

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND THE UNBAPTISED AUGUSTINE:
HIS CHILDHOOD AND THE MANICHAEAN CONNECTION

Unde est malum et quod semen eius?
Conf. VII,5,7

1. *Introduction*

My feeling, since the start of this year's conference, has been that of a dwarf among giants. I have no pretension of being a scholar on Augustine. I am just a toddler, a beginner who is greatly interested in Augustine. So, my intention, this morning, is to add a few footnotes to what has been said so well by many experts. What I would also like to say, with your permission, is that I am a disciple of the beloved master, Père Adalbert-G. Hamman O.F.M. (1910-2000), one of the founding fathers of the Augustinianum, whose death, two years ago, passed almost unnoticed in academic circles. I am preparing a long-awaited appreciation of this great patristic scholar of the twentieth century, who among his innumerable works remains famous not only for his *Supplementum* to the *Patrologia Latina*, but also for his interest in Augustine and for his well-known and beautifully written *La vie quotidienne en Afrique du nord au temps de Saint Augustin* (Paris 1985). But now, I hasten to my assigned topic.

2. *The problem of evil*

About twenty-three centuries ago, the Greek philosopher Epicurus¹ (342-270 BC) made an affirmation which embodies one of the most irreconcilable enigmas facing "man's speculative intellect and moral consciousness, the problem of evil".² In fact, he states:

"The gods can either take away evil from the world and will not, or, being willing to do so, cannot; or they neither can nor will, or lastly, they are both

¹ Epicurus whose philosophy, together with Stoicism, later influenced the Roman world, affirmed that human beings should seek pleasure, since genuine pleasure is lived with prudence, honour and justice. He also held that although gods exist, they have no relevance to human life. See J. Bowden, *Who's Who in Theology?*, New York 1992, p. 45.

² L. Stafford Betty, *Aurobindo's Concept of Lila and the Problem of Evil*, in *International Philosophical Quarterly* 16 (1976), p. 315.

able and willing. If they have the will to remove evil and cannot, then they are not omnipotent. If they can, but will not, then they are not benevolent. If they are neither able nor willing, then they are neither omnipotent nor benevolent. Lastly, if they are both willing and able to annihilate evil, how does it exist?"³

The genesis of the problem of evil lies in the apparent incompatibility in making these statements in succession:

1. God exists.
2. God is good.
3. God is omnipotent.
4. God is omniscient.
5. Evil exists in the world.

We know that over the centuries countless thinkers have sought to treat the problem of evil. Many have found themselves incapable of explaining how "a good, knowing and powerful God would create or allow not just *any* evil, but the various types or amounts of evil that the world actually contains".⁴ Thus, the problem of evil can also be formulated by asserting that God exists, that God is good, omnipotent and omniscient, together with the fact that certain types or amounts of evil can be seen to exist.

The problem of evil, which for several philosophers has provided strong and "perhaps decisive evidence against belief in God",⁵ is a logical problem arising from an attempt at "clarifying and reconciling a number of beliefs"⁶. These beliefs are based on the terms 'good', 'evil', 'omnipotent' and 'omniscient', and on the fact that good is always diametrically opposed to evil, in such a way that something good "always eliminates evil as far as it can",⁷ and that the doings of an omnipotent being are unbounded and unrestricted. Hence, a good omnipotent being is supposed to eradicate evil entirely. Consequently, a gross incompatibility arises when asserting that a good omnipotent being exists, and that evil exists.⁸ The existence of evil, both in the world and within Man, puts to the test, according to Dewey J.

³ B. Evans, ed., *Dictionary of Quotations*, New York 1968, p. 209.

⁴ S.C. Inati, *An Examination of Ibn Sina's Theodicy: Dissolving the Problem of Evil*, in *The New Scholasticism* 58 (1984), p. 171.

⁵ L. Hitterdale, *The Problem of Evil and the Subjectivity of Values are Incompatible*, in *International Philosophical Quarterly* 18 (1978), p. 467.

⁶ J.L. Mackie, *Evil and Omnipotence*, in *Mind* 64 (1955), p. 200.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁸ Cfr. Eric O. Springsted, *Is There a Problem with the Problem of Evil?*, in *International Philosophical Quarterly* 24 (1984), p. 303.

Hoitenga, "our fundamental conceptions of good and evil, freedom and causation, the divine and the human".⁹ This is what it did in Augustine.

