i>SD</i>	1.39	1.30	1.30	1.47	1.64	0.80	0.72	1.06	0.94	1.18	0.62	0.26
<i>IQR</i>	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.50	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.00

*Note.* This table presents the standard deviation (SD) and interquartile range (IQR) of the mean rankings of the IR scale items following the expert ranking procedure. Item numbers indicate the final IR scale items, and item letters indicate the initial IR scale items (see **Chapter 7**). X = items excluded from the final IR scales.

**Table E3***Initial 12-Item RFI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Anti-Image Correlation Matrix*

<b>Item</b>	<b>1 (A)</b>	<b>2 (B)</b>	<b>3 (C)</b>	<b>4 (D)</b>	<b>X (E)</b>	<b>5 (F)</b>	<b>6 (G)</b>	<b>X (H)</b>	<b>7 (I)</b>	<b>8 (J)</b>	<b>9 (K)</b>	<b>10(L)</b>
<b>1 (A)</b>	<b>.942</b>	-.165	-.189	-.112	-.093	-.060	-.118	.101	-.099	-.006	-.122	-.066
<b>2 (B)</b>	-.165	<b>.926</b>	.059	-.205	-.074	-.182	.007	.069	.009	.056	-.121	-.168
<b>3 (C)</b>	-.189	.059	<b>.924</b>	-.151	.020	-.235	-.030	-.086	-.110	.007	-.053	-.035
<b>4 (D)</b>	-.112	-.205	-.151	<b>.934</b>	.033	-.211	-.057	-.033	-.054	-.134	-.011	-.073
<b>X (E)</b>	-.093	-.074	.020	.033	<b>.943</b>	-.173	-.065	-.072	.041	-.032	-.153	-.126
<b>5 (F)</b>	-.060	-.182	-.235	-.211	-.173	<b>.917</b>	-.026	.100	-.022	.004	-.018	-.022
<b>6 (G)</b>	-.118	.007	-.030	-.057	-.065	-.026	<b>.922</b>	.012	-.163	-.272	-.073	.004
<b>X (H)</b>	.101	.069	-.086	-.033	-.072	.100	.012	<b>.785</b>	-.083	-.133	-.001	-.141
<b>7 (I)</b>	-.099	.009	-.110	-.054	.041	-.022	-.163	-.083	<b>.947</b>	-.111	-.102	-.121
<b>8 (J)</b>	-.006	.056	.007	-.134	-.032	.004	-.272	-.133	-.111	<b>.898</b>	.013	-.113
<b>9 (K)</b>	-.122	-.121	-.053	-.011	-.153	-.018	-.073	-.001	-.102	.013	<b>.904</b>	-.451
<b>10 (L)</b>	-.066	-.168	-.035	-.073	-.126	-.022	.004	-.141	-.121	-.113	-.451	<b>.899</b>

*Note.* This table presents the anti-image correlation matrix for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item RFI scale. Figures in bold indicate measures of sampling adequacy (MSA).

**Table E4***Initial 12-Item RFI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Communalities*

<b>Item</b>	<b>Initial</b>	<b>Extraction (Eigenvalues &gt; 1)</b>	<b>Extraction (EFA fixed to 1 Factor)</b>
Item 1 (A)	.490	.541	.524
Item 2 (B)	.467	.538	.447
Item 3 (C)	.388	.379	.379
Item 4 (D)	.473	.496	.492
Item X (E)	.355	.354	.354
Item 5 (F)	.454	.513	.435
Item 6 (G)	.349	.390	.328
Item X (H)	.125	.148	.051
Item 7 (I)	.377	.433	.384
Item 8 (J)	.308	.421	.249
Item 9 (K)	.607	.596	.602
Item 10 (L)	.630	.630	.632


*Note.* This table presents the communalities for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item RFI scale.

**Table E5***Initial 12-Item RFI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Total Variance Explained*

Factor <sup>a</sup>	Initial eigenvalues			Extraction sums of squared loadings			Rotated sums of squared loadings
	Total	% of variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of variance	Cumulative %	
1	5.419	45.155	45.155	4.913	40.941	40.941	4.741
2	1.159	9.658	54.813	0.526	4.379	45.320	2.545
3	0.867	7.224	62.037				
4	0.772	6.436	68.473				
5	0.652	5.431	73.904				
6	0.609	5.076	78.980				
7	0.520	4.333	83.313				
8	0.501	4.176	87.489				
9	0.448	3.735	91.225				
10	0.412	3.430	94.655				
11	0.382	3.181	97.835				
12	0.260	2.165	100.000				

*Note.* This table presents the initial eigenvalues, extraction sums of squared loadings and rotated sums of squared loadings, for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item RFI scale. The Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960) was applied on this output when determining the number of factors for the RFI scale. However, one factor was retained, based on the parallel analysis (see below).

<sup>a</sup> **When fixing EFA to extract 1 factor, for Factor 1, Extraction sums of squared loadings: Total = 4.878; % of variance = 40.651; Cumulative % = 40.651.**

**Figure E6***Initial 12-Item RFI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Scree Plot*

*Note.* This figure presents the scree plot for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item RFI scale.



**Table E7**

*Initial 12-Item RFI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Factor Correlation Matrix*

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>
1	1.000	.519
2	.519	1.000

*Note.* This table presents the factor correlation matrix for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item RFI scale. As the factors underlying the items were expected to correlate (in the eventuality of multiple factors), oblique rotation was employed, using Direct Oblimin (delta set at zero), when exploring this initial output.

**Table E8**

*Initial 12-Item RFI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Pattern Matrix*

<b>Item</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>
Item 1 (A)	.727	.016
Item 2 (B)	.805	-.163
Item 3 (C)	.565	.088
Item 4 (D)	.665	.070
Item X (E)	.552	.077
Item 5 (F)	.780	-.144
Item 6 (G)	.311	.403
Item X (H)	-.046	.406
Item 7 (I)	.370	.384
Item 8 (J)	.131	.571
Item 9 (K)	.671	.168
Item 10 (L)	.638	.245

*Note.* This table presents the pattern matrix (rotation converged in 9 iterations) for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item RFI scale. As the factors underlying the items were expected to correlate (in the eventuality of multiple factors), oblique rotation was employed, using Direct Oblimin (delta set at zero).

**Table E9***Initial 12-Item RFI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Structure Matrix*

<b>Item</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>
Item 1 (A)	.735	.394
Item 2 (B)	.720	.255
Item 3 (C)	.611	.382
Item 4 (D)	.702	.416
Item X (E)	.592	.363
Item 5 (F)	.706	.262
Item 6 (G)	.521	.565
Item X (H)	.165	.382
Item 7 (I)	.570	.577
Item 8 (J)	.427	.639
Item 9 (K)	.758	.517
Item 10 (L)	.765	.577

*Note.* This table presents the structure matrix for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item RFI scale. As the factors underlying the items were expected to correlate (in the eventuality of multiple factors), oblique rotation was employed, using Direct Oblimin (delta set at zero).

**Table E10***Initial 12-Item RFI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Factor Matrix*


<b>Item</b>	<b>Eigenvalues &gt; 1</b>		<b>EFA fixed to 1 Factor</b>
	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>
Item 1 (A)	.724	-.132	.724
Item 2 (B)	.679	-.279	.669
Item 3 (C)	.614	-.047	.616
Item 4 (D)	.700	-.080	.701
Item X (E)	.593	-.053	.595
Item 5 (F)	.667	-.260	.659
Item 6 (G)	.579	.235	.573
Item X (H)	.231	.307	.227
Item 7 (I)	.624	.209	.620
Item 8 (J)	.515	.394	.499
Item 9 (K)	.772	-.010	.776
Item 10 (L)	.792	.054	.795

*Note.* This table presents the factor matrix for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item RFI scale, with EFA set to extract factors based on eigenvalues > 1 (2 factors extracted following 9 iterations), and with EFA fixed to extract 1 factor (1 factor extracted following 4 iterations).

**Table E11***Initial 12-Item RFI Scale: Parallel Analysis Output—Eigenvalue Comparisons*

Root	Raw data eigenvalue	Mean eigenvalue	Percentile eigenvalue
<b>1</b>	<b>5.419</b>	<b>1.326</b>	<b>1.409</b>
2	1.159	1.239	1.298
3	0.867	1.173	1.221
4	0.772	1.115	1.157
5	0.652	1.063	1.103
6	0.609	1.015	1.051
7	0.520	0.967	1.004
8	0.501	0.920	0.957
9	0.448	0.873	0.912
10	0.412	0.825	0.866
11	0.382	0.773	0.816
12	0.260	0.710	0.763

*Note.* This table presents the output for the parallel analysis based on  $N = 322$  (i.e., Maltese and Arab participants; excluding mixed Arab-Maltese participants), 12 variables (initial RFI scale), 5000 permutations of the raw data set, and the percentile of eigenvalues set at 95. The row in bold indicates the number of factors to retain, wherein the number of eigenvalues generated from the dataset (Raw data eigenvalues) was greater than the corresponding Percentile eigenvalues (see Horn, 1965).

**Figure E12***Initial 12-Item RFI Scale: Parallel Analysis Output—Scree Plot Comparisons*

*Note.* This figure presents the scree plots obtained during parallel analysis, comparing the eigenvalues generated from the raw data (initial 12-item RFI scale; blue), with those of the corresponding mean eigenvalues (red) and percentile eigenvalues (green).

**Table E13***Final 10-Item RFI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Anti-Image Correlation Matrix*

<b>Item</b>	<b>1 (A)</b>	<b>2 (B)</b>	<b>3 (C)</b>	<b>4 (D)</b>	<b>5 (F)</b>	<b>6 (G)</b>	<b>7 (I)</b>	<b>8 (J)</b>	<b>9 (K)</b>	<b>10 (L)</b>
<b>1 (A)</b>	<b>.941</b>	-.180	-.181	-.107	-.087	-.126	-.089	.004	-.138	-.065
<b>2 (B)</b>	-.180	<b>.915</b>	.066	-.202	-.206	.001	.017	.063	-.133	-.172
<b>3 (C)</b>	-.181	.066	<b>.923</b>	-.155	-.230	-.028	-.119	-.004	-.052	-.046
<b>4 (D)</b>	-.107	-.202	-.155	<b>.931</b>	-.207	-.055	-.059	-.138	-.006	-.075
<b>5 (F)</b>	-.087	-.206	-.230	-.207	<b>.922</b>	-.039	-.008	.011	-.045	-.032
<b>6 (G)</b>	-.126	.001	-.028	-.055	-.039	<b>.915</b>	-.160	-.277	-.084	-.003
<b>7 (I)</b>	-.089	.017	-.119	-.059	-.008	-.160	<b>.945</b>	-.122	-.098	-.131
<b>8 (J)</b>	.004	.063	-.004	-.138	.011	-.277	-.122	<b>.889</b>	.007	-.141
<b>9 (K)</b>	-.138	-.133	-.052	-.006	-.045	-.084	-.098	.007	<b>.886</b>	-.487
<b>10 (L)</b>	-.065	-.172	-.046	-.075	-.032	-.003	-.131	-.141	-.487	<b>.883</b>

*Note.* This table presents the anti-image correlation matrix for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the final 10-item RFI scale. Figures in bold indicate measures of sampling adequacy (MSA).

**Table E14***Final 10-Item RFI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Communalities*


<b>Item</b>	<b>Initial</b>	<b>Extraction</b>
Item 1 (A)	.481	.532
Item 2 (B)	.462	.449
Item 3 (C)	.384	.387
Item 4 (D)	.472	.507
Item 5 (F)	.433	.434
Item 6 (G)	.346	.329
Item 7 (I)	.372	.390
Item 8 (J)	.294	.245
Item 9 (K)	.597	.586
Item 10 (L)	.615	.613

*Note.* This table presents the communalities for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the final 10-item RFI scale.

**Table E15***Final 10-Item RFI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Total Variance Explained*

Factor	Initial eigenvalues			Extraction sums of squared loadings		
	Total	% of variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of variance	Cumulative %
1	5.002	50.021	50.021	4.474	44.737	44.737
2	0.988	9.877	59.898			
3	0.735	7.350	67.248			
4	0.646	6.461	73.708			
5	0.563	5.630	79.339			
6	0.514	5.144	84.483			
7	0.470	4.702	89.184			
8	0.430	4.301	93.485			
9	0.390	3.897	97.382			
10	0.262	2.618	100.000			

*Note.* This table presents the initial eigenvalues, extraction sums of squared loadings and rotated sums of squared loadings, for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the final 10-item RFI scale. The Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960) was applied on this output when determining the number of factors for the RFI scale.

**Figure E16***Final 10-Item RFI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Scree Plot*

*Note.* This figure presents the scree plot for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the final 10-item RFI scale.

**Table E17***Final 10-Item RFI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Factor Matrix*

<b>Item</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>
Item 1 (A)	.730
Item 2 (B)	.670
Item 3 (C)	.622
Item 4 (D)	.712
Item 5 (F)	.659
Item 6 (G)	.574
Item 7 (I)	.625
Item 8 (J)	.495
Item 9 (K)	.766
Item 10 (L)	.783

*Note.* This table presents the factor matrix (1 factor extracted following 4 iterations) for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the final 10-item RFI scale.


**Table E18***Final 10-Item RFI Scale: Parallel Analysis Output—Eigenvalue Comparisons*

<b>Root</b>	<b>Raw data eigenvalue</b>	<b>Mean eigenvalue</b>	<b>Percentile eigenvalue</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>5.002</b>	<b>1.285</b>	<b>1.364</b>
2	0.988	1.197	1.254
3	0.735	1.130	1.176
4	0.646	1.072	1.112
5	0.563	1.018	1.056
6	0.514	0.967	1.005
7	0.470	0.916	0.955
8	0.430	0.864	0.904
9	0.390	0.809	0.854
10	0.262	0.742	0.796

*Note.* This table presents the output for the parallel analysis based on  $N = 322$  (i.e., Maltese and Arab participants; excluding mixed Arab-Maltese participants), 10 variables (final RFI scale), 5000 permutations of the raw data set, and the percentile of eigenvalues set at 95. The row in bold indicates the number of factors to retain, wherein the number of eigenvalues generated from the dataset (Raw data eigenvalues) was greater than the corresponding Percentile eigenvalues (see Horn, 1965).

**Figure E19**

*Final 10-Item RFI Scale: Parallel Analysis Output—Scree Plot Comparisons*



*Note.* This figure presents the scree plots obtained during parallel analysis, comparing the eigenvalues generated from the raw data (final 10-item RFI scale; blue), with those of the corresponding mean eigenvalues (red) and percentile eigenvalues (green).

**Table E20**

*Initial 12-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Anti-Image Correlation Matrix*

Item	1 (A)	2 (B)	3 (C)	4 (D)	X (E)	5 (F)	6 (G)	X (H)	7 (I)	8 (J)	9 (K)	10(L)
<b>1 (A)</b>	<b>.856</b>	-.176	-.191	-.266	-.043	-.186	.047	.071	-.043	-.089	.031	-.106
<b>2 (B)</b>	-.176	<b>.881</b>	-.156	-.148	-.105	-.136	.075	-.095	-.092	-.075	.049	-.127
<b>3 (C)</b>	-.191	-.156	<b>.888</b>	-.153	-.152	-.091	-.110	.073	.000	-.020	-.037	-.075
<b>4 (D)</b>	-.266	-.148	-.153	<b>.871</b>	.040	-.113	-.027	.033	-.105	.067	-.091	-.037
<b>X (E)</b>	-.043	-.105	-.152	.040	<b>.833</b>	-.166	.099	-.043	-.030	.107	-.033	-.167
<b>5 (F)</b>	-.186	-.136	-.091	-.113	-.166	<b>.815</b>	-.052	-.014	.133	-.020	-.182	.117
<b>6 (G)</b>	.047	.075	-.110	-.027	.099	-.052	<b>.745</b>	.009	-.283	-.051	-.012	-.169
<b>X (H)</b>	.071	-.095	.073	.033	-.043	-.014	.009	<b>.683</b>	-.032	.088	-.095	-.243
<b>7 (I)</b>	-.043	-.092	.000	-.105	-.030	.133	-.283	-.032	<b>.801</b>	-.217	-.119	-.109
<b>8 (J)</b>	-.089	-.075	-.020	.067	.107	-.020	-.051	.088	-.217	<b>.784</b>	-.141	-.044
<b>9 (K)</b>	.031	.049	-.037	-.091	-.033	-.182	-.012	-.095	-.119	-.141	<b>.840</b>	-.244
<b>10 (L)</b>	-.106	-.127	-.075	-.037	-.167	.117	-.169	-.243	-.109	-.044	-.244	<b>.822</b>

*Note.* This table presents the anti-image correlation matrix for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item AROI scale. Figures in bold indicate measures of sampling adequacy (MSA).

**Table E21***Initial 12-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Communalities*

Item	Initial	Extraction (Eigenvalues > 1)	Extraction (EFA fixed to 2 Factors)
Item 1 (A)	.416	.547	.507
Item 2 (B)	.368	.432	.437
Item 3 (C)	.356	.432	.427
Item 4 (D)	.356	.421	.398
Item X (E)	.220	.287	.211
Item 5 (F)	.284	.333	.337
Item 6 (G)	.203	.263	.248
Item X (H)	.133	.253	.065
Item 7 (I)	.311	.504	.462
Item 8 (J)	.172	.222	.165
Item 9 (K)	.276	.301	.293
Item 10 (L)	.391	.579	.441

*Note.* This table presents the communalities for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item AROI scale.


**Table E22***Initial 12-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Total Variance Explained*

Factor <sup>a</sup>	Initial eigenvalues			Extraction sums of squared loadings			Rotated sums of squared loadings
	Total	% of variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of variance	Cumulative %	
1	3.799	31.660	31.660	3.225	26.871	26.871	2.838
2	1.460	12.163	43.823	0.847	7.057	33.928	1.860
3	1.175	9.793	53.617	0.503	4.193	38.122	1.257
4	0.847	7.059	60.676				
5	0.779	6.491	67.166				
6	0.761	6.341	73.507				
7	0.667	5.555	79.062				
8	0.593	4.943	84.005				
9	0.521	4.340	88.345				
10	0.516	4.301	92.645				
11	0.469	3.910	96.555				
12	0.413	3.445	100.000				

*Note.* This table presents the initial eigenvalues, extraction sums of squared loadings and rotated sums of squared loadings, for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item AROI scale. The Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960) was applied on this output when determining the number of factors for the AROI scale. However, two factors were retained, based on the parallel analysis (see below).

<sup>a</sup> When fixing EFA to extract 2 factors, Extraction sums of squared loadings: Factor 1: Total = 3.186, % of variance = 26.553, Cumulative % = 26.553; Factor 2: Total = .804, % of variance = 6.699, Cumulative % = 33.252. Rotated Sums of Squared Loadings: Factor 1 = 2.844; Factor 2 = 2.261.



**Figure E23***Initial 12-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Scree Plot*

*Note.* This figure presents the scree plot for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item AROI scale.

**Table E24.1**

*Initial 12-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Factor Correlation Matrix, based on EFA (Eigenvalues > 1)*

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>	<b>Factor 3</b>
1	1.000	.373	.320
2	.373	1.000	.225
3	.320	.225	1.000

*Note.* This table presents the factor correlation matrix for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item AROI scale, with factors extracted based on eigenvalues > 1. As the factors underlying the items were expected to correlate, oblique rotation was employed, using Direct Oblimin (delta set at zero).

**Table E24.2**

*Initial 12-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Factor Correlation Matrix, based on EFA (EFA fixed to extract 2 factors)*

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>
1	1.000	.487
2	.487	1.000

*Note.* This table presents the factor correlation matrix for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item AROI scale, with EFA fixed to extract 2 factors. As the factors underlying the items were expected to correlate, oblique rotation was employed, using Direct Oblimin (delta set at zero).

**Table E25.1***Initial 12-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Pattern Matrix (Eigenvalues > 1)*

<b>Item</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>	<b>Factor 3</b>
Item 1 (A)	.735	.086	-.123
Item 2 (B)	.593	.060	.100
Item 3 (C)	.619	.102	-.019
Item 4 (D)	.602	.144	-.073
Item X (E)	.431	-.151	.267
Item 5 (F)	.610	-.105	-.008
Item 6 (G)	-.040	.512	.057
Item X (H)	-.056	.012	.516
Item 7 (I)	.010	.683	.080
Item 8 (J)	.075	.452	-.074
Item 9 (K)	.195	.283	.272
Item 10 (L)	.167	.318	.528

*Note.* This table presents the pattern matrix (rotation converged in 6 iterations) for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item AROI scale. As the factors underlying the items were expected to correlate, oblique rotation was employed, using Direct Oblimin (delta set at zero).

**Table E25.2***Initial 12-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Pattern Matrix (EFA fixed to extract 2 factors)*

<b>Item</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>
Item 1 (A)	.704	.016
Item 2 (B)	.606	.100
Item 3 (C)	.609	.083
Item 4 (D)	.578	.098
Item X (E)	.461	-.004
Item 5 (F)	.629	-.118
Item 6 (G)	-.091	.536
Item X (H)	.020	.244
Item 7 (I)	-.050	.703
Item 8 (J)	.023	.394
Item 9 (K)	.194	.420
Item 10 (L)	.206	.539

*Note.* This table presents the pattern matrix (rotation converged in 5 iterations) for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item AROI scale. As the factors underlying the items were expected to correlate, oblique rotation was employed, using Direct Oblimin (delta set at zero).

**Table E26.1***Initial 12-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Structure Matrix (Eigenvalues > 1)*

<b>Item</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>	<b>Factor 3</b>
Item 1 (A)	.727	.333	.132
Item 2 (B)	.647	.304	.304
Item 3 (C)	.651	.328	.202
Item 4 (D)	.633	.352	.153
Item X (E)	.460	.070	.371
Item 5 (F)	.568	.121	.164
Item 6 (G)	.169	.510	.159
Item X (H)	.114	.107	.501
Item 7 (I)	.290	.705	.237
Item 8 (J)	.220	.464	.052
Item 9 (K)	.387	.416	.398
Item 10 (L)	.455	.499	.653

*Note.* This table presents the structure matrix for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item AROI scale. As the factors underlying the items were expected to correlate, oblique rotation was employed, using Direct Oblimin (delta set at zero).

**Table E26.2***Initial 12-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Structure Matrix (EFA fixed to extract 2 factors)*

<b>Item</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>
Item 1 (A)	.712	.359
Item 2 (B)	.655	.395
Item 3 (C)	.649	.380
Item 4 (D)	.625	.379
Item X (E)	.459	.220
Item 5 (F)	.571	.188
Item 6 (G)	.170	.492
Item X (H)	.139	.254
Item 7 (I)	.292	.678
Item 8 (J)	.215	.405
Item 9 (K)	.399	.514
Item 10 (L)	.469	.640

*Note.* This table presents the structure matrix for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item AROI scale. As the factors underlying the items were expected to correlate, oblique rotation was employed, using Direct Oblimin (delta set at zero).

**Table E27.1***Initial 12-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Factor Matrix (Eigenvalues > 1)*

<b>Item</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>	<b>Factor 3</b>
Item 1 (A)	.667	-.280	-.155
Item 2 (B)	.634	-.169	.038
Item 3 (C)	.625	-.191	-.075
Item 4 (D)	.610	-.174	-.134
Item X (E)	.431	-.184	.260
Item 5 (F)	.484	-.314	.016
Item 6 (G)	.336	.355	-.157
Item X (H)	.223	.191	.409
Item 7 (I)	.508	.450	-.207
Item 8 (J)	.334	.231	-.241
Item 9 (K)	.507	.184	.099
Item 10 (L)	.637	.298	.290

*Note.* This table presents the factor matrix (3 factors extracted following 11 iterations) for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item AROI scale.

