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https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/100460
Title: | Eavesdropping near-field contactless payments : a quantitative analysis |
Authors: | Diakos, Thomas P. Briffa, Johann A. Brown, Tim W. C. Wesemeyer, Stephan |
Keywords: | Eavesdropping Antennas (Electronics) Near-field communication Magnetic fields -- Computer programs |
Issue Date: | 2013 |
Publisher: | The Institution of Engineering and Technology |
Citation: | Diakos, T. P., Briffa, J. A., Brown, T. W., & Wesemeyer, S. (2013). Eavesdropping near‐field contactless payments : a quantitative analysis. The Journal of Engineering, 2013(10), 48-54. |
Abstract: | This paper presents an assessment of how successful an eavesdropping attack on a contactless payment transaction can be in terms of bit and frame error rates, using an easily concealable antenna and low-cost electronics. Potential success of an eavesdropping attack largely depends on the correct recovery of the data frames used in the ISO 14443 standard. A near-field communication inductive loop antenna was used to emulate an ISO 14443 transmission. For eavesdropping, an identical inductive loop antenna as well as a shopping trolley modified to act like an antenna were used. The authors present and analyse frame error rates obtained with the authors equipment over a range of distances, up to 100 cm, well above the official maximum operating distance depending on the magnetic field strength. |
URI: | https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/100460 |
Appears in Collections: | Scholarly Works - FacICTCCE |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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Eavesdropping_near_field_contactless_payments_a_quantitative_analysis_2013.pdf | 855.61 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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