Programming obligations of European agencies : an effective instrument for the European Commission to exercise control?

Abstract

The prevailing view in academic literature highlights the independence of European agencies as the rationale for their creation. Contrary to this perception, this work demonstrates that the Commission exercises considerable control through its opinions on an agency´s Single Programming Document. Being part of the budgetary procedure, European agencies are obliged to draw up a `Single Programming Document` comprising an annual and multiannual work programme together with corresponding planning of human and financial resources. Based upon performance-budgeting principles, the Framework Financial Regulation (FFR) hereby sets out detailed rules on the programming procedure and defines the Commission´s role in this respect. Apart from proposing the number of contributions from the EU budget, the Commission has the competence to give its opinion on an agency´s draft single programming document. To examine the Commission´s exercise of control, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) were part of the case study. For both agencies, the draft single programming documents for the years 2019-2021 were analysed and compared with their final programming version. It was noticed that the Commission´s comments frequently appear as instructions rather than recommendations and that the majority of their requests were observed by the agency. To establish the Commission´s role in a broader context, its opinions are analysed in terms of their content and quality of comments. Hereby, it is noticed that the Commission´s role depends on external factors and is thus a flexible one. Acting mainly as a legal supervisor, the Commission also addresses efficiency-related aspects and ensures that policy directions are properly considered in the programme. Several instances are noted where the Commission pursues its own interests that are outside the scope of the programme procedure. Even though, it exercises considerable powers over an agency´s programming content, the relationship between the Commission and European agencies is not yet comparable with ministry-agency constellations found at the nation-state level. Nevertheless, it is regarded that the Commission transgresses its competences as its opinions go beyond the limited scope of the Framework Financial Regulation. Possible legislative improvements are discussed in the last chapter of this work. It concludes that the Treaties lack an appropriate basis for the adoption of secondary legislation that regulates the programming procedure comprehensively. Therefore, Treaty amendments are required in addition to secondary EU legislation that sanctions today´s programming practice. Suggestions for legislative proposals are made to this end.