Squaring the circle of smart surveillance and privacy

Abstract

This paper finds that recent growth in investment in CCTV surveillance technology is in inverse proportion to its relatively very low rate of effectiveness in combating crime and terrorism. It maintains that the much-publicised failures of some smart surveillance technologies such as automated face recognition in the period 1997-2003 has led to investment in even “smarter” technologies of a type here categorised as MIMSI (Massively Integrated Multiple Sensor Installations) which link up optical-based technologies such as CCTV to other sensory detectors involving scent, sound and motion. After having outlined the risks inherent in new surveillance technologies and their applications, the paper moves on to examine the paucity of legal safeguards currently available for the protection of the privacy of citizens. This analysis serves as the context for the final part of the paper which focuses on the European Union’s Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The latter purports to provide a safer way in which personal data may be exchanged between the police and security forces of European Union states. This paper finds that the CFD 2008/977/JHA sets out an extremely important principle relevant to smart surveillance but then does nothing to actually provide concrete safeguards for citizen privacy.