3. *Augustine and the problem of evil*

In this paper, we shall be analysing the experience of the yet unbaptised Augustine in his encounter with the problem of evil. This paper seeks to study what the *Confessiones* tell us about the childhood of this *son of many tears*, and about his subsequent Manichaean connection. G.R. Evans affirms that

"Augustine's account of the problem of evil came in the end to embrace almost every area of his writing, as he perceived more and more of the ramifications of the subject. His interest began in his youth, in the course of his long journey through a series of religious systems in search of one which could satisfy him with answers to the questions which persistently presented themselves to him, amongst which those concerning evil were particularly prominent".¹⁰

A careful reading of the *Confessiones* provides us with a great deal of valuable information about this *magister optimus*¹¹ and *vir summus*,¹² a "towering genius"¹³ renowned for "the richness and sublimity of his teachings".¹⁴ The son of a pagan father, Patricius, and an exemplary Christian mother, Monica, Augustine was registered by her as a catechumen, but not baptised.

4. *Augustine's childhood experience of evil*

In his biography on Augustine, Peter Brown affirms that Augustine grew up as a sensitive boy.¹⁵ He was especially afraid of being shamed, and was terrified of the humiliation of being beaten up at school.¹⁶ We know that he excelled in Latin and the Latin classics,¹⁷ but hated Greek which bored him

⁹ D.J. Hoitenga, *Logic and the Problem of Evil*, in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 4 (1967), p. 114.

¹⁰ G.R. Evans, *Evil*, in *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia*, ed. A.D. Fitzgerald, Grand Rapids – Cambridge 1999, p. 340.

¹¹ Celestine I, *Apostolici Verba* (May 431).

¹² Paul VI, Homily at the Canonisation of the Ugandan Martyrs (18 October 1964), in *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 56 (1964), p. 905.

¹³ Pius XI, Encyclical Letter on the Fifteenth Centenary of the Death of St Augustine *Ad Salutem Humani Generis* (30 April 1930), p. 5.

¹⁴ John Paul II, Apostolic Letter on the Sixteenth Centenary of the Conversion of St Augustine *Augustinum Hipponensem* (28 August 1986), Introduction.

¹⁵ Cfr. P. Brown, *Augustine of Hippo*, Berkeley – Los Angeles 1969, p. 35.

¹⁶ Cfr. Augustine, *conf.* I,9,14.

¹⁷ Cfr. *conf.* I,13,20.

to distraction. Having "passed through the terrible floggings of his school at Tagaste",¹⁸ Augustine grew up as an intelligent boy, very fond of learning.

Augustine reflects upon his childhood self. He remarks upon himself: "Such a little boy and so great a sinner".¹⁹ In what could he have sinned as a young boy? In fact, he asks, "What then was my sin?"²⁰ In other words, Augustine is searching for the genesis of evil within him. He recalls that it is not uncommon to see infants crying greedily in order to be fed, or else jealously screwing up their faces when seeing other children being nourished and fondled by their mothers, even when they themselves had already been fed previously.²¹ Augustine attempted to recall his own early childhood feelings by observing children.

Augustine identifies himself with these children and is certain that he behaved similarly. He exclaims: "I beseech thee, O my God, where Lord, or when, was I, thy servant, guiltless?"²² He explains that evil is easily evident in young children, because they are yet too young to control or hide their urges and impulses. According to Augustine, jealousy is as strong in infants as in adults. It is merely that infants are physically weak and cannot act upon their wicked driving forces as an adult would do. Infants are harmless (*innocentes*) as a result of the weakness of their bodies. In fact, Augustine rules out harmlessness or innocence of mind in children. He affirms that the strength of the forces of evil are so great in the growing child that the latter strongly attempts to acquire language and speech capabilities in order to express effectively "the affections of the mind, as it pursues, possesses, rejects or shuns".²³

Augustine recalls his childhood disobedience: "I disobeyed, not from a better choice, but from love of play, loving the pride of victory in my contests".²⁴ In other words, Augustine asserts that he disobeyed, not because he wanted to do something better with his time, but out of sheer paltriness. He questions himself: "Is this the innocence of boyhood?"²⁵ Augustine describes himself lying in order to deceive his teacher at Tagaste, as well as his parents. He does this out of sheer "love of play, eagerness to see vain shows, and restlessness to imitate them".²⁶ He recalls stealing from the family cellar, in order to barter those stolen objects with other children's toys. He

¹⁸ P. Brown, *ibid.*, p. 38.

