Exploring host-state consent in counterterrorism operations : the case study of French operation Barkhane in Mali

Abstract

“Since this morning, […] [the] redeployment has been effective with the departure from Mali of the last French soldier of Operation Barkhane”. These were the words of the President of the Republic of France, Emmanuel Macron, on August 15, 2022, marking the official end of the second French Counterterrorism Operation in Mali. For nearly a decade, France militarily supported Mali in the fight against jihadist terrorist armed groups affecting the country’s stability. Due to Malian President Dioncounda Traoré’s request for intervention in 2013, French Operation Serval (2013-2014) was launched. It lasted two years, and in 2014 it was replaced by Operation Barkhane (2014-2022) with a broader scope and a longer duration. While the international community has labelled Serval successful, the second operation is considered a failure. Among the reasons for this failure, observers suggest the Malian strategic shift toward Russia as the primary security provider and the transitional junta in power. However, the existing literature has not sufficiently assessed the role of host-state consent in counterterrorism operations and how it specifically affected Barkhane’s outcome. Therefore, this research answers the following question: In which ways has host-state consent impacted the outcome of French Counterterrorism Operation Barkhane? With a qualitative approach based on the case study of Mali, this thesis will unpack the volatile but essential nature of host-state consent, mainly studied in peacekeeping and absent in counterterrorism. It will also explain the existence of a nexus between host-state consent and the outcomes of counterterrorism operations. Lastly, it will discuss how the two types of host-state consent (host-government and host-population consent) influence the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations.