The legitimacy of decision-making in the EU, and the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe

Abstract

Until the Treaty of Maastricht, European integration was pursued on the assumption that the Member States had the consensus of their people in favour of such integration. With the difficulties which arose regarding the ratification of the Treaty on European Union, it became evident that this consensus no longer existed. The EU, its institutions and the decision-making processes are thus said to suffer from a legitimacy deficit. The concept of legitimacy must be distinguished from that of democracy and may be divided into three elements. Output legitimacy is the first and refers to legitimacy derived from the EU's problem-solving ability, its effectiveness and efficiency. The second element, indirect input legitimacy, deals with the legitimacy which the EU derives from its Member States, which are themselves legitimate and have conferred power on the EU. The last element of legitimacy is direct input legitimacy and this refers to legitimacy bestowed on the EU directly by its citizens, whether through representation or direct participation. The argument developed in this thesis is, that the EU requires improvement in all three sectors, in order for it to be considered legitimate. Following an analysis of such elements, the conclusion reached is that the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe would contribute to the EU's legitimacy in all three respects, while also including mechanisms which would ensure a degree of balance between the three elements, avoiding improvement of one at the expense of another. It is also argued that in spite of the failure of the Constitution to enter into force, following the rejection of the Treaty in France and The Netherlands, the provisions contemplated by the Constitution are nevertheless important, especially since some of the reforms could be implemented without Treaty amendment.