¹⁹ *Conf.* I,12,19.

²⁰ *Conf.* I,7,11.

²¹ Cfr. *ibid.*

²² *Conf.* I,7,12.

²³ *Conf.* I,8,13.

²⁴ *Conf.* I,10,16.

²⁵ *Conf.* I,19,30.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

remembers cheating during games and "chose to quarrel rather than to yield"²⁷ on these occasions. Augustine remarks that the seemingly petty evil actions of childhood later become the grave offences of adolescence and adulthood.

5. *Casting pears before swine*

The sheer emptiness of evil is evident in Augustine's illustration of theft. He states: "I lusted to thieve ... I stole that of which I had enough, and much better. Nor cared I to enjoy what I stole, but joyed in the theft".²⁸ Here, he describes the theft of the pears from a neighbour's orchard, his and his friends' intention not being to eat the pears, since they stole out of sheer love of evil only. The pear episode has been ably studied in depth earlier on in this conference by Professor John Rist of Cambridge University. Augustine and his friends "took huge loads, not for ... eating, but to fling to the very hogs".²⁹

The episode just mentioned from the *Confessiones* demonstrates that Augustine's pleasure lay, not in eating the pears, but in the wickedness of the act itself, this being, figuratively speaking, a *condiment*, that is, something used to give relish to food. "For when gathered [the pears], I flung them away, my only feast therein being my own sin, which I was pleased to enjoy".³⁰ Elsewhere, Augustine says: "My heart ... having no temptation to ill, but the ill itself. It was foul, and I loved it; I loved to perish, I loved mine own fault, not that for which I was faulty, but my fault itself".³¹ He describes himself as having "loved a sin for its own sake".³² In describing this *fruity sin*, Professor Rist asked: Is Augustine "re-creating" Adam's sin? Rist also introduced a useful comparison when he pointed out that the prodigal son (*Lc.* 15,11-32) also fed the swine. The conclusions, in my opinion, are self-evident. The young Augustine can be likened to the prodigal son who distances himself from the Father, and who eventually returns to the fold in his long-postponed conversion.

We have seen above that Augustine saw himself as having loved a sin and thus evil for its own sake. He admits that he had been evil for such a trifling purpose that he could say that he had been wicked for nothing. Herein lies the apparent paradox which troubled Augustine for such a long time. He admits that evil is a potent agency, fully operating in the youngest child, as

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Conf.* II,4,9.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Conf.* II,6,12.

³¹ *Conf.* II,4,9.

³² *Conf.* II,7,15.

we have seen, and yet, evil is something trivial or trifling. He asserts: "To love evil ... is to love nothing".³³ The fundamental paradox for Augustine is hence this: if he got pleasure from nothing but the theft itself (in the pear tree episode), then he got pleasure from nothing at all, for that was nothing. Reflecting on his past and on his childhood, Augustine realises that evil has made him see things only obscurely, as if enveloped in thick clouds.³⁴

Since his earliest childhood experiences, Augustine was confronted with the dilemma between good and evil. Knowing too well what human beings really are - from his wide spectrum of experiences - Augustine is certain that an unending battle between good and evil is present even in the young child. The opening book of the *Confessiones* and the beginning of the second attest to this tension or struggle, most probably, a projection on the part of Augustine. This tension continues to unfold in the young Augustine's encounter and subsequent 'cohabitation' with the Manichaeans.

6. *Augustine the Manichaean*

I will not be entering excessively into the details of Manichaeism, but will restrict myself to Augustine's reflections on the problem of evil during this phase of his life. This complex dualistic religion was essentially gnostic in character.³⁵ One of the fundamental doctrines of Manichaeism is a dualistic conception of the structure of the world, a radical duality and opposition between, for example, Light and Darkness, and between Good and Evil. Light resides in knowledge, revelation, the soul, the heavens and repose, that is, the Good. On the other hand, Darkness resides in ignorance, matter, the body and unrest, that is, the Evil. One can therefore understand the magnitude of the struggle taking place within the human being. Since human beings are made up of body and soul, the terrible struggle between Good and Evil continues within them. G.R. Evans comments that this element of Manichaean doctrine

"went a long way toward explaining the observable ills of the human condition and Augustine's own consciousness of internal warfare. It also made it possible to understand human souls as sparks of the good spirit trapped in evil material bodies. Their salvation would thus naturally consist in freeing themselves of those bodies by denying themselves physical pleasures and foods which built up the bodily part, and aspiring always toward the spiritual and intellectual".³⁶

³³ *Conf.* II,8,16.

