The case for military intervention against ISIS

Abstract

The Islamic State (IS), in its reach to form a caliphate, has been named a ‘global and unprecedented threat’. By its nature, the use of force runs counter to Article 2 (4) of the UN. Thus, the research project outlines the legal foundations carefully chosen by States upon which they base their justifications to intervene. The first analysis dealt with in section 1 is the exception to use of force if authorised by the Security Council. The main focus is resolution 2249 which potentially illustrates an admission by the Security Council for the use of force in Iraq and Syria by the US led coalition. The resolution alone does not provide the sufficient legality required. The section also highlights the modern R2P doctrine which emerged in 2005 and the shortcomings of the Security Council in implementing it in Syria, after its nominal disrepute in the Libyan crisis. The second analysis shifts the focus onto the exception to intervene militarily when consent is forthcoming from the territorial State. This is the so-called ‘intervention by invitation’ which becomes problematic once the parties are involved in an internal armed conflict, such as the case of Syria. The intervention is seemingly allowed if the request is made by the legitimate government and if the armed rebels are not exercising their right to self-determination. While the legitimacy of the Assad Regime is controversial, there is no doubt that IS is by no means expressing the right to selfdetermination. Finally, attention is shifted onto the theory of self-defence. While there is no doubt that the acts in self-defence are necessary and proportionate to the armed attacks committed by IS, the controversy lies in the traditional area of attribution necessary between the Assad Regime and IS. A possible solution to the lack of attribution is the unable or unwilling doctrine – the Assad Regime has manifestly proved that it is unable to prevent armed attacks by IS.