Anglo-Italian Mediterranean diplomatic relations, 1918-1940

Abstract

This thesis seeks to determine some of the possible reasons why Anglo-Italian relations deteriorated to the extent that Italy detached itself from the victorious alliance of 1918 and realigned itself with Germany between 1935 and 1940. Anglo-Italian diplomacy ultimately failed during the interwar period due to Italian revisionist aspirations to replace Britain and France as the foremost power in the Mediterranean and North Africa and due to the policy failures of successive British Governments and key statesmen during the 1930s. The ascendancy of Germany and its annexation of Austria resulted in a new Italo-German border where Hitler made a rare exception to German self determination in return for Mussolini's strategic support. The fall of France provided an opportunity for Mussolini to settle outstanding Franco-Italian issues from a position of strength hence his declaration of war. Armed conflict with Britain may have been possibly averted by a British offer that included the relinquishment or demilitarization of Malta. Mussolini's strategic error of targeting Britain simultaneously with France was probably influenced by Hitler's plans for suppressing Britain and by the misperception that Churchill rather than fight alone would sue for peace. When Hitler decided to return to his Mein Kampf agenda and to attack the USSR, Mussolini found himself cursing his prior decision to severe Anglo-Italian relations.