The compatibility problem : an investigation into folk intuitions on the compatibility of free will, determinism and moral responsibility

Abstract

The main aim of this study is to explore folk intuitions about moral responsibility, free will and determinism, as well as the factors which contribute to the generation of these intuitions. To avoid the significant problem of defining determinism in easily understandable and accurate terms, the present study employed a scenario describing a traffic accident involving an autonomous vehicle as a metaphor for the determinist thesis. The study also employed a 40- item personality inventory to measure personality traits and the Free Will Inventory to measure basic intuitions about free will and determinism. The sample was made up of 132 participants (n=132; 53 males, 79 females). The role of affect, personality traits, strength of belief in determinism and strength of belief in free will were tested as potential factors generating participants intuitions about moral responsibility and determinism. A weak role of affect was noted, with increased affect pushing people to not assign blame to the agent described in the scenario. The remaining three factors did not have any predictive power on the resultant intuitions. The influential NBAR Hypothesis, which postulates that an individual will always seek to assign blame once a norm has been violated, was able to explain the findings in the present study. An addition to this rule was suggested, whereby the aforementioned factors, and many others, are recruited only when the norm violation is not sufficiently salient.