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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Zimmermann, Beatriz Brunelli | - |
dc.contributor.author | Buttigieg, Christopher P. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-11-03T14:17:28Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-11-03T14:17:28Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Brunelli Zimmermann, B., & Buttigieg, C. P. (2022). A history of continuous power delegation: the establishment and further development of the European system of Financial Supervision. Law and Financial Markets Review, 16(1-2), 145-161. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.issn | 17521440 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/115028 | - |
dc.description.abstract | International and Regional Regulatory Institutions (IRIs) have, throughout history, been created and reshaped by crises. This article argues that this phenomenon can be explained through rational choice neo-institutionalism, which argues that crises shift policy equilibrium and allow for greater political will towards solving the root causes of the crisis – in turn, this usually involves some degree of power delegation from the national to the supranational. This article applies this theory to the creation and further development of the European System of Financial Supervision in three cases: the post-2009 crisis; the post sovereign debt crisis; and the European Union’s shortfall in antimoney laundering compliance and supervision. This article concludes that by delegating power after every crisis and debacle, countries attempt to solve cooperation, coordination, trust, and uncertainty problems. However, relying on crises to generate political will makes IRIs reactive not proactive – ultimately, this might have implications over global financial soundness, as exemplified by the case of crypto-assets. | en_GB |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Routledge | en_GB |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess | en_GB |
dc.subject | European Systemic Risk Board (Organization) | en_GB |
dc.subject | Finance -- Case studies | en_GB |
dc.subject | New institutionalism (Social sciences) | en_GB |
dc.subject | Finance -- History | en_GB |
dc.subject | Markets -- History | en_GB |
dc.subject | Financial institutions -- Europe | en_GB |
dc.subject | European System of Financial Supervision | en_GB |
dc.title | A history of continuous power delegation : the establishment and further development of the European system of Financial Supervision | en_GB |
dc.type | article | en_GB |
dc.rights.holder | The copyright of this work belongs to the author(s)/publisher. The rights of this work are as defined by the appropriate Copyright Legislation or as modified by any successive legislation. Users may access this work and can make use of the information contained in accordance with the Copyright Legislation provided that the author must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the prior permission of the copyright holder. | en_GB |
dc.description.reviewed | peer-reviewed | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/17521440.2023.2181671 | - |
dc.publication.title | Law and Financial Markets Review | en_GB |
Appears in Collections: | Scholarly Works - FacEMABF |
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