Life imprisonment : retributive justice or a breach of the right to life?

Abstract

After abolishing the death penalty for the most heinous crimes, trial judges were required to impose the sentence of life imprisonment in substitution. It may well be expected that the criminal justice system would incur public negative scrutiny if the rejection of the death penalty were not automatically replaced by life imprisonment. Moreover, because of the deterrence and retribution mentality, the life sentence is still considered to be very popular within the Maltese system and in the public opinion. Nonetheless, the absence of competent studies on the effects and the end results of the life sentence when it was called upon to replace the death penalty, pose an important question on its validity and legitimacy in a modern democratic state. The European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Vinter and Others vs. UK, concluded that the sentence of life imprisonment breaches Article 3 of its Convention, when it is imposed with no prospect of release. In simple terms, putting a convict in prison for the rest of natural life would constitute a cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It is the life sentence per se, where there is no hope of release, which is against what Article 3 demands and not the actual imposition of a life sentence. The purpose of this research is to find out the invalidity or otherwise of the life sentence operative within various jurisdictions, particularly the Maltese legal system. Furthermore, reference is made to international conventions and agreements so as to elicit the principles and objectives governing these international legal instruments which might be applicable with regards to the sentence of life imprisonment.