The concept of human dignity in Maltese human rights jurisprudence

Abstract

It is generally accepted that no consensus on a universal definition of human dignity has been universally attained. However, dignity is extensively employed in human rights jurisprudence, and thus, some form of conception of the notion must exist, at least as to what the Court making use of it would be attempting to portray by doing so.

This Term Paper investigates this issue, particularly within the realm of Maltese human rights jurisprudence, with regard to where and why the Maltese judiciary has made use of the term in such judgements, and its effect, if any, on the ratio decedendi. This study is carried out in conjunction with an analysis of a number of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgements which make use of the notion, particularly those mentioned in the Maltese cases analysed.

This study primarily takes a multidisciplinary view of dignity. It then analyses the Maltese Constitution in the light of other national constitutional texts which make use of the term ‘dignity’ in specific contexts.

The use of human dignity in Maltese human rights jurisprudence is then studied in the light of the treatment of prisoners, and also in the way it appears to be used as a justification for an apparent violation of another’s rights. Dignity sometimes appears to bear significance, albeit indirect, to the judgement. However, in other cases, it is either disregarded or mentioned too vaguely. This paper attempts to delve deeper into the meaning and interpretation of dignity and its weight in such decisions.

Although human dignity is not directly mentioned in the Maltese Constitution, it still appears to bear significance in Maltese human rights jurisprudence, thus showing a move towards the importance attributed to the concept. However, the extent of its application and interpretation is still subject to further discernment.