How can a Rortyan view of moral imagination help teach solidarity?

Abstract

As a neo-pragmatist, Rorty regards philosophy as a conversational and social practice. He argues that morality is based on sentiment rather than reason and believes that the essence of moral philosophy lies in human solidarity. According to Rorty, moral development can only be attained if communities exhibit solidarity. Therefore, he places greater importance on literary culture over philosophical culture, valuing narratives over theory. Rorty firmly believes that narratives can potentially reduce cruelty and hardship in societies and foster moral sensitivity and progress. This dissertation examines Rorty's perspective on solidarity as portrayed in his book Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (1989) and delves into its role, alongside moral imagination, in promoting social and moral progress. The moral imagination enables individuals to empathise with the pain and suffering of others. When people recognize that pain and humiliation are shared experiences among all beings, it becomes easier to overlook differences. Drawing upon Rorty's ideas on solidarity, this investigation explores crucial aspects of this core value, its significance, and how it can be effectively employed in an Ethics class.