The right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence in the light of decisions of the Maltese courts

Abstract

The right of an accused person to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is a fundamental cornerstone of the criminal justice system and is a principle which has been ardently upheld by the Maltese Courts. However, in the interpretation and application of the right of the presumption of innocence, the Courts are faced with a constant interplay between the right of an accused to be presumed innocent on one hand and the general interest of society in seeing that transgressions of the criminal law are punished on the other. An examination is carried out to determine whether the Courts have stricken the balance between these two interests as weighing more in favour of the accused or otherwise and the considerations which have prompted them in doing so. This examination is carried. out with reference to a number of separate aspects relevant to the presumption of innocence. It is examined how a number of transgressions have been excluded from or included within the purview of the right of the presumption of innocence through the classification of rules or measures as criminal or otherwise. The issue of the shifting of the burden of proof, the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination and the issue of pre-trial publicity are also addressed. In the light of the Courts' interpretation and application of the right of the presumption of innocence with respect to each of these aspects, an attempt is made to present a general picture of how the Maltese Courts perceive the nature of the presumption of innocence and its role within the criminal justice system.