Individual legal status : a tool for developing European law?

Abstract

The present work is one of the outcomes of the Jean Monnet Project “Status within European Union Law”- EuroStatus, funded by the EACEA (Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency) in the context of the Jean Monnet—Life Long Learning Programme of the European Union. The idea of the Project comes from the scientific cooperation between the Università degli Studi di Perugia, University of Regensburg, Tecnológico de Monterrey, De Montfort University, Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna, Universidad de Alcalá de Henares, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Faculty of Law Osijek, Universidad de Valencia, Università degli Studi di Torino and University of Malta. The aim of the project is to investigate, how the individual status of European citizens is being profoundly conditioned by contemporary EU law. The concept of individual legal status finds its origins in Roman law, and remains an important feature of modern legal systems. EU law is providing new criteria which may be employed for defining the significance and contours of individual legal status. The process of EU integration has been accompanied by structural and economic changes, which have influenced the individual’s legal status in distinct and varying ways. In order to enhance the functioning of its internal market, certain legal statuses (such as those of worker, producer, consumer etc.), have been foregrounded by the EU, while at the same time EU law has greatly modified them. EU recognition of particular individual rights is contributing to define and re-define the legal status of the person in light of the process of European integration. The attention paid to individual status and to the relations between private actors within the EU legal order is crucial for understanding the development of EU law. The book summarized scientific results held in Malta during the Conference titled “European dimensions of Individual Economic Status. Market Economies, Fundamental Rights, and Private Law”. In the first chapter, key aspects of EU statuses are introduced. Valentina Colcelli underlines how European Union has introduced or amended laws on the status of individuals as defined by their activities and relationships with other individuals. EU law has a clear impact on an individual’s traditional familial status (e.g., parent/child, workers’ family members, etc.), but it also has created new types of status connected with economic rules, market organisation, and free circulation (e.g., status of consumers). The EU also gives new dignity to non-traditional status (i.e., same-sex partners, common law spouses); individuals with non-traditional status are regarded as legal family members in some member states, such as Italy. Yet the EU legal system currently does not incorporate a composite reflection on how its laws affect individuals with regard to changing traditional categories of status. This paper analyses the relations between EU institutional settings and individuals in view of the EU law integration process. It provides answers to these research questions: Has the process of EU integration changed the juridical traditional definition of individual status? Is there a new function for the legal status concept? What role has EU law played in such a function? Under EU law, is it possible to build a unified definition of the status of individuals over and above the legal systems of member states? Calogero Pizzolo, in the second chapter, describes the fundamental right for EU citizens status related to people’s free movement. The chapter deals with some developments in the scope of people’s free movement and residence within the EU related to third-country nationals. It also examines the case law of the Court of Justice and its broad interpretation, in particular, of Article 20 (TFEU), whereby it guarantees an effective protection of EU citizens towards their home countries. In this context, the link between a non-EU parent and a child holder of the right in question is of primary importance. According to the case law of the Court, in the evaluation of the aforesaid link, the best interests of the child must be considered as a criterion of interpretation. A summary analysis of Directive 2004/38/CE is carried out in order to contextualise the considerations of the Court of Luxembourg. The second part of the book is devoted to analyse some specific individual situations qualified as statutes in the EU legal framework and how E.U. legislation protects human rights and individual rights. Joaquín Sarrión Esteve considers the configuration of a constitutional procedural status for consumers in European Court of Justice case law. Although we can see consumer protection primarily as an instrument with which to develop the EU internal market, it is also a relevant instrument for defining the individual economic status of EU citizens and residents as equal players in the EU market. Firstly, we will explain our motivation and objectives of the paper. We will then explain our methodology, and we will study the EU regulation bases and the concept of consume. Finally, the chapter will analyse the relevant case law which developed the EU constitutional procedural status for EU consumers. Lena Seglitz-Baierl studies the status of parents under the National and European Union law. EU law in particular regulates a considerable number of issues which are connected with the transnational dimension (families with parents of different EU member state nationalities or of a EU citizen and a third State national). This is of importance for the rights the resulting from EU citizenship or, in the professional field, for the exercise of the fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, profession-related issues of concern for parents come under the jurisdiction of EU law. The aim of Tunjica Petraševíc and Paula Poretti’s paper is to discuss the non-contractual liability of the EU in damages for delayed EU court proceedings, with special reference to antitrust cases. First of all we will discuss the possibility of the EU incurring liability for breaches made by the EU judiciary. In the second part, we will focus on delayed EU court proceedings in antitrust cases. We will analyse relevant case law in order to draw certain conclusions. An earlier prevalent understanding of the Court of Justice (CJ) was that it was possible to ask for a reparation of damages in appellate procedure before the CJ against the judgment of a lower court – the General Court (GC). The current position adopted by the CJ is that such a request involves an independent action and it is necessary to initiate an independent “fresh” action in damages. According to Art. 256, TFEU the competent court for the actions of individuals is the GC. An unusual situation in which the GC decides in favour of an action against itself can certainly trigger suspicion regarding whether the requirements of impartiality and independence are met in such cases. In the concluding remarks we will therefore try to critically evaluate the newly established approach of the CJ. David Edward Zammit underlines just like E.U. legislation, the European framework for protecting human rights via the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg is meant to accommodate diversity while promoting convergence between the legal systems of ratifying states. Yet, as regards proceedings alleging a breach of Article 6 rights due to excessive delays in legal proceedings, it seems that the decisions of the Strasbourg Court are failing to achieve any meaningful convergence between national remedial practices for such grievances. Over 5,331 violations based on the length of proceedings, out of a total of 17,754 rulings finding a violation, have been handed down since 1959, and there is no other area of human rights law where the Strasbourg Court has given such unequivocal and clear direction to national courts. Yet, the stream of complaints being filed directly before the Court continues to flow unabated, and this notwithstanding that it is meant to operate no more than a subsidiary mechanism to redress new points of law which exceptionally arise, and in regard to which its multinational expertise is required. In this paper we seek to investigate why the response of certain national systems, primarily Malta and Italy, to the direction of the Court appears to be so conservative and ineffectual. To what extent can the response of the Maltese legal system be attributed to inadequate positive legislation and to what extent does it reflect a compartmentalised legal culture rooted in its hybrid legal tradition? What parallels can be drawn to the legal system of Italy, which faces the same problems, and what approaches might break the vicious circle which inhibits effective harmonisation of remedies? [Foreword]