**Table E27.2***Initial 12-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Factor Matrix (EFA fixed to extract 2 factors)*


<b>Item</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>
Item 1 (A)	.664	-.257
Item 2 (B)	.639	-.168
Item 3 (C)	.628	-.179
Item 4 (D)	.611	-.158
Item X (E)	.423	-.178
Item 5 (F)	.489	-.312
Item 6 (G)	.335	.369
Item X (H)	.209	.145
Item 7 (I)	.503	.457
Item 8 (J)	.330	.237
Item 9 (K)	.508	.188
Item 10 (L)	.612	.258

*Note.* This table presents the factor matrix (2 factors extracted following 9 iterations) for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the initial 12-item AROI scale.

**Table E28***Initial 12-Item AROI Scale: Parallel Analysis Output—Eigenvalue Comparisons*

Root	Raw data eigenvalue	Mean eigenvalue	Percentile eigenvalue
<b>1</b>	<b>3.799</b>	<b>1.325</b>	<b>1.405</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>1.460</b>	<b>1.239</b>	<b>1.296</b>
3	1.175	1.173	1.221
4	0.847	1.116	1.157
5	0.779	1.064	1.103
6	0.761	1.014	1.051
7	0.667	0.967	1.003
8	0.593	0.921	0.956
9	0.521	0.874	0.912
10	0.516	0.825	0.866
11	0.469	0.772	0.817
12	0.413	0.709	0.760

*Note.* This table presents the output for the parallel analysis based on  $N = 322$  (i.e., Maltese and Arab participants; excluding mixed Arab-Maltese participants), 12 variables (initial AROI scale), 5000 permutations of the raw data set, and the percentile of eigenvalues set at 95. The rows in bold indicate the number of factors to retain, wherein the number of eigenvalues generated from the dataset (Raw data eigenvalues) was greater than the corresponding Percentile eigenvalues (see Horn, 1965).

**Figure E29***Initial 12-Item AROI Scale: Parallel Analysis Output—Scree Plot Comparisons*

*Note.* This figure presents the scree plots obtained during parallel analysis, comparing the eigenvalues generated from the raw data (initial 12-item AROI scale; blue), with those of the corresponding mean eigenvalues (red) and percentile eigenvalues (green).

**Table E30***Final 10-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Anti-Image Correlation Matrix*

Item	1 (A)	2 (B)	3 (C)	4 (D)	5 (F)	6 (G)	7 (I)	8 (J)	9 (K)	10 (L)
1 (A)	<b>.846</b>	-.176	-.205	-.268	-.195	.051	-.042	-.092	.036	-.101
2 (B)	-.176	<b>.864</b>	-.169	-.142	-.160	.088	-.100	-.056	.036	-.180
3 (C)	-.205	-.169	<b>.888</b>	-.151	-.118	-.097	-.002	-.010	-.036	-.089
4 (D)	-.268	-.142	-.151	<b>.872</b>	-.107	-.031	-.103	.060	-.087	-.023
5 (F)	-.195	-.160	-.118	-.107	<b>.810</b>	-.036	.129	.000	-.193	.089
6 (G)	.051	.088	-.097	-.031	-.036	<b>.762</b>	-.281	-.063	-.007	-.157
7 (I)	-.042	-.100	-.002	-.103	.129	-.281	<b>.793</b>	-.213	-.124	-.129
8 (J)	-.092	-.056	-.010	.060	.000	-.063	-.213	<b>.829</b>	-.131	-.003
9 (K)	.036	.036	-.036	-.087	-.193	-.007	-.124	-.131	<b>.811</b>	-.289
10 (L)	-.101	-.180	-.089	-.023	.089	-.157	-.129	-.003	-.289	<b>.831</b>

*Note.* This table presents the anti-image correlation matrix for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the final 10-item AROI scale. Figures in bold indicate measures of sampling adequacy (MSA).

**Table E31***Final 10-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Communalities*


Item	Initial	Extraction
Item 1 (A)	.412	.536
Item 2 (B)	.355	.426
Item 3 (C)	.338	.417
Item 4 (D)	.354	.429
Item 5 (F)	.264	.317
Item 6 (G)	.195	.259
Item 7 (I)	.309	.503
Item 8 (J)	.155	.183
Item 9 (K)	.269	.275
Item 10 (L)	.331	.383

*Note.* This table presents the communalities for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the final 10-item AROI scale.

**Table E32***Final 10-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Total Variance Explained*

Factor	Initial eigenvalues			Extraction sums of squared loadings			Rotated sums of squared loadings
	Total	% of variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of variance	Cumulative %	
1	3.569	35.688	35.688	2.972	29.718	29.718	2.644
2	1.380	13.803	49.491	0.757	7.572	37.290	2.123
3	0.848	8.478	57.969				
4	0.820	8.201	66.169				
5	0.749	7.486	73.655				
6	0.622	6.216	79.871				
7	0.581	5.808	85.679				
8	0.526	5.256	90.934				
9	0.482	4.821	95.755				
10	0.424	4.245	100.000				

*Note.* This table presents the initial eigenvalues, extraction sums of squared loadings and rotated sums of squared loadings, for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the final 10-item AROI scale. The Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960) was applied on this output when determining the number of factors for the AROI scale.

**Figure E33***Final 10-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Scree Plot*

*Note.* This figure presents the scree plot for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the final 10-item AROI scale.

**Table E34***Final 10-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Factor Correlation Matrix*

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>
1	1.000	.487
2	.487	1.000

*Note.* This table presents the factor correlation matrix for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the final 10-item AROI scale. As the factors underlying the items were expected to correlate, oblique rotation was employed, using Direct Oblimin (delta set at zero).

**Table E35***Final 10-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Pattern Matrix*

<b>Item</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>
Item 1 (A)	.731	.003
Item 2 (B)	.608	.083
Item 3 (C)	.594	.094
Item 4 (D)	.613	.080
Item 5 (F)	.609	-.113
Item 6 (G)	-.075	.541
Item 7 (I)	-.057	.735
Item 8 (J)	.041	.407
Item 9 (K)	.207	.392
Item 10 (L)	.217	.484

*Note.* This table presents the pattern matrix (rotation converged in 5 iterations) for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the final 10-item AROI scale. As the factors underlying the items were expected to correlate, oblique rotation was employed, using Direct Oblimin (delta set at zero). The pattern matrix was the matrix used to determine factor loadings.



**Table E36***Final 10-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Structure Matrix*

<b>Item</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>
Item 1 (A)	.732	.359
Item 2 (B)	.648	.379
Item 3 (C)	.640	.384
Item 4 (D)	.652	.378
Item 5 (F)	.554	.183
Item 6 (G)	.188	.505
Item 7 (I)	.301	.708
Item 8 (J)	.239	.427
Item 9 (K)	.397	.493
Item 10 (L)	.452	.589

*Note.* This table presents the structure matrix for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the final 10-item AROI scale. As the factors underlying the items were expected to correlate, oblique rotation was employed, using Direct Oblimin (delta set at zero).

**Table E37***Final 10-Item AROI Scale: Factor Analysis Output (SPSS)—Factor Matrix*


<b>Item</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>
Item 1 (A)	.677	-.279
Item 2 (B)	.626	-.183
Item 3 (C)	.623	-.170
Item 4 (D)	.628	-.186
Item 5 (F)	.473	-.305
Item 6 (G)	.355	.364
Item 7 (I)	.525	.477
Item 8 (J)	.357	.236
Item 9 (K)	.499	.163
Item 10 (L)	.580	.216

*Note.* This table presents the factor matrix (2 factors extracted following 11 iterations) for the exploratory factor analysis (with principal axis factoring) conducted on the final 10-item AROI scale.

**Table E38***Final 10-Item AROI Scale: Parallel Analysis Output—Eigenvalue Comparisons*

Root	Raw data eigenvalue	Mean eigenvalue	Percentile eigenvalue
<b>1</b>	<b>3.569</b>	<b>1.285</b>	<b>1.365</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>1.380</b>	<b>1.197</b>	<b>1.254</b>
3	0.848	1.130	1.176
4	0.820	1.072	1.112
5	0.749	1.018	1.056
6	0.622	0.967	1.005
7	0.581	0.916	0.955
8	0.526	0.863	0.904
9	0.482	0.808	0.854
10	0.424	0.741	0.795

*Note.* This table presents the output for the parallel analysis based on  $N = 322$  (i.e., Maltese and Arab participants; excluding mixed Arab-Maltese participants), 10 variables (final AROI scale), 5000 permutations of the raw data set, and the percentile of eigenvalues set at 95. The rows in bold indicate the number of factors to retain, wherein the number of eigenvalues generated from the dataset (Raw data eigenvalues) was greater than the corresponding Percentile eigenvalues (see Horn, 1965).

**Figure E39***Final 10-Item AROI Scale: Parallel Analysis Output—Scree Plot Comparisons*

*Note.* This figure presents the scree plots obtained during parallel analysis, comparing the eigenvalues generated from the raw data (final 10-item AROI scale; blue), with those of the corresponding mean eigenvalues (red) and percentile eigenvalues (green).

## Appendix F

### Study 3: Supplementary Material

#### Figure F1

*Study 3: Questionnaire in English*



**Welcome.**

**In this anonymous survey, we are asking both Maltese and Arab participants to tell us what they think of the relations between the Maltese and Arabs in Malta. We invite you to take a moment to tell us your views by answering this questionnaire, which should take around 10 minutes to complete. Your participation in this research is on a voluntary basis, and no data that reveals your identity will be requested during this questionnaire. Only adults (18+) who live in Malta are allowed to take part in this survey.**

**Your views are very important to us.**

**We thank you in advance for your collaboration.**

This study is being carried out by PhD student Luke J Buhagiar (luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt) under the supervision of Prof Gordon Sammut (gordon.sammut@um.edu.mt) from the University of Malta. By clicking below, you confirm that you have read the above information, that you are an adult and that you consent to participate in this research.

[Click here to continue](#)


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Age (in years)

Which of the following categories do you fall under?

- Maltese** (of non-Arab origin)
- Arab origin** (with or without Maltese nationality/ citizenship)
- Mixed Arab and Maltese origin** (with or without Maltese nationality/ citizenship)

[Click here to continue](#)

Powered by Qualtrics 

Maltese (of non-Arab origin)

40%

Thanks again 😊

In this section, we would like to know what you think about the following statements concerning relations between the Maltese and Arabs in Malta.

We would also like to know what you think that Arabs in Malta think about the same statements.

Please answer the following questions using a scale from 1 to 7.

---

The Maltese and Arabs can definitely get along whilst fully keeping their cultural and religious differences – living together is highly beneficial.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

It would be better for society if the Maltese and Arabs engage with each other (e.g., at work, at school, etc.) instead of isolating themselves.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

Having Christian and Muslim places of worship side by side makes for a strong and diverse society, both here in Malta and elsewhere.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

The similarities between Arab and Maltese culture, heritage, language and mentality can help us get along.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

As a minimum, there should be no discrimination between the Maltese and Arabs.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

As with other cultures, cultural contact between Arabs and the Maltese can be good in some specific respects (e.g., new food, music, etc.).

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

The religious and cultural differences between Arabs and the Maltese can be problematic when it comes to living together.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural practices private in order to get along with the locals.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?



They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

---

Arabic Islamic culture and Maltese Christian culture are too contrasting for us to get along well.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

---

---

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

---

At the end of the day, the Arabs or the Maltese will want to impose their way of life on the other.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

---

---

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

---

It would definitely be better if the Maltese and Arabs avoid dealing with each other altogether.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

---

---

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

Racism between the Maltese and Arabs makes sense - we simply should not mix.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree


I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

[Click here to continue](#)

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**Arab origin (with or without Maltese nationality/ citizenship)**

40%

Thanks again 😊

In this section, we would like to know what you think about the following statements concerning relations between the Maltese and Arabs in Malta.

We would also like to know what you think that the Maltese think about the same statements.

Please answer the following questions using a scale from 1 to 7.

---

The Maltese and Arabs can definitely get along whilst fully keeping their cultural and religious differences – living together is highly beneficial.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

It would be better for society if the Maltese and Arabs engage with each other (e.g., at work, at school, etc.) instead of isolating themselves.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

Having Christian and Muslim places of worship side by side makes for a strong and diverse society, both here in Malta and elsewhere.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

The similarities between Arab and Maltese culture, heritage, language and mentality can help us get along.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

As a minimum, there should be no discrimination between the Maltese and Arabs.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

As with other cultures, cultural contact between Arabs and the Maltese can be good in some specific respects (e.g., new food, music, etc.).

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

The religious and cultural differences between Arabs and the Maltese can be problematic when it comes to living together.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural practices private in order to get along with the locals.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

---

Arabic Islamic culture and Maltese Christian culture are too contrasting for us to get along well.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

---

---

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

---

At the end of the day, the Arabs or the Maltese will want to impose their way of life on the other.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

---

---

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

---

It would definitely be better if the Maltese and Arabs avoid dealing with each other altogether.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

---

---

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

---

Racism between the Maltese and Arabs makes sense - we simply should not mix.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

---

---

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

---

[Click here to continue](#)

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**Mixed Arab and Maltese origin (with or without Maltese nationality/ citizenship)**

40%

Thanks again 😊

In this section, we would like to know what you think about the following statements concerning relations between the Maltese and Arabs in Malta.

We would also like to know what you think that the Maltese and Arabs in Malta think about the same statements.

Please answer the following questions using a scale from 1 to 7.

---

The Maltese and Arabs can definitely get along whilst fully keeping their cultural and religious differences – living together is highly beneficial.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

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It would be better for society if the Maltese and Arabs engage with each other (e.g., at work, at school, etc.) instead of isolating themselves.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree



To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

Having Christian and Muslim places of worship side by side makes for a strong and diverse society, both here in Malta and elsewhere.

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To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

The similarities between Arab and Maltese culture, heritage, language and mentality can help us get along.

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To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

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They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

---

As a minimum, there should be no discrimination between the Maltese and Arabs.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

---

---

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

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---

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

---

As with other cultures, cultural contact between Arabs and the Maltese can be good in some specific respects (e.g., new food, music, etc.).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

---

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To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

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To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

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To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

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They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

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To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

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They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

---

Arabic Islamic culture and Maltese Christian culture are too contrasting for us to get along well.

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To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

At the end of the day, the Arabs or the Maltese will want to impose their way of life on the other.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

It would definitely be better if the Maltese and Arabs avoid dealing with each other altogether.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

Racism between the Maltese and Arabs makes sense - we simply should not mix.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the above statement?

I strongly disagree

I strongly agree

To what extent do you think that the Maltese agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

To what extent do you think that Arabs in Malta agree or disagree with the above statement?

They strongly disagree

They strongly agree

[Click here to continue](#)

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80%

We would now like to ask you about your views concerning life in general and related matters.

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following five statements by choosing a number from 1 to 5, where 1 means "strongly disagree" and 5 means "strongly agree".

Strongly disagree

Strongly agree

1

2

3

4

5

**PY24.** The future depends on us and the choices we make. We need to work to fix institutions, laws and policies so that they can cater better to the needs of the people and society.

**WZ05.** To succeed, we need to adjust to our life situations. Sometimes we have to close an eye to the rules to help our loved ones.

**KH30.** In life, we need to help one another and improve our communities. We need to follow local rules and customs so that there can be order in society.

**UL03.** In life, we get what we deserve. One needs to make the best of what life offers and if one works hard enough, one will ultimately succeed.

**XY20.** People are what they are and one has little control over what will turn out in the end. One needs to live day by day and let tomorrow take care of itself.

Which one of the five statements that you have just read comes closest to your view?

PY24

WZ05

KH30

UL03

XY20

**Show how much you favour or oppose each idea by selecting a number from 1 to 6 on the scale below, where 1 means “strongly oppose” and 6 means “strongly favour”. You can work quickly; your first feeling is generally best.**

Strongly oppose

Strongly favour

1

2

3

4

5

6

Some groups of people must be kept in their place.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

No one group should dominate in society.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Groups at the bottom should not have to stay in their place.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Group dominance is a poor principle.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

We should not push for group equality.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

We shouldn't try to guarantee that every group has the same quality of life.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

It is unjust to try to make groups equal.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Group equality should not be our primary goal.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

No matter how much effort it takes, we ought to strive to ensure that all groups have the same chance in life.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Group equality should be our ideal.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

**Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements by choosing a number from 1 to 6, where 1 means “strongly disagree” and 6 means “strongly agree”.**

Strongly disagree

Strongly agree

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6

I don't like situations that are uncertain.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred in my life.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )



I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

When I have made a decision, I feel relieved.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

When I am confronted with a problem, I'm dying to reach a solution very quickly.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a solution to a problem immediately.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

I dislike unpredictable situations.

When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.

**Show how much you agree or disagree with the following statement using the slider below, where 0 means “strongly disagree” and 100 means “strongly agree”.**

Strongly disagree

Strongly agree

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

I feel I belong in my neighbourhood.

[Click here to continue](#)

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100%

**In this final section, there are a few quick questions about yourself.**

**Gender**

- Male
- Female
- Other

**Relationship Status**

- Married
- Not married
- Separated/ Divorced/ Annulled marriage
- Widower/ Widow

**Education (the highest level you have completed)**

- Primary
- Secondary
- Post-secondary (e.g. Sixth form, etc.)
- Tertiary (e.g. University, etc.)
- No formal education

**Occupation**

- Homemaker
- Pensioner / Retired
- Student
- Worker
- Unemployed

**Religion**

- Christianity
- Islam
- Judaism
- None
- Other

To what extent do you identify with your religion on a scale from 1 to 10?

I do not identify at all

I identify completely

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Nationality

Town/Village where you live

How long have you been living in Malta?

Less than 6 months	Between 6 months and 1 year	Between 1 year and 2 years	Between 2 years and 4 years	5 years or more
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Click here to submit your responses](#)

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Grazzi talli hadt il-hin sabiex timla das-servej.

It-twegibiet tieghek ġew irregistrati.

Jekk ikollok xi mistoqsijiet, jekk jogħġbok ibgħat lill-istudent tal-PhD Luke J Buhagiar: [luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt](mailto:luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt)

---

نشكرك على الوقت الذي أمضيتَه في إجراء هذا الاستبيان.

لقد تم تسجيل أجوبتك.

إذا كان لديك أي استفسارات، يرجى الاتصال بالطالب في درجة الدكتوراه  
Luke J Buhagiar: [luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt](mailto:luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt)

—

We thank you for your time spent taking this survey.

Your responses have been recorded.


Should you have any queries, please contact PhD student Luke J Buhagiar: [luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt](mailto:luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt)

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*Note.* This figure presents the questionnaire conducted in Study 3, in English (see **Chapter 8**). The sections labelled ‘Maltese (of non-Arab origin)’ (blue), ‘Arab origin (with or without Maltese nationality/ citizenship)’ (yellow), and ‘Mixed Arab and Maltese origin (with or without Maltese nationality/ citizenship)’ (green) were presented to participants based on their answer to the question, ‘Which of the following categories do you fall under?’

**Figure F2**

*Study 3: Questionnaire in Maltese*



**Merħba.**


**F'dan is-servej anonimu, qegħdin nistaqsu kemm parteċipanti Maltin kif ukoll Gharab sabiex jgħidulna x'jaħsbu fuq ir-relazzjonijiet bejn il-Maltin u l-Gharab f'Malta. Nixtiequ nistidnuk sabiex tghidilna l-fehmiet tiegħek billi twieġeb dan il-kwestjonarju, li għandu jieħu madwar 10 minuti sabiex jitlesta. Il-parteċipazzjoni tiegħek f'din ir-riċerka hija fuq bażi volontarja, u l-ebda data li tikxef l-identita' tiegħek mhi se tiġi mitluba minnek waqt il-kwestjonarju. Adulti (18+) li jgħixu Malta biss jistgħu jieħdu sehem f'dan is-servej.**

**Il-fehmiet tiegħek huma importanti ħafna għalina.**

**Grazzi bil-quddiem tal-kollaborazzjoni tiegħek.**

Dan l-istudju qed jiġi mmexxi mill-istudent tal-PhD Luke J Buhagiar ([luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt](mailto:luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt)) taħt is-superviżjoni ta' Prof Gordon Sammut ([gordon.sammut@um.edu.mt](mailto:gordon.sammut@um.edu.mt)) mill-Universita' ta' Malta. Billi tagħfas hawn taħt, inti tkun qed tikkonferma li qrajt l-informazzjoni t'hawn fuq, li inti adult/a u li tagħti l-kunsens tiegħek għall-parteċipazzjoni f'din ir-riċerka.

Agħfas hawn biex tkompli

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Eta' (fi snin)

Taht liema kategorija taqa'?

- Malti/ Maltija** (ta' origini mhux Għarbija)
- Origini Għarbija** (kemm jekk b'nazzjonalita'/ ċittadinanza Maltija kif ukoll jekk mingħajr)
- Origini mħallta Għarbija u Maltija** (kemm jekk b'nazzjonalita'/ ċittadinanza Maltija kif ukoll jekk mingħajr)

Aghfas hawn biex tkompli

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**Maltese (of non-Arab origin)**

40%

Grazzi mill-ġdid 😊

**F'din is-sezzjoni, nixtiequ nkunu nafu x'taħseb fuq dawn l-istqarrijiet li ġejjin dwar ir-relazzjonijiet bejn il-Maltin u l-Għarab f'Malta.**

**Nixtiequ nkunu nafu wkoll x'taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaħsbu dwar dawn l-istess stqarrijiet.**

**Jekk jogħġbok wieġeb il-mistoqsijiet li ġejjin billi tuża skala minn 1 sa 7.**

Il-Maltin u l-Għarab jistgħu ċertament imorru tajjeb flimkien filwaqt li jżommu d-differenzi kulturali u religjużi tagħhom bis-sħiħ - li ngħixu flimkien huwa ta' benefiċċju kbir.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

**Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Ikun aħjar għas-socjeta' jekk il-Maltin u l-Għarab jirrelataw bejniethom (eż. fuq ix-xogħol, l-iskola, eċċ.) minflok ma jiżolaw ruħhom minn xulxin.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

**Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Li jkollok postijiet reliġjużi Insara u Musulmani hdejn xulxin jirriżulta f'soċjetà b'saħħitha u diversa, kemm hawn Malta kif ukoll f'postijiet oħra.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Is-similaritajiet bejn l-Għarab u l-Maltin fejn jidhlu kultura, wirt, lingwa u mentalita' jistgħu jgħinuna ningiebu ma' xulxin.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Minn tal-inqas, m'għandux ikun hemm diskriminazzjoni bejn il-Maltin u l-Għarab.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

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Bħalma jista' jingħad għal kulturi oħra, il-kuntatt kulturali bejn I-Għarab u I-Maltin jista' jkun tajjeb f'ċerti aspetti speċifiċi (eż. ikel ġdid, mużika, eċċ.).