³⁴ Cfr. *conf.* VII,1,1.

³⁵ Cfr. C. Riggi, *Mani and Manichaeism*, in *Encyclopedia of the Early Church*, ed. A. Di Berardino, Cambridge 1992, I, p. 519; S. Folgado Flórez, *Evil*, *ibid.*, p. 308.

³⁶ G.R. Evans, *Evil*, p. 341.

After Augustine had read Cicero's *Hortensius* (an invitation to philosophy), he was captivated by the ideal of wisdom.³⁷ It was at this moment in his life that he attempted to read the Bible, but the literary style repulsed him.³⁸ It was within this context that he was attracted to Manichaeism. Augustine later affirms in his *Confessiones*: "Therefore I fell among men proudly doting ... in whose mouths were the snares of the Devil ... [and who] cried out 'Truth, Truth', and spoke much therefore to me, yet it was not in them".³⁹ Reflecting upon this,

"it seems quite incredible ... that a man of Augustine's genius and intellectual calibre could have been so well infatuated and carried away by certain elements of Manichaean doctrine. Why was Augustine, then, so strongly attracted to Manichaeism? It is highly probable that the Manichaean explanation of the problem of evil, coupled with his inexperience and lack of knowledge on God and his attributes, convinced him and set his mind at rest - though for a short time only."⁴⁰

Augustine's nine-year-long membership⁴¹ of the sect was as an Auditor. The Manichaeans seemed to promise him the road to understanding God by the use of reason. Being an intelligent person and very profound in his thought, the subtle use of the intellect enticed him easily. The Manichaeans, Augustine thought, sought to tackle the problem of evil, the topic of this paper. Perhaps this was one of the factors which kept Augustine so long within their clutches.

Augustine was indeed determined to find the "open and pure Truth".⁴² His aversion to Sacred Scripture pleased the Manichaeans who themselves enjoyed mocking the Book.⁴³ Intelligent yet inexperienced, impatient yet willing to make great strides in his burning odyssey for the Truth, Augustine was still perturbed by the genesis, existence and implications of evil in the world. At one point, he came very close to accepting that evil could even influence God. Indeed, writing later, Augustine comments that it was a "shocking and detestable profanity that the wedge of darkness sunders the

³⁷ Cfr. J. Lupi, *La crisi spirituale di Sant'Agostino I*, in *Melita Theologica* 4 (1951), p. 90.

³⁸ Cfr. *conf.* III,5,9.

³⁹ *Conf.* III,6,10. Cfr. *util. cred.* 1,2.

⁴⁰ H. Scerri, *Augustine the Manichaean and the Problem of Evil*, in *Augustinian Panorama* 5-7 (1988-90), p. 79.

⁴¹ "Per tempus annorum novem Augustinus apud Manichaeos permansit". Cfr. A. Trapè, *Conversio Sancti Augustini*, Oratorio in three parts, Maltese Augustinian Province 1986, Part One.

⁴² *Util. cred.* 2.

⁴³ Cfr. J. Lupi, *La crisi spirituale*, p. 92.

very nature of God".⁴⁴ Furthermore, we know that a certain text, called the *Manichaean Psalm book*, influenced Augustine. Certain psalms within that book not only reminded him of Scripture, but also served to re-ignite his dilemma regarding the problem of evil. Two examples suffice:

"The radiance of God shines both on the evil and on the good" (*Psalm 239*)...

"The evil body of the Enemy I have cast away from me, the abode of Darkness that is full of fear (*Psalm 247*)".⁴⁵

One of the dimensions of the Manichaean religious experience for those members who were Auditors involved an illumination which allowed them to differentiate between the good within them (present within their souls), and the evil forces besieging them, which forces came from the passions and from concupiscence. The dividing line, therefore, between the good and the evil was that between the spiritual and the material. Augustine the Manichaean envisaged the existence of an evil force which opposed the good and perpetually sought to encroach upon it, even arriving to suffocate it.

