The philosophical status of the argument from evil

Abstract

The debate surrounding the argument from evil is one of the longest and tar reaching debates in philosophy and theology. With origins in early philosophy, it is still discussed widely today, affecting and intriguing many. This essay starts with the aim of investigating the different versions and approaches to the problem of evil. In it I will investigate in detail the debate surrounding the problem of evil from the first formulation allegedly given by Epicurus in the fourth century BC, up till the most recent discussions by philosophers such as Peter van Inwagen and William Rowe. I will be asking which type of approach and solution would work best. During the essay, I will discuss different styles of argument: the abstract or logical approach, and the mythical or narrative style. I will look at how they both work and then go on to argue that the narrative style must not be rejected. This is because it is the style best equipped to move forward within this type of debate. By the end I will hopefully be closer to answering the question of which version might be the best way forward within the debate; which approach has the best possibility of coming closer to the truth. The first chapter begins by presenting an overall background of the debate surrounding the problem of evil. This thorough overview of the argument is essential to enable further investigation of the subject in greater detail. It starts with an outline of the subject and explains the differences between the logical and evidential formulations of the argument from evil. Along with these, several well-known objections to the arguments are pointed out. Besides the arguments and objections, the distinction between theodicy and defence is an important aspect of this discussion and these are fully explained in the next part of the chapter. Towards the end of the first chapter, the question of why the evidential argument is preferred lately over the logical argument is examined. It is claimed that the logical argument from evil, along with the attempt at providing a theodicy, are too strong to work. This section argues in favour of examining the possibility of the evidential argument from evil and of providing a defence over the logical argument and the theodicy. The second chapter deals with the evidential argument from evil, discussing William Rowe's different formulations of the argument. The first section begins by outlining the different kinds of probability, since the evidential argument depends on probability. This makes it weaker than the logical argument from evil, which focuses on possibility. Then the issue of gratuitous evil is explained, since it is a main component of the argument. Rowe's arguments are also described, along with an account of his inclusion of the G. E. Moore shift and the various objections presented against the arguments. In the third and final chapter, the discussion moves on to a different approach to the subject of the problem of evil. This is the narrative approach as employed recently by Peter van Inwagen. This narrative style is distinctive due to its difference from the other styles discussed in the previous chapters. This approach does not use scientific language or abstract explanations; rather it employs a narrative or mythic style. Van Inwagen uses this approach to put forward his extended free will defence, his discussion on gratuitous evil and also that of the suffering of beasts and massively irregular worlds. Peter Serracino Inglott deals with the subject in a similar way in Beginning Philosophy (1987) where he claims that mythical language is the only way we can deal with such problems as evil, suffering, love and death.