Dissolution of the Contract of Lease in the Light of the Civil Code. A Study Concerning Leases of Urban Property

Abstract

In this thesis I have carried out a study of the grounds of dissolution of the contract of lease of urban property in the light of the provisions of the Civil Code. In the Introduction I commenced by giving a concise overview of the time-frame when the provisions of the Civil Code were applicable to contracts of lease, due to the fact that in the last century the contract of lease was regulated by more than one piece of legislation. Moreover, I also gave a brief definition of the term urban property. In the following Chapters I dealt separately with each ground of dissolution found under the Civil Code. In Chapter 2 I dealt with the expiration of the term, both that expressly convened and that presumed by Law, and proceeded to make a short reference to the notions of Tacit Renewal and Continuation of the Lease. In the following Chapter I dealt with two grounds of dissolution, namely dissolution brought about by a breach of a Tacit or Express Pactum Commissorium, and also dissolution caused by the breach of an Express Resolutive Condition. In the fourth Chapter I dealt the situation when the object of the lease is destroyed totally or partially, with reference both to material destruction and to the lessening of enjoyment. Reference was made to the different causes of destruction and the obligations, if any, which arise concomitant to such destruction. In the fifth Chapter I dealt with the Death of one of the parties. The sixth Chapter was dedicated to a variety of grounds which bring about the dissolution of the contract of lease. Some of these grounds are applicable to all contracts in general, whereas others are specific, like when the lessor reserves the right to dissolve the lease in case of sale or other alienation of the thing let. I concluded my thesis by expounding on a procedural issue, namely the issue of competence between the Ordinary Courts and the Rent Regulation Board. Furthermore, I made proposals regarding how these two Judicial Bodies could be merged together to abolish the issue of competence whilst expediting proceedings and lessening the burden of the ordinary Courts.