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li I-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn Jaqblu kompletament

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Id-differenzi religjużi u kulturali bejn I-Għarab u I-Maltin jistgħu jkunu problematiċi meta niġu biex ngħixu flimkien.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li I-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn Jaqblu kompletament

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L-immigranti jaġhmlu tajjeb kieku jzommu ċertu prattiċi kulturali privati sabiex jingiebu man-nies tal-lokal.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li I-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn Jaqblu kompletament

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Il-kultura Izlamika Għarbija u l-kultura Nisranija Maltija huma wisq kontrastanti biex aħna mmorru tajjeb flimkien.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

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Fl-aħħar mill-aħħar, l-Għarab jew il-Maltin se jkunu jridu jimponu l-mod tal-ħajja tagħhom fuq l-ieħor.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

---

Ikun ċertament aħjar jekk il-Maltin u l-Għarab jevitaw għal kollox li jkollhom x'jaqsmu ma' xulxin.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

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Ir-razzizmu bejn il-Maltin u l-Għarab jagħmel sens - m'għandniex nitħalltu, sempliċi.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Agħfas hawn biex tkompli

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**Arab origin (with or without Maltese nationality/ citizenship)**

40%

Grazzi mill-ġdid 😊

F'din is-sezzjoni, nixtiequ nkunu nafu x'taħseb fuq dawn l-istqarrijiet li ġejjin dwar ir-relazzjonijiet bejn il-Maltin u l-Għarab f'Malta.

Nixtiequ nkunu nafu wkoll x'taħseb li l-Maltin jaħsbu dwar dawn l-istess stqarrijiet.

Jekk jogħġbok wieġeb il-mistoqsijiet li ġejjin billi tuża skala minn 1 sa 7.

Il-Maltin u l-Għarab jistgħu ċertament imorru tajjeb flimkien filwaqt li jżommu d-differenzi kulturali u religjużi tagħhom bis-sħiħ - li ngħixu flimkien huwa ta' benefiċċju kbir.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Ikun aħjar għas-socjeta' jekk il-Maltin u l-Għarab jirrelataw bejniethom (eż. fuq ix-xogħol, l-iskola, eċċ.) minflok ma jiżolaw ruħhom minn xulxin.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Li jkollok postijiet reliġjużi Insara u Musulmani ħdejn xulxin jirrizulta f'soċjetà b'saħħitha u diversa, kemm hawn Malta kif ukoll f'postijiet oħra.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Is-similaritajiet bejn l-Għarab u l-Maltin fejn jidhlu kultura, wirt, lingwa u mentalita' jistgħu jgħinuna ningiebu ma' xulxin.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Minn tal-inqas, m'għandux ikun hemm diskriminazzjoni bejn il-Maltin u l-Għarab.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

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Bħalma jista' jingħad għal kulturi oħra, il-kuntatt kulturali bejn I-Għarab u I-Maltin jista' jkun tajjeb f'ċerti aspetti speċifiċi (eż. ikel ġdid, mużika, eċċ.).

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li I-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

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Id-differenzi religjużi u kulturali bejn I-Għarab u I-Maltin jistgħu jkunu problematiċi meta niġu biex ngħixu flimkien.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li I-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

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L-immigranti jagħmlu tajjeb kieku jzommu ċertu prattiċi kulturali privati sabiex jingiebu man-nies tal-lokal.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li I-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament



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Il-kultura Iżlamika Għarbija u l-kultura Nisranija Maltija huma wisq kontrastanti biex aħna mmorru tajjeb flimkien.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

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Fl-aħħar mill-aħħar, l-Għarab jew il-Maltin se jkunu jridu jimponu l-mod tal-ħajja tagħhom fuq l-ieħor.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

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Ikun ċertament aħjar jekk il-Maltin u l-Għarab jevitaw għal kollox li jkollhom x'jaqsmu ma' xulxin.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

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Ir-razziżmu bejn il-Maltin u l-Għarab jagħmel sens - m'għandniex nitfalltu, sempliċi.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn


Naqbel kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Agħfas hawn biex tkompli

Powered by Qualtrics 

**Mixed Arab and Maltese origin (with or without Maltese nationality/ citizenship)**

40%

Grazzi mill-ġdid 😊

F'din is-sezzjoni, nixtiequ nkunu nafu x'taħseb fuq dawn l-istqarrijiet li ġejjin dwar ir-relazzjonijiet bejn il-Maltin u l-Għarab f'Malta.

Nixtiequ nkunu nafu wkoll x'taħseb li l-Maltin u l-Għarab f'Malta jaħsbu dwar dawn l-istess stqarrijiet.

Jekk jogħġbok wieġeb il-mistoqsijiet li ġejjin billi tuża skala minn 1 sa 7.

Il-Maltin u l-Għarab jistgħu ċertament imorru tajjeb flimkien filwaqt li jzommu d-differenzi kulturali u reliġjużi tagħhom bis-siġħ - li ngħixu flimkien huwa ta' benefiċċju kbir.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Ikun aħjar għas-soċjeta' jekk il-Maltin u l-Għarab jirrelataw bejniethom (eż. fuq ix-xogħol, l-iskola, eċċ.) minflok ma jiżolaw ruħhom minn xulxin.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Li jkollok postijiet religjużi Insara u Musulmani hdejn xulxin jirriżulta f'soċjetà b'saħħitha u diversa, kemm hawn Malta kif ukoll f'postijiet oħra.

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**Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Is-similaritajiet bejn l-Għarab u l-Maltin fejn jidhlu kultura, wirt, lingwa u mentalita' jistgħu jgħinuna ningiebu ma' xulxin.

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**Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

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Minn tal-inqas, m'għandux ikun hemm diskriminazzjoni bejn il-Maltin u l-Għarab.

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Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

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Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

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Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

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Bħalma jista' jingħad għal kulturi oħra, il-kuntatt kulturali bejn l-Għarab u l-Maltin jista' jkun tajjeb f'certi aspetti speċifiċi (eż. ikel gdid, mużika, eċċ.).

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Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

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Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

---

Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

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Id-differenzi religjużi u kulturali bejn I-Għarab u I-Maltin jistgħu jkunu problematiċi meta niġu biex ngħixu flimkien.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li I-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Kemm taħseb li I-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

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L-immigranti jagħmlu tajjeb kieku jzommu ċertu prattici kulturali privati sabiex jingiebu man-nies tal-lokal.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

**Kemm taħseb li I-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?**

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Kemm taħseb li I-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Il-kultura Iżlamika Għarbija u I-kultura Nisranija Maltija huma wisq kontrastanti biex aħna mmorru tajjeb flimkien.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

Kemm taħseb li I-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Kemm taħseb li I-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

FI-aħħar mill-aħħar, I-Għarab jew il-Maltin se jkunu jridu jimponu I-mod tal-ħajja tagħhom fuq I-ieħor.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

Kemm taħseb li I-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Kemm taħseb li I-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Ikun certament aħjar jekk il-Maltin u I-Għarab jevitaw għal kollox li jkollhom x'jaqsmu ma' xulxin.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Ir-razziżmu bejn il-Maltin u l-Għarab jagħmel sens - m'għandniex nithalltu, sempliċi.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Maltin jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Kemm taħseb li l-Għarab f'Malta jaqblu jew ma jaqblux mal-istqarrija t'hawn fuq?

Ma jaqblu xejn

Jaqblu kompletament

Agħfas hawn biex tkompli

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80%

**Issa nixtiequ nistaqsuk fuq il-fehmiet tiegħek dwar il-ħajja b'mod ġenerali u kwistjonijiet relatati.**

**Jekk jogħġbok immarka kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx ma' dawn il-ħames stqarrijiet li ġejjin billi tagħzel numru minn 1 sa 5, fejn 1 ifisser "ma naqbel xejn" u 5 ifisser "naqbel kompletament".**

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

1

2

3

4

5

**PY24.** Il-futur jiddependi minna u mill-għażliet li nagħmlu. Hemm bżonn nirrangaw l-istituzzjonijiet, il-liġijiet u l-proċeduri sabiex inkunu nistgħu nindirizzaw aħjar l-esiġenzi tan-nies u tas-soċjeta'.

\_\_\_\_\_

**WZ05.** Biex wieħed jimxi 'l quddiem irid jadatta ruħu għaċ-ċirkostanzi. Fejn jidhlu r-regoli, xi kultant trid tagħlaq għajn waħda sabiex tgħin lill-għeżież tiegħek.

\_\_\_\_\_

**KH30.** Fil-ħajja hemm bżonn ngħinu lil xulxin u nrawmu l-komunitajiet tagħna. Irridu nimxu skont il-liġijiet u l-użanzi lokali sabiex ikun hawn ordni fis-soċjeta'.

\_\_\_\_\_

**UL03.** Fil-ħajja, tiegħu li haqqek. Wieħed irid jagħraf jakkwista l-opportunitajiet li toffri l-ħajja u jekk wieħed jaħdem u jistinka biżżejjed, fl-aħħar jimexxi.

\_\_\_\_\_

**XY20.** In-nies huma li huma u wieħed f'it għandu kontroll fuq x'jiġri fl-aħħar mill-aħħar. L-aħjar hu li wieħed jgħix għurata b'għurata għax il-futur hadd ma rah.

\_\_\_\_\_

**Liema waħda minn dawn il-ħames stqarrijiet li għadek kemm qrajt hija l-eqreb għall-fehma tiegħek?**

PY24

WZ05

KH30

UL03

XY20

**Uri kemm tapprova jew topponi kull idea billi tagħzel numru minn 1 sa 6 fuq l-iskala t'hawn taħt, fejn 1 ifisser "nopponi hafna" u 6 ifisser "napprova hafna". Tista' taħdem b'mod**

**mgħaġġel; l-ewwel fehma tiegħek hija ġeneralment l-aħjar waħda.**

Nopponi ħafna

Napprova ħafna

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6

Ċertu gruppi ta' nies għandhom jinżammu f'posthom.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Probabbilment hija taġa tajba li ċertu gruppi huma fil-quċċata u gruppi oħra huma fil-qiegħ.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Soċjeta' ideali teħtieġ li xi gruppi jkunu fil-quċċata u oħrajn ikunu fil-qiegħ.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Ċertu gruppi ta' nies huma sempliċiment inferjuri għal gruppi oħra.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Gruppi li qegħdin fil-qiegħ jistħoqqilhom daqs kemm jistħoqqilhom gruppi li qegħdin fil-quċċata.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

L-ebda grupp wieħed m'għandu jiddomina fis-soċjeta'.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Gruppi fil-qiegħ m'għandhomx għalfejn ikollhom jibqgħu fil-post tagħhom.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Id-dominanza tal-gruppi hija prinċipju fqir.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

M'għandniex nimbuttaw għall-ugwaljanza bejn il-gruppi.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

M'għandniex nippruvaw niggarantixxu li kull grupp ikollu l-istess kwalita' ta' ħajja.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Huwa ingust li tipprova tagħmel il-gruppi ugwali.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

L-ugwaljanza bejn il-gruppi m'għandniex tkun l-għan primarju tagħna.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Għandna naħdmu sabiex nagħtu lill-gruppi kollha ċans indaqs li jimexxu.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Għandna nagħmlu dak li nistgħu sabiex noħolqu kundizzjonijiet indaqs għal gruppi differenti.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

Ma jimpurtax kemm hemm bżonn sforz, għandna nagħmlu ħilitna sabiex niżguraw li l-gruppi kollha jkollhom l-istess ċans fil-ħajja.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

L-ugwaljanza bejn il-gruppi għandha tkun l-ideal tagħna.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

**Jekk jogħġbok immarka kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx ma' dawn l-istqarrijiet li ġejjin billi tagħzel numru minn 1 sa 6, fejn 1 ifisser "ma naqbel xejn" u 6 ifisser "naqbel kompletament".**

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

1

2

3

4

5

6

Ma jogħġbunx sitwazzjonijiet li huma incerti.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

Ma jogħġbunx mistoqsijiet li jistgħu jiġu mwieġba b'ħafna modi differenti.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

Jien insib li ħajja ordnata sew b'siġhat regolari hija xierqa għat-temperament tiegħi.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

Inħossni skomdu/skomda meta ma nifhimx ir-raġuni għala xi ħaġa tkun ġrat f'ħajti.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

Inħossni irritat(a) meta persuna waħda ma taqbilx ma' dak li kulhadd jemmen fih fi grupp.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

Ma niħux gost nidhol f'sitwazzjoni mingħajr ma nkun naf x'għandi nistenna minnha.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

Ġieli għedt xi ħaġa ħażina dwar ħabib/a minn wara dahru/a.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

Meta nkun għamilt decizjoni, inħossni mistrieħ(a).

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

Meta nkun affrontat(a) bi problema, inkun bla sabar biex insib soluzzjoni vera malajr.

( \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

Malajr nitlef il-paċenzja u nsir irratat(a) jekk ma nsibx soluzzjoni għal problema immedjament.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Ma niħux gost inkun ma' nies li huma kapaċi jagħmlu azzjonijiet mhux mistennija.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Kien hemm okkażjonijiet fejn hadt vantaġġ minn xi hadd.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Niddejjaq meta dikjarazzjoni ta' persuna tkun tista' tfisser ħafna affarijiet differenti.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Jien insib li jekk nistabbilixxi rutina konsistenti, inkun nista' ngawdi l-ħajja iktar.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Nieħu gost ikolli mod ta' ħajja ċar u strutturat.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Normalment ma nikkonsultax ħafna opinjonijiet differenti qabel ma nifforma l-opinjoni tiegħi.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Ma jogħġbunx sitwazzjonijiet imprevedibbli.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Meta ninzerta nies jtkellmu b'mod privat, nevita li nisma'.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

**Uri kemm taqbel jew ma taqbilx mal-istqarrija li ġejja billi tuża l-iskala t'hawn taħt, fejn 0 ifisser "ma naqbel xejn" and 100 ifisser "naqbel kompletament".**

Ma naqbel xejn

Naqbel kompletament

0      10      20      30      40      50      60      70      80      90      100

Inħoss li nappartjeni fil-post fejn ngħix.

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

Agħfas hawn biex tkompli

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F'din l-aħħar sezzjoni, hawn ftit mistoqsijiet ħfief dwarek innifsek.

**Ġeneru**

- Raġel
- Mara
- Ġeneru leħor

**Status maritali**

- Miżżewweġ/ Miżżewġa
- Mhux miżżewweġ/ Mhux miżżewġa
- Separat(a)/ Iddivorzjat(a)/ Żwieġ annullat
- Armel/ Armla

**Edukazzjoni (l-ogħla livell li lestejt)**

- Primarja
- Sekondarja
- Post-sekondarja (eż. "Sixth form", eċċ.)
- Terzjarja (eż. Universita', eċċ.)
- Mingħajr edukazzjoni formali

**Impjieg**

- Raġel/ Mara tad-dar
- Penzjonant(a) / Irtirat(a)
- Student/a
- Haddiem/a
- Bla xogħol

**Reliġjon**

- Kristjaneżmu
- Islam
- Ġudaizmu
- L-ebda
- Oħra

Sa liema estent tidentifika mar-religjon tieghek, fuq skala minn 1 sa 10?

Ma nidentifika xejn

Nidentifika kompletament

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Nazzjonalita'

Post fejn tghix

Kemm ilek tghix Malta?

Inqas minn sitt xhur

Bejn sitt xhur u sena

Bejn sena u sentejn

Bejn sentejn u erba' snin

Hames snin jew iktar

Aghfas hawn biex tissottometti t-twegibiet tieghek

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Grazzi talli ħadt il-ħin sabiex timla das-servej.

It-twegibiet tiegħek gew irregistrati.

Jekk ikollok xi mistoqsijiet, jekk jogħġbok ibgħat lill-istudent tal-PhD Luke J Buhagiar: [luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt](mailto:luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt)

---

نشكرك على الوقت الذي أمضيتَه في إجراء هذا الاستبيان.

لقد تم تسجيل أجوبتك.

إذا كان لديك أي استفسارات، يرجى الاتصال بالطالب في درجة الدكتوراه  
Luke J Buhagiar: [luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt](mailto:luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt)

—

We thank you for your time spent taking this survey.

Your responses have been recorded.


Should you have any queries, please contact PhD student Luke J Buhagiar: [luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt](mailto:luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt)

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*Note.* This figure presents the questionnaire conducted in Study 3, in Maltese (see **Chapter 8**). The sections labelled ‘Maltese (of non-Arab origin)’ (blue), ‘Arab origin (with or without Maltese nationality/ citizenship)’ (yellow), and ‘Mixed Arab and Maltese origin (with or without Maltese nationality/ citizenship)’ (green) were presented to participants based on their answer to the question, ‘Taħt liema kategorija taqa?’

**Figure F3**

*Study 3: Questionnaire in Arabic*





أهلا وسهلا بك.

في هذا الاستبيان السري، نقوم بطرح مجموعة من الاسئلة لمشاركين مالطيين وعرب ليطلعونا عن آرائهم حول العلاقات بين المالطيين والعرب بمالطا. نحن نرجو أن تتكرم علينا بالقليل من الوقت للإجابة عن الأسئلة التي ستأخذ من وقتك حوالي 10 دقائق. تتم المشاركة في هذا البحث بشكل تطوعي ولن يتم طلب او تجميع أي معلومات شخصية عند ملء الاستبيان. يُسمح للبالغين (+18) القاطنين بمالطا فقط بالمشاركة في هذا الاستبيان.

وجهات نظرك هامة بالنسبة لنا.

نشكرك على مشاركتك وتعاونك.

يتم إجراء هذه الدراسة من طرف الطالب في درجة الدكتوراه Luke J. Buhagiar تحت إشراف البروفسور Gordon Sammut من جامعة مالطا. بصغتك على الزر أدناه، أنت تؤكد قراءتك لجميع المعلومات المذكورة أعلاه، وتقرأ أنك شخص بالغ، وتوافق على المشاركة في هذا البحث.

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العمر (بالسنوات)

ما هي الفئة، ضمن الفئات المدرجة أدناه، التي تنتمي إليها؟

- مواطن مالطي (بدون أصول عربية)
- شخص ذو أصول عربية (مع أو بدون الجنسية المالطية)
- شخص ذو أصول عربية ومالطية في آن واحد (مع أو بدون الجنسية المالطية)

انقر هنا للمتابعة

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Maltese (of non-Arab origin)

40%

شكرا لك مرة أخرى 😊

في هذا الجزء، نود أن نتعرف على رأيك بخصوص العبارات التالية حول العلاقات بين المالطيين والعرب في مالطا. نود أن نتعرف كذلك على مفهومك الشخصي لآراء العرب المتواجدين بمالطا بخصوص نفس العبارات.

يرجى الإجابة عن الأسئلة التالية باستخدام مقياس تقييم من 1 إلى 7.

حتما يستطيع المالطيون والعرب أن ينموا علاقات طيبة فيما بينهم مع الحفاظ على جميع الاختلافات الثقافية والدينية الخاصة بكل منهم – إن العيش سوياً هو أمر مفيد للغاية.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

سيكون من الأفضل بالنسبة للمجتمع إذا اختلط المالطيون والعرب مع بعضهم البعض (على سبيل المثال، في العمل أو المدرسة أو ما إلى ذلك) بدلاً من عزل أنفسهم.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

تواجد أماكن عبادة مسيحية وإسلامية جنباً إلى جنب يؤدي إلى مجتمع قوي ومتنوع، هنا في مالطا كما في أماكن أخرى.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

أوجه التشابه في الثقافة والتراث واللغة والعقلية بين العرب والمالطيين قد تساعدنا على التعايش.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

يجب، كحد أدنى، ألا يكون هناك تمييز بين المالطيين والعرب.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

كما هو الحال مع ثقافات أخرى، قد يكون الإتصال الثقافي بين العرب والمالطيين جيدًا في بعض النواحي المحددة (مثل الطبخ والطعام الجديد، الموسيقى، إلخ).

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

يمكن أن تمثل الاختلافات الدينية والثقافية بين العرب والمالطيين عائقًا فيما يتعلق بالتعايش سويًا.

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

من الأفضل للمهاجرين أن يحافظوا على خصوصية بعض ممارساتهم الثقافية حتى يتمكنوا من التعايش مع السكان المحليين.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

تختلف الثقافتان الإسلامية العربية والمسيحية المالطية إلى حد كبير، مما يعسر مهمة التعايش.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

سيرغب العرب أو المالطيون أن يفرضوا أسلوب حياتهم على الآخر في نهاية المطاف.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

حتمًا أنه من الأفضل للمالطيين والعرب عدم التعامل مع بعضهم البعض بأي شكل.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

تعتبر العنصرية بين المالطيين والعرب أمرا منطقيًا – فيجب ألا يختلطان.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

انقر هنا للمتابعة

Arab origin (with or without Maltese nationality/ citizenship)

40%

شكرا لك مرة أخرى 😊

في هذا الجزء، نود أن نتعرف على رأيك بخصوص العبارات التالية حول العلاقات بين المالطيين والعرب في مالطا. نود أن نتعرف كذلك على مفهومك الشخصي لآراء المالطيين بخصوص نفس العبارات.

يرجى الإجابة عن الأسئلة التالية باستخدام مقياس تقييم من 1 إلى 7.

حتمًا يستطيع المالطيون والعرب أن ينموا علاقات طيبة فيما بينهم مع الحفاظ على جميع الاختلافات الثقافية والدينية الخاصة بكل منهم – إن العيش سويًا هو أمر مفيد للغاية.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

سيكون من الأفضل بالنسبة للمجتمع إذا اختلط المالطيون والعرب مع بعضهم البعض (على سبيل المثال، في العمل أو المدرسة أو ما إلى ذلك) بدلاً من عزل أنفسهم.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟



لا يوافقون بشده

يوافقون بشده

تواجد أماكن عبادة مسيحية وإسلامية جنباً إلى جنب يؤدي إلى مجتمع قوي ومتنوع، هنا في مالطا كما في أماكن أخرى.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا أوافق بشده

أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا يوافقون بشده

يوافقون بشده

أوجه التشابه في الثقافة والتراث واللغة والعقلية بين العرب والمالطيين قد تساعدنا على التعايش.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا أوافق بشده

أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا يوافقون بشده

يوافقون بشده

يجب، كحد أدنى، ألا يكون هناك تمييز بين المالطيين والعرب.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

كما هو الحال مع ثقافات أخرى، قد يكون الإتصال الثقافي بين العرب والمالطيين جيداً في بعض النواحي المحددة (مثل الطبخ والطعام الجديد، الموسيقى، إلخ).

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

يمكن أن تمثل الاختلافات الدينية والثقافية بين العرب والمالطيين عائقاً فيما يتعلق بالتعايش سوياً.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

من الأفضل للمهاجرين أن يحافظوا على خصوصية بعض ممارساتهم الثقافية حتى يتمكنوا من التعايش مع السكان المحليين.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

لاوافق بشده أووافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالكين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا يوافقون بشده يوافقون بشده

تختلف الثقافتان الإسلامية العربية والمسيحية المالطية إلى حد كبير، مما يعسر مهمة التعايش.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

لاوافق بشده أووافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالكين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا يوافقون بشده يوافقون بشده

سيرغب العرب أو المالطيون أن يفرضوا أسلوب حياتهم على الآخر في نهاية المطاف.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

لاوافق بشده أووافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

حتمًا أنه من الأفضل للمالطيين والعرب عدم التعامل مع بعضهم البعض بأي شكل.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

تعتبر العنصرية بين المالطيين والعرب أمرا منطقيًا – فيجب ألا يختلطان.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

انقر هنا للمتابعة

Powered by Qualtrics

Mixed Arab and Maltese origin (with or without Maltese nationality/ citizenship)

40%

شكرا لك مرة أخرى ☺

في هذا الجزء، نود أن نتعرف على رأيك بخصوص العبارات التالية حول العلاقات بين المالطيين والعرب في مالطا.  
نود أن نتعرف كذلك على مفهومك الشخصي لآراء كل من المالطيين والعرب المتواجدين بمالطا بخصوص نفس العبارات.

يرجى الإجابة عن الأسئلة التالية باستخدام مقياس تقييم من 1 إلى 7.

