An analytical study into the constitutional reform of appointment of the judiciary

Abstract

The aim of this study is to analyse the recent amendments to the appointment procedure of members of the judiciary in Malta. Today, after a Constitutional amendment, the executive has no power in selection of members of the judiciary. Instead, it is the President of the Republic who appoints the judiciary after being given a report compiled by the Judicial Appointments Committee, a sub-committee of the Commission for the Administration of Justice. The new appointment system is part of a wider governmental Constitutional Reform in 2020 were the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) was an important component. On the judicial appointment system, which has been followed since 1964, the Venice Commission concluded that the Prime Minister had too much power and deemed such power as interference with the independence of the judiciary. To the contrary, the European Court of Justice found no issues with the former procedure of appointments to the bench. While for the Venice Commission, the method of appointment directly effects the independence of the judiciary. The European Court of Justice seeks different guarantees of independence. Nonetheless, the Government opted overhaul the procedure which is now deemed more transparent since when vacancies arise, interested candidates can apply and be evaluated by the Judicial Appointments Committee. However, shall it remain unchanged? This study aims to analyse the current situation and make recommendations to inter alia amend the Constitution to improve the method of selection.