The Lander in Germany's political system : a model for the regions in a future European Union

Abstract

The EU's Committee of the Regions, created in 1992, is the sole institution in which are represented regional and local authorities at the supranational level. Gradually since its creation, the Committee has gained more weight but was never awarded veto powers. Its main achievement has been the recognition of the subsidiarity principle. It projects itself as the third level of the policy-making procedure. Due to its democratically elected 222 members, it should not be overshadowed in co-deciding on matters within its competence. In this thesis, Belgium, Italy and the UK have been chosen as case studies as they can be used as examples that are similar to other states' subnational networks. The future of Europe debate is of paramount importance for the regions too. Regions' participation enhances the Union's legitimate democracy and transparency thus bringing the EU closer to the citizens. However regional differences hinder increased substantive strengthening of the regions' position. Regional competences were eroded on the excuse of integration, inducing the regions to make themselves heard in the matter. National foreign policy has become European domestic policy, making some regions, mainly constitutional regions, the front-runners in strengthening the third tier of decision-making. They achieved more political clout also by seeking direct access to the Union's institutions. Paradoxically, they have tended to see the Union both as an intruder and as an ally. European integration is advancing and regions rightly continue to expect to be consulted. However, we are not witnessing a Europe of the regions, since the latter remain rather weak as compared to their respective states. A more suited description would be a Europe with the regions having multi-level governance. The German political system, with its Bund-Lander and inter-Lander relations offers a possible mould in which other Member States and their regions can be organised. The Lander may only legislate in areas where the Bund does not have this competence though national homogenous legislation is practised. Overtime, the Vll Bund increased its powers but the Lander have increased theirs through Bundesrat (a federal body) participation. Article 23 of the Grundgesetz allows the Bundesrat to play an active part in Union-related policies. Moreover, with the Bundesrat, the Europakammer also deals European affairs. The main achievement of the Lander undoubtedly is the ability to represent the Bund in the Council of Ministers' delegation. The Landerbeobachter (Lander's Obseiver) and the Landerburo also are effective means of participation in European matters. Co-operative federalism motivated the Lander to choose the strategy of 'compensation-through-participation'. European integration has tended to support and maybe even strengthen German federalism since sharing, not division became the prevailing element in the distribution of powers. Thanks to the allocation of powers, Lander still remain the administrative backbone of the Community legislation implementation as they are for national policies. In addition, the Lander have also gained more powers at the Bund's expense. Definitely, federalism has helped the Lander strengthen in many ways. However, a federal system would not be the solution for all regions. Regions in the EU are very different and have different capabilities. Nonetheless, regions can learn from their German counterparts, without necessary altering their national governance system by being given the power to speak in matters that involve them.