حتما يستطيع المالطيون والعرب أن ينموا علاقات طيبة فيما بينهم مع الحفاظ على جميع الاختلافات الثقافية والدينية الخاصة بكل منهم – إن العيش سوياً هو أمر مفيد للغاية.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

\_\_\_\_\_

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

\_\_\_\_\_

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

\_\_\_\_\_

سيكون من الأفضل بالنسبة للمجتمع إذا اختلط المالطيون والعرب مع بعضهم البعض (على سبيل المثال، في العمل أو المدرسة أو ما إلى ذلك) بدلاً من عزل أنفسهم.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

تواجد أماكن عبادة مسيحية وإسلامية جنباً إلى جنب يؤدي إلى مجتمع قوي ومتنوع، هنا في مالطا كما في أماكن أخرى.

7

6

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1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

أوجه التشابه في الثقافة والتراث واللغة والعقلية بين العرب والمالطين قد تساعدنا على التعايش.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

يجب، كحد أدنى، ألا يكون هناك تمييز بين المالطيين والعرب.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

كما هو الحال مع ثقافات أخرى، قد يكون الإتصال الثقافي بين العرب والمالطيين جيداً في بعض النواحي المحددة (مثل الطبخ والطعام الجديد، الموسيقى، إلخ).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

يمكن أن تمثل الاختلافات الدينية والثقافية بين العرب والمالطيين عائقاً فيما يتعلق بالتعايش سوياً.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشده

لا أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشده

لا يوافقون بشده



من الأفضل للمهاجرين أن يحافظوا على خصوصية بعض ممارساتهم الثقافية حتى يتمكنوا من التعايش مع السكان المحليين.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا أوافق بشده أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا يوافقون بشده يوافقون بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا يوافقون بشده يوافقون بشده

تختلف الثقافتان الإسلامية العربية والمسيحية المالطية إلى حد كبير، مما يعسر مهمة التعايش.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا أوافق بشده أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا يوافقون بشده يوافقون بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا يوافقون بشده يوافقون بشده

سيرغب العرب أو المالطيون أن يفرضوا أسلوب حياتهم على الآخر في نهاية المطاف.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

لاوافق بشده أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا يوافقون بشده يوافقون بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا يوافقون بشده يوافقون بشده

حتمًا أنه من الأفضل للمالطيين والعرب عدم التعامل مع بعضهم البعض بأي شكل.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

لاوافق بشده أوافق بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا يوافقون بشده يوافقون بشده

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

لا يوافقون بشده يوافقون بشده

تعتبر العنصرية بين المالطيين والعرب أمرا منطقيًا – فيجب ألا يختلطان.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة أعلاه؟

أوافق بشدة

لا أوافق بشدة

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المالطيين يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشدة

لا يوافقون بشدة

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن العرب في مالطا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على العبارة أعلاه؟

يوافقون بشدة

لا يوافقون بشدة

انقر هنا للمتابعة

Powered by Qualtrics

80%

نود أن نسألك عن وجهات نظرك حول الحياة بشكل عام وحول أمور أخرى ذات صلة.

المرجو الإشارة إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارات الخمس التالية و ذلك باختيار رقم من 1 إلى 5، حيث يمثل رقم 1 "لا أوافق بشدة" ورقم 5 "أوافق بشدة".

لا أوافق بشده  
أوافق بشده

1 2 3 4 5

**PY24.** يعتمد المستقبل علينا وعلى الخيارات التي نتخذها. نحن بحاجة إلى العمل على تحسين القوانين والسياسات والمؤسسات حتى تتمكن من تلبية احتياجات الناس والمجتمع بشكل أفضل.

\_\_\_\_\_

**WZ05.** نحتاج إلى التكيف مع ظروف حياتنا من أجل تحقيق النجاح. يجب علينا أحيانا، أن نغض الطرف عن قواعد السلوك من أجل مساعدة أحبائنا.

\_\_\_\_\_

**KH30.** نحتاج إلى مساعدة بعضنا البعض في الحياة، وأن نحسن مجتمعاتنا. نحن بحاجة إلى اتباع القوانين والعتادات والأعراف المحلية من أجل الحفاظ على النظام في المجتمع.

\_\_\_\_\_

**UL03.** نحصل على ما نستحقه في الحياة. يحتاج المرء إلى الاستفادة على أكمل وجه مما تمنحه الحياة، فإذا عمل الشخص بشكل جدي بما فيه الكفاية، فإنه سينجح حتما في النهاية.

\_\_\_\_\_

**XY20.** من غير الممكن تغيير الأشخاص، وليس باستطاعتنا التحكم كليا فيما ستؤول إليه أحوال الناس في النهاية. يحتاج المرء إلى أن يعيش حياته يوما بيوم، وألا يفكر كثيرا بالغد والمستقبل.

\_\_\_\_\_

أي من العبارات الخمس التي قرأتها للتو هي الأقرب إلى وجهة نظرك؟

PY24

WZ05

KH30

UL03

XY20

أظهر إلى أي مدى تؤيد أو تعارض كل فكرة عن طريق اختيار رقم من 1 إلى 6 على المقياس أدناه، حيث يمثل رقم 1 "أعارض بشدة" ويمثل رقم 6 "أؤيد بشدة". يمكنك اختيار جوابك بسرعة، حيث غالبا ما يكون انطباعك الأول هو الأفضل.

أؤيد بشده

أعارض بشده

6

5

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1

يجب عدم السماح لبعض المجموعات أن يتعدوا حدودهم.

لعله من المستحسن أن تكون مجموعات بأعلى القمة و أخرى بالأسفل.

يتطلب المجتمع المثالي تواجد بعض المجموعات بأعلى القمة و أخرى بالأسفل.

تعتبر بعض المجموعات من الناس أدنى من مجموعات أخرى.

تستحق المجموعات المتواجدة بالأسفل ذات الحقوق التي تتمتع بها المجموعات الموجودة بأعلى القمة.

لا ينبغي أن تهيمن مجموعة واحدة على المجتمع بأكمله.

لا يتوجب أن تبقى المجموعات المتواجدة بالأسفل في مكانها.

تعتبر هيمنة مجموعة واحدة على الجميع مبدأ سيئا.

يجب ألا نعمل على تحقيق المساواة بين الجماعات.

يجب ألا نحاول ضمان حصول كل مجموعة على نفس مستويات المعيشة.

من الظلم محاولة تكوين مجموعات متساوية.

---

لا ينبغي أن يكون تحقيق المساواة الجماعية هدفا أساسيا.

---

يجب أن نعمل على إعطاء فرص متساوية للنجاح لكل الجماعات.

---

يجب أن نفعل كل ما في وسعنا من أجل تحقيق مساواة في الأوضاع والظروف لدى مختلف المجموعات.

---

بغض النظر عن مقدار الجهد اللازم بذله، يجب علينا أن نضمن إتاحة نفس الفرص في الحياة لكافة المجموعات.

---

يجب أن تكون المساواة بين المجموعات هدفا الأسمى.

---

المرجو الإشارة إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على كل عبارة من العبارات التالية، باختيار رقم من 1 إلى 6 ، حيث يمثل رقم 1 "لا أوافق بشدة" ويمثل رقم 6 "أوافق بشدة".

لا أوافق بشده  
أوافق بشده

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

لا أحب المواقف التي يلفها الغموض والشك.

---

لا أحب الأسئلة التي يمكن الإجابة عليها بعدة طرق مختلفة.

---

أجد أن الحياة المرتبة بشكل جيد بالإضافة إلى نمط حياة منتظم أمران يوافقان مزاجي.

---

أشعر بعدم الارتياح حين لا أفهم سبب وقوع حدث ما في حياتي.

---

أشعر بالغيظ حين يختلف شخص واحد مع ما يعتقده سائر أعضاء مجموعة معينة.

---

لا أحب التواجد في موقف دون أن أعرف ما يمكن توقعه من ذلك الموقف.

---

لقد قلت في بعض الأحيان شيئاً سيئاً عن صديق من وراء ظهره.

---

أشعر بالارتياح حين اتخذ قراراً ما.

---

حين تعترضني مشكلة ما، أتوق إلى حلها بأسرع وقت.

---

سرعان ما أعتاظ وأفقد صبري متى لا أجد حلاً فورياً لمشكلة أواجهها.

---

لا أحب مجالسة أشخاص لهم ردود أفعال غير متوقعة.

---

كانت هناك مناسبات أقدمت فيها على استغلال شخص ما.

---

لا يعجبني أن يقول شخص جملة تحتمل العديد من التأويلات.

---

أجد أن إنشاء واتباع روتين معين هو أمر يتيح لي الاستمتاع بالحياة بشكل أفضل.

---

أحب أن يكون لدي نمط حياة منظم وواضح.

---

عادة ما لا أستشير الكثير من الآراء المختلفة قبل تشكيل وجهة نظري الخاصة.

---

لا أحب الحالات التي لا يمكن التنبؤ بما قد ينتج عنها.

أتجنب اختلاس السمع لأشخاص يتكلمون على انفراد.

أظهر إلى أي مدى توافق أو لا توافق على العبارة التالية عن طريق استخدام المقياس أدناه، حيث يمثل رقم 0 "لا أوافق بشدة" ويمثل رقم 100 "أوافق بشدة".

أوافق بشده لا أوافق بشده

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

أشعر أنني أنتمي إلى الحي الذي أقطنه.

انقر هنا للمتابعة

Powered by Qualtrics



100%

توجد بعض الأسئلة السهلة في هذا الجزء الأخير و التي تتعلق بك.

الجنس

- ذكر
- أنثى
- غير

الحالة الاجتماعية

- متزوج (ة)
- غير متزوج (ة)
- منفصل (ة) / مطلق (ة) / زواج ملغى
- أرمل (ة)

التعليم (أعلى مستوى أكملته)

- الابتدائية
- الثانوية
- مرحلة ما بعد الثانوية
- التعليم العالي (مثل الجامعة، إلخ)
- غير حاصل (ة) على أي تعليم رسمي

### المهنة

- ربة بيت
- متقاعد
- طالب
- موظف أو حر العمل
- عاطل عن العمل

### الديانة

- المسيحية
- الإسلام
- اليهودية
- دون أي دين
- ديانة أخرى

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن ديانتك تحدد هويتك على مقياس من 1 إلى 10؟

يحدد هويتي كليا

لا يحدد هويتي على الإطلاق

- 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
- 

الجنسية

البلدة / القرية التي تعيش فيها

منذ متى وأنت تعيش في مالطا؟

5 سنوات أو  
أكثر

بين سنتين  
و 4 سنوات

بين سنة  
واحدة  
وسنتين

بين 6 أشهر  
وسنة واحدة

أقل من 6  
أشهر

انقر هنا لتقديم ردودك

Powered by Qualtrics [↗](#)

Grazzi talli ħadt il-ħin sabiex timla das-servej.

It-twegibiet tiegħek gew irregistrati.

Jekk ikollok xi mistoqsijiet, jekk jogħġbok ibgħat lill-istudent tal-PhD Luke J Buhagiar: [luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt](mailto:luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt)

---

نشكرك على الوقت الذي أمضيتَه في إجراء هذا الاستبيان.

لقد تم تسجيل أجوبتك.

إذا كان لديك أي استفسارات، يرجى الاتصال بالطالب في درجة الدكتوراه  
Luke J Buhagiar: [luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt](mailto:luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt)

—

We thank you for your time spent taking this survey.

Your responses have been recorded.

Should you have any queries, please contact PhD student Luke J Buhagiar: [luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt](mailto:luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt)


Powered by Qualtrics 

*Note.* This figure presents the questionnaire conducted in Study 3, in Arabic (see **Chapter 8**). The sections labelled ‘Maltese (of non-Arab origin)’ (blue), ‘Arab origin (with or without Maltese nationality/ citizenship)’ (yellow), and ‘Mixed Arab and Maltese origin (with or without Maltese nationality/ citizenship)’ (green) were presented to participants based on their answer to the question, ‘ما هي الفئة، ضمن الفئات المدرجة أدناه، التي تنتمي إليها؟’

## Figure F4

### Acknowledgement of the Ethics Self-Assessment Form for Study 2 and Study 3

4/20/2021 University of Malta Mail - 2620\_26082019\_Luke Joseph Buhagiar\_For FREC RECORDS

 L-Università ta' Malta Luke Buhagiar <luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt>

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**2620\_26082019\_Luke Joseph Buhagiar\_For FREC RECORDS**  
3 messages

---

**Luke J Buhagiar** <luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt> 26 August 2019 at 22:41  
To: SWB FREC <research-ethics.fsw@um.edu.mt>  
Cc: Gordon Sammut <gordon.sammut@um.edu.mt>


Dear SWB FREC,

Please find attached my ethics form for FREC Records.

Kind regards,  
Luke J Buhagiar

—  
Luke Joseph Buhagiar  
PhD Candidate in Social Psychology  
University of Malta

---

 **2620\_26082019\_Luke Joseph Buhagiar\_For\_FREc\_Records.rar**  
493K

---

**Gordon Sammut** <gordon.sammut@um.edu.mt> 27 August 2019 at 06:13  
To: Luke J Buhagiar <luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt>  
Cc: SWB FREC <research-ethics.fsw@um.edu.mt>

Endorsed from my end.  
[Quoted text hidden]

—  
Gordon Sammut PhD  
Associate Professor  
Department of Psychology  
University of Malta

---

**SWB FREC** <research-ethics.fsw@um.edu.mt> 27 August 2019 at 08:51  
To: Luke J Buhagiar <luke.buhagiar@um.edu.mt>  
Cc: Gordon Sammut <gordon.sammut@um.edu.mt>

Dear Mr Luke Joseph Buhagiar,

Your Ethics & Data Protection (E&DP) form and supervisor's endorsement were received with thanks.

As indicated in the *UM Research Ethics Review Procedures (RERP)*, E&DP forms having no self-assessment issues are kept for record and audit purposes and the research may commence.

Please note that FREC will not issue any form of approval as the responsibility for the self-assessment part lies exclusively with the researcher.

Regards,

Faculty Research Ethics Committee (FREC)  
Faculty for Social Wellbeing  
Room 113  
Humanities A Building (Laws & Theology)  
University of Malta  
Msida MSD 2080

Tel: (+356) 2340 3958

**Students' hours:**  
Monday-Friday  
08:00-12:15 and 13:30-17:00 (1 October-15 June)  
08:00-13:00 (16 June-30 September)

**Website:** [um.edu.mt/socialwellbeing/students/researchethics](http://um.edu.mt/socialwellbeing/students/researchethics)

<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/1?ik=3755315c2f&view=pt&search=all&permthid=thread-a%3Ar-991854542512661702&simpl=msg-a%3Ar289809...>

*Note.* This figure presents the acknowledgement of the ethics self-assessment form for Study 2 and Study 3.

**Table F5***Study 3: Descriptive Statistics (Sample Excluding Outliers)*

			Maltese	Arabs	Arab-Maltese	Total
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	Male	83 46.9%	37 44.0%	3 27.3%	123 45.2%
		Female	94 53.1%	47 56.0%	8 72.7%	149 54.8%
<b>Age (Continuous)</b>		<i>M</i>	39.81	29.88	22.22	35.83
		<i>SD</i>	14.12	10.39	4.04	13.86
		<b>Minimum</b>	18.00	18.00	18.00	18.00
		<b>Maximum</b>	89.00	55.00	33.00	89.00
<b>Relationship Status</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	Not married	77 43.5%	45 53.6%	10 90.9%	132 48.5%
		Married	95 53.7%	36 42.9%	1 9.1%	132 48.5%
		Separated/Divorced/ Annulled Marriage	3 1.7%	3 3.6%	0 0.0%	6 2.2%
		Widow(er)	2 1.1%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	2 0.7%
<b>Education</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	Primary	0 0.0%	1 1.3%	0 0.0%	1 0.4%
		Secondary	38 21.6%	6 7.7%	1 11.1%	45 17.1%
		Post-Secondary	43 24.4%	16 20.5%	3 33.3%	62 23.6%
		Tertiary	95 54.0%	55 70.5%	5 55.6%	155 58.9%
<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	Worker	154 87.0%	44 52.4%	7 63.6%	205 75.4%
		Student	5 2.8%	34 40.5%	4 36.4%	43 15.8%
		Homemaker	8 4.5%	4 4.8%	0 0.0%	12 4.4%
		Pensioner/Retired	9 5.1%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	9 3.3%
		Unemployed	1 0.6%	2 2.4%	0 0.0%	3 1.1%
<b>Religion</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	Christianity	145 81.9%	2 2.4%	2 18.2%	149 54.8%
		Islam	1 0.6%	80 95.2%	7 63.6%	88 32.4%
		No Religion	27 15.3%	2 2.4%	2 18.2%	31 11.4%
		Other	4 2.3%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	4 1.5%
<b>Religious Identification</b>		<i>M</i>	6.77	8.00	7.44	7.22
		<i>SD</i>	2.36	2.21	2.19	2.37
		<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
		<b>Maximum</b>	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00

<b>Locality (Region)</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	North	44	8	0	52
			25.6%	9.8%	0.0%	19.6%
		West	41	6	2	49
			23.8%	7.3%	18.2%	18.5%
		Northern Harbour	44	56	5	105
			25.6%	68.3%	45.5%	39.6%
		Southern Harbour	20	7	4	31
			11.6%	8.5%	36.4%	11.7%
		South East	14	5	0	19
			8.1%	6.1%	0.0%	7.2%
		Gozo or Comino	9	0	0	9
			5.2%	0.0%	0.0%	3.4%
<b>Living in Malta</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	1 year – 2 years	0	9	0	9
			0.0%	10.7%	0.0%	3.4%
		2 years – 4 years	2	14	0	16
			1.2%	16.7%	0.0%	6.0%
		5 years or more	168	61	11	240
			98.8%	72.6%	100.0%	90.6%
<b>Mentalities</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	Civic	59	34	4	97
			33.0%	40.5%	36.4%	35.4%
		Pragmatism	23	7	1	31
			12.8%	8.3%	9.1%	11.3%
		Localism	32	12	2	46
			17.9%	14.3%	18.2%	16.8%
		Reward	43	24	3	70
			24.0%	28.6%	27.3%	25.5%
		Survivalism	22	7	1	30
			12.3%	8.3%	9.1%	10.9%
	<b>Civic</b>	<i>M</i>	4.49	4.63	4.36	4.53
		<i>SD</i>	0.75	0.67	0.92	0.74
		<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00
		<b>Maximum</b>	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	<b>Pragmatism</b>	<i>M</i>	3.53	3.68	4.09	3.60
		<i>SD</i>	1.19	1.19	0.83	1.18
		<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
		<b>Maximum</b>	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	<b>Localism</b>	<i>M</i>	4.29	4.31	4.45	4.30
		<i>SD</i>	0.82	0.90	0.82	0.84
		<b>Minimum</b>	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
		<b>Maximum</b>	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	<b>Reward</b>	<i>M</i>	4.04	4.45	4.55	4.19
		<i>SD</i>	1.06	0.88	0.52	1.01
		<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.00
		<b>Maximum</b>	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	<b>Survivalism</b>	<i>M</i>	3.04	2.86	3.09	2.99
		<i>SD</i>	1.42	1.42	1.30	1.41
		<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
		<b>Maximum</b>	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
<b>NFC</b>		<i>M</i>	4.08	4.10	3.88	4.08
		<i>SD</i>	0.86	0.74	0.98	0.83
		<b>Minimum</b>	1.33	2.60	2.27	1.33

	<b>Maximum</b>	6.00	6.00	5.33	6.00
<b>Sense of Community</b>	<i>M</i>	72.58	62.08	61.91	68.93
	<i>SD</i>	25.52	29.25	35.53	27.50
	<b>Minimum</b>	0.00	0.00	16.00	0.00
	<b>Maximum</b>	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
<b>SDO (Composite)</b>	<i>M</i>	2.61	2.29	2.11	2.50
	<i>SD</i>	0.87	0.69	0.63	0.82
	<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	1.44	1.00
	<b>Maximum</b>	5.69	3.88	3.63	5.69
<b>SDO-D</b>	<i>M</i>	2.70	2.47	2.11	2.61
	<i>SD</i>	0.90	0.79	0.60	0.87
	<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	1.13	1.00
	<b>Maximum</b>	5.50	4.63	3.38	5.50
<b>SDO-E</b>	<i>M</i>	2.53	2.12	2.10	2.39
	<i>SD</i>	1.01	0.78	0.81	0.95
	<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	1.13	1.00
	<b>Maximum</b>	5.88	3.75	3.88	5.88
<b>RFI</b>	<i>M</i>	4.50	5.91	5.94	5.01
	<i>SD</i>	1.34	0.73	0.71	1.34
	<b>Minimum</b>	1.03	3.13	4.23	1.03
	<b>Maximum</b>	7.00	7.00	6.90	7.00
<b>ARO I</b>	<i>M</i>	4.51	4.27	3.10	4.36
	<i>SD</i>	1.03	1.18	1.09	1.12
	<b>Minimum</b>	1.03	1.07	1.40	1.03
	<b>Maximum</b>	7.00	6.93	4.80	7.00
<b>PRO-ALT</b>	<i>M</i>	4.55	4.14	3.27	4.35
	<i>SD</i>	1.30	1.32	1.28	1.34
	<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.13	1.67	1.00
	<b>Maximum</b>	7.00	7.00	5.60	7.00
<b>ANTI-ALT</b>	<i>M</i>	3.52	3.60	5.07	3.63
	<i>SD</i>	1.18	1.29	1.17	1.26
	<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	2.73	1.00
	<b>Maximum</b>	7.00	7.00	6.87	7.00

*Note.* This table presents the descriptive statistics for the Maltese, the Arabs, and the mixed Arab-Maltese participants, in the sample obtained in Study 3. These descriptive statistics are based on the sample excluding outliers (for the Maltese and Arabs). Religious Identification (1 = ‘I do not identify at all’; 10 = ‘I identify completely’) could be completed by all participants excluding those with No Religion. Of the total number of participants ( $N = 336$ ), 64% were Maltese ( $n = 215$ ), 31% were Arab ( $n = 103$ ), and 5% were Arab-Maltese ( $n = 18$ ). Given their small sample size, Arab-Maltese participants were excluded from analysis. All participants completed Block 1 (age and self-identification) and Block 2 (the IR scales) in full. In all, 83% of Maltese participants ( $n = 179$ ) and 82% of Arab participants ( $n = 84$ ) completed Block 3 (ERVs). Of these, most also completed Block 4 (demographics). Maltese participants reported being of Maltese nationality ( $n = 175$ ; 100%). Arab participants reported various nationalities, with the absolute majority (90.4%;  $n = 75$ ) being from 12 different Arab League States.



