Revocation of wills and lapse of testamentary dispositions

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to tackle and critically analyse two aspects of testate succession - the law on the revocation of wills and the lapse of testamentary dispositions. The approach taken is to make a comparative analysis of particular areas of the law in the context of the topic. I have proceeded by making a restatement and analysis of selected elements of the law of succession related to the revocation of wills, within the framework of the underlying principle, in the law of testate succession, of the liberty of testation, as the very basis of the right to revoke one's will at any time until death. In particular, and in the light of such analysis, the conclusion is drawn that the legislator allows for the testator's intention to reign supreme in matters of revocation. This is equally true in cases of lapse of testamentary dispositions, where the legislator provides for the testator's intention to prevail, if provision for such eventuality is made in the testator's will. If such provision has not been made, the law makes a presumption of such intention by providing for tacit substitution, and in default, the right of accretion, if the conditions allowing for accretion exist. The various presumptions of the testator's intention made by law are seen to operate primarily in favour of the persons to whom the testator owes the legal duty of maintenance during lifetime, thereby extending such duty beyond his death.