From successful invasion to failed war : an analysis of Soviet military strategy in Afghanistan (1979-1989)

Abstract

The changing security environment of the 21st century requires continuous comprehension and development of concepts, within which an understanding of the new and old threats could be seen. One of the so-called old threat, namely, the Soviet - Afghan war of 1979-1989 has been considered in this dissertation. Nowadays, many years later, Afghanistan still remains a country that cannot be adjusted even by such Great Powers as the USA and the USSR. It is necessary to analyze the military and political strategy of the USSR, to determine errors and understand how effective was the "new war" of Martin van Creveld to understand why after the successful invasion, Soviet troops failed the war. So, how effective was the Soviet Union's military strategy in the war against Islamic armed opposition? Was the Soviet Union able to achieve its political goals? And who has lost the Soviet-Afghan war? To answer the aforementioned questions, an objective approach to the study of the issue should be used. To do so, not only the Soviet (Russian) analysts and scientists but also foreign historians and political scholars have been analyzed. In order to understand the seriousness of the problem, it is worth to remember that Afghanistan is still a threat for many countries, being a world leader in the production and marketing of drugs mainly in Russia and Europe. To protect their borders against external threats, countries need to comprehend all the previous actions and mistakes on the territory of the country to deal with Islamic groups as effective as with the production of drugs. Moreover, the recent case of the US-Afghan war (2001-2014) proves the hypothesis that the war against a weaker enemy in circumstances of a “new war” cannot be won and may last for decades with no significant results.