**Table F6***Study 3: Descriptive Statistics (Sample Including Outliers)*

			Maltese	Arabs	Arab-Maltese	Total
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	Male	83 46.4%	38 44.2%	3 27.3%	124 44.9%
		Female	96 53.6%	48 55.8%	8 72.7%	152 55.1%
<b>Age (Continuous)</b>		<i>M</i>	40.03	29.90	22.22	35.96
		<i>SD</i>	14.24	10.31	4.04	13.95
		<b>Minimum</b>	18.00	18.00	18.00	18.00
		<b>Maximum</b>	89.00	55.00	33.00	89.00
<b>Relationship Status</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	Not married	77 43.0%	47 54.7%	10 90.9%	134 48.6%
		Married	97 54.2%	36 41.9%	1 9.1%	134 48.6%
		Separated/Divorced/ Annulled Marriage	3 1.7%	3 3.5%	0 0.0%	6 2.2%
		Widow(er)	2 1.1%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	2 0.7%
<b>Education</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	Primary	0 0.0%	1 1.3%	0 0.0%	1 0.4%
		Secondary	38 21.3%	6 7.5%	1 11.1%	45 16.9%
		Post-Secondary	44 24.7%	16 20.0%	3 33.3%	63 23.6%
		Tertiary	96 53.9%	57 71.3%	5 55.6%	158 59.2%
<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	Worker	155 86.6%	45 52.3%	7 63.6%	207 75.0%
		Student	5 2.8%	34 39.5%	4 36.4%	43 15.6%
		Homemaker	8 4.5%	4 4.7%	0 0.0%	12 4.3%
		Pensioner/Retired	10 5.6%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	10 3.6%
		Unemployed	1 0.6%	3 3.5%	0 0.0%	4 1.4%
<b>Religion</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	Christianity	147 82.1%	2 2.3%	2 18.2%	151 54.7%
		Islam	1 0.6%	82 95.3%	7 63.6%	90 32.6%
		No Religion	27 15.1%	2 2.3%	2 18.2%	31 11.2%
		Other	4 2.2%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	4 1.4%
<b>Religious Identification</b>		<i>M</i>	6.79	7.98	7.44	7.22
		<i>SD</i>	2.36	2.21	2.19	2.36
		<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
		<b>Maximum</b>	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00

<b>Locality (Region)</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	North	45	9	0	54
			25.9%	10.7%	0.0%	20.1%
		West	41	6	2	49
			23.6%	7.1%	18.2%	18.2%
		Northern Harbour	44	57	5	106
			25.3%	67.9%	45.5%	39.4%
		Southern Harbour	20	7	4	31
			11.5%	8.3%	36.4%	11.5%
		South East	14	5	0	19
			8.0%	6.0%	0.0%	7.1%
		Gozo or Comino	10	0	0	10
			5.7%	0.0%	0.0%	3.7%
<b>Living in Malta</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	1 year – 2 years	0	9	0	9
			0.0%	10.5%	0.0%	3.3%
		2 years – 4 years	2	14	0	16
			1.2%	16.3%	0.0%	5.9%
		5 years or more	170	63	11	244
			98.8%	73.3%	100.0%	90.7%
<b>Mentalities</b>	<b>Frequency % in group</b>	Civic	59	34	4	97
			32.6%	39.5%	36.4%	34.9%
		Pragmatism	23	7	1	31
			12.7%	8.1%	9.1%	11.2%
		Localism	33	13	2	48
			18.2%	15.1%	18.2%	17.3%
		Reward	43	24	3	70
			23.8%	27.9%	27.3%	25.2%
		Survivalism	23	8	1	32
			12.7%	9.3%	9.1%	11.5%
	<b>Civic</b>	<i>M</i>	4.49	4.62	4.36	4.53
		<i>SD</i>	0.75	0.69	0.92	0.74
		<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00
		<b>Maximum</b>	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	<b>Pragmatism</b>	<i>M</i>	3.53	3.69	4.09	3.60
		<i>SD</i>	1.19	1.18	0.83	1.18
		<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
		<b>Maximum</b>	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	<b>Localism</b>	<i>M</i>	4.29	4.31	4.45	4.30
		<i>SD</i>	0.81	0.90	0.82	0.84
		<b>Minimum</b>	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
		<b>Maximum</b>	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	<b>Reward</b>	<i>M</i>	4.05	4.45	4.55	4.19
		<i>SD</i>	1.06	0.88	0.52	1.01
		<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.00
		<b>Maximum</b>	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	<b>Survivalism</b>	<i>M</i>	3.07	2.90	3.09	3.01
		<i>SD</i>	1.42	1.42	1.30	1.42
		<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
		<b>Maximum</b>	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
<b>NFC</b>		<i>M</i>	4.08	4.10	3.88	4.08
		<i>SD</i>	0.86	0.74	0.98	0.83
		<b>Minimum</b>	1.33	2.60	2.27	1.33

	<b>Maximum</b>	6.00	6.00	5.33	6.00
<b>Sense of Community</b>	<i>M</i>	72.61	61.73	61.91	68.82
	<i>SD</i>	25.51	29.25	35.53	27.53
	<b>Minimum</b>	0.00	0.00	16.00	0.00
	<b>Maximum</b>	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
<b>SDO (Composite)</b>	<i>M</i>	2.63	2.30	2.11	2.51
	<i>SD</i>	0.87	0.69	0.63	0.82
	<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	1.44	1.00
	<b>Maximum</b>	5.69	3.88	3.63	5.69
<b>SDO-D</b>	<i>M</i>	2.71	2.48	2.11	2.62
	<i>SD</i>	0.90	0.79	0.60	0.87
	<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	1.13	1.00
	<b>Maximum</b>	5.50	4.63	3.38	5.50
<b>SDO-E</b>	<i>M</i>	2.54	2.12	2.10	2.39
	<i>SD</i>	1.01	0.78	0.81	0.96
	<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	1.13	1.00
	<b>Maximum</b>	5.88	3.75	3.88	5.88
<b>RFI</b>	<i>M</i>	4.47	5.87	5.94	4.98
	<i>SD</i>	1.37	0.79	0.71	1.37
	<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	3.13	4.23	1.00
	<b>Maximum</b>	7.00	7.00	6.90	7.00
<b>ARO I</b>	<i>M</i>	4.53	4.26	3.10	4.37
	<i>SD</i>	1.04	1.17	1.09	1.13
	<b>Minimum</b>	1.03	1.07	1.40	1.03
	<b>Maximum</b>	7.00	6.93	4.80	7.00
<b>PRO-ALT</b>	<i>M</i>	4.56	4.13	3.27	4.36
	<i>SD</i>	1.30	1.31	1.28	1.34
	<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.13	1.67	1.00
	<b>Maximum</b>	7.00	7.00	5.60	7.00
<b>ANTI-ALT</b>	<i>M</i>	3.50	3.62	5.07	3.62
	<i>SD</i>	1.19	1.28	1.17	1.26
	<b>Minimum</b>	1.00	1.00	2.73	1.00
	<b>Maximum</b>	7.00	7.00	6.87	7.00

*Note.* This table presents the descriptive statistics for the Maltese, the Arabs, and the mixed Arab-Maltese participants, in the sample obtained in Study 3. These descriptive statistics are based on the sample including outliers. Religious Identification (1 = ‘I do not identify at all’; 10 = ‘I identify completely’) could be completed by all participants excluding those with No Religion. Of the total number of participants ( $N = 340$ ), 64% were Maltese ( $n = 217$ ), 31% were Arab ( $n = 105$ ), and 5% were Arab-Maltese ( $n = 18$ ). Given their small sample size, Arab-Maltese participants were excluded from analysis. All participants completed Block 1 (age and self-identification) and Block 2 (the IR scales) in full. In all, 83% of Maltese participants ( $n = 181$ ) and 82% of Arab participants ( $n = 86$ ) completed Block 3 (ERVs). Of these, most also completed Block 4 (demographics). Maltese participants reported being of Maltese nationality ( $n = 177$ ; 100%). Arab participants reported various nationalities, with the absolute majority (90.6%;  $n = 77$ ) being from 12 different Arab League States.

**Table F7***Study 3: Independent Samples t-tests—Maltese Sample, Excluding Outliers*

Variable	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	Hedges' <i>g</i>
Gender							
Male	83	4.38	1.34	-0.45	175	.655	0.07
Female	94	4.47	1.28				
Relationship Status							
Not Married	77	4.46	1.36	0.33	170	.746	0.05
Married	95	4.39	1.26				
Occupation							
Worker	154	4.41	1.29	-0.65	175	.518	0.14
Rest	23	4.60	1.43				
Religion							
Christian	145	4.31	1.26	-2.31*	170	.022	0.48
No Religion	27	4.93	1.42				

*Note.* This table presents the results of separate independent samples *t*-tests comparing mean RFI scores (7-point scale), for the Maltese sample excluding outliers. Statistics are presented for variables that had a sufficient sample size per level of the categorical variable. Alternatively, some variables (e.g., Occupation) were re-grouped to facilitate analysis. \*  $p < 0.05$

**Table F8***Study 3: Independent Samples t-tests—Maltese Sample, Including Outliers*

Variable	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	Hedges' <i>g</i>
Gender							
Male	83	4.38	1.34	-0.10	177	.924	0.01
Female	96	4.40	1.36				
Relationship Status							
Not Married	77	4.46	1.36	0.64	172	.521	0.10
Married	97	4.32	1.33				
Occupation							
Worker	155	4.38	1.32	-0.25	177	.803	0.06
Rest	24	4.46	1.55				
Religion							
Christian	147	4.26	1.30	-2.40*	172	.018	0.48
No Religion	27	4.93	1.42				

*Note.* This table presents the results of separate independent samples *t*-tests comparing mean RFI scores (7-point scale), for the Maltese sample including outliers. Statistics are presented for variables that had a sufficient sample size per level of the categorical variable. Alternatively, some variables (e.g., Occupation) were re-grouped to facilitate analysis. \*  $p < 0.05$

**Table F9***Study 3: One-Way ANOVAs—Maltese Sample, Excluding Outliers*

Variable	Sum of Squares	<i>df</i>	Mean Square	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	$\eta^2$
Education						
Between Groups	20.719	2	10.360	6.670**	.002	.072
Within Groups	268.714	173	1.553			
Total	289.433	175				
Locality						
Between Groups	15.799	5	3.160	1.855	.105	.053
Within Groups	282.710	166	1.703			
Total	298.509	171				
Mentalities						
Between Groups	21.477	4	5.369	3.343*	.011	.071
Within Groups	279.453	174	1.606			
Total	300.930	178				

*Note.* This table presents the results of separate one-way ANOVAs comparing mean RFI scores (7-point scale), for the Maltese sample excluding outliers. Statistics are presented for variables that had a minimum sufficient sample size per level of the categorical variable. *Education* levels: Secondary; Post-Secondary; and Tertiary. *Locality* levels: North; West; Northern Harbour; Southern Harbour; South East; and Gozo or Comino. *Mentalities* levels: Civic; Pragmatism; Localism; Reward; and Survivalism. \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$

**Table F10***Study 3: Post-Hoc Tests for Education—Maltese Sample, Excluding Outliers*

	Education (I)	Education (J)	Mean Diff. (I-J)	Std. Error	<i>p</i>	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Tukey's HSD	Secondary	Post-secondary	-.628	.277	.064	-1.284	.028
		Tertiary	-.874***	.239	.001	-1.439	-.308
	Post-Secondary	Secondary	.628	.277	.064	-.028	1.284
		Tertiary	-.246	.229	.533	-.787	.296
	Tertiary	Secondary	.874***	.239	.001	.308	1.439
		Post-secondary	.246	.229	.533	-.296	.787
Games-Howell	Secondary	Post-secondary	-.628	.279	.069	-1.296	.039
		Tertiary	-.874**	.248	.002	-1.469	-.279
	Post-Secondary	Secondary	.628	.279	.069	-.039	1.296
		Tertiary	-.246	.222	.512	-.774	.283
	Tertiary	Secondary	.874**	.248	.002	.279	1.469
		Post-secondary	.246	.222	.512	-.283	.774

*Note.* This table presents post-hoc tests comparing different levels of Education on mean RFI scores (Maltese sample excluding outliers). Secondary:  $n = 38$ ,  $M = 3.825$ ,  $SD = 1.311$ ; Post-Secondary:  $n = 43$ ,  $M = 4.453$ ,  $SD = 1.186$ ; Tertiary:  $n = 95$ ,  $M = 4.698$ ,  $SD = 1.247$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Table F11***Study 3: Post-Hoc Tests for Mentalities—Maltese Sample, Excluding Outliers*

						95% Confidence Interval	
	Mentality (I)	Mentality (J)	Mean Diff. (I-J)	Std. Error	<i>p</i>	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Tukey's HSD	Civic	Pragmatism	.591	.312	.323	-.268	1.450
		Localism	.647	.278	.142	-.120	1.414
		Reward	.877**	.254	.006	.177	1.578
		Survivalism	.459	.317	.596	-.414	1.332
	Pragmatism	Civic	-.591	.312	.323	-1.450	.268
		Localism	.056	.346	1.000	-.899	1.011
		Reward	.286	.327	.906	-.616	1.189
		Survivalism	-.132	.378	.997	-1.173	.910
	Localism	Civic	-.647	.278	.142	-1.414	.120
		Pragmatism	-.056	.346	1.000	-1.011	.899
		Reward	.230	.296	.937	-.585	1.046
		Survivalism	-.188	.351	.984	-1.155	.780
	Reward	Civic	-.877**	.254	.006	-1.578	-.177
		Pragmatism	-.286	.327	.906	-1.189	.616
		Localism	-.230	.296	.937	-1.046	.585
		Survivalism	-.418	.332	.717	-1.334	.498
Survivalism	Civic	-.459	.317	.596	-1.332	.414	
	Pragmatism	.132	.378	.997	-.910	1.173	
	Localism	.188	.351	.984	-.780	1.155	
	Reward	.418	.332	.717	-.498	1.334	
Games- Howell	Civic	Pragmatism	.591	.307	.321	-.284	1.466
		Localism	.647	.283	.163	-.147	1.441
		Reward	.877**	.258	.009	.158	1.596
		Survivalism	.459	.300	.550	-.397	1.315
	Pragmatism	Civic	-.591	.307	.321	-1.466	.284
		Localism	.056	.342	1.000	-.913	1.025
		Reward	.286	.322	.899	-.627	1.200
		Survivalism	-.132	.357	.996	-1.147	.883
	Localism	Civic	-.647	.283	.163	-1.441	.147
		Pragmatism	-.056	.342	1.000	-1.025	.913
		Reward	.230	.299	.938	-.608	1.068
		Survivalism	-.188	.336	.980	-1.140	.764
	Reward	Civic	-.877**	.258	.009	-1.596	-.158
		Pragmatism	-.286	.322	.899	-1.200	.627
		Localism	-.230	.299	.938	-1.068	.608
		Survivalism	-.418	.315	.677	-1.313	.477
Survivalism	Civic	-.459	.300	.550	-1.315	.397	
	Pragmatism	.132	.357	.996	-.883	1.147	
	Localism	.188	.336	.980	-.764	1.140	
	Reward	.418	.315	.677	-.477	1.313	

*Note.* This table presents post-hoc tests comparing different levels of Mentalities on mean RFI scores (Maltese sample excluding outliers). Civic:  $n = 59$ ,  $M = 4.886$ ,  $SD = 1.302$ ; Pragmatic:  $n = 23$ ,  $M = 4.296$ ,  $SD = 1.229$ ; Localism:  $n = 32$ ,  $M = 4.240$ ,  $SD = 1.282$ ; Reward:  $n = 43$ ,  $M = 4.009$ ,  $SD = 1.279$ ; Survivalism:  $n = 22$ ,  $M = 4.427$ ,  $SD = 1.163$ . \*\*  $p < .01$

**Table F12***Study 3: One-Way ANOVAs—Maltese Sample, Including Outliers*

Variable	Sum of Squares	<i>df</i>	Mean Square	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	$\eta^2$
Education						
Between Groups	19.217	2	9.608	5.763**	.004	.062
Within Groups	291.792	175	1.667			
Total	311.009	177				
Locality						
Between Groups	14.231	5	2.846	1.565	.172	.045
Within Groups	305.450	168	1.818			
Total	319.681	173				
Mentalities						
Between Groups	23.240	4	5.810	3.420*	.010	.072
Within Groups	298.984	176	1.699			
Total	322.225	180				

*Note.* This table presents the results of separate one-way ANOVAs comparing mean RFI scores (7-point scale), for the Maltese sample including outliers. Statistics are presented for variables that had a minimum sufficient sample size per level of the categorical variable. *Education* levels: Secondary; Post-Secondary; and Tertiary. *Locality* levels: North; West; Northern Harbour; Southern Harbour; South East; and Gozo or Comino. *Mentalities* levels: Civic; Pragmatism; Localism; Reward; and Survivalism. \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$

**Table F13***Study 3: Post-Hoc Tests for Education—Maltese Sample, Including Outliers*

	Education (I)	Education (J)	Mean Diff. (I-J)	Std. Error	<i>p</i>	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Tukey's HSD	Secondary	Post-secondary	-.550	.286	.135	-1.226	.126
		Tertiary	-.838**	.247	.003	-1.423	-.253
	Post-Secondary	Secondary	.550	.286	.135	-.126	1.226
		Tertiary	-.289	.235	.438	-.844	.267
	Tertiary	Secondary	.838**	.247	.003	.253	1.423
		Post-secondary	.289	.235	.438	-.267	.844
Games-Howell	Secondary	Post-secondary	-.550	.287	.142	-1.236	.137
		Tertiary	-.838**	.250	.004	-1.437	-.239
	Post-Secondary	Secondary	.550	.287	.142	-.137	1.236
		Tertiary	-.289	.234	.436	-.846	.269
	Tertiary	Secondary	.838**	.250	.004	.239	1.437
		Post-secondary	.289	.234	.436	-.269	.846

*Note.* This table presents post-hoc tests comparing different levels of Education on mean RFI scores (Maltese sample including outliers). Secondary:  $n = 38$ ,  $M = 3.825$ ,  $SD = 1.311$ ; Post-Secondary:  $n = 44$ ,  $M = 4.374$ ;  $SD = 1.282$ ; Tertiary:  $n = 96$ ,  $M = 4.663$ ,  $SD = 1.288$ . \*\*  $p < .01$

**Table F14***Study 3: Post-Hoc Tests for Mentalities—Maltese Sample, Including Outliers*

	Mentality (I)	Mentality (J)	Mean Diff. (I-J)	Std. Error	<i>p</i>	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Tukey's HSD	Civic	Pragmatism	.591	.320	.352	-.292	1.474
		Localism	.745	.283	.069	-.036	1.526
		Reward	.877**	.261	.008	.157	1.597
		Survivalism	.595	.320	.344	-.288	1.478
	Pragmatism	Civic	-.591	.320	.352	-1.474	.292
		Localism	.154	.354	.992	-.822	1.130
		Reward	.286	.337	.914	-.642	1.214
		Survivalism	.004	.384	1.000	-1.055	1.064
	Localism	Civic	-.745	.283	.069	-1.526	.036
		Pragmatism	-.154	.354	.992	-1.130	.822
		Reward	.132	.302	.992	-.699	.964
		Survivalism	-.150	.354	.993	-1.126	.826
	Reward	Civic	-.877**	.261	.008	-1.597	-.157
		Pragmatism	-.286	.337	.914	-1.214	.642
		Localism	-.132	.302	.992	-.964	.699
		Survivalism	-.282	.337	.919	-1.210	.646
Survivalism	Civic	-.595	.320	.344	-1.478	.288	
	Pragmatism	-.004	.384	1.000	-1.064	1.055	
	Localism	.150	.354	.993	-.826	1.126	
	Reward	.282	.337	.919	-.646	1.210	
Games- Howell	Civic	Pragmatism	.591	.307	.321	-.284	1.466
		Localism	.745	.294	.096	-.081	1.571
		Reward	.877**	.258	.009	.158	1.596
		Survivalism	.595	.321	.360	-.323	1.513
	Pragmatism	Civic	-.591	.307	.321	-1.466	.284
		Localism	.154	.351	.992	-.840	1.148
		Reward	.286	.322	.899	-.627	1.200
		Survivalism	.004	.374	1.000	-1.061	1.070
	Localism	Civic	-.745	.294	.096	-1.571	.081
		Pragmatism	-.154	.351	.992	-1.148	.840
		Reward	.132	.310	.993	-.736	1.001
		Survivalism	-.150	.364	.994	-1.181	.881
	Reward	Civic	-.877**	.258	.009	-1.596	-.158
		Pragmatism	-.286	.322	.899	-1.200	.627
		Localism	-.132	.310	.993	-1.001	.736
		Survivalism	-.282	.336	.917	-1.236	.672
Survivalism	Civic	-.595	.321	.360	-1.513	.323	
	Pragmatism	-.004	.374	1.000	-1.070	1.061	
	Localism	.150	.364	.994	-.881	1.181	
	Reward	.282	.336	.917	-.672	1.236	

*Note.* This table presents post-hoc tests comparing different levels of Mentalities on mean RFI scores (Maltese sample including outliers). Civic:  $n = 59$ ,  $M = 4.886$ ,  $SD = 1.302$ ; Pragmatic:  $n = 23$ ,  $M = 4.296$ ,  $SD = 1.229$ ; Localism:  $n = 33$ ,  $M = 4.141$ ,  $SD = 1.382$ ; Reward:  $n = 43$ ,  $M = 4.009$ ,  $SD = 1.279$ ; Survivalism:  $n = 23$ ,  $M = 4.291$ ,  $SD = 1.310$ . \*\*  $p < .01$



**Table F15***Study 3: Inter-Item Correlations—Maltese Sample, Excluding Outliers*

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1. Age	39.81	14.12	-															
2. Religious Identification	6.77	2.36	.20*	-														
3. Civic	4.49	.75	.01	-.06	-													
4. Pragmatism	3.53	1.19	.02	-.03	.02	-												
5. Localism	4.29	.82	.08	.03	.15*	.23**	-											
6. Reward	4.04	1.06	.03	.07	.14	.12	.22**	-										
7. Survivalism	3.04	1.42	.00	-.02	-.13	.29***	.14	.12	-									
8. NFC	4.08	.86	.22**	.15	.02	.20**	.26***	.34***	.28***	-								
9. SoC	72.58	25.52	.16*	.14	.01	.10	.21**	.16*	.05	.19*	-							
10. SDO <sub>C</sub>	2.61	.87	-.12	.07	-.10	.19**	-.02	.12	.15*	.25***	-.12	-						
11. SDO-D	2.70	.90	-.13	.07	-.05	.21**	.04	.15*	.16*	.28***	-.07	.90***	-					
12. SDO-E	2.53	1.01	-.09	.05	-.12	.13	-.08	.07	.12	.18*	-.13	.92***	.65***	-				
13. RFI	4.50	1.34	-.02	.02	-.01	-.21**	-.04	-.17*	-.06	-.27***	.00	-.50***	-.43***	-.48***	-			
14. AROI	4.51	1.03	.00	.08	.06	-.10	-.01	.01	-.02	-.19*	.03	-.35***	-.30***	-.33***	.60***	-		
15. PRO-ALT	4.55	1.30	-.05	.01	.11	-.04	-.01	.01	.05	-.08	.03	-.24**	-.16*	-.27***	.53***	.85***	-	
16. ANTI-ALT	3.52	1.18	-.06	-.13	.03	.12	.01	-.01	.09	.24**	-.02	.34***	.35***	.28***	-.46***	-.81***	-.38***	-

*Note.* This table presents the correlation matrix for variables in the Maltese sample excluding outliers. \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Table F16***Study 3: Inter-Item Correlations—Maltese Sample, Including Outliers*

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1. Age	40.03	14.24	-															
2. Religious Identification	6.79	2.36	.20*	-														
3. Civic	4.49	.75	.02	-.06	-													
4. Pragmatism	3.53	1.19	.01	-.02	.02	-												
5. Localism	4.29	.81	.08	.03	.15*	.23**	-											
6. Reward	4.05	1.06	.03	.07	.14	.12	.22**	-										
7. Survivalism	3.07	1.42	.03	-.01	-.11	.28***	.13	.13	-									
8. NFC	4.08	.86	.21**	.15	.02	.20**	.26***	.33***	.27***	-								
9. SoC	72.61	25.51	.15*	.15	.01	.11	.21**	.17*	.05	.19*	-							
10. SDO <sub>C</sub>	2.63	.87	-.10	.08	-.09	.19*	-.03	.13	.17*	.24**	-.11	-						
11. SDO-D	2.71	.90	-.11	.09	-.04	.22**	.04	.15*	.18*	.27***	-.06	.90***	-					
12. SDO-E	2.54	1.01	-.07	.05	-.11	.13	-.08	.08	.13	.17*	-.13	.92***	.65***	-				
13. RFI	4.47	1.37	-.06	.00	-.03	-.20**	-.03	-.17*	-.10	-.25***	-.01	-.51***	-.44***	-.49***	-			
14. AROI	4.53	1.04	.02	.09	.07	-.09	-.02	.02	.01	-.19*	.03	-.31***	-.27***	-.30***	.54***	-		
15. PRO-ALT	4.56	1.30	-.04	.01	.12	-.04	-.01	.01	.06	-.08	.03	-.22**	-.14	-.25***	.49***	.85***	-	
16. ANTI-ALT	3.50	1.19	-.08	-.14	.01	.12	.02	-.02	.05	.24***	-.02	.31***	.31***	.25***	-.40***	-.82***	-.39***	-

*Note.* This table presents the correlation matrix for variables in the Maltese sample including outliers. \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Table F17***Study 3: Independent Samples t-tests—Arab Sample, Excluding Outliers*

Variable	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	Hedges' <i>g</i>
Gender							
Male	37	6.02	0.54	0.54	82	.594	0.12
Female	47	5.95	0.65				
Relationship Status							
Not Married	45	5.97	0.61	-0.06	79	.951	0.01
Married	36	5.98	0.58				
Occupation							
Worker	44	6.09	0.62	1.76	76	.082	0.40
Student	34	5.84	0.60				
Locality							
Northern Harbour	56	5.88	0.60	-1.83	80	.071	0.43
Rest	26	6.14	0.57				

*Note.* This table presents the results of separate independent samples *t*-tests comparing mean RFI scores (7-point scale), for the Arab sample excluding outliers. Statistics are presented for variables that had a sufficient sample size per level of the categorical variable. Alternatively, some variables (e.g., Locality) were re-grouped to facilitate analysis.

