Maltese civil society and policy engagement : the domestic and European arena

Abstract

Civil society has gained prominence on all levels of political systems as it locates itself between citizens and government structures—an intersection between national and supranational domains. In mathematical terms, civil society would act as the equation’s operator (+/-), articulating values and representing interests that populate societies to cross over to political actors responsible for policymaking. The desired outcome is to create an “intermediary sphere” influencing societal norms into shaping public policy. Ideally, transform the political environment enough to uphold “a vibrant democracy.” Identified as a phenomenon by many scholars, civil society organizations (CSOs) have proliferated. It contributes to political pluralism enriching domestic, European, and international levels with public engagement. Many local and international organizations fall within the category of interest groups, encompassing various groupings. Baroni et al. (2014) identified two critical elements for the behavioural approach and the organizational capacities of interest groups. Scholars that adopt a behavioural definition focus on lobbying strategies of groups actively participating in the policy process with the ultimate objective of influencing “policy outcomes”. Regardless if the groups are motivated by social capital funded by political incentives, membership-based or “characterized as functionally driven” by shared interests such as business organizations, universities Etc. (Jordan, Halpin & Maloney, 2004). This term is used to portray political representation or contribution to the formation and execution of public policy (Grant, 1989, p. 9). The organizational structure of groups showcases an alternative definition for organizations which are not politically inclined to lobby but unpredictably partake in political activities (Beyers, Eising & Maloney, 2008). Usually, these membership-based organizations are ‘latent’ according to Truman (1993), until the common interest necessitates pressure on a public body. The pursuit of common objectives mobilizes groups to take collective action as well as the choice to enter the political process. The principle of ‘organized behaviour’ is of paramount importance as it distinguishes those organizations following a membership-based or individually-based fitting within the context of the "voluntary stereotype" that are typically "democratically accountable", have an “internal democracy” for leadership of the organization, distinct from any form of the governmental body and accepts funding in the form of subscriptions (Jordan, Halpin & Maloney, 2004). Accordingly, since the vast number of interest groups covers by significant more ground than political parties, despite the manifold contrasts between the two in terms of positioning their ambitions on the political agenda. Both have something in common: the appeal of support for mobilization. Grant (2001) rightly points out that any group is expected to be founded on sound organisational qualities for the public to embrace it as a "vehicle of democratic participation" and a normative alternative for political parties. Ultimately, representing shared attitudes in policymaking. This is intended to prevent the ‘legitimacy’ of interest groups from being “undermined” and considered irrelevant. Nonetheless, not all group formations adhere to the general standards implied (Salisbury 1984). Beyers (Beyers, 2004) argues that “structural weakness” in groups which lack the resources to aggregate a larger membership and do not have a clearly defined “constituency” gain ground by the meaningful pursuit of the interest itself, which covers a "diffused" general public opinion, compelling a policy change. On the other end, groups that represent “specific interests” are bound by their expertise in the “professional, economic, social and commercial” concerns of their constituency; as a result, they have a clear “stake” in taking part in the formulation and implementation of policy. Whereas one acts for the betterment of society, the other is predominantly motivated by “self-interest” (Grant, 2003) pp. 167-170). Hence interest groups are classified according to the area of activity (Schneider, Baltz, 2003); other claims contrast between “sectional groups” and “cause groups” (Klüver, 2013), while groups allowing specialized members only and those accessible for all (Walker, 1991) as cited in (Baroni et al., 2014). [...]