Interest groups and wicked problems insights from water policy in Malta

Abstract

This study investigates the influence that interest groups have on government as the principal policymaker in Malta, taking water policy as a context, as it offers a unique platform to explore interest group influence. It considers Malta’s water resources as a wicked problem, due to acute water scarcity, the multiplicity of competing and conflicting interests over the country’s water resources, the lop-sided policy framework, and ineffectual water governance. Using a qualitative approach by charting Malta’s water policy history since 1959, the study makes use of archival research, media reports and oral histories to weave a narrative of water policy development spanning almost sixty years. In so doing the study investigates the social, economic, political and technological factors which shaped the country’s water policy. Thereby the study sheds light on the factors that either facilitate, or obstruct, or even prevent, policy innovations, which could enhance the equity, efficiency and sustainability of water policy. Consequently, the influence of interest groups, their resistance and demands, is investigated in order to identify and assess the circumstances that give interest groups influence over the policymaker; the effects of such influence on policymaking; and ultimately the government’s reactions to all this. Five conflicting interests are identified throughout the history of water policy in Malta: domestic consumers; agricultural interests; the bottled water industry; environmental NGOs; and tourism interests and hoteliers. These interests emerge as spoilers of government policy, actions and initiatives, rather than acting as catalysts for new policies, either through subversion of policy, national protest or special pleading. This accentuates further the problematic nature of water in Malta, which evolves as a wicked problem, not only because of the reasons mentioned earlier, but also due to the politicisation of water politics. All this is set in the local clientilistic political context which weakens the rule of law, and sets a vicious circle in which the ever-weaker rule of law affords greater scope for clientelism and subversion. Consequently, Government either gives in to the pressures put on by interest groups by withdrawing its policy proposals, or else goes ahead with its original plans and face electoral consequences. Hence the study posits that rather than drafting water plans which end up as futile, it would be better to focus on institutional capacity and the possibly to arrive at some sort of political pact that depoliticises water.