**Table F18***Study 3: Independent Samples t-tests—Arab Sample, Including Outliers*

Variable	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	Hedges' <i>g</i>
Gender							
Male	38	5.96	0.65	0.41	84	.686	0.09
Female	48	5.90	0.73				
Relationship Status							
Not Married	47	5.87	0.76	-0.71	81	.482	0.01
Married	36	5.98	0.58				
Occupation							
Worker	45	6.03	0.71	1.29	77	.202	0.29
Student	34	5.84	0.60				
Locality							
Northern Harbour	57	5.84	0.67	-1.30	82	.199	0.30
Rest	27	6.05	0.72				

*Note.* This table presents the results of separate independent samples *t*-tests comparing mean RFI scores (7-point scale), for the Arab sample including outliers. Statistics are presented for variables that had a sufficient sample size per level of the categorical variable. Alternatively, some variables (e.g., Locality) were re-grouped to facilitate analysis.

**Table F19***Study 3: One-Way ANOVAs—Arab Sample, Excluding Outliers*

Variable	Sum of Squares	<i>df</i>	Mean Square	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	$\eta^2$
<b>Education</b>						
Between Groups	.624	2	.312	.864	.426	.023
Within Groups	26.704	74	.361			
Total	27.327	76				
<b>Living in Malta</b>						
Between Groups	2.039	2	1.019	2.943	.058	.068
Within Groups	28.056	81	.346			
Total	30.094	83				
<b>Mentalities</b>						
Between Groups	6.588	4	1.647	5.536***	.001	.219
Within Groups	23.506	79	.298			
Total	30.094	83				

*Note.* This table presents the results of separate one-way ANOVAs comparing mean RFI scores (7-point scale), for the Arab sample excluding outliers. Statistics are presented for variables that had a minimum sufficient sample size per level of the categorical variable. *Education* levels: Secondary; Post-Secondary; and Tertiary. *Living in Malta* levels: 1 year–2 years; 2 years–4 years; and 5 years or more. *Mentalities* levels: Civic; Pragmatism; Localism; Reward; and Survivalism. \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Table F20***Study 3: Post-Hoc Tests for Mentalities—Arab Sample, Excluding Outliers*

	Mentality (I)	Mentality (J)	Mean Diff. (I-J)	Std. Error	<i>p</i>	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Tukey's HSD	Civic	Pragmatism	.420	.226	.349	-.212	1.053
		Localism	-.343	.183	.342	-.854	.169
		Reward	-.319	.145	.193	-.725	.087
		Survivalism	.511	.226	.170	-.121	1.143
	Pragmatism	Civic	-.420	.226	.349	-1.053	.212
		Localism	-.763*	.259	.034	-1.487	-.039
		Reward	-.739*	.234	.019	-1.394	-.085
		Survivalism	.090	.292	.998	-.724	.904
	Localism	Civic	.343	.183	.342	-.169	.854
		Pragmatism	.763*	.259	.034	.039	1.487
		Reward	.024	.193	1.000	-.515	.562
		Survivalism	.854*	.259	.013	.129	1.578
	Reward	Civic	.319	.145	.193	-.087	.725
		Pragmatism	.739*	.234	.019	.085	1.394
		Localism	-.024	.193	1.000	-.562	.515
		Survivalism	.830**	.234	.006	.176	1.484
Survivalism	Civic	-.511	.226	.170	-1.143	.121	
	Pragmatism	-.090	.292	.998	-.904	.724	
	Localism	-.854*	.259	.013	-1.578	-.129	
	Reward	-.830**	.234	.006	-1.484	-.176	
Games- Howell	Civic	Pragmatism	.420	.217	.357	-.287	1.128
		Localism	-.343	.162	.238	-.811	.126
		Reward	-.319	.147	.207	-.734	.096
		Survivalism	.511	.214	.193	-.186	1.208
	Pragmatism	Civic	-.420	.217	.357	-1.128	.287
		Localism	-.763*	.222	.037	-1.484	-.042
		Reward	-.739*	.212	.039	-1.444	-.035
		Survivalism	.090	.263	.997	-.749	.930
	Localism	Civic	.343	.162	.238	-.126	.811
		Pragmatism	.763*	.222	.037	.042	1.484
		Reward	.024	.155	1.000	-.431	.478
		Survivalism	.854*	.220	.017	.143	1.564
	Reward	Civic	.319	.147	.207	-.096	.734
		Pragmatism	.739*	.212	.039	.035	1.444
		Localism	-.024	.155	1.000	-.478	.431
		Survivalism	.830*	.210	.019	.137	1.523
Survivalism	Civic	-.511	.214	.193	-1.208	.186	
	Pragmatism	-.090	.263	.997	-.930	.749	
	Localism	-.854*	.220	.017	-1.564	-.143	
	Reward	-.830*	.210	.019	-1.523	-.137	

*Note.* This table presents post-hoc tests comparing different levels of Mentalities on mean RFI scores (Arab sample excluding outliers). Civic:  $n = 34$ ,  $M = 5.916$ ,  $SD = 0.635$ ; Pragmatic:  $n = 7$ ,  $M = 5.495$ ,  $SD = 0.497$ ; Localism:  $n = 12$ ,  $M = 6.258$ ,  $SD = 0.413$ ; Reward:  $n = 24$ ,  $M = 6.235$ ,  $SD = 0.486$ ; Survivalism:  $n = 7$ ,  $M = 5.405$ ,  $SD = 0.489$ . \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$

**Table F21***Study 3: One-Way ANOVAs—Arab Sample, Including Outliers*

Variable	Sum of Squares	<i>df</i>	Mean Square	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	$\eta^2$
Education						
Between Groups	1.242	2	.621	1.279	.284	.033
Within Groups	36.900	76	.486			
Total	38.142	78				
Living in Malta						
Between Groups	1.777	2	.888	1.887	.158	.043
Within Groups	39.078	83	.471			
Total	40.855	85				
Mentalities						
Between Groups	8.400	4	2.100	5.241***	.001	.219
Within Groups	32.456	81	.401			
Total	40.855	85				

*Note.* This table presents the results of separate one-way ANOVAs comparing mean RFI scores (7-point scale), for the Arab sample including outliers. Statistics are presented for variables that had a minimum sufficient sample size per level of the categorical variable. *Education* levels: Secondary; Post-Secondary; and Tertiary. *Living in Malta* levels: 1 year–2 years; 2 years–4 years; and 5 years or more. *Mentalities* levels: Civic; Pragmatism; Localism; Reward; and Survivalism. \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Table F22***Study 3: Post-Hoc Tests for Mentalities—Arab Sample, Including Outliers*

	Mentality (I)	Mentality (J)	Mean Diff. (I-J)	Std. Error	<i>p</i>	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Tukey's HSD	Civic	Pragmatism	.420	.263	.502	-.313	1.154
		Localism	-.148	.206	.952	-.724	.428
		Reward	-.319	.169	.331	-.790	.152
		Survivalism	.745*	.249	.029	.051	1.439
	Pragmatism	Civic	-.420	.263	.502	-1.154	.313
		Localism	-.569	.297	.317	-1.397	.259
		Reward	-.739	.272	.060	-1.498	.019
		Survivalism	.324	.328	.859	-.590	1.238
	Localism	Civic	.148	.206	.952	-.428	.724
		Pragmatism	.569	.297	.317	-.259	1.397
		Reward	-.171	.218	.935	-.779	.438
		Survivalism	.893*	.284	.019	.100	1.687
	Reward	Civic	.319	.169	.331	-.152	.790
		Pragmatism	.739	.272	.060	-.019	1.498
		Localism	.171	.218	.935	-.438	.779
		Survivalism	1.064***	.258	.001	.343	1.785
Survivalism	Civic	-.745*	.249	.029	-1.439	-.051	
	Pragmatism	-.324	.328	.859	-1.238	.590	
	Localism	-.893*	.284	.019	-1.687	-.100	
	Reward	-1.064***	.258	.001	-1.785	-.343	
Games- Howell	Civic	Pragmatism	.420	.217	.357	-.287	1.128
		Localism	-.148	.248	.974	-.899	.602
		Reward	-.319	.147	.207	-.734	.096
		Survivalism	.745	.304	.184	-.272	1.761
	Pragmatism	Civic	-.420	.217	.357	-1.128	.287
		Localism	-.569	.292	.329	-1.453	.316
		Reward	-.739*	.212	.039	-1.444	-.035
		Survivalism	.324	.340	.870	-.762	1.410
	Localism	Civic	.148	.248	.974	-.602	.899
		Pragmatism	.569	.292	.329	-.316	1.453
		Reward	-.171	.244	.954	-.914	.573
		Survivalism	.893	.361	.149	-.220	2.007
	Reward	Civic	.319	.147	.207	-.096	.734
		Pragmatism	.739*	.212	.039	.035	1.444
		Localism	.171	.244	.954	-.573	.914
		Survivalism	1.064*	.300	.040	.049	2.079
Survivalism	Civic	-.745	.304	.184	-1.761	.272	
	Pragmatism	-.324	.340	.870	-1.410	.762	
	Localism	-.893	.361	.149	-2.007	.220	
	Reward	-1.064*	.300	.040	-2.079	-.049	

*Note.* This table presents post-hoc tests comparing different levels of Mentalities on mean RFI scores (Arab sample including outliers). Civic:  $n = 34$ ,  $M = 5.916$ ,  $SD = 0.635$ ; Pragmatic:  $n = 7$ ,  $M = 5.495$ ,  $SD = 0.497$ ; Localism:  $n = 13$ ,  $M = 6.064$ ,  $SD = 0.804$ ; Reward:  $n = 24$ ,  $M = 6.235$ ,  $SD = 0.486$ ; Survivalism:  $n = 8$ ,  $M = 5.171$ ,  $SD = 0.801$ . \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Table F23***Study 3: Inter-Item Correlations—Arab Sample, Excluding Outliers*

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1. Age	29.88	10.39	-															
2. Religious Identification	8.00	2.21	.00	-														
3. Civic	4.63	.67	.17	.00	-													
4. Pragmatism	3.68	1.19	.03	-.03	.17	-												
5. Localism	4.31	.90	.14	-.05	.27*	.39***	-											
6. Reward	4.45	.88	.24*	-.06	.30**	.23*	.21	-										
7. Survivalism	2.86	1.42	-.08	.06	.10	.21	.10	-.05	-									
8. NFC	4.10	.74	.21	-.01	-.01	.12	.14	.21	.03	-								
9. SoC	62.08	29.25	.11	-.14	.16	.16	.20	-.05	.01	.19	-							
10. SDO <sub>C</sub>	2.29	.69	-.12	-.02	-.27*	-.01	-.06	.01	.16	-.07	-.15	-						
11. SDO-D	2.47	.79	-.17	-.02	-.24*	.03	-.01	.00	.15	.01	-.05	.88***	-					
12. SDO-E	2.12	.78	-.04	-.02	-.22*	-.05	-.10	.02	.12	-.14	-.21	.88***	.54***	-				
13. RFI	5.91	.73	.03	-.07	.06	-.16	.25*	.09	-.22*	.15	.19	-.29**	-.22*	-.28**	-			
14. AROI	4.27	1.18	-.10	-.14	-.17	-.05	.00	-.07	-.14	-.07	.04	.08	.07	.07	.34***	-		
15. PRO-ALT	4.14	1.32	-.12	-.15	-.13	-.05	.01	-.05	-.08	-.07	.03	.02	.03	.02	.41***	.91***	-	
16. ANTI-ALT	3.60	1.29	.06	.10	.17	.03	.01	.08	.17	.05	-.04	-.12	-.10	-.11	-.20*	-.90***	-.64***	-

*Note.* This table presents the correlation matrix for variables in the Arab sample excluding outliers. \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$




**Table F24***Study 3: Inter-Item Correlations—Arab Sample, Including Outliers*

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1. Age	29.90	10.31	-															
2. Religious Identification	7.98	2.21	.02	-														
3. Civic	4.62	.69	.18	.04	-													
4. Pragmatism	3.69	1.18	.03	-.04	.15	-												
5. Localism	4.31	.90	.14	-.04	.27*	.39***	-											
6. Reward	4.45	.88	.24*	-.05	.31**	.23*	.22*	-										
7. Survivalism	2.90	1.42	-.08	.04	.05	.21	.10	-.06	-									
8. NFC	4.10	.74	.21*	.00	.01	.12	.15	.22*	.02	-								
9. SoC	61.73	29.25	.12	-.12	.19	.16	.21	-.04	-.01	.20	-							
10. SDO <sub>C</sub>	2.30	.69	-.11	-.01	-.24*	-.01	-.05	.02	.16	-.06	-.14	-						
11. SDO-D	2.48	.79	-.17	-.03	-.24*	.03	.00	.00	.17	.01	-.06	.88***	-					
12. SDO-E	2.12	.78	-.03	.01	-.17	-.05	-.08	.03	.11	-.12	-.18	.87***	.54***	-				
13. RFI	5.87	.79	.03	-.02	.13	-.16	.20	.07	-.28**	.13	.21	-.28**	-.25*	-.24*	-			
14. AROI	4.26	1.17	-.10	-.14	-.16	-.05	-.01	-.08	-.15	-.07	.04	.07	.06	.06	.34***	-		
15. PRO-ALT	4.13	1.31	-.12	-.14	-.12	-.06	.01	-.05	-.09	-.07	.04	.02	.02	.01	.40***	.91***	-	
16. ANTI-ALT	3.62	1.28	.06	.10	.16	.03	.02	.08	.18	.06	-.04	-.11	-.09	-.10	-.21*	-.90***	-.64***	-

*Note.* This table presents the correlation matrix for variables in the Arab sample including outliers. \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Figure F25**


*Study 3: Maltese Model Excluding Outliers, Step 1—Histogram and Normal P-P Plot*



*Note.* This figure presents a histogram and normal P-P plot generated for the Maltese model (Step 1; excluding outliers).

**Figure F26**


*Study 3: Maltese Model Excluding Outliers, Step 2—Histogram and Normal P-P Plot*



*Note.* This figure presents a histogram and normal P-P plot generated for the Maltese model (Step 2; excluding outliers).

**Figure F27**



*Study 3: Maltese Model Including Outliers, Step 1—Histogram and Normal P-P Plot*



*Note.* This figure presents a histogram and normal P-P plot generated for the Maltese model (Step 1; including outliers).

**Figure F28**



*Study 3: Maltese Model Including Outliers, Step 2—Histogram and Normal P-P Plot*



*Note.* This figure presents a histogram and normal P-P plot generated for the Maltese model (Step 2; including outliers).

**Figure F29**


*Study 3: Arab Model Excluding Outliers—Histogram and Normal P-P Plot*



*Note.* This figure presents a histogram and normal P-P plot generated for the Arab model (excluding outliers).

**Figure F30**



*Study 3: Arab Model Including Outliers—Histogram and Normal P-P Plot*





*Note.* This figure presents a histogram and normal P-P plot generated for the Arab model (including outliers).



**Figure F31**

*Study 3: Maltese Model Excluding Outliers—Partial Regression Plots per Predictor Variable*















*Note.* This figure presents partial regression plots for the Maltese model (excluding outliers), for each predictor variable with RFI.

**Figure F32**

*Study 3: Maltese Model Including Outliers—Partial Regression Plots per Predictor Variable*












*Note.* This figure presents partial regression plots for the Maltese model (including outliers), for each predictor variable with RFI.

**Figure F33**

*Study 3: Arab Model Excluding Outliers—Partial Regression Plots per Predictor Variable*










*Note.* This figure presents partial regression plots for the Arab model (excluding outliers), for each predictor variable with RFI.



**Figure F34**

*Study 3: Arab Model Including Outliers—Partial Regression Plots per Predictor Variable*










*Note.* This figure presents partial regression plots for the Arab model (including outliers), for each predictor variable with RFI.

**Figure F35**


*Study 3: Maltese Model Excluding Outliers, Step 1—Studentized Residuals (\*SRESID) versus Standardized Predicted Values (\*ZPRED)*



*Note.* This figure plots studentized residuals (\*SRESID) versus standardized predicted values (\*ZPRED), for the Maltese model (Step 1; excluding outliers).

**Figure F36**


*Study 3: Maltese Model Excluding Outliers, Step 2—Studentized Residuals (\*SRESID) versus Standardized Predicted Values (\*ZPRED)*



*Note.* This figure plots studentized residuals (\*SRESID) versus standardized predicted values (\*ZPRED), for the Maltese model (Step 2; excluding outliers).

**Figure F37**


*Study 3: Maltese Model Including Outliers, Step 1—Studentized Residuals (\*SRESID) versus Standardized Predicted Values (\*ZPRED)*



*Note.* This figure plots studentized residuals (\*SRESID) versus standardized predicted values (\*ZPRED), for the Maltese model (Step 1; including outliers).

**Figure F38**


*Study 3: Maltese Model Including Outliers, Step 2—Studentized Residuals (\*SRESID) versus Standardized Predicted Values (\*ZPRED)*



*Note.* This figure plots studentized residuals (\*SRESID) versus standardized predicted values (\*ZPRED), for the Maltese model (Step 2; including outliers).

**Figure F39**


*Study 3: Arab Model Excluding Outliers—Studentized Residuals (\*SRESID) versus Standardized Predicted Values (\*ZPRED)*



*Note.* This figure plots studentized residuals (\*SRESID) versus standardized predicted values (\*ZPRED), for the Arab model (excluding outliers).

**Figure F40**

*Study 3: Arab Model Including Outliers—Studentized Residuals (\*SRESID) versus Standardized Predicted Values (\*ZPRED)*



*Note.* This figure plots studentized residuals (\*SRESID) versus standardized predicted values (\*ZPRED), for the Arab model (including outliers).

## Section F41 (Text)

### *Study 3: Bivariate and Multivariate Statistics Including Outliers*

This section presents (a) Maltese-Arab comparisons; (b) preliminary tests for interaction effects; and (c) outputs for the final models, for the samples including outliers. This section is presented in a way that mirrors parts of the **Results** section of **Chapter 8**, for ease of comparison.

#### ***Maltese-Arab Comparisons***

The Maltese and Arab groups differed in terms of RFI and AROI. Regarding AROI, the groups differed both on the composite AROI measure, and on the PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT sub-dimensions (see **Table F41.1**, **Table F41.2** and **Figure F41.3**).

**RFI.** Overall, Arabs ( $M = 5.87$ ;  $SD = 0.79$ ) had significantly higher RFI (more integrationist views) than the Maltese ( $M = 4.47$ ;  $SD = 1.37$ ),  $t(310.72) = -11.56$ ,  $p < .001$ , Hedges'  $g = 1.15$ , supporting  $H_{1A}$ . Arabs also expressed significantly more integrationist views than the Maltese on all individual items of the RFI scale ( $ps < .001$ ), that is, Arabs scored higher on Items 1-5 (pro-integrationist items), and lower on Items 6-10 (anti-integrationist items), supporting  $H_{1B}$ .

**AROI.** Contrary to  $H_{2A}$ , the Maltese (Maltese AROI:  $M = 4.53$ ;  $SD = 1.04$ ) alternatively re-presented Arabs' project as being more integrationist, than Arabs (Arab AROI:  $M = 4.26$ ;  $SD = 1.17$ ) alternatively re-presented the Maltese's project to be,  $t(320) = 2.10$ ,  $p < .05$ ,  $g = 0.25$ .

More specifically, contrary to  $H_{2B}$ , the Maltese ( $M = 4.56$ ;  $SD = 1.30$ ) had higher PRO-ALT scores than Arabs ( $M = 4.13$ ;  $SD = 1.31$ ),  $t(320) = 2.77$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $g = 0.33$ . There was no significant difference between the Maltese ( $M = 3.50$ ;  $SD = 1.19$ ) and Arabs ( $M = 3.62$ ;  $SD = 1.28$ ) on ANTI-ALT scores,  $t(320) = -0.78$ ,  $p = .437$ ,  $g = 0.09$ , providing no support for  $H_{2C}$ .

**Re-Representational Access.** Maltese RFI and Arab AROI were statistically compared to test  $H_{2D}$ . The difference between Maltese re-presentation for integration (Maltese RFI:  $M = 4.47$ ;  $SD = 1.37$ ) and Arab alternative re-presentation of the Maltese project (Arab AROI:  $M = 4.26$ ;  $SD = 1.17$ ) was not statistically significant,  $t(320) = 1.39$ ,  $p = .165$ ,  $g = 0.17$ , providing no support for  $H_{2D}$ .

Arab RFI and Maltese AROI were statistically compared to test  $H_{2E}$ . Maltese alternative re-presentation of the Arab project (Maltese AROI:  $M = 4.53$ ;  $SD = 1.04$ ) was less integrationist than Arabs' social re-presentation for integration (Arab RFI:  $M = 5.87$ ;  $SD = 0.79$ ),  $t(263.02) = -12.86$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $g = 1.39$ , supporting  $H_{2E}$ .

