On chance

Abstract

In this dissertation I analyse problems regarding the ontology of chance and conclude that the possibility or impossibility of ontic chance is only a matter of belief, and that we have no way of knowing whether the universe is deterministic or not. This is firstly done by looking at the status of chance in two different physics systems: classical mechanics and quantum mechanics. In both cases I attempt to show that the question, of whether these theories are deterministic or not, has no clear cut answer. Finally, I approach the problem metaphysically. I propose that ontic chance and determinism are not compossible; it is only epistemic chance that is possible in a deterministic universe. The concept of determinism employed is that of unique evolution and ontic chance is taken to be its exact opposite. The question of the possibility of ontic chance in the universe still remains unanswered; however, I propose, that in the process of understanding phenomena, determinism is worth assuming.