The significance and scope of separate opinions at the European Court of human rights with particular reference to the influence of judge Giovanni Bonello

Abstract

This thesis delves into what drives judges of the European Court of Human Rights to append separate opinions to judgments, through an analysis of the role of the Court and the way in which the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms should be interpreted. It is concluded that the Court can and should be deemed the ultimate protector of human rights and as such should seek to maintain and further realise human rights and fundamental freedoms. Through this task, its judgments demand the publication of separate opinions, as whilst they pose a number of benefits to the system, their crucial scope is their potential to influence subsequent case-law, making them highly significant amid any court’s jurisprudence. Several instances of such influence both within the European Union and without are exhibited as proof of such significance. Focusing its attention towards proving the significance of separate opinions within the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights itself, the thesis also displays departures from precedents or Chamber judgments which seemingly have separate opinions as their precursors. The final chapter of the thesis illustrates the very real potential of separate opinions through the accomplishments of the separate opinions of Judge Giovanni Bonello.