Can recognition in Hegel’s dialectic of desire account for Lacan’s problem of misrecognition? : readings from the ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’ and the ‘Mirror Stage’

Abstract

In this dissertation, I seek to ask and answer the question of whether Hegel can respond to Lacan’s problem of misrecognition. I do so by offering a detailed outline of both positions and offering a brief analysis of the similarities and differences within their conclusions. To this end, I outline Lacan’s objection to the Cartesian cogito and his response in the form of desire, and the ultimate failure of this desire to account for the integrity of the subject and its pursuit of its own truth. I also outline Hegel’s account of desire and recognition, demonstrating how desire fails to give the subject its truth, and why it seems as though the servile consciousness succeeds in recognising the truth of itself. In my concluding synthesis, I answer the question posed positively, by elaborating on Lacan’s ethical imperative and demonstrating how this is similar to the endeavours of the servile consciousness.