Heidegger and the question of Dasein's Being-a-Whole

Abstract

The problem of individuation is an old metaphysical problem. Basically it could be expressed in two questions: 'What makes an entity that exact entity?' and 'What makes this entity different from other entities?'. This paper will be somewhat experimental. We will try to see the shape this old problem takes in the post-metaphysical philosophy of Martin Heidegger. First, we need to look back at Kant. In the "Critique of Pure Reason" Kant talks about two different kinds of individuation: the individuation of the object and the individuation of the subject. Although Heidegger is one of the most severe critics of the philosophy of the subject, undoubtedly Dasein replaces Subject in "Being and Time". According to Kant, individuation is a transcendental principle ... Every phenomenon one experiences is followed by a representation "] think". To simplify, every experienced phenomenon is experienced by someone. The Subject gets its identity and unity from the transcendental unity of apperception, which synthesizes all its experiences under "] think". The question of individuation then becomes, firs and foremost, the question of unity of the subject both through time and synchronically.