We read about the ups and downs of Augustine during this phase in the *Confessiones*. He was greatly perturbed because the soul, he writes, has a share in the "vast and bright body ... of the Lord",⁴⁶ although it is battered by the body and its impulses. The text of the Manichaean *Psalm 223* states that evil is to be curbed, thus preventing it from restraining the good: the divided heart of the dilemma-faced Augustine assented to this.

We know from the text of the *Confessiones* that during these years of his life Augustine started to understand evil as "a kind of substance",⁴⁷ certainly "not derived from God".⁴⁸ He describes this substance (*substantia*) as "foul, hideous"⁴⁹ and "contrary to nature".⁵⁰ For him, "evil is nothing but the privation of a good".⁵¹ Later, Augustine affirms that evil "is not a substance"⁵² and "does not represent a nature".⁵³ This iniquitous essence is hurtful and

⁴⁴ *C. ep. Man.* 24,26.

⁴⁵ These texts were obtained from C.R.C. Allberry, ed., *A Manichaean Psalmbook* (Part II), *Manichaean Manuscripts in the Chester Beatty Collection*, II, Leipzig 1938.

⁴⁶ *Conf.* IV,16,31.

⁴⁷ *Conf.* V,10,20. Cfr. *mor.* II,2.

⁴⁸ *Conf.* IV,15,24.

⁴⁹ *Conf.* V,10,20.

⁵⁰ *Mor.* II,2.

⁵¹ *Conf.* III,7,12.

⁵² *Conf.* VII,12,18.

⁵³ *Civ.* XI,22.

corrupt and opposes the good. The next step reasoned out by Augustine follows. Of course, he is writing with the advantage of hindsight, and much water has flowed under the bridge. It is approximately the year 402. And our *vir summus* affirms that God, the Good, could not have been the creator of the intrinsically evil reality we have already talked about. Such reasoning would have led him to conclude that God's power was restricted: "I [would be] ... constrained to confess Thee bounded".⁵⁴

It was not easy for Augustine the Manichaean. He describes that phase of his life as one when he "wallowed in the mire of that deep pit",⁵⁵ faced as he was with countless "Manichaean delusions".⁵⁶ Feeling very entangled, he speaks of the "knots of cunning calumnies",⁵⁷ and at one point asks: "Who can disentangle that most twisted and intricate knottiness (*tortuosissimam et implicatissimam nodositatem*)?"⁵⁸

While he reflects on his meandering and past experiences, Augustine sees that the knot becomes a tangle, and finally a hopeless tangle ensues. The degree to which the forces of evil have influenced him and considerably altered the course of the good can be gauged from the degree of *nodositatem* attained. For Augustine, the Light (*sic!*) of Manes the Paraclete started to flicker.

7. *Towards the end of the tunnel*

Since he was never fully gratified by the Manichaean doctrines and their false solutions to the problem of evil, Augustine's restive mind kept delving deeply in search for an answer. He comments that the Manichaeans were very poor in their debate with Christians, especially when confronted with Scripture. Augustine criticises Manes, and refers to his "sacrilegious presumption ... seeing he delivered things which not only he knew not, but which were falsified".⁵⁹ The young man from Tagaste was also disconcerted by the void he encountered in Manichaean philosophy. He avers that the Manichaeans "tore everything down and were unable to construct anything in its place".⁶⁰

Augustine's resentment grew when he was aware of the immoral behaviour of some of the Manichaean elite (the *Elect*) who pretended to lead an ascetic lifestyle of holiness and austerity.⁶¹ This hypocrisy helped to

⁵⁴ *Conf.* V,10,20.

⁵⁵ *Conf.* III,11,20.

⁵⁶ *Conf.* V,13,23.

⁵⁷ *Conf.* VI,3,4.

⁵⁸ *Conf.* II,10,18.

⁵⁹ *Conf.* V,5,8.

⁶⁰ *Util. cred.* 1,2.

⁶¹ Cfr. H. Scerri, *Augustine the Manichaean and the Problem of Evil*, pp. 82-83.

consolidate Augustine's resentment of Manichaeism. He was disillusioned with the poor showing made by Faustus of Milevus, a leading Manichaean,⁶² unable to answer the questions put to him: "In the assembly of his auditors, I was not allowed to put in and communicate those questions that troubled me".⁶³ Evil remained, for Augustine, the "real, ineradicable"⁶⁴ power it has always been. Although Augustine did not immediately break with the Manichaeans, he decided to abandon them until the advent of some new teaching which could direct him to better waters. The Manichaean connection had been a period wherein Augustine came into direct contact with the metaphysical preoccupation concerning the character of evil. However, Augustine's knot on the problem of evil still remained tangled and, certainly, Gordian in character.