**Table F41.1**

*Maltese and Arab RFI and AROI (Including Outliers)*

Scale per group	RFI		AROI		PRO-ALT		ANTI-ALT	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Maltese	4.47***	1.37	4.53*	1.04	4.56**	1.30	3.50	1.19
Arab	5.87***	0.79	4.26*	1.17	4.13**	1.31	3.62	1.28

*Note.* This table presents the mean (*M*) and standard deviation (*SD*) for RFI and AROI, and for the PRO-ALT and ANTI-ALT sub-dimensions of AROI, for both Maltese and Arab samples including outliers. All items were scored on a 7-point scale (1 = 'Strongly disagree'; 7 = 'Strongly agree'); significant *p*-values were yielded in independent samples *t*-tests comparing both groups separately for (a) RFI, (b) AROI, and (c) PRO-ALT. \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

**Table F41.2***Maltese and Arab RFI and AROI: Individual Items (Including Outliers)*


Items	RFI				AROI			
	Maltese		Arabs		Maltese		Arabs	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Item 1	4.69 <sup>***</sup>	1.82	6.15 <sup>***</sup>	1.34	4.54	1.70	4.40	1.75
Item 2	5.23 <sup>***</sup>	1.75	6.30 <sup>***</sup>	1.29	4.82 <sup>***</sup>	1.66	4.01 <sup>***</sup>	1.71
Item 3	4.35 <sup>***</sup>	1.94	5.70 <sup>***</sup>	1.73	4.27 <sup>**</sup>	1.88	3.62 <sup>**</sup>	1.77
Item 4	4.24 <sup>***</sup>	1.85	5.48 <sup>***</sup>	1.47	4.33	1.64	4.20	1.64
Item 5	4.94 <sup>***</sup>	1.73	5.76 <sup>***</sup>	1.36	4.93	1.51	4.67	1.54
Item 6	5.15 <sup>***</sup>	1.74	3.09 <sup>***</sup>	1.83	4.40	1.78	4.11	1.79
Item 7	4.24 <sup>***</sup>	2.02	2.83 <sup>***</sup>	1.79	4.18	1.84	3.99	1.80
Item 8	4.74 <sup>***</sup>	1.82	3.21 <sup>***</sup>	1.89	4.49 <sup>**</sup>	1.79	3.85 <sup>**</sup>	1.86
Item 9	3.29 <sup>***</sup>	2.04	1.68 <sup>***</sup>	1.45	2.99	1.73	3.14	1.71
Item 10	3.12 <sup>***</sup>	2.02	1.72 <sup>***</sup>	1.24	2.87 <sup>***</sup>	1.67	3.61 <sup>***</sup>	1.81

*Note.* This table presents the mean (*M*) and standard deviation (*SD*) for each item of the RFI scale and the AROI scale, for both Maltese and Arab samples including outliers. Item 1 is the most pro-integrationist item, and Item 10 the most anti-integrationist (see **Chapter 7**). All items were scored on a 7-point scale (1 = ‘Strongly disagree’; 7 = ‘Strongly agree’); significant *p*-values are presented for independent samples *t*-tests comparing both groups separately for each item of (a) the RFI scale, and (b) the AROI scale. \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .



**Figure F41.3**

*Distributions of RFI and AROI scores for the Maltese and Arabs (Including Outliers)*



*Note.* This figure presents Maltese and Arab scores (samples including outliers) on each item of the RFI scale and the AROI scale, all the way from Item 10 (most anti-integrationist) to Item 1 (most pro-integrationist). Maltese RFI = Maltese social re-presentation for integration; Arab RFI = Arab social re-presentation for integration; Maltese AROI = Maltese alternative re-presentation of Arabs' project; and Arab AROI = Arab alternative re-presentation of the Maltese's project. All items were scored on a 7-point scale (1 = 'Strongly disagree'; 7 = 'Strongly agree').

### ***Preliminary Interaction Tests***

Moderator effects were, generally, detected more reliably in the Maltese sample ( $n = 181$ , including outliers), than in the Arab sample ( $n = 86$ , including outliers). Significant interaction effects were not probed at this preliminary stage.

**Maltese Sample.** In the Maltese sample, the moderator effect of NFC on ANTI-ALT in predicting RFI (with PRO-ALT included as covariate),  $B$  (95% CI) = .01 (-.17, .18),  $SE$  (HC3) = .09,  $t(176) = 0.06$ ,  $p = .96$ , was non-significant, providing no support for  $H_{4.2A}$ . However, the moderator effect of Reward on ANTI-ALT in predicting RFI (with PRO-ALT as covariate) was statistically significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = .15 (.02, .29),  $SE$  (HC3) = .07,  $t(176)$

= 2.32,  $p < .05$ , provisionally supporting  $H_{4.2C}$ . Finally, the moderator effect of Survivalism on ANTI-ALT in predicting RFI (with PRO-ALT as covariate) was statistically significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = .14, (.02, .25),  $SE$  (HC3) = .06,  $t(176) = 2.32$ ,  $p < .05$ , provisionally supporting  $H_{4.2D}$ .

**Arab Sample.** In the Arab sample, the moderator effect of NFC on ANTI-ALT in predicting RFI (with PRO-ALT as covariate),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.01 (-.22, .21),  $SE$  (HC3) = .11,  $t(81) = -0.06$ ,  $p = .95$ , was non-significant, providing no support for  $H_{4.2B}$ . The moderator effect of Survivalism on ANTI-ALT in predicting RFI (with PRO-ALT as covariate) was also non-significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = .01 (-.08, .11),  $SE$  (HC3) = .05,  $t(81) = .26$ ,  $p = .80$ , providing no support for  $H_{4.2E}$ .

**Table F41.4***Maltese Model, Including Outliers (Supplementary Analysis): Model Summary and ANOVA Statistics*

Model	Model summary				ANOVA					
	<i>R</i>	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	Adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>RMSE</i>		<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Step 1	.671	.450	.431	1.009	Regression	145.06	6	24.177	23.745	.000
					Residual	177.16	174	1.018		
					Total	322.23	180			
Step 2	.697	.485	.461	.982	Regression	156.32	8	19.540	20.259	.000
					Residual	165.90	172	.965		
					Total	322.23	180			

*Note.* This table presents the summary for the Maltese model (Step 1 and Step 2), including outliers. The table presents the coefficient of determination (*R*; *R*<sup>2</sup>; Adjusted *R*<sup>2</sup>), and root mean square error (*RMSE*); and the ANOVA statistics, that is, the sum of squares (*SS*), degrees of freedom (*df*), mean square (*MS*), *F*-statistic (*F*), and *p*-value (*p*).

**Table F41.5***Maltese Model, Including Outliers (Supplementary Analysis): Change in R<sup>2</sup>*

Model	Change Statistics				
	$\Delta R^2$	<i>F</i> Change	df1	df2	<i>p</i>
Step 1	.450	23.745	6	174	.000
Step 2	.035	5.838	2	172	.004

*Note.* This table presents the statistics for the change in *R*<sup>2</sup> between Step 1 (main effects) and Step 2 (interaction effects), for the Maltese model, including outliers. The table presents the change in *R*<sup>2</sup> ( $\Delta R^2$ ), and in the *F*-statistic (*F* change), together with the degrees of freedom (df1; df2) and *p*-value (*p*).

**Table F41.6***Maltese Model, Including Outliers (Supplementary Analysis: Models C<sub>M</sub> and D<sub>M</sub>): Hierarchical Multiple Regression Summary for Variables Predicting RFI*

Model (with predictors)	$\beta$	HC3 Estimator (Model C <sub>M</sub> )						Non-robust Estimator (Model D <sub>M</sub> )					
		<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Step 1													
Intercept		4.41	.08	4.26	4.56	57.33	.000	4.41	.08	4.26	4.56	58.76	.000
PRO-ALT	.36	.39	.07	.24	.53	5.36	.000	.39	.07	.25	.52	5.79	.000
ANTI-ALT	-.14	-.16	.09	-.34	.01	-1.82	.070	-.16	.08	-.31	-.02	-2.18	.031
SDO-D	-.16	-.23	.12	-.47	.01	-1.91	.057	-.23	.11	-.46	-.01	-2.05	.042
SDO-E	-.25	-.33	.12	-.56	-.10	-2.83	.005	-.33	.10	-.53	-.13	-3.31	.001
Reward	-.13	-.16	.07	-.30	-.03	-2.37	.019	-.16	.07	-.31	-.02	-2.27	.025
Survivalism	-.04	-.03	.06	-.15	.08	-0.57	.570	-.03	.05	-.14	.07	-0.61	.545
Step 2													
Intercept		4.40	.08	4.25	4.55	57.68	.000	4.40	.07	4.26	4.55	60.15	.000
PRO-ALT	.33	.35	.07	.20	.50	4.70	.000	.35	.07	.22	.48	5.34	.000
ANTI-ALT	-.19	-.23	.07	-.37	-.08	-3.06	.003	-.23	.08	-.38	-.08	-3.00	.003
SDO-D	-.15	-.22	.11	-.44	.01	-1.92	.057	-.22	.11	-.44	.00	-1.96	.052
SDO-E	-.25	-.34	.12	-.57	-.10	-2.86	.005	-.34	.10	-.53	-.14	-3.44	.001
Reward	-.15	-.20	.07	-.33	-.06	-2.90	.004	-.20	.07	-.34	-.05	-2.73	.007
Survivalism	-.03	-.02	.05	-.13	.08	-0.44	.660	-.02	.05	-.13	.08	-0.46	.649
ANTI-ALT×Reward	.13	.16	.06	.04	.27	2.72	.007	.16	.07	.02	.29	2.25	.026
ANTI-ALT×Survivalism	.13	.11	.05	.01	.20	2.24	.026	.11	.05	.02	.20	2.38	.019

*Note.* This table presents the results of hierarchical multiple regression for the Maltese model, including outliers (Step 1: main effects; Step 2: interaction effects). The table presents the standardised beta coefficients ( $\beta$ ) for each predictor; and the unstandardised beta coefficient (*B*), lower [CI (LL)] and upper limits [CI (UL)] for 95% Confidence Intervals, *t*-statistics (*t*), and *p* values (*p*) for models using the HC3 (Model C<sub>M</sub>) and the non-robust estimators (Model D<sub>M</sub>), for all predictors in the Maltese model. Variables were centred to facilitate interpretation of interaction terms.

**Table F41.7***Arab Model, Including Outliers (Supplementary Analysis): Model Summary and ANOVA Statistics*

Model	Model summary				ANOVA					
	<i>R</i>	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	Adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>RMSE</i>		<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Arab	.538	.289	.245	.602	Regression	11.818	5	2.364	6.512	.000
					Residual	29.038	80	.363		
					Total	40.855	85			

*Note.* This table presents the summary for the Arab model, including outliers. The table presents the coefficient of determination (*R*; *R*<sup>2</sup>; Adjusted *R*<sup>2</sup>), and root mean square error (*RMSE*); and the ANOVA statistics, that is, the sum of squares (*SS*), degrees of freedom (*df*), mean square (*MS*), *F*-statistic (*F*), and *p*-value (*p*).

**Table F41.8***Arab Model, Including Outliers (Supplementary Analysis: Models C<sub>A</sub> and D<sub>A</sub>): Multiple Regression Summary for Variables Predicting RFI*

Variable	HC3 Estimator (Model C <sub>A</sub> )							Non-robust Estimator (Model D <sub>A</sub> )					
	$\beta$	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Intercept		5.15	.61	3.93	6.37	8.41	.000	5.15	.62	3.91	6.39	8.25	.000
PRO-ALT	.37	.20	.06	.08	.32	3.40	.001	.20	.07	.07	.33	3.06	.003
ANTI-ALT	.07	.04	.07	-.10	.17	0.53	.595	.04	.07	-.10	.17	0.53	.597
SDO <sub>c</sub>	-.23	-.23	.10	-.43	-.03	-2.25	.027	-.23	.10	-.42	-.03	-2.34	.022
Localism	.21	.16	.08	.01	.31	2.12	.037	.16	.07	.01	.31	2.19	.031
Survivalism	-.24	-.12	.05	-.22	-.01	-2.26	.027	-.12	.05	-.21	-.02	-2.47	.016


*Note.* This table presents the results of multiple regression for the Arab model, including outliers. The table presents the standardised beta coefficient ( $\beta$ ) for multiple regression; and the unstandardised beta coefficient (*B*), lower [CI (LL)] and upper limits [CI (UL)] for 95% Confidence Intervals, *t*-statistics (*t*), and *p*-values (*p*) for models using the HC3 (Model C<sub>A</sub>) and the non-robust estimators (Model D<sub>A</sub>), for all predictors in the Arab model.

**Text F41.9. Maltese Model (Model  $C_M$ : Including Outliers): ANTI-ALT×Reward**

Using the HC3 estimator on the Maltese sample including outliers, simple slope analyses indicated that the moderator effect of Reward on ANTI-ALT was significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = .16 (.04, .27),  $SE$  (HC3) = .06,  $t(172) = 2.72$ ,  $p < .01$ , supporting  $H_{4.2c}$ . This interaction was further probed. Specifically, for low Reward ( $M - 1SD$ ), the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.39 (-.57, -.22),  $SE$  (HC3) = .09,  $t(172) = -4.36$ ,  $p < .001$ , was stronger than that for average Reward ( $M$ ),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.23 (-.37, -.08),  $SE$  (HC3) = .07,  $t(172) = -3.06$ ,  $p < .01$ , but significant for both. For high Reward ( $M + 1SD$ ), the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI was non-significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.08 (-.27, .11),  $SE$  (HC3) = .10,  $t(172) = -0.81$ ,  $p = .418$ . In summary, at low Reward, the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI is stronger but always more integrationist than at average Reward, supporting  $H_{4.2c}$  (see **Figure F41.9**). The Johnson-Neyman technique (see Potthoff, 1964) indicated that at about Reward = 4.481 (i.e., 0.43 above the mean), ANTI-ALT and RFI are significantly related,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.16 (-.32, .00),  $SE$  (HC3) = .08,  $t(172) = -1.97$ ,  $p = .05$ . As Reward decreases, the negative relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI becomes stronger, peaking at the lowest score for Reward (Reward = 1),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.70 (-1.06, -0.34),  $SE$  (HC3) = .18,  $t(172) = -3.87$ ,  $p < .001$ .

**Figure F41.9**

*Moderating Effect of Reward on the Relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI among the Maltese (Including Outliers; Model C<sub>M</sub>)*



*Note.* This figure represents the relationship between ANTI-ALT and (mean) RFI for each level of Reward in the Maltese sample including outliers (Model C<sub>M</sub>). The slopes for Low ( $p < .001$ ) and Average ( $p < .01$ ) Reward are significant.


**Text F41.10. Maltese Model (Model C<sub>M</sub>: Including Outliers): ANTI-ALT×Survivalism**

Using the HC3 estimator on the Maltese sample including outliers, simple slope analysis indicated that the moderator effect of Survivalism on ANTI-ALT was significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = .11 (.01, .20),  $SE$  (HC3) = .05,  $t(172) = 2.24$ ,  $p < .05$ , supporting  $H_{4.2D}$ . This interaction was further probed. Specifically, for low Survivalism ( $M - 1SD$ ), the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.38 (-.57, -.20),  $SE$  (HC3) = .09,  $t(172) = -4.07$ ,  $p < .001$ , was stronger than that for average Survivalism ( $M$ ),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.23 (-.37, -.08),  $SE$  (HC3) = .07,  $t(172) = -3.06$ ,  $p < .01$ , but significant for both. For high Survivalism ( $M + 1SD$ ), the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI was not significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.07 (-.29, .14),  $SE$  (HC3) = .11,  $t(172) = -0.69$ ,  $p = .49$ . In summary, at Low Survivalism, the negative relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI was stronger than that for Average Survivalism, supporting  $H_{4.2D}$ . Moreover, the interaction was disordinal, such that as ANTI-ALT increases just above Average ANTI-ALT, participants with Low Survivalism become overall less integrationist (lower RFI) than those with Average Survivalism (see **Figure F41.10**). The Johnson-Neyman technique (see Potthoff, 1964) indicated that at about a Survivalism score of 3.66 (i.e., 0.59 above the mean), ANTI-ALT and RFI are significantly related,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.16 (-.33, .00),  $SE$  (HC3) = .08,  $t(172) = -1.97$ ,  $p = .05$ . As Survivalism decreases, the negative relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI becomes stronger, peaking at the lowest score for Survivalism (Survivalism = 1),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.45 (-.68, -.22),  $SE$  (HC3) = .12,  $t(172) = -3.90$ ,  $p < .001$ .



**Figure F41.10**

*Moderating Effect of Survivalism on the Relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI among the Maltese (Including Outliers; Model C<sub>M</sub>)*



*Note.* This figure represents the relationship between ANTI-ALT and (mean) RFI for each level of Survivalism in the Maltese sample including outliers (Model C<sub>M</sub>). The slopes for Low ( $p < .001$ ) and Average ( $p < .01$ ) Survivalism are significant.

## Note F42

### *Notes on Education as Covariate in the Maltese Models*

#### *Note 1*

Among the Maltese, artificially re-categorizing Education as Non-tertiary (Secondary) and Tertiary (Post-Secondary and Tertiary) would have been more meaningful in view of participants' mean RFI scores. That is, mean RFI scores for Secondary and Tertiary education were statistically significantly different, and mean RFI scores for Post-Secondary and Tertiary education were close, possibly because participants who are currently at University completed the question asking for 'Education (the highest level you have completed)' by ticking 'Post-Secondary'. However, this categorization would not have solved the issue concerning different sample sizes across levels of Education, and thus, would have still resulted in a significant reduction in the statistical power of the model (Stone-Romero et al., 1994). Accordingly, Education was artificially re-categorized as Non-tertiary (Secondary and Post-Secondary) and Tertiary (Tertiary), such that, at least, the sample sizes per level approached 0.46/0.54.

#### *Note 2*

As per the reasons provided in **Chapter 8** (see **A Note on Covariates**), analysis and interpretation relies on the main models presented in **Chapter 8**, and not on the models with Education included as covariate. Moreover, there were probable multicollinearity issues in the Maltese models with Education included as covariate. For instance, the effect sizes for the differences between Tertiary and Non-tertiary participants vis-à-vis Reward (Tertiary:  $M = 3.72$ ;  $SD = 1.18$ ; Non-tertiary:  $M = 4.41$ ;  $SD = 0.77$ ),  $t(163.41) = -4.67$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $g = 0.68$ , and Survivalism (Tertiary:  $M = 2.58$ ;  $SD = 1.23$ ; Non-tertiary:  $M = 3.58$ ;  $SD = 1.43$ ),  $t(158.59) = -5.00$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $g = 0.75$ , were substantial.

**Note 3**

The minor differences between the main model presented in **Chapter 8** (Model  $A_M$ ; HC3 estimator, excluding outliers) and Model  $A_{ME}$  (HC3 estimator, excluding outliers, and with Education as covariate; presented in this appendix), were that, in the latter model, Reward was not a significant predictor, and the ANTI-ALT $\times$ Reward interaction displayed a slight cross-over at higher levels of ANTI-ALT (see **Figure F42.4**). However, the main hypotheses surrounding alternative and social re-presentation were supported by both models (see Tables below).

**Table F42.1***Maltese Model with Education as Covariate, Excluding Outliers: Model Summary and ANOVA Statistics*

Model	Model summary				ANOVA					
	<i>R</i>	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	Adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>RMSE</i>		<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Step 1	.714	.510	.490	0.919	Regression	147.67	7	21.095	24.999	.000
					Residual	141.77	168	.844		
					Total	289.43	175			
Step 2	.723	.523	.497	.912	Regression	151.38	9	16.819	20.224	.000
					Residual	138.06	166	.832		
					Total	289.43	175			

*Note.* This table presents the summary for the Maltese model excluding outliers (Step 1 and Step 2), with Education re-categorised (Non-tertiary [ $n = 81$ ] = Secondary + Post-Secondary; Tertiary [ $n = 95$ ] = Tertiary) and added as covariate. The table presents the coefficient of determination ( $R$ ;  $R^2$ ; Adjusted  $R^2$ ), and  $RMSE$ ; and the ANOVA statistics ( $SS$ ,  $df$ ,  $MS$ ,  $F$ ,  $p$ ).

**Table F42.2***Maltese Model with Education as Covariate, Excluding Outliers: Change in  $R^2$* 

Model	Change Statistics				
	$\Delta R^2$	<i>F</i> Change	df1	df2	<i>p</i>
Step 1	.510	24.999	7	168	.000
Step 2	.013	2.230	2	166	.111

*Note.* This table presents the statistics for the change in  $R^2$  between Step 1 (main effects) and Step 2 (interaction effects), for the Maltese model excluding outliers, with Education re-categorised and added as covariate. The table presents  $\Delta R^2$ ,  $F$  change,  $df$  and  $p$ .

**Table F42.3***Maltese Model with Education as Covariate, Excluding Outliers (Models A<sub>ME</sub> and B<sub>ME</sub>): Hierarchical Multiple Regression for Variables Predicting RFI*

Model (with predictors)	$\beta$	HC3 Estimator (Model A <sub>ME</sub> )						Non-robust Estimator (Model B <sub>ME</sub> )					
		<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Step 1													
Intercept		4.27	.11	4.05	4.49	37.77	.000	4.27	.11	4.05	4.48	39.15	.000
Education	.15	.37	.15	.07	.68	2.45	.015	.37	.16	.07	.68	2.39	.018
PRO-ALT	.37	.39	.07	.25	.52	5.57	.000	.39	.06	.27	.51	6.32	.000
ANTI-ALT	-.23	-.27	.07	-.41	-.13	-3.83	.000	-.27	.07	-.42	-.13	-3.80	.000
SDO-D	-.11	-.16	.10	-.36	.04	-1.55	.123	-.16	.11	-.37	.05	-1.48	.141
SDO-E	-.22	-.29	.10	-.49	-.09	-2.81	.006	-.29	.09	-.47	-.10	-3.08	.002
Reward	-.09	-.10	.07	-.23	.03	-1.55	.122	-.10	.07	-.24	.03	-1.49	.138
Survivalism	.05	.05	.06	-.06	.16	0.89	.376	.05	.05	-.06	.15	0.93	.354
Step 2													
Intercept		4.27	.11	4.05	4.50	37.88	.000	4.27	.11	4.06	4.49	39.46	.000
Education	.14	.35	.15	.05	.66	2.27	.024	.35	.16	.04	.66	2.25	.026
PRO-ALT	.35	.37	.07	.22	.51	5.14	.000	.37	.06	.24	.49	5.91	.000
ANTI-ALT	-.26	-.30	.07	-.43	-.17	-4.42	.000	-.30	.07	-.44	-.16	-4.13	.000
SDO-D	-.12	-.17	.10	-.37	.03	-1.68	.094	-.17	.11	-.38	.04	-1.60	.111
SDO-E	-.22	-.29	.10	-.49	-.08	-2.77	.006	-.29	.09	-.47	-.10	-3.10	.002
Reward	-.11	-.13	.07	-.26	.00	-1.94	.054	-.13	.07	-.27	.01	-1.84	.067
Survivalism	.05	.05	.06	-.06	.16	0.89	.376	.05	.05	-.06	.15	0.93	.354
ANTI-ALT×Reward	.10	.12	.05	.02	.22	2.39	.018	.12	.07	-.01	.25	1.84	.068
ANTI-ALT×Survivalism	.05	.04	.04	-.04	.12	1.09	.279	.04	.04	-.04	.13	0.99	.323


*Note.* This table presents the results of hierarchical multiple regression for the Maltese model excluding outliers (Step 1: main effects; Step 2: interaction effects), with Education re-categorised and added as covariate. The table presents the standardised beta coefficients ( $\beta$ ) for each predictor; and the unstandardised beta coefficient (*B*), lower [CI (LL)] and upper limits [CI (UL)] for 95% Confidence Intervals, *t*-statistics (*t*), and *p* values (*p*) for models using the HC3 (Model A<sub>ME</sub>) and the non-robust estimators (Model B<sub>ME</sub>), for all predictors in the Maltese model. Variables were centred to facilitate interpretation of interaction terms. Education: 0 = Non-tertiary; 1 = Tertiary.

