The Maltese parliament and the scrutiny of EU legislation under the subsidiarity protocol

Abstract

Formal rules and procedures of parliaments conducive to the scrutiny of EU legislation under the Subsidiarity Protocol are indicative to the extent parliaments can exert control on their governments in the transferring of powers from national to supranational authority. Although parliaments in Europe are subject to the same EU-opportunities, their powers within the EU context are asymmetrical. In assessing the Maltese Parliament's institutional strength, the focus was placed on Parliament's document-based scrutiny model, the extent this is effective in binding Government and how Maltese Constitutional rules and formal scrutiny procedures are effective in legitimizing Parliament's decisions on subsidiarity. An investigation into the interpretation of the subsidiarity and proportionality principle with reference to Jacques Pelkmans's (2006) functional approach to subsidiarity was carried out as an in-depth appraisal leading to the formalization of a subsidiarity check model which complies with the Lisbon Treaty's reform. The proposed subsidiarity check based on a vertical functional approach was correlated with eight reasoned opinions by the Kamra tad Deputati to be able to assess the proposed model's applicability. It was finally observed that the decision-making procedures in place pursuant to the Early Warning System demand that the strength of the subsidiarity check is sustained by the institutional strength of parliaments in legitimizing their decisions on subsidiarity. In this end it transpires that the Maltese institutional diarchy system which was in place under the British rule, whereby two authorities were running simultaneously national parliamentary affairs, has left an imprint on how Parliament exerts control in EU affairs. For Parliament to gain more input legitimacy pursuant to the subsidiarity decisions taken place at the supranational level it has to expand its scrutiny of EU affairs and additionally strengthen its institutional autonomy and accountability.