8. *New vistas and new experiences*

Augustine left Carthage for Rome in the year 383 and taught rhetoric there for a year. As in Carthage, his students in Rome were also unruly and disrespectful, and also cheated him by not paying their fees. In the autumn of 384, he acquired an influential teaching post in rhetoric at Milan. This was to be "his Damascus".⁶⁵ Milan was then rapidly becoming the political centre of an important section of the Western Roman Empire. Emperors, courtiers, diplomats, philosophers, poets and churchmen made their way to Milan. There, he befriended the Prefect of the City, Symmachus, as well as the bishop, Ambrose. This latter encounter would prove to be a turning-point in Augustine's life.⁶⁶ It was also at Milan that Augustine was introduced to Neo-Platonic philosophy. This helped him immensely in his reflections on the problem of evil.

He had as yet no intention to embrace Christianity.⁶⁷ Having distanced himself from Manichaeism, as we have seen, Augustine now sought the paths of philosophy for he "judged the tenets of most of the philosophers to have been much more provable".⁶⁸ After a brief connection with the Academicians

⁶² Cfr. *Conf.* V,6,11; V,7,12; J. Lupi, *La crisi spirituale di Sant'Agostino II*, *Melita Theologica* 5 (1952), p. 31.

⁶³ *Conf.* V,6,11.

⁶⁴ G. Schlesinger, *The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Suffering*, in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 1 (1964), p. 247.

⁶⁵ G. Mucci, *Sant'Agostino: Due centenari e un libro*, in *La civiltà cattolica* 137/III (1986), p. 50.

⁶⁶ G.R. Evans affirms that through his encounter with Ambrose, Augustine "found himself transfixed" (*Evil, in Augustine through the Ages*, p. 341).

⁶⁷ Cfr. *Conf.* V,13,23.

⁶⁸ *Conf.* V,14,25.

whose scepticism, he states, "long detained me tossing in the waves",⁶⁹ he encountered a group of men - Zenobius, Hermogenianus and Manlius Theodorus - who labelled themselves as *Platonici*. "The first flash of lightning to rip through Augustine's stormy thirtieth year was the burst of enlightenment"⁷⁰ that moved him to read "certain books of the Platonists, translated from Greek into Latin"⁷¹ by Marius Victorinus. Professor Carol Harrison of Durham University has explained in her paper at this conference that by reading the Platonic books Augustine discovered God's eternity, immutability and transcendence. This helped him to encounter an initial, albeit provisional, solution to the problem of evil. God is the good that cannot be vitiated. All other things can be vitiated because they are mutable. We also know that Augustine was highly influenced by the writings of Plotinus (205-270) and his disciple, Porphyry (232-304). As explained by Professor Frederick Van Fleteren (Philadelphia) on the first day of the conference, it can be affirmed quite safely that Augustine was converted to Neoplatonic Christianity rather than to Neoplatonism. Plotinus inspired him. Porphyry gave him a programme.

The journey made by the yet unbaptised Augustine was far from complete. "It is a journey, not only from Tagaste to Carthage to Rome to Milan, nor is it a journey from childhood to maturity".⁷² It is above all the spiritual journey within the heart of a profound man. It is an unending journey marked with the following sentiments in a man's dialogue with God: "I tasted you, and now I hunger and thirst for you; you touched me, and I have burned for your peace".⁷³

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⁶⁹ *Beata v.* 4.

⁷⁰ P. Henry, *Philosophy and Mysticism in the Confessions of St Augustine*, in *Philosophy Today* 5 (1961), p. 242.

⁷¹ *Conf.* VII,9,13.

⁷² H. Scerri, *Augustine the Manichaean and the Problem of Evil*, pp. 83-84.

⁷³ *Conf.* X,27,38. I have intentionally not delved into the problem of evil as expounded by the mature Augustine. This would fall outside the scope of this conference paper. However, for a very concise summary regarding the mature Augustine on physical and moral evil, Cfr. S. Folgado Flórez, *Evil*, p. 308.