*Maltese Model with Education as Covariate (Model A<sub>ME</sub>: Excluding Outliers): ANTI-ALT×Reward*

Using the HC3 estimator on the Maltese sample excluding outliers, simple slope analyses indicated that the moderator effect of Reward on ANTI-ALT was significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = .12 (.02, .22),  $SE$  (HC3) = .05,  $t(166) = 2.39$ ,  $p < .05$ , supporting  $H_{4.2c}$ . This interaction was further probed. Specifically, for low Reward ( $M - 1SD$ ), the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.43 (-.60, -.26),  $SE$  (HC3) = .08,  $t(166) = -5.14$ ,  $p < .001$ , was stronger than that for average Reward ( $M$ ),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.30 (-.43, -.17),  $SE$  (HC3) = .07,  $t(166) = -4.44$ ,  $p < .001$ , and stronger than that for high Reward ( $M + 1SD$ ),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.18 (-.35, -.01),  $SE$  (HC3) = .09,  $t(166) = -2.13$ ,  $p < .05$ , but significant for all, supporting  $H_{4.2c}$  (see **Figure F42.4**). The Johnson-Neyman technique (see Potthoff, 1964) indicated that at the highest score for Reward (Reward = 5, i.e., 0.955 above the mean), ANTI-ALT and RFI are significantly related,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.18 (-.35, -.01),  $SE$  (HC3) = .09,  $t(166) = -2.13$ ,  $p = .035$ . As Reward decreases, the negative relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI becomes stronger, peaking at the lowest score for Reward (Reward = 1),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.67 (-.99, -.34),  $SE$  (HC3) = .16,  $t(166) = -4.08$ ,  $p = .0001$ .

**Figure F42.4**

*Moderating Effect of Reward on the Relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI among the Maltese (Model with Education as Covariate, Excluding Outliers; Model A<sub>ME</sub>)*



*Note.* This figure represents the relationship between ANTI-ALT and (mean) RFI for each level of Reward in the Maltese sample excluding outliers (model with education as covariate; Model A<sub>ME</sub>). The slopes for Low ( $p < .001$ ), Average ( $p < .001$ ) and High ( $p < .05$ ) Reward are significant.

**Table F43.1***Maltese Model with Education as Covariate, Including Outliers: Model Summary and ANOVA Statistics*

Model	Model summary				ANOVA					
	<i>R</i>	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	Adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>RMSE</i>		<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Step 1	.676	.458	.435	.996	Regression	142.329	7	20.333	20.492	.000
					Residual	168.680	170	.992		
					Total	311.009	177			
Step 2	.699	.489	.461	.973	Regression	151.961	9	16.885	17.835	.000
					Residual	159.048	168	.947		
					Total	311.009	177			

*Note.* This table presents the summary for the Maltese model including outliers (Step 1 and Step 2), with Education re-categorised (Non-tertiary [ $n = 82$ ] = Secondary + Post-Secondary; Tertiary [ $n = 96$ ] = Tertiary) and added as covariate. The table presents the coefficient of determination ( $R$ ;  $R^2$ ; Adjusted  $R^2$ ), and  $RMSE$ ; and the ANOVA statistics ( $SS$ ,  $df$ ,  $MS$ ,  $F$ ,  $p$ ).

**Table F43.2***Maltese Model with Education as Covariate, Including Outliers: Change in  $R^2$* 

Model	Change Statistics				
	$\Delta R^2$	<i>F</i> Change	df1	df2	<i>p</i>
Step 1	.458	20.492	7	170	.000
Step 2	.031	5.087	2	168	.007

*Note.* This table presents the statistics for the change in  $R^2$  between Step 1 (main effects) and Step 2 (interaction effects), for the Maltese model including outliers, with Education re-categorised and added as covariate. The table presents  $\Delta R^2$ ,  $F$  change,  $df$  and  $p$ .



**Table F43.3***Maltese Model with Education as Covariate, Including Outliers (Models C<sub>ME</sub> and D<sub>ME</sub>): Hierarchical Multiple Regression for Variables Predicting RFI*

Model (with predictors)	$\beta$	HC3 Estimator (Model C <sub>ME</sub> )						Non-robust Estimator (Model D <sub>ME</sub> )					
		<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Step 1													
Intercept		4.25	.12	4.02	4.49	35.45	.000	4.25	.12	4.02	4.49	36.20	.000
Education	.12	.33	.17	-.01	.66	1.91	.057	.33	.17	-.01	.66	1.93	.055
PRO-ALT	.35	.37	.07	.23	.51	5.13	.000	.37	.07	.24	.50	5.55	.000
ANTI-ALT	-.15	-.18	.09	-.36	.01	-1.89	.060	-.18	.08	-.33	-.03	-2.36	.020
SDO-D	-.15	-.22	.13	-.47	.03	-1.74	.084	-.22	.11	-.44	.01	-1.90	.059
SDO-E	-.25	-.33	.12	-.56	-.10	-2.84	.005	-.33	.10	-.53	-.13	-3.30	.001
Reward	-.09	-.11	.07	-.25	.03	-1.60	.111	-.11	.08	-.26	.04	-1.47	.143
Survivalism	.01	.01	.06	-.12	.13	0.11	.916	.01	.06	-.11	.12	0.12	.906
Step 2													
Intercept		4.26	.12	4.03	4.49	36.52	.000	4.26	.11	4.04	4.49	37.13	.000
Education	.11	.28	.17	-.06	.62	1.64	.103	.28	.17	-.04	.61	1.72	.088
PRO-ALT	.31	.33	.07	.19	.48	4.45	.000	.33	.07	.20	.46	5.09	.000
ANTI-ALT	-.20	-.23	.08	-.39	-.08	-3.00	.003	-.23	.08	-.38	-.08	-3.06	.003
SDO-D	-.15	-.22	.12	-.45	.01	-1.85	.066	-.22	.11	-.44	.00	-1.94	.053
SDO-E	-.25	-.33	.12	-.55	-.10	-2.81	.006	-.33	.10	-.52	-.13	-3.33	.001
Reward	-.12	-.15	.07	-.29	-.01	-2.13	.035	-.15	.07	-.30	.00	-1.99	.049
Survivalism	.01	.01	.06	-.11	.13	0.14	.888	.01	.06	-.10	.12	0.15	.877
ANTI-ALT×Reward	.12	.15	.06	.03	.27	2.51	.013	.15	.07	.01	.29	2.17	.031
ANTI-ALT×Survivalism	.12	.10	.05	.00	.21	1.91	.057	.10	.05	.01	.19	2.21	.029


*Note.* This table presents the results of hierarchical multiple regression for the Maltese model including outliers (Step 1: main effects; Step 2: interaction effects), with Education re-categorised and added as covariate. The table presents the standardised beta coefficients ( $\beta$ ) for each predictor; and the unstandardised beta coefficient (*B*), lower [CI (LL)] and upper limits [CI (UL)] for 95% Confidence Intervals, *t*-statistics (*t*), and *p* values (*p*) for models using the HC3 (Model C<sub>ME</sub>) and the non-robust estimators (Model D<sub>ME</sub>), for all predictors in the Maltese model. Variables were centred to facilitate interpretation of interaction terms. Education: 0 = Non-tertiary; 1 = Tertiary.

*Maltese Model with Education as Covariate (Model C<sub>ME</sub>: Including Outliers): ANTI-ALT×Reward*

Using the HC3 estimator on the Maltese sample including outliers, simple slope analyses indicated that the moderator effect of Reward on ANTI-ALT was significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = .15 (.03, .27),  $SE$  (HC3) = .06,  $t(168) = 2.51$ ,  $p < .05$ , supporting  $H_{4.2c}$ . This interaction was further probed. Specifically, for low Reward ( $M - 1SD$ ), the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.39 (-.57, -.22),  $SE$  (HC3) = .09,  $t(168) = -4.36$ ,  $p < .001$ , was stronger than that for average Reward ( $M$ ),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.23 (-.39, -.08),  $SE$  (HC3) = .08,  $t(168) = -3.02$ ,  $p < .01$ , but significant for both. For high Reward ( $M + 1SD$ ), the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI was non-significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.09 (-.30, .12),  $SE$  (HC3) = .11,  $t(168) = -0.85$ ,  $p = .397$ . In summary, at low Reward, the relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI is stronger than at average Reward, supporting  $H_{4.2c}$  (see **Figure F43.4**). The Johnson-Neyman technique (see Potthoff, 1964) indicated that at about Reward = 4.465 (i.e., 0.415 above the mean), ANTI-ALT and RFI are significantly related,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.17 (-.34, .00),  $SE$  (HC3) = .09,  $t(168) = -1.97$ ,  $p = .05$ . As Reward decreases, the negative relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI becomes stronger, peaking at the lowest score for Reward (Reward = 1),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.69 (-1.05, -.33),  $SE$  (HC3) = .18,  $t(168) = -3.77$ ,  $p < .001$ .

**Figure F43.4**

*Moderating Effect of Reward on the Relationship between ANTI-ALT and RFI among the Maltese (Model with Education as Covariate; Including Outliers; Model C<sub>ME</sub>)*



*Note.* This figure represents the relationship between ANTI-ALT and (mean) RFI for each level of Reward in the Maltese sample including outliers (model with education as covariate; Model C<sub>ME</sub>). The slopes for Low ( $p < .001$ ) and Average ( $p < .01$ ) Reward are significant.

## **Note F44**

### *Notes on Education as Covariate in the Arab Models*

#### **Note 1**

Among Arabs, no artificial re-categorization of Education could address the reduction of statistical power brought about by unequal sample sizes per level (Stone-Romero et al., 1994). Nonetheless, Education was artificially re-categorized as Non-tertiary (Secondary and Post-Secondary) and Tertiary (Tertiary), to enable comparisons between the Arab models with Education as covariate, and the Maltese models with Education as covariate.

#### **Note 2**

As per the reasons provided in **Chapter 8** (see **A Note on Covariates**), analysis and interpretation relies on the main models presented in **Chapter 8**, and not on the models with Education included as covariate. Moreover, there were probable multicollinearity issues in the Arab models with Education included as covariate. For instance, the effect size for the difference between Tertiary ( $M = 3.73$ ;  $SD = 1.24$ ) and Non-tertiary ( $M = 4.75$ ;  $SD = 1.05$ ) participants vis-à-vis PRO-ALT,  $t(76) = -3.42$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $g = 0.84$ , was substantial.

#### **Note 3**

The minor difference between the main model presented in **Chapter 8** (Model A<sub>A</sub>; HC3 estimator, excluding outliers) and Model A<sub>AE</sub> (HC3 estimator, excluding outliers, and with Education as covariate; presented in this appendix), was that, in the latter model, SDO<sub>C</sub> was not a significant predictor of RFI. However, the main hypotheses surrounding alternative and social re-presentation were similarly supported by both models (see Tables below).

**Table F44.1***Arab Model with Education as Covariate, Excluding Outliers: Model Summary and ANOVA Statistics*

Model	Model summary				ANOVA					
	<i>R</i>	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	Adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>RMSE</i>		<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Arab	.537	.288	.228	.53138	Regression	8.114	6	1.352	4.789	.000
					Residual	20.048	71	.282		
					Total	28.163	77			

*Note.* This table presents the summary for the Arab model excluding outliers, with Education re-categorised (Non-tertiary [*n* = 23] = Secondary + Post-Secondary; Tertiary [*n* = 55] = Tertiary) and added as covariate. The table presents the coefficient of determination (*R*; *R*<sup>2</sup>; Adjusted *R*<sup>2</sup>), and *RMSE*; and the ANOVA statistics (*SS*, *df*, *MS*, *F*, *p*).

**Table F44.2***Arab Model with Education as Covariate, Excluding Outliers (Models A<sub>AE</sub> and B<sub>AE</sub>): Multiple Regression Summary for Variables Predicting RFI*

Variable	$\beta$	HC3 Estimator (Model A <sub>AE</sub> )						Non-robust Estimator (Model B <sub>AE</sub> )					
		<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Intercept		4.90	.69	3.52	6.27	7.09	.000	4.90	.64	3.61	6.18	7.61	.000
Education	-.02	-.02	.15	-.33	.28	-.14	.889	-.02	.14	-.31	.27	-.15	.882
PRO-ALT	.39	.18	.07	.05	.32	2.70	.009	.18	.06	.06	.31	2.92	.005
ANTI-ALT	.13	.06	.07	-.08	.20	.89	.378	.06	.06	-.06	.19	.99	.326
SDO <sub>C</sub>	-.20	-.18	.09	-.36	.01	-1.89	.063	-.18	.09	-.36	.01	-1.89	.063
Localism	.27	.18	.08	.02	.34	2.31	.024	.18	.07	.04	.32	2.61	.011
Survivalism	-.22	-.09	.05	-.19	.00	-1.94	.056	-.09	.04	-.18	.00	-2.07	.042

*Note.* This table presents the results of multiple regression for the Arab model excluding outliers, with Education re-categorised and added as covariate. The table presents the standardised beta coefficient ( $\beta$ ) for multiple regression; and the unstandardised beta coefficient (*B*), lower [CI (LL)] and upper limits [CI (UL)] for 95% Confidence Intervals, *t*-statistics (*t*), and *p*-values (*p*) for models using the HC3 (Model A<sub>AE</sub>) and the non-robust estimators (Model B<sub>AE</sub>), for all predictors in the Arab model. Education: 0 = Non-tertiary; 1 = Tertiary.

**Table F45.1**

*Arab Model with Education as Covariate, Including Outliers: Model Summary and ANOVA Statistics*

Model	Model summary				ANOVA					
	<i>R</i>	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	Adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>RMSE</i>		<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Arab	.527	.278	.219	.620	Regression	10.802	6	1.800	4.682	.000
					Residual	28.071	73	.385		
					Total	38.873	79			

*Note.* This table presents the summary for the Arab model including outliers, with Education re-categorised (Non-tertiary [*n* = 23] = Secondary + Post-Secondary; Tertiary [*n* = 57] = Tertiary) and added as covariate. The table presents the coefficient of determination (*R*; *R*<sup>2</sup>; Adjusted *R*<sup>2</sup>), and *RMSE*; and the ANOVA statistics (*SS*, *df*, *MS*, *F*, *p*).

**Table F45.2**

*Arab Model with Education as Covariate, Including Outliers (Models C<sub>AE</sub> and D<sub>AE</sub>): Multiple Regression Summary for Variables Predicting RFI*

Variable	$\beta$	HC3 Estimator (Model C <sub>AE</sub> )						Non-robust Estimator (Model D <sub>AE</sub> )					
		<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI(LL)	CI(UL)	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Intercept		5.12	.77	3.58	6.65	6.65	.000	5.12	.74	3.64	6.59	6.91	.000
Education	-.06	-.09	.16	-.42	.23	-0.58	.562	-.09	.17	-.43	.24	-0.56	.577
PRO-ALT	.33	.19	.07	.05	.32	2.79	.007	.19	.07	.04	.33	2.52	.014
ANTI-ALT	.10	.06	.07	-.09	.20	0.77	.443	.06	.07	-.09	.20	0.79	.432
SDO <sub>C</sub>	-.20	-.21	.11	-.44	.02	-1.80	.075	-.21	.11	-.42	.01	-1.93	.057
Localism	.22	.17	.08	.01	.34	2.06	.043	.17	.08	.01	.33	2.16	.034
Survivalism	-.27	-.13	.06	-.24	-.02	-2.34	.022	-.13	.05	-.23	-.03	-2.56	.012

*Note.* This table presents the results of multiple regression for the Arab model including outliers, with Education re-categorised and added as covariate. The table presents the standardised beta coefficient ( $\beta$ ) for multiple regression; and the unstandardised beta coefficient (*B*), lower [CI (LL)] and upper limits [CI (UL)] for 95% Confidence Intervals, *t*-statistics (*t*), and *p*-values (*p*) for models using the HC3 (Model C<sub>AE</sub>) and the non-robust estimators (Model D<sub>AE</sub>), for all predictors in the Arab model. Education: 0 = Non-tertiary; 1 = Tertiary.

## Section F46 (Text)

### *Supplementary Bivariate Statistics*

Further to the above tests, (a) Maltese RFI and Maltese AROI, and (b) Arab RFI and Arab AROI, were statistically compared using paired sample *t*-tests.

**Maltese RFI and Maltese AROI.** Excluding outliers, the difference between Maltese RFI ( $M = 4.50$ ;  $SD = 1.34$ ) and Maltese AROI ( $M = 4.51$ ;  $SD = 1.03$ ) was non-significant,  $t(214) = -0.10$ ,  $p = .923$ ,  $g = .007$ . Furthermore, including outliers, the difference between Maltese RFI ( $M = 4.47$ ;  $SD = 1.37$ ) and Maltese AROI ( $M = 4.53$ ;  $SD = 1.04$ ) was non-significant,  $t(216) = -0.66$ ,  $p = .508$ ,  $g = .045$ .

**Arab RFI and Arab AROI.** Excluding outliers, the difference between Arab RFI ( $M = 5.91$ ;  $SD = 0.73$ ) and Arab AROI ( $M = 4.27$ ;  $SD = 1.18$ ) was statistically significant,  $t(102) = 14.40$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $g = 1.41$ . Furthermore, including outliers, the difference between Arab RFI ( $M = 5.87$ ;  $SD = 0.79$ ) and Arab AROI ( $M = 4.26$ ;  $SD = 1.17$ ) was statistically significant,  $t(104) = 14.15$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $g = 1.38$ .

## Section F47 (Text)

### *Study 3: Additional Preliminary Interaction Tests (Not Hypothesised)*

This section presents additional preliminary interaction tests that were conducted prior to the final models, for which no explicit hypotheses were postulated. All resulted in non-significant findings.

#### ***Maltese Sample (Excluding Outliers)***

The following tests were carried out on the Maltese sample, excluding outliers. The moderator effect of NFC on PRO-ALT in predicting RFI (with ANTI-ALT as covariate),  $B$  (95% CI) =  $-.13$  ( $-.34$ ,  $.08$ ),  $SE$  (HC3) =  $.11$ ,  $t(174) = -1.26$ ,  $p = .21$ , was not statistically significant. Moreover, the moderator effect of SDO-D on ANTI-ALT in predicting RFI (with

PRO-ALT and SDO-E as covariates; see Ho et al., 2015),  $B$  (95% CI) = .02 (-.08, .12),  $SE$  (HC3) = .05,  $t(173) = 0.43$ ,  $p = .670$ , was not statistically significant. Similarly, the moderator effect of SDO-D on PRO-ALT in predicting RFI (with ANTI-ALT and SDO-E as covariates),  $B$  (95% CI) = .01 (-.11, .14),  $SE$  (HC3) = .06,  $t(173) = 0.19$ ,  $p = .851$ , was not statistically significant.

The interaction between SDO-E and ANTI-ALT (with PRO-ALT and SDO-D as covariates) in predicting RFI,  $B$  (95% confidence interval [CI]) = .02 (-.10, .14),  $SE$  (HC3) = .06,  $t(173) = 0.37$ ,  $p = .714$ , was not statistically significant. Similarly, the interaction between SDO-E and PRO-ALT (with ANTI-ALT and SDO-D as covariates) in predicting RFI,  $B$  (95% confidence interval [CI]) = .03 (-.10, .17),  $SE$  (HC3) = .07,  $t(173) = 0.48$ ,  $p = .632$ , was not statistically significant.

#### ***Maltese Sample (Including Outliers)***

Among the Maltese, including outliers, the moderator effect of NFC on PRO-ALT in predicting RFI (with ANTI-ALT as covariate),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.11 (-.32, .09),  $SE$  (HC3) = .11,  $t(176) = -1.08$ ,  $p = .28$ , was not statistically significant. Moreover, the moderator effect of SDO-D on ANTI-ALT in predicting RFI (with PRO-ALT and SDO-E as covariates),  $B$  (95% CI) = .10 (-.05, .25),  $SE$  (HC3) = .08,  $t(175) = 1.29$ ,  $p = .199$ , was not statistically significant. Similarly, the moderator effect of SDO-D on PRO-ALT in predicting RFI (with ANTI-ALT and SDO-E as covariates),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.03 (-.17, .11),  $SE$  (HC3) = .07,  $t(175) = -0.47$ ,  $p = .641$ , was not statistically significant.

The interaction between SDO-E and ANTI-ALT (with PRO-ALT and SDO-D as covariates) in predicting RFI,  $B$  (95% confidence interval [CI]) = .10 (-.05, .26),  $SE$  (HC3) = .08,  $t(175) = 1.29$ ,  $p = .198$ , was not statistically significant. Similarly, the interaction between SDO-E and PRO-ALT (with ANTI-ALT and SDO-D as covariates) in predicting RFI,  $B$  (95% confidence interval [CI]) = .02 (-.18, .13),  $SE$  (HC3) = .08,  $t(175) = -0.31$ ,  $p = .754$ , was not statistically significant.



### ***Arab Sample (Excluding Outliers)***

Among the Arabs, excluding outliers, the moderator effect of NFC on PRO-ALT in predicting RFI (with ANTI-ALT as covariate),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.03 (-.18, .12),  $SE$  (HC3) = .08,  $t(79) = -0.37$ ,  $p = .711$ , was not statistically significant.

Moreover, the moderator effect of SDO<sub>C</sub> on ANTI-ALT in predicting RFI (with PRO-ALT included as covariate) was not statistically significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.07 (-.26, .12),  $SE$  (HC3) = .10,  $t(79) = -0.73$ ,  $p = .470$ . Similarly, the moderator effect of SDO<sub>C</sub> on PRO-ALT in predicting RFI (with ANTI-ALT included as covariate) was not statistically significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = .04 (-.12, .20),  $SE$  (HC3) = .08,  $t(79) = 0.48$ ,  $p = .636$ .

### ***Arab Sample (Including Outliers)***

Among the Arabs, including outliers, the moderator effect of NFC on PRO-ALT in predicting RFI (with ANTI-ALT as covariate),  $B$  (95% CI) = -.04 (-.20, .12),  $SE$  (HC3) = .08,  $t(81) = -0.47$ ,  $p = .643$ , was not statistically significant.

Moreover, the moderator effect of SDO<sub>C</sub> on ANTI-ALT in predicting RFI (with PRO-ALT included as covariate) was not statistically significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = -.10 (-.30, .10),  $SE$  (HC3) = .10,  $t(81) = -0.96$ ,  $p = .342$ . Similarly, the moderator effect of SDO<sub>C</sub> on PRO-ALT in predicting RFI (with ANTI-ALT included as covariate) was not statistically significant,  $B$  (95% CI) = .05 (-.13, .22),  $SE$  (HC3) = .09,  $t(81) = 0.54$ ,  $p = .592$ .


## Appendix G

### Joint Display: Supplementary Material


**Figure G1**

*Joint Display Matrices for Item E and Item H (Items Excluded from IR Scales following EFA)—Excluding and Including Outliers*


Item E (X) – Excluding Outliers




Item E (X) – Including Outliers



Item H (X) – Excluding Outliers




Item H (X) – Including Outliers



*Note.* These figures present the values of, and relationships between, all combinations of scores for Item E and Item H (items excluded from the IR scales following EFA) among both groups. \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Figure G2**


*A Synthesis for Item E*



Note. This figure presents a selection of Maltese arguments (Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab arguments (Study 1) behind Item E (excluded from the IR scales).

**Figure G3**

*A Synthesis for Item H*




*Note.* This figure presents a selection of Maltese arguments (Sammut, 2015-2016) and Arab arguments (Study 1) behind Item H (excluded from the IR scales).


**Figure G4**

*Joint Display Matrices—Samples Including Outliers*


Item 1




Item 2




Item 3




Item 4




Item 5




Item 6




Item 7




Item 8



Item 9



Item 10



Note. These figures present the values of, and relationships between, all combinations of scores for all items in the Maltese and Arab RFI and AROI scales, based on the samples including outliers. \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .