Peculiar constitutions? A classical theory perspective to the mixed constitutions of the four European microstates

Abstract

The four European microstates – Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino – all have longstanding and unique political systems which can be regarded as relics from earlier periods in European history. While the democratic credentials of their institutions are sometimes questioned, they have certainly provided for profound political stability, contributing to the survival of the microstates. More specifically, their institutions are designed to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of single actors or institutions, which is an obvious risk in very small communities. Building a bridge between constitutional theory and comparative politics, the present article examines the political institutions of these microstates through the prism of Classical theories about the mixed constitution, formulated most prominently by Polybius. We find that all four microstates employ elements of the mixed constitution, and that their political institutions foster political stability and prevent power concentration.