The Libya-Italy migration corridor

Abstract

The Libya–Italy corridor is one of the main corridors used by migrants to irregularly cross the Mediterranean Sea. In 2017, it registered 119,369 sea border crossers, a drop from previous years when on average some 170,000 would be registered every year (UNHCR 2018). However, even though the deaths at sea dropped from 4578 in 2016 to 2846 in 2017, this remains the most deadly border in the world UNHCR 2018). The Libya–Italy corridor is part of a broader route, also encompassing Tunisia and Malta, which is equally subject to border control and migration governance and is often referred to as the Central Mediterranean Route. For many, this corridor is a small part of a longer route across Western or Eastern African countries and an equally long route ahead after the sea crossing to destination countries in northern Europe. For this reason, the Mediterranean can be considered a geo-racial border zone (Van Reekum 2016). Human smuggling and other geopolitical interests in the area have contributed towards an intense governance game played by bordering states and also by more powerful actors such as the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). The aim of this article is to encourage an appreciation of the political and socio-economic ‘factors, dynamics, and actors’ (Ciabarri 2014, 258) which contribute to the production of this migratory corridor, thus challenging a superficial representation of this corridor as a fixed or straightforward reality.